P ERS PE CT IVE S ON PS YC HOLOGIC AL SC IENC E

A Comparison of Models for

Interstate Wars and for
Individual Violence
Gerald R. Patterson
Oregon Social Learning Center, Eugene, OR

ABSTRACTIt is assumed that violence is functional at both

individual and societal levels. A model developed for violent individuals is compared with a proposed model for
interstate wars. In both domains, the data are consistent
with the assumption that violence is functional. At the societal level, the contingencies of training are provided by
official staff and require reasonably well-socialized
soldiers. At the individual level, reinforcers are provided
by victims, and aggressors are usually socially incompetent. In the societal model, decision makers receive reinforcers for initiating and winning wars. The combat
soldiers behavior is somewhat paradoxical. Soldiers are
thought to remain in harms way out of love for their
buddies. The actual reinforcers for their combat behavior
are unknown.

MODELS FOR VIOLENCE

History emphasizes the ubiquitous presence of violence at individual and societal levels (Diamond, 2005). The last half
century has been characterized by a growing interest in the study
of violence at both of these levels. This interest is reflected in the
body of dedicated work laying the groundwork for a science of
war (Richardson, 1960; Singer & Diehl, 1990; Vasquez, 1987;
Wright, 1970). During roughly that same time span, criminologists and psychologists were also tracing some of the trajectories
leading to individual forms of violence (Dishion & Patterson,
2006; Loeber & Farrington, 1998; Nagin & Tremblay, 1999;
Toch, 1969). This article examines mechanisms thought to account for differences in performance levels for societal and individual violence. Although the empirical findings in these
Address correspondence to Gerald R. Patterson, Oregon Social
Learning Center, 10 Shelton McMurphey Boulevard, Eugene, OR
97401; e-mail: jerryp@oslc.org.

Volume 3Number 3

areas are in the early stages of development, it is also the case

that the two domains share some interesting developments in
common. For example, both areas emphasize the centrality
played by specific training for violence. They differ dramatically, however, in terms of the kinds of training experience, who
provides it, and where or when it occurs. As experienced by a
victim, the topography of a violent act may be the same whether
it is the outcome of individual or societal violence.
A science of violence is still in its infancy. The data reviewed
in the present article can identify only the outlines for the main
parameters required for prediction. The data show that environments that produce individuals at risk for committing violent
acts have some special characteristics. In the same vein, there
are data showing that environments associated with the risk
for interstate violence have some definable characteristics.
One of the main tasks of this article is to examine empirical
findings that relate environmental characteristics to violent
outcomes.
I believe that both individual and societal forms of violence
are functional. One reason that violence occurs so often is that
it works so well. There are certain environments in which
violence, in both its societal and individual forms, is functional.
In either case, it is assumed that the violent event is the outcome
of a definable sequence. Given that there are measures that
describe these sequences, one should be able to predict violent
outcomes at some level. The resulting models should inform us
about various possibilities for controlling violence. This article
represents a preliminary effort to present an empirical account
of the nature of some sequences that make violence so functional. Alternatively, one might conclude that there is no need to
construct complex models that selectively wed environments
to violent outcomes because both societal and individual violence are simply manifestations of human nature (Ehrenreich,
1997; Feshbach, 1987; Lorenz, 1966). This powerful idea is so
much a part of the conventional wisdom that it seems a natural
starting point for the present article.

Copyright r 2008 Association for Psychological Science

203

War and Violence

HUMAN NATURE

If one assumes that violence is a part of human nature, then one

would expect to find it embedded in the human enterprise since
early times. On the other hand, if studies of primitive tribes
revealed some that never engaged in wars, then one might take
the position that a more complex model is needed. The more
complex model would suggest that under certain environmental
conditions, mans tendency toward violence can be held in
check.
Contemporary studies of stone-age cultures suggest that some
form of warfare may have been present even before the development of agrarian societies and long before the development of
city-states or nation-states (Ember, 1978). The findings suggest
that most primitive societies engaged in warfare. This growing
consensus is based on the study of the 180 or so existing hunter
gatherer groups still functioning in modern times. The groups
contain more than a third of a million people and are widely
dispersed around the world. Ember (1978) concluded that about
64% of these modern huntergatherer groups were involved in
warfare at least once every 2 years. However, about 12% of these
groups may have lived without war. There is little comfort in
such a small number.
Keeley (1996) provides a thoughtful and up-to-date review of
these findings in his publication, War Before Civilization. He
concludes that there probably were and are some primitive
tribes that did not engage in warfare, but their numbers would be
very small. Indeed, of 157 North American Indian groups, he
estimates that there might have been 7 that did not participate in
any kind of raiding or warfare. He concludes, After exploring
war before civilization in search of something less terrible than
the wars we know, we merely arrive where we began with an all
too familiar catalogue of deaths, rapes, pillage, destruction and
terror (p. 174).
Why do wars have such a long history? Why do wars occur so
often? The findings seem consistent with the idea that man by
nature is violent. An alternative hypothesis, which drives much
of the present article, is that both individual and societal acts of
violence are functional. This assumption about the functionality
of war is consistent with the cultural materialist perspective
provided by Harris (1983, 1989). In his view, warfare exists in
societies to the extent that it serves some useful purpose. For
example, in the case of tribal war, violence could protect tribal
territories. This seems to be the case as suggested by longitudinal studies of the Papuan (New Guinea), which began in the
1940s (Sorenson, 1976). At that time, the society had just moved
from a huntergatherer adjustment to a slash-and-burn agricultural base. Initially, there was plenty of territory that lent
itself to this type of farming, food was plentiful, and there was
almost no warfare.
Following World War II (WWII), government policies changed, and much of the Papuans land was lost to development. The
struggle among the tribes for an adequate territory was accom-

204

panied by a rapid increase in fighting and warfare. Sorensons

account demonstrates the changes in the environment that make
warfare functional. What is particularly surprising is the rapid
rate at which these changes can occur. If I am interpreting the
report accurately, it required less than two generations to create
a warrior caste. Modern studies of the Yanomamo and other
Amazonian tribes are attempting to quantify the conditions
under which these changes come about and are maintained
(Chagnon & Hames, 1979). In the same vein, Diamonds (2005)
brilliant studies of cultures in decline identify breakdowns in
food supplies as settings for increased warfare for the peoples of
Easter Island, the Mayans, and the Anasazi. This suggests that to
understand societal violence one must understand how environmental changes over time facilitate or retard the risk of war.
What kind of environments place individuals at risk to become
violent?
It would seem reasonable to construct models that reflect
the contribution of both environmental variables and the fact
that individuals come to these exchanges with very different
biological equipment. Modern genetics presents the hypothesis that human behavior reflects the outcome of an interaction between environmental requirements and biological reactivity as signified by genes. This could mean that some individuals may acquire the warrior or other violence-related skills
at a more rapid rate than do others. The twin and adoption
studies reviewed in Bock and Goode (1996), Genetics of
Criminal and Antisocial Behavior, showed only a modest contribution of genes to various forms of antisocial behavior. It is
interesting to note that findings show only a minimal contribution of genes to crimes of violence and to juvenile delinquency (Carey, 1994). A number of researchers (Cadoret,
Cain, & Crowe, 1983; Cadoret, Leve, & Devor, 1997;
and Ge et al., 1996) have studied adoptive families in the
U.S.; Brennan, Mednick, and Jacobsen (1999) have studied
them in Copenhagen; and Bohman (1996) has studied them in
Stockholm. All five studies showed that having a biological
parent who was antisocial increased the risk for the adopted
child showing antisocial behavior. These findings emphasized
the contribution of genes to understanding violent individuals.
But in these same studies, it was also the case that a disrupted
adoptive home (environment) contributed significantly to the
risk for antisocial behavior.
The pattern of findings emphasizes the interaction between
biological and environmental variables in determining aggressive and violent outcomes. In this pattern, one needs to measure
both environment and genes. There is not a gene for individual
violence any more than there is a gene for war. For the moment,
the behavior-genetics literature does not inform us as to the
exact nature of the interaction between genes and environment
that produce violence as an outcome. Modern molecular genetic
studies, such as Caspi et al. (2002), will eventually tell us more
about how it is that genes interact with environment to produce
violent individuals.

Volume 3Number 3

Gerald R. Patterson

Even at this early stage of understanding, it is clear that the

contribution of the Environment  Genes dance to our understanding of violence will not be a simple affair. For example, the
programmatic studies by Cairns and his colleagues showed that
selectively breeding fighting mice produced line differences in
as few as three generations (Hood & Cairns, 1989). Clearly, the
animals that were selectively bred for aggression were different
from those that were not. These studies replicated the Lagerspetz and Lagerspetz (1971) findings, and together they reiterate
the obvious point that biology makes a difference. However, both
the Cairns and the earlier Lagerspetz studies also showed the
effects of selective breeding were evident only under certain
rearing (environment) conditions. For example, mice reared in
homogeneous groups with social partners from the same line
neutralized the effect of selective breeding. Cairns also demonstrated that a single punishment for attack behavior offset the
effect of breeding for aggressiveness.
Suomis (2002) cross-fostering study of primates provides an
elegant test of the interaction hypothesis. In that study,
researchers observed that infants genetically at risk for
extreme emotional reactivity who were reared by calm surrogate
mothers were socially competent. Conversely, infants without
genetic vulnerability to emotional reactivity who were paired
with highly reactive mothers showed impaired social competence. The most at-risk infants were those who were both
genetically at risk and raised by highly reactive mothers. So
again, rather than being a part of human nature, it is the interaction between biological and environmental factors that determines violent individuals.
In summary, genes alone do not drive violence. Given the right
mix of biological and environmental variables, it should be
possible to predict which individuals are most likely to be highrate antisocial (violent) individuals and which are not. If wars
are part of human nature, one might expect that, over time, they
would occur regardless of environmental conditions. Alternatively, it could be said that certain environmental conditions are
conducive to warfare and others are not.
When are wars most likely to occur? Why do they start? Why
are some individuals more violent then others? Are violent individuals effective participants in societal warfare? What are
the long-term effects of being violent? Given the likelihood of
maiming and death, why do individuals participate in warfare?
I will examine these and a number of related questions. Individual and societal models both emphasize the key role played
by training. Who provides the training? Who receives it? When
is it given? How long does the training last? In which settings
does it occur? How effective is the training? What kind of individual is best suited to receive the training? What are the longterm effects of the violence? In what sense is violence functional? What determines rates of violence? Can we prevent violence or intervenewhat do the data show? I will begin with an
examination of the empirical findings that define developmental
trajectories for individual acts of violence.

Volume 3Number 3

A GENERAL MODEL FOR INDIVIDUAL VIOLENCE

The aggressive boy is the fore-runner to the violent man.

Oliver James (1995, p. 10)

It is assumed that an individuals violent act is an event embedded in a much larger picture. In this larger picture, I examine
the possibility that a persons mode of interacting with others has
some unique features and that these features are in place at a
very early age. These interactions lead to the development of an
orderly sequence of antisocial behaviors. Increases in the frequency of these behaviors during adolescence are accompanied
by risk for violent episodes. The assumption that violence is the
outcome of stable, long-term growth is important because it
introduces the possibility of intervention before the child becomes a violent adolescent.
This section considers data from longitudinal studies from
sociology and developmental psychology that trace individual
trajectories leading to antisocial and violent behavior. A case is
made for a developmental sequence that leads to chronic
criminal and violent behavior. The case begins by specifying
what that sequence is, then it moves to considering how these
sequences come about. Specifying the sequence plus the underlying mechanisms defines one possible model for individual
violence.
Building such a model requires that one address an interesting array of problems. To begin with, even the most violent
individual engages in violent acts at relatively low rates. Furthermore, only a very small number of individuals are violent.
What is an effective strategy for the study of low-base-rate
events? It is hypothesized that the small set of all those shown to
be violent can also be shown to be members of a much larger
class of individuals who are antisocial. Furthermore, it is assumed that violent acts bear a transitive relation to antisocial
acts. This requires that almost all violent individuals are also
shown to be antisocial. At the same time, most antisocial individuals are not violent. Incidentally, studies show that most of
the antisocial acts contributed by these individuals are relatively trivial in nature, such as lying, cheating, threatening, and
excessive drinking.
In studying the trajectory from antisocial to violent acts, the
essential parameter is frequency. Individuals who engage in
very high rates of antisocial behavior are at significantly greater
risk to commit violent acts. This means that identifying the
mechanisms that explain individual differences in frequency
(for relatively trivial acts) will tell us something about violent
acts as well. For example, data from the Pittsburgh longitudinal
study showed that almost all (p 5 .93) adolescent boys identified
as homicidal had been previously identified as antisocial 10year-olds (Loeber, 2002). The Ns were tiny, but the findings also
emphasized the transitive nature of the progressions moving
toward a low-base-rate event. For example, most violent boys did

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War and Violence

not move forward in the trajectory and commit a homicide

(p 5 .10).
In his classic three-decade longitudinal study of 411 males
and their families living in inner city London, Farrington (1991)
found that, given a juvenile with three or more arrests, the
likelihood of his committing a violent act was .49. The finding
was replicated (p 5 .47) in a longitudinal study of 206 boys
living with their families in high-crime areas of a small metropolitan center in Oregon (Capaldi & Patterson, 1996). Both
studies showed that boys who committed high rates of nonserious crimes were at greater risk for violent crime. In the Capaldi
study, violence was defined by assault, intimidation, menace,
robbery, and rape. Farrington (1991) concluded, . . . the causes
of aggression and violence must be essentially the same as the
causes of persistent and extreme antisocial delinquent and
criminal behavior (p. 25). In due course, I will examine data
thought to describe these causes. But how early can these trajectories be detected?

Onset of Antisocial Trajectories

Longitudinal studies of infants by Martin (1981), replicated and
extended by Shaw and Winslow (1997), detail the process by
which interactions with the caretaker can lead to problematic
outcomes. By the time toddlers reached the second or third
grade, teachers and peers began to label them as problem
children and view them as potentially dangerous. Even at this
early stage, problem children are not simply aggressive.
Rather, these children present an entire matrix of intercorrelated problems. For example, they tend to be slow in language
development, toilet training, and relational skills. They also
score very low on achievement tests and are at significant risk
to be held back one or more grades.
Studies by the Montreal group provide further support for a
hypothesized early age of onset specifically for physical attack
behaviors. For example, Tremblay et al. (1999) found in mothers
ratings of 17-month-old infants that 46% of the infants had
pushed, 24% had kicked, and 15% had hit. In a longitudinal
design, they showed that that boys identified by their elementary-grade teachers as physically aggressive were shown later as
adolescents to be at specific risk for physical aggression (Nagin
& Tremblay, 1999).
These studies are consistent in emphasizing continuity over
time for general forms of antisocial behavior and for physical
aggression as well. Tremblay et al. (2005) have given an empirical base to such speculation. In these analyses, the boys who
persisted in their physical aggression were labeled chronics.
Over the interval from ages 6 through 16, only about 4% to 5% of
the cohort fit this trajectory (Nagin & Tremblay, 1999). However,
1 child in 8 in the Montreal study continued in this category
through the full course of the study. Presumably these early
starting persistors would also be characterized by high rates of
antisocial behaviors. There were no late arrivals to the physical

206

aggression trajectory. In other words, boys who started at a very

early age produce most adolescent violence. What is particularly surprising is that the pattern of these earliest manifestations is consistent across cultures. For example, the large
sample of 2- and 3-year-olds living in Holland were described as
showing high rates of disobedience, defiance, high activity
levels, and temper tantrums (Koot, 1993). In her review,
Campbell (1995) concludes that similar patterns are found in
Great Britain, the United States, and Hong Kong. In reviewing
these findings, she provides 10% to 15% as an estimate for
prevalence rates of these preschool problem children.
The Federal Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention sponsored a recent study group of 29 premier juvenile justice and criminology researchers. They spent a year and
a half sifting through the findings and the literature. In keeping
with the present report, they concluded that serious and violent
offenders tend to start early and maintain their offending over
long periods of time (Snyder, 1999). As noted earlier, it is the
chronic offenders who are at grave risk for violence; and of these,
only about 1 in 10 may commit a homicide (Loeber, 2002).
The individual violence model makes the case that children
learn aggressive behaviors very early on. This, in turn, is accompanied by a wide spectrum of deficits in prosocial skills. The
regime that produces deviant behavior also fails to train for
prosocial skills. How do these trajectories come about? The key
assumption is that this process is, in fact, observable and that
antisocial behavior is a product of interactions with family
members and peers (Patterson, 1982).

The Training Process

The social interactional perspective presented here would have
it that aggressive and violent individuals are inadvertently
trained in their homes by siblings and parents. Observation data
collected in the home showed two general patterns characterized
families of antisocial children. On the one hand, there was little
positive reinforcement provided for prosocial behavior and a
surprising amount of support for a wide range of coercive behavior. Why would family members reinforce coercive and
aggressive behaviors?
The training for aggression and violence takes place in the
context of conflict bouts within the family. Observations in
homes showed that, on the average, families with antisocial
children were characterized by a conflict bout every 16 min
(Snyder & Patterson, 1995). Detailed analyses of conflict bouts
showed that a child in a nondeviant family might successfully
terminate (win) a conflict sequence by employing a wide range of
prosocial reactions, such as talking, humor, or problem solving.
Nondeviant children also employed a range of coercive reactions, such as negative verbal or physical behaviors. In other
words, in nondeviant families a large range of behaviors worked,
which is to say that they successfully terminated conflict bouts.
However, in families of antisocial children, the situation was

Volume 3Number 3

Gerald R. Patterson

Context
Poverty
Divorce
Depression
Criminality
Neighborhood
Genes

Parenting
Discipline
Monitoring
Encouraging
Problem solving
Involvement

Family-Provided
Contingencies

High Rates of
Antisocial
Behavior and
School Failure

Peer-Provided
Contingencies

Violent Behavior

Fig. 1. A contingency model for individual violence.

dramatically different. Only coercive reactions successfully

terminated conflict bouts. In this strange family environment,
socially competent behaviors were nonfunctional! Only coercive
and aggressive behaviors were effective in terminating conflict
bouts. Observation studies showed that this training begins
during toddler stages (Martin, 1981; Shaw & Winslow, 1997).
Children learn to adapt to their own particular environments.
From a social interaction perspective, the reactions supplied by
parents and siblings teach children to select those reactions that
work and to ignore those that do not. In a Darwinian sense,
people select responses that prove to be functional. Nonfunctional responses are dropped. The process is analogous to
survival of the fittest responses. In effect, it is the environment
that determines the nature of the fittest response. For example,
in problem families, the child learns that hitting is an effective
means for terminating a conflict bout when interacting with
siblings (Patterson, 1984).
From a social interactive perspective, understanding aggression requires a focus on the coercion process. This in turn
leads to a sustained interest in studying conflict bouts. What
makes this so complex is that it requires that one be able to adopt
both a long-term and short-term perspective. An example of this
would be a conflict bout that begins with the mother scolding
about homework, followed by the child arguing, followed in turn
by the mother giving in. In the short run, from the mothers view,
the arguing stopped as soon as she gave in. Mothers submission
was reinforced and is therefore more likely to recur in future
trials. In addition, the long-term outcome of the same exchange
is an increase in the probability that there will be conflicts about
homework in the future and that the child will be more likely to
argue. Within the coercion model, pursuing short-term gains
(termination of conflict) is bought at the expense of long-term
gains in misery (Patterson, 1982).
Observation in families of antisocial children shows that the
family member who escalates during a conflict bout is likely to
be reinforced (Patterson, 1980, 1982). Anger is one of the more
functional modes for escalation (i.e., it works in terminating
conflict bouts). Snyder, Edwards, McGraw, Kilgore, and Holton
(1994) showed that clinical families were more likely to escalate
during conflict than were nondeviant families. In families who
reinforce antisocial children, irritability and anger form a

Volume 3Number 3

ubiquitous dimension of family interaction. The problem child

averages an aversive behavior every 3 min! In these families,
there is very little reinforcement offered for prosocial skills.
The effects of the training in the home generalizes to the
school and the community at large. Experiments by Dodge
(1983), replicated by Coie and Kupersmidt (1983), showed that
the combination of the problem childs coercive style plus his
lack of prosocial skills leads to rapid rejection by nondeviant
peers. The rejection by nondeviant peers represents a critical
stage in the development of the antisocial and violent child.
It creates a situation where the child is placed at grave risk of
being influenced by deviant peers.
As shown in Figure 1, contingency-type variables should be
the most effective predictors for antisocial behavior. Changing
contingencies should also be an effective means for treating
antisocial behavior. Snyder and Patterson (1995) observed a
sample of preschool motherchild dyads with attention to
measures of conflict bouts and measures of the relative success
of deviant child behaviors in terminating these conflicts. The
reinforcement variables correlated (.81) with child deviant
behavior observed in the home a week later. The finding is
consistent with the assumption that the relative rate of reinforcement is a significant predictor for the relative rate of aggressive
behavior. Later in this article, I will consider the possibility that
a similar generalized extension of the matching law will apply to
interstate wars.
In a replication study, Snyder, Schrepferman, and St. Peter
(1997) examined observation data for an older clinical sample
and found that the frequency of conflict bouts and relative rates
of reinforcement accounted for 44% of the variance in police
arrests and out-of-home placements 2 years later. The implication is that the relative rate of reinforcement may be a causal
variable. If this is true, then reducing the relative rate of reinforcement should produce a reduction in the rate of antisocial
behavior. To test this possibility, a randomized trial prevention
design was used to show that after training, parents in the experimental group reduced their negative reinforcement for
noncompliance. This was accompanied by a significant reduction in child noncompliance (Martinez & Forgatch, 2001).
Lucyshyn and colleagues (2004) describe a whole genre of
studies that tested for the impact of reductions in negative

207

War and Violence

Three Aspects of the Basic Black Model

Basic Black, Risk Sample
Observer Impressions

.62
.71

Nattering
.52

Inept
Discipline

.34**

.79

Abusive Behavior

Child
Antisocial
Behavior

.38**
Interviewer Impressions

Parent Hours
Child Report

.88
.26
.44

Parent Report

.53

.32**

Teacher Report

.32
Child Telephone Report

.78

Poor
Monitoring

Peer Report
R = .30

R = .15

GFI =.986

Basic Black, Divorce Sample

Observer Impressions

Nattering
Abusive Behavior
Interviewer Impressions

Parent Hours
Child Report

= 37.83; p = .220

**p < .01

.82
.80
.69

.93
.17
.50

Inept
Discipline

.32*

.53

Child
Antisocial
Behavior

.18(l = 1.47)
Poor
Monitoring

.59*

R = .52

Parent Report

.16

Teacher Report

.80
Child Telephone Report

X
= 27.79; p = .269
GFI = .943
*p < .05

Basic Black, Clinical Sample

Observer Impressions

Nattering
Interviewer Impressions

.60

.48*

.61

.90

n.s.
.89
.58

Parent Hours

Inept
Discipline

Poor
Monitoring

=
.28 (l

1.44)

Parent Report

Child
Antisocial
Behavior

.52
Teacher Report

X
R = .31

= 8.96; p = .441

GFI = .960
*p < .05

Fig. 2. Three replications of the parenting model (data from Forgatch, 1991). The basic black model means that the model fits all three
data sets (much like a simple black dress is suitable for all occasions).

reinforcement as an effective means for producing reductions in

deviant behavior.
Later in this article, I entertain the notion that there may be
reinforcers for inter-state wars and the possibility that the relative rate of reinforcement will covary with the relative rate of
warfare. Such a model provides an empirical underpinning to
Harriss (1979, 1983, 1989) thesis that violence is functional.
As shown in Figure 1, contingency variables constitute the
most proximal cause for antisocial behavior. Typically, these
analyses are based on 1020 hr of observation. The next level of
proximal variable, parenting practices, is much easier to study.

Parenting Practices as Mechanisms for Change

In their review of empirically based studies, Loeber and Dishion
(1983) concluded that there was something about disruptions in
the parenting process that contributed to delinquency. The data
showed that measures of disrupted discipline and monitoring
practices were among the best predictors of later delinquency.

208

Findings such as this have now become routine and have been
shown to hold for both at-risk or nondeviant samples (Metzler &
Dishion, 1992). Investigators working from a social interactional
perspective developed multimethod and multiagent assessments that define four key parenting practices and a construct
for antisocial behavior (Capaldi & Patterson, 1989; Patterson,
Reid, & Dishion, 1992). Forgatch and DeGarmo (1999) updated
the measurement model.
As shown in Figure 2, Forgatch (1991) employed data from
three different samples to demonstrate that measures of monitor
and discipline reliably correlated with a latent construct for
child aggression. Notice that the parenting constructs accounted
for a substantial (30%52%) amount of the variance in the child
antisocial behavior construct. The structural equation models
each demonstrated an acceptable fit of the data set to the a priori
model. Of course, replicated correlations do not establish causal
connections between disrupted parenting and antisocial child
outcomes. However, replications such as these do lend credence
to a belief that disrupted parenting practices are associated with

Volume 3Number 3

Gerald R. Patterson

aggressive child outcomes. Later in this article, I will examine

experiments that test for the causal status of parenting practices.
These data introduce the question of what it is that disrupts
parenting and sets these processes in motion. Generally
speaking, the environment in which the family is embedded is a
key component in the models for individual violence.

Effect of Context on Parenting

Four longitudinal studies demonstrated that ineffective parenting practices were handed down from one generation to another. The findings also suggested some interaction between
genetic and parenting skills as predictors for future generations
of antisocial persons. (Capaldi, Conger, Hops, & Thornberry,
2003). Ge et al. (1996) used an adoption design, together with
multiagent, multimethod specification and a sophisticated
structural equation model to demonstrate a genetic effect for
the contribution of the child to disrupting parent discipline
practices.
Some of the first scientific efforts to understand aggression,
crime, and violence focused on poor economic conditions,
poverty, and divorce as direct causes (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960;
Merton, 1957). Unfortunately, these types of variables were not
very effective in accounting for changes in either societal or
individual rates of crime (Elliott, Huizinga, & Ageton, 1985).
The amounts of variance explained tended to be small and often
not replicable. However, modern studies indicate that these
same contextual variables play important indirect roles in
contributing to crime and antisocial and violent behavior. An
expanded list of adverse contextual variables would typically
include parental depression or psychopathology, parent criminal status, and measures of social disadvantage. Studies by a
wide range of investigators have found that the contribution of
variables such as these to antisocial behavior is indirect rather
than direct.
The classic study by Elder and Caspi (1988) was among the
first to demonstrate a mediated model describing the impact of
economic conditions on antisocial outcomes. The impact of
deteriorating economic conditions on adolescent antisocial
outcomes depends on whether the fathers discipline practices
were disrupted. Sampson and Laub replicated this effect in their
research (Laub & Sampson, 1988; Sampson & Laub, 1993).
They found that measures of social disadvantage showed lowlevel correlations with official data for arrests. However, in their
elegant model, the introduction of measures of parenting
effectiveness led to the linkage becoming nonsignificant. In
effect, measures of parenting practices mediated the impact of
social disadvantage on child outcomes. Robert Larzelere and I
replicated this model for an Oregon sample (Larzelere & Patterson, 1990). The point is that contextual variables such as
poverty, divorce, or antisocial or depressed parents are indirect
causes for violence and antisocial behavior at the individual
level. Disrupted parenting is thought to be a direct cause. I

Volume 3Number 3

assume that there are contextual variables that facilitate or retard the initiation of interstate wars. It will be of some interest to
search for variables that might serve as moderators or mediators
for these effects.
Causal Mechanisms
Recent innovations in preventive intervention designs make it
possible to test assertions that improvements in parenting
practices produce reductions in child antisocial behavior. There
are three studies in Oregon and one in Montreal that address this
issue. In each study, at-risk families participated in a randomized trial in which families in the experimental group received
extensive parent training and supervision, whereas families in
the comparison groups did not (Dishion & Kavanagh, 2003;
Eddy & Chamberlain, 2000; Forgatch & DeGarmo, 1999, 2002;
Vitaro, Tremblay, Kerr, Pagani, & Bukowski, 1997). The data
showed that children in the untreated comparison groups became increasingly antisocial, whereas children in the experimental groups showed reductions in antisocial behavior.
Further, more findings from the Oregon studies showed that the
magnitude of changes in child behavior was significantly correlated with the magnitude of changes in parenting.
Findings from these experiments suggest that improved parenting practices may function as a causal mechanism for producing reductions in child antisocial behavior. In effect,
intervention creates an environment in which aggression becomes less functional and prosocial skills become more functional within families.
Deviant Peers as Trainers
Most major delinquency theories, such as those put forth by
Elliott et al. (1985); Osgood, Wilson, OMalley, Bachman, and
Johnston (1996); and Thornberry and Krohn (1997) hypothesized that the deviant peer group is a key covariate in predicting
delinquency. The Oregon Youth Study takes this one step further
by maintaining that the mechanisms explaining the impact of
deviant peers is directly observable. The findings indicated that
positively reinforcing contingencies supplied during social exchanges with deviant peers was a key causal variable (Dishion,
Andrews, & Crosby, 1995; Dishion, Patterson, & Griesler,
1994).
In the programmatic studies by Dishion, the researchers
collected data on the observed frequency of positive reinforcement for deviant speech and estimates of amount of unsupervised time spent with deviant peers (Patterson, Dishion, &
Yoerger, 2000). In that study, it was assumed that the reinforcing
sequences of behavior would predict which adolescents would
show growth in new forms of deviancy during the ensuing 4 years
of the longitudinal project. The data showed a strong correlation
(.66) between deviancy training and a massive increase in police
arrests, in new forms of health-risking sexual behavior, and
in substance use over the ensuing years. In the Oregon model,

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members of the deviant peer group become the primary determinant for the metamorphosis of simple, childhood forms of
antisocial behavior to the more complex, adult forms that
characterize criminal behavior, such as substance use, healthrisking sexual behavior, theft, and burglary (Patterson et al.,
2000). It was assumed that violent adults immerse themselves
in loosely structured groups of peers who are very much like
themselves: (a) unskilled, (b) irritable and angry, and (c) antisocial. As a group, they select settings where violence is expected and, within limits, acceptable.
Effective intervention requires that some means be provided
that will reduce the contribution of deviant peers to antisocial
behavior. Existing studies suggest two different avenues that
could effectively change the availability of deviant peers. Behavioral approaches to classroom management has produced
long-term reductions in antisocial behavior as demonstrated by
randomized trials and long-term follow up by both Kellam,
Mayer, Rebok, and Hawkins (1998) and Reid, Eddy, Fetrow, and
Stoolmiller (1999). These studies are based on extensive efforts
to design empirically based classroom environments that increase prosocial skills and minimize aggression (ONeil, Horner,
Albin, Storey, & Sprague, 1997; Walker, Colvin, & Ramsey,
1995). These studies leave little doubt that classrooms in both
inner city (Kellam et al., 1998) and moderate-sized metropolitan
settings (ONeil et al., 1997; Reid et al., 1999) can be programmed to produce very low rates of antisocial behavior. This,
in turn, would lead to reduced possibilities for input by deviant
peers to the socialization process.
There is a second path for reducing peer-group contributions
to the deviancy training process. Analyses of parenting practices
showed strong correlations between disrupted parenting practices and delinquency. For example, Patterson and Dishion
(1985) showed that disrupted parental monitoring predicted
delinquency. In a longitudinal study, Patterson, Capaldi, and
Bank (1991) found that disrupted monitoring contributed both
directly and indirectly to police arrests. The indirect connection
was derived from the link between disrupted monitoring and
increased involvement with deviant peers. Simons, Wu, Conger,
and Lorenz (1994) replicated both the direct and indirect effects. These studies suggest that improving parenting skills
could have both direct and indirect effects in reducing delinquency.
Only an experiment could effectively test this hypothesis. Two
such experiments have been carried out. In both cases, the
hypotheses were supported. In one study, children identified in
grade school as being at risk were randomly assigned to either a
comparison or an experimental group (Vitaro, Brendgen, &
Tremblay, 2001). The latter group received parent training (plus
relational skills training), whereas the comparison group did
not. At adolescence, the follow-up data showed significant improvement in parental supervision, less involvement with deviant peers, and both effects associated with reduced
delinquency. This effect was replicated in a randomized pre-

210

vention trial for recently divorced mothers (DeGarmo & Forgatch, 2005). Results from the experiments directly support the
correlational models: Training in parenting practices led to reduced involvement with deviant peers, and this, in turn, reduced
delinquent behavior. The comparison group did not show these
effects.
SUMMARY AND LIMITATIONS

Violent children grow up to be violent adolescents and adults.

The process begins in the family with its rich schedule of conflicts and reinforcement for coercive behaviors. This escalates to
antisocial and violent solutions. All of this is accompanied by a
lack of support for prosocial skills. These developments, in turn,
lead to rejection by nondeviant peers. Problem children become
heavily invested in the deviant peer group, and deviant peers
complete advanced training for illegal antisocial acts and
eventual careers as adult criminals.
The good news is that these antisocial trajectories can be altered as suggested by reviews of randomized prevention and
intervention studies (Brestan & Eyberg, 1998; Kazdin, 1987).
The findings show that antisocial and violent behavior does not
have to be a ubiquitous accompaniment of the socialization
process. Families and communities can be trained to make a
childs antisocial behavior nonfunctional. The real issue is not
practicality. The issue concerns societys willingness to seek or
even tolerate lower rates of violence and antisocial behavior in
homes and classrooms. However, it must be noted that, as of yet,
there have been no studies demonstrating that these promising
techniques have significantly reduced rates of violence for an
entire city, county, or state. Studies that address the prevalence
issue are currently underway in Michigan and Norway, but as yet
there are no data that address this critical issue. For the moment,
the reduction in the prevalence of aggression and violence remains a promissory note.
Although many of these models are based on replicated
findings, it is the case that comparisons of contingency models to
other major theories are only just beginning. For example, the
programmatic studies by Dodge, Bates, and Pettit (1990) are a
major alternative that focus on cognitive and information processing components. The mutual exploration of these two domains is just beginning as evidenced by studies such as those by
Snyder, Cramer, Afrank, and Patterson (2005) and Nix et al.
(1999), but it is already obvious that both theories have profited.

Some Suggested Implications for the Interstate War Model

Reinforcement by family members and by deviant peers controls
violence for individuals. Assuming that one can extrapolate
findings from the individual to the group case, the implication is
that there may be one or more reinforcers for interstate wars. At
the group level, is it the case that the relative rate of reinforcement covaries with the relative rate of wars? At the indi-

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Gerald R. Patterson

vidual level, reinforcers supplied by the victim are associated

with increased likelihood that in the near future, the aggressor
will attack the same victim using the same form of aggression
(Patterson, Littman, & Bricker, 1967). In interstate wars, does a
reinforcer, such as winning, increase the likelihood of future
wars? Given models for individual violence, contextual factors
are significant predictors for the likelihood that reinforcers will
occur. What are the relevant contextual variables for interstate
war models? If one could reduce the reinforcers for war, would
this be accompanied by a commensurate drop in frequency? In
the model for individual violence, a reduction of the reinforcers
for aggression and violence is followed by a reduction in the
occurrence of these behaviors. In what sense could the reinforcers for societal violence be reduced? The arena where violent individual acts are actually committed could be thought
of as a pathological outcome of coercive social interactions. Is
there a comparable pathology for societal violence?
Efforts to Build a Science of War
It should be said at the outset that I collected none of the findings
to be presented in this section. Experience in the combat infantry led to an enduring interest in the literature about war. My
research career has been focused on building empirical models
for individual aggression. Eventually, I came to believe that
there were areas of overlap between the two domains.
One of the features of the research literature that aroused my
interest was the fact that a half a century of effort had failed to
generate a replicable model for interstate wars.
Because of inconsistencies and anomalies in the findings as well
as differences in measurement and research design, the meaning
and significance of these findings is hardly self-evident. Rather
they exist as a set of clues or pieces of a puzzle that needs to be put
together.
(Vasquez, 1993, p. 3)

Obviously the topic of interstate war is a complex one. It requires models at several different levels. At one level, a contingency-type model thought to govern decision makers will be
presented. The other level examines the poorly understood behavior of the soldier in combat. A contingency model was suggested for this second level, but it remains untested because of
the lack of data. The discussion will begin with a brief review of
earlier models.
Earlier Models
Attempts to understand war were certainly in place long before
the 20th century. Organized efforts to establish a scientific database, however, are quite recent, perhaps within the last half of
the preceding century. Quincy Wrights A Study of War (1970)
could be said to mark the advent of this epoch. In that work, he
summarized the findings relating to causes and outcomes for

Volume 3Number 3

wars occurring during the interval between 1890 and 1940. He

assimilated existing data on frequency and presumed causes for
war. In addition to these scientific contributions, he took personal responsibility to insure the posthumous publication of
Richardsons classic work Statistics of Deadly Quarrels (1960).
In his editors introduction to that volume, he presented some of
his own findings and suggested contiguity, nationalism, revenge,
and religion as causes of war.
Richardsons basic premise was that wars emerge from the
action and reactions of nation-states to each other. This interactional perspective was focused on the sequential exchanges
between nation-states. Over time, these interchanges impact
both members. The metaphor fits comfortably with my socialinteraction learning model for individual acts of violence. From
this perspective, interstate quarrels arise from conditions that
are themselves measurable. Given such measures, it should be
possible to build empirically based models that explain when
interstate violence will occur. This also is basically the perspective taken in the prestigious Correlates of War project based
at the University of Michigan (Singer & Diehl, 1990).
Contrary to Marxist predictions, Richardson (1960) did not
find support for the idea that economic conditions or differences
were associated with warfare. However, religious differences
definitely were significantly related to the occurrence of war.
The association was stronger for some time intervals than for
others. The publications by Wright (1970) and by Richardson
(1960) were followed by a steady stream of high quality publications from the Michigan project (Singer, 1990; Singer & Diehl,
1990; Singer & Small, 1972; Vasquez, 1993, 1995). These
publications represent a strenuous effort to establish an empirical base for understanding and predicting interstate conflicts. The new studies also include examination of the direct and
indirect costs of war (e.g., Grossman, 1995; Sivard, Brawer, &
Roermer, 1989).
One of the key questions raised by Richardson (1960) concerned changes in the frequency of wars. On the basis of the 300
wars occurring between 1820 through 1949, he concluded that
the frequency of wars was distributed randomly over time. There
was a slight but nonsignificant trend toward a reduction in frequency. Later analyses summarized by Singer (1990) supported
this same conclusion. Findings for the last two centuries also
failed to support the idea that war patterns might be characterized by identifiable periodicity. The lack of systematic
changes in slope for war frequency suggests that the payoffs
provided by interstate wars are present in the same relative
abundance today as they had been in the preceding three centuries.
Both Richardson (1960) and Wright (1970) believed that
contiguity was one of the stronger causal variables for war. In
Wrights first approximation to a model stated that . . . the
probability of war is a function of the distances between states
and the policies that they pursue (p. x). He considered the
number of shared borders to be a significant predictor (e.g.,

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nations with six borders would be more vulnerable than nations

with four). However, the interrelations seemed very complex.
For example, the contiguity variable seemed to interact with
differences in policy that would dampen or amplify this effect,
such as a shared common government or culture, a desire for
revenge, or certain aberrant forms of nationalism.
Contiguity models have been carried forward and are reflected
in modern efforts to construct sophisticated nonlinear models
that begin with a consideration of Richardson-type models (e.g.,
shared borders and polarities in policy). For example, MayerKress (1992, cited in Guastello, 1995) extended the Richardson-type model to identify points of chaos that characterize some
contiguous systems. He compared linear and nonlinear models
as predictors using a data set prepared by Moul (1993), in which
each of the wars during the interval 18151964 was coded both
for war outcomes and for degree of polarization in policies.
Guastellos reanalysis of their data set traced out the implications of single polarities versus multiple polarities on future wars
by emphasizing the potential usefulness of nonlinear models
that employ polynomial rather than simple linear or quadratic
functions. It is apparent that Richardsons point of view is alive
and healthy today.
There is one application of the contiguity model that is of
interest even though it is not a part of any empirical tradition.
It combines Richardsons concept of contiguity with Harriss
(1979) concept that war is functional. Schmookler (1995) put
both of these ideas together in his thought provoking The Parable of the Tribes. He gives Richardsons contiguity formulation a
dynamic twist by adding the concept of time. Given a warlike
neighbor, how does the process unfold over time, and how does
it eventually impact an entire system?
Imagine a perfect Rousseauian world during a stone-age period in which each tribe has a considerable amount of territory
and none engage in war (Rousseau, 1782/1928). In Schmooklers thought problem, if even one of the tribes finds violence and
war to be functional, for whatever reason, then it is only a
question of time until all tribes either learn to be violent or
become slaves. In the thought problem, imagine you are one of
four sets of neighbors who live adjacent to the newly violent
tribe. If you succumb to their invasion, you become slaves to the
aggressors or you may be annihilated. To resist, your tribe must
itself become violent. If you successfully resist, in a generation
or two you will, in turn, be at risk to become an aggressor.
Eventually, you find it necessary to aggress against some of your
own neighbors. Either decision produces a negative outcome.
There will be an increasing number of individuals living within a
system where societal violence is declared to be functional.
As increasing numbers of tribes are contaminated, the
worldwide risk of attack by a neighbor increases concomitantly.
Although a state of constant preparedness is costly and therefore
punishing to maintain, it is the lesser of two evils when compared with the alternatives. In a very short period of time, the
aegis of violence is extended until it eventually encompasses the

212

world, as it is today. Again, the assumption is that interstate

violence spreads because it is effective.
CONTINGENCIES FOR DECISION MAKERS

It is apparent that some countries are more likely to engage in

repeated wars than are others. The question of why this is so is
complex and requires models that operate at different levels.
The first level considered concerns the behavior of the decision
makers. The second level will consider the paradoxical behavior
of the individual soldier engaged in combat.
The first model assumes that the act of initiating a war is accompanied by a reinforcing contingency. The payoff is that the
initiator is more likely to win. Winning an offensive war could
mean that you actually gain territory, markets, slaves, or economic resources. This arrangement describes a positive reinforcement contingency.
Initiators Win
The first model in the series is based on the sizeable literature
finding a significant correlation between status as initiator of a
war and status as winner of the war. Bueno de Mesquita (1981)
used the data from Singer and Small (1972) to examine 58 interstate wars. Of these, the nation initiating the war won 42
times. Given status as an initiator, the likelihood of success was
.72. Initiators were more likely to win. As one might expect,
likelihood of winning also varies as a function of context. For
example, Singer and Small found that in a war initiated by a
major power against a minor power (e.g., France against Mexico
in 1862), the likelihood of the major powers success was .94.
However, in a war initiated by one major nation-state against
another, the likelihood of success was only 37.5%.
Bueno de Mesquita then goes on to examine the record of
about 250 interstate conflicts covering about two centuries and
concludes as follows:
Initiation and negotiation, escalation, and capitulation have all
been shown to follow systematically from expected utility theory.
The war trap is sprung by actors willing to plunge into the storm of
conflict and combat in search of some treasure of policy or plunder.
More often than not that storm ends as they anticipated
(p. 182).

From Bueno de Mesquitas point of view, the decision to initiate is based on cognitive processes. However, there is no requirement that the cognitive process be a rational one. Three
decades of scientific work defining the early stages of the recent
cognitive revolution in psychology speak to the difficulty of rational processes. Dawess (1988) prize-winning Rational Choice
in an Uncertain World defines rational choice in the following
manner: (a) it takes into account the likely consequences, (b) it is
based on accurate assessment of current assets, and (c) the
assessment of either assets or liabilities and their relation to

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Gerald R. Patterson

outcome is based on the basic rules of probability theory. The

bulk of his presentation details the ways in which most of us,
most of the time, violate the rules of probability in making
choices. As he pointed out so eloquently, even under ideal situations, humans decision-making process tends to be extremely
limited (e.g., nonrational). The studies show that rather than a
science of rational choice, one might better characterize the field
as the psychology of shallow thinking.
As Dawes pointed out, there are some conditions involving
group process in which scientific rules of evidence provide
guidelines that enhance rational choice in decision making. In
the present context, a leader might be surrounded with a cabinet
or advisory board that, in turn, bases its input on accurate data
that is correctly weighted. Given that the decision-making
process is rational implies an effective preparation for war. This
would lead to an expectation of a very high correlation between
the relative rate of initiating wars and the relative likelihood of
winning.
It is probable that correlation between relative rates of winning and relative rates of initiation will never reach 1:0 because
the decision-making processes would not always be ideal.
History is replete with examples where the decisions to initiate
war were based on inaccurate assessments. Tuchmans (1984)
classic The March of Folly: From Troy to Vietnam chronicled in
detail the calamitous decisions made by George III that led, in
turn, to his loss of the American colonies. She goes on to
the Trojan War and details the process of deciding to bring
the wooden horse within the walls. Her account also includes the
decision by Lyndon Johnson and staff to launch a full-scale war
in Vietnam. With the clarity of hindsight, one can now see that
the countervailing evidence in each case was very clear but that
it was ignored by the decision makers.

Who Initiates?
One assumes that the decision to initiate war is based on extensive planning and preparation. In the last few decades, there
have been extensive efforts to apply rational choice theory to
understand war onsets between nation-states (Bremer & Cusack, 1995; Bueno de Mesquita, 1981; Bueno de Mesquita &
Lalman, 1986). The choice of war or peace depends on the
choices of individuals . . . their choices depend on their estimation of costs and benefits and their comprehension of right
and wrong (Bueno de Mesquita, 1981, p. 8). He goes on to make
a strong case for the decision makers to function as costutility
maximizers (i.e., the greatest gains at minimal costs). The decision to initiate is made after a period of information gathering
about the likely behavior of the other state(s) with a particular
focus on the anticipated outcomes and the level of uncertainty. If
nations simply stumble into wars, then there should be no particular advantage to starting one.
The general model outlined in Figure 3 implies that one is
more likely to win if the war is preceded by careful planning. In

Volume 3Number 3

Relative rate
initiate war

Alliances
Planning
Proportion
of budget
to military

Relative rate
win war

Fig. 3. Two predictors for decisions to initiate war.

the panel model, the latent construct for planning is defined by

two indicators. One is a measure of alliances entered into and
the other is a measure of economic support for the military
preferably, an estimate of the proportion of total national budget
(relative rate) that is directed toward the military. The thorough
review for the interval 18701976 by Singer (1990) examines
the correlations among several related measures for that seem to
converge. For example, the correlation between total military
expenditures and iron and steel production was .70, and the
correlation between total military expenditures and industrial
energy production was .65. In evaluating the implication of
these economic variables, Singer (1990) states, Worth noting at
the onset is that initiators of war are superior to their targets
about twice as often as they are equal or inferior (p. 211). The
greater a nation-states economic investment in military and the
greater the number of alliances the nation-state has entered into,
the greater its risk for initiating war.
As shown in Figure 3, it is hypothesized that measures of investment in the military will predict both initiation and winning.
Singers (1990) analyses of the data for the interval 18161976
showed that in wars where one country had invested more in the
military than the other, the country with the larger investment was
more likely to win (see p. 57). Presumably countries that invest
more in the military would also be more likely to initiate wars, but
to my knowledge, this possibility has not been tested yet.
In his review, Vasquez (1987) indicated that the prestigious
Correlates of War project begun in 1963 at the University of
Michigan had produced complex and contradictory findings.
However, one thing was clear. Entering into alliances and investing relatively large amounts of the national budget in the
military was not an effective move toward peace. In fact, the
findings strongly suggest that both avenues contributed to war.
In considering the complex role of alliances, two very different
pieces of information are needed. For example, in developing a
similar model for individual acts of violence, observation data
collected in the home described interaction sequences among
family members that led to aggression (Patterson, 1974, 1977).
Unlike the fixed environment encountered in laboratory studies
of the matching law (Davison & McCarthy, 1988), the environment in which families or countries interact is constantly
changing. For this reason, one of the conditionals in Figure 3
describes the likelihood of war given the appropriate environmental conditions (e.g., alliances or military budget). This can
be thought of as a specification of the impact of context at a

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TABLE 1
Contingency Data for Alliances
Century
20th
19th
18th
17th
16th

p War/alliances

p Alliances/war

.81
.44
.73
.89
1.00

.60
.25
.35
.14
.18

Note. Data is from Levy (1981).

microsocial level. The second conditional describes what proportion of wars were preceded by this environmental condition.
In the family studies, interaction sequences were analyzed to
identify antecedent behavior of family members that were reliably followed by aggressive behaviors of the problem child
(Patterson 1973, 1974, 1977). This gives us p (aggressive behavior/antecedent behavior). The second conditional describes
the likelihood that these particular antecedents really account
for significant amounts of aggression (Hops, 1971; Patterson,
1977). Given that aggression had occurred, the conditional
describes the likelihood it was preceded by this particular antecedent p (antecedent behavior/aggressive behavior).
Comparable data at the interstate level was provided by Levy
(1981) and is summarized in Table 1. The second column describes risk for war in the next decade, given that a country is
involved in an alliance. It can be seen there that, given a nation
with an alliance, the risk for war is 0.81 in the 20th century, as
compared with 0.44 for the 19th century, and 0.73 and 0.89 for
the 18th and 17th centuries. If the nation was a major power, the
risk was even higher. Presumably comparable support would be
obtained if the dependent variable was initiation. I know of no
data testing the hypothesis that alliances also predicts winning.
The third column of figures in Table 1 describes the likelihood
that a war was preceded by an alliance. The median conditional
is a modest .25, suggesting that alliances are important predictors, but this variable leaves about two thirds of the wars
unaccounted for. Vasquez (1987) reviewed findings suggesting
that the impact of an alliance may be even greater as a function
of the number of countries involved and the tightness of the
networks involved.
The model suggests that if the initiation to war is preceded by
careful planning, there is an increased likelihood of winning.
The claim is made that winning operates as a reinforcer. But
what is the utility of such a claim? The studies of individual
violence suggest that if reinforcement could be reduced, the risk
for war could be reduced. At the present time, it is unlikely that
one can arrange such a test.
However, there is a prediction based on contingency theory
that is feasible. A reinforcing contingency such as winning
should provide a basis for predicting future attacks. This prediction held in previous studies of individual violence. Our
earliest observation studies showed that about 80% of childrens

214

aggressive acts were successful, in that the victim reacted by

crying and/or giving up the disputed toy (Patterson et al., 1967).
The immediate effect of the reinforcer was an increase in the
likelihood of the aggressor attacking the same victim and employing the same aggressive act he had used previously. In the
present context, a country that initiated a war and won would be
more likely to initiate another war during the next 10 years.
Singer and Small (1974) found that over a 10-year period, 73
countries initiated a war. Of these 73, 13 countries initiated
another war during the next decade. The base rate for reinitiating a war in the second decade is 0.18. Twelve of these reinitiators had won the prior war. This certainly suggests that
winning a war is associated with repeating. Unfortunately, the
key values are missing. A proper test for the contingency model
would require data for the forward conditional of initiating another war, given that the nation had won the prior war. One would
want to compare this conditional with the base rate for initiating
during both decades. Incidentally, this linkage in the contingency model would lend itself to an event history analyses
where winning serves as a predictor for the time interval until
the next war.
The published literature that I am aware of provides an indirect test of the reinforcement hypothesis. The backward conditionals discussed earlier supported the idea that war repeaters
were significantly more likely to have been winners. However,
I lacked data for the critical question of whether winners are
at risk to become repeaters during the ensuing decade. There is
an additional finding from the Singer and Small (1974) study
that is of interest. It involves the 98 states that were attacked
during the first decade. Of these, 11 initiated an attack during
the decade that followed. But 10 of these had won the prior war
(p 5 .91). Again, winning is associated with repeating. The
general pattern of findings is consistent with what would be
predicted for a contingency analyses.
These data are meant to be illustrative and are not meant to
test a hypothesis. There is good reason to be cautious in our
interpretations of even these fragmentary findings. For example,
in a very thoughtful analysis, Singer (1990, p. 230) examined the
impact of winning (or losing) a war upon a nations future wars,
covering intervals up to 39 years. There was a trend for the
5-year data following a victory, favoring a reinforcement interpretation. For interstate wars in the first 5 years, the exponential
model predicted 16 cases in which a second war was initiated by
an aggressor nation; this compares favorably with the 21 cases
that had actually started wars. The findings suggest that the
reinforcing effects of winning does not extend beyond 5 years.
The fact that the findings for the 510 year period after the war
predict lower risk for starting future wars emphasizes the need
to proceed with caution.
Again, it may be the case that contingency analyses are useful
for understanding the behavior of individuals but not macro
units such as countries. However, it would be passing strange if
societies did not show a preference for courses of action that

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Gerald R. Patterson

were effective while dropping those that were not. Presumably,

societies that persist in selecting bad choices would be unlikely
to survive. Selectively engaging in unsuccessful wars or winning
wars for which there were no economic payoffs would be a risk
for early oblivion.
Multiple Models?
The studies suggest that contextual variables such as status as a
major or minor power is an important predictor of initiation. For
example, Singer (1990, p. 234) presented data showing that,
over a decade, the likelihood of initiating a war was .95 for a
major power and .21 for minor powers. Status as a major or minor
power may be a variable that can be controlled statistically in a
multivariate model, but the more conservative approach might
be to construct separate war models for major and minor countries. Thus, it seems unlikely that researchers will be successful
in constructing a single, all-purpose model for dyadic interstate
wars that holds at all points in time. Vasquez (1993) takes the
context problem one step further in making a case for different
models for dyadic wars as compared with the rapid spread of
WWII. He also considers that wars of equals may require a
special model.
Eventually, researchers must call upon a model or on a set of
models to explain how it is that a nation may be warlike during
one time period, whereas at another interval it is not. For example, Richardson (1960) noted how the covariation between
nationality and war frequency varied across time (Richardson,
1960). Over the long run, the idea that one people may be more
prone to war than another does not seem tenable. The history of
the Viking raids during the Dark Ages is a case in point. The
early history contrasts dramatically with modern Scandinavia.
One might also contrast modern Spain with its 16th century
history. Wright (1970) also pointed out that the great European
powers had been the most frequent fighters.
Vasquez concludes in his 1987 essay that the findings do not
support a single model for interstate wars. Promising models fail
to replicate results, and there is little sense that information
about war is accumulating. He reiterates that what the field
needs is a good theory.
The Paradoxical Behavior of Soldiers in Combat
A model for interstate wars that includes a singular focus only on
decision makers is necessarily incomplete because it ignores the
question of who it is that will actually do the killing and the
related question as to why they do this. For violent individuals, it
was the victim that provided the reinforcement for the violent
act. Who provides the reinforcers for violent acts as they occur in
interstate wars? It will become apparent that, in a very real
sense, the pathological model for individual violent acts is the
antithesis of the model for violent acts committed during interstate wars. It is given that a decision to initiate a war requires not
only careful planning, as discussed above, but that the troops

Volume 3Number 3

that engage in the violent acts must also be trained to commit

violent acts and to function like an army.
A well-trained army itself has some special characteristics.
Waging effective war requires a special social structure that
includes a rigid division of all military personnel into officers
and enlisted men:
The government and society of the United States are greatly
different from those of the Soviet Union or Egypt, but their armies
are so close in structure and in spirit that their officers, when they
come into contact, cannot help recognizing their common membership in a single universal profession whose characteristics
everywhere are shaped by the demands of battle.
(Dyer, 1985, p. 133)

As Dyer goes on to point out, the most striking characteristics

of modern armies lies in their emphasis on rote learning, standardization, and strict obedience. The main outline emphasizing
a professional officer corps was initiated by the Prussians in
1803, following their defeat by Napoleons armies.
In modern times, the teenage recruit is taught to obey the
commands of both the commissioned and noncommissioned
officers. He learns to do this in Week 1 of basic training. In
combat situations, those commands can place him in situations
where he may well be asked to kill or be exposed to the possibility of being killed or maimed. Paradoxically, this training is
superimposed on what for most persons is a lifetime of injunctions to not kill.
One of the more salient paradoxes associated with the war
model is that the rapidly trained teenage recruit often obeys
those commands! There are several dimensions to this particular
paradox. The first dimension has a long and hoary niche in social
psychologys pantheon; the second is from developmental psychology; and the third is from studies carried out by the military
itself, particularly during WWII.
In his thoughtful book War, Dyer (1985) points out that each
individual in an army implicitly agrees to place him or herself at
risk of being maimed or killed. The implicit contract also stipulates that, when ordered, the soldier will main or kill others. On
the face of it, this is a strange contract given that most societies,
our own included, explicitly forbids killing (with or without
permission). During the millennia of emerging cities and
agrarian culture, some millions of young men have honored that
contract in full measure by giving their lives.
The paradox lies in the fact that many individuals fulfill the
contract in actual combat. They actually do main and kill. They
also behave in ways that place themselves at obvious risk for
death or serious injury. One can perhaps understand why an
adolescent recruit may agree to such a contract, but it seems
beyond understanding that it would be acted upon.
Milgram (1974) carried out programmatic studies on obedience to commands by figures in authority. His studies led to the
conclusion that early training for compliance may be a core

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component of the socialization experience. In his study,

teachers were recruited for an experiment and told to administer an electric shock to a learner in the next room. Presumably, the shock was designed to facilitate learning. Each
shock increased in intensity and was followed by an audible
reaction from the learner. The teacher was unaware that there
was no learner in the adjoining room. What the teacher was
hearing was vocal reactions of an actor that ranged from mild
discomfort to screams and pleading. Milgram found that 65% of
the teachers pushed the shock to its maximum as instructed!
He replicated these findings across eight different countries,
and he obtained 85% compliance in Germany alone! Complying
with commands of the figure in charge and presumably delivering pain to another human seems directly applicable to understanding the military situation. However, acquiescence to
authority is only one of several dimensions involved with compliance to commands in combat.
I assumed that broad individual differences exist in the disposition to comply with requests or commands. Furthermore,
most developmental psychologists view initial training for
compliance during the toddler stage as a necessary first step in
the socialization process. Studies in anthropology show that
whether one lives in a tribe in the rainforest or in suburbia, it is
required that the child learns to comply at a reasonable level.
What is striking about this, is the fact that two such disparate
cultures require similar levels of child compliance. The classic
observation-based study of five cultures by Whiting and Whiting
(1975) showed that 2-year-old children in all of these cultures
complied to parental requests and demands roughly three times
out of four. Families living in the rainforest and families living in
modern suburbia agree that this level of compliance is the bare
minimum for entrance to society.
What makes this of particular interest is that intensive observation studies of antisocial children showed that noncompliance is their most salient failure. Observation studies showed
that the out-of-control antisocial child complied with parental
requests and demands only about one time in four (Forehand,
King, Peed, & Yoder, 1975; Forehand, Wells, & Sturgis, 1978;
Patterson, 1982). I propose that minimal requirements for socialization are also a necessary condition for producing young
men or women who are trainable as soldiers (e.g., one who will
acquire soldiering skills and obey orders given to them by officers). Developmental studies of antisocial boys suggest several
respects in which they would make ineffective combat soldiers
(e.g., core noncompliance).
Notice this first instance of antithesis for the two models. In
the individual model, noncompliance is one of the first products
of the coercion process. By way of contrast, compliance is one of
the hallmarks of the well-trained soldier.
One might expect that violent individuals would make excellent soldiers. At a superficial level, their apparent love of
conflict, fighting, and violence would seem to make them ideally
suited for the task of soldiering. However, studies show that, in

216

keeping with the developmentalists point of view, nothing could

be further from the truth. The retrospective studies carried out
decades ago by Roff (1961, 1970) and others showed that men
who were antisocial before entering the armed forces were more
likely to go absent without leave and to receive dishonorable
discharges. The finding was replicated by prospective studies.
It seems reasonable then to assume that one of the first requirements in modern warfare is the availability of well-socialized recruits. Well-socialized individuals make the best
soldiers. The statement is based on findings from the American
Soldier describing the programmatic WWII studies by Stouffer,
Suchman, DeVinney, Star, and Williams (1949). The data
showed that the good soldier tends to be better educated, is less
likely to come from a broken home, was healthy as a child, and
has a history of fewer nervous breakdowns. If the family and
school systems have done their jobs properly, a call to war will
result in society sending forward a young person at least minimally compliant and with at least a modest array of academic
and social skills.
At the close of WWII, there seemed to be a fatal flaw in the
entire complianceobedience issue. The great mystery about
wars has to do with the implicit contracts that constrain its
participants. Each participant tacitly agrees to accept the risk of
being killed or maimed. Each participant also agrees that he will
shoot and kill others on command. And it is this issue where
noncompliance or failure in obedience seems to occur. Rough
estimates suggested that most of the shooting in WWII was
actually done by a very small percentage (25% or less) of the
participants (Marshall, 1978). The failure to fire suggested that
there may be some limits on the Milgram paradigm. Some writers
suggested that the failure to comply with the command to shoot
reflected basic moral antipathy to killing. However, modern
studies of the military suggest otherwise. Studies reviewed by
Grossman (1995) showed that it was faulty training rather than
deeply embedded moral compunctions that produced the failure
to fire. Training that simulated actual combat conditions increased the percentages of soldiers who fire to between 90% and
95% during the Vietnam conflict.
Even with the more advanced training in firing, there may be
situations in which the soldier chooses to not comply. As shown
in the Mai Lai massacre of Vietnamese civilians, only about half
of the soldiers obeyed Captain Medianas command, Kill everything. Grossman (1995) takes the position that there is a
residual resistance to killing within most individuals, even in
those who are in combat. His groundbreaking study of reactions
to combat is one of the first detailed appraisals by a trained
psychologist.
This brings us to a second paradox concerning the war contract. It has to do with the key nature of the role played by a
soldiers relationship within his immediate squad.
A tremendous volume of research indicates that the primary factor
that motivates a soldier to do the things that no sane man wants to

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Gerald R. Patterson

do in combat (that is, killing and dying) is not the force of self
preservation but a powerful sense of accountability to his comrades on the battlefield. The defeat of even the most elite group is
usually achieved only when so many casualties have been inflicted
(usually around 50%) that the group slips into a form of mass
depression and apathy.
(Grossman, 1995, p. 149)

The picture of the warrior that emerges does not fit the mythic
heroes of film and legend. Instead, one sees a reasonably wellsocialized individual training, marching, and responding to
commands by his noncommissioned/commissioned officers. The
critical piece missing from this picture is any reference to his
motivation. Why does he get up and charge the machine gun
when both he and his officers know that he is likely to be
wounded or killed? The question itself frames the nature of the
paradox. Effective functioning of combat troops on the front line
rests solidly on the central importance of human relationships
and an appreciable level of social skills.
The explanation for effectiveness in combat rests on the most
basic of human experience: relationships with other human
beings and positive reinforcement. It is counterintuitive, but in a
very real sense a societal model for a soldiers effectiveness at
killing the enemy and risking death is based on a commitment to
ones buddies. This identification with the immediate group and
reliance on positive reinforcement is also the model for family
functioning. As a process, it is the antithesis of the pathological
model that forms the basis for individual violence.
In his book Men Against Fire, Marshall (1978) states the
following:
I hold it to be one of the simplest truths of war that the thing which
enables an infantry soldier to keep going with his weapons is the
near presence or presumed presence of a comrade. The warmth
which derives from human companionship is essential to his
employment of the arms.
(p. 47)

He goes on to point out many different circumstances in which

the integrity of a battle unit (company, battalion) had been
broken down and piecemeal segments were used to form a new
group. There was only a tiny fraction that functioned as an
effective fighting force. This reflects the inherent unwillingness
of the soldier to risk danger on behalf of men with whom he had
no social identity (p. 158).
In his psychological analyses of combat, Grossman (1995)
makes the interesting observation that most of the participants in
Vietnam were replacements. They were not permanent members
of a line unit and served only for a limited interval of 12 to 13
months. He hypothesized that this may have reduced the
bonding among squad members and that this, in turn, contributed to the higher postcombat rates of distress.
Addressing the issue of why the soldier remains in the combat
setting raises the question of what it is that determines the actual

Volume 3Number 3

killing behavior (e.g., shooting, firing the mortar, dropping the

bombs). On the basis of personal experience, I believe that the
infantry squad has many of the characteristics of a family in that
the interpersonal interactions are shaped and maintained by
reinforcing contingencies. Presumably, observing an infantry
squad under combat conditions would reveal coercive reactions
to incompetent combat behavior (e.g., going to sleep on guard
duty, failure to do share of work details, being sloppy or irritable,
talking about fallen comrades). Failure to perform adequately
would likely elicit negative reactions from buddies. Conversely,
there is some positive support for being a competent member of a
squad. For example, it is my impression that there can be real
source of pride in belonging to a good outfit. I felt that my
squad was one of the most skilled, and it suggests to me that
there could be high levels of support for competent combat
behaviors in elite groups.
In a very real sense, the crucial contingency data are missing.
To my knowledge, no one has sent trained observers into combat
to obtain the data that would show that combat effectiveness
covaries with relative rates of reinforcement by peers in ones
squad.

Some Costs of War

Although wars may not be increasing in frequency, there is a
general consensus that they are increasing in seriousness. There
has been a massive increase in the lethality of modern weapons
since the days of the bow and arrow. Although the percentage of
troops killed in a particular action has decreased from 20% to
40% to less than 10% in modern times, the proportion of population at risk to become casualties has increased (Richardson,
1960, p. ix). Note that this estimate includes deaths from epidemics and famine as well as from combat casualties.
One change is the dramatic increase in the number of civilian
casualties. Incidentally, Clemens and Singer (2000) showed
that, since the Napoleonic wars, casualties of war typically include more dead civilians than dead soldiers. For example, the
Rockefeller report showed that about 50% of 18th century casualties were civilian and that 53% of 19th century casualties
were civilian. There has been a steady increase during the 20th
century to an estimated figure of 70% civilian casualties in 1985
(Sivard et al., 1989).
There are, of course, several dimensions to be considered in
discussing seriousness other than just a listing of casualties. A
true assessment of cost should include the relative allocation of
societal resources to the military. For example, in 1989, world
expenditures for military budgets totaled roughly 17 trillion in
U.S. dollars. $15 trillion was used for education expenditures,
and $10 trillion was used for health expenditures (Sivard et al.,
1989). The data showed that the disparity was even greater in
developing third-world countries during the same intervals
when its citizens were being decimated by disease (another
accompaniment of war). In the developing world, there is one

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War and Violence

soldier per 240 inhabitants, one physician per 1,950 (Sivard et

al., 1989, p. 5).
What is produced by these expenditures? In the 127 wars
since 1945, there were an average of 525,000 killed per year and
an average of 1,200,000 injured in these wars (Sivard et al.,
1989, p. 5). Wright (1970) estimates that 10% of deaths
in modern civilization can be attributed directly or indirectly
to war.
There are some products of war that are often overlooked. For
example, Archer and Gartner (1976) showed that the murder
rate in the United States more than doubled during the Vietnam
War. They went on to study time series of homicide rates for 110
nations beginning in the early 1900s. Postwar homicide rates of
50 combatant nations were compared with 30 noncombatant
nations. The findings showed significant postwar increases for
the combatant nations. The higher the combat deaths, the
greater the increases in postwar homicide rates.
Elder, Pavalko, and Clipp (1993) reported on a longitudinal
follow up of 149 men who served in WWII or Korea. They noted
that roughly 20% of the veterans who had experienced heavy
combat reported long-term symptoms, such as depression,
flashbacks, or nightmares. In another longitudinal study, Lee,
Vaillant, Torrey, and Elder (1995) found that 56% of those veterans exposed to heavy combat were either dead or chronically
ill by age 65. In keeping with this finding, Snow, Stellman,
Stellman, and Sommer (1988) studied 2,858 randomly selected
American Legion members who had served in Southeast Asia.
They found a doseresponse relationship between the amount of
combat stress and later reports of posttraumatic stress disorder
(PTSD). The higher the level of combat stress, the greater the
frequency of later reports of PTSD.
The studies reviewed by Grossman (1995) suggested that
somewhere between 18% and 54% of the servicemen in Vietnam
might suffer from PTSD. It was further suggested that the bulk of
those suffering from PTSD were veterans who had participated
in combat. These veterans also suffered from higher rates of
divorce, marital problems, alcoholism, joblessness, heart disease, and ulcers. It was also the case, as shown by Schnurr,
Friedman, and Rosenberg (1993), that prior psychological
problems increased the risk for combat-related PTSD problems.
Taken together, these findings strongly emphasize the need to
expand our definition of costs attributable to war. Among other
things, it must include the psychological costs to the combatants
who survive it.

Summary and Limitations of Interstate War Models

I have made the case that initiating and waging war can be
functional. A series of contingency models detailed some of the
ways in which waging war may have a payoff. Existing data from
published findings were used to illustrate some of these relations. In that the data were not designed to test these particular
models, the results must be thought of as more illustrative rather

218

than confirmatory. This of course is a major weakness. The fact

that a stronger case cannot be made for some alternative model is
a commentary on the field itself, as noted repeatedly by Vasquez
(1993) and others. The general case was made in several places
(e.g., pp. 3235 and 4546).
The first contingency linkage in the interstate war model
described a connection between initiating a war to winning a
war. It was assumed that countries that initiate are more likely to
win. There were findings from published studies directly supporting this assumption. Notice, however, that the strength of
this relationship varied as a function of status as a major or minor
power. Alliances and proportion of the national budget assigned
to the military were thought to be predictors for which decision
makers were at risk to initiate interstate wars. The latent construct defined by these two variables were thought to contribute
directly to winning and indirectly to initiating.
The second contingency model specified that winning a war
served as a reinforcer that strengthened the likelihood of future
attacks. There were data available that offered direct support for
this hypothesis. There was also some suggestion that this reinforcement effect may generalize only over a limited 5-year interval.
From this perspective, the individual violence and the interstate war models both rest to some degree on foundations that are
contingent in nature. Depending on who you are and where you
practice it, violence pays off. Humanity has constructed societies where it is often the case that violence is expected and even
condoned. The fact that we are beginning to understand what the
reinforcers are and who gives and who receives them could
provide the groundwork for designing societies where violence
becomes nonfunctional.
The present writer assumes that the societal models presented
here are limited in that they apply only to interstate wars. Even
here it may be necessary to develop separate models for major
and minor powers. One assumes that the existing models would
be of only limited value in examining genocide, revolutions, and
world wars.
I conclude that the individual violence is the outcome of a
pathologic process. In contrast, societal violence rests on two or
more contingencies. Two of these control the behavior of the
decision makers. The actual violence associated with war is
maintained by a complex of processes.
The individual soldier stays in the combat area because of his
relationships with his buddies. It is thought that the actual
maintenance of the combat behaviors (e.g., killing) is related to
reinforcement by peers for combat effectiveness. Structurally,
this third component for the interstate war model amounts to
taking the basic components for building a society and subverting it to produce a pathologic outcome.
Finally, follow-up studies reveal some hidden costs to war.
Postwar homicide rates are significantly increased for combatant countries. Also, modern studies show participants in active
combat are at significantly greater risk for future PTSD and other
psychological disorders.

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Gerald R. Patterson

SPECIFIC COMPARISONS OF THE TWO MODELS

Ways in Which the Two Models Are Similar

l. The individual and societal models are similar in that they
are both contingency based and they both hold that violence
is functional. In both instances, there are data consistent with
the assertion that violent behavior is controlled by its consequences.
2. Both models take the position that extensive training precedes the violent act. In the societal model, the training is
planned, whereas in the individual model the training by
parents and peers is inadvertent. In both domains, the
training is such that the overlearned violent act becomes
automatic. For example, the violent individual who physically assaults his wife has a prior history of thousands of
reinforcers for a wide variety of antisocial behaviors. In a
similar vein, the soldier firing at and killing an enemy soldier
has been trained in hundreds of practice trials to perform this
act.
3. In both models, reducing the relative rate of reinforcement
would be associated with reductions in violence. To date,
there is empirical support for this assertion only as it applies
to individual acts.
4. In both models, peers are thought to play a key role in providing reinforcers for violence related behaviors.

Ways in Which the Two Models Differ

1. The specific contingencies identified in the two models are
totally different. In the individual model, the reinforcer is
supplied by the victim (e.g., submission, crying, pain reactions) and is given directly to the aggressor. The response
being reinforced is the attack behavior. In the interstate
models, the reinforcers are the products associated winning
(e.g., power, glory, territory, wealth). These reinforcers are
seldom awarded to the soldier committing the violent acts.
It is primarily the elite who receive the reinforcers. The response being reinforced was the decision to go to war.
2. For the combat soldier, his trainers (officers and NCOs) are
clearly identified. By way of contrast, the trainers for individual acts of aggression and violence are the victims
themselves.
3. In the war model, the effective combat soldier tends to be the
more socially skilled and competent. In contrast, the violent
persons in the individual model tend to be socially incompetent (Caspi, Elder, & Herbener, 1990; Wilson & Herrnstein, 1985).
4. For combat operations, obedience is at the core of the
training. Once military training begins, it demands almost
perfect compliance on the drill field. By way of contrast,
noncompliance is a lifelong characteristic of the antisocial
individual.

Volume 3Number 3

5. Individuals who commit violent acts generally have a history

of being antisocial children. In contrast, the more effective
combat soldiers tended not to be antisocial as children.
6. When the war is over, most combat soldiers stop committing
violent acts (a significant number of them do not stop). In
contrast, there is no definable end point for the violent individual. For example, as a spouse abuser ages, the frequency of violent acts diminishes, but even then the
probability is not necessarily zero.
7. The emotions most characteristic of the two kinds of violence
are quite different. Studies suggest that aggressive individuals have little empathy for other people (Perry & Perry,
1974; Slaby & Guerra, 1988). During an aggressive episode,
the most likely emotion is anger and contempt (Stoolmiller &
Snyder, 2004). In combat, the most salient emotion is likely
to be fear. It is interesting to note that in observation of
conflict bouts of parents and their aggressive children, one of
the most salient findings is the childs absence of fear
(Stoolmiller & Snyder, 2004).
8. Finally, it seems that the two domains of violence are based
on diametrically opposing socialization processes. The individual model of violence rest essentially on a coercion base
that provides short-term payoffs (analogous to escape conditioning) correlated with long-term increases in misery. It
also rests on positive reinforcement for deviant behaviors
supplied by peers. The interstate model is served by contingent reinforcers for the decision makers who initiate a war.
It is hypothesized that peers supply reinforcement for competent combat behaviors. This mechanism has not been
tested.
9. Modern studies of combat show that the soldiers deep sense
of commitment and feeling for ones buddies maintains their
presence on the firing line. Practitioners of individual violence are characterized by a rapid turnover in relationships
and a relative lack of commitment.

IMPLICATIONS

Another few decades of study should provide a test of the writers

claim that some variant of the current models for individual
violence will be shown to be effective in reducing the prevalence
of antisocial behavior at the community or state level. As noted
earlier, effectiveness trials currently underway in Norway, the
state of Michigan, and The Netherlands will provide empirical
answers to this question. It is these kinds of studies that will
provide the test of the maturity of the individual violence
models.
The more interesting and complex question concerns the
possibility of reducing the prevalence of interstate wars. Of the
contingency bases for the war model, the one that is most relevant to such a concern would involve the planners and initiators
whose decisions and planning control the initiations to war. Are

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War and Violence

there mechanisms for controlling the behavior of the power elite

who govern us? Two different strategies come to mind. One requires a profound shift in the power structure in such a way that
initiating a war would immediately be referred to a United Nations or NATO-type organization. The reaction to the genocide in
Bosnia and to nuclear developments in Libya come to mind as
examples. If interventions of this kind became more frequent, it
could impact decision-making bodies and alter plans for initiating future wars. However, it would be disingenuous to hold that
these developments will come to pass any time soon.
The other, more appealing strategy is to initiate a change in
the cloud of mystery that has historically accompanied our
thinking about war. I propose a Peace Department at the federal
level with an annual budget. The funds would support an annual
report on the size of our military budget, a listing of formal alliances, a frequency count of wars initiated each year (overt and
covert), and a count of casualties (civilian and military). The
budget would include estimates for pensions and disability
payments. The public needs to know the true costs of war. The
real genius of people like Richardson, Bueno de Mesquita,
Singer, Small, and Vasquez lay in the belief that people could
use science to take the mystery out of war.
AcknowledgmentsSupport for this project was provided by
National Institute of Drug Abuse Grant No. RO1 DA 16097 and
by a grant from Atferdssenteret (The Behavior Center), Oslo,
Norway.
I gratefully acknowledges E. Elgesem, R. Dawes, J. Gustin, and
R. Littman for effective feedback on earlier drafts of this article.
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