1 Crespo vs Mogul

Petitioner Mario Crespo was accused for Estafa in the Circuit Criminal Court
of Lucena City. When the case was set for arraignment, the accused filed a
motion for defer arraignment on the ground that there was a pending
petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice. However, Justice
Mogul denied the motion, but the arraignment was deferred in a much
later date to afford time for the petitioner to elevate the mater to the
appellate court.

The accused filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a
preliminary writ of injunction to the CA. The CA ordered the trial court to
refrain from proceeding with the arraignment until further orders of the
Court. Undersecretary of Justice, Hon. Catalino Macaraig Jr., resolved the
petition for review reversed the resolution of the office of the Provincial
Fiscal and directed the Fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the
information filed against the accused. Judge Mogul denied the motion for
dismissal of the case ad set the arraignment. The accused then filed a
petition for Certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with petition for the
issuance of preliminary writ of prohibition and/or temporary restraining
order in the CA. The CA dismissed the order and lifted the restraining order.

Issue: Whether the trial court may refuse to grant a motion to dismiss filed
by the Fiscal under orders fro, the Secretary of Justice and insists on
arraignment and trial on the merits.

modify or reverse the action or opinion of the fiscal. Consequently the

Secretary of Justice may direct that a motion to dismiss the case be filed in
Court or otherwise, that an information be filed in Court.

The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action.

The Court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case, which is the
authority to hear and determine the case. The preliminary investigation
conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima
facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated
upon the filing of the information in the proper court.
2 Roberts vs CA
THE FACTS: Petitioners, who are corporate officers and members of the
Board of Pepsi Cola Products Phils., Inc. were prosecuted in connection with
the Pepsi Number Fever promotion by handlers of the supposedly
winning 349 Pepsi crowns. Of the four cases filed against the petitioners,
probable cause was found by the investigating prosecutor only for the
crime of estafa, but not for the other alleged offenses.
On 12 April 1993, the information was filed with the trial court without
anything accompanying it. A copy of the investigating prosecutors Joint
Resolution was forwarded to and received by the trial court only on 22 April
1993. However, no affidavits of the witnesses, transcripts of stenographic
notes of the proceedings during the preliminary investigation, or other
documents submitted in the course thereof were found in the records of
the case as of 19 May 1993.

HELD:
It is a cardinal principle that all criminal actions either commenced by
complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and
control of the fiscal. 17 The institution of a criminal action depends upon
the sound discretion of the fiscal. The reason for placing the criminal
prosecution under the direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent
malicious or unfounded prosecution by private persons. 19 It cannot be
controlled by the complainant.

On 15 April 1993, petitioners Roberts, et al. filed a petition for review to the
Department of Justice seeking the reversal of the finding of probable cause
by the investigating prosecutor. They also moved for the suspension of the
proceedings and the holding in abeyance of the issuance of warrants of
arrest against them. Meanwhile, the public prosecutor also moved to defer
the arraignment of the accused-appellants pending the final disposition of
the appeal to the Department of Justice.

However, the action of the fiscal or prosecutor is not without any limitation
or control. The same is subject to the approval of the provincial or city
fiscal or the chief state prosecutor as the case maybe and it maybe
elevated for review to the Secretary of Justice who has the power to affirm,

On 17 May 1993, respondent Judge Asuncion issued the challenged order

(1) denying, on the basis of Crespovs. Mogul, the foregoing motions
respectively filed by the petitioners and the public prosecutor, and
directing the issuance of the warrants of arrest after June 1993 and

setting the arraignment on 28 June 1993. In part, respondent judge stated

in his order that since the case is already pending in this Court for trial,
following whatever opinion the Secretary of Justice may have on the matter
would undermine the independence and integrity his court. To justify his
order, he quoted the ruling of the Supreme Court in Crespo, which stated:

3.
May the Supreme Court determine in this [sic] proceedings the
existence of probable cause either for the issuance of warrants of arrest
against the petitioners or for their prosecution for the crime of estafa?

III. THE RULING

In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the
Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action of the fiscal may be
disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice should, as far as
practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from
the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already
been filed in Court. The matter should be left entirely for the determination
of the Court.

Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that the respondent
judge had not the slightest basis at all for determining probable cause
when he ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest. After finding that a
copy of the public prosecutors Joint Resolution had in fact been forwarded
to, and received by, the trial court on 22 April 1993, the CA denied
petitioners application for writ of preliminary injunction. The CA ruled that
the Joint Resolution was sufficient in itself to have been relied upon by
respondent Judge in convincing himself that probable cause indeed exists
for the purpose of issuing the corresponding warrants of arrest and that
the mere silence of the records or the absence of any express declaration
in the questioned order as to the basis of such finding does not give rise to
an adverse inference, for the respondent Judge enjoys in his favor the
presumption of regularity in the performance of his official duty. Roberts, et
al. sought reconsideration, but meanwhile, the DOJ affirmed the finding of
probable cause by the investigating prosecutor. The CA therefore dismissed
the petition for mootness.
II. THE ISSUES 1. Did Judge Asuncion commit grave abuse of discretion
in denying, on the basis of Crespo vs. Mogul, the motions to suspend
proceedings and hold in abeyance the issuance of warrants of arrest and to
defer arraignment until after the petition for review filed with the DOJ shall
have been resolved?
2.
Did Judge Asuncion commit grave abuse of discretion in ordering the
issuance of warrants of arrest without examining the records of the
preliminary investigation?

[The Court, in a 7-5-2 vote, GRANTED the petition. It SET ASIDE the
decision and resolution of the CA, the resolutions of the DOJ 349
Committee, and the order of respondent judge.]

1.
YES, Judge Asuncion committed grave abuse of discretion in denying,
on the basis of Crespo vs. Mogul, the motions to suspend proceedings and
hold in abeyance the issuance of warrants of arrest and to defer
arraignment until after the petition for review filed with the DOJ shall have
been resolved.
There is nothing in Crespo vs. Mogul which bars the DOJ from taking
cognizance of an appeal, by way of a petition for review, by an accused in
a criminal case from an unfavorable ruling of the investigating prosecutor.
It merely advised the DOJ to, as far as practicable, refrain from
entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal,
when the complaint or information has already been filed in Court.
Whether the DOJ would affirm or reverse the challenged Joint Resolution is
still a matter of guesswork. Accordingly, it was premature for respondent
Judge Asuncion to deny the motions to suspend proceedings and to defer
arraignment on the following grounds:
This case is already pending in this Court for trial. To follow whatever
opinion the Secretary of Justice may have on the matter would undermine
the independence and integrity of this Court. This Court is still capable of
administering justice.
The real and ultimate test of the independence and integrity of this court is
not the filing of the aforementioned motions [to suspend proceedings and
issuance of warrants of arrest and to defer arraignment] at that stage but
the filing of a motion to dismiss or to withdraw the information on the basis
of a resolution of the petition for review reversing the Joint Resolution of
the investigating prosecutor. However, once a motion to dismiss or
withdraw the information is filed the trial judge may grant or deny it, not
out of subservience to the Secretary of Justice, but in faithful exercise of
judicial prerogative.

2.
YES, Judge Asuncion committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering
the issuance of warrants of arrest without examining the records of the
preliminary investigation.
The teachings then of Soliven, Inting, Lim, Allado, and Webb reject the
proposition that the investigating prosecutors certification in an
information or his resolution which is made the basis for the filing of the
information, or both, would suffice in the judicial determination of probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. In Webb, this Court assumed
that since the respondent Judges had before them not only the 26-page
resolution of the investigating panel but also the affidavits of the
prosecution witnesses and even the counter-affidavits of the respondents,
they (judges) made personal evaluation of the evidence attached to the
records of the case.
In this case, nothing accompanied the information upon its filing on 12
April 1993 with the trial court. A copy of the Joint Resolution was forwarded
to, and received by, the trial court only on 22 April 1993. And as revealed
by the certification of respondent judges clerk of court, no affidavits of the
witnesses, transcripts of stenographic notes of the proceedings during the
preliminary investigation, or other documents submitted in the course
thereof were found in the records of this case as of 19 May 1993. Clearly,
when respondent Judge Asuncion issued the assailed order of 17 May 1993
directing, among other things, the issuance of warrants of arrest, he had
only the information, amended information, and Joint Resolution as bases
thereof. He did not have the records or evidence supporting the
prosecutor's finding of probable cause. And strangely enough, he made no
specific finding of probable cause; he merely directed the issuance of
warrants of arrest after June 21, 1993. It may, however, be argued that
the directive presupposes a finding of probable cause. But then compliance
with a constitutional requirement for the protection of individual liberty
cannot be left to presupposition, conjecture, or even convincing logic.
3.
NO, the Supreme Court MAY NOT determine in this [sic] proceedings
the existence of probable cause either for the issuance of warrants of
arrest against the petitioners or for their prosecution for the crime of
estafa.
Ordinarily, the determination of probable cause is not lodged with this
Court. Its duty in an appropriate case is confined to the issue of whether
the executive or judicial determination, as the case may be, of probable
cause was done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction. This is consistent with the

general rule that criminal prosecutions may not be restrained or stayed by

injunction, preliminary or final.
There are, however, exceptions to the foregoing rule. But the Court refused
to reevaluate the evidence to determine if indeed there is probable cause
for the issuance of warrants of arrest in this case. For the respondent judge
did not, in fact, find that probable cause exists, and if he did he did not
have the basis therefor. Moreover, the records of the preliminary
investigation in this case are not with the Court. They were forwarded by
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to the DOJ in compliance
with the latter's 1st Indorsement of 21 April 1993. The trial court and the
DOJ must be required to perform their duty.
3 Fuentes vs Sandiganbayan
4 Villaflor vs Vivar
Facts: An information for slight physical injuries was filed agaist Dindo Vivar
for beating Gian Paulo Villaflor outside the Fat Tueasday Bar. On his way
out, Gian met Dindo who told that next time, I will use my gun on you. The
injuries sustained by Gian turned out to be more serious than they had
appeared so an Information for serious physical injuries was filed and the
charge for slight physical injuries was withdrawn. Another Information for
grave threats was filed against Vivar. Vivar, instead of filing a counter
affidavit, he filed a Motion to Quash the Information for grave threats since
it was made in connection with the charge of serious physical injuries
should have been absorbed by the latter, and because the court did not
acquire jurisdiction over it. MTC denied the motion to quash. Vivar filed for
a motion for reconsideration which was again denied. He was arraigned
and pleaded not guilty. Vivar filed a petition for certiorari in the RTC RTC
granted the motion to quash and denied the motion for reconsideration
filed by Villaflor. Villaflor filed a petiton for certiorari with the Supreme
Court.
Issues: (1) Can the court motu proprio order the dismissal of the case on
the ground of lack of preliminary investigation?
(2) Should the failure of the public prosecutor to conduct preliminary
investigation be considered a ground to quash the informations?
Held: (1) The Court ruled that the absence of a preliminary investigation
does not impair the validity of the information. In the case a bar, a
preliminary investigation was for slight physical injuries was conducted by
the assistant city prosecutor. But the Information was however amended
when petitioners injuries turned out to be more serious. However the
change in the information was only a formal amendment and did not

violate the right of Vivar against hasty, malicious and oppressive

prosecution, since it still involves the same facts.
(2) Section 3, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides
the grounds on which an accused can move to quash the complaint or
information. Nowhere in the rule mention of a lack of preliminary
investigation as a ground for a motion to quash. When accused failed to
assert any ground for a motion to quash before arraignment, he has
deemed waived his right.
5 Uy vs SB
Issue: Wether or not the prosecutory power of the Ombudsman has no
authority to prosecute cases falling within the jurisdiction of regular courts?

Held: No. The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the
Ombudsman us plenary and unqualified. It has been held that the clause
any illegal act or omission of any public officials is broad enough to
embrace all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and non-feasance
committed by public officers and employees during their tenure of office.

malfeasance bad and illegal acts, especially by a public official.

Misfeasance An act that is legal but performed improperly.
Nonfeasance omission to do a duty.

The court held in the case of Sanchez vs. Demetriou that the power of the
Ombudsman under Section 15 (1) of RA 6770 is not an exclusive authority
but rather a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense
charged. Thus, Administrative Order No. 8 issued by the Office of
Ombudman provides: The prosecution of case cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan shall be under the direct exclusive control and supervision
by the Office of the Ombudsman. The law recognizes a concurrence of
jurisdiction between the Office of the Ombudsman and other investigate
agencies of government in the prosecution of cases cognizable by regular
courts.
6 Sales vs SB

Facts: The petitioner, the incumbent mayor of Pagudpud Ilocos Norte, shot
the former mayor and his political rival Atty. Benemerito. After the
shooting, he surrendered himself and hence the police inspector and wife
of the victim filed a criminal complaint for murder against him. The judge
after conducting the preliminary examination (p.e. for brevity) found
probable cause and issued a warrant of arrest. Also after conducting the
preliminary investigation (p.i. for brevity), he issued a resolution forwarding
the case to the prosecutor for appropriate action. Petitioner received a
subpoena directing him to file his counter affidavit, affidavit of witnesses
and other supporting documents. He did it the following day. While
proceedings are ongoing, he filed a petition for habeas corpus with the C.A
alleging that: the warrant was null and void because the judge who issued
it was a relative by affinity of the private respondent and the p.e. and the
p.i. were illegal and irregular as the judge doesnt have jurisdiction on the
case. The C.A. granted the petition holding that the judge was a relative by
affinity by 3rd degree to the private respondent and the p.i. he conducted
has 2 stages, the p.e. and the p.i. proper. The proceeding now consists only
of one stage. He conducted the requisite investigation prior to the issuance
of warrant of arrest. Moreover he did not complete it. He only examined
the witness of the complainant. But the prosecution instead of conducting
p.i. of his own forwarded the records to the Ombudsman (OMB for brevity)
for the latter to conduct the same. The OMB directed the petitioner to
submit his counter affidavit, but he did not comply with it finding the same
superfluous. The graft investigator recommended the filing of information
for murder which the OMB approved. Petitioner received a copy of the
resolution but prevented seeking reconsideration thereof he filed a motion
to defer issuance of warrant of arrest pending the determination of
probable cause. The Sandiganbayan denied the motion. This is now a
petition for review on the decision of the Sandiganbayan.
Issues: (1) Whether or Not the OMB followed the procedure in conducting
preliminary investigation.
(2) Whether or Not petitioner was afforded an opportunity to be heard and
to submit controverting evidence.
Held: The proper procedure in the conduct of preliminary investigation was
not followed because of the following reasons. Firstly, the preliminary
investigation was conducted by 3 different investigators, none of whom
completed the preliminary investigation There was not one continuous
proceeding but rather, cases of passing the buck, the last one being the
OMB throwing the buck to the Sandiganbayan. Secondly, the charge of
murder is a non bailable offense. The gravity of the offense alone should
have merited a deeper and more thorough preliminary investigation. The
OMB did nothing of the sort but wallowed the resolution of the graft

investigator. He did a worse job than the judge, by actually adopting the
resolution of the graft investigator without doing anything and threw
everything to the Sandiganbayan for evaluation. Thirdly, a person under
preliminary investigation by the OMB is entitled to a motion for
reconsideration, as maintained by the Rules of Procedure by the OMB. The
filing of the motion for reconsideration is an integral part of the preliminary
investigation proper. The denial thereof is tantamount to the denial of the
right itself to a preliminary investigation. This fact alone renders
preliminary investigation conducted in this case incomplete. And lastly, it
was patent error for the Sandiganbayan to have relied purely on the OMBs
certification of probable cause given the prevailing facts of the case much
more so in the face of the latters flawed report and one side factual
findings.
The court cannot accept the Sandiganbayans assertion of having found
probable cause on its own, considering the OMBs defective report and
findings, which merely relied on the testimonies of the witnesses for the
prosecution and disregarded the evidence for the defense.

Judgment is rendered setting aside the resolution of the Sandiganbayan,

ordering the Sandiganbayan to quash the warrant of arrest and remanding
the OMB for completion of the preliminary investigation.
7 Hegerty vs CA
8 Ocampo vs Abando
FACTS:

On 26 August 2006, a mass grave was discovered by elements of the 43rd

Infantry Brigade of the Philippine Army at Sitio Sapang Daco, Barangay
Kaulisihan, Inopacan, Leyte.1The mass grave contained skeletal remains of
67 individuals believed to be victims of "Operation Venereal Disease"
(Operation VD) launched by members of the Communist Party of the
Philippines/New Peoples Army/National Democratic Front of the Philippines
(CPP/NPA/NDFP) to purge their ranks of suspected military informers.

P C/Insp. Almaden of the (PNP) Regional Office 8 and Staff Judge Advocate
Captain Allan Tiu (Army Captain Tiu) of the 8th Infantry Division of the
Philippine Army sent 12 undated letters to the Provincial Prosecutor of

Leyte through Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Rosulo U. Vivero (Prosecutor

Vivero).The letters requested appropriate legal action on 12 complaintaffidavits attached therewith accusing 71 named members of the
Communist Party of the Philippines/New Peoples Army/National Democratic
Front of the Philippines (CPP/NPA/NDFP) of murder, including petitioners
herein along with several other unnamed members.

Also attached to the letters were the affidavits of Zacarias Piedad,Leonardo

C. Tanaid, Floro M. Tanaid, Numeriano Beringuel, Glecerio Roluna and
Veronica P. Tabara. They narrated that they were former members of the
CPP/NPA/NDFP.According to them, Operation VD was ordered in 1985 by
the CPP/NPA/NDFP Central Committee.Allegedly, petitioners Saturnino C.
Ocampo (Ocampo),Randall B. Echanis (Echanis),Rafael G. Baylosis
(Baylosis),and Vicente P. Ladlad (Ladlad)were then members of the Central
Committee.

From 1985 to 1992, at least 100 people had been abducted, hog-tied,
tortured and executed by members of the CPP/NPA/NDF pursuant to
Operation VD.

On the basis of the 12 letters and their attachments, Prosecutor Vivero

issued a subpoena requiring, among others, petitioners to submit their
counter-affidavits and those of their witnesses.Petitioner Ocampo
submitted his counter-affidavit.Petitioners Echanisand Baylosis did not file
counter-affidavits because they were allegedly not served the copy of the
complaint and the attached documents or evidence. Counsel of petitioner
Ladlad made a formal entry of appearance on 8 December 2006 during the
preliminary investigation. However, petitioner Ladlad did not file a counteraffidavit because he was allegedly not served a subpoena.

In a Resolution, Prosecutor Vivero recommended the filing of an

Information for 15 counts of multiple murder against 54 named members
of the CPP/NPA/NDFP, including petitioners herein

Prosecutor Vivero also recommended that Zacarias Piedad, Leonardo

Tanaid, Numeriano Beringuel and Glecerio Roluna be dropped as

respondents and utilized as state witnesses, as their testimonies were vital

to the success of the prosecution.

Judge Abando issued an Order denying the motion.Petitioners Echanis and

Baylosis filed a Motion for Reconsideration but before being able to rule
thereon, Judge Abando issued an Order transmitting the records of Criminal
Case to the Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC Manila.

The Information was filed before the (RTC) of Hilongos, Leyte, Branch 18
(RTC Hilongos, Leyte) presided by Judge Ephrem S. Abando (Judge Abando).

On 6 March 2007, Judge Abando issued an Order finding probable cause "in
the commission by all mentioned accused of the crime charged." He
ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest against them with no
recommended bail for their temporary liberty.

On 16 March 2007, petitioner Ocampo filed a special civil action for

certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking the
annulment of the 6 March 2007 Order of Judge Abando and the Resolution
of Prosecutor Vivero.The petition prayed for the unconditional release of
petitioner Ocampo from PNP custody, as well as the issuance of a
temporary restraining order/ writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the
conduct of further proceedings during the pendency of the petition.

Petitioner Ocampo argued that a case for rebellion against him and 44
others (including petitioners Echanis and Baylosisand Ladlad) was then
pending before the RTC Makati, Branch 150 (RTC Makati).Putting forward
the political offense doctrine, petitioner Ocampo argues that common
crimes, such as murder in this case, are already absorbed by the crime of
rebellion when committed as a necessary means, in connection with and in
furtherance of rebellion.

While the proceedings were suspended, petitioner Echanis was arrested by

virtue of the warrant of arrest issued by Judge Abando. On 1 February
2008, petitioners Echanis and Baylosis filed a Motion for Judicial
Reinvestigation/ Determination of Probable Cause with Prayer to Dismiss
the Case Outright and Alternative Prayer to Recall/ Suspend Service of
Warrant.

Petitioner Ladlad and Baylosis filed an Urgent Motion to Fix Bail and a
Motion to Allow Petitioner to Post Bail respectively.The OSG interposed no
objection to the grant of aP100,000 cash bail to them. The Court granted
the motions of petitioners Ladlad and Baylosis and fixed their bail in the
amount ofP100,000, subject to the condition that their temporary release
shall be limited to the period of their actual participation in the peace
negotiations

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not petitioners were denied due process during preliminary

investigation and in the issuance of the warrant of arrest;
2. Whether the murder charges against petitioners should be dismissed
under the political offense doctrine.

HELD: The petition was denied.

POLITICAL LAW Due process

A. Preliminary Investigation

"The essence of due process is reasonable opportunity to be heard and

submit evidence in support of one's defense." What is proscribed is lack of
opportunity to be heard. Thus, one who has been afforded a chance to
present ones own side of the story cannot claim denial of due process.

Majority of the respondents did not submit their counter-affidavits because

they could no longer be found in their last known address, per return of the
subpoenas. On the other hand, Saturnino Ocampo @ Satur, Fides Lim,
Maureen Palejaro and Ruben Manatad submitted their Counter-Affidavits.
However, Vicente Ladlad and Jasmin Jerusalem failed to submit the
required Counter Affidavits in spite entry of appearance by their respective
counsels.

Section 3(d), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, allows Prosecutor Vivero to
resolve the complaint based on the evidence before him if a respondent
could not be subpoenaed. As long as efforts to reach a respondent were
made, and he was given an opportunity to present countervailing
evidence, the preliminary investigation remains valid.

In this case, the Resolution stated that efforts were undertaken to serve
subpoenas on the named respondents at their last known addresses. This
is sufficient for due process. It was only because a majority of them could
no longer be found at their last known addresses that they were not served
copies of the complaint and the attached documents or evidence.

Petitioner Ladlad, through his counsel, had every opportunity to secure

copies of the complaint after his counsels formal entry of appearance and,
thereafter, to participate fully in the preliminary investigation. Instead, he
refused to participate.

Neither can we uphold petitioner Ocampos contention that he was denied

the right to be heard. For him to claim that he was denied due process by
not being furnished a copy of the Supplemental Affidavit of Zacarias Piedad
would imply that the entire case of the prosecution rested on the
Supplemental Affidavit. The OSG has asserted that the indictment of
petitioner Ocampo was based on the collective affidavits of several other
witnesses attesting to the allegation that he was a member of the
CPP/NPA/NDFP Central Committee, which had ordered the launch of
Operation VD.

Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution provides that "no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce."

Petitioner Ocampo alleges that Judge Abando did not comply with the
requirements of the Constitution in finding the existence of probable cause
for the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners.

Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest has been defined as
"such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person
sought to be arrested." Allado v. Diokno, G.R. No. 113630, May 5,
1994.Although the Constitution provides that probable cause shall be
determined by the judge after an examination under oath or an affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses, we have ruled that a hearing is not
necessary for the determination thereof. In fact, the judges personal
examination of the complainant and the witnesses is not mandatory and
indispensable for determining the aptness of issuing a warrant of arrest.

It is enough that the judge personally evaluates the prosecutors report and
supporting documents showing the existence of probable cause for the
indictment and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or if, on the
basis of his evaluation, he finds no probable cause, to disregard the
prosecutor's resolution and require the submission of additional affidavits
of witnesses to aid him in determining its existence. Delos Santos-Reyes v.
Montesa, Jr. 317 Phil. 101

The determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest

against petitioners is addressed to the sound discretion of Judge Abando as
the trial judge.

CRIMINAL LAW - political offense doctrine

B. Issuance of the Warrants of Arrest

3 Manotoc Jr vs CA
Under the political offense doctrine, "common crimes, perpetrated in
furtherance of a political offense, are divested of their character as
"common" offenses and assume the political complexion of the main crime
of which they are mere ingredients, and, consequently, cannot be punished
separately from the principal offense, or complexed with the same, to
justify the imposition of a graver penalty." People v. Hernandez, 99 Phil.
515

Any ordinary act assumes a different nature by being absorbed in the

crime of rebellion.Thus, when a killing is committed in furtherance of
rebellion, the killing is not homicide or murder. Rather, the killing assumes
the political complexion of rebellion as its mere ingredient and must be
prosecuted and punished as rebellion alone.

But when the political offense doctrine is asserted as a defense in the trial
court, it becomes crucial for the court to determine whether the act of
killing was done in furtherance of a political end, and for the political
motive of the act to be conclusively demonstrated.

REMEDIAL LAW Amendment or Substitution

Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Zamboanga Del Norte v. CA, 401 Phil
905 if during trial, petitioners are able to show that the alleged murders
were indeed committed in furtherance of rebellion, Section 14, Rule 110 of
the Rules of Court provides the remedy of Amendment or substitution.

Thus, if it is shown that the proper charge against petitioners should have
been simple rebellion, the trial court shall dismiss the murder charges upon
the filing of the Information for simple rebellion, as long as petitioners
would not be placed in double jeopardy.
Bail
1 Stack vs Boyle
2 Yap Jr Vs CA

4 Esteban vs Alhambra
5 Taborite vs Sollesta
6 Serapio vs SB
Facts: Atty. Edward Serapio (petitioner) filed two petitions in the SC; these
are: 1. A petition for certiorari assailing the resolutions of the Third division
of the Sandiganbayan denying his petition for bail, motion for
reinvestigation and motion to quash; 2. Petition for Habeas Corpus.

Petitioner was charged with the crime of plunder together with Former
President Joseph Estrada and son Jinggoy Estrada among others. Petitioner
was a member of the Board of Trustees and legal counsel of Erap Muslim
Youth Foundation. He allegedly received, on behalf of the said foundation,
millions of pesos coming from illegal activities.

The Ombudsman recommended the filing of a case against him before the
Sandiganbayan. A warrant for his arrest was issued. Upon learning of the
said warrant he voluntarily surrendered to the PNP. Petitioner, thereafter,
file an Urgent Motion for Bail but such motion is opposed by the
prosecution for the reason that petitioner should be arraign first before he
can avail of Bail. Later on Petitioner simultaneously filed a motion to quash.

The bail hearing was reset several times due to various pleadings filed by
petitioner and the prosecution.

Due to this, petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus for the reason that
the prosecution have waived their right to present evidence in opposition
to his petition for bail; the prosecution launched an endless barrage of
obstructive and dilatory moves to prevent the conduct of the bail hearings;
and, on the failure of the People to adduce strong evidence of his guilt. For
the said reasons, he is still being deprived of his liberty.

Petitioner cited also Moncupa vs. Enrile, which in such case the Court held
that habeas corpus extends to instances where detention, while valid from
its inception, has later become arbitrary.

Issue: Whether the petition habeas corpus should be granted?

Decision: No. SC finds no basis for the issuance of the writ of habeas
corpus. General rule applies.

Petition for habeas corpus is not the appropriate remedy for asserting
ones right to bail. It cannot be availed of where accused is entitled to bail
not as a matter of right but on the discretion of the court and the latter has
not abused such discretion in refusing to grant bail, or has not even
exercised said discretion. The proper recourse is to file an application for
bail with the court where the criminal case is pending and to allow
hearings thereon to proceed.

Moncupa vs Enrile does not apply in this case because petitioners restraint
of liberty did not become arbitrary. His application for bail has yet to
commence (to be heard).

The delay in the hearing of his petition for bail cannot be pinned solely to
the Sandiganbayan or on the prosecution because he himself is partly to
be blamed (his actions caused delay too.

7 Chua vs CA
8 Leviste vs CA
Facts: Jose Antonio Leviste was charged with the crime of murder but was
convicted by the RTC for the lesser crime of homicide. He appealed the
RTC's decision to the CA then he filed an application for admission to bail
pending appeal, due to his advanced age and health condition, and
claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part.
The CA denied his application on the ground that the discretion to extend
bail during the course of appeal should be exercised with grave caution
and only for strong reasons. That bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or
aged detainee or a prisoner needing medical care outside the prison
facility.
On this matter, Leviste questioned the ruling of the CA and averred that
the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in the denial of his application
for bail considering that none of the conditions justifying denial of bail
under the Sec. 5 (3) Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was present. That when
the penalty imposed by the trial court is more than six years but not more
than 20 years and the circumstances in the above-mentioned provision are
absent, bail must be granted to an appellant pending appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying the application for bail of Leviste.
Ruling: No, under Sec 5 of Rule 114 bail is discretionary, upon conviction by
the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment. Under par. 3 of the same rule if the penalty impose is more
than 6 years the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail be cancelled upon
a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following
or other circumstances:
that he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has
committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;

As a general rule, the writ of habeas corpus will not issue where the person
alleged to be restrained of his liberty in custody of an officer under a
process issued by the court which jurisdiction to do so.
In exceptional circumstances, habeas corpus may be granted by the courts
even when the person concerned is detained pursuant to a valid arrest or
his voluntary surrender, for this writ of liberty is recognized as the
fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against
arbitrary and lawless state action due to its ability to cut through barriers
of form and procedural mazes.

that he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence,

or violated the conditions of his bail without a valid justification;
that he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional
pardon;
that the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if
released on bail; or

that there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the
pendency of the appeal.
That bail is expressly declared to be discretionary pending appeal and it
cannot be said that CA committed grave abuse of discretion. After

conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence terminates and,

accordingly, the constitutional right to bail ends, from then on the grant of
bail is subject to judicial discretion.