SECOND DIVISION

[A.C. No. 4749. January 20, 2000.]

SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., complainant, vs. ATTY. FRANCISCO
R. LLAMAS, respondent.
SYNOPSIS
Soliman M. Santos, Jr., a member of the bar, sent a letter-complaint
dated February 8, 1997 to this Court. He alleged that Atty. Francisco
R. Llamas for a number of years had not indicated the proper
Professional Tax Receipt (PTR) and Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) Official Receipt Numbers and data (date and place of issuance) in
his pleadings. If at all, he only indicated "IBP Rizal 259060," but he had
been using this for at least three years already. This matter was being
brought in the context of Rule 138, Section 1 which qualifies a that only
a duly admitted member of the bar "who is in good and regular
standing, is entitled to practice law." In his comment,
Atty.Llamas claimed that since 1992, he publicly made it clear in his
Income Tax Return that he had only a limited practice of law and his
principal occupation is farming. And being a senior citizen since 1992,
he is legally exempt under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7432 in the
payment of taxes. Thus, he honestly believed in view of his
detachment from a total practice of law, but only a limited practice, the
subsequent payment by him of dues with the Integrated Bar is covered
by such exemption. Nonetheless, despite such honest belief, he was
ready to tender such fulfillment on payment.
The Court ruled that respondent can engage in the practice of law only
by paying his dues, and it does not matter that his practice is "limited."
While it is true that R.A. No. 7432, 4, grants senior citizens "exemption
from the payment of individual income taxes: provided, that their
annual taxable income does not exceed the poverty level as
determined by the National Economic and Development Authority
(NEDA) for that year," the exemption does not include payment of
membership or association dues. Respondent's failure to pay his IBP
dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in court
indeed merited the most severe penalty. However, in view of
respondent's advanced age, his express willingness to pay his dues
and plea for a more temperate application of the law, the Court
believed that the penalty of one year suspension from the practice of
law or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later, was
appropriate.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP);
MEMBERSHIP DUES; PAYMENT IS REQUIRED TO LIMITED PRACTICE.
Respondent can engage in the practice of law only by paying his dues,
and it does not matter that his practice is "limited."
2. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7432;
SENIOR CITIZENS EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF INDIVIDUAL INCOME
TAXES; PAYMENT OF MEMBERSHIP OR ASSOCIATION DUES ARE NOT
INCLUDED THEREIN. While it is true that R.A. No. 7432, 4 grants
senior citizens "exemption from the payment of individual income
taxes: provided, that their annual taxable income does not exceed the
poverty level as determined by the National Economic and
Development Authority (NEDA) for that year," the exemption does not
include payment of membership or association dues.
3. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY; VIOLATED BY MISREPRESENTATION OF LAWYER TO
PUBLIC AND COURTS THAT HE HAS PAID HIS IBP DUES. By indicating
"IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to the
public and the courts that he had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal
Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides: Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. CANON 7 A
LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF
THE LEGAL PROFESSION, AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR. CANON 10 A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS
AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT. Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do
any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he
mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; PENALTY; MITIGATED BY LAWYER'S ADVANCED AGE,
EXPRESS WILLINGNESS TO PAY HIS IBP DUES AND PLEA FOR MORE
TEMPERATE APPLICATION OF LAW. Respondent's failure to pay his
IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in court
indeed merit the most severe penalty. However, in view of
respondent's advanced age, his express willingness to pay his dues
and plea for a more temperate application of the law, we believe the
penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law or until he has
paid his IBP dues, whichever is later, is appropriate.
DECISION

MENDOZA, J p:
This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar
membership dues filed against respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas.
In a letter-complaint to this Court dated February 8, 1997, complainant
Soliman M. Santos, Jr., himself a member of the bar, alleged that:
On my oath as an attorney, I wish to bring to your attention and
appropriate sanction the matter of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas who, for a
number of years now, has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP O.R.
Nos. and data (date & place of issuance) in his pleadings. If at all, he
only indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" but he has been using thisfor at least
three years already, as shown by the following attached sample
pleadings in various courts in 1995, 1996 and 1997: (originals
available)
Annex A "Ex-Parte Manifestation and Submission" dated December
1, 1995 in Civil Case No. Q-95-25253, RTC, Br. 224, QC
Annex B "Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation Motion" dated November
13, 1996 in Sp. Proc. No. 95-030, RTC Br. 259 (not 257), Paraaque, MM
Annex C "An Urgent and Respectful Plea for Extension of Time to File
Required Comment and Opposition" dated January 17, 1997 in CA-G.R.
SP (not Civil Case) No. 42286, CA 6th Div.
This matter is being brought in the context of Rule 138, Section 1
which qualifies that only a duly admitted member of the bar "who is in
good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law." There is also
Rule 139-A, Section 10 which provides that "default in the payment of
annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in
the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a
ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from
the Roll of Attorneys."
Among others, I seek clarification (e.g. a certification) and appropriate
action on the bar standing of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas both with the
Bar Confidant and with the IBP, especially its Rizal Chapter of which
Atty. Llamas purports to be a member.
Please note that while Atty. Llamas indicates "IBP Rizal 259060"
sometimes, he does not indicate any PTR for payment of professional
tax.
Under the Rules, particularly Rule 138, Sections 27 and 28, suspension
of an attorney may be done not only by the Supreme Court but also by
the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court (thus, we are also copy
furnishing some of these courts). cdtai
Finally, it is relevant to note the track record of Atty. Francisco
R. Llamas, as shown by:
1. his dismissal as Pasay City Judge per Supreme Court Admin. Matter
No. 1037-CJ En Banc Decision on October 28, 1981 (in SCRA)
2. his conviction for estafa per Decision dated June 30, 1994 in Crim.
Case No. 11787, RTC Br. 66, Makati, MM (see attached copy of the
Order dated February 14, 1995 denying the motion for reconsideration
of the conviction which is purportedly on appeal in the Court of
Appeals).
Attached to the letter-complaint were the pleadings dated December 1,
1995, November 13, 1996, and January 17, 1997 referred to by
complainant, bearing, at the end thereof, what appears to be
respondent's signature above his name, address and the receipt
number "IBP Rizal 259060." 1 Also attached was a copy of the
order, 2dated February 14, 1995, issued by Judge Eriberto U. Rosario,
Jr. of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, Makati, denying respondent's
motion for reconsideration of his conviction, in Criminal Case No.
11787, for violation of Art. 316, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code.
On April 18, 1997, complainant filed a certification 3 dated March 18,
1997, by the then president of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
Atty. Ida R. Macalinao-Javier, that respondent's "last payment of his IBP
dues was in 1991. Since then he has not paid or remitted any amount
to cover his membership fees up to the present."
On July 7, 1997, respondent was required to comment on the complaint
within ten days from receipt of notice, after which the case was
referred to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation. In his
comment-memorandum, 4 dated June 3, 1998, respondent alleged: 5
3. That with respect to the complainant's absurd claim that for using in
1995, 1996 and 1997 the same O.R. No. 259060 of the Rizal IBP,
respondent is automatically no longer a member in good standing.
Precisely, as cited under the context of Rule 138, only an admitted
member of the bar who is in good standing is entitled to practice law.
The complainant's basis in claiming that the undersigned was no
longer in good standing, were as above cited, the October 28, 1981
Supreme Court decision of dismissal and the February 14, 1995
conviction for Violation of Article 316 RPC, concealment of
encumbrances.

As above pointed out also, the Supreme Court dismissal decision was
set aside and reversed and respondent was even promoted from City
Judge of Pasay City to Regional Trial Court Judge of Makati, Br. 150.
Also as pointed out, the February 14, 1995 decision in Crim. Case No.
11787 was appealed to the Court of Appeals and is still pending.
Complainant need not even file this complaint if indeed the decision of
dismissal as a Judge was never set aside and reversed, and also had
the decision of conviction for a light felony, been affirmed by the Court
of Appeals. Undersigned himself would surrender his right or privilege
to practice law.
4. That complainant capitalizes on the fact that respondent had been
delinquent in his dues.
Undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income Tax
Return, up to the present, that he had only a limited practice of law. In
fact, in his Income Tax Return, his principal occupation is a farmer of
which he is. His 30 hectares orchard and pineapple farm is located at
Calauan, Laguna.
Moreover, and more than anything else, respondent being a Senior
Citizen since 1992, is legally exempt under Section 4 of Rep. Act
7432 which took effect in 1992, in the payment of taxes, income taxes
as an example. Being thus exempt, he honestly believe in view of his
detachment from a total practice of law, but only in a limited practice,
the subsequent payment by him of dues with the Integrated Bar is
covered by such exemption. In fact, he never exercised his rights as an
IBP member to vote and be voted upon.
Nonetheless, if despite such honest belief of being covered by the
exemption and if only to show that he never in any manner wilfully and
deliberately failed and refused compliance with such dues, he is willing
at any time to fulfill and pay all past dues even with interests, charges
and surcharges and penalties. He is ready to tender such fulfillment or
payment, not for allegedly saving his skin as again irrelevantly and
frustratingly insinuated for vindictive purposes by the complainant, but
as an honest act of accepting reality if indeed it is reality for him to pay
such dues despite his candor and honest belief in all good faith, to the
contrary. prLL
On December 4, 1998, the IBP Board of Governors passed a
resolution 6 adopting and approving the report and recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner which found respondent guilty, and
recommended his suspension from the practice of law for three months
and until he pays his IBP dues. Respondent moved for a
reconsideration of the decision, but this was denied by the IBP in a
resolution, 7 dated April 22, 1999. Hence, pursuant to Rule 139-B,
12(b) of the Rules of Court, this case is here for final action on the
decision of the IBP ordering respondent's suspension for three months.
The findings of IBP Commissioner Alfredo Sanz are as follows:
On the first issue, Complainant has shown "respondent's non-indication
of the proper IBP O.R. and PTR numbers in his pleadings (Annexes "A",
"B" and "C" of the letter complaint, more particularly his use of "IBP
Rizal 259060 for at least three years."
The records also show a "Certification dated March 24, 1997 from IBP
Rizal Chapter President Ida R. Makahinud Javier that respondent's last
payment of his IBP dues was in 1991."
While these allegations are neither denied nor categorically admitted
by respondent, he has invoked and cited that "being a Senior Citizen
since 1992, he is legally exempt under Section 4 of Republic Act No.
7432 which took effect in 1992 in the payment of taxes, income taxes
as an example."
xxx xxx xxx
The above cited provision of law is not applicable in the present case.
In fact, respondent admitted that he is still in the practice of law when
he alleged that the "undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it
clear per his Income tax Return up to the present time that he had only
a limited practice of law." (par. 4 of Respondent's Memorandum).
Therefore respondent is not exempt from paying his yearly dues to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
On the second issue, complainant claims that respondent has misled
the court about his standing in the IBP by using the same IBP O.R.
number in his pleadings of at least six years and therefore liable for his
actions. Respondent in his memorandum did not discuss this issue.
First. Indeed, respondent admits that since 1992, he has engaged in
law practice without having paid his IBP dues. He likewise admits that,
as appearing in the pleadings submitted by complainant to this Court,
he indicated "IBP-Rizal 259060" in the pleadings he filed in court, at
least for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, thus misrepresenting that
such was his IBP chapter membership and receipt number for the years
in which those pleadings were filed. He claims, however, that he is only

engaged in a "limited" practice and that he believes in good faith that

he is exempt from the payment of taxes, such as income tax,
under R.A. No. 7432, 4 as a senior citizen since 1992.
Rule 139-A provides:
Sec. 9. Membership dues. Every member of the Integrated Bar shall
pay such annual dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with
the approval of the Supreme Court. A fixed sum equivalent to ten
percent (10%) of the collections from each Chapter shall be set aside
as a Welfare Fund for disabled members of the Chapter and the
compulsory heirs of deceased members thereof.
Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. Subject to the provisions of
Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six
months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar,
and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the
removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of
Attorneys.
In accordance with these provisions, respondent can engage in the
practice of law only by paying his dues, and it does not matter that his
practice is "limited." While it is true that R.A. No. 7432, 4 grants senior
citizens "exemption from the payment of individual income taxes:
provided, that their annual taxable income does not exceed the
poverty level as determined by the National Economic and
Development Authority (NEDA) for that year," the exemption does not
include payment of membership or association dues.
Second. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby
misrepresenting to the public and the courts that he had paid his IBP
dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides:
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY
AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, AND SUPPORT THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
CANON 10 A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH
TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled
by any artifice.
Respondent's failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in
the pleadings he filed in court indeed merit the most severe penalty.
However, in view of respondent's advanced age, his express
willingness to pay his dues and plea for a more temperate application
of the law, 8 we believe the penalty of one year suspension from the
practice of law or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later, is
appropriate. LLjur
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas is SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR, or until he has paid his IBP dues,
whichever is later. Let a copy of this decision be attached to
Atty. Llamas' personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and
copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and to all courts in the land.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Quisumbing, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
||| (Santos, Jr. v. Llamas, A.C. No. 4749, [January 20, 2000], 379 PHIL
569-578)

EN BANC
[B.M. No. 1370. May 9, 2005.]
LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR., REQUESTING
EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF IBP DUES.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J p:
This is a request for exemption from payment of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) dues filed by petitioner Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr.
In his letter, 1 dated 22 September 2004, petitioner sought exemption
from payment of IBP dues in the amount of P12,035.00 as alleged
unpaid accountability for the years 1977-2005. He alleged that after
being admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1961, he became part of the
Philippine Civil Service from July 1962 until 1986, then migrated to, and
worked in, the USA in December 1986 until his retirement in the year
2003. He maintained that he cannot be assessed IBP dues for the years
that he was working in the Philippine Civil Service since the Civil
Service law prohibits the practice of one's profession while in
government service, and neither can he be assessed for the years
when he was working in the USA.
On 05 October 2004, the letter was referred to the IBP for comment. 2
On 16 November 2004, the IBP submitted its comment 3 stating inter
alia: that membership in the IBP is not based on the actual practice of
law; that a lawyer continues to be included in the Roll of Attorneys as
long as he continues to be a member of the IBP; that one of the
obligations of a member is the payment of annual dues as determined
by the IBP Board of Governors and duly approved by the Supreme
Court as provided for in Sections 9 and 10, Rule 139-A of the Rules of
Court; that the validity of imposing dues on the IBP members has been
upheld as necessary to defray the cost of an Integrated Bar Program;
and that the policy of the IBP Board of Governors of no exemption from
payment of dues is but an implementation of the Court's directives for
all members of the IBP to help in defraying the cost of integration of
the bar. It maintained that there is no rule allowing the exemption of
payment of annual dues as requested by respondent, that what is
allowed is voluntary termination and reinstatement of membership. It
asserted that what petitioner could have done was to inform the
secretary of the IBP of his intention to stay abroad, so that his
membership in the IBP could have been terminated, thus, his
obligation to pay dues could have been stopped. It also alleged that
the IBP Board of Governors is in the process of discussing proposals for
the creation of an inactive status for its members, which if approved by

the Board of Governors and by this Court, will exempt inactive IBP
members from payment of the annual dues. EcSaHA
In his reply 4 dated 22 February 2005, petitioner contends that what
he is questioning is the IBP Board of Governor's Policy of NonExemption in the payment of annual membership dues of lawyers
regardless of whether or not they are engaged in active or inactive
practice. He asseverates that the Policy of Non-Exemption in the
payment of annual membership dues suffers from constitutional
infirmities, such as equal protection clause and the due process clause.
He also posits that compulsory payment of the IBP annual membership
dues would indubitably be oppressive to him considering that he has
been in an inactive status and is without income derived from his law
practice. He adds that his removal from nonpayment of annual
membership dues would constitute deprivation of property right
without due process of law. Lastly, he claims that non-practice of law
by a lawyer-member in inactive status is neither injurious to active law
practitioners, to fellow lawyers in inactive status, nor to the community
where the inactive lawyers-members reside.
Plainly, the issue here is: whether or nor petitioner is entitled to
exemption from payment of his dues during the time that he was
inactive in the practice of law that is, when he was in the Civil Service
from 1962-1986 and he was working abroad from 1986-2003?
We rule in the negative.
An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer
must belong, as distinguished from bar association organized by
individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary.
Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every member
of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his shares in carrying out
the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its
responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an
Integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are
required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules
prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of
payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the
purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics or
professional responsibility, breach of which constitutes sufficient
reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing,
a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending
member. 5
The integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of
the entire lawyer population. This requires membership and financial
support of every attorney as condition sine qua non to the practice of
law and the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the
Supreme Court. 6
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone.
He is free to attend or not to attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar
Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The
only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of his annual
dues. The Supreme Court, in order to foster the State's legitimate
interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may
require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be
shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program
the lawyers. 7
Moreover, there is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court,
under its constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning
the admission to the practice of law and in the integration of the
Philippine Bar 8 which power required members of a privileged
class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying
the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is
quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure,
designed to raise funds for carrying out the noble objectives and
purposes of integration.
The rationale for prescribing dues has been explained in the
Integration of the Philippine Bar, 9 thus:
For the court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not
mean that the Court is attempting to levy a tax.
A membership fee in the Bar association is an exaction for regulation,
while tax purpose of a tax is a revenue. If the judiciary has inherent
power to regulate the Bar, it follows that as an incident to regulation, it
may impose a membership fee for that purpose. It would not be
possible to put on an integrated Bar program without means to defray
the expenses. The doctrine of implied powers necessarily carries with it
the power to impose such exaction.
The only limitation upon the State's power to regulate the privilege of
law is that the regulation does not impose an unconstitutional burden.
The public interest promoted by the integration of the Bar far

outweighs the slight inconvenience to a member resulting from his

required payment of the annual dues.
Thus, payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in
the IBP, of which no one is exempt. This means that the compulsory
nature of payment of dues subsists for as long as one's membership in
the IBP remains regardless of the lack of practice of, or the type of
practice, the member is engaged in. DSIaAE
There is nothing in the law or rules which allows exemption from
payment of membership dues. At most, as correctly observed by the
IBP, he could have informed the Secretary of the Integrated Bar of his
intention to stay abroad before he left. In such case, his membership in
the IBP could have been terminated and his obligation to pay dues
could have been discontinued.
As abovementioned, the IBP in its comment stated that the IBP Board
of Governors is in the process of discussing the situation of members
under inactive status and the nonpayment of their dues during such
inactivity. In the meantime, petitioner is duty bound to comply with his
obligation to pay membership dues to the IBP.
Petitioner also contends that the enforcement of the penalty of
removal would amount to a deprivation of property without due
process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights.
This question has been settled in the case of In re Atty. Marcial
Edillon, 10 in this wise:
. . . Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its
being one that entitles the holder of a license to practice a profession,
we do not here pause to consider at length, as it [is] clear that under
the police power of the State, and under the necessary powers granted
to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to
practice law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter
subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as
a regulatory measure is recognize[d], then a penalty designed to
enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by
payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property
right but a mere privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent
regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's
public responsibilities.
As a final note, it must be borne in mind that membership in the bar is
a privilege burdened with conditions, 11 one of which is the payment
of membership dues. Failure to abide by any of them entails the loss of
such privilege if the gravity thereof warrants such drastic move.
WHEREFORE, petitioner's request for exemption from payment of IBP
dues is DENIED. He is ordered to pay P12,035.00, the amount assessed
by the IBP as membership fees for the years 1977-2005, within a nonextendible period of ten (10) days from receipt of this decision, with a
warning that failure to do so will merit his suspension from the practice
of law. HSaEAD
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio Morales,
Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga andGarcia, JJ., concur.
||| (Letter of Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr., B.M. No. 1370, [May 9, 2005],
497 PHIL 535-544)
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 1162 August 29, 1975
IN RE: VICTORIO D. LANUEVO, former Bar Confidant and Deputy
Clerk of Court, respondent.
A.C. No. 1163 August 29, 1975
IN RE: RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E. GALANG, 1971 Bar
Examinee, respondent.
A.M. No. 1164 August 29, 1975
IN RE: HON. BERNARDO PARDO, HON. RAMON PAMATIAN, ATTY.
MANUEL TOMACRUZ, ATTY. FIDEL MANALO and ATTY.
GUILLERMO PABLO, JR., Members, 1971 Bar Examining
Committee, respondent.
MAKASIAR, J.:
Administrative proceedings against Victorio D. Lanuevo for
disbarment; Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang for
disbarment; Hon. Bernardo Pardo, Hon. Ramon Pamatian, Atty. Manuel
C. Tomacruz; Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Manalo and Atty.

Guillermo Pablo, Jr. for disciplinary action for their acts and
omissions during the 1971 Bar Examinations.
In his request dated March 29, 1972 contained in a confidential letter
to the Court for re-correction and re-evaluation of his answer to the
1971 Bar Examinations question, Oscar Landicho who flunked in the
1971, 1968 and 1967 Bar Examinations with a grade of 70.5%, 65.35%
and 67.55%, respectively invited the attention of the Court to "The
starling fact that the grade in one examination (Civil Law) of at least
one bar candidate was raised for one reason or another, before the bar
results were released this year" (Confidential Letter, p. 2. Vol. I, rec.).
This was confirmed, according to him, by the Civil Law Examiner
himself (Hon. Ramon C. Pamatian) as well as by Bar Confidant Victorio
D. Lanuevo. He further therein stated "that there are strong reasons to
believe that the grades in other examination notebooks in other
subjects also underwent alternations to raise the grades prior to
the release of the results. Note that this was without any formal motion
or request from the proper parties, i.e., the bar candidates concerned.
If the examiners concerned reconsidered their grades without formal
motion, there is no reason why they may not do so now when proper
request answer motion therefor is made. It would be contrary to due
process postulates. Might not one say that some candidates got unfair
and unjust treatment, for their grades were not asked to be
reconsidered 'unofficially'? Why the discrimination? Does this not afford
sufficient reason for the Court en banc to go into these matters by its
conceded power to ultimately decide the matter of admission to the
bar?" (p. 2, Confidential Letter, Vol. I, rec.).
Acting on the aforesaid confidential letter, the Court checked the
records of the 1971 Bar Examinations and found that the grades in five
subjects Political Law and Public International Law, Civil Law,
Mercantile Law, Criminal Law and Remedial Law of a successful bar
candidate with office code No. 954 underwent some changes which,
however, were duly initialed and authenticated by the respective
examiner concerned. Further check of the records revealed that the bar
candidate with office code No. 954 is one Ramon E. Galang, a perennial
bar candidate, who flunked in the 1969, 1966, 1964, 1963,
and 1962 bar examinations with a grade of 67.55%, 68.65%, 72.75%,
68.2%, 56.45% and 57.3%, respectively. He passed in the 1971 bar
examinations with a grade of 74.15%, which was considered as 75% by
virtue of a Court of 74.15%, which was considered as 75% as the
passing mark for the 1971 bar examinations.
Upon the direction of the Court, the 1971 Bar Examination Chairman
requested Bar Confidant Victorio D. Lanuevo and the five (5) bar
examiners concerned to submit their sworn statements on the matter,
with which request they complied.
In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, said Bar
Confidant admitted having brought the five examination notebooks of
Ramon E. Galang, alias Ramon E. Galang, back to the respective
examiners for re-evaluation and/or re-checking, stating the
circumstances under which the same was done and his reasons for
doing the same.
Each of the five (5) examiners in his individual sworn
statement admitted having re-evaluated and/or re-checked the
notebook involved pertaining to his subject upon the representation to
him by Bar Confidant Lanuevo that he has the authority to do the same
and that the examinee concerned failed only in his particular subject
and/or was on the borderline of passing.
Finding a prima facie case against the respondents warranting a formal
investigation, the Court required, in a resolution dated March 5, 1973,
Bar Confidant Victorio Lanuevo "to show cause within ten (10) days
from noticewhy his name should not be stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 34, rec.). Considering that the reevaluation of the examination papers of Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman
E. Galang, was unauthorized, and therefore he did not obtain a passing
average in the 1971 bar examinations, the Court likewise resolved on
March 5, 1971 to requires him "to show cause within ten (10) days
from notice why his name should not be stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1163, p. 99, rec.). The five examiners
concerned were also required by the Court "to show cause within ten
(10) days from notice why no disciplinary action should be taken
against them" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 31, rec.).
Respondent Tomacruz filed his answer on March 12, 1973 (Adm. Case
No. 1164, p. 70, rec.). while respondents Pardo, Pamatian, Montecillo,
Manalo and Lanuevo filed theirs on March 19, 1973 (Adm. Case No.
1162, pp. 60-63, 32-35, 40-41, 36-39 and 35-38, rec.). At the hearing
on August 27, 1973, respondent Lanuevo filed another sworn
statement in addition to, and in amplication of, his answer filed on
March 19, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47, rec.). Respondent

Galang filed his unverified answer on March 16, 1973 (Adm. Case No.
1163, pp. 100-104, rec.). He was required by the Court to verify the
same and complaince came on May 18, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp.
106-110,) rec.).
In the course of the investigation, it was found that it was not
respondent Bernardo Pardo who re-evaluated and/or re-checked
examination booklet with Office Code No. 954 in Political Law and
Public International Law of examinee Ramon Galang, alias Roman E.
Galang, but Guillermo Pablo, Jr., examiner in Legal Ethics and Practical
Exercise, who was asked to help in the correction of a number of
examination notebooks in Political Law and Public International Law to
meet the deadline for submission (pp. 17-24, Vol. V, rec.). Because of
this development, Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr. was likewise included as
respondent in Administrative Case No. 1164. Hon. Bernardo Pardo
remainded as a respondent for it was also discovered that another
paper in Political Law and Public International Law also underwent reevaluation and/or re-checking. This notebook with Office Code No.
1662 turned out to be owned by another successful candidate by the
name of Ernesto Quitaleg. Further investigation resulted in the
discovery of another re-evaluation and/or re-checking of a notebook in
the subject of Mercantile Law resulting in the change of the grade from
4% to 50% This notebook bearing Office Code No. 110 is owned by
another successful candidate by the name of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz.
Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz and the latter's father were summoned to
testify in the investigation.
An investigation conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation
upon request of the Chairman of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee
as Investigation Officer, showed that one Romy Galang y Esguerra,
alias Ramon E. Galang, a student in the School of Law of Manuel L.
Quezon University, was, on September 8, 1959, charged with the crime
of slight physical injuries in the Municipal Court of Manila committed on
Eufrosino F. de Vera, another student of the same university.
Confronted with this information at the hearing of August 13, 1973
(Vol. V, pp. 20-21, 32, rec.), respondent Galang declared that he does
not remember having been charged with the crime of slight physical
injuries in that case. (Vol. VI, pp. 45-60, rec.).
Respondent Galang, in all his application to take the bar examinations,
did not make mention of this fact which he is required under the rules
to do.
The joint investigation of all the cases commenced on July 17, 1973
and was terminated on October 2, 1973. Thereafter, partiesrespondents were required to submit their memoranda. Respondents
Lanuevo, Galang and Pardo submitted their respective memorandum
on November 14, 1973.
Before the joint hearing commenced, Oscar Landicho took up
permanent residence in Australia, where he is believed to be gainfully
employed. Hence, he was not summoned to testify.
At the joint investigation, all respondents, except respondent Pablo,
who offered as evidence only his oral testimony, submitted as their
direct evidence only his oral testimony, submitted as their direct
evidence the affidavits and answers earlier submitted by them to the
Court. The same became the basis for their cross-examination.
In their individual sworn statements and answer, which they offered as
their direct testimony in the investigation conducted by the Court, the
respondent-examiners recounted the circumstances under which they
re-evaluated and/or re-checked the examination notebooks in question.
In His affidavit dated April 11, 1972, respondent Judge (later Associate
Justice of the Court of Appeals) Ramon C. Pamatian, examiner in Civil
Law, affirmed:
2. That one evening sometime in December last year, while I was
correcting the examination notebooks, Atty. Lanuevo, Bar Confidant,
explained to me that it is the practice and the policy in bar
examinations that he (Atty. Lanuevo) make a review of the grades
obtained in all subjects and if he finds that candidate obtained an
extraordinary high grade in one subject and a rather low one in
another, he will bring back the latter to the examiner concerned for reevaluation and change of grade;
3. That sometime in the latter part of January of this year, he brought
back to me an examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation,
because according to him the owner of the paper is on the borderline
and if I could reconsider his grade to 75% the candidate concerned will
get passing mark;
4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was really the
practice and policy of the Supreme Court to do so in the further belief
that I was just manifesting cooperation in doing so, I re-evaluated the
paper and reconsidered the grade to 75%;

5. That only one notebook in Civil Law was brought back to me for such
re-evaluation and upon verifying my files I found that the notebook is
numbered '95;
6. That the original grade was 64% and my re-evaluation of the
answers were based on the same standard used in the correction and
evaluation of all others; thus, Nos. 3 and 4 with original grades of 7%
each was reconsidered to 10%; No. 5 with 4% to 5%; No. 7 with 3% to
5%; and No. 8 with 8% to 10% (emphasis supplied).
His answer dated March 19, 1973 substantially reiterated his
allegations in his April 11, 1972 affidavit with following additional
statements:
xxx xxx xxx
3. ... However the grades in Nos. 1, 2, 6, 9 and 10, were not
reconsidered as it is no longer to make the reconsideration of these
answers because of the same evaluation and standard; hence, Nos. 1,
2 and 10 remainded at 5% and Nos. 6 and 9 at 10%;
4. That at the time I made the reconsideration of examination booklet
No. 951 I did not know the identity of its owner until I received this
resolution of the Honorable Supreme Court nor the identities of the
examiners in other subjects;
5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and under the
belief that I am authorized to do so in view of the misrepresentation of
said Atty. Lanuevo, based on the following circumstances:
a) Since I started correcting the papers on or about October 16, 1971,
relationship between Atty. Lanuevo and myself had developed to the
point that with respect to the correction of the examination booklets of
bar candidates I have always followed him and considered his
instructions as reflecting the rules and policy of the Honorable
Supreme Court with respect to the same; that I have no alternative but
to take his words;
b) That considering this relationship and considering his
misrepresentation to me as reflecting the real and policy of the
Honorable Supreme Court, I did not bother any more to get the
consent and permission of the Chairman of the Bar Committee.
Besides, at that time, I was isolating myself from all members of the
Supreme Court and specially the chairman of the Bar Committee for
fear that I might be identified as a bar examiner;
xxx xxx xxx
e) That no consideration whatsoever has been received by me in return
for such recorrection, and as proof of it, I declined to consider and
evaluate one booklet in Remedial Law aforesaid because I was not the
one who made the original correction of the same (Adm. Case No.
1164, pp. 32-35, rec.; emphasis supplied).
Then Assistant Solicitor General, now CFI Judge, Bernardo Pardo,
examiner in Political Law and Public International Law, confirmed in his
affidavit of April 8, 1972 that:
On a day or two after the Bar Confidant went to my residence to obtain
from me the last bag of two hundred notebooks (bearing examiner's
code numbers 1200 to 1400) which according to my record was on
February 5, 1972, he came to my residence at about 7:30 p.m. riding in
a Vokswagen panel of the Supreme Court, with at least two
companions. The bar confidant had with him an examinee's notebook
bearing code number 661, and, after the usual amenties, he requested
me if it was possible for me to review and re-examine the said
notebook because it appears that the examinee obtained a grade of
57, whereas, according to the Bar Confidant, the said examinee had
obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which was 84,
if I recall correctly, in remedial law.
I asked the Bar Confidant if I was allowed to receive or re-examinee
the notebook as I had submitted the same beforehand, and he told me
that I was authorized to do so because the same was still within my
control and authority as long as the particular examinee's name had
not been identified or that the code number decode and the
examinee's name was revealed. The Bar Confidant told me that the
name of the examinee in the case present bearing code number 661
had not been identified or revealed; and that it might have been
possible that I had given a particularly low grade to said examinee.
Accepting at face value the truth of the Bar Confidant's
representations to me, and as it was humanly possible that I might
have erred in the grading of the said notebook, I re-examined the
same, carefully read the answer, and graded it in accordance with the
same standards I had used throughout the grading of the entire
notebooks, with the result that the examinee deserved an increased
grade of 66. After again clearing with the Bar Confidant my authority
to correct the grades, and as he had assured me that the code number
of the examinee in question had not been decoded and his name
known, ... I therefore corrected the total grade in the notebook and the

grade card attached thereto, and properly initia(l)ed the same. I also
corrected the itemized grades (from item No. 1 to item No. 10) on the
two sets of grading sheets, my personal copy thereof, and the Bar
Confidant brought with him the other copy thereof, and the Bar
Confidant brought with him the other copy the grading sheet" (Adm.
Case No. 1164, pp. 58-59; rec.; emphasis supplied)
In his answer dated March 17, 1973 which he denominated as
"Explanation", respondent Bernardo P. Pardo adopted and replaced
therein by reference the facts stated in his earlier sworn statement and
in additional alleged that:
xxx xxx xxx
3. At the time I reviewed the examinee's notebook in political and
international law, code numbered 661, I did know the name of the
examinee. In fact, I came to know his name only upon receipt of the
resolution of March 5, 1973; now knowing his name, I wish to state that
I do not know him personally, and that I have never met him even up
to the present;
4. At that time, I acted under the impression that I was authorized to
make such review, and had repeatedly asked the Bar Confidant
whether I was authorized to make such revision and was so assured of
my authority as the name of the examinee had not yet been decoded
or his identity revealed. The Bar Confidant's assurance was apparently
regular and so appeared to be in the regular course of express
prohibition in the rules and guidelines given to me as an examiner, and
the Bar Confidant was my official liaison with the Chairman, as, unless
called, I refrained as much as possible from frequent personal contact
with the Chairman lest I be identified as an examiner. ...;
5. At the time the Bar Confidant came to see me at about 7:30 o'clock
in the evening at my residence, I felt it inappropriate to verify his
authority with the Chairman. It did not appear to me that his
representations were unauthorized or suspicious. Indeed, the Bar
Confidant was riding in the official vehicle of the Supreme Court, a
Volkswagen panel, accompanied by two companions, which was usual,
and thus looked like a regular visit to me of the Bar Confidant, as it was
about the same hour that he used to see me:
xxx xxx xxx
7. Indeed, the notebook code numbered 661 was still in the same
condition as when I submitted the same. In agreeing to review the said
notebook code numbered 661, my aim was to see if I committed an
error in the correction, not to make the examinee pass the subject. I
considered it entirely humanly possible to have erred, because I
corrected that particular notebook on December 31, 1971, considering
especially the representation of the Bar Confidant that the said
examinee had obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of
which was 84% in remedial law, if I recall correctly. Of course, it did not
strike me as unusual that the Bar Confidant knew the grades of the
examinee in the position to know and that there was nothing irregular
in that:
8. In political and international law, the original grade obtained by the
examinee with notebook code numbered 661 was 57%. After review, it
was increased by 9 points, resulting in a final grade of 66%. Still, the
examinee did not pass the subject, and, as heretofore stated, my aim
was not to make the examinee pass, notwithstanding the
representation that he had passed the other subjects. ...
9. I quite recall that during the first meeting of the Bar Examiners'
Committee consensus was that where an examinee failed in only one
subject and passed the rest, the examiner in said subject would review
the notebook. Nobody objected to it as irregular. At the time of the
Committee's first meeting, we still did not know the names of the
candidates.
10. In fine, I was a victim of deception, not a party to it. It had
absolutely no knowledge of the motives of the Bar Confidant or his
malfeasance in office, and did not know the examinee concerned nor
had I any kind of contract with him before or rather the review and
even up to the present (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 60-63; rec.; emphasis
supplied).
Atty. Manuel Tomacruz, examiner in Criminal Law, affirmed in his
affidavit dated April 12, 1972:
1. xxx xxx xxx
2. That about weekly, the Bar Confidant would deliver and collect
examination books to my residence at 951 Luna Mencias,
Mandaluyong, Rizal.
3. That towards the end when I had already completed correction of
the books in Criminal Law and was helping in the correction of some of
the papers in another subject, the Bar Confidant brought back to me
one (1) paper in Criminal Law saying that that particular examinee had
missed the passing grade by only a fraction of a percent and that if his

paper in Criminal Law would be raised a few points to 75% then he

would make the general passing average.
4. That seeing the jurisdiction, I raised the grade to 75%, that is, giving
a raise of, if I remember correctly, 2 or 3 points, initialled the revised
mark and revised also the mark and revised also the mark in the
general list.
5. That I do not recall the number of the book of the examinee
concerned" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his answer dated March 12, 1973, respondent Tomacruz stated
that "I accepted the word of the Bar Confidant in good faith and
without the slightest inkling as to the identity of the examinee in
question who up to now remains a total stranger and without
expectation of nor did I derive any personal benefit" (Adm. Case No.
1164, p. 70, rec.; emphasis supplied).
Atty. Fidel Manalo, examiner in Remedial Law, stated in his affidavit
dated April 14, 1972, that:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Sometime about the late part of January or early part of February
1972, Attorney Lanuevo, Bar Confidant of the Supreme Court, saw me
in my house at No. 1854 Asuncion Street, Makati, Rizal. He produced to
me an examinee's notebook in Remedial Law which I had previously
graded and submitted to him. He informed me that he and others (he
used the words "we") had reviewed the said notebook. He requested
me to review the said notebook and possibly reconsider the grade that
I had previously given. He explained that the examine concerned had
done well in other subjects, but that because of the comparatively low
grade that I had given him in Remedial Law his general average was
short of passing. Mr. Lanuevo remarked that he thought that if the
paper were reviewed I might find the examinee deserving of being
admitted to the Bar. As far as I can recall, Mr. Lanuevo particularly
called my attention to the fact in his answers the examinee expressed
himself clearly and in good enough English. Mr. Lanuevo however
informed me that whether I would reconsider the grades I had
previously given and submitted was entirely within my discretion.
3. Believing fully that it was within Mr. Lanuevo's authority as Bar
Confidant to address such a request to me and that the said request
was in order, I, in the presence of Mr. Lanuevo, proceeded tore-read
and re-evaluate each and every item of the paper in question. I recall
that in my re-evaluation of the answers, I increased the grades in some
items, made deductions in other items, and maintained the same
grades in other items. However, I recall that after Mr. Lanuevo and I
had totalled the new grades that I had given after re-evaluation, the
total grade increased by a few points, but still short of the passing
mark of 75% in my subject.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 74-75, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his answer (response) dated March 18, 1973, respondent Manalo
reiterated the contents of his sworn statement, adding the following:
xxx xxx xxx
5. In agreeing to re-evaluate the notebook, with resulted in increasing
the total grade of the examinee-concerned in Remedial Law
from 63.75% to 74.5%, herein respondent acted in good faith. It may
well be that he could be faulted for not having verified from the
Chairman of the Committee of Bar Examiners the legitimacy of the
request made by Mr. Lanuevo. Herein respondent, however, pleads in
attenuation of such omission, that
a) Having been appointed an Examiner for the first time, he was not
aware, not having been apprised otherwise, that it was not within the
authority of the Bar Confidant of the Supreme Court to request or
suggest that the grade of a particular examination notebook be revised
or reconsidered. He had every right to presume, owing to the highly
fiduciary nature of the position of the Bar Confidant, that the request
was legitimate.
xxx xxx xxx
c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee concerned, herein
respondent carefully evaluated each and every answer written in the
notebook. Testing the answers by the criteria laid down by the Court,
and giving the said examinee the benefit of doubt in view of Mr.
Lanuevo's representation that it was only in that particular subject that
the said examine failed, herein respondent became convinced that the
said examinee deserved a higher grade than that previously given to
him, but that he did not deserve, in herein respondent's honest
appraisal, to be given the passing grade of 75%. It should also be
mentioned that, in reappraising the answers, herein respondent
downgraded a previous rating of an answer written by the examinee,
from 9.25% to 9% (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 36-39, rec.; emphasis
supplied).

Atty. Manuel Montecillo, examiner in Mercantile Law, affirmed in his

affidavit dated April 17, 1972:
xxx xxx xxx
That during one of the deliberations of the Bar Examiners' Committee
after the Bar Examinations were held, I was informed that one Bar
examinee passed all other subjects except Mercantile Law;
That I informed the Bar Examiners' Committee that I would be willing
to re-evaluate the paper of this particular Bar candidate;.
That the next day, the Bar Confidant handed to me a Bar candidate's
notebook (No. 1613) showing a grade of 61%;
That I reviewed the whole paper and after re-evaluating the answers of
this particular Bar candidate I decided to increase his final grade to
71%;
That consequently, I amended my report and duly initialed the changes
in the grade sheet (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 72, rec.; emphasis
supplied).
In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Montecillo restated
the contents of his sworn statement of April 17, 1972, and
xxx xxx xxx
2. Supplementary to the foregoing sworn statement, I hereby state that
I re-evaluated the examination notebook of Bar Candidate No. 1613 in
Mercantile Law in absolute good faith and in direct compliance with the
agreement made during one of the deliberations of the Bar Examiners
Committee that where a candidate fails in only one subject, the
Examiner concerned should make a re-evaluation of the answers of the
candidate concerned, which I did.
3. Finally, I hereby state that I did not know at the time I made the
aforementioned re-evaluation that notebook No. 1613 in Mercantile
Law pertained to bar examine Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E.
Galang, and that I have never met up to this time this particular bar
examinee (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, Bar Confidant Lanuevo
stated:
xxx xxx xxx
As I was going over those notebooks, checking the entries in the
grading sheets and the posting on the record of ratings, I was
impressed of the writing and the answers on the first notebook. This
led me to scrutinize all the set of notebooks. Believing that those five
merited re-evalation on the basis of the memorandum circularized to
the examiners shortly earlier to the effect that
... in the correction of the papers, substantial weight should then be
given to clarify of language and soundness of reasoning' (par. 4),
I took it upon myself to bring them back to the respective examiners
for re-evaluation and/or re-checking.
It is our experience in the Bar Division that immediately after the
release of the results of the examinations, we are usually swarmed
with requests of the examinees that they be shown their notebooks.
Many of them would copy their answers and have them checked by
their professors. Eventually some of them would file motions or
requests for re-correction and/or re-evaluation. Right now, we have
some 19 of such motions or requests which we are reading for
submission to the Honorable Court.
Often we feel that a few of them are meritorious, but just the same
they have to be denied because the result of the examinations when
released is final and irrevocable.
It was to at least minimize the occurrence of such instances that
motivated me to bring those notebooks back to the respective
examiners for re-evaluation" (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 24, rec.;
emphasis supplied).
In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Lanuevo avers:
That he submitted the notebooks in question to the examiners
concerned in his hotest belief that the same merited re-evaluation;
that in so doing, it was not his intention to forsake or betray the trust
reposed in him as bar confidant but on the contrary to do justice to the
examinee concerned; that neither did he act in a presumptuous
manner, because the matter of whether or not re-evaluation was
inorder was left alone to the examiners' decision; and that, to his
knowledge, he does not remember having made the alleged
misrepresentation but that he remembers having brought to the
attention of the Committee during the meeting a matter concerning
another examinee who obtained a passing general average but with a
grade below 50% in Mercantile Law. As the Committee agreed to
remove the disqualification by way of raising the grade in said subject,
respondent brought the notebook in question to the Examiner
concerned who thereby raised the grade thus enabling the said
examinee to pass. If he remembers right, the examinee concerned is
one surnamed "de la Cruz" or "Ty-de la Cruz".

Your Honors, respondent never entertained a notion that his act would
stir such serious charges as would tend to undermine his integrity
because he did it in all good faith.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 35, rec.; emphasis supplied).
On August 27, 1973, during the course of the investigation, respondent
Lanuevo filed another sworn statement in addition to, and in
amplification of, his answer, stating:
xxx xxx xxx
1. That I vehemently deny having deceived the examiners concerned
into believing that the examinee involved failed only in their respective
subjects, the fact of the matter being that the notebooks in question
were submitted to the respective examiners for re-evaluation believing
in all good faith that they so merited on the basis of the Confidential
Memorandum (identified and marked as Exh. 1-Lanuevo, particularly
that portion marked as Exh. 1-a-Lanuevo)which was circulated to all
the examiners earlier, leaving to them entirely the matter of whether
or not re-evaluation was in order,
2. That the following coincidence prompted me to pry into the
notebooks in question:
Sometime during the latter part of January and the early part of
February, 1972, on my way back to the office (Bar Division) after lunch,
I though of buying a sweepstake ticket. I have always made it a point
that the moment I think of so buying, I pick a number from any object
and the first number that comes into my sight becomes the basis of
the ticket that I buy. At that moment, the first number that I saw was
"954" boldly printed on an electrical contribance (evidently belonging
to the MERALCO) attached to a post standing along the right sidewalk
of P. Faura street towards the Supreme Court building from San
Marcelino street and almost adjacent to the south-eastern corner of the
fence of the Araullo High School(photograph of the number '954', the
contrivance on which it is printed and a portion of the post to which it
is attached is identified and marked as Exhibit 4-Lanuevo and the
number "954" as Exh. 4-a-Lanuevo).
With this number (954) in mind, I proceeded to Plaza Sta. Cruz to look
for a ticket that would contain such number. Eventually, I found a
ticket, which I then bought, whose last three digits corresponded to
"954". This number became doubly impressive to me because the sum
of all the six digits of the ticket number was "27", a number that is so
significant to me that everything I do I try somewhat instinctively to
link or connect it with said number whenever possible. Thus even in
assigning code numbers on the Master List of examinees from 1968
when I first took charge of the examinations as Bar Confidant up to
1971, I either started with the number "27" (or "227") or end with said
number. (1968 Master List is identified and marked as Exh. 5-Lanuevo
and the figure "27" at the beginning of the list, as Exh. 5-a Lanuevo;
1969 Master List as Exh. 6-Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the
beginning of the list, as Exh. 6-a-Lanuevo; 1970 Master List as Exh. 7Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the beginning of the list as Exh. 7-aLanuevo; and the 1971 Master List as Exh. 8-Lanuevo and the figure
"227" at the end of the list as Exh. 8-a-Lanuevo).
The significance to me of this number (27) was born out of these
incidents in my life, to wit: (a) On November 27, 1941 while with the
Philippine Army stationed at Camp Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva
Ecija, I was stricken with pneumonia and was hospitalized at the Nueva
Ecija Provincial Hospital as a result. As will be recalled, the last Pacific
War broke out on December 8, 1941. While I was still confined at the
hospital, our camp was bombed and strafed by Japanese planes on
December 13, 1941 resulting in many casualties. From then on, I
regarded November 27, 1941 as the beginning of a new life for me
having been saved from the possibility of being among the casualties;
(b) On February 27, 1946, I was able to get out of the army byway of
honorable discharge; and (c) on February 27, 1947, I got married and
since then we begot children the youngest of whom was born on
February 27, 1957.
Returning to the office that same afternoon after buying the ticket, I
resumed my work which at the time was on the checking of the
notebooks. While thus checking, I came upon the notebooks bearing
the office code number "954". As the number was still fresh in my
mind, it aroused my curiosity prompting me to pry into the contents of
the notebooks. Impressed by the clarity of the writing and language
and the apparent soundness of the answers and, thereby, believing in
all good faith on the basis of the aforementioned Confidential
Memorandum (Exh. 1-Lanuevo and Exh. 1-a-Lanuevo) that they
merited re-evaluation, I set them aside and later on took them back to
the respective examiners for possible review recalling to them the said
Confidential Memorandum but leaving absolutely the matter to their
discretion and judgment.

3. That the alleged misrepresentation or deception could have

reference to either of the two cases which I brought to the attention of
the committee during the meeting and which the Committee agreed to
refer back to the respective examines, namely:
(a) That of an examinee who obtained a passing general average but
with a grade below 50% (47%) in Mercantile Law(the notebooks of this
examinee bear the Office Code No. 110, identified and marked as Exh.
9-Lanuevo and the notebook in Mercantile Law bearing the Examiner's
Code No. 951 with the original grade of 4% increased to 50% after reevaluation as Exh. 9-a-Lanuevo); and
(b) That of an examinee who obtained a borderline general average of
73.15% with a grade below 60% (57%) in one subject which, at the
time, I could not pinpoint having inadvertently left in the office the data
thereon. It turned out that the subject was Political and International
Law under Asst. Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo (The notebooks of
this examinee bear the Office Code No. 1622 identified and marked as
Exh. 10-Lanuevo and the notebook in Political and International Law
bearing the Examiner's Code No. 661 with the original grade of 57%
increased to 66% after re-evaluation, as Exh. 10-a-Lanuevo). This
notebook in Political and International Law is precisely the same
notebook mentioned in the sworn statement of Asst. Solicitor General
Bernardo Pardo(Exh. ------- Pardo).
4. That in each of the two cases mentioned in the next preceding
paragraph, only one (1) subject or notebook was reviewed or reevaluated, that is, only Mercantile Law in the former; and only Political
and International Law in the latter, under the facts and circumstances I
made known to the Committee and pursuant to which the Committee
authorized the referral of the notebooks involved to the examiners
concerned;
5. That at that juncture, the examiner in Taxation even volunteered to
review or re-check some 19, or so, notebooks in his subject but that I
told the Committee that there was very little time left and that the
increase in grade after re-evaluation, unless very highly substantial,
may not alter the outcome since the subject carries the weight of only
10% (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47, rec.).
The foregoing last-minute embellishment only serves to accentuate the
fact that Lanuevo's story is devoid of truth. In his sworn statement of
April 12, 1972, he was "led to scrutinize all the set of notebooks" of
respondent Galang, because he "was impressed of the writing and the
answers on the first notebook "as he "was going over those notebooks,
checking the entries in the grading sheets and the posting on the
record of ratings." In his affidavit of August 27, 1973, he stated that the
number 954 on a Meralco post provoked him "to pry into the contents
of the notebooks" of respondent Galang "bearing office code number
'954."
Respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, asserted, among
others;
1. That herein respondent is not acquainted with former BarConfidant
Victorio Lanuevo and never met him before except once when, as
required by the latter respondent submitted certain papers necessary
for taking the bar examinations.
xxx xxx xxx
4. That it has been the consistent policy of the Supreme Court not to
reconsider "failure" cases; after the official release thereof; why should
it now reconsider a "passing" case, especially in a situation where the
respondent and the bar confidant do not know each other and, indeed,
met only once in the ordinary course of official business?
It is not inevitable, then, to conclude that the entire situation clearly
manifests a reasonable doubt to which respondent is richly entitled?
5. That respondent, before reading a copy of this Honorable Court's
resolution dated March 5, 1973, had no knowledge whatsoever of
former Bar Confidant Victorio Lanuevo's actuations which are stated in
particular in the resolution. In fact, the respondent never knew this
man intimately nor, had the herein respondent utilized anyone to
contact the Bar Confidant Lanuevo in his behalf.
But, assuming as true, the said actuations of Bar Confidant Lanuevo as
stated in the Resolution, which are evidently purported to show as
having redounded to the benefit of herein respondent, these questions
arise: First, was the re-evaluation of Respondent's examination papers
by the Bar Examination Committee done only or especially for him and
not done generally as regards the paper of the other bar candidates
who are supposed to have failed? If the re-evaluation of Respondent's
grades was done among those of others, then it must have been done
as a matter of policy of the Committee to increase the percentage of
passing in that year's examination and, therefore, the insinuation that
only respondent's papers were re-evaluated upon the influence of Bar
Confidant Lanuevo would be unjustifiable, if not far fetched. Secondly,

is the fact that BarConfidant Lanuevo's actuations resulted in herein

Respondent's benefit an evidence per se of Respondent's having
caused actuations of Bar confidant Lanuevo to be done in former's
behalf? To assume this could be disastrous in effect because that would
be presuming all the members of the Bar Examination Committee as
devoid of integrity, unfit for the bar themselves and the result of their
work that year, as also unworthy of anything. All of these inferences
are deductible from the narration of facts in the resolution, and which
only goes to show said narration of facts an unworthy of credence, or
consideration.
xxx xxx xxx
7. This Honorable Tribunal's Resolution of March 5, 1973 would make
this Respondent Account or answer for the actuations of Bar Confidant
Lanuevo as well as for the actuations of the Bar Examiners implying
the existence of some conspiracy between them and the Respondent.
The evident imputation is denied and it is contended that the Bar
Examiners were in the performance of their duties and that they should
be regarded as such in the consideration of this case.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.).
I
The evidence thus disclosed clearly demonstrates how respondent
Lanuevo systematically and cleverly initiated and prepared the stage
leading to the re-evalation and/or recorrection of the answers of
respondent Galang by deceiving separately and individually the
respondents-examiners to make the desired revision without prior
authority from the Supreme Court after the corrected notebooks had
been submitted to the Court through the respondent Bar Confidant,
who is simply the custodian thereof for and in behalf of the Court.
It appears that one evening, sometime around the middle part of
December, 1971, just before Christmas day, respondent Lanuevo
approached Civil Law examiner Pamatian while the latter was in the
process of correcting examination booklets, and then and there made
the representations that as BarConfidant, he makes a review of the
grades obtained in all subjects of the examinees and if he finds that a
candidate obtains an extraordinarily high grade in one subject and a
rather low one on another, he will bring back to the examiner
concerned the notebook for re-evaluation and change of grade(Exh. 2Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 55-56; Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).
Sometime in the latter part of January, 1972, respondent Lanuevo
brought back to respondent-examiner Pamatian an examination
booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation, representing that the examinee
who owned the particular notebook is on the borderline of passing
and if his grade in said subject could be reconsidered to 75%, the said
examine will get a passing average. Respondent-examiner Pamatian
took respondent Lanuevo's word and under the belief that was really
the practice and policy of the Supreme Court and in his further belief
that he was just manifesting cooperation in doing so, he re-evaluated
the paper and reconsidered the examinee's grade in said subject to
75% from 64%. The particular notebook belonged to an examinee with
Examiner's Code Number 95 and with Office Code Number 954. This
examinee is Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang. Respondent
Pamatian did not know the identity of the examinee at the time he reevaluated the said booklet (Exhs. 1-Pamatian, 2-Pamatian, and 3Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 32-33, 55-56, 57; Vol. V, pp. 3-4,
rec.).
Before Justice Pamatian made the revision, Examinee Galang failed in
seven subjects including Civil Law. After such revision, examinee
Galang still failed in six subjects and could not obtain the passing
average of 75% for admission to the Bar.
Thereafter, about the latter part of January, 1972 or early part of
February, 1972, respondent Lanuevo went to the residence of
respondent-examiner Fidel Manalo at 1854 Asuncion Street, Makati,
Rizal, with an examinee's notebook in Remedial Law, which respondent
Manalo and previously corrected and graded. Respondent Lanuevo
then requested respondent Manalo to review the said notebook and
possibly to reconsider the grade given, explaining and representing
that "they" has reviewed the said notebook and that the examinee
concerned had done well in other subjects, but that because of the
comparatively low grade given said examinee by respondent Manalo in
Remedial Law, the general average of said examinee was short of
passing. Respondent Lanuevo likewise made the remark and
observation that he thought that if the notebook were reviewed,
respondent Manalo might yet find the examinee deserving of being
admitted to the Bar. Respondent Lanuevo also particularly called the
attention of respondent Manalo to the fact that in his answers, the
examinee expressed himself clearly and in good English. Furthermore,

respondent Lanuevo called the attention of respondent Manalo to

Paragraph 4 of the Confidential Memorandum that read as follows:
4. Examination questions should be more a test of logic, knowledge of
legal fundamentals, and ability to analyze and solve legal problems
rather than a test of memory; in the correction of papers, substantial
weight should be given to clarify of language and soundness of
reasoning.
Respondent Manalo was, however, informed by respondent Lanuevo
that the matter of reconsideration was entirely within his (Manalo's)
discretion. Respondent Manalo, believing that respondent Lanuevo, as
Bar Confidant, had the authority to make such request and further
believing that such request was in order, proceeded to re-evaluate the
examinee's answers in the presence of Lanuevo, resulting in an
increase of the examinee's grade in that particular subject, Remedial
Law, from 63.25% to 74.5%. Respondent Manalo authenticated with his
signature the changes made by him in the notebook and in the grading
sheet. The said notebook examiner's code number is 136, instead of
310 as earlier mentioned by him in his affidavit, and belonged to
Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1 & 2- Manalo, Adm.
Case No. 1164, pp. 36-39, 74-75; Vol. V, pp. 50-53, rec.).
But even after the re-evaluation by Atty. Manalo, Examinee Galang
could not make the passing grade due to his failing marks in five
subjects.
Likewise, in the latter part of January, 1972, on one occasion when
respondent Lanuevo went to deliver to respondent Guillermo Pablo, Jr.
in the latter's house a new batch of examination papers in Political Law
and Public International Law to be corrected, respondent Lanuevo
brought out a notebook in Political Law bearingExaminer's Code
Number 1752 (Exh. 5-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 66, rec.),
informing respondent Pablo that particular examinee who owns the
said notebook seems to have passed in all other subjects except in
Political Law and Public International Law; and that if the said notebook
would be re-evaluated and the mark be increased to at least 75%, said
examinee will pass the bar examinations. After satisfying himself from
respondent that this is possible the respondent Bar Confidant
informing him that this is the practice of the Court to help out
examinees who are failing in just one subject respondent Pablo
acceded to the request and thereby told the Bar Confidant to just leave
the said notebook. Respondent Pablo thereafter re-evaluated the
answers, this time with leniency. After the re-evaluation, the grade was
increased to 78% from 68%, or an increase of 10%. Respondent Pablo
then made the corresponding corrections in the grading sheet and
accordingly initialed the charges made. This notebook with Office Code
Number 954 also belonged to Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang
(Vol. V, pp. 43-46, rec.).
After the re-evaluation by Atty. Pablo, Jr., examinee Galang's general
average was still below the passing grade, because of his failing marks
in four subjects.
Towards the end of the correction of examination notebooks,
respondent Lanuevo brought back to respondent Tomacruz one
examination booklet in Criminal Law, with the former informing the
latter, who was then helping in the correction of papers in Political Law
and Public International Law, as he had already finished correcting the
examination notebooks in his assigned subject Criminal Law that
the examinee who owns that particular notebook had missed the
passing grade by only a fraction of a percent and that if his grade in
Criminal Law would be raised a few points to 75%, then the examinee
would make the passing grade. Accepting the words of respondent
Lanuevo, and seeing the justification and because he did not want to
be the one causing the failure of the examinee, respondent Tomacruz
raised the grade from 64% to 75% and thereafter, he initialed the
revised mark and also revised the mark in the general list and likewise
initialed the same. The examinee's Examiner Code Number is 746
while his Office Code Number is 954. This examinee is Ramon E.
Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1, 2 & 3-Tomacruz, Adm. Case
No. 1164, pp. 65, 66 and 71; Vol. V, pp. 24-25, 60-61, rec.).
Respondent Tomacruz does not recall having been shown any memo by
respondent Lanuevo when the latter approached him for this particular
re-evaluation; but he remembers Lanuevo declaring to him that where
a candidate had almost made the passing average but had failed in
one subject, as a matter of policy of the Court, leniency is applied in
reviewing the examinee's notebook in the failing subject. He recalls,
however, that he was provided a copy of the Confidential Memorandum
but this was long before the re-evaluation requested by respondent
Lanuevo as the same was received by him before the examination
period (Vol. V, p. 61, rec.).

However, such revision by Atty. Tomacruz could not raise Galang's

general average to a passing grade because of his failing mark in three
more subjects, including Mercantile Law. For the revision of examinee
Galang's notebook in Mercantile Law, respondent Lanuevo neatly set
the last phase of his quite ingenious scheme by securing
authorization from the Bar Examination Committee for the examiner in
Mercantile Law tore-evaluate said notebook.
At the first meeting of the Bar Examination Committee on February 8,
1972, respondent Lanuevo suggested that where an examinee failed in
only one subject and passed the rest, the examiner concerned would
review the notebook. Nobody objected to it as irregular and the
Committee adopted the suggestion (Exhs. A & B-Montecillo, Exh. 2Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 41, 72, 63; Vol. Vi, p. 16, rec.).
At a subsequent meeting of the Bar Examination Committee,
respondent Montecillo was informed by respondent Lanuevo that a
candidate passed all other subjects except Mercantile Law. This
information was made during the meeting within hearing of the order
members, who were all closely seated together. Respondent Montecillo
made known his willingness tore-evaluate the particular paper. The
next day, respondent Lanuevo handed to respondent Montecillo a bar
candidate's notebook with Examiner's Code Number 1613 with a grade
of 61%. Respondent Montecillo then reviewed the whole paper and
after re-evaluating the answers, decided to increase the final grade to
71%. The matter was not however thereafter officially brought to the
Committee for consideration or decision (Exhs. A& B-Montecillo, Adm.
Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, 70-71; Vol. V, pp. 33-34, rec.).
Respondent Montecillo declared that without being given the
information that the particular examinee failed only in his subject and
passed all the others, he would not have consented to make the reevaluation of the said paper(Vol. V, p. 33, rec.).Respondent Montecillo
likewise added that there was only one instance he remembers, which
is substantiated by his personal records, that he had to change the
grade of an examinee after he had submitted his report, referring to
the notebook of examinee Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang,
with Examiner's Code Number 1613 and with Office Code Number 954
(Vol. V, pp. 34-35, rec.).
A day or two after February 5, 1972, when respondent Lanuevo went to
the residence of respondent-examiner Pardo to obtain the last bag of
200 notebooks, respondent Lanuevo returned to the residence of
respondent Pardo riding in a Volkswagen panel of the Supreme Court of
the Philippines with two companions. According to respondent
Lanuevo, this was around the second week of February, 1972, after the
first meeting of the Bar Examination Committee. respondent Lanuevo
had with him on that occasion an examinee's notebook bearing
Examiner's Code No. 661. Respondent Lanuevo, after the usual
amenities, requested respondent Pardo to review and re-examine, if
possible, the said notebook because, according to respondent
Lanuevo, the examine who owns that particular notebook obtained
higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which is 84% in
Remedial Law. After clearing with respondent Lanuevo his authority to
reconsider the grades, respondent Pardo re-evaluated the answers of
the examine concerned, resulting in an increase of grade from 57% of
66%. Said notebook has number 1622 as office code number. It
belonged to examinee Ernesto Quitaleg (Exhs. 1 & 2-Pardo, Adm. Case
No. 1164, pp. 58-63; Vol. V, pp. 12-24, 29-30, rec.).
II
Re: Administrative Case No. 1162, Victorio D. Lanuevo, respondent.
A
UNAUTHORIZED RE-EVALUATION OF THE ANSWERS OF EXAMINE
RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E. GALANG, IN ALL FIVE (5) MAJOR
SUBJECTS.
Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having requested on his own
initiative the five examiners concerned to re-evaluate the five
notebooks of Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, that eventually
resulted in the increase of Galang's average from 66.25% to the
passing grade 74.15%, or a total increase of eight (8) weighted points,
more or less, that enabled Galang to hurdle the 1971 Bar examinations
via a resolution of the Court making 74% the passing average for that
year's examination without any grade below fifty percent (50%) in any
subject. Galang thereafter took his lawyer's oath. It is likewise beyond
dispute that he had no authority from the Court or the Committee to
initiate such steps towards the said re-evaluation of the answers of
Galang or of other examinees.
Denying that he made representations to the examiners concerned
that respondent Galang failed only in their respective subjects and/or
was on the borderline of passing, Respondent Lanuevo sought to justify
his actuations on the authority of the aforequoted paragraph 4 of the

Confidential Memorandum(Exhs. 1 and 1-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Cases Nos.

1162 & 1164, p. 51, Adm. Case No. 1162; Vol. VII, p. 4, rec.) distributed
to the members of the Bar Examination Committee. He maintains that
he acted in good faith and "in his honest belief that the same merited
re-evaluation; that in doing so, it was not his intention to forsake or
betray the trust reposed in him as BarConfidant but on the contrary to
do justice to the examinee concerned; and that neither did he act in a
presumptuous manner because the matter of whether or not reevaluation was in order was left alone to the examiners' decision ..."
(Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 35-37, rec.).
But as openly admitted by him in the course of the investigation, the
said confidential memorandum was intended solely for the examiners
to guide them in the initial correction of the examination papers and
never as a basis for him to even suggest to the examiners the reevaluation of the examination papers of the examinees (Vol. VII, p. 23,
rec.). Any such suggestion or request is not only presumptuous but
also offensive to the norms of delicacy.
We believe the Examiners Pablo, Manalo, Montecillo, Tomacruz,
Pardo and Pamatian whose declarations on the matter of the
misrepresentations and deceptions committed by respondent Lanuevo,
are clear and consistent as well as corroborate each other.
For indeed the facts unfolded by the declarations of the respondentsexaminers (Adm. Case No. 1164) and clarified by extensive crossexamination conducted during the investigation and hearing of the
cases show how respondent Lanuevo adroitly maneuvered the passing
of examinee Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang in the 1971 Bar
Examinations. It is patent likewise from the records that respondent
Lanuevo too undue advantage of the trust and confidence reposed in
him by the Court and the Examiners implicit in his position as
BarConfidant as well as the trust and confidence that prevailed in and
characterized his relationship with the five members of the 1971 Bar
Examination Committee, who were thus deceived and induced into reevaluating the answers ofonly respondent Galang in five subjects that
resulted in the increase of his grades therein, ultimately enabling him
to be admitted a member of the Philippine Bar.
It was plain, simple and unmitigated deception that characterized
respondent Lanuevo's well-studied and well-calculated moves in
successively representing separately to each of the five examiners
concerned to the effect that the examinee failed only in his particular
subject and/or was on the borderline of passing. To repeat, the before
the unauthorized re-evaluations were made, Galang failed in the five
(5) major subjects and in two (2) minor subjects while his general
average was only 66.25% which under no circumstances or standard
could it be honestly claimed that the examinee failed only in one, or he
was on the borderline of passing. In fact, before the first notebook of
Galang was referred back to the examiner concerned for re-evaluation,
Galang had only one passing mark and this was in Legal Ethics and
Practical Exercises, a minor subject, with grade of 81%. The averages
and individual grades of Galang before and after the unauthorized reevaluation are as follows:
BAI
1. Political Law Public
International Law 68% 78% = 10 pts.
or 30 weighted points
BAI
Labor Laws and Social
Legislations 67% 67% = no reevaluation made.
2. Civil Law 64% 75% = 1 points
or 33 weighted points.
Taxation 74% 74% = no reevaluation made.
3. Mercantile Law 61% 71% = 10 pts.
or 30 weighted points.
4. Criminal Law 64% 75% = 11 pts. or
22 weighted points.
5. Remedial Law 63.75% (64) 75.5% (75%) =
11 pts. or 44 weighted points.
Legal Ethics and Practical
Exercises 81% 81% = no reevaluation made.

General Weighted Averages 66.25% 74.15%

Hence, by the simple expedient of initiating the re-evaluation of the
answers of Galang in the five (5) subjects under the circumstances
already narrated, Galang's original average of 66.25% was increased to
74.15% or an increase of 7.9 weighted points, to the great damage and

prejudice of the integrity of the Bar examinations and to the

disadvantage of the other examinees. He did this in favor only of
examinee Galang, with the possible addition of examinees Ernesto
Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. But only one notebook was reevaluated for each of the latter who Political Law and Public
International Law for Quitaleg and Mercantile Law for Ty dela Cruz.
The Office of the Bar Confidant, it must be stressed, has absolutely
nothing to do in the re-evaluation or reconsideration of the grades of
examinees who fail to make the passing mark before or after their
notebooks are submitted to it by the Examiners. After the corrected
notebooks are submitted to him by the Examiners, his only function is
to tally the individual grades of every examinee in all subjects taken
and thereafter compute the general average. That done, he will then
prepare a comparative data showing the percentage of passing and
failing in relation to a certain average to be submitted to the
Committee and to the Court and on the basis of which the Court will
determine the passing average, whether 75 or 74 or 73, etc. The Bar
Confidant has no business evaluating the answers of the examinees
and cannot assume the functions of passing upon the appraisal made
by the Examiners concerned. He is not the over-all Examiner. He
cannot presume to know better than the examiner. Any request for reevaluation should be done by the examinee and the same should be
addressed to the Court, which alone can validly act thereon. A Bar
Confidant who takes such initiative, exposes himself to suspicion and
thereby compromises his position as well as the image of the Court.
Respondent Lanuevo's claim that he was merely doing justice to
Galang without any intention of betraying the trust and confidence
reposed in him by the Court as Bar Confidant, can hardly invite belief in
the fact of the incontrovertible fact that he singled out Galang's papers
for re-evaluation, leaving out the papers of more than ninety (90)
examinees with far better averages ranging from 70% to 73.9% of
which he was fully aware (Vol. VI, pp. 46-47, 101, rec.), which could be
more properly claimed as borderline cases. This fact further betrays
respondent Lanuevo's claim of absolute good faith in referring back the
papers of Galang to the Examiners for re-evaluation. For certainly, as
against the original weighted average of 66.25% of Galang, there can
hardly be any dispute that the cases of the aforesaid more than ninety
(90) examinees were more deserving of reconsideration. Hence, in
trying to do justice to Galang, as claimed by respondent Lanuevo,
grave injustice was inflicted on the other examinees of the 1971 Bar
examinations, especially the said more than ninety candidates. And the
unexplained failure of respondent Lanuevo to apprise the Court or the
Committee or even the Bar Chairman of the fact of re-evaluation
before or after the said re-evaluation and increase of grades,
precludes, as the same is inconsistent with, any pretension of good
faith.
His request for the re-evaluation of the notebook in Political Law and
International Law of Ernesto Quitaleg and the notebook in Mercantile
Law of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz to give his actuations in the case of Galang
a semblance of impartiality, hoping that the over ninety examinees
who were far better situated than Galang would not give him away.
Even the re-evaluation of one notebook of Quitaleg and one notebook
of Ty dela Cruz violated the agreement of the members of the 1971 Bar
Examination Committee to re-evaluate when the examinee concerned
fails only in one subject. Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz failed in four (4) and
three (3) subjects respectively as hereinafter shown.
The strange story concerning the figures 954, the office code number
given to Galang's notebook, unveiled for the first time by respondent
Lanuevo in his suplemental sworn statement(Exh. 3- Lanuevo, Adm.
Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47. rec.) filed during the investigation with this
Court as to why he pried into the papers of Galang deserves scant
consideration. It only serves to picture a man desperately clutching at
straws in the wind for support. Furthermore, it was revealed by
respondent Lanuevo for the first time only on August 27, 1973 or a
period of more than five 95) months after he filed his answer on March
19, 1973(Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 35-36, rec.),
showing that it was just an after-thought.
B
REFERRAL OF EXAMINEE ALFREDO TY DELA CRUZ NOTEBOOK IN
MERCHANTILE LAW TO RAISE HIS GRADE OF 47% TO 50% TO
EXAMINER MANUEL MONTECILLO AND OF EXAMINEE ERNESTO
QUITALEG'S NOTEBOOK IN POLITICAL LAW TO EXAMINER BERNARDO
PARDO FOR RE-EVALUATION, RESULTING IN THE INCREASE OF HIS
GRADE IN THAT SUBJECT FROM 57% TO 66%.
Likewise, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having referred
back the aforesaid notebooks on Mercantile Law and Political Law

respectively of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz and Ernesto Quitaleg to the

Examiners concerned.
The records are not clear, however, under what circumstances the
notebooks of Ty dela Cruz and Quitaleg were referred back to the
Examiners concerned. Respondent Lanuevo claimed that these two
cases were officially brought to the Bar Examination Committee during
its first meeting (Vol. VI, pp. 50-51, rec.) and the latter decided to refer
them back to the Examiners concerned for re-evaluation with respect
to the case of Quitaleg and to remove the disqualification in the case of
Ty dela Cruz(Vol. VI, pp. 33-39, 84-86, rec.). Respondent Lanuevo
further claimed that the date of these two cases were contained in a
sheet of paper which was presented at the said first meeting of the
Committee (Vol. VI, pp. 39-43, 49-51, rec.). Likewise a record of the
dates of every meeting of the Committee was made by respondent
Lanuevo (Vol. VI, p. 28, rec.). The alleged sheet containing the date of
the two examinees and record of the dates of the meeting of the
Committee were not presented by respondent Lanuevo as, according
to him, he left them inadvertently in his desk in the Confidential Room
when he went on leave after the release of the Bar results (Vol. VI, pp.
28, 41-45, rec.). It appears, however, that the inventory conducted by
officials of the Court in the Confidential Room of respondent Lanuevo
did not yield any such sheet of record (Exh. X, Adm. Case No. 1162, p.
74, rec.; Vol. VIII, pp. 11-13, 20-22, 29-31, rec.).
Respondent Examiner Montecillo, Mercantile Law, maintained that
there was only one notebook in Mercantile Law which was officially
brought to him and this is substantiated by his personal file and record
(Vol. VI, pp. 34-35, rec.). According to him, this notebook's examiner
code number is 1613 (Vol. V, p.35, rec.) and is owned by Ramon E.
Galang, alias Roman E. Galang. It appears, however, that the original
grade of 47% in Mercantile Law of Ty dela Cruz was changed to 50% as
appearing in the cover of the notebook of said examinee and the
change is authenticated with the initial of Examiner Montecillo. He was
present when respondent Lanuevo presented in evidence the notebook
of Ty dela Cruz bearing Examiner code number 951 and Office Code
Number 110 as Exhibit 9-Lanuevo in Administrative Case No. 1162, and
the figures 47 crossed out, replaced by the figures 50 bearing the
initial of Examiner Montecillo as Exhibit 9-a-Lanuevo (Adm. Case No.
1162, p. 48, rec.; Vol. VI, pp. 23-24, Vol. VIII, p. 4, rec.); but Atty.
Montecillo did not interpose any objection to their admission in
evidence.
In this connection, respondent Examiner Pardo testified that he
remembers a case of an examinee presented to the Committee, who
obtained passing marks in all subjects except in one and the
Committee agreed to refer back to the Examiner concerned the
notebook in the subject in which the examinee failed (Vol. V, pp. 15-16,
rec.). He cannot recall the subject, but he is certain that it was not
Political Law (Vol. V, p. 16, rec.).Further, Pardo declared that he is not
aware of any case of an examinee who was on the borderline of
passing but who got a grade below 50% in one subject that was taken
up by the Committee (Vol. V, pp. 16-17, rec.).
Examiner Montecillo testified that it was the notebook with Examiner
Code Number 1613 (belonging to Galang) which was referred to the
Committee and the Committee agreed to return it to the Examiner
concerned. The day following the meeting in which the case of an
examinee with Code Number 1613 was taken up, respondent Lanuevo
handed him said notebook and he accordingly re-evaluated it. This
particular notebook with Office Code Number 954 belongs to Galang.
Examiner Tomacruz recalled a case of an examinee whose problem was
Mercantile Law that was taken up by the Committee. He is not certain
of any other case brought to the Committee (Vol. V, pp. 59-61, rec.).
Pardo declared that there was no case of an examinee that was
referred to the Committee that involved Political Law. He re-evaluated
the answers of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law upon the
representation made by respondent Lanuevo to him.
As heretofore stated, it was this consensus at the meeting on February
8, 1972 of the members of the Committee that where an examinee
failed in only one subject and passed all the others, the Examiner in
whose subject the examinee failed should re-evaluate or recheck the
notebook (Vol. V, p. 16, rec.: Exh. 2-Pardo, allegation No. 9, Adm. Case
No. 1164, pp. 60-63, Exh. A-Montecillo, Allegation No. 2, Adm. Case No.
1164, pp. 40-41, and Exh. B-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 72,
rec.).
At the time the notebook of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law with a
grade of 57% was referred back to Examiner Pardo, said examinee had
other failing grades in three (3) subjects, as follows:
Labor Laws 3%
Taxation 69%

Mercantile Law 68%

Ernesto Quitaleg's grades and averages before and after the reevaluation of his grade in Political Law are as follows:
BA
Political Law 57% 66% = 9 pts. or 27
weighted points
Labor Laws 73% 73% = No reevaluation
Civil Law 75% 75% = "
Taxation 69% 69% = "
Mercantile Law 68% 68% = "
Criminal Law 78% 78% = "
Remedial Law 85% 85% = "
Legal Ethics 83% 83% = "

Average (weighted) 73.15% 74.5%

(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27; Exhs. 10 and 10-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162,
rec.)
Alfredo Ty dela Cruz, at the time his notebook in Mercantile Law was
referred to Examiner Montecillo to remove the disqualification grade of
47% in said subject, had two (2) other failing grades. These are:
Political Law 70%
Taxation 72%
His grades and averages before and after the disqualifying grade was
removed are as follows:
BA
Political Law 70% 70% = No reevaluation
Labor Laws 75% 75% = "
Civil Law 89% 89% = "
Taxation 72% 72% = "
Mercantile Law 47% 50% = 3 pts. or 9
weighted points
Criminal Law 78% 78% = no reevaluation
Remedial Law 88% 88% = "
Legal Ethics 79% 79% = "

Weighted Averages 74.95% 75.4%

(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27, rec.).
The re-evaluation of the answers of Quitaleg in Political Law and the
answers of Ty dela Cruz in Mercantile Law, violated the consensus of
the Bar Examination Committee in February, 1971, which violation was
due to the misrepresentation of respondent Lanuevo.
It must be stated that the referral of the notebook of Galang in
Mercantile Law to Examiner Montecillo can hardly be said to be
covered by the consensus of the Bar Examination Committee
because even at the time of said referral, which was after the
unauthorized re-evaluation of his answers of four (4) subjects, Galang
had still failing grades in Taxation and Labor Laws. His re-evaluated
grade of 74.5% in Remedial Law was considered 75% under the
Confidential Memorandum and was so entered in the record. His grade
in Mercantile Law as subsequently re-evaluated by Examiner Montecillo
was 71%.
Respondent Lanuevo is therefore guilty of serious misconduct of
having betrayed the trust and confidence reposed in him as Bar
Confidant, thereby impairing the integrity of the Bar examinations and
undermining public faith in the Supreme Court. He should be disbarred.
As to whether Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz should be
disbarred or their names stricken from the Roll of Attorneys, it is
believed that they should be required to show cause and the
corresponding investigation conducted.
III
Re: Administrative Case No. 1163, Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E.
Galang, respondent.
A
The name of respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang,
should likewise be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys. This is a necessary
consequence of the un-authorized re-evaluation of his answers in
five(5) major subjects Civil Law, Political and International Law,
Criminal Law, Remedial Law, and Mercantile Law.
The judicial function of the Supreme Court in admitting candidates to
the legal profession, which necessarily involves the exercise of
discretion, requires: (1) previous established rules and principles; (2)
concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate
individuals; and (3) a decision as to whether these facts are governed
by the rules and principles (In re: Cunanan Flunkers' Petition for
Admission to the Bar -- 94 Phil. 534, 544-545). The determination of
whether a bar candidate has obtained the required passing grade

certainly involves discretion (Legal and Judicial Ethics, Justice Martin,

1969 ed., p. 13).
In the exercise of this function, the Court acts through a Bar
Examination Committee, composed of a member of the Court who acts
as Chairman and eight (8) members of the Bar who act as examiners in
the eight (8) bar subjects with one subject assigned to each. Acting as
a sort of liaison officer between the Court and the Bar Chairman, on
one hand, and the individual members of the Committee, on the other,
is the Bar Confidant who is at the same time a deputy clerk of the
Court. Necessarily, every act of the Committee in connection with the
exercise of discretion in the admission of examinees to membership of
the Bar must be in accordance with the established rules of the Court
and must always be subject to the final approval of the Court. With
respect to the Bar Confidant, whose position is primarily confidential as
the designation indicates, his functions in connection with the conduct
of the Bar examinations are defined and circumscribed by the Court
and must be strictly adhered to.
The re-evaluation by the Examiners concerned of the examination
answers of respondent Galang in five (5) subjects, as already clearly
established, was initiated by Respondent Lanuevo without any
authority from the Court, a serious breach of the trust and confidence
reposed by the Court in him as Bar Confidant. Consequently, the reevaluation that enabled respondent Galang to pass the 1971 Bar
examinations and to be admitted to the Bar is a complete nullity. The
Bar Confidant does not possess any discretion with respect to the
matter of admission of examinees to the Bar. He is not clothed with
authority to determine whether or not an examinee's answers merit reevaluation or re-evaluation or whether the Examiner's appraisal of such
answers is correct. And whether or not the examinee benefited was in
connivance or a privy thereto is immaterial. What is decisive is whether
the proceedings or incidents that led to the candidate's admission to
the Bar were in accordance with the rules.
B
Section 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964, in
connection, among others, with the character requirement of
candidates for admission to the Bar, provides that "every applicant for
admission as a member of the Bar must be ... of good moral
character ... and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory
evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against him
involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court
in the Philippines." Prior to 1964, or under the old Rules of Court, a bar
applicant was required to produce before the Supreme Court
satisfactory testimonials of good moral character (Sec. 2, Rule 127).
Under both rules, every applicant is duty bound to lay before the Court
all his involvement in any criminal case, pending or otherwise
terminated, to enable the Court to fully ascertain or determine
applicant's moral character. Furthermore, as to what crime involves
moral turpitude, is for the supreme Court to determine. Hence, the
necessity of laying before or informing the Court of one's personal
record whether he was criminally indicted, acquitted, convicted or
the case dismissed or is still pending becomes more compelling. The
forms for application to take the Bar examinations provided by the
Supreme Court beginning the year 1965 require the disclosure not only
of criminal cases involving moral turpitude filed or pending against the
applicant but also of all other criminal cases of which he has been
accused. It is of course true that the application form used by
respondent Galang when he took the Bar for the first time in 1962 did
not expressly require the disclosure of the applicant's criminal records,
if any. But as already intimated, implicit in his task to show satisfactory
evidence or proof of good moral character is his obligation to reveal to
the Court all his involvement in any criminal case so that the Court can
consider them in the ascertainment and determination of his moral
character. And undeniably, with the applicant's criminal records before
it, the Court will be in a better position to consider the applicant's
moral character; for it could not be gainsaid that an applicant's
involvement in any criminal case, whether pending or terminated by its
dismissal or applicant's acquittal or conviction, has a bearing upon his
character or fitness for admission to the Bar. In 1963 and 1964, when
respondent Galang took the Bar for the second and third time,
respectively, the application form provided by the Court for use of
applicants already required the applicant to declare under oath that
"he has not been accused of, indicted for or convicted by any court or
tribunal of any offense involving moral turpitude; and that there is no
pending case of that nature against him." By 1966, when Galang took
the Bar examinations for the fourth time, the application form prepared
by the Court for use of applicants required the applicant to reveal all
his criminal cases whether involving moral turpitude or not. In

paragraph 4 of that form, the applicant is required under oath to

declare that "he has not been charged with any offense before a Fiscal,
Municipal Judge, or other officer; or accused of, indicted for or
convicted by any court or tribunal of any crime involving moral
turpitude; nor is there a pending case against him" (Adm. Case No.
1163, p. 56, rec.). Yet, respondent Galang continued to intentionally
withhold or conceal from the Court his criminal case of slight physical
injuries which was then and until now is pending in the City Court of
Manila; and thereafter repeatedly omitted to make mention of the
same in his applications to take the Bar examinations in 1967, 1969
and 1971.
All told, respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, is guilty
of fraudulently concealing and withholding from the Court his pending
criminal case for physical injuries in 1962, 1963, 1964, 1966, 1967,
1969 and 1971; and in 1966, 1967,1969 and 1971, he committed
perjury when he declared under oath that he had no pending criminal
case in court. By falsely representing to the Court that he had no
criminal case pending in court, respondent Galang was allowed
unconditionally to take the Bar examinations seven (7) times and in
1972 was allowed to take his oath.
That the concealment of an attorney in his application to take the Bar
examinations of the fact that he had been charged with, or indicted for,
an alleged crime, is a ground for revocation of his license to practice
law is well settled (see 165 ALR 1151, 7 CJS 741). Thus:
[1] It requires no argument to reach the conclusion that the
respondent, in withholding from the board of law examiners and from
the justice of this court, to whom he applied for admission, information
respecting so serious a matter as an indictment for a felony, was guilty
of fraud upon the court (cases cited).
[2] It is equally clear that, had the board of law examiners, or the judge
to whom he applied for admission, been apprised of the true situation,
neither the certificate of the board nor of the judge would have been
forthcoming (State ex rel. Board of Law Examiners v. Podell, 207 N W
709 710).
The license of respondent Podell was revoke and annulled, and he was
required to surrender to the clerk of court the license issued to him,
and his name was stricken from the roll of attorneys (p. 710).
Likewise in Re Carpel, it was declared that:
[1] The power to admit to the bar on motion is conferred in the
discretion of the Appellate Division.' In the exercise of the discretion,
the court should be informed truthfully and frankly of matters tending
to show the character of the applicant and his standing at the bar of
the state from which he comes. The finding of indictments against him,
one of which was still outstanding at the time of his motion, were facts
which should have been submitted to the court, with such explanations
as were available. Silence respecting them was reprehensible, as
tending to deceive the court (165 NYS, 102, 104; emphasis supplied).
Carpel's admission to the bar was revoked (p. 105).
Furthermore, respondent's persistent denial of his involvement in any
criminal case despite his having been apprised by the Investigation of
some of the circumstances of the criminal case including the very
name of the victim in that case(he finally admitted it when he was
confronted by the victim himself, who was called to testify thereon),
and his continued failure for about thirteen years to clear his name in
that criminal case up to the present time, indicate his lack of the
requisite attributes of honesty, probity and good demeanor. He is
therefore unworthy of becoming a member of the noble profession of
law.
While this aspect of the investigation was not part of the formal
resolution of the Court requiring him to explain why his name should
not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys, respondent Galang was, as
early as August, 1973, apprised of his omission to reveal to the Court
his pending criminal case. Yet he did not offer any explanation for such
omission.
Under the circumstances in which respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias
Roman E. Galang, was allowed to take the Bar examinations and the
highly irregular manner in which he passed the Bar, WE have no other
alternative but to order the surrender of his attorney's certificate and
the striking out of his name from the Roll of Attorneys. For as WE said
in Re Felipe del Rosario:
The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted every one
who demands it, but is a privilege to be extended or withheld in the
exercise of sound discretion. The standards of the legal profession are
not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape the
penalties of the criminal law. It would be a disgrace to the Judiciary to
receive one whose integrity is questionable as an officer of the court,
to clothe him with all the prestige of its confidence, and then to permit

him to hold himself as a duly authorized member of the bar (citing

American cases) [52 Phil. 399-401].
What WE now do with respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E.
Galang, in this present case is not without any precedent in this
jurisdiction. WE had on several occasions in the past nullified the
admission of successful bar candidates to the membership of the Bar
on the grounds, among others, of (a)misrepresentations of, or false
pretenses relative to, the requirement on applicant's educational
attainment [Tapel vs. Publico, resolution of the Supreme Court striking
off the name of Juan T. Publico from the Roll of Attorneys on the basis
of the findings of the Court Investigators contained in their report and
recommendation, Feb. 23, 1962; In re: Telesforo A. Diao, 7 SCRA 475478; (b) lack of good moral character [In re: Peralta, 101 Phil. 313314]; and (c) fraudulent passing of the Bar examinations [People vs.
Romualdez -- re: Luis Mabunay, 57 Phil. 151; In re: Del Rosario, 52 Phil.
399 and People vs. Castro and Doe, 54 Phil. 42]. In the cases of
Romualdez (Mabunay) and Castro, the Court found that the grades of
Mabunay and Castro were falsified and they were convicted of the
crime of falsification of public documents.
IV
RE: Administrative Case No. 1164, Assistant Solicitor General Bernardo
Pardo (now CFI Judge), Judge Ramon Pamatian(Later Associate Justice
of the Court of Appeals, now deceased)Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty.
Fidel Manalo, Atty. Manuel Tomacruz and Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr.,
respondents.
All respondents Bar examiners candidly admitted having made the reevaluation and/or re-correction of the papers in question upon the
misrepresentation of respondent BarConfidant Lanuevo. All, however,
professed good faith; and that they re-evaluated or increased the
grades of the notebooks without knowing the identity of the examinee
who owned the said notebooks; and that they did the same without
any consideration or expectation of any. These the records clearly
demonstrate and WE are of the opinion and WE so declare that indeed
the respondents-examiners made the re-evaluation or re-correcion in
good faith and without any consideration whatsoever.
Considering however the vital public interest involved in the matter of
admission of members to the Bar, the respondents bar examiners,
under the circumstances, should have exercised greater care and
caution and should have been more inquisitive before acceding to the
request of respondent Bar Confidant Lanuevo. They could have asked
the Chairman of the Bar Examination Committee, who would have
referred the matter to the Supreme Court. At least the respondentsexaminers should have required respondent Lanuevo to produce or
show them the complete grades and/or the average of the examinee
represented by respondent Lanuevo to have failed only in their
respective and particular subject and/or was on the borderline of
passing to fully satisfy themselves that the examinee concerned was
really so circumstances. This they could have easily done and the stain
on the Bar examinations could have been avoided.
Respondent Bar examiners Montecillo, Pamatian, and Manalo claimed
and so declared under oath that the answers of respondent Galang
really deserved or merited the increased grades; and so with
respondent Pardo in connection with the re-evaluation of Ernesto
Quitaleg's answers in Political Law. With respect to respondents
Tomacruz and Pablo, it would appear that they increased the grades of
Galang in their respective subject solely because of the
misrepresentations of Respondent Lanuevo. Hence, in the words of
respondent Tomacruz: "You brought to me one paper and you said that
this particular examinee had almost passed, however, in my subject he
received 60 something, I cannot remember the exact average and if he
would get a few points higher, he would get a passing average. I
agreed to do that because I did not wish to be the one causing his
failure. ..." (Vol. V, pp. 60-61, rec.; see also allegations 3 and 4, Exh. 1Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.; emphasis ours). And
respondent Pablo: "... he told me that this particular examinee seems
to have passed in allot her subject except this subject and that if I can
re-evaluate this examination notebook and increase the mark to at
least 75, this particular examinee will pass the bar examinations so I
believe I asked him 'Is this being done?' and he said 'Yes, that is the
practice used to be done before to help out examinees who are failing
in just one subject' so I readily acceded to his request and said 'Just
leave it with me and I will try to re-evaluate' and he left it with me and
what i did was to go over the book and tried to be as lenient as I
could. While I did not mark correct the answers which were wrong,
what I did was to be more lenient and if the answers was correct
although it was not complete I raise the grade so I had a total of 78
instead of 68 and what I did was to correct the grading sheet

accordingly and initial the changes" (Vol. V, pp. 44-45, rec.; emphasis
supplied).
It could not be seriously denied, however, that the favorable reevaluations made by respondents Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo and
Pardo notwithstanding their declarations that the increases in grades
they gave were deserved by the examinee concerned, were to a
certain extent influenced by the misrepresentation and deception
committed by respondent Lanuevo. Thus in their own words:
Montecillo
Q And by reason of that information you made the re-evaluation of the
paper?
A Yeas, your Honor.
Q Would you have re-evaluated the paper of your own accord in the
absence of such information?
A No, your Honor, because I have submitted my report at that time"
(Vol. V, p. 33, rec.; see also allegations in paragraphs 2, 3, 4 & 5,
Affidavit of April 17, 1972, Exh. B-Montecillo; allegation No. 2, Answer
dated march 19, 1973, Exh. A-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 4041, and 72, rec.).
Pamatian
3. That sometime in the later part of January of this year, he brought
back to me an examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation
because according to him the owner of the paper is on the borderline
and if I could reconsider his grade to 75% the candidate concerned will
get passing mark;
4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was really the
practice and policy of the Supreme Court to do so and in the further
belief that I was just manifesting cooperation in doing so, I reevaluated the paper and reconsidered the grade to 75%; ..." (Exh. 2Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 55, rec.); and
5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and under the
belief that I am authorized to do so in view of them is representation of
said Atty. Victorio Lanuevo, ..." (Exh. 1-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164,
pp. 33-34, rec.).
Manalo
(c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee concerned, herein
respondent carefully evaluated each and every answer written in the
notebook. Testing the answer by the criteria laid down by the Court,
and giving the said examinee the benefit of the doubt in view of Mr.
Lanuevo's representation that it was only in that particular subject that
said examinee failed, herein respondent became convinced that the
said examinee deserved a higher grade than that previously given him,
but he did not deserve, in herein respondent's honest appraisal, to be
given the passing grade of
75%. ..."(allegation 5-c, p. 38, Exh. 1-Manalo, rec.; emphasis supplied).
Pardo
... I considered it entirely humanly possible to have erred, because I
corrected that particular notebook on December 31,1971, considering
especially the representation of the Bar Confidant that the said
examinee had obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of
which was 84% in Remedial Law, if I recall
correctly. ... (allegation 7, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 62,
rec.; emphasis supplied).
With the misrepresentations and the circumstances utilized by
respondent Lanuevo to induce the herein examiners to make the reevaluation adverted to, no one among them can truly claim that the reevaluation effected by them was impartial or free from any improper
influence, their conceded integrity, honesty and competence
notwithstanding.
Consequently, Galang cannot justifiably claim that he deserved the
increased grades given after the said re-evaluations(Galang's memo
attached to the records, Adm. Case No. 1163).
At any rate, WE are convinced, in the light of the explanations of the
respondents-examiners, which were earlier quoted in full, that their
actuations in connection with the re-evaluation of the answers of
Galang in five (5) subjects do not warrant or deserve the imposition of
any disciplinary action. WE find their explanations satisfactory.
Nevertheless, WE are constrained to remind herein respondentsexaminers that their participation in the admission of members to the
Bar is one impressed with the highest consideration of public interest
absolute purity of the proceedings and so are required to exercise
the greatest or utmost case and vigilance in the performance of their
duties relative thereto.
V
Respondent Atty. Victorio D. Lanuevo, in his memorandum filed on
November 14, 1973, claimed that respondent-examiner Pamatian "in
bringing up this unfounded cause, or lending undue assistance or

support thereto ... was motivated with vindictiveness due to

respondent's refusal to be pressured into helping his (examiner's)
alleged friend a participant in the 1971 Bar Examinations whom said
examiner named as Oscar Landicho and who, the records will show, did
not pass said examinations (p. 9, Lanuevo's memo, Adm. Case No.
1162).
It must be stated that this is a very serious charge against the honor
and integrity of the late Justice Ramon Pamatian, who passed away on
October 18, 1973 and therefore cannot refute Lanuevo's insinuations.
Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo did not bring this out during the
investigation which in his words is "essential to his defense. "His
pretension that he did not make this charge during the investigation
when Justice Pamatian was still alive, and deferred the filing of such
charge against Justice Pamatian and possibly also against Oscar
Landicho before the latter departed for Australia "until this case shall
have been terminated lest it be misread or misinterpreted as being
intended as a leverage for a favorable outcome of this case on the part
of respondent or an act of reprisal", does not invite belief; because he
does not impugn the motives of the five other members of the 1971
Bar Examination Committee, who also affirmed that he deceived them
into re-evaluating or revising the grades of respondent Galang in their
respective subjects.
It appears, however, that after the release of the results of the 1971
Bar examinations, Oscar Landicho, who failed in that examinations,
went to see and did see Civil Law examiner Pamatian for the purpose
of seeking his help in connection with the 1971 Bar Examinations.
Examiner Pamatian advised Landicho to see the Chairman of the 1971
Bar Examination Committee. Examiner Pamatian mentioned in passing
to Landicho that an examination booklet was re-evaluated by him
(Pamatian) before the release of the said bar results (Vol. V, pp. 6-7,
rec). Even though such information was divulged by respondent
Pamatian after the official release of the bar results, it remains an
indecorous act, hardly expected of a member of the Judiciary who
should exhibit restraint in his actuations demanded by resolute
adherence to the rules of delicacy. His unseemly act tended to
undermine the integrity of the bar examinations and to impair public
faith in the Supreme Court.
VI
The investigation failed to unearth direct evidence that the illegal
machination of respondent Lanuevo to enable Galang to pass the 1971
Bar examinations was committed for valuable consideration.
A
There are, however, acquisitions made by Respondent Lanuevo
immediately after the official release of the 1971 Bar examinations in
February, 1972, which may be out of proportion to his salary as Bar
Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court.
1. On April 5, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife acquired from the
BF Homes, Inc. a house and lot with an area of 374 square meters,
more or less, for the amount of P84,114.00. The deed of sale was
dated March 5, 1972 but was notarized only on April 5, 1972. On the
same date, however, respondent Lanuevo and his wife executed two
(2)mortgages covering the said house and lot in favor of BF Homes,
Inc. in the total amount of P67,291.20 (First mortgage P58,879.80,
Entry No. 90913: date of instrument April 5, 1972, date of inscription
April 20, 1972: Second mortgage P8,411.40, Entry No. 90914:
date of instrument April 5, 1972, date of inscription April 20,
1972). [D-2 to D-4, Vol. III, rec.]. Respondent Lanuevo paid as down
payment the amount of only P17,000.00, which according to him is
equivalent to 20%, more or less, of the purchase price of P84,114.00.
Respondent Lanuevo claimed that P5,000.00 of the P17,000.00 was his
savings while the remaining the P12,000.00 came from his sister in
Okinawa in the form of a loan and received by him through a niece
before Christmas of 1971 in dollars ($2000) [Vol. VII, pp. 41-48; Vol.
VIII, pp. 2-3, rec.]
It appears, however, that his alleged P5,000.00
savings and P12,000.00 loan from his sister; are not fully reflected and
accounted for in respondent's 1971 Statement of Assets and Liabilities
which hefiled on January 17, 1972.
In said 1971 statement, respondent Lanuevo listed under Assets a
bank deposit in the amount of only P2,000.00. In his 1972 statement,
his bank deposit listed under Assets was in the amount of P1,011.00,
which shows therefore that of the P2,000.00 bank deposit listed in his
1971 statement under Assets, only the amount of P989.00 was used or
withdrawn. The amount of P18,000.00 receivable listed under Assets in
his 1971 statement was not realized because the transaction therein
involved did not push through (Statement of Assets and Liabilities of
respondent Lanuevo from 1965 to 1972; Vol. VIII, pp. 47-48, rec.).

Likewise, the alleged December, 1971 $2000 loan of respondent from

his married sister in Okinawa is extremely doubtful. In the first place,
said amount of $2000 (P12,000.00) is not reflected in
his1971 Statement of Assets and Liabilities filed on January 17, 1972.
Secondly, the alleged note which he allegedly received from his sister
at the time he received the $200 was not even presented by
respondent during the investigation. And according to Respondent
Lanuevo himself, while he considered this a loan, his sister did not
seriously consider it as one. In fact, no mode or time of payment was
agreed upon by them. And furthermore, during the investigation,
respondent Lanuevo promised to furnish the Investigator the address
of his sister in Okinawa. Said promise was not fulfilled as borne out by
the records. Considering that there is no showing that his sister, who
has a family of her own, is among the top earners in Okinawa or has
saved a lot of money to give to him, the conclusion, therefore, that
the P17,000.00 of respondent Lanuevo was either an ill-gotten or
undeclared income is inevitable under the foregoing circumstances.
On August 14, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife mortgaged their
BF Homes house and lot to the GSIS for the amount of P65,000.00
(Entry No. 4992: August 14, 1972 date of instrument;August 23,
1972 date of inscription). On February 28, 1973, the second
mortgage in favor of BF Homes, Entry No. 90914, was redeemed by
respondent and was subsequently cancelled on March 20,1973, Entry
No. 30143. Subsequently, or on March 2, 1973 the first mortgage in
favor of BF Homes, Entry No. 90913 was also redeemed by respondent
Lanuevo and thereafter cancelled onMarch 20, 1973, (See D-2 to D-4,
Vol. III, rec.). Hence, only the mortgage in favor of GSIS remains as the
encumbrance of respondent's house and lot. According to respondent
Lanuevo, the monthly amortization of the GSIS mortgage is P778.00 a
month, but that since May of 1973, he was unable to pay the same. In
his 1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities, which he filed in
connection with his resignation and retirement (filed October 13,
1972), the house and lot declared as part of his assets, were valued at
P75,756.90. Listed, however, as an item in his liabilities in the same
statement was the GSIS real estate loan in the amount
of P64,200.00 (1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities).
2. Listed as an asset in his 1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities is
a 1956 VW car valued atP5,200.00. That he acquired this car sometime
between January, 1972 and November, 1972 could be inferred from the
fact that no such car or any car was listed in his statement of assets
and liabilities of 1971 or in the years previous to 1965. It appears,
however, that his listed total assets, excluding receivables in his 1971
Statement was P19,000.00, while in his 1972 (as of November, 1972)
Statement, his listed total assets, excluding the house and lot was
P18,211.00, including the said 1956 VW car worth P5,200.00.
The proximity in point of time between the official release of the 1971
Bar examinations and the acquisition of the above-mentioned
properties, tends to link or tie up the said acquisitions with the illegal
machination committed by respondent Lanuevo with respect to
respondent Galang's examination papers or to show that the money
used by respondent Lanuevo in the acquisition of the above properties
came from respondent Galang in consideration of his passing the Bar.
During the early stage of this investigation but after the Court had
informed respondent Lanuevo of the serious irregularities in the 1971
Bar examinations alleged in Oscar Landicho's Confidential Letter and in
fact, after Respondent Lanuevo had filed on April 12, 1972 his sworn
statement on the matter, as ordered by the Court, respondent Lanuevo
surprisingly filed his letter or resignation on October 13, 1972 with the
end in view of retiring from the Court. His resignation before he was
required to show cause on March 5, 1973 but after he was informed of
the said irregularities, is indicative of a consciousness of guilt.
It must be noted that immediately after the official release of the
results of the 1971 Bar examinations, respondent Lanuevo went on
vacation and sick leave from March 16, 1972 to January 15, 1973,
obtaining the case value thereof in lump sum in the amount of
P11,000.00. He initially claimed at the investigation that h e used a
part thereof as a down payment for his BF Homes house and lot (Vol.
VII, pp. 40-48, rec.), which he bought on April 5, 1972.
Criminal proceedings may be instituted against respondent Lanuevo
under Section 3 (a & e) in relation to Section 9 of Republic Act No. 1379
(Anti-Graft Law) for:
(a) Persuading inducing or influencing another public officer to perform
an act constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly
promulgated by competent authority or an offense in connection with
the official duties of the latter, or allowing himself to be presented,
induced, or influenced to commit such violation or offense.
xxx xxx xxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government,
or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evidence bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of offices or government corporations charged with the
grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
Section 8 of said Republic Act No. 3019 authorizes the dismissal or
removal of a public officer once it is determined that his property or
money "is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public
officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income
from legitimately acquired property ... " (Sec. 2, Rep. Act 1379; Sec. 8,
Rep. Act 3019).
It should be stressed, however, that respondent Lanuevo's
aforementioned Statements of Assets and Liabilities were not
presented or taken up during the investigation; but they were
examined as they are part of the records of this Court.
B
There are likewise circumstances indicating possible contacts between
respondent Ramon E. Galang and/or his father and respondent Victorio
D. Lanuevo before the latter become the bar Confidant.
1. Respondent Ramon E. Galang was a beneficiary of the G.I Bill of
Rights educational program of the Philippine Veterans Board from his
high school days 1951 to 1955 up to his pre-law studies at the
MLQ Educational Institution (now MLQ University) 1955 to 1958.
From 1948 to 1958, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo was connected
with the Philippine Veterans Board which is the governmental agency
entrusted with the affairs of our veterans including the implementation
of the Veterans Bill of Rights. From 1955 to 1958, Respondent Lanuevo
successively held the position of Junior Investigator, Veterans Claims
Investigator, Supervising Veterans Investigator and Veterans Claims
Investigator (Service Record, p. 9, Adm. Case No. 1162). During that
period of time, therefore, respondent Lanuevo had direct contacts with
applicants and beneficiaries of the Veterans Bill of Rights. Galang's
educational benefits was approved on March 16, 1954, retroactive as
of the date of waiver July 31, 1951, which is also the date of filing (A,
Vol. IV, rec.).
It is alleged by respondent Ramon E. Galang that it was his father who
all the time attended to the availment of the said educational benefits
and even when he was already in Manila taking up his pre-law at MLQ
Educational Institution from 1955 to 1958. In 1955, respondent Galang
was already 19 years old, and from 1957 to 1958, he was employed as
a technical assistant in the office of Senator Roy (Vol. V, pp. 79-80, 8687, rec.).[Subsequently, during the investigation, he claimed that he
was the private secretary of Senator Puyat in 1957 (Vol. VI, pp. 12-13,
rec.)]. It appears, however, that a copy of the notice-letter dated June
28, 1955 of the Philippine Veterans Board to the MLQ Educational
Institution on the approval of the transfer of respondent Galang from
Sta. Rita Institute to the MLQ Educational Institution effective the first
semester of the school year 1955-56 was directly addressed and
furnished to respondent Ramon E. Galang at 2292 Int. 8 Banal St.,
Tondo, Manila (A-12, Vol. IV, rec.).
Respondent Ramon E. Galang further declared that he never went to
the Office of the Philippine Veterans to follow up his educational
benefits and claimed that he does not even know the location of the
said office. He does not also know whether beneficiaries of the G.I. Bill
of Rights educational benefits are required to go to the Philippine
Veterans Board every semester to submit their ratings (Vol. V, p. 86,
rec.). But respondent Galang admits that he had gone to the GSIS and
City Court of Manila, although he insists that he never bothered to take
a look at the neighboring buildings (Vol. V, pp. 93-94, rec.). The huge
and imposing Philippine Veterans Building is beside the GSIS building
and is obliquely across the City Court building.
2. Respondent Lanuevo stated that as an investigator in the Philippine
Veterans Board, he investigated claims for the several benefits given to
veterans like educational benefits and disability benefits; that he does
not remember, however, whether in the course of his duties as
veterans investigator, he came across the application of Ramon E.
Galang for educational benefits; and that he does not know the father
of Mr. Ramon E. Galang and has never met him (Vol. VII, pp. 28, 49,
rec.).
3. Respondent Lanuevo, as a member of the USAFEE, belonged to the
91st Infantry operating at Zambales and then Cabanatuan, Nueva
Ecija, shortly before the war (Vol. VII, pp. 48-49, rec.). Later he joined
the guerrilla movement in Samar.
He used to be a member of the Philippine Veterans Legion especially
while working with the Philippine Veterans Board(Vol. VII, p. 49, rec.).

He does not know the Banal Regiment of the guerrillas, to which

Galang's father belonged. During the Japanese occupation, his guerrilla
outfit was operating in Samar only and he had no communications with
other guerrilla organization in other parts of the country.
He attended meetings of the Philippine Veterans Legion in his chapter
in Samar only and does not remember having attended its meeting
here in Manila, even while he was employed with the Philippine
Veterans Board. He is not a member of the Defenders of Bataan and
Corregidor (Vol. VII, p.51, rec.).
On November 27, 1941, while respondent Lanuevo was with the
Philippine Army stationed at Camp Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva
Ecija, he was stricken with pneumonia and was hospitalized at the
Nueva Ecija Provincial Hospital as a result and was still confined there
when their camp was bombed and strafed by Japanese planes on
December 13, 1941 (Sworn statement of respondent Lanuevo dated
August 27, 1973, Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 46, rec.).
German Galang, father of respondent Galang, was a member of the
Banal Guerilla Forces, otherwise known as the Banal Regiment. He was
commissioned and inducted as a member thereof on January 16, 1942
and was given the rank of first lieutenant. His unit "was attached and
served into the XI-Corps, US Army; XIII-C US Army, 43rd Div., US Army,
stationed headquarters at Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija and with the 38th
Division, US army stationed at Corregidor in the mopping-up operations
against the enemies, from 9 May 1945 date of recognition to 31
December 1945, date of demobilization"(Affidavit of Jose Banal dated
December 22, 1947, Vol. IV, A-3, rec.).
It should be stressed that once the bar examiner has submitted the
corrected notebooks to the Bar Confidant, the same cannot be
withdrawn for any purpose whatsoever without prior authority from the
Court. Consequently, this Court expresses herein its strong disapproval
of the actuations of the bar examiners in Administrative Case No. 1164
as above delineated.
WHEREFORE, IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1162, RESPONDENT
VICTORIO D. LANUEVO IS HEREBY DISBARRED AND HIS NAME
ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS; AND IN
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1163, RESPONDENT RAMON E. GALANG,
alias Roman E. GALANG, IS HEREBY LIKEWISE DISBARRED AND HIS
NAME ALSO ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS.
Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Fernando, Barredo, Esguerra, Muoz Palma and
Aquino, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., concurs in the result.
Antonio, J., is on official leave.
Concepcion and Martin, JJ., took no part.

EN BANC
[B.M. No. 810 . January 27, 1998.]
IN RE: PETITION TO TAKE THE LAWYER'S OATH BY ARTHUR M.
CUEVAS, JR.
SYNOPSIS
Petitioner Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr. passed the 1996 Bar Examinations. His
oath-taking was held in abeyance in view of the Court's resolution
which permitted him to take the Bar Examinations "subject to the
condition that should (he) pass the same, (he) shall not be allowed to
take the lawyer's oath pending approval of the Court due to his
previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide.
The conviction stemmed from petitioner's participation in the initiation
rites of the LEX TALIONIS FRATERNITAS, a fraternity in the SAN BEDA
COLLEGE OF LAW, sometime in September 1991, where Raul I.
Camaligan, a neophyte, died as a result of the personal violence
inflicted upon him. Thereafter, petitioner applied for and was granted
probation. On May 16, 1995, he was discharged from probation and his
case considered closed and terminated.

In this petition, petitioner prays that "he be allowed to take his lawyer's
oath at the Court's most convenient time" attaching thereto the Order
dated May 16, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10 of Antique
discharging him from his probation, and certifications attesting to his
righteous, peaceful and law abiding character. On July 15, 1997, the
Court, before acting on petitioner's application, resolved to require
Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan, father of the deceased hazing victim Raul I.
Camaligan, to comment thereon.
The Court stated that it shares the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert D.
Camaligan and commiserates with the untimely death of his son.
Nonetheless, Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan admits that "he is not, in a
position to say whether petitioner since then has become morally fit
and submits petitioner's plea to be admitted to the noble profession of
law to the sound and judicious discretion of the Court.
The petition before the Court requires the balancing of the reasons for
disallowing or allowing petitioner's admission to the noble profession of
law. His deliberate participation in the senseless beatings over a
helpless neophyte which resulted to the latter's untimely demise
indicates absence of that moral fitness required for admission to the
bar. And as the practice of law is a privilege extended only to the few
who possess the high standards of intellectual and moral qualifications
the Court is duty bound to prevent the entry of undeserving aspirants,
as well as to exclude those who have been admitted but have become
a disgrace to the profession. The Court, nonetheless, is willing to give
petitioner a chance in the same manner that it recently allowed Al
Caparros Argosino, petitioner's co-accused below, to take the lawyer's
oath. The Court then resolved to allow petitioner Arthur M. Cuevas Jr. to
take the lawyer's oath and to sign the Roll of Attorneys on a date to be
set by the Court, subject to the payment of appropriate fees. STcADa
SYLLABUS
REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; ATTORNEYS AND ADMISSION TO THE BAR;
PETITION TO TAKE LAWYER'S OATH AFTER DISCHARGE FROM
PROBATION, GRANTED; CASE AT BAR. The petition before the Court
requires the balancing of the reasons for disallowing or allowing
petitioner's admission to the noble profession of law. His deliberate
participation in the senseless beatings over a helpless neophyte which
resulted to the latter's untimely demise indicates absence of that
moral fitness required for admission to the bar. And as the practice of
law is a privilege extended only to the few who possess the high
standards of intellectual and moral qualifications the Court is duty
bound to prevent the entry of undeserving aspirants, as well to exclude
those who have been admitted but have become a disgrace to the
profession. The Court, nonetheless, is willing to give petitioner a
chance in the same manner that it recently allowed Al Caparros
Argosino, petitioner's co-accused below, to take the lawyer's oath.
Petitioner Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr.'s discharge from probation without any
infraction of the attendant conditions therefor and the various
certifications attesting to his righteous, peaceful and civic-oriented
character prove that he has taken decisive steps to purge himself of
his deficiency in moral character and atone for the unfortunate death
of Raul I. Camaligan. The Court is prepared to give him the benefit of
the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general tendency of the youth to
be rash, temerarious and uncalculating. Let it be stressed to herein
petitioner that the lawyer's oath is not a mere formality recited for a
few minutes in the glare of flashing cameras and before the presence
of select witnesses. Petitioner is exhorted to conduct himself beyond
reproach at all times and to live strictly accordingly to his oath and the
Code of Professional Responsibility. And, to paraphrase Mr. Justice
Padilla's comment in the sister case of Re: Petition of Al Argosino To
Take the Lawyer's Oath, Bar Matter No. 712, March 19, 1997, "[t]he
Court sincerely hopes that" Mr. Cuevas, Jr., "will continue with the
assistance he has been giving to his community. As a lawyer he will
now be in a better position to render legal and other services to the
more unfortunate members of society." ACCORDINGLY, the Court
hereby resolved to allow petitioner Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr., to take the
lawyer's oath and to sign the Roll of Attorneys on a date to be set by
the Court, subject to the payment of appropriate fees. DaHcAS
RESOLUTION
FRANCISCO, J p:
Petitioner Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr., recently passed the 1996 Bar
Examinations, 1 His oath-taking was held in abeyance in view of the
Court's resolution dated August 27, 1996 which permitted him to take
the Bar Examinations "subject to the condition that should (he) pass
the same, (he) shall not be allowed to take the lawyer's oath pending
approval of the Court . . ." due to his previous conviction for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting In Homicide. The conviction stemmed from
petitioner's participation in the initiation rites of the LEX TALIONIS

FRATERNITAS, a fraternity in the SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW,

sometime in September 1991, where Raul I. Camaligan, a neophyte,
died as a result of the personal violence inflicted upon him. Thereafter,
petitioner applied for and was granted probation. On May 16, 1995, he
was discharged from probation and his case considered closed and
terminated. LLjur
In this petition, received by the Court on May 5, 1997, petitioner prays
that "he be allowed to take his lawyer's oath at the Court's most
convenient time" 2 attaching thereto the Order dated May 16, 1995 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10 of Antique discharging him from his
probation, and certifications attesting to his righteous, peaceful and
law abiding character issued by: (a) the Mayor of the Municipality of
Hamtic, Antique; (b) the Officer-in-Charge of Hamtic Police Station; (c)
the Sangguniang Kabataan of Pob. III, Hamtic, through its chairman
and officers (d) a member of the IBP Iloilo Chapter; (e) the Parish Priest
and Vicar General of St. Joseph Cathedral, San Jose, Antique; and (f)
the President of the Parish Pastoral Council, Parish of Sta. Monica,
Hamtic, Antique. On July 15, 1997, the Court, before acting on
petitioner's application, resolved to require Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan,
father of the deceased hazing victim Raul I. Camaligan, to comment
thereon. In compliance with the Court's directive, Atty. Gilbert D.
Camaligan filed his comment which states as follows:
"1. He fully appreciates the benign concern given by this Hon. Court in
allowing him to comment to the pending petition of Arthur M. Cuevas
to take the lawyer's oath, and hereby expresses his genuine gratitude
to such gesture.
"2. He conforms completely to the observation of the Hon. Court in its
resolution dated March 19, 1997 in Bar Matter No. 712 that the
infliction of severe physical injuries which approximately led to the
death of the unfortunate Raul Camaligan was deliberate (rather than
merely accidental or inadvertent) thus, indicating serious character
flaws on the part of those who inflicted such injuries. This is consistent
with his stand at the outset of the proceedings of the criminal case
against the petitioner and his co-defendants that they are liable not
only for the crime of homicide but murder, since they took advantage
of the neophytes' helpless and defenseless condition when they were
"beaten and kicked to death like a useless stray dog", suggesting the
presence of abuse of confidence, taking advantage of superior strength
and treachery (People vs. Gagoco, 58 Phil. 524).
"3. He, however, has consented to the accused-students' plea of guilty
to the lesser offense of reckless imprudence resulting to the homicide,
including the petitioner, out of pity to their mothers and a pregnant
wife of the accused who went together at his house in Lucena City,
literally kneeling, crying and begging for forgiveness for their sons, on
a Christmas day in 1991 and on Maundy Thursday in 1992, during
which they reported that the father of one of the accused died of heart
attack upon learning of his son's involvement in the case. cdll
"4. As a Christian, he has forgiven the petitioner and his co-defendants
in the criminal case for the death of his son. But as a loving father, who
lost a son in whom he has high hope to become a good lawyer to
succeed him, he still feels the pain of his untimely demise, and the
stigma of the gruesome manner of taking his life. This he cannot
forget.
"5. He is not, right now, in a position to say whether petitioner, since
then has become morally fit for admission to the noble profession of
the law. He politely submits this matter to the sound and judicious
discretion of the Hon. Court." 3
At the outset, the Court shares the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert D.
Camaligan and commiserates with the untimely death of his son.
Nonetheless, Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan admits that "[he] is not, right
now, in a position to say whether petitioner since then has become
morally fit . . ." and submits petitioner's plea to be admitted to the
noble profession or law to the sound and judicious discretion of the
Court.
The petition before the Court requires the balancing of the reasons for
disallowing or allowing petitioner's admission to the noble profession of
law. His deliberate participation in the senseless beatings over a
helpless neophyte which resulted to the latter's untimely demise
indicates absence of that moral fitness required for admission to the
bar. And as the practice of law is a privilege extended only to the few
who possess the high standards of intellectual and moral qualifications
the Court is duty bound to prevent the entry of undeserving aspirants,
as well as to exclude those who have been admitted but have become
a disgrace to the profession. The Court, nonetheless, is willing to give
petitioner a chance in the same manner that it recently allowed Al

Caparros Argosino, petitioner's co-accused below, to take the lawyer's

oath. 4
Petitioner Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr.'s discharge from probation without any
infraction of the attendant conditions therefor and the various
certifications attesting to his righteous, peaceful and civic-oriented
character prove that he has taken decisive steps to purge himself of
his deficiency in moral character and atone for the unfortunate death
of Raul I. Camaligan. The Court is prepared to give him the benefit of
the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general tendency of the youth to
be rash, temerarious and uncalculating. 5 Let it be stressed to herein
petitioner that the lawyer's oath is not a mere formality recited for a
few minutes in the glare of flashing cameras and before the presence
of select witnesses. Petitioner is exhorted to conduct himself beyond
reproach at all times and to live strictly according to his oath and the
Code of Professional Responsibility. And, to paraphrase Mr. Justice
Padilla's comment in the sister case of Re: Petition of Al Argosino To
Take The Lawyer's Oath, Bar Matter No. 712, March 19, 1997, "[t]he
Court sincerely hopes that" Mr. Cuevas, Jr., "will continue with the
assistance he has been giving to his community. As a lawyer he will
now be in a better position to render legal and other services to the
more unfortunate members of society". 6
ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby resolved to allow petitioner Arthur M.
Cuevas, Jr., to take the lawyer's oath and to sign the Roll of Attorneys
on a date to be set by the Court, subject to the payment of appropriate
fees. Let this resolution be attached to petitioner's personal records in
the Office of the Bar Confidant. prLL
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C .J ., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno,
Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban and Martinez, JJ ., concur.
||| (In re: Cuevas, Jr., B.M. No. 810 (Resolution), [January 27, 1998], 348
PHIL 841-847)

EN BANC
[B.M. No. 1154. June 8, 2004.]
IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE
HARON S. MELING IN THE 2002 BAR EXAMINATIONS AND FOR
DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE SHARI'A
BAR, ATTY. FROILAN R. MELENDREZ, petitioner.
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J p:
The Court is here confronted with a Petition that seeks twin reliefs, one
of which is ripe while the other has been rendered moot by a
supervening event.
The antecedents follow.
On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez) filed with
the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) a Petition 1 to disqualify Haron S.
Meling (Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar Examinations and to impose
on him the appropriate disciplinary penalty as a member of the
Philippine Shari'a Bar.
In the Petition, Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his
Petition to take the 2002 Bar Examinations that he has three (3)
pending criminal cases before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), Cotabato City, namely: Criminal Cases Nos. 15685 and 15686,
both for Grave Oral Defamation, and Criminal Case No. 15687 for Less
Serious Physical Injuries.
The above-mentioned cases arose from an incident which occurred on
May 21, 2001, when Meling allegedly uttered defamatory words
against Melendrez and his wife in front of media practitioners and other
people. Meling also purportedly attacked and hit the face of Melendrez'
wife causing the injuries to the latter.
Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the title
"Attorney" in his communications, as Secretary to the Mayor of
Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a member of the Bar.
Attached to the Petition is an indorsement letter which shows that
Meling used the appellation and appears on its face to have been
received by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cotabato City on
November 27, 2001.
Pursuant to this Court's Resolution 2 dated December 3, 2002, Meling
filed his Answer with the OBC.
In his Answer, 3 Meling explains that he did not disclose the criminal
cases filed against him by Melendrez because retired Judge Corocoy
Moson, their former professor, advised him to settle his
misunderstanding with Melendrez. Believing in good faith that the case
would be settled because the said Judge has moral ascendancy over
them, he being their former professor in the College of Law, Meling
considered the three cases that actually arose from a single incident
and involving the same parties as "closed and terminated." Moreover,
Meling denies the charges and adds that the acts complained of do not
involve moral turpitude.
As regards the use of the title "Attorney," Meling admits that some of
his communications really contained the word "Attorney" as they were,
according to him, typed by the office clerk.
In its Report and Recommendation 4 dated December 8, 2003, the
OBC disposed of the charge of non-disclosure against Meling in this
wise:
The reasons of Meling in not disclosing the criminal cases filed against
him in his petition to take the Bar Examinations are ludicrous. He
should have known that only the court of competent jurisdiction can
dismiss cases, not a retired judge nor a law professor. In fact, the cases
filed against Meling are still pending. Furthermore,
granting arguendo that these cases were already dismissed, he is still
required to disclose the same for the Court to ascertain his good moral
character. Petitions to take the Bar Examinations are made under oath,
and should not be taken lightly by an applicant.
The merit of the cases against Meling is not material in this case. What
matters is his act of concealing them which constitutes dishonesty.
In Bar Matter 1209, the Court stated, thus:

It has been held that good moral character is what a person really is,
as distinguished from good reputation or from the opinion generally
entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the
place where he is known. Moral character is not a subjective term but
one which corresponds to objective reality. The standard of personal
and professional integrity is not satisfied by such conduct as it merely
enables a person to escape the penalty of criminal law. Good moral
character includes at least common honesty.
The non-disclosure of Meling of the criminal cases filed against him
makes him also answerable under Rule 7.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which states that "a lawyer shall be answerable for
knowingly making a false statement or suppressing a material fact in
connection with his application for admission to the bar." 5
As regards Meling's use of the title "Attorney", the OBC had this to say:
Anent the issue of the use of the appellation "Attorney" in his letters,
the explanation of Meling is not acceptable. Aware that he is not a
member of the Bar, there wasno valid reason why he signed as
"attorney" whoever may have typed the letters.
Although there is no showing that Meling is engaged in the practice of
law, the fact is, he is signing his communications as "Atty. Haron S.
Meling" knowing fully well that he is not entitled thereto. As held by the
Court in Bar Matter 1209, the unauthorized use of the appellation
"attorney" may render a person liable for indirect contempt of court. 6
Consequently, the OBC recommended that Meling not be allowed to
take the Lawyer's Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys in the event that
he passes the Bar Examinations. Further, it recommended that Meling's
membership in the Shari'a Bar be suspended until further orders from
the Court. 7
We fully concur with the findings and recommendation of the OBC.
Meling, however, did not pass the 2003 Bar Examinations. This renders
the Petition, insofar as it seeks to prevent Meling from taking the
Lawyer's Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys, moot and academic.
On the other hand, the prayer in the same Petition for the Court to
impose the appropriate sanctions upon him as a member of the Shari'a
Bar is ripe for resolution and has to be acted upon.
Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Shari'a Court, is not a
matter of right but merely a privilege bestowed upon individuals who
are not only learned in the law but who are also known to possess good
moral character. 8 The requirement of good moral character is not only
a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law, its continued
possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law. 9
The standard form issued in connection with the application to take the
2002 Bar Examinations requires the applicant to aver that he or she
"has not been charged with any act or omission punishable by law, rule
or regulation before a fiscal, judge, officer or administrative body, or
indicted for, or accused or convicted by any court or tribunal of, any
offense or crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there any pending
case or charge against him/her." Despite the declaration required by
the form, Meling did not reveal that he has three pending criminal
cases. His deliberate silence constitutes concealment, done under oath
at that. IaDcTC
The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court to determine
whether there is satisfactory evidence of good moral character of the
applicant. 10 The nature of whatever cases are pending against the
applicant would aid the Court in determining whether he is endowed
with the moral fitness demanded of a lawyer. By concealing the
existence of such cases, the applicant then flunks the test of fitness
even if the cases are ultimately proven to be unwarranted or
insufficient to impugn or affect the good moral character of the
applicant.
Meling's concealment of the fact that there are three (3) pending
criminal cases against him speaks of his lack of the requisite good
moral character and results in the forfeiture of the privilege bestowed
upon him as a member of the Shari'a Bar.
Moreover, his use of the appellation "Attorney", knowing fully well that
he is not entitled to its use, cannot go unchecked. In Alawi
v. Alauya, 11 the Court had the occasion to discuss the impropriety of
the use of the title "Attorney" by members of the Shari'a Bar who are
not likewise members of the Philippine Bar. The respondent therein, an
executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi

City, used the title "Attorney" in several correspondence in connection

with the rescission of a contract entered into by him in his private
capacity. The Court declared that:
. . . persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of
the Philippine Bar, hence, may only practice law before Shari'a courts.
While one who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has
been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered
"counselors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a
professional capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title
"attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary
degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar
Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is
they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction. 12
The judiciary has no place for dishonest officers of the court, such as
Meling in this case. The solemn task of administering justice demands
that those who are privileged to be part of service therein, from the
highest official to the lowliest employee, must not only be competent
and dedicated, but likewise live and practice the virtues of honesty and
integrity. Anything short of this standard would diminish the public's
faith in the Judiciary and constitutes infidelity to the constitutional
tenet that a public office is a public trust.
In Leda v. Tabang, supra, the respondent concealed the fact of his
marriage in his application to take the Bar examinations and made
conflicting submissions before the Court. As a result, we found the
respondent grossly unfit and unworthy to continue in the practice of
law and suspended him therefrom until further orders from the Court.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED insofar as it seeks the imposition
of appropriate sanctions upon Haron S. Meling as a member of the
Philippine Shari'a Bar. Accordingly, the membership of Haron S. Meling
in the Philippine Shari'a Bar is hereby SUSPENDED until further orders
from the Court, the suspension to take effect immediately. Insofar as
the Petition seeks to prevent Haron S. Meling from taking the Lawyer's
Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys as a member of the Philippine
Bar, the same is DISMISSED for having become moot and academic.
Copies of this Decision shall be circulated to all the Shari'a Courts in
the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C .J ., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, YnaresSantiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio
Morales, Callejo, Sr. and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
||| (In re Haron S. Meling, B.M. No. 1154, [June 8, 2004])

SECOND DIVISION
[A.C. No. 5768. March 26, 2010.]
ATTY. BONIFACIO T. BARANDON, JR., complainant, vs. ATTY.
EDWIN Z. FERRER, SR., respondent.
DECISION
ABAD, J p:
This administrative case concerns a lawyer who is claimed to have
hurled invectives upon another lawyer and filed a baseless suit against
him.
The Facts and the Case
On January 11, 2001 complainant Atty. Bonifacio T. Barandon, Jr. filed a
complaint-affidavit 1 with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) seeking the disbarment,
suspension from the practice of law, or imposition of appropriate
disciplinary action against respondent Atty. Edwin Z. Ferrer, Sr. for the
following offenses:
1. On November 22, 2000 Atty. Ferrer, as plaintiff's counsel in Civil
Case 7040, filed a reply with opposition to motion to dismiss that
contained abusive, offensive, and improper language which insinuated
that Atty. Barandon presented a falsified document in court.
2. Atty. Ferrer filed a fabricated charge against Atty. Barandon in Civil
Case 7040 for alleged falsification of public document when the
document allegedly falsified was a notarized document executed on
February 23, 1994, at a date when Atty. Barandon was not yet a lawyer
nor was assigned in Camarines Norte. The latter was not even a
signatory to the document. TDESCa
3. On December 19, 2000, at the courtroom of Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) Daet before the start of hearing, Atty. Ferrer, evidently drunk,
threatened Atty. Barandon saying, "Laban kung laban, patayan kung
patayan, kasama ang lahat ng pamilya. Wala na palang magaling na
abogado sa Camarines Norte, ang abogado na rito ay mga tagaCamarines Sur, umuwi na kayo sa Camarines Sur, hindi kayo taga-rito."
4. Atty. Ferrer made his accusation of falsification of public document
without bothering to check the copy with the Office of the Clerk of
Court and, with gross ignorance of the law, failed to consider that a
notarized document is presumed to be genuine and authentic until
proven otherwise.
5. The Court had warned Atty. Ferrer in his first disbarment case
against repeating his unethical act; yet he faces a disbarment charge
for sexual harassment of an office secretary of the IBP Chapter in
Camarines Norte; a related criminal case for acts of lasciviousness; and
criminal cases for libel and grave threats that Atty. Barandon filed
against him. In October 2000, Atty. Ferrer asked Atty. Barandon to
falsify the daily time record of his son who worked with the Commission
on Settlement of Land Problems, Department of Justice. When Atty.
Barandon declined, Atty. Ferrer repeatedly harassed him with
inflammatory language.
Atty. Ferrer raised the following defenses in his answer with motion to
dismiss:
1. Instead of having the alleged forged document submitted for
examination, Atty. Barandon filed charges of libel and grave threats
against him. These charges came about because Atty. Ferrer's clients
filed a case for falsification of public document against Atty. Barandon.
2. The offended party in the falsification case, Imelda Palatolon,
vouchsafed that her thumbmark in the waiver document had been
falsified.
3. At the time Atty. Ferrer allegedly uttered the threatening remarks
against Atty. Barandon, the MTC Daet was already in session. It was

improbable that the court did not take steps to stop, admonish, or cite
Atty. Ferrer in direct contempt for his behavior.
4. Atty. Barandon presented no evidence in support of his allegations
that Atty. Ferrer was drunk on December 19, 2000 and that he
degraded the law profession. The latter had received various citations
that speak well of his character.
5. The cases of libel and grave threats that Atty. Barandon filed against
Atty. Ferrer were still pending. Their mere filing did not make the latter
guilty of the charges. Atty. Barandon was forum shopping when he filed
this disbarment case since it referred to the same libel and grave
threats subject of the criminal cases.
In his reply affidavit, 2 Atty. Barandon brought up a sixth ground for
disbarment. He alleged that on December 29, 2000 at about 1:30 p.m.,
while Atty. Ferrer was on board his son's taxi, it figured in a collision
with a tricycle, resulting in serious injuries to the tricycle's
passengers. 3 But neither Atty. Ferrer nor any of his co-passengers
helped the victims and, during the police investigation, he denied
knowing the taxi driver and blamed the tricycle driver for being drunk.
Atty. Ferrer also prevented an eyewitness from reporting the accident
to the authorities. 4 DTAIaH
Atty. Barandon claimed that the falsification case against him had
already been dismissed. He belittled the citations Atty. Ferrer allegedly
received. On the contrary, in its Resolution 00-1, 5 the IBP-Camarines
Norte Chapter opposed his application to serve as judge of the MTC of
Mercedes, Camarines Sur, on the ground that he did not have "the
qualifications, integrity, intelligence, industry and character of a trial
judge" and that he was facing a criminal charge for acts of
lasciviousness and a disbarment case filed by an employee of the
same IBP chapter.
On October 10, 2001 Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan
of the IBP-CBD submitted to this Court a Report, recommending the
suspension for two years of Atty. Ferrer. The Investigating
Commissioner found enough evidence on record to prove Atty. Ferrer's
violation of Canons 8.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He attributed to Atty. Barandon, as counsel in Civil Case
7040, the falsification of the plaintiff's affidavit despite the absence of
evidence that the document had in fact been falsified and that Atty.
Barandon was a party to it. The Investigating Commissioner also found
that Atty. Ferrer uttered the threatening remarks imputed to him in the
presence of other counsels, court personnel, and litigants before the
start of hearing.
On June 29, 2002 the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution XV2002-225, 6 adopting and approving the Investigating Commissioner's
recommendation but reduced the penalty of suspension to only one
year.
Atty. Ferrer filed a motion for reconsideration but the Board denied it in
its Resolution 7 of October 19, 2002 on the ground that it had already
endorsed the matter to the Supreme Court. On February 5, 2003,
however, the Court referred back the case to the IBP for resolution of
Atty. Ferrer's motion for reconsideration. 8On May 22, 2008 the IBP
Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation 9 of the Investigating Commissioner that denied Atty.
Ferrer's motion for reconsideration. 10
On February 17, 2009, Atty. Ferrer filed a Comment on Board of
Governors' IBP Notice of Resolution No. XVIII-2008. 11 On August 12,
2009 the Court resolved to treat Atty. Ferrer's comment as a petition
for review under Rule 139 of the Revised Rules of Court. Atty. Barandon
filed his comment, 12 reiterating his arguments before the IBP. Further,
he presented certified copies of orders issued by courts in Camarines
Norte that warned Atty. Ferrer against appearing in court drunk. 13
The Issues Presented
The issues presented in this case are:
1. Whether or not the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP Investigating
Commissioner erred in finding respondent Atty. Ferrer guilty of the
charges against him; and
2. If in the affirmative, whether or not the penalty imposed on him is
justified.
The Court's Ruling
We have examined the records of this case and find no reason to
disagree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of
Governors and the Investigating Commissioner.
The practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high
standards of legal proficiency and morality. Any violation of these
standards exposes the lawyer to administrative liability. 14
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility commands all
lawyers to conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor

towards their fellow lawyers and avoid harassing tactics against

opposing counsel. Specifically, in Rule 8.01, the Code provides:
Rule 8.01. A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings,
use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise
improper.
Atty. Ferrer's actions do not measure up to this Canon. The evidence
shows that he imputed to Atty. Barandon the falsification of
the Salaysay Affidavit of the plaintiff in Civil Case 7040. He made this
imputation with pure malice for he had no evidence that the affidavit
had been falsified and that Atty. Barandon authored the same. aHIDAE
Moreover, Atty. Ferrer could have aired his charge of falsification in a
proper forum and without using offensive and abusive language
against a fellow lawyer. To quote portions of what he said in his reply
with motion to dismiss:
1. That the answer is fraught with grave and culpable
misrepresentation and "FALSIFICATION" of documents,
committed to mislead this Honorable Court, but with
concomitant grave responsibility of counsel for Defendants, for
distortion and serious misrepresentation to the court, for
presenting a grossly "FALSIFIED" document, in violation of his
oath of office as a government employee and as member of the
Bar, for the reason, that, Plaintiff, IMELDA PALATOLON, has
never executed the "SALAYSAY AFFIDAVIT", wherein her
fingerprint has been falsified, in view whereof, hereby DENY
the same including the affirmative defenses, there
being no knowledge or information to form a belief as to the
truth of the same, from pars. (1) to par. (15) which are all lies
and mere fabrications, sufficient ground for "DISBARMENT" of
the one responsible for said falsification and distortions. 15
The Court has constantly reminded lawyers to use dignified language
in their pleadings despite the adversarial nature of our legal
system. 16
Atty. Ferrer had likewise violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which enjoins lawyers to uphold the dignity and integrity
of the legal profession at all times. Rule 7.03 of the Code provides:
Rule 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflect on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he,
whether in public or private life behave in scandalous manner
to the discredit of the legal profession.
Several disinterested persons confirmed Atty. Ferrer's drunken
invectives at Atty. Barandon shortly before the start of a court hearing.
Atty. Ferrer did not present convincing evidence to support his denial of
this particular charge. He merely presented a certification from the
police that its blotter for the day did not report the threat he
supposedly made. Atty. Barandon presented, however, the police
blotter on a subsequent date that recorded his complaint against Atty.
Ferrer.
Atty. Ferrer said, "Laban kung laban, patayan kung patayan, kasama
ang lahat ng pamilya. Wala na palang magaling na abogado sa
Camarines Norte, ang abogado na rito ay mga taga-Camarines Sur,
umuwi na kayo sa Camarines Sur, hindi kayo taga-rito." Evidently, he
uttered these with intent to annoy, humiliate, incriminate, and discredit
Atty. Barandon in the presence of lawyers, court personnel, and
litigants waiting for the start of hearing in court. These language is
unbecoming a member of the legal profession. The Court cannot
countenance it.
Though a lawyer's language may be forceful and emphatic, it should
always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal
profession. The use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions
has no place in the dignity of judicial forum. 17 Atty. Ferrer ought to
have realized that this sort of public behavior can only bring down the
legal profession in the public estimation and erode public respect for it.
Whatever moral righteousness Atty. Ferrer had was negated by the way
he chose to express his indignation. SaIEcA
Contrary to Atty. Ferrer's allegation, the Court finds that he has been
accorded due process. The essence of due process is to be found in the
reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may
have in support of one's defense. 18 So long as the parties are given
the opportunity to explain their side, the requirements of due process
are satisfactorily complied with. 19 Here, the IBP Investigating
Commissioner gave Atty. Ferrer all the opportunities to file countless
pleadings and refute all the allegations of Atty. Barandon.
All lawyers should take heed that they are licensed officers of the
courts who are mandated to maintain the dignity of the legal
profession, hence they must conduct themselves honorably and
fairly. 20 Atty. Ferrer's display of improper attitude, arrogance,
misbehavior, and misconduct in the performance of his duties both as

a lawyer and officer of the court, before the public and the court, was a
patent transgression of the very ethics that lawyers are sworn to
uphold.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court AFFIRMS the May 22, 2008 Resolution of
the IBP Board of Governors in CBD Case 01-809 and ORDERS the
suspension of Atty. Edwin Z. Ferrer, Sr. from the practice of law for one
year effective upon his receipt of this Decision.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered in Atty. Ferrer's personal record
as an attorney with the Office of the Bar Confidant and a copy of the
same be served to the IBP and to the Office of the Court Administrator
for circulation to all the courts in the land.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Brion, Del Castillo and Perez, JJ., concur.
||| (Barandon, Jr. v. Ferrer, Sr., A.C. No. 5768, [March 26, 2010], 630
PHIL 524-533)

SECOND DIVISION
[A.C. No. 5398. December 3, 2002.]
ANTONIO A. ALCANTARA, complainant, vs. ATTY. MARIANO
PEFIANCO, respondent.
SYNOPSIS
Atty. Antonio A. Alcantara, District Public Attorney of the Public
Attorney's Office in San Jose, Antique filed a complaint against Atty.
Mariano Pefianco for conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar for
using improper and offensive language and threatening and
attempting to assault complainant in the latter's office. In his
Comment, respondent Pefianco said that the sight of the crying
woman, whose husband had been murdered, moved him and prompted
him to take up her defense. He said that he resented the fact that
complainant had ordered an employee to put a sign outside prohibiting
"standbys" from hanging around in the Public Attorney's Office.
Accordingly, the Committee on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines found that respondent committed the acts alleged in
the complaint and that he violated Canon 8 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. For this reason, it recommended that respondent be
reprimanded and warned that repetition of the same will be dealt with
more severely in the future.
The Court found the recommendation of the IBP Committee on Bar
Discipline to be well taken. Canon 8 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility admonishes lawyers to conduct themselves with
courtesy, fairness and candor toward their fellow lawyers. Lawyers are
duty bound to uphold the dignity of the legal profession. They must act
honorably, fairly and candidly toward each other and otherwise
conduct themselves without reproach at all times. In this case,
respondent's meddling in a matter in which he had no right to do so

caused the untoward incident. He had no right to demand an

explanation from Atty. Salvani why the case of the woman had not or
could not be settled. Even so, Atty. Salvani in fact tried to explain the
matter to respondent, but the latter insisted on his view about the
case. Thus, considering that this is the first offense, Atty. Pefianco was
fined in the amount of one thousand pesos (P1,000) and reprimanded.
SYLLABUS
1. LEGAL ETHICS; CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY; LAWYERS
MUST CONDUCT THEMSELVES WITH COURTESY, FAIRNESS AND
CANDOR TOWARD THEIR FELLOW LAWYERS. Canon 8 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility admonishes lawyers to conduct themselves
with courtesy, fairness and candor toward their fellow lawyers. Lawyers
are duty bound to uphold the dignity of the legal profession. They must
act honorably, fairly and candidly toward each other and otherwise
conduct themselves without reproach at all times.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; VIOLATED BY A LAWYER WHO MEDDLED IN A MATTER
WHICH HE HAD NO RIGHT TO DO SO. In this case, respondent's
meddling in a matter in which he had no right to do so caused the
untoward incident. He had no right to demand an explanation from
Atty. Salvani why the case of the woman had not or could not be
settled. Even so, Atty. Salvani in fact tried to explain the matter to
respondent, but the latter insisted on his view about the case.
Respondent said he was moved by the plight of the woman whose
husband had been murdered as she was pleading for the settlement of
her case because she needed the money. Be that as it may,
respondent should realize that what he thought was righteous did not
give him the right to demand that Atty. Salvani and his client,
apparently the accused in the criminal case, settle the case with the
widow.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; RESPONDENT'S MORAL RIGHTEOUSNESS WAS NEGATED
BY THE WAY HE CHOSE TO EXPRESS HIS INDIGNATION. Even when
he was being pacified, respondent did not relent. Instead he insulted
and berated those who tried to calm him down. Two of the witnesses,
Atty. Pepin Marfil and Robert Minguez, who went to the Public
Attorney's Office because they heard the commotion, and two guards
at the Hall of Justice, who had been summoned, failed to stop
respondent from his verbal rampage. Respondent ought to have
realized that this sort of public behavior can only bring down the legal
profession in the public estimation and erode public respect for it.
Whatever moral righteousness respondent had was negated by the
way he chose to express his indignation. An injustice cannot be righted
by another injustice.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; PENALTY FOR VIOLATION THEREOF. Atty. Mariano
Pefianco is found GUILTY of violation of Canon 8 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and, considering this to be his first offense,
is hereby FINED in the amount of P1,000.00 and REPRIMANDED with a
warning that similar action in the future will be sanctioned more
severely. TDcHCa
DECISION
MENDOZA, J p:
This is a complaint against Atty. Mariano Pefianco for conduct
unbecoming a member of the bar for using improper and offensive
language and threatening and attempting to assault
complainant. IASTDE
The complainant, Atty. Antonio A. Alcantara, is the incumbent District
Public Attorney of the Public Attorney's Office in San Jose, Antique. He
alleged that on May 18, 2000, while Atty. Ramon Salvani III was
conferring with a client in the Public Attorney's Office (PAO) at the Hall
of Justice in San Jose, Antique, a woman approached them.
Complainant saw the woman in tears, whereupon he went to the group
and suggested that Atty. Salvani talk with her amicably as a hearing
was taking place in another room. At this point, respondent Atty.
Mariano Pefianco, who was sitting nearby, stood up and shouted at
Atty. Salvani and his client, saying,"Nga-a gina-areglo mo ina, ipapreso
ang imo nga kliyente para mahibal-an na anang sala." ("Why do you
settle that case? Have your client imprisoned so that he will realize his
mistake.")
Complainant said he was surprised at respondent Pefianco's outburst
and asked him to cool off, but respondent continued to fulminate at
Atty. Salvani. Atty. Salvani tried to explain to respondent that it was the
woman who was asking if the civil aspect of the criminal case could be
settled because she was no longer interested in prosecuting the same.
Respondent refused to listen and instead continued to scold Atty.
Salvani and the latter's client.
As head of the Office, complainant approached respondent and asked
him to take it easy and leave Atty. Salvani to settle the matter.
Respondent at first listened, but shortly after he again started shouting

at and scolding Atty. Salvani. To avoid any scene with respondent,

complainant went inside his office. He asked his clerk to put a notice
outside prohibiting anyone from interfering with any activity in the
Public Attorney's Office.
Complainant said that he then went out to attend a hearing, but when
he came back he heard respondent Pefianco saying: "Nagsiling si Atty.
Alcantara nga pagwa-on na kuno ako dya sa PAO, buyon nga klase ka
tawo." ("Atty. Alcantara said that he would send me out of the PAO,
what an idiot.") Then, upon seeing complainant, respondent pointed his
finger at him and repeated his statement for the other people in the
office to hear. At this point, according to complainant, he confronted
respondent Pefianco and told him to observe civility or else to leave
the office if he had no business there. Complainant said respondent
resented this and started hurling invectives at him. According to
complainant, respondent even took a menacing stance towards him.
This caused a commotion in the office. Atty. Pepin Marfil and Mr. Robert
Minguez, the Chief of the Probation Office, tried to pacify respondent
Pefianco. Two guards of the Hall of Justice came to take respondent out
of the office, but before they could do so, respondent tried to attack
complainant and even shouted at him, "Gago ka!"("You're stupid!")
Fortunately, the guards were able to fend off respondent's blow and
complainant was not harmed.
Complainant also submitted the affidavits of Atty. Ramon Salvani III,
Felizardo Del Rosario, Atty. Pepin Joey Marfil, Robert Minguez, Herbert
Ysulat and Ramon Quintayo to corroborate his allegations.
In his Comment and Counter-Complaint, respondent Pefianco said that
the sight of the crying woman, whose husband had been murdered,
moved him and prompted him to take up her defense. He said that he
resented the fact that complainant had ordered an employee,
Napoleon Labonete, to put a sign outside prohibiting "standbys" from
hanging round in the Public Attorney's Office.
Respondent claimed that while talking with Atty. Salvani concerning the
woman's case, complainant, with his bodyguard, arrived and shouted
at him to get out of the Public Attorney's Office. He claimed that two
security guards also came, and complainant ordered them to take
respondent out of the office. Contrary to complainant's claims,
however, respondent said that it was complainant who moved to punch
him and shout at him, "Gago ka!" ("You're stupid!")
Prior to the filing of the present complaint, respondent Pefianco had
filed before the Office of the Ombudsman an administrative and
criminal complaint against complainant. However, the complaint was
dismissed by the said office.
The Committee on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines found that respondent committed the acts alleged in the
complaint and that he violated Canon 8 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The Committee noted that respondent failed not only to
deny the accusations against him but also to give any explanation for
his actions. For this reason, it recommended that respondent be
reprimanded and warned that repetition of the same act will be dealt
with more severely in the future.
We find the recommendation of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline to
be well taken.
The evidence on record indeed shows that it was respondent Pefianco
who provoked the incident in question. The affidavits of several
disinterested persons confirm complainant's allegation that respondent
Pefianco shouted and hurled invectives at him and Atty. Salvani and
even attempted to lay hands on him (complainant).
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility 1 admonishes
lawyers to conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor
toward their fellow lawyers. Lawyers are duty bound to uphold the
dignity of the legal profession. They must act honorably, fairly and
candidly toward each other and otherwise conduct themselves without
reproach at all times. 2
In this case, respondent's meddling in a matter in which he
had no right to do so caused the untoward incident. He had no right to
demand an explanation from Atty. Salvani why the case of the woman
had not or could not be settled. Even so, Atty. Salvani in fact tried to
explain the matter to respondent, but the latter insisted on his view
about the case.
Respondent said he was moved by the plight of the woman whose
husband had been murdered as she was pleading for the settlement of
her case because she needed the money. Be that as it may,
respondent should realize that what he thought was righteous did not
give him the right to demand that Atty. Salvani and his client,
apparently the accused in the criminal case, settle the case with the
widow. Even when he was being pacified, respondent did not relent.

Instead he insulted and berated those who tried to calm him down. Two
of the witnesses, Atty. Pepin Marfil and Robert Minguez, who went to
the Public Attorney's Office because they heard the commotion, and
two guards at the Hall of Justice, who had been summoned, failed to
stop respondent from his verbal rampage. Respondent ought to have
realized that this sort of public behavior can only bring down the legal
profession in the public estimation and erode public respect for it.
Whatever moral righteousness respondent had was negated by the
way he chose to express his indignation. An injustice cannot be righted
by another injustice.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Mariano Pefianco is found GUILTY of violation of
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and, considering this
to be his first offense, is hereby FINED in the amount of P1,000.00 and
REPRIMANDED with a warning that similar action in the future will be
sanctioned more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
||| (Alcantara v. Pefianco, A.C. No. 5398, [December 3, 2002], 441 PHIL
514-520)

SECOND DIVISION
[A.C. No. 3149. August 17, 1994.]
CERINA B. LIKONG, petitioner, vs. ATTY. ALEXANDER H.
LIM, respondent.
DECISION
PADILLA, J p:

Cerina B. Likong filed this administrative case against Atty. Alexander

H. Lim, seeking the latter's disbarment for alleged malpractice and
grave misconduct.
The circumstances which led to the filing of this complaint are as
follows:
Sometime in September 1984, complainant obtained a loan of
P92,100.00 from a certain Geesnell L. Yap. Complainant executed a
promissory note in favor of Yap and a deed of assignment, assigning to
Yap pension checks which she regularly received from the United
States government as a widow of a US pensioner. The aforementioned
deed of assignment states that the same shall be irrevocable until the
loan is fully paid. Complainant likewise executed a special power of
attorney authorizing Yap to get, demand, collect and receive her
pension checks from the post office at Tagbilaran City. The above
documents were apparently prepared and notarized by respondent
Alexander H. Lim, Yap's counsel.
On 11 December 1984, about three (3) months after the execution of
the aforementioned special power of attorney, complainant informed
the Tagbilaran City post office that she was revoking the special power
of attorney. As a consequence, Geesnell Yap filed a complainant for
injunction with damages against complainant. Respondent Alexander
H. Lim appeared as counsel for Yap while Attys. Roland B. Inting and
Erico B. Aumentado appeared for complainant (as defendant).
A writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the trial court on 23
January 1985, preventing complainant from getting her pension checks
from the Tagbilaran City post office. Yap later filed an urgent omnibus
motion to cite complainant in contempt of court for attempting to
circumvent the preliminary injunction by changing her address to
Mandaue city. Upon motion by Yap, the court also issued an order
dated 21 May 1985 expanding all post offices in the Philippines from
releasing pension checks to complainant.
On 26 July 1985, complainant and Yap filed a joint motion to allow the
latter to withdraw the pension checks. This motion does not bear the
signatures of complainants' counsel of record but only the signatures of
both parties, "assisted by" respondent Attorney Alexander H. Lim.
On 2 August 1985, complainant and Yap entered into a compromise
agreement again without the participation of the former's counsel. In
the compromise agreement, it was stated that complainant Cerino B.
Likong admitted an obligation to Yap of P150,000.00. It was likewise
stated therein that complainant and Yap agreed that the amount would
be paid in monthly installments over a period of 54 months at an
interest of 40% per annum discounted every six (6) months. The
compromise agreement was approved by the trial court on 15 August
1985.
On 24 November 1987, Cerina B. Likong filed the present complaint for
disbarment, based on the following allegations:
"7. In all these motions, complainant was prevented from seeking
assistance, advise and signature of any of her two (2) lawyers; no copy
thereof was furnished to either of them or at least to complainant
herself despite the latter's pleas to be furnished copies of the same;
8. Complainant was even advised by respondent that it was not
necessary for her to consult her lawyers under the pretense that: (a)
this could only jeopardize the settlement; (b) she would only be
incurring enormous expense if she consulted a new lawyer; (c)
respondent was assisting her anyway; (d) she had nothing to worry
about the documents foisted upon her to sign; (e) complainant need
not come to court afterwards to save her time; and in any event
respondent already took care of everything;
9. Complainant had been prevented from exhibiting fully her case by
means of fraud, deception and some other form of mendacity practiced
on her respondent;
10. Finally, respondent fraudulently or without authority assumed to
represent complainant and connived in her defeat; . . ." 1
Respondent filed his Answer stating that counsel for complainant, Atty.
Roland B. Inting had abandoned his client. Atty. Lim further stated that
the other counsel, Atty. Enrico Aumentado, did not actively participate
in the case and it was upon the request of complainant and another
debtor of Yap, Crispina Acuna, that he (respondent) made the
compromise agreement.
Respondent states that he first instructed complainant to notify her
lawyers but was informed that her lawyer had abandoned her since she
could not pay his attorney's fees.
Complainant filed a reply denying that she had been abandoned by her
lawyers. Complainant stated that respondent never furnished her
lawyers with copies of the compromise agreement and a motion to
withdraw the injunction cash bond deposited by Yap.

At the outset, it is worth noting that the terms of the compromise

agreement are indeed grossly loaded in favor of Geesnell L. Yap,
respondent's client.
Complainant's original obligation was to pay P92,100.00 within one (1)
year from 4 October 1984. There is no provision in the promissory note
signed by her with respect to any interest to be paid. The only
additional amount which Yap could collect based on the promissory
note was 25% of the principal as attorney's fees in case a lawyer was
hired by him to collect the loan.
In the compromise agreement prepared by respondent, dated 2 August
1985, complainant's debt to Yap was increased to P150,000.00 (from
92,100.00) after the lapse of only ten (10) months. This translates to
an interest in excess of seventy-five percent (75%) per annum. In
addition, the compromise agreement provides that the P150,000.00
debt would be payable in fifty-four (54) monthly installments at an
interest of forty percent (40%) per annum. No great amount of
mathematical prowess is required to see that the terms of the
compromise agreement are grossly prejudicial to complainant.
With respect to respondent's failure to notify complainant's counsel of
the compromise agreement, it is of record that complainant was
represented by two (2) lawyers, Attys. Inting and Aumentado.
Complainant states that respondent prevented her from informing her
lawyers by giving her the reasons enumerated in the complaint and
earlier quoted in this decision.
There is no showing that respondent even tried to inform opposing
counsel of the compromise agreement. Neither is there any showing
that respondent informed the trial court of the alleged abandonment of
the complainant by her counsel.
Instead, even assuming that complainant was really abandoned by her
counsel, respondent saw an opportunity to take advantage of the
situation, and the result was the execution of the compromise
agreement which, as previously discussed, is grossly and patently
disadvantageous and prejudicial to complainant.
Undoubtedly, respondent's conduct is unbecoming a member of the
legal profession.
Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Ethics states:
"9. Negotiations with opposite party.
A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subject of
controversy with a party represented by counsel; much less should he
undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter with him, but should
deal only with his counsel. It is incumbent upon the lawyer most
particularly to avoid everything that may tend to mislead a party not
represented by counsel and he should not undertake to advise him as
to the law."
The Code of Professional Responsibility states:
"Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral, or deceitful conduct.
Rule 8.02 A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the
professional employment of another lawyer; however, it is the right of
any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and assistance
to those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.
Rule 15.03 A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interest except by
written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the
facts."
The violation of the aforementioned rules of professional conduct by
respondent Atty. Alexander H. Lim, warrants the imposition upon him of
the proper sanction from this Court. Such acts constituting malpractice
and grave misconduct cannot be left unpunished for not only do they
erode confidence and trust in the legal profession, they likewise
prevent justice from being attained.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Alexander H. Lim is hereby imposed
the penalty SUSPENSION from the practice of law for a period of ONE
(1) YEAR, effective immediately upon his receipt of this decision.
Let a copy of this decision be entered in respondent's personal record
as attorney and member of the Bar, and furnished the Bar Confidant,
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
||| (Likong v. Lim, A.C. No. 3149, [August 17, 1994])

FIRST DIVISION
[A.C. No. 6290. July 14, 2004.]
ANA MARIE CAMBALIZA, complainant, vs. ATTY. ANA LUZ B.
CRISTAL-TENORIO, respondent.
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J p:
In a verified complaint for disbarment filed with the Committee on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on 30 May 2000,
complainant Ana Marie Cambaliza, a former employee of respondent
Atty. Ana Luz B. Cristal-Tenorio in her law office, charged the latter with
deceit, grossly immoral conduct, and malpractice or other gross
misconduct in office.
On deceit, the complainant alleged that the respondent has been
falsely representing herself to be married to Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr.,
who has a prior and subsisting marriage with another woman.
However, through spurious means, the respondent and Felicisimo R.
Tenorio, Jr., were able to obtain a false marriage contract, 1 which
states that they were married on 10 February 1980 in Manila.
Certifications from the Civil Registry of Manila 2 and the National
Statistics Office (NSO) 3 prove that norecord of marriage exists
between them. The false date and place of marriage between the two
are stated in the birth certificates of their two children, Donnabel
Tenorio 4 and Felicisimo Tenorio III. 5 But in the birth certificates of
their two other children, Oliver Tenorio 6 and John Cedric
Tenorio, 7 another date and place of marriage are indicated, namely,
12 February 1980 in Malaybalay, Bukidnon.
As to grossly immoral conduct, the complainant alleged that the
respondent caused the dissemination to the public of a libelous
affidavit derogatory to Makati City Councilor Divina Alora Jacome. The
respondent would often openly and sarcastically declare to the
complainant and her co-employees the alleged immorality of Councilor
Jacome.
On malpractice or other gross misconduct in office, the complainant
alleged that the respondent (1) cooperated in the illegal practice of law
by her husband, who is not a member of the Philippine Bar; (2)
converted her client's money to her own use and benefit, which led to
the filing of an estafa case against her; and (3) threatened the
complainant and her family on 24 January 2000 with the statement
"Isang bala ka lang" to deter them from divulging respondent's illegal
activities and transactions.
In her answer, the respondent denied all the allegations against her. As
to the charge of deceit, she declared that she is legally married to
Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr. They were married on 12 February 1980 as
shown by their Certificate of Marriage, Registry No. 2000-9108 of the
Civil Registry of Quezon City. 8 Her husband has no prior and
subsisting marriage with another woman.
As to the charge of grossly immoral conduct, the respondent denied
that she caused the dissemination of a libelous and defamatory
affidavit against Councilor Jacome. On the contrary, it was Councilor
Jacome who caused the execution of said document. Additionally, the
complainant and her cohorts are the rumormongers who went around
the city of Makati on the pretext of conducting a survey but did so to
besmirch respondent's good name and reputation.
The charge of malpractice or other gross misconduct in office was
likewise denied by the respondent. She claimed that her CristalTenorio Law Office is registered with the Department of Trade and
Industry as a single proprietorship, as shown by its Certificate of
Registration of Business Name. 9 Hence, she has no partners in her law
office. As to the estafa case, the same had already been dropped
pursuant to the Order of 14 June 1996 issued by Branch 103 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.10 The respondent likewise denied
that she threatened the complainant with the words "Isang bala ka
lang" on 24 January 2000.

Further, the respondent averred that this disbarment complaint was

filed by the complainant to get even with her. She terminated
complainant's employment after receiving numerous complaints that
the complainant extorted money from different people with the
promise of processing their passports and marriages to foreigners, but
she reneged on her promise. Likewise, this disbarment complaint is
politically motivated: some politicians offered to re-hire the
complainant and her cohorts should they initiate this complaint, which
they did and for which they were re-hired. The respondent also
flaunted the fact that she had received numerous awards and citations
for civic works and exemplary service to the community. She then
prayed for the dismissal of the disbarment case for being baseless.
The IBP referred this case to Investigating Commissioner Atty. Kenny H.
Tantuico.
During the hearing on 30 August 2000, the parties agreed that the
complainant would submit a Reply to respondent's Answer, while the
respondent would submit a Rejoinder to the Reply. The parties also
agreed that the Complaint, Answer, and the attached affidavits would
constitute as the respective direct testimonies of the parties and the
affiants. 11
In her Reply, the complainant bolstered her claim that the respondent
cooperated in the illegal practice of law by her husband by submitting
(1) the letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio Law Office 12 where the name of
Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., is listed as a senior partner; and (2) a Sagip
Communication Radio Group identification card 13 signed by the
respondent as Chairperson where her husband is identified as "Atty.
Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr." She added that respondent's husband even
appeared in court hearings.
In her Rejoinder, respondent averred that she neither formed a law
partnership with her husband nor allowed her husband to appear in
court on her behalf. If there was an instance that her husband
appeared in court, he did so as a representative of her law firm. The
letterhead submitted by the complainant was a false reproduction to
show that her husband is one of her law partners. But upon crossexamination, when confronted with the letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio
Law Officebearing her signature, she admitted that Felicisimo R.
Tenorio, Jr., is not a lawyer, but he and a certain Gerardo A. Panghulan,
who is also not a lawyer, are named as senior partners because they
have investments in her law office. 14
The respondent further declared that she married Felicisimo R. Tenorio,
Jr., on 12 February 1980 in Quezon City, but when she later discovered
that their marriage contract was not registered she applied for late
registration on 5 April 2000. She then presented as evidence a certified
copy of the marriage contract issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar
General and authenticated by the NSO. The erroneous entries in the
birth certificates of her children as to the place and date of her
marriage were merely an oversight. 15
Sometime after the parties submitted their respective Offer of
Evidence and Memoranda, the complainant filed a Motion to Withdraw
Complaint on 13 November 2002 after allegedly realizing that this
disbarment complaint arose out of a misunderstanding and
misappreciation of facts. Thus, she is no longer interested in pursuing
the case. This motion was not acted upon by the IBP.
In her Report and Recommendation dated 30 September 2003, IBP
Commissioner on Bar Discipline Milagros V. San Juan found that the
complainant failed to substantiate the charges of deceit and grossly
immoral conduct. However, she found the respondent guilty of the
charge of cooperating in the illegal practice of law by Felicisimo R.
Tenorio, Jr., in violation of Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility based on the following evidence: (1) the
letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio Law Office, which lists Felicisimo R.
Tenorio, Jr., as a senior partner; (2) the Sagip Communication Radio
Group identification card of "Atty. Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr.," signed by
respondent as Chairperson; (3) and the Order dated 18 June 1997
issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court in Criminal Cases Nos. 20729
20734, wherein Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., entered his appearance as
counsel and even moved for the provisional dismissal of the cases for
failure of the private complainants to appear and for lack of interest to
prosecute the said cases. Thus, Commissioner San Juan recommended
that the respondent be reprimanded.
In its Resolution No. XVI-2003-228 dated 25 October 2003, the IBP
Board of Governors adopted and approved with modification the Report
and Recommendation of Commissioner San Juan. The modification
consisted in increasing the penalty from reprimand to suspension from
the practice of law for six months with a warning that a similar offense
in the future would be dealt with more severely. HAaDcS

We agree with the findings and conclusion of Commissioner San Juan

as approved and adopted with modification by the Board of Governors
of the IBP.
At the outset, we find that the IBP was correct in not acting on the
Motion to Withdraw Complaint filed by complainant Cambaliza.
In Rayos-Ombac vs. Rayos, 16 we declared:
The affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case allegedly executed
by complainant does not, in any way, exonerate the respondent. A
case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest
or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the
basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and
grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven. This rule is premised
on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension
or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where the complainant
is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary
proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for
private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the
public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving
courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to
practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his
conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who
called the attention of the court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is
in no sense a party, and has generally nointerest in the outcome
except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of
justice. Hence, if the evidence on record warrants, the respondent may
be suspended or disbarred despite the desistance of complainant or his
withdrawal of the charges.
Hence, notwithstanding the Motion to Withdraw Complaint, this
disbarment case should proceed accordingly.
The IBP correctly found that the charges of deceit and grossly immoral
conduct were not substantiated. In disbarment proceedings, the
complainant has the burden of proving his case by convincing
evidence. 17 With respect to the estafa case which is the basis for the
charge of malpractice or other gross misconduct in office, the
respondent is not yet convicted thereof. In Gerona
vs. Datingaling, 18 we held that when the criminal prosecution based
on the same act charged is still pending in court, any administrative
disciplinary proceedings for the same act must await the outcome of
the criminal case to avoid contradictory findings.
We, however, affirm the IBP's finding that the respondent is guilty of
assisting in the unauthorized practice of law. A lawyer who allows a
non-member of the Bar to misrepresent himself as a lawyer and to
practice law is guilty of violating Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which read as follows:
Canon 9 A lawyer shall not directly or indirectly assist in the
unauthorized practice of law.
Rule 9.01 A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the
performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a
member of the Bar in good standing.
The term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually holding
oneself out to the public as a lawyer for compensation as a source of
livelihood or in consideration of his services. Holding one's self out as a
lawyer may be shown by acts indicative of that purpose like identifying
oneself as attorney, appearing in court in representation of a client, or
associating oneself as a partner of a law office for the general practice
of law. 19 Such acts constitute unauthorized practice of law.
In this case, Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., is not a lawyer, but he holds
himself out as one. His wife, the respondent herein, abetted and aided
him in the unauthorized practice of the legal profession.
At the hearing, the respondent admitted that the letterhead of CristalTenorio Law Office listed Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., Gerardo A.
Panghulan, and Maricris D. Battung as senior partners. She admitted
that the first two are not lawyers but paralegals. They are listed in the
letterhead of her law office as senior partners because they have
investments in her law office. 20 That is a blatant misrepresentation.
The Sagip Communication Radio Group identification card is another
proof that the respondent assisted Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., in
misrepresenting to the public that he is a lawyer. Notably, the
identification card stating that he is "Atty. Felicisimo Tenorio, Jr.," bears
the signature of the respondent as Chairperson of the Group.
The lawyer's duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the
unauthorized practice of law is founded on public interest and policy.
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those
individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The
permissive right conferred on the lawyer is an individual and limited
privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards

of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public,

the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty
of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary
control of the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see that this purpose
is attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the profession enjoin him
not to permit his professional services or his name to be used in aid of,
or to make possible the unauthorized practice of law by, any agency,
personal or corporate. And, the law makes it a misbehavior on his part,
subject to disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the unauthorized
practice of law. 21
WHEREFORE, for culpable violation of Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, respondent Atty. Ana Luz B. CristalTenorio is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of
six (6) months effective immediately, with a warning that a repetition
of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be attached to respondent Cristal-Tenorio's
record as attorney in this Court and furnished to the IBP and the Office
of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ ., concur.
||| (Cambaliza v. Cristal-Tenorio, A.C. No. 6290, [July 14, 2004], 478
PHIL 378-389)

SECOND DIVISION
[A.C. No. 7269. November 23, 2011.]
ATTY. EDITA NOE-LACSAMANA, complainant, vs. ATTY. YOLANDO F.
BUSMENTE, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J p:
The Case
Before the Court is a complaint for disbarment filed by Atty. Edita NoeLacsamana (Noe-Lacsamana) against Atty. Yolando F. Busmente
(Busmente) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
The Antecedent Facts
Noe-Lacsamana alleged in her complaint that she was the counsel for
Irene Bides, the plaintiff in Civil Case No. SCA-2481 before the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 167, while Busmente was the counsel
for the defendant Imelda B. Ulaso (Ulaso). Noe-Lacsamana alleged that
Ulaso's deed of sale over the property subject of Civil Case No. SCA2481 was annulled, which resulted in the filing of an ejectment case
before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), San Juan, docketed as Civil
Case No. 9284, where Busmente appeared as counsel. Another case for
falsification was filed against Ulaso where Busmente also appeared as
counsel. Noe-Lacsamana alleged that one Atty. Elizabeth Dela Rosa or
Atty. Liza Dela Rosa (Dela Rosa) would accompany Ulaso in court,
projecting herself as Busmente's collaborating counsel. Dela Rosa
signed the minutes of the court proceedings in Civil Case No. 9284 nine
times from 25 November 2003 to 8 February 2005. Noe-Lacsamana
further alleged that the court orders and notices specified Dela Rosa as
Busmente's collaborating counsel. Noe-Lacsamana alleged that upon
verification with this Court and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
she discovered that Dela Rosa was not a lawyer. IDTSaC

Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa was a law graduate and was his
paralegal assistant for a few years. Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa's
employment with him ended in 2000 but Dela Rosa was able to
continue misrepresenting herself as a lawyer with the help of Regine
Macasieb (Macasieb), Busmente's former secretary. Busmente alleged
that he did not represent Ulaso in Civil Case No. 9284 and that his
signature in the Answer 1 presented as proof by Noe-Lacsamana was
forged.
The Decision of the Commission on Bar Discipline
In its Report and Recommendation, 2 the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline (IBP-CBD) found that Dela Rosa was not a lawyer and that
she represented Ulaso as Busmente's collaborating counsel in Civil
Case No. 9284. The IBP-CBD noted that while Busmente claimed that
Dela Rosa no longer worked for him since 2000, there was no proof of
her separation from employment. The IBP-CBD found that notices from
the MTC San Juan, as well as the pleadings of the case, were all sent to
Busmente's designated office address. The IBP-CBD stated that
Busmente's only excuse was that Dela Rosa connived with his former
secretary Macasieb so that the notices and pleadings would not reach
him.
The IBP-CBD rejected the affidavit submitted by Judy M. Ortalez
(Ortalez), Busmente's staff, alleging Macasieb's failure to endorse
pleadings and notices of Civil Case No. 9284 to Busmente. The IBP-CBD
noted that Ortalez did not exactly refer to Ulaso's case in her affidavit
and that there was no mention that she actually witnessed Macasieb
withholding pleadings and notices from Busmente. The IBP-CBD also
noted that Macasieb was still working at Busmente's office in
November 2003 as shown by the affidavit attached to a Motion to Lift
Order of Default that she signed. However, even if Macasieb resigned
in November 2003, Dela Rosa continued to represent Ulaso until 2005,
which belied Busmente's allegation that Dela Rosa was able to illegally
practice law using his office address without his knowledge and only
due to Dela Rosa's connivance with Macasieb. As regards Busmente's
allegation that his signature on the Answer was forged, the IBP-CBD
gave Busmente the opportunity to coordinate with the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI) to prove that his signature was forged but he
failed to submit any report from the NBI despite the lapse of four
months from the time he reserved his right to submit the report.
The IBP-CBD recommended Busmente's suspension from the practice
of law for not less than five years. On 26 May 2006, in its Resolution
No. XVII-2006-271, 3 the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved
the recommendation of the IBP-CBD, with modification by reducing the
period of Busmente's suspension to six months. DaESIC
Busmente filed a motion for reconsideration and submitted a report 4
from the NBI stating that the signature in the Answer, when compared
with standard/sample signatures submitted to its office, showed that
they were not written by one and the same person. In its 14 May 2011
Resolution No. XIX-2011-168, the IBP Board of Governors denied
Busmente's motion for reconsideration.
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether Busmente is guilty of directly or
indirectly assisting Dela Rosa in her illegal practice of law that warrants
his suspension from the practice of law.
The Ruling of this Court
We agree with the IBP.
Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:
Canon 9. A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the
unauthorized practice of law.
The Court ruled that the term "practice of law" implies customarily or
habitually holding oneself out to the public as a lawyer for
compensation as a source of livelihood or in consideration of his
services. 5 The Court further ruled that holding one's self out as a
lawyer may be shown by acts indicative of that purpose, such as
identifying oneself as attorney, appearing in court in representation of
a client, or associating oneself as a partner of a law office for the
general practice of law. 6
The Court explained:
The lawyer's duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the
unauthorized practice of law is founded on public interest and policy.
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those
individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The
permissive right conferred on the lawyer is an individual and limited
privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards
of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public,

the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty
of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary
control of the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see that this purpose
is attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the profession enjoin him
not to permit his professional services or his name to be used in aid of,
or to make possible the unauthorized practice of law by, any agency,
personal or corporate. And, the law makes it a misbehavior on his part,
subject to disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the unauthorized
practice of law. 7 ESCacI
In this case, it has been established that Dela Rosa, who is not a
member of the Bar, misrepresented herself as Busmente's
collaborating counsel in Civil Case No. 9284. The only question is
whether Busmente indirectly or directly assisted Dela Rosa in her
illegal practice of law.
Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa's employment in his office ended in
2000 and that Dela Rosa was able to continue with her illegal practice
of law through connivance with Macasieb, another member of
Busmente's staff. As pointed out by the IBP-CBD, Busmente claimed
that Macasieb resigned from his office in 2003. Yet, Dela Rosa
continued to represent Ulaso until 2005. Pleadings and court notices
were still sent to Busmente's office until 2005. The IBP-CBD noted that
Dela Rosa's practice should have ended in 2003 when Macasieb left.
We agree. Busmente's office continued to receive all the notices of Civil
Case No. 9284. The 7 December 2004 Order 8 of Judge Elvira DC.
Panganiban (Judge Panganiban) in Civil Case No. 9284 showed that
Atty. Elizabeth Dela Rosa was still representing Ulaso in the case. In
that Order, Judge Panganiban set the preliminary conference of Civil
Case No. 9284 on 8 February 2005. It would have been impossible for
Dela Rosa to continue representing Ulaso in the case, considering
Busmente's claim that Macasieb already resigned, if Dela Rosa had no
access to the files in Busmente's office.
Busmente, in his motion for reconsideration of Resolution No. XVII2006-271, submitted a copy of the NBI report stating that the signature
on the Answer submitted in Civil Case No. 9284 and the specimen
signatures submitted by Busmente were not written by one and the
same person. The report shows that Busmente only submitted to the
NBI the questioned signature in the Answer. The IBP-CBD report,
however, showed that there were other documents signed by
Busmente, including the Pre-Trial Brief dated 14 November 2003 and
Motion to Lift Order of Default dated 22 November 2003. NoeLacsamana also submitted a letter dated 14 August 2003 addressed to
her as well as three letters dated 29 August 2003 addressed to the
occupants of the disputed property, all signed by Busmente. Busmente
failed to impugn his signatures in these other documents.
Finally, Busmente claimed that he was totally unaware of Civil Case No.
9284 and he only came to know about the case when Ulaso went to his
office to inquire about its status. Busmente's allegation contradicted
the Joint Counter-Affidavit 9 submitted by Ulaso and Eddie B. Bides
stating that: cEAHSC
a. That our legal counsel is Atty. YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE of the
YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE AND ASSOCIATES LAW OFFICES with address at
suite 718 BPI Office Cond. Plaza Cervantes, Binondo Manila.
b. That ELIZABETH DELA ROSA is not our legal counsel in the case
which have been filed by IRENE BIDES and LILIA VALERA in
representation of her sister AMELIA BIDES for Ejectment docketed as
Civil Case No. 9284 before Branch 58 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of
San Juan, Metro Manila.
c. That we never stated in any of the pleadings filed in the cases
mentioned in the Complaint-Affidavit that ELIZABETH DELA ROSA was
our lawyer;
d. That if ever ELIZABETH DELA ROSA had affixed her signature in the
notices or other court records as our legal counsel the same could not
be taken against us for, we believed in good faith that she was a
lawyer; and we are made to believe that it was so since had referred
her to us (sic), she was handling some cases of Hortaleza and client of
Atty. Yolando F. Busmente;
e. That we know for the fact that ELIZABETH DELA ROSA did not sign
any pleading which she filed in court in connection with our cases at all
of those were signed by Atty. YOLANDO BUSMENTE as our legal
counsel; she just accompanied us to the court rooms and/or hearings;

f. That we cannot be made liable for violation of Article 171 (for and in
relation to Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code) for the reason that
the following elements of the offense are not present, to wit:
1. That offender has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts
narrated;
2. There must be wrongful intent to injure a 3rd party;
3. Knowledge that the facts narrated by him are absolutely false;
SIDTCa
4. That the offender makes in a document untruthful statements in the
narration of facts.
And furthermore the untruthful narrations of facts must affect the
integrity which is not so in the instant case.
g. That from the start of our acquaintance with ELIZABETH DELA ROSA
we never ask her whether she was a real lawyer and allowed to
practice law in the Philippines; it would have been unethical and
shameful on our part to ask her qualification; we just presumed that
she has legal qualifications to represent us in our cases because Atty.
YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE allowed her to accompany us and attend our
hearings in short, she gave us paralegal assistance[.] (Emphasis
supplied)
The counter-affidavit clearly showed that Busmente was the legal
counsel in Civil Case No. 9284 and that he allowed Dela Rosa to give
legal assistance to Ulaso.
Hence, we agree with the findings of the IBP-CBD that there was
sufficient evidence to prove that Busmente was guilty of violation of
Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. We agree with the
recommendation of the IBP, modifying the recommendation of the IBPCBD, that Busmente should be suspended from the practice of law for
six months.
WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Yolando F. Busmente from the practice
of law for SIX MONTHS.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Busmente's personal
record in the Office of the Bar Confidant. Let a copy of this Decision be
also furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and to all courts in the land.
SO ORDERED.
Brion, Perez, Sereno and Reyes, JJ., concur.
||| (Noe-Lacsamana v. Busmente, A.C. No. 7269, [November 23, 2011],
677 PHIL 1-9)

SECOND DIVISION
[A.C. No. 9604. March 20, 2013.]
RODRIGO E. TAPAY and ANTHONY J. RUSTIA, complainants, vs. ATTY.
CHARLIE L. BANCOLO and ATTY. JANUS T. JARDER, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J p:
The Case
This administrative case arose from a Complaint filed by Rodrigo E.
Tapay (Tapay) and Anthony J. Rustia (Rustia), both employees of the

Sugar Regulatory Administration, against Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo (Atty.

Bancolo) and Atty. Janus T. Jarder (Atty Jarder) for violation of the
Canons of Ethics and Professionalism, Falsification of Public Document,
Gross Dishonesty, and Harassment. HICATc
The Facts
Sometime in October 2004, Tapay and Rustia received an Order dated
14 October 2004 from the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas requiring
them to file a counter-affidavit to a complaint for usurpation of
authority, falsification of public document, and graft and corrupt
practices filed against them by Nehimias Divinagracia, Jr.
(Divinagracia), a co-employee in the Sugar Regulatory Administration.
The Complaint 1 dated 31 August 2004 was allegedly signed on behalf
of Divinagracia by one Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo of the Jarder Bancolo
Law Office based in Bacolod City, Negros Occidental.
When Atty. Bancolo and Rustia accidentally chanced upon each other,
the latter informed Atty. Bancolo of the case filed against them before
the Office of the Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo denied that he
represented Divinagracia since he had yet to meet Divinagracia in
person. When Rustia showed him the Complaint, Atty. Bancolo declared
that the signature appearing above his name as counsel for
Divinagracia was not his. Thus, Rustia convinced Atty. Bancolo to sign
an affidavit to attest to such fact. On 9 December 2004, Atty. Bancolo
signed an affidavit denying his supposed signature appearing on the
Complaint filed with the Office of the Ombudsman and submitted six
specimen signatures for comparison. Using Atty. Bancolo's affidavit and
other documentary evidence, Tapay and Rustia filed a counter-affidavit
accusing Divinagracia of falsifying the signature of his alleged counsel,
Atty. Bancolo.
In a Resolution dated 28 March 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman
provisionally dismissed the Complaint since the falsification of the
counsel's signature posed a prejudicial question to the Complaint's
validity. Also, the Office of the Ombudsman ordered that separate
cases for Falsification of Public Document 2 and Dishonesty 3 be filed
against Divinagracia, with Rustia and Atty. Bancolo as complainants.
Thereafter, Divinagracia filed his Counter-Affidavit dated 1 August 2005
denying that he falsified the signature of his former lawyer, Atty.
Bancolo. Divinagracia presented as evidence an affidavit dated 1
August 2005 by Richard A. Cordero, the legal assistant of Atty. Bancolo,
that the Jarder Bancolo Law Office accepted Divinagracia's case and
that the Complaint filed with the Office of the Ombudsman was signed
by the office secretary per Atty. Bancolo's instructions. Divinagracia
asked that the Office of the Ombudsman dismiss the cases for
falsification of public document and dishonesty filed against him by
Rustia and Atty. Bancolo and to revive the original Complaint for
various offenses that he filed against Tapay and Rustia.
In a Resolution dated 19 September 2005, the Office of the
Ombudsman dismissed the criminal case for falsification of public
document (OMB-V-C-05-0207-E) for insufficiency of evidence. The
dispositive portion states: IaDTES
WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED for insufficiency of
evidence, without prejudice to the re-filing by Divinagracia, Jr. of a
proper complaint for violation of RA 3019 and other offenses against
Rustia and Tapay.
SO ORDERED. 4
The administrative case for dishonesty (OMB-V-A-05-0219-E) was also
dismissed for lack of substantial evidence in a Decision dated 19
September 2005.
On 29 November 2005, Tapay and Rustia filed with the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) a complaint 5 to disbar Atty. Bancolo and Atty.
Jarder, Atty. Bancolo's law partner. The complainants alleged that they
were subjected to a harassment Complaint filed before the Office of
the Ombudsman with the forged signature of Atty. Bancolo.
Complainants stated further that the signature of Atty. Bancolo in the
Complaint was not the only one that was forged. Complainants
attached a Report 6 dated 1 July 2005 by the Philippine National Police
Crime Laboratory 6 which examined three other letter-complaints
signed by Atty. Bancolo for other clients, allegedly close friends of Atty.
Jarder. The report concluded that the questioned signatures in the

letter-complaints and the submitted standard signatures of Atty.

Bancolo were not written by one and the same person. Thus,
complainants maintained that not only were respondents engaging in
unprofessional and unethical practices, they were also involved in
falsification of documents used to harass and persecute innocent
people.
On 9 January 2006, complainants filed a Supplement to the Disbarment
Complaint Due to Additional Information. They alleged that a certain
Mary Jane Gentugao, the secretary of the Jarder Bancolo Law Office,
forged the signature of Atty. Bancolo.
In their Answer dated 26 January 2006 to the disbarment complaint,
respondents admitted that the criminal and administrative cases filed
by Divinagracia against complainants before the Office of the
Ombudsman were accepted by the Jarder Bancolo Law Office. The
cases were assigned to Atty. Bancolo. Atty. Bancolo alleged that after
being informed of the assignment of the cases, he ordered his staff to
prepare and draft all the necessary pleadings and documents.
However, due to some minor lapses, Atty. Bancolo permitted that the
pleadings and communications be signed in his name by the secretary
of the law office. Respondents added that complainants filed the
disbarment complaint to retaliate against them since the cases filed
before the Office of the Ombudsman were meritorious and strongly
supported by testimonial and documentary evidence. Respondents
also denied that Mary Jane Gentugao was employed as secretary of
their law office.
Tapay and Rustia filed a Reply to the Answer dated 2 March 2006.
Thereafter, the parties were directed by the Commission on Bar
Discipline to attend a mandatory conference scheduled on 5 May 2006.
The conference was reset to 10 August 2006. On the said date,
complainants were present but respondents failed to appear. The
conference was reset to 25 September 2006 for the last time. Again,
respondents failed to appear despite receiving notice of the
conference. Complainants manifested that they were submitting their
disbarment complaint based on the documents submitted to the IBP.
Respondents were also deemed to have waived their right to
participate in the mandatory conference. Further, both parties were
directed to submit their respective position papers. On 27 October
2006, the IBP received complainants' position paper dated 18 October
2006 and respondents' position paper dated 23 October 2006. AHDaET
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
On 11 April 2007, Atty. Lolita A. Quisumbing, the Investigating
Commissioner of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP,
submitted her Report. Atty. Quisumbing found that Atty. Bancolo
violated Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
while Atty. Jarder violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the same Code. The
Investigating Commissioner recommended that Atty. Bancolo be
suspended for two years from the practice of law and Atty. Jarder be
admonished for his failure to exercise certain responsibilities in their
law firm.
In her Report and Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner
opined:
. . . . In his answer[,] respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo admitted that
his signature appearing in the complaint filed against complainants'
Rodrigo E. Tapay and Anthony J. Rustia with the Ombudsman were
signed by the secretary. He did not refute the findings that his
signatures appearing in the various documents released from his office
were found not to be his. Such pattern of malpratice by respondent
clearly breached his obligation under Rule 9.01 of Canon 9, for a lawyer
who allows a non-member to represent him is guilty of violating the
aforementioned Canon. The fact that respondent was busy cannot
serve as an excuse for him from signing personally. After all respondent
is a member of a law firm composed of not just one (1) lawyer. The
Supreme Court has ruled that this practice constitute negligence and
undersigned finds the act a sign of indolence and ineptitude. Moreover,
respondents ignored the notices sent by undersigned. That showed
patent lack of respect to the Integrated Bar of the Philippine[s']
Commission on Bar Discipline and its proceedings. It betrays lack of
courtesy and irresponsibility as lawyers.
On the other hand, Atty. Janus T. Jarder, a senior partner of the law firm
Jarder Bancolo and Associates Law Office, failed to exercise certain

responsibilities over matters under the charge of his law firm. As a

senior partner[,] he failed to abide to the principle of "command
responsibility". . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent Atty. Janus Jarder after all is a seasoned practitioner,
having passed the bar in 1995 and practicing law up to the present. He
holds himself out to the public as a law firm designated as Jarder
Bancolo and Associates Law Office. It behooves Atty. Janus T. Jarder to
exert ordinary diligence to find out what is going on in his law firm, to
ensure that all lawyers in his firm act in conformity to the Code of
Professional Responsibility. As a partner[,] it is his responsibility to
provide efficacious control of court pleadings and other documents that
carry the name of the law firm. Had he done that, he could have known
the unethical practice of his law partner Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo.
Respondent Atty. Janus T. Jarder failed to perform this task and is
administratively liable under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. 7
On 19 September 2007, in Resolution No. XVIII-2007-97, the Board of
Governors of the IBP approved with modification the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. The Resolution
states:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation
fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules, and considering Respondent Atty. Bancolo's violation of Rule
9.01, Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Charlie L.
Bancolo is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1)
year. HAEDCT
However, with regard to the charge against Atty. Janus T. Jarder, the
Board of Governors RESOLVED as it is hereby RESOLVED to AMEND, as
it is hereby AMENDED the Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner, and APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the case for lack of
merit. 8
Tapay and Rustia filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Likewise, Atty.
Bancolo filed his Motion for Reconsideration dated 22 December 2007.
Thereafter, Atty. Jarder filed his separate Consolidated Comment/Reply
to Complainants' Motion for Reconsideration and Comment Filed by
Complainants dated 29 January 2008.
In Resolution No. XX-2012-175 dated 9 June 2012, the IBP Board of
Governors denied both complainants' and Atty. Bancolo's motions for
reconsideration. The IBP Board found no cogent reason to reverse the
findings of the Investigating Commissioner and affirmed Resolution No.
XVIII-2007-97 dated 19 September 2007.
The Court's Ruling
After a careful review of the records of the case, we agree with the
findings and recommendation of the IBP Board and find reasonable
grounds to hold respondent Atty. Bancolo administratively liable.
Atty. Bancolo admitted that the Complaint he filed for a former client
before the Office of the Ombudsman was signed in his name by a
secretary of his law office. Clearly, this is a violation of Rule 9.01 of
Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:
CANON 9
A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN THE
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW.
Rule 9.01 A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the
performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a
member of the Bar in good standing.
This rule was clearly explained in the case of Cambaliza v. CristalTenorio, 9 where we held: AacDHE
The lawyer's duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the
unauthorized practice of law is founded on public interest and policy.

Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those

individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The
permissive right conferred on the lawyer is an individual and limited
privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards
of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public,
the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty
of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary
control of the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see that this purpose
is attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the profession enjoin him
not to permit his professional services or his name to be used in aid of,
or to make possible the unauthorized practice of law by, any agency,
personal or corporate. And, the law makes it a misbehavior on his part,
subject to disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the unauthorized
practice of law.
In Republic v. Kenrick Development Corporation, 10 we held that the
preparation and signing of a pleading constitute legal work involving
the practice of law which is reserved exclusively for members of the
legal profession. Atty. Bancolo's authority and duty to sign a pleading
are personal to him. Although he may delegate the signing of a
pleading to another lawyer, he may not delegate it to a non-lawyer.
Further, under the Rules of Court,counsel's signature serves as a
certification that (1) he has read the pleading; (2) to the best of his
knowledge, information and belief there is good ground to support it;
and (3) it is not interposed for delay. 11 Thus, by affixing one's
signature to a pleading, it is counsel alone who has the responsibility to
certify to these matters and give legal effect to the document.
In his Motion for Reconsideration dated 22 December 2007, Atty.
Bancolo wants us to believe that he was a victim of circumstances or of
manipulated events because of his unconditional trust and confidence
in his former law partner, Atty. Jarder. However, Atty. Bancolo did not
take any steps to rectify the situation, save for the affidavit he gave to
Rustia denying his signature to the Complaint filed before the Office of
the Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo had an opportunity to maintain his
innocence when he filed with the IBP his Joint Answer (with Atty. Jarder)
dated 26 January 2006. Atty. Bancolo, however, admitted that prior to
the preparation of the Joint Answer, Atty. Jarder threatened to file a
disbarment case against him if he did not cooperate. Thus, he was
constrained to allow Atty. Jarder to prepare the Joint Answer. Atty.
Bancolo simply signed the verification without seeing the contents of
the Joint Answer.
In the Answer, Atty. Bancolo categorically stated that because of some
minor lapses, the communications and pleadings filed against Tapay
and Rustia were signed by his secretary, albeit with his tolerance.
Undoubtedly, Atty. Bancolo violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility by allowing a non-lawyer to affix his signature to a
pleading. This violation is an act of falsehood which is a ground for
disciplinary action.
The complainants did not present any evidence that Atty. Jarder was
directly involved, had knowledge of, or even participated in the
wrongful practice of Atty. Bancolo in allowing or tolerating his secretary
to sign pleadings for him. Thus, we agree with the finding of the IBP
Board that Atty. Jarder is not administratively liable. AHSaTI
In sum, we find that the suspension of Atty. Bancolo from the practice
of law for one year is warranted. We also find proper the dismissal of
the case against Atty. Jarder.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the complaint against Atty. Janus T. Jarder for
lack of merit.
We find respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo administratively liable for
violating Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
one year effective upon finality of this Decision. He is warned that a
repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with
more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent Atty. Charlie L.
Bancolo's record in this Court as attorney. Further, let copies of this
Decision be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to
all the courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

Brion, Del Castillo, Perez and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

||| (Tapay v. Bancolo, A.C. No. 9604, [March 20, 2013], 707 PHIL 1-10)

Industrial Relations (CIR), for unfair labor practices specified in Sec.

4(a) 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the Industrial Peace Act. Made respondents were
their former employer, Binalbagan Sugar Central Company, Inc.
(Biscom), Rafael Jalandoni, its president and general manager; Gonzalo
Guillen, its chief engineer and general factory superintendent; and
Fraternal Labor Organization and/or Roberto Poli, its president.
Failing in their attempts to dismiss the complaint (motions to dismiss
dated June 30, 1956 and July 6, 1956), 2 respondents Biscom,
Jalandoni, and Guillen, on July 9, 1957, answered and counterclaimed.
Respondents Fraternal Labor Union and Poli also filed their answer
dated July 12, 1957.
With the issues joined, the case on the merits was heard before a trial
commissioner.
At the hearings, only ten of the forty-eight complainant laborers
appeared and testified. Two of these ten were permanent (regular)
employees of respondent company; the remaining eight were seasonal
workers. The regular employees were Arsenio Reyes and Fidel
Magtubo. Seasonal workers were Catalino Bangoy, Juan Fernandez,
Jose Garlitos, Dionisio Pido, Santiago Talagtag, Dominador Tangente,
Felimon Villaluna and Brigido Casas.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-23467. March 27, 1968.]
AMALGAMATED LABORERS' ASSOCIATION and/or FELISBERTO M.
JAVIER, for Himself and as General President, ATTY. JOSE UR.
CARBONELL, ET AL., petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS and ATTY. LEONARDO C. FERNANDEZ, respondents.
Jose Ur. Carbonell and for and in his own behalf as petitioner.
Leonardo C. Fernandez for and in his own behalf as respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. ATTORNEY AND CLIENT; ATTORNEY'S FEES; DISPUTE MERELY
INCIDENTAL TO A MAIN CIR CASE; CIR HAS JURISDICTION. The CIR
has authority to adjudicate contractual disputes over attorney's fees,
where as in this case, the said controversy over attorneys' fees is but
an epilogue or a tail-end feature of the main case, CIR Case No. 70ULP-Cebu, which undoubtedly is within CIR's jurisdiction. This is so,
because once the Court of Industrial Relations has acquired jurisdiction
over a case under the law of its creation, it retains that jurisdiction until
the case is completely decided, including all the incidents related
thereto.
2. ID.; ID.; INVALIDITY OF AGREEMENT THAT UNION PRESIDENT
SHOULD SHARE IN THE ATTORNEYS' FEES. The alleged oral
agreement that the union president should share in the attorneys' fees
is immoral. Canon 34 of Legal Ethics condemns this arrangement in
terms clear and explicit. The union president is not the attorney for the
laborers. He may seek compensation only as such president.
3. ID.; ID.; STIPULATED FEES MUST NOT BE EXCESSIVE; DUTY OF
COURT. Because of the inequality of the situations between lawyers
and laborers, courts should go slow in awarding huge sums by way of
attorney's fees based solely on contracts. Contracts for legal services
between laborer and attorney should be zealously scrutinized to the
end that a fair share of the benefits be not denied the former.
Considering the circumstances of this case the 30% stipulated
attorneys' fee is excessive. An award of 25% is reasonable.
DECISION

On November 13, 1962, CIR, thru Associate Judge Arsenio Martinez,

rendered judgment, which provides, inter alia that the two regular
employees (Reyes and Magtubo) be reinstated "to their former
positions, without loss of seniority and other benefits which should
have accrued to them had they not been illegally dismissed, with full
back wages from the time of their said dismissals up to the time of
their actual reinstatements, minus what they have earned elsewhere in
the meantime," and that the eight seasonal workers "be readmitted to
their positions as seasonal workers of respondent company (Biscom),
with back wages as seasonal workers from the time they were not
rehired at the start of the 1955-1956 milling season on October 1,
1955 up to the time they are actually reinstated, less the amount
earned elsewhere during the period of their lay-off."
Respondents Biscom, Jalandoni and Guillen appealed direct to this
Court. 3 On March 28, 1963, this Court dismissed the appeal, without
costs. Ground: Petitioners therein did not seek reconsideration of CIR's
decision of November 13, 1962. The judgment became final.
Upon the ten complainants' motion to name an official computer to
determine the actual money due them, CIR, on June 4, 1963, directed
the Chief Examiner of its Examining Division to go to the premises of
Biscom and compute the backwages due the ten complainants.
On August 9, 1963, the Chief Examiner reported that the total net back
wages due the ten complainants were P79,755.22. Biscom and the
complainants moved for reconsideration: Biscom on August 17, 1963;
complainants on September 24, 1963.
In the interim, Atty. Leonardo C. Fernandez (a respondent herein) filed
on July 15, 1963 in the same case CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu a
"Notice of Attorney's Lien." He alleged therein that he had been the
attorney of record for the laborers in CIR Case 70-ULP-Cebu "since the
inception of the preliminary hearings of said case up to the Supreme
Court on appeal, as chief counsel thereof that he "had actually
rendered legal services to the laborers who are subject of this present
litigation [CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu] since the year 1956, more or
less"; that the laborers "have voluntarily agreed to give [him],
representing his attorney's fees on contingent basis such amounts
equivalent to 25% thereof which agreement is evidenced by a Note";
and that the 25% attorney's fee so contracted is "reasonable and
proper taking into consideration the length of services he rendered and
the nature of the work actually performed by him."

SANCHEZ, J p:
Controversy over attorneys' fees for legal services rendered in CIR
Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu.
The background facts are as follows:
On May 30, 1956, Florentino Arceo and 47 others together with their
union, Amalgamated Laborers' Association, and/or Felisberto Javier,
general president of said union, lodged a complaint 1 in the Court of

On September 25, 1963, Atty. Fernandez filed an "Amended Notice of

Attorney's Lien," which in part reads:
"3. That the laborers, subject of this present litigation, sometime on
February 3, 1956, had initially voluntarily agreed to give Undersigned
Counsel herein, representing his Attorney's fees on contingent basis,
such amounts as equivalent to Thirty Per Cent (30%) of whatever
money claims that may be adjudicated by this Honorable Court, copy
of said Agreement, in the local Visayan dialect and a translation of the

same in the English language are hereto attached as annexes 'A' 'A-1'
hereof;

case over which CIR may validly assume jurisdiction is to disregard the
special and limited nature of said court's jurisdiction.

4. That subsequently thereafter, when the above entitled Case was

already decided in their favor, Arsenio Reyes, in behalf of his colaborers who are also Complainants in this Case begged from the
Undersigned Counsel herein that he reduce his attorney's fees to
Twenty-Five Per Cent (25%) only for the reason that they have to share
and satisfy also Atty. Jose Ur. Carbonell in the equivalent amount of
Five Per Cent (5%) although the latter's actual services rendered was
so insignificant thereof;

These arguments are devoid of merit.

5. That because of the pleadings of said Arsenio Reyes, who is the

President of said Union, the Undersigned Counsel herein finally agreed
and consented that his attorney's fees be reduced to Twenty-Five Per
Cent (25%) instead of Thirty Per Cent (30%) as originally agreed upon
in 1956."
On October 7, 1963, Atty. Jose Ur. Carbonell (a petitioner herein) filed in
court a document labelled "Discharge" informing CIR of the discharge,
release and dismissal thru a union board resolution (attached
thereto as Annex A thereof of Atty. Leonardo C. Fernandez as one of
the lawyers of the complainants in CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu, effective
February 28, 1963.
On October 14, 1963, Atty. Fernandez replied. He averred that the
grounds for his discharge specified in the board resolution were
"malicious and motivated by greed and ungratefulness" and that the
unjustifiable discharge did not affect the already stipulated contract for
attorneys' fees.
On March 19, 1964, CIR Judge Arsenio I. Martinez resolved Biscom's
and complainants' motions for reconsideration objecting to the Chief
Examiner's Report and also respondent Fernandez' Amended Notice of
Attorney's Lien. Judge Martinez' order reads in part:
"(b) Respondent company is further directed to deposit the amount
representing 25% of P79,755.22 with the Cashier of this Court, as
attorney's fees;
xxx xxx xxx
"(d) The amount representing attorney's fees to be deposited by the
respondent company is hereby awarded and granted to Atty. Leonardo
C. Fernandez, and he may collect the same from the Cashier of the
Court upon the finality of this order, subject to existing auditing
procedure; . . ."
Biscom complied with the order of deposit. 4
On April 10, 1964, Atty. Carbonell moved to reconsider the March 19,
1964 order with respect to the award of attorneys' fees. Amongst his
grounds are that CIR has no jurisdiction to determine the matter in
question, and that the award of 25% as attorneys' fees to Atty.
Fernandez is excessive, unfair and illegal. This motion was denied on
April 28, 1964 by CIR en banc.
On June 9, 1964, a motion for reconsideration of the April 28, 1964
resolution was filed by Atty. Carbonell. This was amplified by a similar
motion filed on June 11, 1964.
On June 25, 1964, two things happened: First. CIR en banc denied the
motion of June 11, 1964. Second. On Atty. Fernandez' motion, Judge
Martinez authorized the Cashier of the court to disburse to Fernandez
the amount of P19,938.81 representing attorneys' fees and deducting
therefrom all legal fees incident to such deposit.

The present controversy over attorneys' fees is but an epilogue or a

tail-end feature of the main case, CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu, which
undoubtedly is within CIR's jurisdiction. And, it has been held that
"once the Court of Industrial Relations has acquired jurisdiction over a
case under the law of its creation, it retains that jurisdiction until the
case is completely decided, including all the incidents related thereto.
5 Expressive of the rule on this point is this
"4. It is well settled that:
'A grant of jurisdiction implies the necessary and usual incidental
powers essential to effectuate it, and every regularly constituted court
has power to do all things reasonably necessary for the administration
of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction, and for the enforcement of
its judgments and mandates, even though the court may thus be
called upon to decide matters which would not be within its cognizance
as original causes of action.
'While a court may be expressly granted the incidental powers
necessary to effectuate its jurisdiction, a grant of jurisdiction, in the
absence of prohibitive legislation, implies the necessary and usual
incidental powers essential to effectuate it (In re Stingers' Estate, 201
P. 693), and, subject to existing laws and constitutional provisions,
every regularly constituted court has power to do all things that are
reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope
of its jurisdiction, and for the enforcement of its judgments and
mandates. So demands, matters, or questions ancillary or incidental to,
or growing out of, the main action, and coming within the above
principles, may be taken cognizance of by the court and determined
since such jurisdiction is in aid of its authority over the principal
matter, even though the court may thus be called on to consider and
decide matters which, as original causes of action, would not be within
its cognizance (Bartholomew vs. Shipe, 251 S.W. 1031), (21 C.J.S. pp.
136-138.)
Thus, in Gomez vs. North Camarines Lumber Co., L-11945, August 18,
1958, and Serrano vs. Serrano L-19562, May 23, 1964, we held that the
court having jurisdiction over the main cause of action, may grant the
relief incidental thereto, even if they would otherwise, be outside its
competence." 6
To direct that the present dispute be lodged in another court as
petitioners advocate would only result in multiplicity of suits, 7 a
situation abhorred by the rules. Thus it is, that usually the application
to fix the attorneys' fees is made before the court which renders the
judgment 8 And, it has been observed that "[a]n approved procedure,
where a charging lien has attached to a judgment or where money has
been paid into court, is for the attorney to file an intervening petition
and have the amount and extent of his lien judicially determined." 9
Appropriately to be recalled at this point is the recent ruling in Martinez
vs. Union de Maquinistas, 1967 A Phild. 142, 141, January 30, 1967,
where, speaking thru Mr. Justice Arsenio P. Dizon, explicit
pronouncement was made by this Court that: "We are of the opinion
that since the Court of Industrial Relations obviously had jurisdiction
over the main cases, . . . it likewise had full jurisdiction to consider and
decide all matters collateral thereto, such as claims for attorney's fees
made by the members of the bar who appeared therein." 10
2. The parties herein join hands in one point the ten (10) successful
complainants in CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu should pay as attorneys'
fees 30% of the amount adjudicated by the court in the latter's favor
(P79,755.22).

Petitioners herein, Atty. Carbonell, Amalgamated Laborers' Association,

and the ten employees, appealed from the June 25, 1964 resolution of
CIR, direct to this Court.

They are at odds, however, on how to split the fees.

1. Petitioners press upon this Court the view that CIR is bereft of
authority to adjudicate contractual disputes over attorneys' fees. Their
reasons: (1) a dispute arising from contracts for attorneys' fees is not a
labor dispute and is not one among the cases ruled to be within CIR's
authority; and (2) to consider such a dispute to be a mere incident to a

Respondent Atty. Fernandez claims twenty-five per cent (25%) of the

30% attorneys' fees. He explains that upon the plea of Arsenio Reyes,
union president and one of the 10 successful complainants, he had to
reduce his fees to 25% since "they have to share and satisfy also Atty.
Jose Ur. Carbonell in the equivalent amount of Five Per Cent (5%)." Atty.
Fernandez exhibited a contract purportedly dated February 3, 1956
before the 48 employees have even filed their complaint in CIR. The

stipulated fee is 30% of whatever amount the ten might recover.

Strange enough, this contract was signed only by 8 of the 10 winning
claimants. What happened to the others? Why did not the union
intervene in the signing of this contract? Petitioners dispute said
contract. They say that Atty. Fernandez required the ten to sign the
contract only after the receipt of the decision.
Petitioners, on the other hand, contend that the verbal agreement
entered into by the union and its officers thru its President Javier and
said two lawyers, Atty. Carbonell and Atty. Fernandez, is that the 30%
attorneys' fees shall be divided equally ("share and share alike")
amongst Atty. Carbonell, Atty. Fernandez and Felisberto Javier, the
union president.
After hearing, CIR Associate Judge Arsenio I. Martinez awarded 25%
attorneys' fees to respondent Atty. Fernandez. CIR noted that "the
active conduct and prosecution of the above-entitled case was done by
Atty. Fernandez up to the appeal in the Supreme Court," and that
petitioner Atty. Carbonell manifested that "Atty. Leonardo C. Fernandez
was the counsel mainly responsible for the conduct of the case." It
noted, too, that petitioner Atty. Carbonell did not file any notice of
Attorney's Lien.
3. We strike down the alleged oral agreement that the union president
should share in the attorney's fees. Canon 34 of Legal Ethics condemns
this arrangement in terms clear and explicit. It says: "No division of
fees for legal services is proper, except with another lawyer, based
upon a division of service or responsibility." The union president is not
the attorney for the laborers. He may seek compensation only as such
president. An agreement whereby a union president is allowed to share
in attorneys' fees is immoral. Such a contract we emphatically reject. It
cannot be justified.
4. A contingent fee contract specifying the percentage of recovery an
attorney is to receive in a suit "should be reasonable under all the
circumstances of the case, including the risk and uncertainty of the
compensation, but should always be subject to the supervision of a
court, as to its reasonableness." 11
Lately, we said: 12
"The principle that courts should reduce stipulated attorney's fees
whenever it is found under the circumstances of the case that the
same is unreasonable, is now deeply rooted in this jurisdiction . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Since then this Court has invariably fixed counsel fees on a quantum
meruit basis whenever the fees stipulated appear excessive,
unconscionable, or unreasonable, because a lawyer is primarily a court
officer charged with the duty of assisting the court in administering
impartial justice between the parties, and hence, the fees should be
subject to judicial control. Nor should it be ignored that sound public
policy demands that courts disregard stipulations for counsel fees,
whenever they appear to be a source of speculative profit at the
expense of the debtor or mortgagor. See, Gorospe et al. vs.
Gochangco, L-12735, October 30, 1959. And it is not material that the
present action is between the debtor and the creditor, and not between
attorney and client. As courts have power to fix the fee as between
attorney and client, it must necessarily have the right to say whether a
stipulation like this, inserted in a mortgage contract, is valid, Bachrach
vs. Golingco, 39 Phil. 138."
In the instant case, the stipulated 30% attorneys' fee is excessive and
unconscionable. With the exception of Arsenio Reyes who receives a
monthly salary of P175, the other successful complainants were mere
wage earners paid a daily rate of P4.20 to P5.00. 13 Considering the
long period of time that they were illegally and arbitrarily deprived of
their just pay, these laborers looked up to the favorable money
judgment as a serum to their pitiful economic malaise. A thirty per cent
(30%) slice therefrom immensely dilutes the palliative ingredient of
this judicial antidote.
The ten complainants involved herein are mere laborers. It is not farfetched to assume that they have not reached an educational
attainment comparable to that of petitioner Carbonell or respondent
Fernandez who, on the other hand, are lawyers. Because of the

inequality of the situation between laborers and lawyers, courts should

go slow in awarding huge sums by way of attorneys' fees based solely
on contracts. 14 For, as in the present case, the real objective of the
CIR judgment in CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu is to benefit the
complainant laborers who were unjustifiedly dismissed from service.
While it is true that laborers should not be allowed to develop that
atavistic proclivity to bite the hands that fed them, still lawyers should
not be permitted to get a lion's share of the benefits due by reason of a
worker's labor. What is to be paid to the laborers is not a windfall but a
product of the sweat of their brow. Contracts for legal services between
laborer and attorney should then be zealously scrutinized to the end
that a fair share of the benefits be not denied the former.
5. An examination of the record of this case will readily show that an
award of twenty-five per cent (25%) attorneys' fees reasonably
compensates the whole of the legal services rendered in CIR Case No.
70-ULP-Cebu. This fee must be shared by petitioner Atty. Carbonell and
respondent Atty. Fernandez. For, after all, they are the counsel of
record of the complainants. Respondent Atty. Fernandez cannot deny
this fact. The pleadings filed even at the early stages of the
proceedings reveal the existence of an association between said
attorneys. The pleadings were filed under the name of "Fernandez &
Carbonell." This imports a common effort of the two. It cannot be
denied though that most of those pleadings up to judgment were
signed for Fernandez & Carbonell by respondent Fernandez.
We note that a break-up in the professional tie-up between Attorneys
Fernandez and Carbonell began when petitioner Atty. Carbonell, on
November 26, 1962, complained to CIR that respondent Atty.
Fernandez "failed to communicate with him nor to inform him about
the incidents of this case." He there requested that he be furnished
"separately copies of the decision of the court and other pleadings and
subsequent orders as well as motions in connection with the case."
Subsequent pleadings filed in the case unmistakably show the
widening rift in their professional relationship. Thus, on May 23, 1963,
a "Motion to Name and Authorize Official Computer" was filed with CIR.
On the same day, a "Motion to Issue Writ of Execution" was also
registered in the same court. Although filed under the name of
"Carbonell & Fernandez," these pleadings were signed solely by
petitioner Atty. Carbonell.
On September 16, 1963, an "Opposition to respondent Biscom's Motion
for Reconsideration" was filed by petitioner Atty. Carbonell. On
September 24, 1963, he filed a "Motion for Clarification" of the
November 13, 1962 judgment of CIR regarding the basic pay of Arsenio
Reyes and Fidel Magtubo. On September 24, 1963, he also filed a
"Motion to Reconsider Report of Chief Examiner." These, and other
pleadings that were fled later were signed solely by petitioner Atty.
Carbonell, not in the name of "Carbonell & Fernandez." While it was
correctly observed by CIR that a good portion of the court battle was
fought by respondent Atty. Fernandez, yet CIR cannot close its eyes to
the legal services also rendered by Atty. Carbonell. For, important and
numerous too, were his services. And, they are not negligible. The
conclusion is inevitable that petitioner Atty. Carbonell must have a
share in the twenty-five per cent (25%) attorneys' fees awarded herein.
As to how much, this is a function pertaining to CIR.
6. We note that CIR's cashier was authorized on June 25, 1964 to
disburse to Atty. Leonardo C. Fernandez the sum of P19,938.81 which is
25% of the amount recovered. In the event payment actually was
made, he should be required to return whatever is in excess of the
amount to which he is entitled in line with the opinion expressed
herein. 15
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the award of twenty-five per cent (25%)
attorneys' fees solely to respondent Atty. Fernandez contained in CIR's
order of March 10, 1964 and affirmed by said court's en banc
resolutions of April 28, 1964 and June 25, 1964, is hereby set aside;
and the case is hereby remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations
with instructions to conduct a hearing on, and determine, the
respective shares of Attorney Leonardo C. Fernandez and Attorney Jose
Ur. Carbonell in the amount of P19,938.81 herein awarded as
attorneys' fees for both.
No costs. So Ordered.

Reyes, J.B.L., Actg. C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar,

Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., is on leave.

||| (Amalgamated Laborers Association v. Court of Industrial Relations,

G.R. No. L-23467, [March 27, 1968], 131 PHIL 374-386)