DUE PROCESS AND EMINENT DOMAIN

The power of eminent domain is the

inherent power of the state to condemn
private property for public use upon
payment of just compensation. For the
expropriation to be valid:
1. The taking must be for public use
2. JC must be paid to the owner of the
property.
Just compensation is the full and fair
equivalent of the property taken from its
owner by the expropriator. It is the fair
market value of the property. Fair market
value is the sum of money which a person
desirous but not compelled to buy, and an
owner willing but not compelled to sell,
would agree on as a price to be given and
received therefor. JC is to be ascertained
as of the time of taking which usually
coincides with the commencement of the
expropriation proceedings.
JC is a judicial function,
Spouses Dycoco v. CA
Ejectment. Cancellation of certificate and
damages.
Due process guarantees that taking of
private property by the State for public use
should
be
with
payment
of
just
compensation. Unfortunately, spouses did
not consider the issue of JC as compelling
enough because they did not raise it in the

complaint or in the position paper. They

only claimed JC for the first time on appeal.
The settled rule is that issues not raised in
the proceedings cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal.
The right to payment of JC does not
include reacquisition of ownership and
possession of the property.
Republic v. BPI
DP filed expropriation proceedings against
BPIs property to which the latter did not
object.
No actual taking of property is necessary
to
grant
consequential
damages.
Consequential damages are awarded if as
a result of the expropriation, the remaining
property suffers from an impairment or
decrease in value.
To determine JC, the trial court should first
ascertain the market value of the property,
to
which
should
be
added
the
consequential damages after deducting
therefrom the consequential benefits
which may arise from the expropriation. If
CB exceed the CD, these items should be
disregarded altogether as the basic value
should be paid in every case.

EQUAL PROTECTION A3S1 CONS

1. Economic Equality
2. Political Equality
Dumlao v. Comelec
Section 4 BP 52 on DQ of 65 yrs old
unconsti?
No. The guarantee of equal
protection is subject to a rational
classification based on reasonable and real
differentiations. Employees 65 years of age
have been classified differently from
younger employees. The former are
subject to compulsory retirement while the
latter are not.
The equal protection clause does not forbid
all legal classification. What is proscribed is
a classification which is arbitrary and
unreasonable. There is a reason to
disqualify a 65 year old elective official
because there is a need for new blood to
assume relevance. A retired has already
declared himself tried and unavailable for
the same government work.

Quinto v. Comelec

RA 8676 elective officials are not deemed

resigned upon filing of their certificate of
candidacy, however, appointive officials
are considered deemed resigned upon
filing of COC.

SC said the law is violate of the equal

protection clause. Requisites of valid
classification:
1. Classification
distinction

rests

on

substantial

minority is not a legitimate state interest

that is sufficient to satisfy the rational
basis review under the EPC. Laws of
general application should apply with
equal force to LGBT.

administration
only.
The
Arroyo
administration is but just a member of a
class,
that
is,
a
class
of
past
administration. It is not a class of its own.
EO 1 suffers from arbitrary classification.

OTHER CASES

BOCEA v. Teves

Trillanes v. Pimentel

Equal protection simply provides that all

persons or things similarly situated should
be treated in a similar manner, both as to
rights
conferred
and
responsibilities
imposed. The purpose of the equal
protection clause is to secure every person
within a states jurisdiction against
intentional and arbitrary discrimination,
whether occasioned by the express terms
of a statute or by its improper execution
through the states duly constituted
authorities.

On whether or not Trillanes may be allowed

to attend senate sessions, the Supreme
Court ruled in the negative. Coup d etat
case being punishable by reclusion
perpetua; there is clearly no distinction as
to the political complexion of moral
turpitude involved in the crime charge.

2. It is germane to the purpose of the law

Soriano v. Laguardia

3. It is not limited to existing conditions

only; and

EPC not violated.

4. It applies equally to all members of the

same class
Treatment of persons holding appointive
officers as opposed to those holding
elective ones is not germane to the
purpose of the law. There is no valid
classification to treat appointive officials
differently from elective officials.
Ang Lad lad v. Comelec
Dismissed petitions on moral grounds.
LGBT tolerates immorality.
The same act of COMELEC is violative of
EPC. Moral disapproval of an unpopular

Chamber v. Romulo
MCIT not violation of EPC since taxes are
the lifeblood of the government. Taxation
is purely a legislative intent. Plenary and
with unlimited range. Only when it
amounts to confiscation of property.
Biraogo v. Phil Truth Commission
EO 1 of Aquino is a violation of EPC. For a
classification to meet the requirements of
constitutionality, it must include or
embrace all persons who naturally belong
to the class. The clear mandate of the
commission is to investigate and find out
the truth concerning the reported cases of
graft and corruption during previous

The equal protection clause recognizes a

valid classification, that is, a classification
that has a reasonable foundation or
rational basis and not arbitrary. With
respect to RA [No.] 9335, its expressed
public policy is the optimization of the
revenue-generation
capability
and
collection of the BIR and the BOC. Since
the subject of the law is the revenuegeneration capability and collection of the
BIR and the BOC, the incentives and/or
sanctions provided in the law should
logically pertain to the said agencies.
Moreover, the law concerns only the BIR
and the BOC because they have the
common distinct primary function of

generating revenues for the national

government through the collection of
taxes, customs duties, fees and charges.
Hypermix (reqs of valid classification)

germane to the purpose of the law; that it

must not be limited to existing conditions
only; and that it must apply equally to
each member of the class. This Court has
held that the standard is satisfied if the
classification or distinction is based on a
reasonable foundation or rational basis
and is not palpably arbitrary.
Measured
against
the
foregoing
jurisprudential yardstick, we find that R.A.
9262 is based on a valid classification as
shall hereinafter be discussed and, as
such, did not violate the equal protection
clause by favoring women over men as
victims of violence and abuse to whom the
State extends its protection.

Manotok v. Heirs of Barque

The equal protection of the laws clause of
the Constitution allows classification.
Classification in law, as in the other
departments of knowledge or practice, is
the grouping of things in speculation or
practice because they agree with one
another in certain particulars. A law is not
invalid because of simple inequality. The
very idea of classification is that of
inequality, so that it goes without saying
that the mere fact of inequality in no
manner
determines
the
matter
of
constitutionality. All that is required of a
valid classification is that it be reasonable,
which means that the classification should
be based on substantial distinctions which
make for real differences; that it must be

The unequal power relationship between

women and men; the fact that women are
more likely than men to be victims of
violence; and the widespread gender bias
and prejudice against women all make for
real differences justifying the classification
under the law. As Justice McIntyre
succinctly states, "the accommodation of
differences ... is the essence of true
equality."
Aquino v. PPA
The equal protection of the laws clause of
the Constitution allows classification. x x x.
A law is not invalid simply because of
simple inequality. The very idea of
classification is that of inequality, so that it
goes without saying that the mere fact of

inequality in no manner determines the

matter of constitutionality.
As
explained
earlier,
the
different
treatment accorded the second sentence
(first paragraph) of Section 12 of RA 6758
to the incumbents as of 1 July 1989, on
one hand, and those employees hired on
or after the said date, on the other, with
respect to the grant of non-integrated
benefits lies in the fact that the legislature
intended to gradually phase out the said
benefits without, however, upsetting its
policy of non-diminution of pay and
benefits.
The consequential outcome under Sections
12 and 17 is that if the incumbent resigns
or is promoted to a higher position, his
successor is no longer entitled to his
predecessor's RATA privilege or to the
transition allowance. After 1 July 1989, the
additional financial incentives such as
RATA may no longer be given by the
GOCCs with the exemption of those which
were authorized to be continued under
Section 12 of RA 6758.
Therefore, the aforesaid provision does not
infringe the equal protection clause of the
Constitution as it is based on reasonable
classification intended to protect the rights
of the incumbents against diminution of
their pay and benefits.
National Artist v. Exec Sec

The special treatment accorded to

respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas,
Maosa and Moreno fails to pass rational
scrutiny.60 No real and substantial
distinction between respondents and
petitioner Abad has been shown that
would justify deviating from the laws,
guidelines and established procedures, and

placing respondents in an exceptional

position. The undue classification was not
germane to the purpose of the law.
Instead, it contradicted the law and wellestablished
guidelines,
rules
and
regulations meant to carry the law into
effect. While petitioner Abad cannot claim
entitlement to the Order of National

Artists, he is entitled to be given an equal

opportunity to vie for that honor. In view of
the foregoing, there was a violation of
petitioner Abads right to equal protection,
an interest that is substantial enough to
confer him standing in this case.