CENTRAL BANK V.

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (2004)

EN BANC
[G.R. NO. 148208, DECEMBER 15, 2004]
CENTRAL BANK (NOW BANGKO SENTRAL NG
PILIPINAS)
EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION,
INC.,
PETITIONER, vs. BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS AND
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, RESPONDENTS.
FACTS:
On July 3, 1993, R.A. No. 7653 (the New Central Bank
Act) took effect. It abolished the old Central Bank of the
Philippines, and created a new BSP.
On June 8, 2001, almost eight years after the effectivity
of R.A. No. 7653, petitioner Central Bank (now BSP)
Employees Association, Inc., filed a petition for prohibition
against BSP and the Executive Secretary of the Office of
the President, to restrain respondents from further
implementing the last proviso in Section 15(c), Article II of
R.A. No. 7653, on the ground that it is unconstitutional.
Article II, Section 15(c) of R.A. No. 7653 provides:
Section 15, Exercise of Authority -In the exercise of its
authority, the Monetary Board shall:
(c) Establish a human resource management system
which shall govern the selection, hiring, appointment,
transfer, promotion, or dismissal of all personnel. Such
system shall aim to establish professionalism and
excellence at all levels of the Bangko Sentral in accordance
with sound principles of management.
A compensation structure, based on job evaluation
studies and wage surveys and subject to the Boards
approval, shall be instituted as an integral component of the
Bangko Sentrals human resource development program:
Provided, That the Monetary Board shall make its own
system conform as closely as possible with the principles
provided for under Republic Act No. 6758 [Salary
Standardization Act]. Provided, however, that compensation
and wage structure of employees whose positions fall
under salary grade 19 and below shall be in accordance
with the rates prescribed under Republic Act No. 6758. The
thrust of petitioners challenge is that the above proviso
makes an unconstitutional cut between two classes of
employees in the BSP, viz: (1) the BSP officers or those
exempted from the coverage of the Salary Standardization
Law (SSL) (exempt class); and (2) the rank-and-file (Salary
Grade [SG] 19 and below), or those not exempted from the
coverage of the SSL (non-exempt class). It is contended
that this classification is a classic case of class legislation,
allegedly not based on substantial distinctions which make
real differences, but solely on the SG of the BSP
personnels position.
Petitioner also claims that it is not germane to the
purposes of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, the
most important of which is to establish professionalism and
excellence at all levels in the BSP. Petitioner offers the
following sub-set of arguments:

a. the legislative history of R.A. No. 7653 shows that the

questioned proviso does not appear in the original and
amended versions of House Bill No. 7037, nor in the
original version of Senate Bill No. 1235;

mandate that "No person shall be . . . denied the equal

protection of the laws."

b. subjecting the compensation of the BSP rank-and-file

employees to the rate prescribed by the SSL actually
defeats the purpose of the law of establishing
professionalism and excellence eat all levels in the BSP;

A. UNDER THE PRESENT STANDARDS OF EQUAL

PROTECTION, SECTION 15(c), ARTICLE II OF R.A. NO.
7653 IS VALID.

c. the assailed proviso was the product of amendments

introduced during the deliberation of Senate Bill No. 1235,
without showing its relevance to the objectives of the law,
and even admitted by one senator as discriminatory against
low-salaried employees of the BSP;
d. GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS personnel are all exempted
from the coverage of the SSL; thus within the class of rankand-file personnel of government financial institutions
(GFIs), the BSP rank-and-file are also discriminated upon;
and
e. the assailed proviso has caused the demoralization
among the BSP rank-and-file and resulted in the gross
disparity between their compensation and that of the BSP
officers.
In sum, petitioner posits that the classification is not
reasonable but arbitrary and capricious, and violates the
equal protection clause of the Constitution. Petitioner also
stresses: (a) that R.A. No. 7653 has a separability clause,
which will allow the declaration of the unconstitutionality of
the proviso in question without affecting the other
provisions; and (b) the urgency and propriety of the petition,
as some 2,994 BSP rank-and-file employees have been
prejudiced since 1994 when the proviso was implemented.
Petitioner concludes that: (1) since the inequitable proviso
has no force and effect of law, respondents implementation
of such amounts to lack of jurisdiction; and (2) it has no
appeal nor any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course except through this petition for
prohibition, which this Court should take cognizance of,
considering the transcendental importance of the legal
issue involved.
Respondent BSP, in its comment, contends that the
provision does not violate the equal protection clause and
can stand the constitutional test, provided it is construed in
harmony with other provisions of the same law, such as
fiscal and administrative autonomy of BSP, and the
mandate of the Monetary Board to establish
professionalism and excellence at all levels in accordance
with sound principles of management.
The Solicitor General, on behalf of respondent Executive
Secretary, also defends the validity of the provision. Quite
simplistically, he argues that the classification is based on
actual and real differentiation, even as it adheres to the
enunciated policy of R.A. No. 7653 to establish
professionalism and excellence within the BSP subject to
prevailing laws and policies of the national government.
ISSUE:
Thus, the sole - albeit significant - issue to be resolved in
this case is whether the last paragraph of Section 15(c),
Article II of R.A. No. 7653, runs afoul of the constitutional

RULING:

Jurisprudential standards for equal protection challenges

indubitably show that the classification created by the
questioned proviso, on its face and in its operation, bears
no constitutional infirmities.

It is settled in constitutional law that the "equal protection"

clause does not prevent the Legislature from establishing
classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules
shall operate - so long as the classification is not
unreasonable.
B.
THE ENACTMENT, HOWEVER, OF SUBSEQUENT
LAWS - EXEMPTING ALL OTHER RANK-AND-FILE
EMPLOYEES OF GFIs FROM THE SSL - RENDERS THE
CONTINUED APPLICATION OF THE CHALLENGED
PROVISION A VIOLATION OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSE.
While R.A. No. 7653 started as a valid measure well
within the legislatures power, we hold that the enactment of
subsequent laws exempting all rank-and-file employees of
other GFIs leeched all validity out of the challenged
proviso.
The constitutionality of a statute cannot, in every
instance, be determined by a mere comparison of its
provisions with applicable provisions of the Constitution,
since the statute may be constitutionally valid as applied to
one set of facts and invalid in its application to another.
A statute valid at one time may become void at another
time because of altered circumstances. Thus, if a statute in
its practical operation becomes arbitrary or confiscatory, its
validity, even though affirmed by a former adjudication, is
open to inquiry and investigation in the light of changed
conditions.
The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in
this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of "equal pay
for equal work." Persons who work with substantially equal
qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar
conditions, should be paid similar salaries.
Congress retains its wide discretion in providing for a
valid classification, and its policies should be accorded
recognition and respect by the courts of justice except
when they run afoul of the Constitution. The deference
stops where the classification violates a fundamental right,
or prejudices persons accorded special protection by the
Constitution. When these violations arise, this Court must
discharge its primary role as the vanguard of constitutional
guaranties, and require a stricter and more exacting
adherence to constitutional limitations. Rational basis
should not suffice.
Furthermore, concerns have been raised as to the
propriety of a ruling voiding the challenged provision. It has

been proffered that the remedy of petitioner is not with this

Court, but with Congress, which alone has the power to
erase any inequity perpetrated by R.A. No. 7653. Indeed, a
bill proposing the exemption of the BSP rank-and-file from
the SSL has supposedly been filed.

poverty, provide adequate social services, extend to them a

decent standard of living, and improve the quality of life for
all. Any act of Congress that runs counter to this
constitutional desideratum deserves strict scrutiny by this
Court before it can pass muster.

1. Whether or not the proclamation done by the COMELEC

is valid.

Under most circumstances, the Court will exercise

judicial restraint in deciding questions of constitutionality,
recognizing the broad discretion given to Congress in
exercising its legislative power. Judicial scrutiny would be
based on the rational basis test, and the legislative
discretion would be given deferential treatment.

To be sure, the BSP rank-and-file employees merit

greater concern from this Court. They represent the more
impotent rank-and-file government employees who, unlike
employees in the private sector, have no specific right to
organize as a collective bargaining unit and negotiate for
better terms and conditions of employment, nor the power
to hold a strike to protest unfair labor practices. These BSP
rank-and-file employees represent the politically powerless
and they should not be compelled to seek a political
solution to their unequal and iniquitous treatment. Indeed,
they have waited for many years for the legislature to act.
They cannot be asked to wait some more for discrimination
cannot be given any waiting time. Unless the equal
protection clause of the Constitution is a mere platitude, it is
the Courts duty to save them from reasonless
discrimination.

HELD:

But if the challenge to the statute is premised on the

denial of a fundamental right or the perpetuation of
prejudice against persons favored by the Constitution with
special protection, judicial scrutiny ought to be more strict.
A weak and watered down view would call for the
abdication of this Courts solemn duty to strike down any
law repugnant to the Constitution and the rights it
enshrines. This is true whether the actor committing the
unconstitutional act is a private person or the government
itself or one of its instrumentalities. Oppressive acts will be
struck down regardless of the character or nature of the
actor.
Accordingly, when the grant of power is qualified,
conditional or subject to limitations, the issue on whether or
not the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been
met, or the limitations respected, is justifiable or nonpolitical, the crux of the problem being one of legality or
validity of the contested act, not its wisdom. Otherwise, said
qualifications, conditions or limitations - particularly those
prescribed or imposed by the Constitution - would be set at
naught. What is more, the judicial inquiry into such issue
and the settlement thereof are the main functions of courts
of justice under the Presidential form of government
adopted in our 1935 Constitution, and the system of checks
and balances, one of its basic predicates. As a
consequence, we have neither the authority nor the
discretion to decline passing upon said issue, but are under
the ineluctable obligation - made particularly more exacting
and peremptory by our oath, as members of the highest
Court of the land, to support and defend the Constitution to settle it.
In the case at bar, the challenged proviso operates on
the basis of the salary grade or officer-employee status. It is
akin to a distinction based on economic class and status,
with the higher grades as recipients of a benefit specifically
withheld from the lower grades. Officers of the BSP now
receive higher compensation packages that are competitive
with the industry, while the poorer, low-salaried employees
are limited to the rates prescribed by the SSL. The
implications are quite disturbing: BSP rank-and-file
employees are paid the strictly regimented rates of the SSL
while employees higher in rank - possessing higher and
better education and opportunities for career advancement
- are given higher compensation packages to entice them
to stay. Considering that majority, if not all, the rank-and-file
employees consist of people whose status and rank in life
are less and limited, especially in terms of job marketability,
it is they - and not the officers - who have the real economic
and financial need for the adjustment This is in accord with
the policy of the Constitution "to free the people from

IN VIEW WHEREOF, we hold that the continued

operation and implementation of the last proviso of Section
15(c), Article II of Republic Act No. 7653 is unconstitutional.
LIMKAICHONG V COMELEC

Jocelyn Limkaichong ran as a representative in the

1st District of Negros Oriental. Olivia Paras, her rival, and
some other concerned citizens filed disqualification cases
against Limkaichong. Limkaichong is allegedly not a natural
born citizen of the Philippines because when she was born
her father was still a Chinese and that her mom, though
Filipino, lost her citizenship by virtue of her marriage to
Limkaichongs dad. During the pendency of the case
against Limkaichong before the (Commission on Elections)
COMELEC. Election day came and votes were cast.
Results came in and Limkaichong won over her rival Paras.
COMELEC after due hearing declared Limkaichong as
disqualified. About 2 days after the counting of votes,
COMELEC declared Limkaichong as a disqualified
candidate.
On the following days however, notwithstanding their
proclamation disqualifying Limkaichong, the COMELEC
issued a proclamation announcing Limkaichong as the
winner of the recently conducted elections. This is in
compliance with Resolution No. 8062 adopting the policyguidelines of not suspending the proclamation of
winning candidates with pending disqualification
cases which shall be without prejudice to the continuation
of the hearing and resolution of the involved cases. Paras
countered the proclamation and she filed a petition before
the COMELEC. Limkaichong asailed Paras petition arguing
that since she is now the proclaimed winner, the
COMELEC can no longer exercise jurisdiction over the
matter. It should be the HRET which should exercise
jurisdiction from then on. COMELEC agreed with
Limkaichong.
ISSUE:

2. Whether or not COMELEC should still exercise

jurisdiction over the matter.

1. The proclamation of Limkaichong was valid. The

COMELEC Second Division rendered its Joint Resolution
dated May 17, 2007. On May 20, 2007, Limkaichong
timely filed with the COMELEC En Banc her motion for
reconsideration as well as for the lifting of the incorporated
directive suspending her proclamation. The filing of the
motion for reconsideration effectively suspended the
execution of the May 17, 2007 Joint Resolution. Since
the execution of the May 17, 2007 Joint Resolution was
suspended, there was no impediment to the valid
proclamation of Limkaichong as the winner. Section 2,
Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides:
Sec. 2. Period for Filing Motions for Reconsideration. A
motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling
of a Division shall be filed within five (5) days from the
promulgation thereof. Such motion, if not pro forma,
suspends the execution for implementation of the
decision, resolution, order and ruling.
2. No. The HRET must exercise jurisdiction after
Limkaichongs proclamation. The SC has invariably held
that
once
a
winning
candidate has
been
proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a
Member of the lower house, the COMELECs jurisdiction
over election contests relating to his election, returns,
and qualifications ends, and the HRETs own
jurisdiction begins. It follows then that the proclamation
of a winning candidate divests the COMELEC of its
jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the time of the
proclamation. The party questioning his qualification
should now present his case in a proper proceeding before
the HRET, the constitutionally mandated tribunal to hear
and decide a case involving a Member of the House of
Representatives with respect to the latters election, returns
and qualifications. The use of the word sole in Section
17, Article VI of the Constitution and in Section 250 of the
OEC underscores the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunals
jurisdiction over election contests relating to its members.
ARANETA V DINGLASAN

Antonio Araneta is being charged for allegedly violating of

Executive Order 62 which regulates rentals for houses and
lots for residential buildings. Judge Rafael Dinglasan was
the judge hearing the case. Araneta appealed seeking to
prohibit Dinglasan and the Fiscal from proceeding with the
case. He averred that EO 62 was issued by virtue of
Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 671 which he claimed ceased
to exist, hence, the EO has no legal basis.
Three other cases were consolidated with this one. L-3055
which is an appeal by Leon Ma. Guerrero, a shoe exporter,
against EO 192 which controls exports in the Philippines;
he is seeking to have permit issued to him.
L-3054 is filed by Eulogio Rodriguez to prohibit the treasury
from disbursing funds [from 49-50] pursuant to EO 225.

L-3056 filed by Antonio Barredo is attacking EO 226 which

was appropriating funds to hold the national elections.
They all aver that CA 671, otherwise known as AN ACT
DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A
RESULT OF WAR INVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES AND
AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE
RULES AND REGULATIONS TO MEET SUCH
EMERGENCY or simply the Emergency Powers Act, is
already inoperative and that all EOs issued pursuant to said
CA had likewise ceased.
ISSUE: Whether or not CA 671 has ceased.
HELD: Yes. CA 671, which granted emergency powers to
the president, became inoperative ex proprio vigore when
Congress met in regular session on May 25, 1946, and that
Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued
without authority of law. In setting the first regular session
of Congress instead of the first special session which
preceded it as the point of expiration of the Act, the SC is
giving effect to the purpose and intention of the National
Assembly. In a special session, the Congress may
consider general legislation or only such subjects as he
(President) may designate. Such acts were to be good
only up to the corresponding dates of adjournment of the
following sessions of the Legislature, unless sooner
amended or repealed by the National Assembly. Even if
war continues to rage on, new legislation must be made
and approved in order to continue the EPAs, otherwise it is
lifted upon reconvening or upon early repeal.

With respect to the motion to include the vote and opinion

of the late Mr. Justice Perfecto in the decision of these
cases, it appears that Mr. Justice Perfecto died and ceased
to be a member of this Court on August 17, 1949, and our
decision in these cases was released for publication on
August 26, 1949. Rule 53, section 1, in connection with
Rule 58, section 1, of the Rules of Court, is as follows:
SECTION 1. Judges: who may take part. All
matters submitted to the court for its consideration
and adjudication will be deemed to be submitted for
consideration and adjudication by any and all of the
justices who are members of the court at the time
when such matters are taken up for consideration
and adjudication, whether such justices were or not
members of the court and whether they were or
were not present at the date of submission; . . . .
Under this provision, one who is not a member of the court
at the time an adjudication is made cannot take part in the
adjudication. The word "adjudication" means decision. A
case can be adjudicated only by means of a decision. And
a decision of this Court, to be of value and binding force,
must be in writing duly signed and promulgated (Article VIII,
sections 11 and 12, of the Constitution; Republic Act No.
296, section 21; Rule 53, section 7, of the Rules of Court).
Promulgated means the delivery of the decision to the
Clerk of Court for filing and publication.
Accordingly, one who is no longer a member of this Court at
the time a decision is signed and promulgated, cannot
validly take part in that decision. As above indicated, the
true decision of the Court is the decision signed by the
Justices and duly promulgated. Before that decision is so
signed and promulgated, there is no decision of the Court

to speak of. The vote cast by a member of the Court after

deliberation is always understood to be subject to
confirmation at the time he has to sign the decision that is
to be promulgated. That vote is of no value if it is not thus
confirmed by the Justice casting it. The purpose of this
practice is apparent. Members of this Court, even after they
have cast their vote, wish to preserve their freedom of
action till the last moment when they have to sign the
decision, so that they may take full advantage of what they
may believe to be the best fruit of their most mature
reflection and deliberation. In consonance with this
practice, before a decision is signed and promulgated, all
opinions and conclusions stated during and after the
deliberation of the Court, remain in the breast of the
Justices, binding upon no one, not even upon the Justices
themselves. Of course, they may serve for determining
what the opinion of the majority provisionally is and for
designating a member to prepare the decision binding
unless and until duly signed and promulgated.

We are of the opinion, therefore, that the motion to include

the vote and opinion of the late Justice Perfecto in the
decision of these cases must be denied.
Mr. Justice Paras, Mr. Justice Bengzon, Mr. Justice Padilla,
Mr. Justice Montemayor, Mr. Justice Alex. Reyes, and Mr.
Justice Torres concur in this denial. Mr. Justice Ozaeta, Mr.
Justice Feria and Mr. Justice Tuason dissent.
SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC.,
Petitioner,
vs.
JOY C. CABILES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 170139

August 5, 2014

And this is practically what we have said in the contempt

case against Abelardo Subido, 1 promulgated on September
28, 1948:
que un asunto o causa pendiente en esta Corte
Suprema solo se considera decidido una vez
registrada, promulgada y publicada la sentencia en
la escribania, y que hasta entonces el resultado de
la votacion se estima como una materia
absolutamente
reservada
y
confidencial,
perteneciente exclusivamente a las camaras
interiores de la Corte.
In an earlier case we had occasion to state that the
decisive point is the date of promulgation of judgment. In
that case a judge rendered his decision on January 14;
qualified himself as Secretary of Finance on January 16;
and his decision was promulgated on January 17. We held
that the decision was void because at the time of its
promulgation the judge who prepared it was no longer a
judge. (Lino Luna vs. Rodriquez, 37 Phil., 186.)
Another reason why the vote and opinion of the Mr. Justice
Perfecto can not be considered in these cases is that his
successor, Mr. Justice Torres, has been allowed by this
Court to take part in the decision on the question of
emergency powers because of lack of majority on that
question. And Mr. Justice Torres is not bound to follow any
opinion previously held by Mr. Justice Perfecto on that
matter. There is no law or rule providing that a successor is
a mere executor of his predecessor's will. On the contrary,
the successor must act according to his own opinion for the
simple reason that the responsibility for his action is his and
of no one else. Of course, where a valid and recorded act
has been executed by the predecessor and only a
ministerial duty remains to be performed for its completion,
the act must be completed accordingly. For instance, where
the predecessor had rendered a valid judgment duly filed
and promulgated, the entry of that judgment which is a
ministerial duty, may be ordered by the successor as a
matter of course. But even in that case, if the successor is
moved to reconsider the decision, and he still may do so
within the period provided by the rules, he is not bound to
follow the opinion of his predecessor, which he may set
aside according to what he may believe to be for the best
interests of justice.

PONENTE: Leonen
TOPIC: Section 10 of RA 8042 vis-a-vis Section 7 of RA
10022

FACTS:
Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency,
Inc., is a recruitment and placement agency.
Respondent Joy Cabiles was hired thus signed a
one-year employment contract for a monthly salary of
NT$15,360.00. Joy was deployed to work for Taiwan
Wacoal, Co. Ltd. (Wacoal) on June 26, 1997. She alleged
that in her employment contract, she agreed to work as
quality control for one year. In Taiwan, she was asked to
work as a cutter.
Sameer claims that on July 14, 1997, a certain
Mr. Huwang from Wacoal informed Joy, without prior notice,
that she was terminated and that she should immediately
report to their office to get her salary and passport. She
was asked to prepare for immediate repatriation.
Joy claims that she was told that from June 26 to July 14,
1997, she only earned a total of NT$9,000.15 According to
her, Wacoal deducted NT$3,000 to cover her plane ticket to
Manila.
On October 15, 1997, Joy filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal with the NLRC against petitioner and
Wacoal. LA dismissed the complaint. NLRC reversed LAs
decision. CA affirmed the ruling of the National Labor
Relations Commission finding respondent illegally
dismissed and awarding her three months worth of salary,
the reimbursement of the cost of her repatriation, and
attorneys fees
ISSUE:
Whether or not Cabiles was entitled to the
unexpired portion of her salary due to illegal dismissal.

amending Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is declared

unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void.

taking of the land. (Morrison vs. Indianapolis, etc. Ry. Co.,

HELD:
YES. The Court held that the award of the threemonth equivalent of respondents salary should be
increased to the amount equivalent to the unexpired term of
the employment contract.
In Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and
Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., this court ruled that
the clause or for three (3) months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less is unconstitutional for
violating the equal protection clause and substantive due
process.
A statute or provision which was declared
unconstitutional is not a law. It confers no rights; it imposes
no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is
inoperative as if it has not been passed at all.
The Court said that they are aware that
the clause or for three (3) months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less was reinstated in
Republic Act No. 8042 upon promulgation of Republic Act
No. 10022 in 2010.
Ruling on the constitutional issue

necessity must precede or accompany, and not follow, the

City of Manila vs Chinese Community of Manila

166 Ind., 511; Stearns vs. Barre, 73 Vt., 281; Wheeling, etc.
R. R. Co. vs. Toledo, Ry. etc. Co., 72 Ohio St., 368.)

City of Manila vs Chinese Community of Manila , GR 14355

The general power to exercise the right of eminent domain

(1D), 31 October 1919

must not be confused with the right to exercise it in

a particular case. The power of the legislature to confer,

FACTS: Petitioner (City of Manila) filed a petition praying

upon municipal corporations and other entities within the

that certain lands be expropriated for the purpose of

State, general authority to exercise the right of eminent

constructing a public improvement namely, the extension of

domain cannot be questioned by the courts, but that

Rizal Avenue, Manila and claiming that such expropriation

general authority of municipalities or entities must not be

was necessary.

confused with the right to exercise it in particular instances.

Herein defendants, on the other hand, alleged (a) that no

The moment the municipal corporation or entity attempts to

necessity existed for said expropriation and (b) that the

exercise the authority conferred, it must comply with the

land in question was a cemetery, which had been used as

conditions

such for many years, and was covered with sepulchres and

necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal

monuments, and that the same should not be converted

corporation to exercise the right of eminent domain is

into a street for public purposes.

admittedly within the power of the legislature. But whether

accompanying

the

authority. The

or not the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the

In the hierarchy of laws, the Constitution is

supreme. No branch or office of the government
may exercise its powers in any manner inconsistent with
the Constitution, regardless of the existence of any law that
supports such exercise. The Constitution cannot be
trumped by any other law. All laws must be read in light of
the Constitution. Any law that is inconsistent with it is a
nullity.

The lower court ruled that there was no necessity for the

right in a particular case under the conditions imposed by

expropriation of the particular strip of land in question.

the general authority, is a question which the courts have

Petitioner therefore assails the decision of the lower court

the right to inquire into.

claiming that it (petitioner) has the authority to expropriate

The conflict in the authorities upon the question whether

any land it may desire; that the only function of the court in

the necessity for the exercise of the right of eminent

such proceedings is to ascertain the value of the land in

domain is purely legislative and not

Thus, when a law or a provision of law is null

because it is inconsistent with the Constitution, the
nullity cannot be cured by reincorporation or
reenactment of the same or a similar law or provision.
A law or provision of law that was already declared
unconstitutional remains as such unless circumstances
have so changed as to warrant a reverse conclusion.

question; that neither the court nor the owners of the land

judicial, arises generally in the wisdom and propriety of the

can inquire into the advisable purpose of the expropriation

legislature in authorizing the exercise of the right of eminent

or ask any questions concerning the necessities therefor;

domain instead of in the question of the right to exercise it

that the courts are mere appraisers of the land involved in

in a particular case. (Creston Waterworks Co. vs. McGrath,

expropriation proceedings, and, when the value of the land

89 Iowa, 502.)

The Court observed that the reinstated clause,

this time as provided in Republic Act. No. 10022, violates
the constitutional rights to equal protection and due
process.96 Petitioner as well as the Solicitor General have
failed to show any compelling change in the circumstances
that would warrant us to revisit the precedent.

is fixed by the method adopted by the law, to render a

By the weight of authorities, the courts have the power of

judgment in favor of the defendant for its value.

restricting the exercise of eminent domain to the actual

The Court declared, once again, the clause, or

for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term,
whichever is less in Section 7 of Republic Act No. 10022

reasonable necessities of the case and for the purposes

ISSUE: W/N the courts may inquire into and hear proof

designated by the law. (Fairchild vs. City of St. Paul. 48

upon the necessity of the expropriation?

Minn., 540.)

HELD: Yes. The very foundation of the right to exercise

eminent domain is a genuine necessity, and that necessity
must be of a public character. The ascertainment of the