Rationalizing The Orient

Rationalizing the Orient: The "East Asia Cooperative Community" in Prewar Japan
Author(s): Han Jung-Sun

Source: Monumenta Nipponica, Vol. 60, No. 4 (Winter, 2005), pp. 481-514
Published by: Sophia University
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25066401
Accessed: 16-01-2017 12:21 UTC
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted
digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about
JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
http://about.jstor.org/terms
Sophia University is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Monumenta
Nipponica
This content downloaded from 133.11.204.54 on Mon, 16 Jan 2017 12:21:28 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
Rationalizing the Orient

The "East Asia Cooperative
Community" in Prewar Japan
Han Jung-Sun
In the late 1930s an amorphous notion oiky?d?tai t?|pH$ (cooperative com

munity) gained currency among a wide range of Japanese intellectuals.1
According to R?yama Masamichi J?L?R31 (1895-1980), one of the leading
proponents of the concept, the "cooperative community" should serve as a means
of transcending regional ethnic and national conflicts and of facilitating "regional
economic development" (chiikiteki keizai no kaihatsu W^Wf?f?^W?W) for the

welfare of all Asians.2 The notion also called for reorganizing the political econ
omy of Japan so as to ensure efficient social mobilization and sustainable growth
as an empire. In its domestic dimension, the ky?d?tai was to be the basis of a
new voluntary collectivity, a "three-dimensional social entity" (rittaiteki na
shakaiteki sonzai Af?6^f?tt?M#ffi), encompassing diverse political and social
interests.3
The notion of ky?d?tai rested on the following assumptions: 1) the East Asian
region needed a new order that would be led by imperial Japan and that was to
supersede the existing League of Nations-centered order; 2) this new order,
The author is senior researcher at the Asiatic Research Center, Korea University. She wishes to
thank the two anonymous reviewers for their constructive criticisms and suggestions. An earlier
version of this article was presented as "The Rise of Internationalism and the Development of
'Cooperative Community' in Prewar Japan," at the Eighth Annual Asian Studies Conference
Japan, Tokyo, June 2004.
1 Intellectuals of various ideological tendencies intensely debated the implications of the term
ky?d?tai. These included Ozaki Hotsumi HW^H, Miki Kiyoshi Hîf, Ry? Shintar? Sfs?6B,
Taira Teiz? ??)i, Sugihara Masami f?UClEE, Yamazaki Seijun Lii^f M, Kada Tetsuji ?nffli?
ZZ, and Funayama Shin'ichi ??L?ig?-, to name just a few. Nationally respected journals such as
Chu? k?ron ^^{?km, Kaiz? ??s, and Nihon hy?ron BAWfm also disseminated the term.
According to Hashikawa Buns? ffi}JII3t__-, the concept of an East Asia Community, proposed as
the basis of the New Order in Asia, was "the only intellectually creative effort to emerge during
the Japan-China war, a period which I have characterized elsewhere as intellectually barren." See
Hashikawa 1980, p. 348.

2 R?yama 1938, pp. 14-18.
3 See R?yama 1939.
482
Monumento Nipponica 60:4
however, could be sustained only by collaborative relations between m?tropole

and colony, and between Japan and China; 3) such collaborative relations re
quired in turn the rational, scientific, and multicultural redefinition of the guiding
principles for governing m?tropole, Japan, and the Orient so as to promote vol
untary individual participation in the multiethnic imperial project.
By analyzing the intellectual matrix underlying the formation and develop
ment of the ky?d?tai idea, this article attempts to readdress one of the enduring
questions of prewar Japanese society: why did the variety of efforts to create a
pluralist and internationalist society in the 1920s in the end converge in the 1930s
in the logic of Ultranationalist militarism and the assertion of a mythology of

Japanese uniqueness?4 Within a larger context, this question relates to one raised
by Ronald P. Dore: "in what sense does the prospect that the world might be get
ting more culturally homogeneous (Westernized, modernized) have implications
for the possibilities of sustaining an international order?"5
To explore these questions, I will focus here primarily on the ideas and activ
ities of R?yama Masamichi in the interwar period. R?yama has been recognized
as one of the leading liberal-minded and internationalist figures of the time. Yet,
in the wake of the China Incident of 1937, he came to embrace the wartime mobi
lization program of the Japanese state. As a charter member of the Sh?wa

Research Association (Sh?wa Kenky?kai Bg?P?jf^?), a policy-oriented research
organization centered around then-premier Konoe Fumimaro ififfi^tS (1891
1945), R?yama actively participated in promoting wartime mobilization by
formulating and circulating the idea of an "East Asia Cooperative Community"
(t?a ky?d?tai A_ffif?|W|#:).
Various scholars, highlighting R?yama's activities during the late 1930s, have
categorized his turn to Japan-centered regional ideas as a classical case of "con
version" (tenk? l?fn?).6 Yet, surprisingly little attention has been paid to his activ
ities during the late 1920s in the Japan Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations
(IPR) or, as the Japanese called it, the Taiheiy? Mondai Ch?sakai ^C^P^P^ffiW
Se (Pacific Problems Research Association).7 This is unfortunate since R?yama's
activities and writings in association with the Japan Council help to untangle the
conceptualization of ky?d?tai from within. I argue that R?yama's turn to the
regionalist notion of ky?d?tai represents less a conversion from internationalist
4 Recently Sakai Tetsuya ?@#??rJc has touched upon this question in relation to R?yama
Masamichi's ideas. His article, which highlights the influence of "socialism" on interwar Japanese
internationalism, is suggestive in many ways and rightly points to the need to examine the con
nection between socialism and interwar internationalism. Yet, it does not engage directly the ques
tion of the 1920s-1930s intellectual shift. See Sakai 2003.
5 Dore 1984, p. 407.
6 See Matsuzawa 1978; Kobayashi 1997; Sakai 1998. For R?yama's ideas on domestic poli
tics, see Ozeki 1997. In English, see Mitani 1973.

7 Matsumoto Shigeharu f?^fif?, a grandson of genr? Matsukata Masayoshi W?ATEl? and a
journalist, suggested that the translation of Institute of Pacific Relations into Taiheiy? Mondai
Ch?sakai disclosed the lack of the notion of "interrelationship" (kankei Pf?) in the vocabulary
of Japanese internationalists. Matsumoto participated as a secretary in the third IPR conference,
held in 1929 in Kyoto. See Matsumoto 1992, pp. 89-90.
Han: Rationalizing the Orient
483
liberalism to nationalist regionalism than a rationalization of internationalist

liberalism that ended up justifying Japanese military assaults.
A few comments on some of these terms are in order. Throughout this essay,
I use the term rationalization to denote the intellectual process through which
the notion of efficient and effective economic development became the supreme
ideal of social organization.8 By internationalist liberalism I mean the intellectual
agenda of the 1920s, which presupposed the "open door" or "informal" imperi
alist order of the late nineteenth century.9
In what follows, I first trace the intellectual development of R?yama from the
mid-1910s to the 1920s. Articulated within the framework of an evolutionary

world history, his works published in the period immediately after World War I
show a typical pattern of internalizing international social norms. Next, I intro
duce the Japan Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations (JIPR) and examine
R?yama's activities as a member of the organization in the late 1920s. R?yama's
experience in the JIPR, where he confronted the predicament Chinese national
ism posed to the internationalist liberal project, provided fertile ground for con
ceptualizing the regionalist idea of ky?d?tai. Finally, I explore the intellectual

and political process by which R?yama and other liberals came to propagate the
idea of ky?d?tai in the wartime environment of the 1930s.
R?yama Masamichi and His Evolutionary World History

Born to a family of sake brewers in Niigata prefecture, R?yama went to the First
Higher School and then entered Tokyo Imperial University in 1917. During his
college years, he acquired a liberal and internationalist outlook under the influ
ence of his mentor, Yoshino Sakuz? pf?Ff?i? (1878-1933).10 A professor at the
Law Faculty and opinion leader, Yoshino was an influential public figure who
popularized liberal and internationalist ideas beyond academic circles and ap
plied them to Japan's relations with China as well as the Western powers.11 In
heriting Yoshino's intellectual outlook with particular focus on Sino-Japanese
relations, R?yama developed a research interest in contemporary international
and regional politics.12
8 For a discussion of how the notion of rationalizing economy and society became the driving
force in creating the "total-war system" during the 1930s, see Yamanouchi 1998.
9 On the "open door," or "informal" imperialism, see Gallagher and Robinson 1953; Beasley
1991; Duus 1989.
10 On the relationship between R?yama and Yoshino, see R?yama 1951. R?yama became an
associate professor at the university in 1922 at the recommendation of Yoshino. See Yoshino's
diary entry for 1922.6.16, in Yoshino 1996. R?yama took over Yoshino's position in 1928 when
Yoshino retired from the university to work for the Asahi shinbun.
11 Studies of Yoshino in English have focused on his ideas of minponshugi &AAM (literally,
people-centrism). See Silberman 1959; Najita 1974; Duus 1978. Studies in Japanese include
Matsumoto 1966; Matsuo 1974; Oka 1975; Mitani 1995; Sakamoto 1996.
12 R?yama recalled in 1951:
It was the summer vacation of 1919. A student group, composed of students at the First
Higher School and Tokyo Imperial University, was organized to observe northern
Manchuria, where the [Japanese] Siberian expeditionary force was stationed. I was also part
of the group and experienced my first trip abroad. As I did not have any idea what to observe
484
In the years following World War I, R?yama published a number of articles

on this subject. Eventually these were collected in one volume as Kokusai seiji
to kokusai gy?sei HKC??C?&?H^fT?C (International Politics and International
Administration), published in 1928. In many regards, the major issues raised in
this book became the recurring themes of his later works. R?yama's first con
cern was how to make sense of the newly emerging patterns of international
cooperation. Observing the meetings of international conferences on disarma
ment and tariff issues, and the establishment of international and nongovern
mental organizations, R?yama attempted to assess the possibility of international
cooperation at the state and social levels in the post-World War I world.
R?yama approached this question in terms of evolutionary history. Believing
in the continuous progress of human reason and history, he saw the contempo
rary development of internationalism (kokusaishugi HB^?) in the West as the
natural result of the maturation of nationalism (kokuminshugi HKee?!). Accord
ing to him, tribal societies (shuzoku shakai SiMt?) evolved into ethnic societies
(minzoku shakai RK?fc?) and then into national societies (kokumin shakai HS
?fc?). In this evolutionary process the nation-state (kokka LU??) became the basis
of international society (kokusai shakai HlS?fc?), but at the same time, various
"derivative societies" (hasei shakai M4?fc?), including corporations, academic
associations, industrial unions, and labor unions, also emerged parallel to the
formation of national societies.13 R?yama claimed that international society was
the most evolved form of human community. The evolution from national soci
eties to international society was not necessarily direct or without conflict, how
ever, and nationalism posed one of the greatest challenges to the development
of international society. R?yama saw the emotional elements within nationalism
as a particular problem.
This perspective led to R?yama's second concern: namely, how to balance

nationalism and internationalism. Although the emotional factor was undeniably
an indispensable component of nationalism, R?yama pointed out that national
ism was largely the product of conscious inculcation carried out through the
national education system. The issue was thus to find ways to control the
emotional forces within nationalism.14 R?yama also believed that nationalism
during the trip, I went to consult with Yoshino-sensei. ... He was generous enough to spend
a long time with me. I was amazed to find that he was able to suggest a whole range of top
ics. I chose two. One was "the problems of Chinese labor in Manchuria" and the other was
"ethnic relations among Japan, Russia, and China in North Manchuria.". . .
Yoshino-sensei's suggestions at the time led me, for better or worse, to research and study
the Manchurian problem for the next ten years. Although it was not my specialty, one of the
reasons that I became extremely interested in international relations and Asian problems was
that, despite the importance of the theses suggested by Yoshino-sensei, the resolution of
these problems was very difficult. Therefore, I could not get these issues off my hands. The
work Nichiman kankei no kenky? B SIBB^^W^l (A Study of Japan-Manchuria Relations),
published in 1933, was the result.
See R?yama 1951, pp. 164-67.
13 R?yama 1928, pp. 12-14.

14 R?yama 1928, pp. 24-36.
485
was destined to fade away as a national society became democratic (demokurashi
A^Z 7?S-) through the development of many "derivative societies." Having

once served to demolish the ancien regime and create polities of popular repre
sentation, nationalism opened the door to a heterogeneous and pluralistic soci
ety comprising new classes and interest groups. Not readily containable within
the boundaries of a nation-state, these emergent social groups further tended to
expand into less-developed regions, as manifested in the formation of

nineteenth-century empires. Imperialism in this context was linked increasingly
to economic expansion in which rising social classes crossed national bound

aries in search of greater opportunities and profits. In sum, nationalism was preg
nant with the seed of its own extinction, and the expansion of international
society signified the beginning of the decline of nationalism.15
R?yama also paid close attention to the ascendancy of internationally based
forms of administration (kokusai gy?sei H^ffR) as a feasible force for ratio
nalizing nationalism. He seemed to suggest that nationalism would be disci
plined as international interdependency deepened through the exchange of
information and trade, leading to an increase in the influence of international
administrative organizations.16 Recognizing the complex nature of international
administration, he emphasized the need to educate and train professionals and
specialists in this area.17 The argument that modern society would be efficiently
governed by the educated classes in general and specialists in particular became

one of R?yama's consistent themes.18
R?yama pointed out that the "epoch-making" moment in the development of
international administration was World War I. In wartime the Allied Powers had
to exchange information and to control the flow of munitions and food as well
as shipping activities. These needs led to the establishment of the Commission
Internationale de Ravitaillement (1914), the Wheat Executive (1916), and the
Allied Maritime Transport Council (1917).19 This wartime experience of inter
national networking, R?yama argued, became the foundation for postwar coop
eration in international administration. He was to apply a similar logic to wartime
Asia in the 1930s in conceptualizing the East Asia Cooperative Community.

Last but not least, R?yama attempted to address what these developments
meant for the "Far East," where Japan's "direct and huge" interests were at stake.
Unlike the European situation, the Far East was still in the age of nationalism.
Pointing to the European experience, R?yama claimed that "true international
ism takes shape only when nationalism has matured and only after nations
undergo fierce conflicts. From this perspective, it is not appropriate to speak of
15 R?yama 1928, pp. 37-38.

16 R?yama 1928, p. 247.
17 R?yama 1928, pp. 248-52.
18 The role of specialists was an important feature of R?yama's call for a controlled economy
in the late 1930s. See Ozeki 1997.
19 R?yama 1928, pp. 278-84.
486
internationalism in the Far East now."20 But while noting the "immature"
elements in the region, R?yama emphasized that the current stage of Far Eastern
societies was transitory and that they, too, would ultimately follow the same evo
lutionary path seen in the development of world history. In the context of the
post-World War I era, such an interpretation had a security dimension as well.
Because the Allied Powers, disregarding existing conditions, had attempted to
transpose liberal internationalism to the region, they had, R?yama implied, exac
erbated the already confused situation evident in the failure of Japanese and
Chinese alike to recognize the "new order." As revealed in the chain of events
surrounding the Treaty of 1915,21 both China and Japan had been blind to the
"progress of history." This circumstance had led to the deterioration of

U.S.-Japan relations on the one hand and Sino-Japanese relations on the other.
While criticizing the backwardness of Chinese nationalism, R?yama urged the
Japanese government to recognize the new trend that was moving toward inter
national cooperation.22
R?yama's call for accommodation to international cooperation was not with
out reservations, however. Conscious of the growing influence of the United
States in the region, R?yama asked what the necessary conditions for realization
of true international cooperation would be. One was to eliminate the remnants
of the old mode of nationalist imperialism in the region. Although skeptical of
the Marxist argument that the financial monopoly of industrialized nations was
the dominant factor in imperialist relations, R?yama claimed that the "monop
oly" over food and natural resources by Britain and the United States, especially
in Southeast Asia, was a central aspect of current Asian affairs. The implication
was that this situation hampered Japan's development as an equal to the Anglo
American powers. The "internationalization" (kokusaika HIS?Ht:) ofthat monop
oly was accordingly an essential step towards doing away with the old order.
Only then would it be possible to form a categorically different community of
cooperation in the region.23
In other words, R?yama observed the stratification at work within evolution
ary world history. While promoting progress and equality at a global level, he
perceived power politics in the name of international cooperation as working in
favor of the early comers to empire. This perception was perhaps a factor in his
20 R?yama 1928, pp. 178-79.
21 The treaty, often labeled the Twenty-One Demands, sought Chinese recognition of the trans
fer of German rights in Shandong to Japan, the extension of Japanese leases and privileges in
South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, a joint Sino-Japanese administration of the
Hanyeping ??p# Iron Works, and a Chinese promise not to lease any port or island to a third
country. A fifth group of "requests" aroused fierce opposition among the Chinese people as
infringing on Chinese sovereignty. These included the employment of Japanese nationals as polit
ical, financial, and military advisers in China; joint policing of troubled areas; the Chinese pur
chase of arms from Japan; permission for Japan to construct railways connecting the Yangtze
valley with the south China coast; and special economic rights in Fujian.
22 R?yama 1928, pp. 189-91.
23 Royama 1928, pp. 226-28.
487
engagement with the Institute of Pacific Relations, an international nongovern

mental organization established in 1923 in Hawaii that sought various ways of
fostering a community of political equals.
The Institute of Pacific Relations: "A Lily in the Farm-Yard of Politics"

The organization and activities of the IPR and of its Japan branch (JIPR) dis
close the ways in which globally enacted norms and rules of conduct shaped
international society. In the aftermath of World War I, the first "total" world war,
internationally minded religious leaders, scholars, artists, and businessmen envi

sioned crosscultural and transnational activities as new bases of international
peace and global cooperation.24 The establishment of the IPR and the JIPR re
flected the new trend towards the formation of international nongovernmental
organizations with the aim of expanding the "transcendental level of social real
ity" in world politics by operating as "a constitutive and directive environment
for states, business enterprises, groups, and individuals."25 As carriers of "uni
versalism," "rational individualism," "voluntarism," and "world citizenship,"
such international nongovernmental organizations were expected to contribute
to the enactment of transnational social norms.
As early as 1919, the Honolulu YMCA proposed holding an international con
ference among countries bordering the Pacific as a way of expanding the asso
ciation's network in the Pacific rim. The organization of the IPR in Hawaii in
1923 was an outgrowth of this call.26 By this time, however, the scope of the
nascent organization's concerns had been broadened to include a wide range of
problems pertinent to the Pacific region, including migration and immigration;
international commercial and industrial relationships; and religious, ethical, and
cultural contacts.27 The institute's first meeting, "Conference on Problems of the
Pacific Peoples," was held in the summer of 1925. The YMCA having relin
quished control of the project, this initial conference evolved into a permanent
"self-governing" organization.
When the second conference took place in Honolulu in 1927, the six national
councils (Australia, Canada, China, Japan, New Zealand, and the United States)
had already been established under the direction of the Pacific Council, to which
each of the constituent national units elected a member. "Local groups" from
Hawaii, Korea, and the Philippines sent representatives to the conference with
"the consent of the national councils concerned," and individuals from Britain
also attended.28 The institute stated that it would be politically "nonsectarian,"
24 Iriye 1997; Iriye 1999.
25 Boli and Thomas 1999, p. 3.
26 On the official history of the IPR, see Davis 1926, pp. 7-40; Condliffe 1928, pp. v-ix. A pio
neering study of the IPR is Thomas 1974. The most up-to-date account is Akami 2002. On the
JIPR, see Sait? 1925; Nakami 1975; Katagiri 1983; Hara 1984; Ajia Taiheiy? Chiikibukai 1996;
Yamaoka 1997. Also see Ogata 1973.
27 See Institute of Pacific Relations 1925, pp. 11, 15-16.

28 On the organization and proceedings of the second conference, see Condliffe 1928, pp. v-ix.
488
having no connection with any government; existentially "practical," so as to be

"of direct service in the removal of difficulties in international relations and in
the promotion of constructive measures of assistance"; and methodologically

"scientific," focusing on the "collection, exchange, discussion, and analysis of
facts related to the big problems of this part of the world."29
The numerous topics discussed and the debates documented in the proceed
ings of the biannual conferences of the institute point to a key shared goal of the
participants?achieving sustainable progress and development through efficient
utilization of human and natural resources on a global scale. From this goal
flowed a variety of issues concerning how to control population, manage mi
gration, increase agricultural productivity, utilize natural resources, promote
international commerce, lower tariffs and customs, rationalize international
transactions, monitor money flows, and establish moral and ethical bases for
dealing with interracial problems and uneven development.30
When the YMCA voluntarily relinquished its control over the meetings, the
IPR took on a more secular coloring, defining its goal as making "a universal
appeal to reason" in creating a new set of human relations and a new interna
tional community.31 Herbert Croly, an American liberal journalist who was also
an organizing member of the New Republic, described the IPR as a "lily in the
farm-yard of politics."32 Croly also pointed out, however, the organization's fun
damental acceptance of the imperialist status quo:
No doubt, powerful maritime nations, such as the United States, Japan, and Great
Britain, would continue to possess legal rights in the territory of Pacific islands
and in eastern Asia, which derived from predatory expeditions of the past, and
the beneficiaries of these pockets of imperialistic politics would have an interest
in contesting the future development of a Pacifie society of nations. But these
powers, however any one or all of them behave in the future, have consented to
the first essential step. The peoples of the Pacific are partially protected in the
ory against any further aggression, and in this sense, they are by way of forming
a community of political equals which are obligated to consult one another about
their common political and economic difficulties and policies.33
The tacit mutual acceptance of previous imperialist gains perhaps was one
factor in the Japanese participants' positive response to this reason-centered
internationalist call and their active participation in the formation of the organi
zation. Avoiding issues related to imperialist and colonial realities, the major
players, the American and the Japanese councils, emphasized instead the inter
racial problems related to migration. For the Japanese members, it may well be
said that "Pacific problems" were primarily the issue of immigration restriction.
29 Institute of Pacifie Relations 1925, p. 26; Condliffe 1928, p. v.

30 Institute of Pacifie Relations 1925; Condliffe 1928; Condliffe 1930; Lasker 1932; Lasker 1934.
31 See the preface to Condliffe 1930, p. vi.
32 Croly 1927, p. 164. On Croly, see Forcey 1961.
33 Croly 1927, p. 167.
489
Many of the roundtable discussions and forums of the early conference meet
ings were devoted to this matter. Yet shared interests in "Pacific problems" did
not guarantee automatic cooperation. Some Japanese found, to the contrary, that
the rise of internationalism threw into sharper relief the unfairness of imperial
ist hierarchies manifested in the form of racial discrimination.
In his speech at the Honolulu conference of 1925, for instance, Sawayanagi

Masatar? RW$kA$$, chairman of the Japanese delegation, argued that "there
[was] no problem of greater importance before the Institute" than promoting "a
reasonable degree of harmony and mutual respect" among the nations of differ
ent racial categories so as to abolish pervasive racial discrimination against
Japanese immigrants by the Western powers.34 Central to his reasoning was the
assertion that industrialization had become the universal goal of all modern
nations, and "whether we [Japanese] like it or not, industrialization has come to
stay." Japan's lack of natural resources and growing population consequently
became sobering problems. The underlying logic was that the Western powers
blocked Japan from obtaining raw materials and securing markets. Therefore, as
Sawayanagi put it, Japan was "necessarily keenly interested in the maintenance
of the time-honored policy of the 'open door' and 'equal opportunity for all' "
and would object to "discrimination on account of race."35
The basic themes articulated by Sawayanagi were fleshed out in the second
conference of the IPR in 1927. According to the summation of the roundtable
discussion on population and food supply:
Japan seems to have reached that point of saturation. Her industrial progress
caused her population to grow to its present size; the education and general en
lightenment of her people have caused wages, as well as the standard of living,
to rise higher; the adoption of occidental civilization has made the aspiration for
a better and richer life an established fact among her people. But because of lim
ited natural resources both in agriculture and industry the expansion of national
income has begun to retard. The population continues to increase and the stan
dard of living to rise. Here lies the most vital question of present-day Japan in
its most rudimentary form.36
Implicitly criticizing the Anglo-American powers who had vast colonial pos
sessions and rich natural resources to be exploited for continuous progress and
development, the Japanese delegate Nasu Shiroshi 3BS?S cried out:
34 Sawayanagi 1925, p. 77. Takagi Yasaka IÂR, the first Hepburn Professor of American
Constitution, History, and Diplomacy at Tokyo Imperial University and a member of the JIPR,
also suggested that the first and foremost reason for organizing the JIPR was to resolve the "immi
gration issue" between Japan and the United States. See Takagi 1979, p. 4. The endowment of
the Hepburn Chair was first proposed in 1918 to Shibusawa Eiichi ?k?R^?^ by Alonzo Barton
Hepburn, chairman of the board of Chase National Bank and cousin of the medical missionary
James Curtis Hepburn, with a view to promoting mutual understanding, especially on the immi
gration issue. See Sait? 1970 and Jansen 1971.
35 Sawayanagi 1925, pp. 76-77.
36 Condliffe 1928, p. 124.
490
What modern Japan is asking for is peaceful existence and development procured
through a more just socio-economic system and a more just international rela
tion. Japan's progress toward the goal will be blocked by extreme selfishness,
unwarranted international suspicion, conceited nationalism, and unscrupulous
monopolizations of huge wealth and resources.37
The Japanese participants in the IPR had to confront the reality that pursuit of
the idea of fostering progress and development at all societal levels through
cross-national communication and understanding did not necessarily ensure
peaceful cooperation and reconciliation of interests. Rather, competition over
the resources required to meet the globally shared goal of rational progress and
development brought an intensifying sense of crisis. In sum, as societies came
to share the same goal, they would be more likely to struggle with one another
than if they had different goals relying on different resources.38 Apprehension
about this state of affairs and growing disenchantment with the "universal appeal
to reason" ran through Japanese involvement in the IPR on the eve of the
Manchurian Incident.
The China Problem, the JIPR, and R?yama Masamichi

As tension between China and Japan heightened during the late 1920s, regional
developments loomed large in the minds of Japanese liberals. In the years

between the second IPR conference in 1927 and the third in 1929, Nationalist
China emerged as a decisive actor in East Asia, demanding the recovery of

national unity and sovereignty, tariff autonomy, and the abolition of extraterri
toriality. Led by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, the Guomindang armies'

Northern Expedition took control of Nanking in 1927 and approached Peking
through Shandong in 1928. The increasing prospects of unification in China
raised fears in Japan about the strategic implications for Japanese holdings in
Manchuria and Korea. The Tanaka cabinet transferred a small contingent of the
Guandong Army to Shandong in June 1927, and once again in April 1928. The
Guandong Army authorities, for their part, devised a scheme to separate
Manchuria from north China, and to that end, arranged the assassination of the
Manchurian warlord Zhang Zuolin in June 1928.
Inevitably, the growing hostility between China and Japan became an issue at
the conference meetings and politicized the IPR as a whole. Britain, which began
from 1927 to participate in the IPR conferences as an observer, in particular
focused attention on the "China problem" because the rise of Chinese national
ism posed a threat to its vested interests in China as well. Sir Frederick Whyte,
the representative of the British group, stressed the centrality of the political
aspect of the "China problem":
37 Nasu 1928, p. 360.

38 Boli and Thomas 1999, p. 5.
491
Pacific relations are of many kinds, and, as the program of the Institute shows,
they are to be treated in many different ways. But they find the center of their
interest in the political sphere because in that sphere national policies meet in
those contacts that produce peace and war. ... It is therefore Pacific relations as
a political subject, with special regard to contemporary China, that are our con
cern here.39
The Japanese members tried to keep the China problem from becoming the
central agenda of the conferences. John B. Condliffe, the research secretary of
the IPR (1927-1931), later recalled that when he visited Japan in 1927 to pre
pare for the conference scheduled to be held in Kyoto in 1929, it was conveyed
to him that topics like Manchuria should not occupy a major place in the con
ferences and that the discussions should be confined to "less explosive sub
jects."40 The Japanese members were also ill prepared in terms of background
to deal with questions about the China problem. Reflecting the JIPR's preoccu
pation with Japan-United States problems centered on migration issues, its lead
ership was largely composed of specialists on Japanese-American relations and
tended to make light of Japan-Asian relations.41
The Japanese delegation to the IPR conference at Honolulu in 1927 soon

realized, however, that the "Pacific problem" involved more than immigration
issues. Even at the previous conference in 1925, the Chinese delegation had
insisted that "some understanding of China's struggle is essential to an under
standing of our relation to the Pacific problem."42 Aoki Setsuichi #^gp^, the
director of the Tokyo branch of the League of Nations, who participated in the
1927 conference as an observer, pointed out in an official gazette that the con
ference's focus shifted away from issues of religion and culture to the issue of
politics, i.e., the "China problem." "Even the roundtable discussions [on] issues
not concerned with China," Aoki continued, "in many cases, ended up discussing
the China problem. Originally, there was not a single item on the agenda regard
ing the China problem. But owing to the British request, [the members] spent
three whole days [discussing the China problem.]"43 In another essay, Aoki com
mented that "although [the members of the Japanese delegation] suffered noth
ing by comparison [to the other delegations], ... if I could have my wish, [the
Japanese delegation would remedy its] lack of China specialists and authorities
on international law/relations."44
39 Whyte 1928, p. 24.
40 Condliffe 1981, p. 18.
41 The leadership of the JIPR overlapped with that of the Japanese-American Relations
Committee, which had been organized in 1915 at the initiative of Shibusawa Eiichi. Formed in
the wake of growing anti-Japanese sentiment in the United States and composed of figures from
the business and financial world, the committee sought to resolve this problem by promoting
mutual understanding between the two nations. See Ogata 1973, p. 465; Yamaoka 1997, pp.
95-118; Nakami 1975, pp. 109-110. See also Takagi 1979, p. 5.
42 Koo 1925, p. 69.
43 Aoki 1927a, p. 4.
44 Aoki 1927b, p. 99.
492
It was in this context that R?yama joined the JIPR in 1927 as a China special
ist. That year, in part responding to the advice of the Foreign Ministry, the JIPR
set up a special research committee on the Manchuria problem,45 and R?yama

was made its head. The research committee investigated various issues with the
plan of presenting the results at the IPR conference to be held in Kyoto in 1929.46
In collaborating with the JIPR, R?yama absorbed the reason-centered interna

tionalism promoted by the IPR and refined his concept of evolutionary world
history and its implications for contemporary regional politics. Given the IPR
emphasis on cultural exchange rather than political deliberations, R?yama may
have believed it would be feasible to utilize the apolitical arena to find ways of
balancing nationalism and internationalism both within and without the Japanese
empire.
R?yama 's Experiments with the JIPR
In the wake of the death of Zhang Zuolin, the warlord of Manchuria, occasional
moments of tension between the Chinese and the Japanese delegations marked
the roundtable discussions of the IPR conference held in Kyoto in 1929. The
issues taken up ranged from the historicity of the region to current questions of
the administration of the railway zone and the Guandong lease territory, various
established practices governed by economic expediency, and the validity of the

1915 treaty. The debates over these issues repeatedly revealed fundamental dif
ferences in Chinese and Japanese attitudes, with the Japanese representatives
favoring maintenance of the status quo in Japan's relations with China by rely
ing on the international framework, while the Chinese demanded the revision of
all procedures and formal arrangements stipulated in the unequal treaties be
tween the two nations.
The intensifying resistance of the Chinese against the Japanese empire added
to Japanese liberals' disenchantment with the post-World War I order and led
some to propose adjustment of the system, or at least of its regional component.
Several members of the JIPR began to construe the deepening confusion on the
mainland and China's lack of central authority as premodern phenomena. Based
on this assumption, they maintained that the international system, which pre
supposed modern nation-states as the only legitimate actors, could not be applied
to Sino-Japanese relations without modification. R?yama's writings from this
period illustrate this subtle shift in perspective.
In his paper "Japan's Position in Manchuria," presented at the 1929 Kyoto
conference, R?yama set forth two main points. First, the Eurocentric, modern
institution of international law premised on the nation-state could not function
45 The JIPR had close informal ties with the government. The Foreign Ministry, in particular,
was actively involved in the organization from its inception and provided it with substantial finan
cial support. In 1926, the Foreign Ministry anonymously donated 22,000 yen, covering more than
half of the 36,702 yen used by the JIPR to prepare for and participate in the second meeting of
the IPR in Honolulu in 1927. See Yamaoka 1997, pp. 104-105.

46 Katagiri 1979.
493
in East Asia because of the peculiar nature of regional conditions. Second,

instead of applying the principles of international law to the region, Japan would
espouse "regional development" as the organizing principle of its "continental

expansion."47 The first argument was meant to persuade the Western powers.
The second, conversely, was for regional consumption to appease Chinese na
tionalists.
The first argument was grounded on the idea that China was not yet a modern
nation-state. This notion was not new, but had been circulated in the Japanese
media since the 1910s. Reacting to the continuous political instability in China,
China specialists such as Nait? Konan ???fflffi (1866-1934) and Oda Yorozu H
ffl7? (1868-1945) and continental activists like Uchida Ry?hei ?EBS? (1874
1937) came to the conclusion that the modern state or "true political unity" did
not exist in China.48 In the wake of the Washington Conference of 1921-1922,
Yano Jin'ichi AM\zz? (1872-1970), a professor of East Asian history at Kyoto
Imperial University, writing in major newspapers like the Osaka Asahi and
nation-wide journals such as Gaik?jih? ^5cNf# and Taiy? A$M, expanded this
premise to highlight the "special" character of Manchuria. Yano acknowledged
that at one time, when Sinocentrism had buttressed the East Asian order,
Mongolia, Tibet, and Manchuria might have belonged to the Chinese cultural
world. In reality, however, he argued, these regions had never been under
China's formal control. Now that the coming of the Western powers had made
the Sinocentric world order obsolete, and there was no centralized authority in
China to replace the bygone monarchy, it was even more implausible to regard
these areas as Chinese territory. In sum, present-day China was not yet a mod
ern civilization since it had 1) no fixed territorial border by which to establish
sovereignty, 2) no central authority to monopolize organized violence, 3) no
rational goals for developing a national economy, 4) no modern cognitive map
for acknowledging other nations as equals, and 5) no organic organization that
would function to incorporate every individual within society.49 Consequently,
Yano held, the Washington Conference's affirmation of China's territorial
integrity was at best based on an illusion. Subject to "extremely fluid" condi
tions, Manchuria, Mongolia, and Tibet were "special regions" (tokubetsu chiiki
#S'Ji?) and should be treated "specially."50

Yano's propositions had a substantial influence on R?yama, who appropriated
the notion of China as not yet a modern nation-state to criticize the current prac
tice of trying to deal with China within the framework of international law. In
47 R?yama 1930a, pp. 524-93.
48 Miwa 1978; Miwa 1990.
49 Yano 1922a; Yano 1922b; and Yano 1922c. Yano's theses seemed to have found a ready ear
among politicians and Foreign Ministry officials as well. Foreign minister Yoshizawa Kenkichi
cTiR? r? made a policy speech saying that "we should not regard China as a well-organized and
coherent state, comparable in the efficacy of its authority to the settled states and governments of
Europe." Quoted in Nish 1990, p. 617.

50 Yano 1922c, p. 49.
494
the face of China's resistance to the implementation of what Japan saw as legit
imate treaty rights, R?yama criticized the Chinese handling of foreign affairs as
premodern. In R?yama's view, China's approach to the administration of leased

territory reflected its adherence to "traditional diplomatic policy." By this he
meant that the Chinese tended to disregard the norms set forth under interna
tional treaties. Instead, still utilizing the traditional diplomacy of "setting one
barbarian nation against another," China was obstructing the establishment of
modern diplomatic machinery in the region.51 According to R?yama, the 1915
agreement regarding south Manchuria and eastern Inner Mongolia stipulated the
Japanese right "to lease land by negotiation." Yet, the law was hardly observed,
owing, on the one hand, to the Chinese government's policy of keeping Japanese
from practicing their treaty rights and, on the other, to the fact that a modern
legal system had yet to develop in China. "[T]he land problem in China," wrote
R?yama, "is still much burdened with the usages of the Middle Ages and is dif
ficult to handle by the mere legalism of the modern world."52
The Chinese refusal to implement Japanese "treaty rights" was rooted, how
ever, in the modern aspiration to become a powerful sovereign nation-state. In
many cases, what the Japanese saw as unjustified obstruction reflected popular
resentment against the Sino-Japanese negotiations of 1915. As a Chinese dele
gate to the IPR conference in 1929 put it: "the Japanese emphasize their treaty
rights; but in the Chinese mind there is no treaty?only the Twenty-One De
mands."53 Such resentment spread beyond students and the intellectual and po
litical elite to include merchants and local gentry. Beginning in Shandong in
1917, chambers of commerce, farmers' leagues, provincial educational associ
ations, and provincial assemblies mounted challenges to Japanese interests.54 In
Mukden, it was reported that Chinese house owners were engaged in "attempts
to drive the Japanese out of the walled city of Mukden" by refusing to rent their
houses to Japanese, raising rents for Japanese tenants who still held leases, or
requesting the vacating of the house on the pretext that it had changed hands.55
The penetration and growing pervasiveness of the modern language of nation

alism among the Chinese people was, in fact, a major source of the problems in
Manchuria. Although R?yama was ambivalent about fully acknowledging
Chinese nationalism, he nonetheless recognized the need to deal with its political
implications. His strategy was to translate nationalist language into that of devel
opment. In an article entitled "The Fundamental Problems of Pacific Relations:
The Reason Why It Is Difficult to Resolve Problems of the Pacific Region,"

R?yama constructed the essence of these problems in terms of "differences in
[the stage of] civilization" (bunmei no s?i ~SC^(D^WM).56 R?yama did not make
51 R?yama 1930a, p. 532.
52 R?yama 1930a, p. 552
53
54
55
56
Quoted in Condliffe 1930, p. 198.

Yuan 1978, p. 28.
The Japan Weekly Chronicle, 19 September 1929.
R?yama 1930b, p. 108.
495
clear what he meant by civilization, but he indicated that its evolution was closely
related to developments in economy and society.57 He identified various prob

lems in the Pacific region, such as the confrontation between colonies and impe
rial powers, the nascent awakening of nationalism among the Asian countries,
especially in China, and the contest between the capitalist and communist sys
tems. All those conflicts, however, were linked to one fundamental cause: the
unequal positions of the parties within the same drive for development.
In R?yama's view, the problems of the Pacific region did not derive primarily
from the confrontation of categorically different civilizations, with the customary
dualism of Western versus Eastern civilization. Neither could the confrontation

be defined in racial terms. Rather, it was the result of competition within the
same civilization fueled by the ideas of progress and development. The impli
cation was clear. By redefining the problems of the Pacific region in terms of
gaps in industrial and social development, R?yama posited an essential identity
between Japan and its neighboring countries, including China. In doing so, he
sought ways of diluting the anti-Japanese feeling in China. Simultaneously he
argued that Japan's role was to bridge the gap between the developed and less
developed. Given that Japan was one of the most industrialized nations in the
region, it seemed natural to him that Japan should take the lead in closing the
gap. In sum, as a counter to the growing resistance to Japanese imperialism among
the Chinese people, R?yama emphasized the notion of economic development.

Combining Yano's conception of China as not yet a modern nation state with
his own idea of "differences in the stage of civilization," R?yama reached the
conclusion that Japan's approach to China should be one of regional develop
ment. The primary aim should be to modernize China but also to bring it into a
new cooperative relationship with a Japan-centered East Asia. On the eve of the
Manchurian Incident, R?yama devoted roughly half of the paper he presented at
the Kyoto Conference to the issue of Japanese "encouragement of industry" in
Manchuria. Based on data collected by the Investigation Bureau of the South
Manchurian Railway Company, R?yama noted that Japanese had undertaken a
wide range of industrial and social projects in Manchuria in agriculture, forestry,
commerce, manufacturing, transportation, and education. In his presentation,

R?yama emphasized several times that the Japanese were not making an imme
diate profit from Japanese-Manchurian trade. Neither Japanese investment in the
form of joint-stock companies nor loans had brought in high rates of profits.58
Although Japanese-Manchurian trade had increased eight times from 1908 to

1927, this had not resulted in a trade surplus on the Japanese side. In fact, R?yama
wrote, Japan imported more than it exported to Manchuria.59 In other words, he
implied, Japanese imperialism was not necessarily exploitative; the "crux of the
matter" was "what has the Japanese administration done, and what it is now
57 R?yama 1930b, p. 111.
58 R?yama 1930a, pp. 554-59.
59 R?yama 1930a, pp. 559-64.
496
doing, to maintain peace and order and to better the lot of the Chinese people as
well as Japanese residents."60

R?yama admitted that the "process of industrialism has not been simple" and
"has faced endless complications." Nevertheless, he pointed out, "the social

structure of Manchuria is due to the complete transformation in the character of
local industries."61 Education and sanitary and health conditions in Manchuria

showed clear signs of progress and improvement. Crucially important, such
social and cultural progress had been achieved through "international coopera
tion" in general and Sino-Japanese cooperation in particular. A case in point was
international projects to control contagious diseases. R?yama highlighted joint
efforts to contain the spread of pneumonic plague between 1910 and 1911 and
cholera in 1919, stressing that these efforts had benefited all people regardless
of their nationality.62 As a result, he argued, one could see "the emergence of a
type of culture that is without marked relation to nationality."63
R?yama did not ignore the benefits that Japan might gain from participation
in the development of Manchuria. Although such participation might not bring
"immediate profit," he pointed out that in the long run Manchuria would offer
Japan solutions to its rural poverty by providing an "abundance of cheap food
stuffs." On the other hand, further industrialization in Japan facilitated by
Manchurian raw materials would resolve urban unemployment. The South

Manchurian Railroad Company, which was "the keystone of Japan's industrial
organization in Manchuria," therefore "should be bound up with the policies of
the State."64 But, he insisted, the consequent benefits of "the scientific exploita
tion of the natural resources" of Manchuria by Japan would accrue to the Chinese
as well as the Japanese.65

In essence, R?yama attempted to establish a basis for Sino-Japanese cooper
ation in Manchuria by transforming political problems into a matter of mutual
economic development. While retaining the idea that nation-states were the only
legitimate players in world politics, he began to question the validity of inter
national codes of conduct such as respecting the territorial integrity of China.
Arguing that China could not be categorized as a modern nation-state, he envis
aged instituting a "special" arrangement between Japan and Manchuria that
would enable purposeful and rational goals and activities designed to promote
the "scientific exploitation" of the Manchurian economy. In the meantime, the
new special arrangement would maintain the particular production relations in
which Manchuria produced agricultural goods and natural resources for metro
pole Japan while becoming a market for Japanese manufactured goods.
60
61
62
63
64
65
R?yama
R?yama
R?yama
R?yama
R?yama
R?yama
1930a,
1930a,
1930a,
1930a,
1930a,
1930a,
p. 543.
pp. 586-87.
p. 590.
p. 592.
pp. 564-65, 578-89.
p. 592.
497
The Manchurian Crisis and the JIPR Liberals

As international tension spiraled ever higher following the Manchurian Incident
of 1931, R?yama began to propose solutions to the problems of Sino-Japanese
relations in less than global terms. Yet he also tried to find ways to make his
recommendations consistent with his earlier conception of a progressive evolu
tionary world history. His answer was to construe a "special" relationship be
tween China and Japan, deriving from China's premodern status.
Reiterating Yano's thesis that China lacked national borders in the modern
sense, R?yama claimed that what existed between Manchuria and the Japanese
empire was not a modern territorial border, but a "frontier zone" (henky? chitai
H?tift?S). This peculiar form of border, R?yama stated, "belongs to the [partic
ular stage] prior to the establishment of the modern sovereign state, that is, the
stage of a tribal state (shuzoku kokka S?SHi?)." The "frontier zone" would
develop into a modern territorial boundary only when the "tribal state" evolved
into an "ethnic state" (minzoku kokka Ki^HI?). The premodern frontier zone
would finally disappear when a sovereign nation-state (kokumin kokka HSBIit)
came into being.66 Implicit in this proposition was the assumption that contem
porary China was not even an "ethnic state," let alone a sovereign nation-state.
Accordingly, international law, which presumed the concerned parties to be
sovereign nation-states, was not applicable to Sino-Japanese relations and

Manchurian problems. R?yama continued,
[I]n other words, a border consisting of a frontier zone is inappropriate between
sovereign nation-states. If the national border referred to by international law
presumes an interrelationship between sovereign states, the notion of a frontier
zone is not compatible with international law. . . . The objective reality [in cer
tain regions], however, points to the existence of such frontier zones. Therefore,
one cannot but say that international law is overly abstract not only because it
prescribes international relationships solely in terms of sovereign states but also
because it conceptualizes certain bilateral relations based on this fictitious assump
tion. Unfortunately, the Sino-Japanese relationship in Manchuria verifies this fact.67
R?yama's reasoning about the "special" Sino-Japanese relations pertinent to

the Manchuria problem in fact discloses how deeply he had internalized the
transnational norms codified and institutionalized in international law. Despite
the growing doubts that he voiced about the applicability of international law to
the ever-more-complicated problems of Manchuria, he remained concerned to
prevent Japan's isolation from international society. His ambivalence can be
seen in a report that he and other JIPR members prepared in the wake of the
Manchurian Incident. Written before Japan's unilateral recognition of Manchu
kuo on 15 September 1932, the unpublished report, which was described as
"strictly confidential" but included an abridged English translation, represented
66 R?yama 1933, pp. 11-12.

67 R?yama 1933, p. 12.
498
an attempt to situate "special" Sino-Japanese relations within the framework of

international cooperation.68
Proclaiming that the "general principle" was that "Japan's course should be
consonant with the constructive trend of international cooperation for the main
tenance and organization of peace,"69 the committee proposed two alternative
plans for resolution of the Manchurian crisis. The first was described as an
"immediate measure for arresting the very dangerous situation now threatening
the Far East."70 This plan, which called for creating an "Autonomous State of
Manchuria," in essence took the establishment of Manchukuo to be a fait accom
pli, but sought to minimize the negative impact of this action on Japan's position
within world politics. The "Autonomous State of Manchuria" would be a "new

type of international regime" in that it would be "an independent state" but its
"powers shall be limited by an international treaty."71 The plan would separate
Manchuria from the central government of China and effectively incorporate it
within the Japanese empire as a kind of "buffer state" by establishing a joint
Manchurian-Japanese police system and by appointing Japanese political, mili
tary, and economic advisers to the Manchurian government.72
In commenting on this plan, the committee strongly argued that Japan should
not recognize the "Autonomous State" unilaterally but should take every possi
ble measure to secure recognition jointly with the Western powers. It noted with
alarm that
the movement by influential people, who closed their eyes to international opin
ion, for immediate recognition of Manchukuo has carried weight with the mass
of the people. We think, however, that the formal recognition of Manchukuo by
Japan alone would certainly be contrary to the spirit of the international agree
ments. It is very urgent, therefore, to settle this problem of recognition by inter
national cooperation.73
To this end the committee recommended convening an international round
table conference under the auspices of the League of Nations or a second

Washington Conference.74 As another measure for promoting international
68 The other JIPR members involved in preparing the report included Yokota Kisabur? ?tfflS
HEB, Matsukata Yoshisabur? f?^?He?, Matsumoto Shigeharu, Yamanaka Tokutar? L?+S^C
6|5, and Uramatsu Samitar? ffif???Ii^?B

69 R?yama 1932a, p. 24; R?yama 1932b, p. 51.
70 R?yama 1932a, p. 30.
71 R?yama 1932a, p. 28.
72 R?yama 1932b, pp. 85-87.
73 R?yama 1932a, p. 39. Ian Nish notes that in this period both R?yama and Yokota Kisabur?
publicly argued against the government's move toward unilateral recognition of Manchukuo. Nish
1993, p. 159.
74 The committee proposed that should the U.S.S.R fail to participate in such conferences, bilat
eral agreements or treaties could be concluded between the U.S.S.R and Manchukuo on the one
hand and the U.S.S.R and Japan on the other. See R?yama 1932a, p. 40. In another article, R?yama
proposed convening a Far Eastern international conference with the three plenipotentiary partic
ipants of China, Japan, and the U.S.S.R., and with other powers like Britain and the United States
attending as observers. See R?yama 1931a, p. 117.
499
cooperation, the committee incorporated in this plan a recommendation that, to

eliminate the economic causes of international conflicts, new agreements on the
railway system, the tariff question, and the general economic development of
Manchuria, whether between the "Autonomous State" and Japan or the "Autono
mous State" and the Western powers, should all be channeled through interna
tional machinery, in accordance with the policies of the "open door" and "equal
opportunity."75
While this first plan sought to secure international recognition for a puppet
state, the second plan aimed at guaranteeing Japan's vested interests and rights
in Manchuria by promoting good will in China. Acknowledging Chinese nation
alism with mixed feelings, the report pointed out that the intensity and extent of
the ongoing "Chinese nationalistic and anti-Japanese movements," especially in

Manchuria, could "not be compared with that of prerevolutionary times" and
that the Japanese had to find a way to cope with it.76 To assuage China's nation
alist aspirations, instead of an "Autonomous State," this plan envisioned an

"Independent Government of Manchuria." China was to retain sovereignty,
however nominal, over Manchuria, and the region would remain an integral part
of the Republic of China. The "Government of Manchuria" would, however,
have its own police, defense, maritime custom houses, diplomatic envoys, and
consular agents, and would thereby be independent of the central government of
China on matters of civil administration and foreign affairs.77 The Committee
adduced the British rule of Canada or the League of Nations' governance of Saar
and Danzig as specific models for this second formula.78
Given the historical course that Japan followed after the Manchurian Incident?
the ensuing unilateral recognition of Manchukuo, the decision to withdraw from
the League of Nations, and the onset of an all-out Sino-Japanese conflict?it is
tempting to assess these liberal efforts as an empty justification of the Japanese
invasion of Manchuria. Yet recent studies of this turbulent and confusing era
show that R?yama and the other JIPR liberals were nearly right in their argu
ment that Japan could have Manchuria without paying the heavy cost of inter
national isolation if only it employed nonmilitaristic methods and appealed to
international sympathy.
The Lytton report, written in September 1932, was more sympathetic to

Japan's side than was assumed then and later.79 To be sure, the report stated that
Manchukuo was not created by a spontaneous, indigenous independence move

ment but came into being with the assistance of Japanese army officers and civil
bureaucrats in the region, and it recommended that the League members not rec
ognize Manchukuo. Some parts of the report, however, were favorable to Japan,
revealing an approach strikingly similar to the second formula for dealing with
75
76
77
78
79
R?yama 1932a,
R?yama 1932a,
R?yama 1932a,
R?yama 1932a,
Nish 1993.
pp. 35-37.
p. 6.
p. 38.
pp. 38-40. See also the appendix of R?yama 1932b, pp. 115-20.
500
the Manchurian crisis proposed by the JIPR committee. The report not only
described the rights and interests of Japan in Manchuria as "special," but it also
advised, in Ian Nish's words, that
[A] restatement of Japan's rights, interests and responsibilities in fresh treaties
is desirable if future friction is to be avoided; the government in Manchuria
should be modified in such a way as to secure, consistently with the sovereignty
of China, a large measure of autonomy designed to meet local conditions and the
special characteristics of the Three Provinces. The important phrase here is "con
sistent with the sovereignty of China." What the Commissioners wanted to rec
ommend was to ignore "Manchukuo," revert to the position on 18 September
1931, make Kuomintang China in Nanking the suzerain power but give
Manchuria a degree of local autonomy in which Japan's treaty rights would be
fully respected.80
Britain, too, not having as much vested interests in Manchuria as in the area
south of the Yangtze river, showed tolerance of Japan's activities in Manchuria.81
As an architect of the nineteenth-century imperial order, Britain had often been
sympathetic to Japan.82 Mired in the Great Depression, the Hoover administra

tion of the United States remained cautious, if not deeply confused, about the
unfolding crisis in East Asia. Profoundly ambivalent toward the Japanese breach
of the legal framework laid by the Washington Conference, it did little to hin
der Japanese aggression or to aid China.83
Yet, the Western powers' very inability to coordinate the conflicting political,
commercial, and strategic aspects of their own policies was double-edged, since
it also sent a signal to the Japanese leadership, particularly to the military, that
no Western nation had interests in the area vital enough to undertake the diffi
culties and costs that launching an operation to stop the Japanese army would
likely entail.
80 Nish 1993, p. 176.
81 British reasoning was reflected in a letter written in August 1932 by Sir Francis Lindley,
British ambassador to Tokyo, to Sir John Simon, the foreign secretary, that stated:
I have little doubt that there are other countries besides Japan which, if put to the test of
seeing their vital interests involved, would have behaved with as little regard for multilat
eral treaties and pacific ideas as has Japan. . . . Although they [the Japanese people] are
intensely anxious as to the future of the country and are torn by conflicting passions, they
produce upon me the impression of such abounding vitality that nothing can suppress it.
Japan is, I believe, the only country where the birthrate is rising?an infallible sign in a civ
ilized community of deep-seated optimism and faith in the future. And it seems to me that
the Western world should be thankful that this explosive energy and teeming life should
have found an outlet in the distant plains of Manchuria, where foreign interests [elsewhere
he refer to "British interests"] hardly exist and where the task is such as to try the strength
even of this remarkable people.

Quoted in Wilson 1987, pp. 34-35.
82 In 1915, speaking for Britain regarding Japan's Twenty-One Demands to China, Sir Edward
Grey had remarked "what Western nation with a population feeling the need for territorial out
lets would have used such an opportunity with more, or even with as much, restraint?" Quoted in
Nish 1972, p. 158.

83 See Thome 1972; Doenecke 1981.

Likewise, two factors in particular undermined the ability of the JIPR liberals
to make an effective case for a reversal in Japan's increasing inclination to resort
to military force and unilateralism to solve the Manchurian problem. First, they
tended to concentrate their efforts more on reasoning with the West and the
Chinese public about the Japanese need to expand abroad than on rallying sup
port among the Japanese public for resolving the Manchurian crisis multilater
ally. While various right-wing organizations were fanning popular opinion in
favor of army-led adventurism and the mass media were uncritically embracing
the government's readiness to recognize the detachment of Manchuria from
China as a fait accompli,84 liberal public figures shied away from making a con
certed effort to check the resurgence of narrowly focused and emotionally
charged popular nationalism or from organizing themselves politically.
To be fair, JIPR members did issue warnings about the negative influence of
the nationalism enveloping the populace and a few of them openly criticized the
state's drift toward violent means. Yokota Kisabur? H?EH??H?R, a JIPR member
and professor at Tokyo Imperial University, criticized the army's activities in
Manchuria as a serious breach of international pacts and favored the League's
intervention and mediation in the matter. His critiques, however, were published
in academically oriented journals with a limited readership, such as Kokusaih?
gaik? zasshi Hlî?^JeSII? (Journal of International Law and Diplomacy) or

Teidai shinbun ^^c?tH (Imperial University Newspaper).85
The state's increased control of the mass media and pervasive censorship
undoubtedly were factors in this reticence. But far more responsible for liberal
intellectuals' failure to publicize their views and to influence popular opinion in
support of international organization and cooperation was their deeply rooted
sense of elitist individualism.86 Largely graduates of Tokyo Imperial University,
they preferred to utilize private networks cultivated through shared institutional
links and rarely embarked on organizational efforts to reach out to the general
populace in garnering popular support. Even a public organization like the JIPR
was highly elitist in both its leadership and orientation.
A second crucial factor constraining liberal intellectuals' efforts to find a way
out of the Manchurian dilemma was the paradox intrinsic to liberal rationality,
which predisposed them to search for an alternative to the order that centered on
the League of Nations. The postwar order, established in Paris by Britain, France,
and the United States and confirmed in the Washington Conference of 1921
1922, globally enacted and institutionalized the ideals of progress and devel
opment. At the same time, the Western powers attempted to control the direc
tion and speed of global enactment in such a way as to minimize competition
and conflict to their own advantage. While internalizing the ideals of progress
and development, Japanese liberals did not fail to perceive the inherently
84 Kakegawa 1973, pp. 533-49.
85 Kakegawa 1973, pp. 538-39; Mitani 1973, pp. 577-78.
86 See Ogata 1973, pp. 485-86.
501
502
conservative nature of the postwar order that served to check Japanese realiza
tion of those goals. They also were unsettled by China's internalization of the
same ideals. China had begun to mobilize its human and natural resources at a
rapid speed, which in turn intensified the already fierce regional competition.
Responding to this predicament, at the fifth IPR conference in Banff, Canada,
in 1933, Takagi Yasaka and Yokota Kisabur? explicitly proposed modification
in the working of the League so as to take account of the prevailing disorder in
China and the resulting "special circumstances" characteristic of Sino-Japanese
relations.87 Given the "coexistence of states of quite different types," they
argued, the League's peace machinery needed to adopt changes "at least in regard
to the fundamental principles." Proposing a detailed new security pact, Takagi
and Yokota claimed:
[I]t would be well to consider once more the paramount importance of machin
ery for the peaceful readjustment of existing economic inequalities and political
injustices in the world, especially in the Pacific area. It has been fully brought to
light that there do exist a number of economic inequalities and political injus
tices in this part of the world; that if it left alone they will necessarily lead some
day or other to a catastrophe; that the machinery for the mere maintenance of the
status quo is, therefore, not enough to keep the peace effectively; and that it is
absolutely necessary to devise some procedure to modify peacefully the status
quo and to readjust the existing economic inequalities and political injustices.88
Takagi and Yokota in effect criticized the League of Nations as promoting a

"status-quo"-oriented world order that froze current political and economic
"injustices." In a similar vein, R?yama argued that the League was never a
"global" organization, but a "European" one. He, too, called for a significant
modification of the League's principles:
[I]t is impossible to see the Manchuria problem as a simple international con
flict, occurring between two members of the League. Not only is it occurring in
a region that has been regarded as a historical and emotional lifeline by Japan,
the economic and militarily great power (ichiry?koku -^H) [of the area], it has
been caused by the breakdown of many years of perseverance. Moreover, the
other party, China, is not a modern nation-state in the full sense of the term but
a country that has not yet emerged from a medieval mode of existence. In China,
a strong central government that can rule its territory legally and effectively has
not come about owing to various obstacles.
The conflict between the two entities, therefore, cannot be resolved by the
League. In theory, the League is expected to settle disputes between strong and
weak nations. The Japan-China conflict might be seen outwardly as a conflict
between the strong and the weak. In content, however, it is characteristically dif
ferent from European conflicts based on the asymmetry of power [among nation
states].89
87 Takagi and Yokota 1934, pp. 441-42.

88 Takagi and Yokota 1934, p. 442.
89 R?yama 1934, p. 114.
503
Nowhere in these criticisms of the League do R?yama and his fellows refer
to the need to create a new order in the region based on a common, traditional
culture exclusive to Asia. Rather, they present the Manchuria problem as deriv
ing from the coexistence of polities and economies at different stages of the
single developmentalist path set by international society. In other words, the
shared goal resulting from the pursuit of development and progress laid the
groundwork for the Japanese liberal call for a new order in Asia.
Paradox of Reason: The Turn to a New Regional Order

Following the Sino-Japanese clash in Mukden and the ensuing drama of Geneva,
the international climate became steadily more unfavorable to Japan. Increasing
alienation from the international community fanned a sense of "national emer
gency" and led to efforts to cope with the crisis by establishing a "national de
fense state." These developments undermined the position of the political parties
and led to the army and the bureaucracy gaining greater power,90 but they did
not result in the creation of a totalitarian regime dominated by a single elite
group, be it the army or the Home Ministry. On the contrary, existing rivalries
between and within the civil bureaucracy and military services were exacerbated
to the point that it became difficult to coordinate effective responses to the cri
sis.91 At the same time, this circumstance was not completely disadvantageous
to publicly and politically oriented intellectuals. The reallocation of power and
disintegration of established decision-making processes made possible the

creation of new channels through which some such intellectuals could have input
into the formulation of government policy.92
R?yama was one of these. Utilizing private channels of access to the influen
tial politician Prince Konoe Fumimaro, R?yama gradually shifted the stage for
his activities away from the JIPR to the Sh?wa Research Association, a civilian
research group formed in 1933. The organization and orientation of this highly
complex association is outside of the scope of this study. Suffice it to say that it
assumed the role of a "brain trust" for Prince Konoe when he first became premier
in 1937.93 R?yama was a central member of the Sh?wa Research Association
90 See Berger 1977. On the rise of "reform bureaucrats" and "total-war officers" respectively,
see Johnson 1982 and Barnhart 1987.
91 See Hosoya 1971.
92 For example, as a result of his close personal relations with Colonel Ishihara Kanji ^BJ^^W
(1889-1949), Miyazaki Masayoshi KWjEK (1893-1954), an employee of the South Manchuria
Railway Company, contributed to the development of a radical plan for national mobilization that
emphasized defense-related industries. ArisawaHiromi ^?RjaE (1896-1988), a professor of eco
nomics at Tokyo Imperial University, similarly highlighted the idea of state management of
"resource allocation" through his informal ties with Prince Konoe Fumimaro. See Barnhart 1987,
pp. 46-47; Gao 1994.
93 The Sh?wa Research Association was first conceived of as an informal national policy cen
ter under Goto Ry?nosuke ?a?H=<?$J (1888-1984), who had had close connections with Konoe
since their school years at Kyoto Imperial University. The Sh?wa Research Association had a
diverse membership, including professors from elite universities, journalists from major news
papers, senior bureaucrats from both the civil and military services, and public figures connected
504
from its inception, and in the wake of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident of 1937,
he was appointed head of the newly established World Policy Section.94

According to a contemporary observer, he "had a fairly close relationship with
Konoe. R?yama's ideological tendency accorded with Konoe's interests to the

extent that he accompanied Konoe on the latter's visit to the United States in
1934."95
The report did not specify the nature of the "ideological tendency" shared by
Konoe and R?yama. By the time of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, however,
R?yama had become increasingly vocal in arguing for the need to establish a
regional organization designed to cope with the Sino-Japanese conflict over
Manchuria. New developments elsewhere influenced his thinking. Germany had
reoccupied the Rhineland in March 1936, violating the Treaty of Versailles and
the Treaty of Locarno. R?yama cast a watchful gaze over Germany's use of mil
itary means to attain its foreign-policy objectives and the ensuing failure of
Britain and France to deter German aggression. R?yama also followed closely
the growing tendency in Italy toward the use of violence both domestically and
abroad.96 Identifying Japanese motives with those of European "nations dis
contented with the status quo" (genj?fumankoku ?ltW?SH), i.e., Nazi Germany
and Fascist Italy, R?yama justified Japan's invasion into Chinese territory as a
legitimate challenge to the conservative postwar order.97
It was in this context that R?yama put forth the idea of an "East Asia Coop
erative Community" (t?a ky?d?tai) as the basis of a new type of regional order
that, among other things would counter and ameliorate Chinese resistance to the
Japanese invasion.98 In 1938 he set out the framework of the proposed new order
in an article entitled "The Principles of an East Asia Cooperative Community"
(T?a ky?d?tai no riron SS?t^f+^Sfro) and published in the journal Kaiz? c&
M. In the article he argued that the ideas of "self-determination" or "one ethnic

ity, one nation" fundamental to the current League-centered order in fact func
tioned to promote Western imperial interests and marginalize a "regionalism that
recognizes the Orient (t?y? ^#) as the Orient." By encouraging nationalism,

to industrial, agricultural, and youth groups. The organization developed through various stages
from 1933 to 1940, and during those eight years almost three thousand people, of varying intel
lectual orientation, from liberalism to Marxism, participated in its different activities. For con
temporary observations on the Sh?wa Research Association, see Furuta 1937, pp. 274-82. On its
history, see Sakai 1970; Crowley 1971; Fletcher 1982.
94 Konoe initially wished Kawai Eijir? ifiTa^f?SB (1891-1944) of Tokyo Imperial University
to be the central person in organizing the Sh?wa Research Association, but Kawai declined the
offer and recommended R?yama instead. (As fellow students of Yoshino, R?yama and Kawai
were close, and in 1938, when Kawai was accused of publishing a "dangerous book" and sus
pended from the university, R?yama resigned from the university in protest.) See Sakai 1970, p.
13. On R?yama and Kawai, see Nagai 1997, p. 130.
95 Furuta 1937, p. 278.
96 R?yama 1935, pp. 298-99.
97 R?yama 1935.
98 The term East Asia Cooperative Community was first used by Sugihara Masami, but R?yama
popularized it through articles he published in major journals. Ishida 1983, p. 160.
505
the Western imperialist powers divided and weakened the region, enabling them
to assert their dominance over the Orient as a whole. The prime example was
the ongoing tragedy of Sino-Japanese conflict, which, R?yama asserted, served
only to perpetuate Western hegemony in the region. Arguing that Chinese

nationalism was essentially anti-Japanese sentiment manipulated by Western
imperialism, he held this nationalism to be a major source of the conflict between
Japan and China. The Chinese people should abandon the "ideas of perverted
xenophobic nationalism" (waikyoku sareta haigaiteki minzokushugi riron S ft
?nfc#WMKK??aim) and the "legacy of the Middle-Ages-like Chinese

empire" (ch?seiteki Ch?ka teikoku no isei ^W^^m^S^MM)99
R?yama did not completely absolve Japan of responsibility for the escalating
regional conflict. Until recently, he pointed out, Japan had treated Taiwan, Korea,
and Manchuria "like colonies without any self-reflection" (muhanseiteki ni

shokuminchishi shite ita MJ???f?\Zf?RW&LT^ft).m He claimed, however,
that Japan had awakened from blind nationalism and realized the need to over
come its own firmly entrenched nationalistic outlook. The League of Nations
had served as a major impetus for this development. "The time has arrived for
the Orient to awaken as the Orient," he wrote:
Despite the fact that this turning-point is the materialization of Western ideas by
the League of Nations, which means the domination of major powers, it is also
the result of the Orient having aligned itself within a global system. If it had not
been for the World War and the postwar League of Nations, which led to a con
crete conceptualization of the world, the Orient could not have awakened as the
Orient.101
In other words, the conceptualization of regionalism in the name of the Orient

was possible only by internalizing the norms of international society as its mem
ber. "[I]n the smoke of cannon and the shower of bullets," R?yama continued,
"the Orient, baptized with guns and swords, will rationalize Oriental thought."102
At the core of the concept of "rationalization of the Orient" (t?y? no g?rika
^ff(?> n*H?b) was the notion of "development" (kaihatsu WiW). Development
was regionally oriented in that it was designed to create a "regional cooperative
economy." But, R?yama emphasized, it did not contain "particularistic ideas"
(tokushuna riron t#?f?3iro). In this sense, the idea of the East Asia Cooperative
Community was "regionally based globalism" (chiikishugiteki sekairon J?^^
mmw^f?)}m
Trapped in the desperate need to resolve regional conflicts rooted in Chinese
nationalism and to accommodate the internationalist call in world politics,

99 R?yama 1938, pp. 6-10.
100 R?yama 1938, p. 16.
101 R?yama 1938, p. 9.
102 R?yama 1938, p. 10.
103 R?yama 1941, p. 365. Sakai Tetsuya also points out the centrality of developmentalism in
R?yama's ideas. See Sakai 1998.
506
R?yama came up with the transnational^ and globally oriented, yet regionally
based notion of "development" as the new organizing principle of the East Asia
Cooperative Community. The supposedly mutually beneficial economic ratio
nality would, he assumed, overcome nationalistic resistance in China to the
Japanese invasion. The creation of a new order in East Asia based on the idea of
regional development would also lead the way towards the next evolutionary
stage of world history. In this way, R?yama's East Asia Cooperative Com
munity, the culmination of a decade-long rationalization of the international sys
tem, finally turned against the very international norms that gave birth to it.
The East Asia Cooperative Community failed to gain acceptance from the
Chinese people because it did not confront the political reality created by
Japanese imperialism. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek wrote, for instance, "the
policy [of a new order in East Asia, founded on the concept of the East Asia
Cooperative Community] was merely a catch-all designation for Japan's plan to
overturn the international order in East Asia, enslave China, establish hegemony
over the entire Pacific region, and conquer the world."104 If abroad the idea of
an East Asia Cooperative Community failed to gain support from its main target,
China, the highly rationalist and "scientific" claims of its proponents lost out
domestically to other, less-than-global, alternatives, such as the idea of an "East
Asian League" (t?a renmei S5_?__I) or hakk? ichiu Alfe?^ (eight corners of
the world under one roof), which in emotion-laden terms sought to emphasize
a racial and cultural affinity between Japan and its Asian neighbors.105 Captive
of his own economic rationality and developmentalist mentality, R?yama
grossly misjudged the intensity of the Chinese commitment to national inde

pendence and self-respect and, by acquiescing to Japan's suicidal war against
China and the Anglo-American powers, embarked on a path that would lead to
the demise of the empire he had sought to preserve.
Conclusion
R?yama's ideas and activities during the latter half of the 1920s show that the
conceptualization of the regionalist notion of ky?d?tai was inextricably bound
up with the tortuous process of internalizing and rationalizing the transnational
norms of progress and development through cross-cultural understanding and
communication. The Chinese commitment to the same goals of progress and
development and China's determination to become a full-fledged member of
international society further complicated this ideational process. Confronting
Chinese nationalist forces, R?yama and other similar-minded intellectuals began
to turn international norms and practices on their head. Assuming a single evo
lutionary path in the development of world history and focusing on the contin
ued lack of a centralized government in China, Japanese liberals construed and
104 Quoted in Hashikawa 1980, p. 349.
105 On the conceptual differences between the East Asia Cooperative Community and other forms
of regionalist appeals, see Miwa 1990; Yonetani 2002.
Han: Rationalizing the Orient 507

popularized the notion that China was not yet a modern nation-state. Since China
was not a modern entity, the logic unfolded, the international social norm of ter
ritorial integrity could not be applied to Sino-Japanese relations. The East Asian
region needed "special" terms to address the coexistence within it of modern and
premodern societies.
The coexistence of these two distinctive social forms, as Japanese liberals saw
it, derived primarily from a temporal difference in economic development, not
a categorical difference in ethnicity, history, or culture. The "special" relation
between China and Japan, then, was conceptualized in terms of economic ratio
nality. R?yama and his colleagues repeatedly emphasized the "special" role of
Japanese leadership in Manchuria in bringing agricultural and industrial progress
to the region. The Manchurian crisis would be resolved, they claimed, by indus
trial development and the economic progress of the region under Japanese lead
ership. Simultaneously the liberals presented Japan-led progress in Manchuria
to the Japanese public as a panacea for metropolitan malaise. Economic devel
opment in Manchuria was to solve rural poverty and urban unemployment in
Japan by providing an abundance of agricultural products and raw materials.
Coexistence would become coprosperity.
R?yama popularized the notion of ky?d?tai as the agency for establishing a
new regional order based on coprosperity. Multiethnic and multicultural, the
ky?d?tai would transcend the narrow-minded nationalisms that were sweeping
the region and single-mindedly pursue regional economic progress. This region
alist turn derived not from isolationist or backward-looking goals, but from glob
ally defined notions with evolutionary objects. Positioning Japan at the apex of
the projected new order, the formulation of the idea of ky?d?tai undermined the
legitimacy of the existing order and encouraged a rejection of the conditions nec
essary for the survival of the Japanese empire. The key factor at work in this
paradox was less the shallowness or limitations of Japanese liberalism than a
commitment to the process of rationalization.
508 Monumento Nipponica 60:4

References
Akami 2002
Tomoko Akami. Internationalizing the Pacific: The United States, Japan and the
Institute of Pacific Relations in War and Peace, 1919-1945. Routledge, 2002.
Aoki 1927a
Aoki Setsuichi WAB-. Kanp? W# 209 (Sept. 7, 1927).
Aoki 1927b
Aoki Setsuichi. "Taiheiy? Mondai Ch?sakai" ??#f^BffiB_-e. Kokusai chishiki SS
K&I? 7:9 (Sept. 1927), pp. 97-102.
Ajia Taiheiy? Chiikibukai 1996

Ajia Taiheiy? Chiikibukai 7-J7A^WW$M<k, ed. Senkanki no ajia taiheiy? chi
iki W3M(D7"J7A?mE^. Waseda Daigaku Shakaikagaku Kenky?sho, 1996.
Barnhart 1987
Michael A. Barnhart. Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic
Security, 1919-1941. Cornell University Press, 1987.
Beasley 1991
W. G. Beasley. Japanese Imperialism, 1894-1945. Oxford University Press, 1991.
Berger 1977
Gordon M. Berger. Parties Out of Power in Japan, 1931-1941. Princeton Univer

sity Press, 1977.
Boli and Thomas 1999
John Boli and George M. Thomas. Constructing World Culture: International Non
governmental Organizations since 1875. Stanford University Press, 1999.
Condliffe 1928
John B. Condliffe, ed. Problems of the Pacific: Proceedings of the Second Con
ference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Honolulu, Hawaii, July 15 to 29, 1927.
University of Chicago Press, 1928.
Condliffe 1930
John B. Condliffe, ed. Problems of the Pacific: Proceedings of the Third Conference
of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Nara and Kyoto, Japan, October 23 to Novem
ber 9, 1929. University of Chicago Press, 1930.
Condliffe 1981
John B. Condliffe. Reminiscences of the Institute of Pacific Relations. University

of British Columbia, 1981.
Croly 1927
Herbert Croly. "The Human Potential in the Politics of the Pacific." The New
Republic 52:672 (Oct. 5, 1927), pp. 164-72.
Crowley 1971
James B. Crowley. "Intellectual Visionaries of the New Asian Order." In Dilemmas

of Growth in Prewar Japan, ed. James William Morley, pp. 319-73. Princeton Uni
versity Press, 1971.
Doenecke 1981
Justus D. Doenecke, ed. The Diplomacy of Frustration: The Manchurian Crisis of

1931-1933 as Revealed in the Papers of Stanley K Hornbeck. Stanford, CA:
Hoover Institution Press, 1981.

Dore 1984
Ronald Dore. "Unity and Diversity in World Culture." In The Expansion of
International Society, ed. Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, pp. 407-24. Oxford Uni
Duus 1978
Peter Duus. "Yoshino Sakuz?: The Christian as Political Critic." JJS 4:2 (Summer
1978), pp. 301-26.
Duus 1989
Peter Duus. "Introduction: Japan's Informal Empire in China, 1895-1937: An

Overview." In The Japanese Informal Empire in China, 1895-1937, ed. Peter Duus
et al., pp. xi-xxix. Princeton University Press, 1989.
Fletcher 1982
William Miles Fletcher III. The Search for a New Order: Intellectuals and Fascism
in Prewar Japan. University of North Carolina Press, 1982.
Forcey 1961
Charles Forcey. The Crossroads of Liberalism: Croly, Weyl, Lippmann, and the
Progressive Era, 1900-1925. Oxford University Press, 1961.
Furuta 1937
Furuta Tokujir? ?ffl?g^?R. "Konoe no burentorasuto" ifi|07>->b7Xb.
Ch?? k?ron **?fra (July 1937), pp. 274-82.

Gallagher and Robinson 1953
John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson. "The Imperialism of Free Trade." The
Economic History Review 6:1 (1953), pp. 1-15.
Gao 1994
Bai Gao. "Arisawa Hiromi and His Theory for a Managed Economy." JJS 20:1
(Winter 1994), pp. 115-53.
Hara 1984
Hara Kakuten SIE5^. Gendai ajia kenky? seiritsushiron ?lftT^TW^L^?L?fra.
Keis? Shob?, 1984.

Hashikawa 1980
Hashikawa Buns?. "Japanese Perspectives on Asia: From Dissociation to Co
prosperity." In The Chinese and the Japanese: Essays in Political and Cultural
Interactions, ed. Akira Iriye, pp. 328-55. Princeton University Press, 1980.
Hosoya 1971
Chihiro Hosoya. "Retrogression in Japan's Foreign Policy Decision-Making Proc

ess." In Dilemmas of Growth in Prewar Japan, ed. James W. Morley, pp. 81-105.
Princeton University Press, 1971.
Institute of Pacific Relations 1925
Institute of Pacific Relations. Institute of Pacific Relations: Honolulu Session, June
30-July 14,1925: History, Organization, Proceedings, Discussions and Addresses.
Honolulu, HI: The Institute of Pacific Relations, 1925.
Iriye 1997
Akira Iriye. Cultural Internationalism and World Order. Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1997.
Iriye 1999
Akira Iriye. "A Century of NGOs." In The Ambiguous Legacy: U.S. Foreign Re
lations in the "American Century, " ed. Michael J. Hogan, pp. 416-36. Cambridge
University Press, 1999.


Ishida 1983
Ishida Takeshi 5EB8. Kindai Nihon no seiji bunka to gengo sh?ch? ]5.W B A^Wlu
?tiktmMMWl. Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1983.

Jansen 1971
Marius B. Jansen. "Introduction." In vol. 5 of Takagi Yasaka chosakush? MAAR
UfE?, pp. v-xxxii. Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1971.
Johnson 1982
Chalmers Johnson. MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial
Policy, 1925-1975. Stanford University Press, 1982.
Kakegawa 1973
Kakegawa Tomiko, with Shumpei Okamoto, trans. "The Press and Public Opinion
in Japan, 1931 -1941." In Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-American Relations,
1931-1941, ed. Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto, pp. 533-49. Columbia Uni
Katagiri 1979
Katagiri Nobuo WMMA. "Taiheiy? Mondai Ch?sakai (IPR) to Mansh? mondai"

*?ffffiSMS? (IPR) tmwmm. H?gaku kenky? m^Qffi 52:9 (Sept. 1979), pp.
48-81.
Katagiri 1983
Katagiri Nobuo. "Taiheiy? Mondai Ch?sakai no kiseki" ;*:???f^llfJê(D^B.
Gunma Kenritsu Joshi Daigaku kiy? M^WîLtÂA^^?M 3 (Mar. 1983), pp.
93-109.
Kobayashi 1997
Kobayashi Hiroharu /h#!??&. "Senkanki no kokusai chitsujo ninshiki to t?a
ky?d?tai ron no keisei" mmM(DmB^JfmWitMM?n#m(Djfm. Nihonshi kenky?
H#5?ffi26 424 (Dec. 1997), pp. 30-54.
Koo 1925
T. Z. Koo. "A Chinese View of Pacific Relations." In Institute of Pacific Relations
1925, pp. 68-70.
Lasker 1932
Bruno Lasker, ed. Problems of the Pacific, 1931: Proceedings of the Fourth Con
ference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Hangchow and Shanghai, China,

October 21 toNovember2, 1931. University of Chicago Press, 1932.
Lasker 1934
Bruno Lasker, ed. Problems of the Pacific, 1933: Economic Conflict and Control;
Proceedings of the Fifth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Banff,
Canada, 14-16 August, 1933. University of Chicago Press, 1934.
Matsumoto 1966
Matsumoto Sannosuke ?^H;?j>. Kindai Nihon no seiji to ningen ]&WBA^>Wta
tAm. S?bunsha, 1966.

Matsumoto 1992
Matsumoto Shigeharu f?*Af?. Interview (kikite fÂ) by Kako Hiroko JPH??.

Waga kokoro no jijoden fcA^L>^>S?J?. K?dansha, 1992.
Matsuo 1974
Matsuo Takayoshi f?JW?ft. Taish? demokurashi AlEA^t? z> i/ ?. Iwanami

Shoten, 1974.
Matsuzawa 1978
Matsuzawa Hiroaki f?iR3/\S?. "Minshushakaishugi no hitobito" K___:tt?___:ii<?>???


t. In vol. 3 of Tenk? $?[r], ed. Shis? no Kagaku Kenky?kai JSS^f^Wê, PP
249-307. Heibonsha, 1978.
Mitani 1973
Mitani Taichir?, with G. Cameron Hurst, trans. "Changes in Japan's International

Position and the Response of Japanese Intellectuals: Trends in Japanese Studies of
Japan's Foreign Relations, 1931-1941." In Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese

American Relations, 1931-1941, ed. Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto, pp.
575-94. Columbia University Press, 1973.
Mitani 1995
Mitani Taichir? H?fcfc?*?|5. Shinpan Taish? demokurashi ron frffcÎETî7 vi/ ?

m. Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1995.
Miwa 1978
Miwa Kimitada H$it??. Ky?d?tai ishiki no dochakusei jkffifcMWiO?3H4.

San'ichi Shob?, 1978.
Miwa 1990
Miwa Kimitada. "Japanese Policies and Concepts for Regional Order in Asia, 1938
1940." In The Ambivalence of Nationalism: Modern Japan between East and West,
ed. James W. White et al., pp. 133-56. Lanham, MD: University Press of America,
1990.
Nagai 1997
Nagai Ken'ichi ?k#Ii?\ "R?yama Masamichi no hito to sh?gai" ?lilK31Â?:^

M. H?gaku shirin i?^?tt 49:3 (Jan. 1997), pp. 129-40.
Najita 1974
Tetsuo Najita. "Some Reflections on Idealism in the Political Thought of Yoshino
Sakuz?." In Japan in Crisis: Essays on Taish? Democracy, ed. Bernard S.
Silberman and H. D. Harootunian, pp. 29-66. Princeton University Press, 1974.
Nakami 1975
Nakami Mari +??8. "Taiheiy? Mondai Ch?sakai to Nihon no chishikijin" i;?
#IHg?*?? B*<Bfcl???. Shis? SS 728 (Feb. 1975), pp. 104-27.
Nasu 1928
Nasu Shiroshi. "The Problem of Population and Food Supply in Japan." In

Condliffe 1928, pp. 33-60.
Nish 1972
Ian H. Nish. Alliance in Decline: A Study in Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1908-1923.

University of London Press, 1972.
Nish 1990
Ian H. Nish. "An Overview of Relations Between China and Japan, 1895-1945."
The China Quarterly 124 (Dec. 1990), pp. 601-38.
Nish 1993
Ian H. Nish. Japan 's Struggle with Internationalism: Japan, China, and the League
of Nations, 1931-3. Kegan Paul International, 1993.
Ogata 1973
Ogata Sadako. "The Role of Liberal Nongovernmental Organizations in Japan." In
Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-American Relations, 1931-1941, ed. Dorothy

Borg and Shumpei Okamoto, pp. 459-86. Columbia University Press, 1973.
Oka 1975
Oka Yoshitake W??. "Kaisetsu" MM. In Yoshino Sakuz? hy?ronsh? ^W?^MWm

M, ed. Oka Yoshitake, pp. 301-61. Iwanami Shoten, 1975.

Ozeki 1997
Ozeki Motoaki /WHJ^B?. "Minponshugi ron no sh?en to ni dai seit? ron no kaiz?"
RttmWinl&Mti?Jz&ftWitD&f?. Shirin &** 80:1 (Jan. 1997), pp. 109-46.
R?yama 1928
R?yama Masamichi ?îliRil. Kokusai seiji to kokusai gy?sei H^K?&?H^fT?C.

Gansh?d? Shoten, 1928.
R?yama 1930a
R?yama Masamichi. "Japan's Position in Manchuria." In Problems of the Pacific

1929, ed. J. B. Condliffe, pp. 524-93. University of Chicago Press, 1930.
R?yama 1930b
R?yama Masamichi. "Taiheiy? kankei no konpon mondai" ????Mi^^fl?^Fo?ii.

Gaik?jih? fl^Bfffi 602 (1 January 1930), pp. 103-11.
R?yama 1931
R?yama Masamichi. "Manm? mondai no 'j?daika'" #?HfpJIi(?> rjE^?Ll. Ch??

k?ron **&I? 46:10 (Oct. 1931), pp. 109-70.
R?yama 1932a
R?yama Masamichi et al. "The Memorandum on Plans for the Solution of the
Manchurian Problem" (May 1932). Unpublished document in Takagi File, F61-5.
Tokyo Daigaku Amerika Kenky? Shiry? Sent?.
R?yama 1932b
R?yama Masamichi et al. "Mansh? mondai kaiketsuan" StJHP^S?I?^ (June 1932).

Unpublished document, T?y? Bunka Kenky?sho ?#?ftWSi0f, Tokyo Daigaku.
R?yama 1933
R?yama Masamichi. Nichiman kankei no kenky? BStMifi^W^. Seik?sha, 1933.
R?yama 1934
R?yama Masamichi. "Kokusai Renmei no kaiz? ni tsuite" HIS?M^&?fcSfc^T.

Gaik?jih? ft?R#|R 698 (Sept. 1934), pp. 113-26.
R?yama 1935
R?yama Masamichi. "Sekai no henkyoku to sono shind?k?" WÔ^M t^ttDffiWl

Ir]. Gaik?jih? 9V3m%k 740 (Oct. 1935), pp. 294-306.
R?yama 1938
R?yama Masamichi. "T?a ky?d?tai no riron" MW&MfoftMim. Kaiz? L&ig (Nov.

1938), pp. 7-27.
R?yama 1939
R?yama Masamichi. "Kokumin ky?d?tai no keisei" M&Wjffif?&f?f?. Kaiz? (May

1939), pp. 4-29.
R?yama 1941
R?yama Masamichi. "Dai t?a ky?eiken no chiseigakuteki k?satsu" ^C?iE?^H^
i?R^?^lK. Orig. pub. in Kaiz? t&ji (March 1941); repr. in R?yama Masamichi,
Sekai to t?a tBr#?jfCM, pp. 360-81. Kaiz?sha, 1941.
R?yama 1951
R?yama Masamichi. "Waga shi Yoshino Sakuz?-sensei" fe?tS5arfffîa5fe4. In
Waga shi o kataru fc^SSSrSS, ed. Shakai Shis? Kenky?kai tt?S?SW^?, pp.
151-74. Shakai Shis? Kenky?kai Shuppanbu, 1951.
Sait? 1970
Sait? Makoto ?HX. "Kaisetsu" MWi. In vol. 1 of Takagi Yasaka chosakush? B?7fc
AKl^?fc, pp. 545-57. Tokyo Daigaku Amerika Kenky? Sent?, 1970.

Sait? 1925
Sait? S?ichi ?SS?. "Taiheiy? kaigi ni tsuite" ??ff?!ifCgt^T. Kaitakusha M
?frg 20:10 (Oct. 1925), pp. 27-39.
Sakai 1970
Sakai Sabur? fi#H?R. Sh?wa Kenky?kai ff?fPW^?. TBS Britannica, 1970.
Sakai 1998
Sakai Tetsuya fi#^3c. " 'T?a ky?d?tai ron' kara 'kindaika ron' e" r|l?|#|j
?> b \m\\\zm\ ^. Nenp? seijigaku ?#Rf?^ (1998), pp. 109-28.
Sakai 2003
Sakai Tetsuya. "Kokusai kankeiron to 'wasurerareta shakaishugi'" H^P?Îto?:
r?nsnfca#_feaij. sms? sa 945 (Jan. 2003), pp. 121-37.

Sakamoto 1996
Sakamoto Takao WlA^W&. "Yoshino Sakuz? no 'minponshugi'" ??Fffr?<?> rg

AAM.\ Nenp? kindai Nihon kenky? ?ffiilrft B*W2S 18 (1996), pp. 225-58.
Sawayanagi 1925
Sawayanagi Masataro. "A Japanese View of Pacific Relations." In Institute of

Pacific Relations 1925, pp. 74-79.
Silberman 1959
Bernard S. Silberman. "The Political Theory and Program of Yoshino Sakuz?."

Journal of Modern History 31:4 (Dec. 1959), pp. 310-24.
Takagi1979
Takagi Yasaka. American Studies in Japan, Oral History Series 6:2. Tokyo
Daigaku Amerika Kenky? Shiry? Sent?, 1979.
Takagi and Yokota 1934
Yasaka Takaki [sic] and Kisaburo Yokota. "A Security Pact for the Pacific Area."
In Lasker 1934.
Thomas 1974
John N. Thomas. The Institute of Pacific Relations: Asian Scholars and American
Politics. University of Washington, 1974.
Thorne 1972
Christopher Thorne. The Limits of Foreign Policy: The West, the League, and the
Far Eastern Crisis of 1931-1933. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1972.
Whyte 1928
Frederick Whyte. "Opening Statement for the British Group." In Condliffe 1928,
pp.23-29.
Wilson 1987
Sandra Wilson. "Pro-Western Intellectuals and the Manchurian Crisis of 1931

1933." Nissan Occasional Paper Series 3 (1987), pp. 1-37.
Yamaoka 1997
Yamaoka Michio iLlNill^. "Taiheiy? Mondai Ch?sakai" kenky? r^^p#pB^|ji|S

?j m%. Ry?kei Shosha, 1997.
Yamanouchi 1998
Yasushi Yamanouchi et al. Total War and "Modernization. " East Asia Program,
Cornell University Press, 1998.
Yano 1922a
Yano Jin'ichi ^?B__?*. "Manm?z? wa Shina honrai no ry?do ni arazaru ron" MM
l^^?*(?ft?il#?fa. Gaik?jih? 9V^mm 412 (1 January 1922), pp. 56-71.

Yano 1922b
Yano Jin'ichi. "Shina no kokka oyobi shakai" ^WMMRXS^tu. Taiy? Xf? 28:11
(Sept. 1922), pp. 90-98.
Yano 1922c
Yano Jin'ichi. "Shina wa kuni ni arazaru ron" ~?M\SM\ZitZ>W&. Gaik?jih? ^S!Nf

m 411 (15 March 1922), pp. 935-51.
Yonetani 2002
Yonetani Masafumi *?f?$. "Nitch? sens?ki no tenn? sei" B ? fHMSJ ^J?fftl. In

vol. 7 of Iwanami k?za: Kindai Nihon no bunkashi SSft?: &XBA(D^Cit^, ed.
Komori Y?ichi /J^??^ et al., pp. 255-94. Iwanami Shoten, 2002.
Yoshino 1996
Yoshino Sakuz? pf?FfEB. Nikki B IB. In vol. 14 of Yoshino Sakuz? sensh? pfSFf?js
S?. Iwanami Shoten, 1996.
Yuan 1978
Tsing Yuan. "The Japanese Intervention in Shantung during World War I." In China
and Japan: A Search for Balance since World War I, ed. Alvin D. Coox and Hilary
Conroy. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-Clio, Inc., 1978.

Rationalizing The Orient

Caricato da

Informazioni sul documento

Titolo originale

Copyright

Formati disponibili

Condividi questo documento

Condividi o incorpora il documento

Opzioni di condivisione

Hai trovato utile questo documento?

Questo contenuto è inappropriato?

Copyright:

Formati disponibili

Rationalizing The Orient

Caricato da

Copyright:

Formati disponibili

Rationalizing the Orient: The "East Asia Cooperative Community" in Prewar Japan

Author(s): Han Jung-Sun

Rationalizing the Orient

In the late 1930s an amorphous notion oiky?d?tai t?|pH$ (cooperative com

economic development" (chiikiteki keizai no kaihatsu W^Wf?f?^W?W) for the

Hashikawa 1980, p. 348.

Monumento Nipponica 60:4

however, could be sustained only by collaborative relations between m?tropole

in the logic of Ultranationalist militarism and the assertion of a mythology of

lization program of the Japanese state. As a charter member of the Sh?wa

tics, see Ozeki 1997. In English, see Mitani 1973.

Han: Rationalizing the Orient

liberalism to nationalist regionalism than a rationalization of internationalist

mid-1910s to the 1920s. Articulated within the framework of an evolutionary

ceptualizing the regionalist idea of ky?d?tai. Finally, I explore the intellectual

R?yama Masamichi and His Evolutionary World History

1991; Duus 1989.

Monumento Nipponica 60:4

In the years following World War I, R?yama published a number of articles

This perspective led to R?yama's second concern: namely, how to balance

See R?yama 1951, pp. 164-67.

13 R?yama 1928, pp. 12-14.

Han: Rationalizing the Orient

was destined to fade away as a national society became democratic (demokurashi

A^Z 7?S-) through the development of many "derivative societies." Having

expand into less-developed regions, as manifested in the formation of

to economic expansion in which rising social classes crossed national bound

governed by the educated classes in general and specialists in particular became

Asia in the 1930s in conceptualizing the East Asia Cooperative Community.

15 R?yama 1928, pp. 37-38.

Monumento Nipponica 60:4

"progress of history." This circumstance had led to the deterioration of

Han: Rationalizing the Orient

engagement with the Institute of Pacific Relations, an international nongovern

The Institute of Pacific Relations: "A Lily in the Farm-Yard of Politics"

internationally minded religious leaders, scholars, artists, and businessmen envi

Yamaoka 1997. Also see Ogata 1973.

27 See Institute of Pacific Relations 1925, pp. 11, 15-16.

Monumento Nipponica 60:4

having no connection with any government; existentially "practical," so as to be

the promotion of constructive measures of assistance"; and methodologically

participants?achieving sustainable progress and development through efficient

29 Institute of Pacifie Relations 1925, p. 26; Condliffe 1928, p. v.

Han: Rationalizing the Orient

In his speech at the Honolulu conference of 1925, for instance, Sawayanagi

Monumento Nipponica 60:4

The China Problem, the JIPR, and R?yama Masamichi

developments loomed large in the minds of Japanese liberals. In the years

China emerged as a decisive actor in East Asia, demanding the recovery of

toriality. Led by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, the Guomindang armies'

Guandong Army authorities, for their part, devised a scheme to separate

37 Nasu 1928, p. 360.

Han: Rationalizing the Orient

The Japanese delegation to the IPR conference at Honolulu in 1927 soon

Monumento Nipponica 60:4

set up a special research committee on the Manchuria problem,45 and R?yama

In collaborating with the JIPR, R?yama absorbed the reason-centered interna

established practices governed by economic expediency, and the validity of the

the IPR in Honolulu in 1927. See Yamaoka 1997, pp. 104-105.

Han: Rationalizing the Orient

in East Asia because of the peculiar nature of regional conditions. Second,

espouse "regional development" as the organizing principle of its "continental

#S'Ji?) and should be treated "specially."50