De Castro v. JBC (Mar 2010)

12/3/2016
G.R.No.191002
RepublicofthePhilippines
SupremeCourt
Manila
ENBANC
G.R.No.191002
ARTUROM.DECASTRO,
Petitioner,
versus
JUDICIALANDBARCOUNCIL
(JBC)andPRESIDENTGLORIA
MACAPAGALARROYO,
Respondents.
xx
JAIMEN.SORIANO,
Petitioner,
versus
(JBC),
Respondent.
xx
PHILIPPINECONSTITUTION
ASSOCIATION(PHILCONSA),
Petitioner,
G.R.No.191032
G.R.No.191057
versus
(JBC),
Respondent.
xx
INREAPPLICABILITYOF
SECTION15,ARTICLEVIIOF
THECONSTITUTIONTO
APPOINTMENTSTOTHE
JUDICIARY,
ESTELITOP.MENDOZA,
Petitioner,
xx
JOHNG.PERALTA,
Petitioner,
versus
(JBC).
Respondent.
xx
PETERIRVINGCORVERA
A.M.No.1025SC
G.R.No.191149
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/march2010/191002.htm
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CHRISTIANROBERTS.LIM
ALFONSOV.TAN,JR.
NATIONALUNIONOFPEOPLES
LAWYERS
MARLOUB.UBANO
INTEGRATEDBAROFTHE
PHILIPPINESDAVAODELSUR
CHAPTER,representedbyits
ImmediatePastPresident,ATTY.
ISRAELITOP.TORREON,andthe
latterinhisownpersonalcapacityas
aMEMBERofthePHILIPPINE
BAR
MITCHELLJOHNL.BOISER
BAGONGALYANSANGBAYAN
(BAYAN)CHAIRMANDR.
CAROLINAP.ARAULLOBAYAN
SECRETARYGENERALRENATO
M.REYES,JR.
CONFEDERATIONFORUNITY,
RECOGNITIONANDADVANCE
MENTOFGOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEES(COURAGE)
CHAIRMANFERDINANDGAITE
KALIPUNANNGDAMAYANG
MAHIHIRAP(KADAMAY)
SECRETARYGENERALGLORIA
ARELLANOALYANSANG
NAGKAKAISANGKABATAAN
NGSAMBAYANANPARASA
KAUNLARAN(ANAKBAYAN)
CHAIRMANKENLEONARD
RAMOSTAYOANGPAGASA
CONVENORALVINPETERS
LEAGUEOFFILIPINO
STUDENTS(LFS)CHAIRMAN
JAMESMARKTERRY
LACUANANRIDONNATIONAL
UNIONOFSTUDENTSOFTHE
PHILIPPINES(NUSP)
CHAIRMANEINSTEIN
RECEDESCOLLEGEEDITORS
GUILDOFTHEPHILIPPINES
(CEGP)CHAIRMANVIJAE
ALQUISOLAandSTUDENT
CHRISTIANMOVEMENTOF
THEPHILIPPINES(SCMP)
G.R.No.191002
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12/3/2016
THEPHILIPPINES(SCMP)
CHAIRMANMA.CRISTINA
ANGELAGUEVARRA
WALDENF.BELLOand
LORETTAANNP.ROSALES
WOMENTRIALLAWYERS
ORGANIZATIONOFTHE
PHILIPPINES,representedby
YOLANDAQUISUMBING
JAVELLANABELLEZA
ALOJADODEMAISIPTERESITA
GANDIONCOOLEDANMA.
VERENAKASILAG
VILLANUEVAMARILYNSTA.
ROMANALEONILADEJESUS
andGUINEVEREDELEON.
Intervenors.
xx
ATTY.AMADORZ.TOLENTINO,
JR.,(IBP
GovernorSouthernLuzon),and
ATTY.ROLANDB.INTING
(IBPGovernorEasternVisayas),
Petitioners,
G.R.No.191002
G.R.No.191342
versus
G.R.No.191420
(JBC),
Respondent.
xx Present:
PHILIPPINEBARASSOCIATION,
PUNO,C.J.,
INC.,
CARPIO,
Petitioner,
CORONA,
CARPIOMORALES,
VELASCO,JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDODECASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
versus
DELCASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA,JR.,
PEREZ,and
MENDOZA,JJ.
Promulgated:
andHEREXCELLENCYGLORIA March17,2010
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G.R.No.191002
andHEREXCELLENCYGLORIA March17,2010
MACAPAGALARROYO,
Respondents.
xx
DECISION
BERSAMIN,J.:
The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs just days
afterthecomingpresidentialelectionsonMay10,2010.Evenbeforetheeventactuallyhappens,it
is giving rise to many legal dilemmas. May the incumbent President appoint his successor,
consideringthatSection15,ArticleVII(ExecutiveDepartment)oftheConstitutionprohibitsthe
PresidentorActingPresidentfrommakingappointmentswithintwomonthsimmediatelybefore
the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger
public safety? What is the relevance of Section 4 (1),Article VIII (Judicial Department) of the
Constitution,whichprovidesthatanyvacancyintheSupremeCourtshallbefilledwithin90days
fromtheoccurrencethereof,tothematteroftheappointmentofhissuccessor?MaytheJudicial
and Bar Council (JBC) resume the process of screening the candidates nominated or being
considered to succeed Chief Justice Puno, and submit the list of nominees to the incumbent
PresidentevenduringtheperiodoftheprohibitionunderSection15,ArticleVII?Doesmandamus
lietocompelthesubmissionoftheshortlistofnomineesbytheJBC?
PrecsoftheConsolidatedCases
Petitioners Arturo M. De Castro and John G. Peralta respectively commenced G.R. No.
[1]
[2]
191002 andG.R.No.191149 asspecialcivilactionsforcertiorariandmandamus,praying
thattheJBCbecompelledtosubmittotheincumbentPresidentthelistofatleastthreenominees
forthepositionofthenextChiefJustice.
[3]
In G.R. No. 191032, Jaime N. Soriano, via his petition for prohibition, proposes to
preventtheJBCfromconductingitssearch,selectionandnominationproceedingsfortheposition
ofChiefJustice.
[4]
In G.R. No. 191057, a special civil action for mandamus, the Philippine Constitution
Association(PHILCONSA)wantstheJBCtosubmititslistofnomineesforthepositionofChief
Justice to be vacated by Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement on May 17, 2010, because the
incumbent President is not covered by the prohibition that applies only to appointments in the
ExecutiveDepartment.
[5]
petitioner Estelito M. Mendoza, a former Solicitor
In Administrative Matter No. 1025SC,

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G.R.No.191002
[5]
In Administrative Matter No. 1025SC, petitioner Estelito M. Mendoza, a former Solicitor
General,seeksarulingfromtheCourtfortheguidanceoftheJBConwhetherSection15,Article
VIIappliestoappointmentstotheJudiciary.
[6]
InG.R.No.191342, whichtheCourtconsolidatedonMarch9,2010withthepetitionsearlier
filed,petitionersAmadorZ.Tolentino,Jr.andRolandB.Inting,IntegratedBarofthePhilippines
(IBP)GovernorsforSouthernLuzonandEasternVisayas,respectively,wanttoenjoinandrestrain
theJBCfromsubmittingalistofnomineesforthepositionofChiefJusticetothePresidentfor
appointmentduringtheperiodprovidedforinSection15,ArticleVII.
AllthepetitionsnowbeforetheCourtposeastheprincipallegalquestionwhethertheincumbent
President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement. That question is
undoubtedlyimpressedwithtranscendentalimportancetotheNation,becausetheappointmentof
theChiefJusticeisanyPresidentsmostimportantappointment.
AprecedentfrequentlycitedisInReAppointmentsDatedMarch30,1998ofHon.MateoA.
ValenzuelaandHon.PlacidoB.VallartaasJudgesoftheRegionalTrialCourtofBranch62,Bago
[7]
City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively (Valenzuela), by which the Court held
that Section 15, Article VII prohibited the exercise by the President of the power to appoint to
judicialpositionsduringtheperiodthereinfixed.
InG.R.No.191002,DeCastrosubmitsthattheconflictingopinionsontheissueexpressed
by legal luminaries one side holds that the incumbent President is prohibited from making
appointments within two months immediately before the coming presidential elections and until
the end of her term of office as President on June 30, 2010, while the other insists that the
prohibition applies only to appointments to executive positions that may influence the election
and, anyway, paramount national interest justifies the appointment of a Chief Justice during the
electionbanhasimpelledtheJBCtodeferthedecisiontowhomtosenditslistofatleastthree
[8]
nominees, whether to the incumbent President or to her successor. He opines that the JBC is
therebyarrogatinguntoitselfthejudicialfunctionthatisnotconferreduponitbytheConstitution,
which has limited it to the task of recommending appointees to the Judiciary, but has not
empowered it to finally resolve constitutional questions, which is the power vested only in the
SupremeCourtundertheConstitution.Assuch,hecontendsthattheJBCactedwithgraveabuse
ofdiscretionindeferringthesubmissionofthelistofnomineestothePresidentandthatafinal
and definitive resolution of the constitutional questions raised above would diffuse (sic) the
tension in the legal community that would go a long way to keep and maintain stability in the
[9]
judiciaryandthepoliticalsystem.
In G.R. No. 191032, Soriano offers the view that the JBC committed a grave abuse of
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G.R.No.191002
discretionamountingtolackorexcessofitsjurisdictionwhenitresolvedunanimouslyonJanuary
18,2010toopenthesearch,nomination,andselectionprocessforthepositionofChiefJusticeto
succeed Chief Justice Puno, because the appointing authority for the position of Chief Justice is
theSupremeCourtitself,thePresidentsauthoritybeinglimitedtotheappointmentoftheMembers
oftheSupremeCourt.Hence,theJBCshouldnotinterveneintheprocess,unlessanomineeisnot
[10]
yetaMemberoftheSupremeCourt.
Foritspart,PHILCONSAobservesinitspetitioninG.R.No.191057thatunorthodoxand
exceptionalcircumstancesspawnedbythediscordantinterpretations,dueperhapstoaperfunctory
understanding, of Sec. 15, Art. VII in relation to Secs. 4(1), 8(5) and 9, Art. VIII of the
Constitution have bred a frenzied inflammatory legal debate on the constitutional provisions
mentioned that has divided the bench and the bar and the general public as well, because of its
dimensional impact to the nation and the people, thereby fashioning transcendental questions or
issuesaffectingtheJBCsproperexerciseofitsprincipalfunctionofrecommendingappointeesto
theJudiciarybysubmittingonlytothePresident(nottothenextPresident)alistofatleastthree
nomineespreparedbytheJudicialandBarCouncilforeveryvacancyfromwhichthemembersof
[11]
the Supreme Court and judges of the lower courts may be appointed.
PHILCONSA further
believesandsubmitsthatnowisthetimetorevisitandreviewValenzuela,thestrangeandexotic
[12]
DecisionoftheCourtenbanc.
Peralta states in his petition in G.R. No. 191149 that mandamus can compel the JBC to
immediatelytransmittothePresident,withinareasonabletime,itsnominationlistfortheposition
of chief justice upon the mandatory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, in compliance
with its mandated duty under the Constitution in the event that the Court resolves that the
PresidentcanappointaChiefJusticeevenduringtheelectionbanunderSection15,ArticleVIIof
[13]
theConstitution.
ThepetitionersinG.R.No.191342insistthatthereisanactualcontroversy,consideringthat
theJBChasinitiatedtheprocessofreceivingapplicationsforthepositionofChiefJusticeandhas
in fact begun the evaluation process for the applications to the position, and is perilously near
completingthenominationprocessandcomingupwithalistofnomineesforsubmissiontothe
President,enteringintotheperiodofthebanonmidnightappointmentsonMarch10,2010,which
onlyhighlightsthepressingandcompellingneedforawritofprohibitiontoenjoinsuchalleged
ministerialfunctionofsubmittingthelist,especiallyifitwillbeconewithintheperiodoftheban
[14]
onmidnightappointments.
Antecedents
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G.R.No.191002
Antecedents
These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming
compulsoryretirementofChiefJusticePunoonMay17,2010,orsevendaysafterthepresidential
election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that vacancy shall be filled
withinninetydaysfromtheoccurrencethereof fromalistofatleastthreenomineespreparedby
theJudicialandBarCouncilforeveryvacancy.
OnDecember22,2009,CongressmanMatiasV.Defensor,anexofficiomemberoftheJBC,
addressedalettertotheJBC,requestingthattheprocessfornominationstotheofficeoftheChief
Justicebecommencedimmediately.
[15]
InitsJanuary18,2010meetingenbanc,therefore,theJBCpassedaresolution,
which
reads:
TheJBC,initsenbancmeetingofJanuary18,2010,unanimouslyagreedtostarttheprocess
offillingupthepositionofChiefJusticetobevacatedonMay17,2010upontheretirementofthe
incumbentChiefJusticeHonorableReynatoS.Puno.
Itwillpublishtheopeningofthepositionforapplicationsorrecommendationsdeliberateon
the list of candidates publish the names of candidates accept comments on or opposition to the
applicationsconductpublicinterviewsofcandidatesandpreparetheshortlistofcandidates.
As to the time to submit this shortlist to the proper appointing authority, in the light of the
Constitution,existinglawsandjurisprudence,theJBCwelcomesandwillconsiderallviewsonthe
matter.
18January2010.
(sgd.)
MA.LUISAD.VILLARAMA
ClerkofCourt&
ExOfficioSecretary
JudicialandBarCouncil
Asaresult,theJBCopenedthepositionofChiefJusticeforapplicationorrecommendation,and
[16]
publishedforthatpurposeitsannouncementdatedJanuary20,2010,
viz:
The Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) announces the opening for application or
recommendation,ofthepositionofCHIEFJUSTICEOFTHESUPREMECOURT,whichwillbe
vacatedon17May2010upontheretirementoftheincumbentChiefJustice,HON.REYNATOS.
PUNO.
Applicationsorrecommendationsforthispositionmustbesubmittednotlaterthan4February
2010(Thursday)totheJBCSecretariatxxx:
TheannouncementwaspublishedonJanuary20,2010inthePhilippineDailyInquirerand
[17]
ThePhilippineStar.
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G.R.No.191002
ThePhilippineStar.
Conformablywithitsexistingpractice,theJBCautomaticallyconsideredforthepositionofChief
Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court, namely: Associate Justice
Antonio T. Carpio Associate Justice Renato C. Corona Associate Justice Conchita Carpio
Morales Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B.
Nachura.However,thelasttwodeclinedtheirnominationthroughlettersdatedJanuary18,2010
[18]
andJanuary25,2010,respectively.
Others either applied or were nominated. Victor Fernandez, the retired Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon,applied,butlaterformallywithdrewhisnamefromconsiderationthroughhisletterdated
February8,2010.Candidateswhoacceptedtheirnominationswithoutconditions were Associate
Justice Renato C. Corona Associate Justice Teresita J. LeonardoDe Castro Associate Justice
ArturoD.BrionandAssociateJusticeEdilbertoG.Sandoval(Sandiganbayan).Candidateswho
accepted their nominations with conditions were Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio and
[19]
Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales.
Declining their nominations were Atty. Henry
Villarica(viatelephoneconversationwiththeExecutiveOfficeroftheJBConFebruary5,2010)
andAtty.GregorioM.Batiller,Jr.(via telephone conversation with the Executive Officer of the
[20]
JBConFebruary8,2010).
TheJBCexcludedfromconsiderationformerRTCJudgeFlorentinoFloro(forfailuretomeetthe
standardssetbytheJBCrules)andSpecialProsecutorDennisVillaIgnaciooftheOfficeofthe
[21]
Ombudsman(duetocasespendingintheOfficeoftheOmbudsman).
InitsmeetingofFebruary8,2010,theJBCresolvedtoproceedtothenextstepofannouncingthe
namesofthefollowingcandidatestoinvitethepublictofiletheirsworncomplaint,writtenreport,
oropposition,ifany,notlaterthanFebruary22,2010,towit:AssociateJusticeCarpio,Associate
Justice Corona, Associate Justice Carpio Morales, Associate Justice LeonardoDe Castro,
Associate Justice Brion, and Associate Justice Sandoval. The announcement came out in the
[22]
PhilippineDailyInquirerandThePhilippineStarissuesofFebruary13,2010.
Issues
Although it has already begun the process for the filling of the position of Chief Justice
Punoinaccordancewithitsrules,theJBCisnotyetdecidedonwhentosubmittothePresidentits
listofnomineesforthepositionduetothecontroversynowbeforeusbeingyetunresolved.Inthe
meanwhile,timeismarchinginquicksteptowardsMay17,2010whenthevacancyoccursupon
theretirementofChiefJusticePuno.
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G.R.No.191002
TheactionsoftheJBChavesparkedavigorousdebatenotonlyamonglegalluminaries,but
also among nonlegal quarters, and brought out highly disparate opinions on whether the
incumbent President can appoint the next Chief Justice or not. Petitioner Mendoza notes that in
Valenzuela,whichinvolvedtheappointmentsoftwojudgesoftheRegionalTrialCourt,theCourt
addressed this issue now before us as an administrative matter to avoid any possible polemics
concerningthematter,butheopinesthatthepolemicsleadingtoValenzuelawould be miniscule
[sic]comparedtothepolemicsthathavenoweruptedinregardtothecurrentcontroversy,andthat
unlessputtoahalt,andthismayonlybeachievedbyarulingfromtheCourt,theintegrityofthe
process and the credibility of whoever is appointed to the position of Chief Justice, may
[23]
irreparablybeimpaired.
Accordingly, we reframe the issues as submitted by each petitioner in the order of the
chronologicalfilingoftheirpetitions.
G.R.No.191002
a.DoestheJBChavethepowerandauthoritytoresolvetheconstitutionalquestionof
whether the incumbent President can appoint a Chief Justice during the election
banperiod?
b.DoestheincumbentPresidenthavethepowerandauthoritytoappointduringthe
electionbanthesuccessorofChiefJusticePunowhenhevacatesthepositionof
ChiefJusticeonhisretirementonMay17,2010?
G.R.No.191032
a.IsthepowertoappointtheChiefJusticevestedintheSupremeCourtenbanc?
G.R.No.191057
a.IstheconstitutionalprohibitionagainstappointmentunderSection15,ArticleVII
oftheConstitutionapplicableonlytopositionsintheExecutiveDepartment?
b.AssumingthattheprohibitionunderSection15,ArticleVIIoftheConstitutionalso
appliestomembersoftheJudiciary,maysuchappointmentsbeexceptedbecause
they are impressed with public interest or are demanded by the exigencies of
public service, thereby justifying these appointments during the period of
prohibition?
c.DoestheJBChavetheauthoritytodecidewhetherornottoincludeandsubmitthe
names of nominees who manifested interest to be nominated for the position of
ChiefJusticeontheunderstandingthathis/hernominationwillbesubmittedtothe
next President in view of the prohibition against presidential appointments from
March11,2010untilJune30,2010?
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March11,2010untilJune30,2010?
G.R.No.191002
A.M.No.1025SC
a.DoesSection15,ArticleVIIoftheConstitutionapplytoappointmentstopositions
intheJudiciaryunderSection9,ArticleVIIIoftheConstitution?
b.MayPresidentGloriaMacapagalArroyomakeappointmentstotheJudiciaryafter
March10,2010,includingthatforthepositionofChiefJusticeafterChiefJustice
PunoretiresonMay17,2010?
G.R.No.191149
a. Does the JBC have the discretion to withhold the submission of the short list to
PresidentGloriaMacapagalArroyo?
G.R.No.191342
a. DoestheJBChavetheauthoritytosubmitthelistofnomineestotheincumbent
President without committing a grave violation of the Constitution and
jurisprudence prohibiting the incumbent President from making midnight
appointments two months immediately preceding the next presidential elections
untiltheendofherterm?
b. IsanyactperformedbytheJBC,includingthevettingofthecandidatesforthe
position of Chief Justice, constitutionally invalid in view of the JBCs illegal
composition allowing each member from the Senate and the House of
Representativestohaveonevoteeach?
OnFebruary16,2010, the Court directed the JBC and the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG)tocommentontheconsolidatedpetitions,exceptthatfiledinG.R.No.191342.
OnFebruary26,2010,theJBCsubmitteditscomment,reportingthereinthatthenextstage
of the process for the selection of the nominees for the position of Chief Justice would be the
publicinterviewofthecandidatesandthepreparationoftheshortlistofcandidates,includingthe
[24]
[25]
interviewoftheconstitutionalexperts,asmaybeneeded.
Itstated:
Likewise,theJBChasyettotakeapositiononwhentosubmittheshortlisttotheproper
appointing authority, in light of Section 4 (1), Article VIII of the Constitution, which
providesthatvacancyintheSupremeCourtshallbefilledwithinninety(90)daysfromthe
occurrence thereof, Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution concerning the ban on
Presidential appointments two (2) months immediately before the next presidential
electionsanduptotheendofhistermandSection261(g),ArticleXXIIoftheOmnibus
ElectionCodeofthePhilippines.
12.SincetheHonorableSupremeCourtisthefinalinterpreteroftheConstitution,theJBCwillbe
guidedbyitsdecisionintheseconsolidatedPetitionsandAdministrativeMatter.
On February 26, 2010, the OSG also submitted its comment, essentially stating that the
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On February 26, 2010, the OSG also submitted its comment, essentially stating that the
incumbentPresidentcanappointthesuccessorofChiefJusticePunouponhisretirementbyMay
17,2010.
The OSG insists that: (a) a writ of prohibition cannot issue to prevent the JBC from
performingitsprincipalfunctionundertheConstitutiontorecommendappointeesintheJudiciary
(b) the JBCs function to recommend is a continuing process, which does not begin with each
vacancy or end with each nomination, because the goal is to submit the list of nominees to
[26]
Malacaangontheverydaythevacancyarises
theJBCwasthusactingwithinitsjurisdiction
whenitcommencedandsetinmotiontheprocessofselectingthenomineestobesubmittedtothe
[27]
PresidentforthepositionofChiefJusticetobevacatedbyChiefJusticePuno
(c) petitioner
SorianostheorythatitistheSupremeCourt,notthePresident,whohasthepowertoappointthe
ChiefJustice,isincorrect,andproceedsfromhismisinterpretationofthephrasemembersofthe
Supreme Court found in Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution as referring only to the
[28]
AssociateJustices,totheexclusionoftheChiefJustice
(d)awritofmandamuscanissueto
compeltheJBCtosubmitthelistofnomineestothePresident,consideringthatitsdutytoprepare
thelistofatleastthreenomineesisunqualified,andthesubmissionofthelistisaministerialact
thattheJBCismandatedtoperformundertheConstitutionassuch,theJBC,thenatureofwhose
principal function is executive, is not vested with the power to resolve who has the authority to
appoint the next Chief Justice and, therefore, has no discretion to withhold the list from the
[29]
President
and(e)awritofmandamuscannotissuetocompeltheJBCtoincludeorexclude
particular candidates as nominees, considering that there is no imperative duty on its part to
include in or exclude from the list particular individuals, but, on the contrary, the JBCs
[30]
determinationofwhoitnominatestothePresidentisanexerciseofadiscretionaryduty.
TheOSGcontendsthattheincumbentPresidentmayappointthenextChiefJustice,because
theprohibitionunderSection15,ArticleVIIoftheConstitutiondoesnotapplytoappointmentsin
theSupremeCourt.ItarguesthatanyvacancyintheSupremeCourtmustbefilledwithin90days
[31]
from its occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), ArticleVIII of the Constitution
that in their
deliberationsonthemandatoryperiodfortheappointmentofSupremeCourtJustices,theframers
neither mentioned nor referred to the ban against midnight appointments, or its effects on such
[32]
period,orviceversa
thathadtheframersintendedtheprohibitiontoapplytoSupremeCourt
appointments,theycouldhaveeasilyexpresslystatedsointheConstitution,whichexplainswhy
the prohibition found in Article VII (Executive Department) was not written in Article VIII
(JudicialDepartment)andthattheframersalsoincorporatedinArticleVIIIamplerestrictionsor
limitations on the Presidents power to appoint members of the Supreme Court to ensure its
[33]
independence from political vicissitudes and its insulation from political pressures,
such as
stringentqualificationsforthepositions,theestablishmentoftheJBC,thespecifiedperiodwithin
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G.R.No.191002
stringentqualificationsforthepositions,theestablishmentoftheJBC,thespecifiedperiodwithin
whichthePresidentshallappointaSupremeCourtJustice.
The OSG posits that although Valenzuela involved the appointment of RTC Judges, the
situationnowreferstotheappointmentofthenextChiefJusticetowhichtheprohibitiondoesnot
applythat,atanyrate,Valenzuelaevenrecognizedthattheremightbetheimperativeneedforan
appointmentduringtheperiodoftheban,likewhenthemembershipoftheSupremeCourtshould
besoreducedthatitwillhavenoquorum,orshouldthevotingonaparticularimportantquestion
[34]
requiringexpeditiousresolutionbedivided
andthatValenzuelaalsorecognizedthatthefilling
ofvacanciesintheJudiciaryisundoubtedlyinthepublicinterest,mostespeciallyifthereisany
compellingreasontojustifythemakingoftheappointmentsduringtheperiodoftheprohibition.
[35]
Lastly,theOSGurgesthattherearenowundeniablycompellingreasonsfortheincumbent
President to appoint the next Chief Justice, to wit: (a) a deluge of cases involving sensitive
[36]
political issues is quite expected
(b) the Court acts as the Presidential Electoral Tribunal
(PET),which,sittingenbanc,isthesolejudgeofallcontestsrelatingtotheelection,returns,and
qualificationsofthePresidentandVicePresidentand,assuch,hasthepowertocorrectmanifest
[37]
errors on the statement of votes (SOV) and certificates of canvass (COC)
(c) if history has
shown that during ordinary times the Chief Justice was appointed immediately upon the
occurrenceofthevacancy,fromthetimeoftheeffectivityoftheConstitution,thereisnoweven
more reason to appoint the next Chief Justice immediately upon the retirement of Chief Justice
[38]
Puno
and (d) should the next Chief Justice come from among the incumbent Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court, thereby causing a vacancy, it also becomes incumbent upon the
JBC to start the selection process for the filling up of the vacancy in accordance with the
[39]
constitutionalmandate.
OnMarch9,2010,theCourtadmittedthefollowingcomments/oppositionsinintervention,
towit:
(a) The oppositioninintervention dated February 22, 2010 of Atty. Peter Irving
[40]
Corvera(Corvera)
(b) TheoppositionininterventiondatedFebruary22,2010ofAtty.ChristianRobert
S.Lim(Lim)
(c)TheoppositionininterventiondatedFebruary23,2010 of Atty.Alfonso V. Tan,

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(c)TheoppositionininterventiondatedFebruary23,2010 of Atty.Alfonso V. Tan,

Jr.(Tan)
(d) The comment/oppositioninintervention dated March 1, 2010 of the National

UnionofPeoplesLawyers(NUPL)
(e)TheoppositionininterventiondatedFebruary25,2010ofAtty.MarlouB.Ubano
(Ubano)
(f) The oppositioninintervention dated February 25, 2010 of Integrated Bar of the
PhilippinesDavaodelSurChapteranditsImmediatePastPresident,Atty.Israelito
P.Torreon(IBPDavaodelSur)
(g)TheoppositionininterventiondatedFebruary26,2010ofAtty.MitchellJohnL.
Boiser(Boiser)
(h)Theconsolidatedcomment/oppositionininterventiondatedFebruary26,2010of
BAYANChairmanDr.CarolinaP.AraulloBAYANSecretaryGeneralRenatoM.
Reyes,Jr.ConfederationforUnity,RecognitionandAdvancementofGovernment
Employees (COURAGE) Chairman Ferdinand Gaite Kalipunan ng Damayang
Mahihirap (KADAMAY) Secretary General Gloria Arellano Alyansa ng
Nagkakaisang Kabataan ng Samayanan Para sa Kaunlaran (ANAKBAYAN)
ChairmanKenLeonardRamosTayoangPagasaConvenorAlvinPetersLeague
ofFilipinoStudents(LFS)ChairmanJamesMarkTerryLacuananRidonNational
UnionofStudentsofthePhilippines(NUSP)ChairmanEinsteinRecedes,College
Editors Guild of the Philippines (CEGP) Chairman Vijae Alquisola and Student
Christian Movement of the Philippines (SCMP) Chairman Ma. Cristina Angela
Guevarra(BAYANetal.)
(i) The oppositioninintervention dated March 3, 2010 of Walden F. Bello and

LorettaAnnP.Rosales(Belloetal.)and
(j)Theconsolidatedcomment/oppositionininterventiondatedMarch4,2010ofthe
WomenTrialLawyersOrganizationofthePhilippines(WTLOP),representedby
Atty. Yolanda QuisumbingJavellana Atty. Belleza Alojado Demaisip Atty.
Teresita GandioncoOledan Atty. Ma. Verena KasilagVillanueva Atty. Marilyn
Sta.RomanaAtty.LeoniladeJesusandAtty.GuineveredeLeon(WTLOP).
IntervenorsTan,WTLOP,BAYANetal.,Corvera,IBPDavaodelSur,andNUPLtaketheposition
that De Castros petition was bereft of any basis, because under Section 15, Article VII, the
outgoingPresidentisconstitutionallybannedfrommakinganyappointmentsfromMarch10,2010
until June 30, 2010, including the appointment of the successor of Chief Justice Puno. Hence,
mandamusdoesnotlietocompeltheJBCtosubmitthelistofnomineestotheoutgoingPresident
iftheconstitutionalprohibitionisalreadyineffect.Tanaddsthattheprohibitionagainstmidnight
appointments was applied by the Court to the appointments to the Judiciary made by then
PresidentRamos,withtheCourtholdingthatthedutyofthePresidenttofillthevacancieswithin
90daysfromoccurrenceofthevacancies(fortheSupremeCourt)orfromthesubmissionofthe
list(forallothercourts)wasnotanexcusetoviolatetheconstitutionalprohibition.
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IntervenorsTan,Ubano,Boiser,Corvera,NULP,BAYANetal.,andBelloetal.opposethe
insistencethatValenzuelarecognizesthepossibilitythatthePresidentmayappointthenextChief
Justice if exigent circumstances warrant the appointment, because that recognition is obiter
dictumandaverthattheabsenceofaChiefJusticeorevenanAssociateJusticedoesnotcause
epicdamageorabsolutedisruptionorparalysisintheoperationsoftheJudiciary.Theyinsistthat
evenwithoutthesuccessorofChiefJusticePunobeingappointedbytheincumbentPresident,the
Courtisallowedtositandadjudgeenbancorindivisionsofthree,fiveorsevenmembersatits
discretionthatafullmembershipoftheCourtisnotnecessarythatpetitionerDeCastrosfearsare
unfounded and baseless, being based on a mere possibility, the occurrence of which is entirely
unsure that it is not in the national interest to have a Chief Justice whose appointment is
unconstitutional and, therefore, void and that such a situation will create a crisis in the judicial
systemandwillworsenanalreadyvulnerablepoliticalsituation.
iceisimperativeforthestabilityofthejudicialsystemandthepoliticalsituationinthecountrywhentheelection
relatedquestionsreachtheCourtasfalse,becausethereisanexistinglawonfillingthevoidbroughtaboutbya
vacancyintheofficeofChiefJusticethatthelawisSection12oftheJudiciaryActof1948,whichhasnotbeen
repealedbyBatasPambansaBlg.129oranyotherlawthatatemporaryoranactingChiefJusticeisnotanathema
tojudicialindependencethatthedesignationofanactingChiefJusticeisnotonlyprovidedforbylaw,butisalso
dictatedbypracticalnecessitythatthepracticewasintendedtobeenshrinedinthe1987Constitution,butthe
CommissionersdecidednottowriteitintheConstitutiononaccountofthesettledpracticethatthepracticewas
followedunderthe1987Constitution,when,in1992,attheendofthetermofChiefJusticeMarceloB.Fernan,
AssociateJusticeAndresNarvasaassumedthepositionasActingChiefJusticepriortohisofficialappointmentas
ChiefJusticethatsaidfillingupofavacancyintheofficeoftheChiefJusticewasacknowledgedandevenused
byanalogyinthecaseofthevacancyoftheChairmanoftheCommissiononElections,perBrillantesv.Yorac,192
SCRA358andthatthehistoryoftheSupremeCourthasshownthatthisruleofsuccessionhasbeenrepeatedly
observedandhasbecomeapartofitstradition.
Intervenors Ubano, Boiser, NUPL, Corvera, and Lim maintain that the Omnibus Election
Codepenalizesasanelectionoffensetheactofanygovernmentofficialwhoappoints,promotes,
or gives any increase in salary or remuneration or privilege to any government official or
employee during the period of 45 days before a regular election that the provision covers all
appointing heads, officials, and officers of a government office, agency or instrumentality,
includingthePresidentthatfortheincumbentPresidenttoappointthenextChiefJusticeuponthe
retirement of Chief Justice Puno, or during the period of the ban under the Omnibus Election
Code,constitutesanelectionoffensethatevenanappointmentofthenextChiefJusticepriorto
theelectionbanisfundamentallyinvalidandwithouteffectbecausetherecanbenoappointment
untilavacancyoccursandthatthevacancyforthepositioncanoccuronlybyMay17,2010.
IntervenorBoiseraddsthatDeCastrosprayertocompelthesubmissionofnomineesbythe
JBC to the incumbent President is offtangent because the position of Chief Justice is still not
vacant that to speak of a list, much more a submission of such list, before a vacancy occurs is
glaringly premature that the proposed advance appointment by the incumbent President of the
nextChiefJusticewillbeunconstitutionalandthatnolistofnomineescanbesubmittedbythe
JBCifthereisnovacancy.
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AlltheintervenorsoppositorssubmitthatSection15,ArticleVIImakesnodistinctionbetweenthe
kinds of appointments made by the President and that the Court, in Valenzuela, ruled that the
appointmentsbythePresidentofthetwojudgesduringtheprohibitionperiodwerevoid.
Intervenor WTLOP posits that Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not
apply only to the appointments in the Executive Department, but also to judicial appointments,
contrary to the submission of PHILCONSA that Section 15 does not distinguish and that
Valenzuelaalreadyinterpretedtheprohibitionasapplicabletojudicialappointments.
Intervenor WTLOP further posits that petitioner Sorianos contention that the power to
appoint the Chief Justice is vested, not in the President, but in the Supreme Court, is utterly
baseless,becausetheChiefJusticeisalsoaMemberoftheSupremeCourtascontemplatedunder
Section 9, Article VIII and that, at any rate, the term members was interpreted in Vargas v.
Rillaroza (G.R. No. L1612, February 26, 1948) to refer to the Chief Justice and the Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court that PHILCONSAs prayer that the Court pass a resolution
declaring that persons who manifest their interest as nominees, but with conditions, shall not be
considered nominees by the JBC is diametrically opposed to the arguments in the body of its
petitionthatsuchglaringinconsistencybetweentheallegationsinthebodyandthereliefprayed
for highlights the lack of merit of PHILCONSAs petition that the role of the JBC cannot be
separatedfromtheconstitutionalprohibitiononthePresidentandthattheCourtmustdirectthe
JBCtofollowtheruleoflaw,thatis,tosubmitthelistofnomineesonlytothenextdulyelected
Presidentaftertheperiodoftheconstitutionalbanagainstmidnightappointmentshasexpired.
OppositorIBPDavaodelSuropinesthattheJBCbecauseitisneitherajudicialnoraquasi
judicialbodyhasnodutyundertheConstitutiontoresolvethequestionofwhethertheincumbent
President can appoint a Chief Justice during the period of prohibition that even if the JBC has
already come up with a short list, it still has to bow to the strict limitations under Section 15,
Article VII that should the JBC defer submission of the list, it is not arrogating unto itself a
judicial function, but simply respecting the clear mandate of the Constitution and that the
application of the general rule in Section 15, Article VII to the Judiciary does not violate the
principleofseparationofpowers,becausesaidprovisionisanexception.
OppositorsNUPL, Corvera, Lim and BAYAN et al. state that the JBCs act of nominating
appointees to the Supreme Court is purely ministerial and does not involve the exercise of
judgmentthattherecanbenodefaultonthepartoftheJBCinsubmittingthelistofnomineesto
the President, considering that the call for applications only begins from the occurrence of the
vacancy in the Supreme Court and that the commencement of the process of screening of
applicantstofillthevacancyintheofficeoftheChiefJusticeonlybeginsfromtheretirementon
May17,2010,for,priortothisdate,thereisnodefinitelegalbasisforanypartytoclaimthatthe
submissionornonsubmissionofthelistofnomineestothePresidentbytheJBCisamatterof
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rightunderlaw.
The main question presented in all the filings herein because it involves two seemingly
conflictingprovisionsoftheConstitutionimperativelydemandstheattentionandresolutionofthis
Court, the only authority that can resolve the question definitively and finally. The imperative
demand rests on the everpresent need, first, to safeguard the independence, reputation, and
integrityoftheentireJudiciary,particularlythisCourt,aninstitutionthathasbeenunnecessarily
draggedintotheharshpolemicsbroughtonbythecontroversysecond,tosettleonceandforall
the doubt about an outgoing Presidents power to appoint to the Judiciary within the long period
starting two months before the presidential elections until the end of the presidential term and
third, to set a definite guideline for the JBC to follow in the discharge of its primary office of
screeningandnominatingqualifiedpersonsforappointmenttotheJudiciary.
Thus,weresolve.
RulingoftheCourt
LocusStandiofPetitioners
Thepreliminaryissuetobesettlediswhetherornotthepetitionershavelocusstandi.
Blackdefineslocusstandiasarightofappearanceinacourtofjusticeonagivenquestion.
[41]
Inpublicorconstitutionallitigations,theCourtisoftenburdenedwiththedeterminationof
the locus standi of the petitioners due to the everpresent need to regulate the invocation of the
interventionoftheCourttocorrectanyofficialactionorpolicyinordertoavoidobstructingthe
efficient functioning of public officials and offices involved in public service. It is required,
therefore,thatthepetitionermusthaveapersonalstakeintheoutcomeofthecontroversy,for,as
[42]
indicatedinAgan,Jr.v.PhilippineInternationalAirTerminalsCo.,Inc.:
Thequestiononlegalstandingiswhethersuchpartieshaveallegedsuchapersonalstake
intheoutcomeofthecontroversyastoassurethatconcreteadversenesswhichsharpensthe
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
[43]
constitutional questions.
Accordingly, it has been held that the interest of a person
assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to
show,notonlythatthelaworanygovernmentactisinvalid,butalsothathesustainedorisin
imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not
merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the person
complaininghasbeenorisabouttobedeniedsomerightorprivilegetowhichheislawfully
entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the
[44]
statuteoractcomplainedof.
[45]
Itistruethatasearlyasin1937,inPeoplev.Vera,
theCourtadoptedthedirectinjury
testfordeterminingwhetherapetitionerinapublicactionhadlocusstandi.There,theCourtheld
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testfordeterminingwhetherapetitionerinapublicactionhadlocusstandi.There,theCourtheld
that the person who would assail the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result. Vera was
[46]
followedinCustodiov.PresidentoftheSenate,
ManilaRaceHorseTrainersAssociationv.De
[47]
[48]
la Fuente,
AntiChinese League of the Philippines v. Felix,
and Pascual v. Secretary of
[49]
PublicWorks.
Yet,theCourthasalsoheldthattherequirementoflocus standi, being a mere procedural

technicality,canbewaivedbytheCourtintheexerciseofitsdiscretion.Forinstance,in1949,in
[50]
Araneta v. Dinglasan,
the Court liberalized the approach when the cases had transcendental
importance.Somenotablecontroversieswhosepetitionersdidnotpassthedirectinjurytest were
[51]
allowedtobetreatedinthesamewayasinAranetav.Dinglasan.
[52]
Inthe1975decisioninAquinov.CommissiononElections,
thisCourtdecidedtoresolvethe
issues raised by the petition due to their farreaching implications, even if the petitioner had no
personalitytofilethesuit.TheliberalapproachofAquinov.CommissiononElections has been
adoptedinseveralnotablecases,permittingordinarycitizens,legislators,andcivic
organizationstobringtheirsuitsinvolvingtheconstitutionalityorvalidityoflaws,regulations,and
[53]
rulings.
However,theassertionofapublicrightasapredicateforchallengingasupposedlyillegalor
unconstitutionalexecutiveorlegislativeactionrestsonthetheorythatthepetitionerrepresentsthe
public in general. Although such petitioner may not be as adversely affected by the action
complainedagainstasareothers,itisenoughthathesufficientlydemonstratesinhispetitionthat
heisentitledtoprotectionorrelieffromtheCourtinthevindicationofapublicright.
Quite often, as here, the petitioner in a public action sues as a citizen or taxpayer to gain
locusstandi.Thatisnotsurprising,foreveniftheissuemayappeartoconcernonlythepublicin
general,suchcapacitiesnonethelessequipthepetitionerwithadequateinteresttosue.InDavidv.
[54]
MacapagalArroyo,
theCourtaptlyexplainswhy:
Caselawinmostjurisdictionsnowallowsbothcitizenandtaxpayerstandinginpublicactions.
[55]
ThedistinctionwasfirstlaiddowninBeauchampv.Silk,
whereitwasheldthattheplaintiffina
taxpayers suit is in a different category from the plaintiff in a citizens suit. In the former, the
plaintiffisaffectedbytheexpenditureofpublicfunds,whileinthelatter,heisbutthemere
instrumentofthepublicconcern.AsheldbytheNewYorkSupremeCourtinPeopleexrelCase
[56]
v. Collins:
In matter of mere public right, howeverthe people are the real partiesIt is at
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G.R.No.191002
least the right, if not the duty, of every citizen to interfere and see that a public offence be
properly pursued and punished, and that a public grievance be remedied. With respect to
[57]
taxpayerssuits,Terrv.Jordan
heldthattherightofacitizenandataxpayertomaintainan
[58]
actionincourtstorestraintheunlawfuluseofpublicfundstohisinjurycannotbedenied.
PetitionersDeCastro(G.R.No.191002),Soriano(G.R.No.191032)andPeralta(G.R.No.
191149) all assert their right as citizens filing their petitions on behalf of the public who are
directlyaffectedbytheissueoftheappointmentofthenextChiefJustice.DeCastroandSoriano
further claim standing as taxpayers, with Soriano averring that he is affected by the continuing
proceedings in the JBC, which involve unnecessary, if not, illegal disbursement of public funds.
[59]
PHILCONSAallegesitselftobeanonstock,nonprofitorganizationexistingunderthelaw
forthepurposeofdefending,protecting,andpreservingtheConstitutionandpromotingitsgrowth
and flowering. It also alleges that the Court has recognized its legal standing to file cases on
[60]
constitutionalissuesinseveralcases.
InA.M.No.1025SC,MendozastatesthatheisacitizenofthePhilippines,amemberof
the Philippine Bar engaged in the active practice of law, and a former Solicitor General, former
MinisterofJustice,formerMemberoftheInterimBatasangPambansaandtheRegularBatasang
Pambansa, and former member of the Faculty of the College of Law of the University of the
Philippines.
The petitioners in G.R. No. 191342 are the Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for Southern Luzon and Eastern Visayas. They allege that they have the legal
standing to enjoin the submission of the list of nominees by the JBC to the President, for [a]n
adjudication of the proper interpretation and application of the constitutional ban on midnight
appointmentswithregardtorespondentJBCsfunctioninsubmittingthelistofnomineesiswell
withintheconcernofpetitioners,whoaredutyboundtoensurethatobedienceandrespectforthe
Constitutionisupheld,mostespeciallybygovernmentoffices,suchasrespondentJBC,whoare
specificallytaskedtoperformcrucialfunctionsinthewholeschemeofourdemocraticinstitution.
They further allege that, reposed in them as members of the Bar, is a clear legal interest in the
processofselectingthemembersoftheSupremeCourt,andintheselectionoftheChiefJustice,
considering that the person appointed becomes a member of the body that has constitutional
[61]
supervisionandauthorityoverthemandothermembersofthelegalprofession.
TheCourtrulesthatthepetitionershaveeachdemonstratedadequateinterestintheoutcome
of the controversy as to vest them with the requisite locus standi. The issues before us are of
transcendentalimportancetothepeopleasawhole,andtothepetitionersinparticular.Indeed,the
issues affect everyone (including the petitioners), regardless of ones personal interest in life,
because they concern that great doubt about the authority of the incumbent President to appoint
notonlythesuccessoroftheretiringincumbentChiefJustice,butalsootherswhomayserveinthe
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notonlythesuccessoroftheretiringincumbentChiefJustice,butalsootherswhomayserveinthe
Judiciary, which already suffers from a far too great number of vacancies in the ranks of trial
judgesthroughoutthecountry.
In any event, the Court retains the broad discretion to waive the requirement of legal
standing in favor of any petitioner when the matter involved has transcendental importance, or
[62]
otherwiserequiresaliberalizationoftherequirement.
Yet, if any doubt still lingers about the locusstandi of any petitioner, we dispel the doubt
nowinordertoremoveanyobstacleorobstructiontotheresolutionoftheessentialissuesquarely
presented herein. We are not to shirk from discharging our solemn duty by reason alone of an
obstaclemoretechnicalthanotherwise.InAgan,Jr.v.PhilippineInternationalAirTerminalsCo.,
[63]
Inc.,
we pointed out: Standing is a peculiar concept in constitutional law because in some
cases,suitsarenotbroughtbypartieswhohavebeenpersonallyinjuredbytheoperationofalaw
oranyothergovernmentactbutbyconcernedcitizens,taxpayersorvoterswhoactuallysueinthe
publicinterest.Butevenif,strictlyspeaking,thepetitionersarenotcoveredbythedefinition,itis
still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and so remove the
[64]
impedimenttoitsaddressingandresolvingtheseriousconstitutionalquestionsraised.
Justiciability
IntervenorNUPLmaintainsthatthereisnoactualcaseorcontroversythatisappropriateor
ripe for adjudication, considering that although the selection process commenced by the JBC is
going on, there is yet no final list of nominees hence, there is no imminent controversy as to
whethersuchlistmustbesubmittedtotheincumbentPresident,orreservedforsubmissiontothe
incomingPresident.
IntervenorTanraisesthelackofanyactualjusticiablecontroversythatisripeforjudicial
determination,pointingoutthatpetitionerDeCastrohasnotevenshownthattheJBChasalready
completeditsselectionprocessandisnowreadytosubmitthelisttotheincumbentPresidentand
thatpetitionerDeCastroismerelypresentingahypotheticalscenariothatisclearlynotsufficient
fortheCourttoexerciseitspowerofjudicialreview.
IntervenorsCorveraandLimseparatelyopinethatDeCastrospetitionrestsonanoverbroad
and vague allegation of political tension, which is insufficient basis for the Court to exercise its
powerofjudicialreview.
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IntervenorBAYANetal.contendthatthepetitionersareseekingamereadvisoryopinionon
whattheJBCandthePresidentshoulddo,andarenotinvokinganyissuesthatarejusticiablein
nature.
IntervenorsBelloetal.submitthatthereexistnoconflictoflegalrightsandnoassertionof
oppositelegalclaimsinanyofthepetitionsthatPHILCONSAdoesnotallegeanyactiontakenby
the JBC, but simply avers that the conditional manifestations of two Members of the Court,
accented by the divided opinions and interpretations of legal experts, or associations of lawyers
and law students on the issues published in the daily newspapers are matters of paramount and
transcendentalimportancetothebench,barandgeneralpublicthatPHILCONSAfailsnotonlyto
cite any legal duty or allege any failure to perform the duty, but also to indicate what specific
actionshouldbedonebytheJBCthatMendozadoesnotevenattempttoportraythematterasa
controversyorconflictofrights,but,instead,praysthattheCourtshouldrulefortheguidanceof
theJBCthatthefactthattheCourtsupervisestheJBCdoesnotautomaticallyimplythattheCourt
canruleontheissuespresentedintheMendozapetition,becausesupervisioninvolvesoversight,
which means that the subordinate officer or body must first act, and if such action is not in
accordancewithprescribedrules,then,andonlythen,maythepersonexercisingoversightorder
the action to be redone to conform to the prescribed rules that the Mendoza petition does not
allege that the JBC has performed a specific act susceptible to correction for being illegal or
unconstitutionalandthattheMendozapetitionaskstheCourttoissueanadvisoryruling,notto
exerciseitspowerofsupervisiontocorrectawrongactbytheJBC,buttodeclarethestateofthe
lawintheabsenceofanactualcaseorcontroversy.
We hold that the petitions set forth an actual case or controversy that is ripe for judicial
determination.TherealityisthattheJBCalreadycommencedtheproceedingsfortheselectionof
the nominees to be included in a short list to be submitted to the President for consideration of
whichofthemwillsucceedChiefJusticePunoasthenextChiefJustice.Althoughthepositionis
not yet vacant, the fact that the JBC began the process of nomination pursuant to its rules and
practices, although it has yet to decide whether to submit the list of nominees to the incumbent
outgoing President or to the next President, makes the situation ripe for judicial determination,
becausethenextstepsarethepublicinterviewofthecandidates,thepreparationoftheshortlistof
candidates,andtheinterviewofconstitutionalexperts,asmaybeneeded.
ApartofthequestiontobereviewedbytheCourtiswhethertheJBCproperlyinitiatedthe
process,therebeinganinsistencefromsomeoftheoppositorsintervenorsthattheJBCcouldonly
do so once the vacancy has occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010). Another part is, of course,
whethertheJBCmayresumeitsprocessuntiltheshortlistisprepared,inviewoftheprovisionof
Section4(1),ArticleVIII,whichunqualifiedlyrequiresthePresidenttoappointonefromtheshort
listtofillthevacancyintheSupremeCourt(beittheChiefJusticeoranAssociateJustice)within
90daysfromtheoccurrenceofthevacancy.
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The ripeness of the controversy for judicial determination may not be doubted. The
challenges to the authority of the JBC to open the process of nomination and to continue the
process until the submission of the list of nominees the insistence of some of the petitioners to
compel the JBC through mandamus to submit the short list to the incumbent President the
counterinsistence of the intervenors to prohibit the JBC from submitting the short list to the
incumbentPresidentonthegroundthatsaidlistshouldbesubmittedinsteadtothenextPresident
thestrongpositionthattheincumbentPresidentisalreadyprohibitedunderSection15,ArticleVII
from making any appointments, including those to the Judiciary, starting on May 10, 2010 until
June30,2010andthecontrarypositionthattheincumbentPresidentisnotsoprohibitedareonly
someoftherealissuesfordetermination.Allsuchissuesestablishtheripenessofthecontroversy,
consideringthatforsometheshortlistmustbesubmittedbeforethevacancyactuallyoccursby
May 17, 2010. The outcome will not be an abstraction, or a merely hypothetical exercise. The
resolution of the controversy will surely settle with finality the nagging questions that are
preventing the JBC from moving on with the process that it already began, or that are reasons
persuadingtheJBCtodesistfromtherestoftheprocess.
WeneednotawaittheoccurrenceofthevacancybyMay17,2010inorderfortheprincipal
issuetoripeforjudicialdeterminationbytheCourt.Itisenoughthatoneallegesconductarguably
affectedwithaconstitutionalinterest,butseeminglyproscribedbytheConstitution.Areasonable
certaintyoftheoccurrenceoftheperceivedthreattoaconstitutionalinterestissufficienttoafford
a basis for bringing a challenge, provided the Court has sufficient facts before it to enable it to
[65]
intelligently adjudicate the issues.
Herein, the facts are not in doubt, for only legal issues
remain.
SubstantiveMerits
I
ProhibitionunderSection15,ArticleVIIdoesnotapply
toappointmentstofillavacancyintheSupremeCourt
ortootherappointmentstotheJudiciary
Twoconstitutionalprovisionsareseeminglyinconflict.
Thefirst,Section15,ArticleVII(ExecutiveDepartment),provides:
Section15.Twomonthsimmediatelybeforethenextpresidentialelectionsanduptotheend
of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary
appointmentstoexecutivepositionswhencontinuedvacanciesthereinwillprejudicepublicservice
orendangerpublicsafety.
Theother,Section4(1),ArticleVIII(JudicialDepartment),states:
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Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen
Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven
Members.Anyvacancyshallbefilledwithinninetydaysfromtheoccurrencethereof.
In the consolidated petitions, the petitioners, with the exception of Soriano,Tolentino and
Inting,submitthattheincumbentPresidentcanappointthesuccessorofChiefJusticePunoupon
his retirement on May 17, 2010, on the ground that the prohibition against presidential
appointmentsunderSection15,ArticleVIIdoesnotextendtoappointmentsintheJudiciary.
TheCourtagreeswiththesubmission.
First. The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the
framers devoted time to meticulously drafting, styling, and arranging the Constitution. Such
meticulousness indicates that the organization and arrangement of the provisions of the
Constitutionwerenotarbitrarilyorwhimsicallydonebytheframers,butpurposelymadetoreflect
theirintentionandmanifesttheirvisionofwhattheConstitutionshouldcontain.
The Constitution consists of 18 Articles, three of which embody the allocation of the
awesomepowersofgovernmentamongthethreegreatdepartments,theLegislative(ArticleVI),
theExecutive(ArticleVII),andtheJudicialDepartments(ArticleVIII).Thearrangementwasa
true recognition of the principle of separation of powers that underlies the political structure, as
ConstitutionalCommissionerAdolfoS.Azcuna(lateraworthymemberoftheCourt)explainedin
hissponsorshipspeech:
We have in the political part of this Constitution opted for the separation of powers in
governmentbecausewebelievethattheonlywaytoprotectfreedomandlibertyistoseparateand
dividetheawesomepowersofgovernment.Hence,wereturntotheseparationofpowersdoctrine
andthelegislative,executiveandjudicialdepartments.
[66]
Ascanbeseen,ArticleVIIisdevotedtotheExecutiveDepartment,and,amongothers,it
liststhepowersvestedbytheConstitutioninthePresident.Thepresidentialpowerofappointment
isdealtwithinSections14,15and16oftheArticle.
ArticleVIIIisdedicatedtotheJudicialDepartmentanddefinesthedutiesandqualifications
ofMembersoftheSupremeCourt,amongothers.Section4(1)andSection9ofthisArticlearethe
provisions specifically providing for the appointment of Supreme Court Justices. In particular,
Section9statesthattheappointmentofSupremeCourtJusticescanonlybemadebythePresident
upon the submission of a list of at least three nominees by the JBC Section 4(1) of the Article
mandatesthePresidenttofillthevacancywithin90daysfromtheoccurrenceofthevacancy.
HadtheframersintendedtoextendtheprohibitioncontainedinSection15,ArticleVIIto
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theappointmentofMembersoftheSupremeCourt,theycouldhaveexplicitlydoneso.Theycould
not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely
writtentheprohibitionmadeexplicitinSection15,ArticleVIIasbeingequallyapplicabletothe
appointmentofMembersoftheSupremeCourtinArticleVIIIitself,mostlikelyinSection4(1),
Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the
PresidentorActingPresidentmakingappointmentswithintwomonthsbeforethenextpresidential
elections and up to the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents term does not refer to the
MembersoftheSupremeCourt.
[67]
Although Valenzuela
came to hold that the prohibition covered even judicial
appointments, it cannot be disputed that the Valenzuela dictum did not firmly rest on the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. Thereby, the confirmation made to the JBC by
then Senior Associate Justice Florenz D. Regalado of this Court, a former member of the
ConstitutionalCommission,abouttheprohibitionnotbeingintendedtoapplytotheappointments
totheJudiciary,whichconfirmationValenzuelaevenexpresslymentioned,shouldprevail.
Relevantly,ValenzuelaadvertedtotheintentoftheframersinthegenesisofSection4(1),Article
VIII,viz:
V.IntentoftheConstitutionalCommission
The journal of the Commission which drew up the present Constitution discloses that the
original proposal was to have an elevenmember Supreme Court. Commissioner Eulogio Lerum
wanted to increase the number of Justices to fifteen. He also wished to ensure that that number
would not be reduced for any appreciable length of time (even only temporarily), and to this end
proposedthatanyvacancymustbefilledwithintwomonthsfromthedatethatthevacancyoccurs.
Hisproposaltohavea15memberCourtwasnotinitiallyadopted.Persistinghoweverinhisdesire
to make certain that the sizeof the Court would not be decreased for any substantial period as a
resultofvacancies,Lerumproposedtheinsertionintheprovision(anenttheCourtsmembership)of
thesamemandatethatINCASEOFANYVACANCY,THESAMESHALLBEFILLEDWITHIN
TWO MONTHS FROM OCCURRENCETHEREOF.He later agreed to suggestions to make the
periodthree,insteadoftwo,months.Asthusamended,theproposalwasapproved.Asitturnedout,
however, the Commission ultimately agreed on a fifteenmember Court. Thus it was that the
sectionfixingthecompositionoftheSupremeCourtcametoincludeacommandtofillupany
vacancythereinwithin90daysfromitsoccurrence.
Inthisconnection,itmaybepointedoutthatthatinstructionthatanyvacancyshallbefilled
within ninety days (in the last sentence of Section 4 (1) of Article VIII) contrasts with the
prohibition in Section 15, Article VII, which is couched in stronger negative language that a
PresidentorActingPresidentshallnotmakeappointments
The commission later approved a proposal of Commissioner Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (now a
Member of this Court) to add to what is now Section 9 of Article VIII, the following paragraph:
WITH RESPECT TO LOWER COURTS, THE PRESIDENT SHALL ISSUE THE
APPOINTMENT WITHIN NINETY DAYS FROM THE SUBMISSION OF THE LIST (of
nomineesbytheJudicialandBarCounciltothePresident).Davidestatedthathispurposewasto
provide a uniform rule for lower courts. According to him, the 90day period should be counted
fromsubmissionofthelistofnomineestothePresidentinviewofthepossibilitythatthePresident
mightrejectthelistsubmittedtohimandtheJBCthusneedmoretimetosubmitanewone.
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mightrejectthelistsubmittedtohimandtheJBCthusneedmoretimetosubmitanewone.
On the other hand, Section 15, Article VII which in effect deprives the President of his
appointingpowertwomonthsimmediatelybeforethenextpresidentialelectionsuptotheendofhis
[68]
termwasapprovedwithoutdiscussion.
However,thereferencetotherecordsoftheConstitutionalCommissiondidnotadvanceorsupport
theresultinValenzuela.Fartothecontrary,therecordsdisclosedtheexpressintentoftheframers
toenshrineintheConstitution,upontheinitiativeofCommissionerEulogioLerum,acommand
[to the President] to fill up any vacancy therein within 90 days from its occurrence, which even
[69]
Valenzuela conceded.
The exchanges during deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
onOctober8,1986furthershowthatthefillingofavacancyintheSupremeCourtwithinthe90
dayperiodwasatruemandateforthePresident,viz:
MR.DECASTRO.IunderstandthatourjusticesnowintheSupremeCourt,togetherwiththe
ChiefJustice,areonly11.
MR.CONCEPCION.Yes.
MR.DECASTRO.Andthesecondsentenceofthissubsectionreads:Anyvacancyshallbe
filledwithinninetydaysfromtheoccurrencethereof.
MR.CONCEPCION.Thatisright.
MR.DECASTRO.Isthisnowamandatetotheexecutivetofillthevacancy?
MR.CONCEPCION.Thatisright.Thatisborneoutofthefactthatinthepast30years,
[70]
seldomhastheCourthadacompletecomplement.
Moreover,theusageinSection4(1),ArticleVIIIofthewordshallanimperative,operating
[71]
to impose a duty that may be enforced
should not be disregarded. Thereby, Sections 4(1)
imposesonthePresidenttheimperativedutytomakeanappointmentofaMemberoftheSupreme
Courtwithin90daysfromtheoccurrenceofthevacancy.ThefailurebythePresidenttodosowill
beacleardisobediencetotheConstitution.
The90daylimitationfixedinSection4(1),ArticleVIIIforthePresidenttofillthevacancy
intheSupremeCourtwasundoubtedlyaspecialprovisiontoestablishadefinitemandateforthe
President as the appointing power, and cannot be defeated by mere judicial interpretation in
ValenzuelatotheeffectthatSection15,ArticleVIIprevailedbecauseitwascouchedinstronger
negativelanguage.Suchinterpretationeventurnedouttobeconjectural,inlightoftherecordsof
theConstitutionalCommissionsdeliberationsonSection4(1),ArticleVIII.
HowValenzuelajustifieditspronouncementandresultishardlywarranted.Accordingtoan
[72]
authorityonstatutoryconstruction:
xxxthecourtshouldseektoavoidanyconflictintheprovisionsofthestatutebyendeavoring
toharmonizeandreconcileeverypartsothateachshallbeeffective.Itisnoteasytodraftastatute,
oranyotherwritingforthatmatter,whichmaynotinsomemannercontainconflictingprovisions.
Butwhatappearstothereadertobeaconflictmaynothaveseemedsotothedrafter.Undoubtedly,
eachprovisionwasinsertedforadefinitereason.Oftenbyconsideringtheenactmentinitsentirety,
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eachprovisionwasinsertedforadefinitereason.Oftenbyconsideringtheenactmentinitsentirety,
whatappearstobeonitsfaceaconflictmaybeclearedupandtheprovisionsreconciled.
Consequently, that construction which will leave every word operative will be favored over
onewhichleavessomewordorprovisionmeaninglessbecauseofinconsistency.Butawordshould
notbegiveneffect,iftodosogivesthestatuteameaningcontrarytotheintentofthelegislature.
On the other hand, if full effect cannot be given to the words of a statute, they must be made
effective as far as possible. Nor should the provisions of a statute which are inconsistent be
harmonized at a sacrifice of the legislative intention. It may be that two provisions are
irreconcilableifso,theonewhichexpressestheintentofthelawmakersshouldcontrol.Andthe
arbitraryrulehasbeenfrequentlyannouncedthatwherethereisanirreconcilableconflictbetween
thedifferentprovisionsofastatute,theprovisionlastinorderofpositionwillprevail,sinceitisthe
latest expression of the legislative will. Obviously, the rule is subject to deserved criticism. It is
seldom applied, and probably then only where an irreconcilable conflict exists between different
sections of the same act, and after all other means of ascertaining the meaning of the legislature
havebeenexhausted.Wheretheconflictisbetweentwostatutes,moremaybesaidinfavorofthe
rulesapplication,largelybecauseoftheprincipleofimpliedrepeal.
Inthisconnection,PHILCONSAsurgingofarevisitandareviewofValenzuela is timely
andappropriate.ValenzuelaarbitrarilyignoredtheexpressintentoftheConstitutionalCommission
to have Section 4 (1), Article VIII stand independently of any other provision, least of all one
found in Article VII. It further ignored that the two provisions had no irreconcilable conflict,
regardless of Section 15, Article VII being couched in the negative. As judges, we are not to
[73]
undulyinterpret,andshouldnotacceptaninterpretationthatdefeatstheintentoftheframers.
Consequently,prohibitingtheincumbentPresidentfromappointingaChiefJusticeonthepremise
that Section 15, Article VII extends to appointments in the Judiciary cannot be sustained. A
misinterpretationlikeValenzuelashouldnotbeallowedto last after its false premises have been
[74]
exposed.
ItwillnotdotomerelydistinguishValenzuelafromthesecases,fortheresulttobe
reached herein is entirely incompatible with what Valenzuela decreed. Consequently, Valenzuela
nowdeservestobequicklysenttothedustbinoftheunworthyandforgettable.
WereverseValenzuela.
Second. Section 15, Article VII does not apply as well to all other appointments in the
Judiciary.
ThereisnoquestionthatoneofthereasonsunderlyingtheadoptionofSection15aspartof
Article VII was to eliminate midnight appointments from being made by an outgoing Chief
[75]
ExecutiveinthemoldoftheappointmentsdealtwithintheleadingcaseofAytonav.Castillo.
Infact,inValenzuela,theCourtsoobserved,statingthat:
xxxitappearsthatSection15,ArticleVIIisdirectedagainsttwotypesofappointments:(1)
thosemadeforbuyingvotesand(2)thosemadeforpartisanconsiderations.Thefirstreferstothose
appointmentsmadewithinthetwomonthsprecedingaPresidentialelectionandaresimilartothose
whicharedeclaredelectionoffensesintheOmnibusElectionCode,viz.:
xxx
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The second type of appointments prohibited by Section 15, Article VII consists of the so
called midnight appointments. In Aytona v. Castillo, it was held that after the proclamation of
DiosdadoMacapagalasdulyelectedPresident,PresidentCarlosP.Garcia,whowasdefeatedinhis
bidforreelection,becamenomorethanacaretakeradministratorwhosedutywastoprepareforthe
orderlytransferofauthoritytotheincomingPresident.SaidtheCourt:
Thefillingupofvacanciesinimportantpositions,iffew,andsospacedastoaffordsome
assuranceofdeliberateactionandcarefulconsiderationoftheneedfortheappointmentand
appointee's qualifications may undoubtedly be permitted. But the issuance of 350
appointments in one night and the planned induction of almost all of them in a few hours
before the inauguration of the new President may, with some reason, be regarded by the
latter as an abuse of Presidential prerogatives, the steps taken being apparently a mere
partisan effort to fill all vacant positions irrespective of fitness and other conditions, and
thereby to deprive the new administration of an opportunity to make the corresponding
appointments.
Asindicated,theCourtrecognizedthattheremaywellbeappointmentstoimportantpositions
whichhavetobemadeevenaftertheproclamationofthenewPresident.Suchappointments,so
longastheyarefewandsospacedastoaffordsomeassuranceofdeliberateactionandcareful
considerationoftheneedfortheappointmentandtheappointeesqualifications, canbemade
by the outgoing President. Accordingly, several appointments made by President Garcia, which
wereshowntohavebeenwellconsidered,wereupheld.
Section 15, Article VII has a broader scope than the Aytona ruling. It may not
unreasonably be deemed to contemplate not only midnight appointments those made
obviouslyforpartisanreasonsasshownbytheirnumberandthetimeoftheirmakingbutalso
appointmentspresumedmadeforthepurposeofinfluencingtheoutcomeofthePresidential
election.
Ontheotherhand,theexceptioninthesameSection15ofArticleVIIallowingappointments
tobemadeduringtheperiodofthebanthereinprovidedismuchnarrowerthanthatrecognizedin
Aytona. The exception allows only the making of temporary appointments to executive positions
when continued vacancies will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.Obviously,the
articlegreatlyrestrictstheappointingpowerofthePresidentduringtheperiodoftheban.
Consideringtherespectivereasonsforthetimeframesforfillingvacanciesinthecourtsand
the restriction on the President's power of appointment, it is this Courts view that, as a general
proposition,incaseofconflict,theformershouldyieldtothelatter.Surely,thepreventionofvote
buyingandsimilarevilsoutweighstheneedforavoidingdelaysinfillingupofcourtvacanciesor
the disposition of some cases. Temporary vacancies can abide the period of the ban which,
incidentallyandasearlierpointedout,comestoexistonlyonceineverysixyears.Moreover,those
occurringinthelowercourtscanbefilledtemporarilybydesignation.Butprohibitedappointments
arelonglastingandpermanentintheireffects.Theymay,asearlierpointedout,infactinfluencethe
[76]
resultsofelectionsand,forthatreason,theirmakingisconsideredanelectionoffense.
GiventhebackgroundandrationalefortheprohibitioninSection15,ArticleVII,wehave
nodoubtthattheConstitutionalCommissionconfinedtheprohibitiontoappointmentsmadeinthe
ExecutiveDepartment.Theframersdidnotneedtoextendtheprohibitiontoappointmentsinthe
Judiciary, because their establishment of the JBC and their subjecting the nomination and
screeningofcandidatesforjudicialpositionstotheunhurriedanddeliberatepriorprocessofthe
JBC ensured that there would no longer be midnight appointments to the Judiciary. If midnight
appointments in the mold of Aytona were made in haste and with irregularities, or made by an
outgoing Chief Executive in the last days of his administration out of a desire to subvert the
[77]
policiesoftheincomingPresidentorforpartisanship,
theappointmentstotheJudiciarymade
aftertheestablishmentoftheJBCwouldnotbesufferingfromsuchdefectsbecauseoftheJBCs
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aftertheestablishmentoftheJBCwouldnotbesufferingfromsuchdefectsbecauseoftheJBCs
prior processing of candidates. Indeed, it is axiomatic in statutory construction that the

ascertainmentofthepurposeoftheenactmentisastepintheprocessofascertainingtheintentor
meaning of the enactment, because the reason for the enactment must necessarily shed
considerable light on the law of the statute, i.e., the intent hence, the enactment should be
construedwithreferencetoitsintendedscopeandpurpose,andthecourtshouldseektocarryout
[78]
thispurposeratherthantodefeatit.
Also,theinterventionoftheJBCeliminatesthedangerthatappointmentstotheJudiciary
can be made for the purpose of buying votes in a coming presidential election, or of satisfying
partisanconsiderations.TheexperiencefromthetimeoftheestablishmentoftheJBCshowsthat
evencandidatesforjudicialpositionsatanylevelbackedbypeopleinfluentialwiththePresident
couldnotalwaysbeassuredofbeingrecommendedfortheconsiderationofthePresident,because
theyfirsthadtoundergothevettingoftheJBCandpassmusterthere.Indeed,thecreationofthe
JBCwaspreciselyintendedtodepoliticizetheJudiciarybydoingawaywiththeinterventionof
theCommissiononAppointments.ThisinsulatingprocesswasabsentfromtheAytona midnight
appointment.
Third.Asearlierstated,thenonapplicabilityofSection15,ArticleVIItoappointmentsin
theJudiciarywasconfirmedbythenSeniorAssociateJusticeRegaladototheJBCitselfwhenit
metonMarch9,1998todiscussthequestionraisedbysomesectorsabouttheconstitutionalityof
xxx appointments to the Court of Appeals in light of the forthcoming presidential elections. He
assured that on the basis of the (Constitutional) Commissions records, the election ban had no
[79]
applicationtoappointmentstotheCourtofAppeals.
Thisconfirmationwasaccepted by the
JBC, which then submitted to the President for consideration the nominations for the eight
[80]
vacanciesintheCourtofAppeals.
The fault of Valenzuela was that it accorded no weight and due consideration to the
confirmation of Justice Regalado. Valenzuela was weak, because it relied on interpretation to
determine the intent of the framers rather than on the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission. Much of the unfounded doubt about the Presidents power to appoint during the
periodofprohibitioninSection15,ArticleVIIcouldhavebeendispelledsinceitspromulgation
onNovember9,1998,hadValenzuelaproperlyacknowledgedandreliedontheconfirmationofa
distinguishedmemberoftheConstitutionalCommissionlikeJusticeRegalado.
Fourth.Ofthe23sectionsinArticleVII,three(i.e.,Section14,Section15,andSection16)
concerntheappointingpowersofthePresident.
Section14speaksofthepowerofthesucceedingPresidenttorevokeappointmentsmadeby
[81]
anActingPresident,
andevidentlyrefersonlytoappointmentsintheExecutiveDepartment.It
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andevidentlyrefersonlytoappointmentsintheExecutiveDepartment.It
hasnoapplicationtoappointmentsintheJudiciary,becausetemporaryoractingappointmentscan
[82]
only undermine the independence of the Judiciary due to their being revocable at will.
The
letterandspiritoftheConstitutionsafeguardthatindependence.Also,thereisnolawinthebooks
thatauthorizestherevocationofappointmentsintheJudiciary.Priortotheirmandatoryretirement
orresignation,judgesofthefirstandsecondlevelcourtsandtheJusticesofthethirdlevelcourts
mayonlyberemovedforcause,buttheMembersoftheSupremeCourtmayberemovedonlyby
impeachment.
Section 16 covers only the presidential appointments that require confirmation by the
CommissiononAppointments.Thereby,theConstitutionalCommissionrestoredtherequirement
ofconfirmationbytheCommissiononAppointmentsaftertherequirementwasremovedfromthe
1973 Constitution. Yet, because of Section 9 of Article VIII, the restored requirement did not
[83]
includeappointmentstotheJudiciary.
Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they
affectthepowerofthePresidenttoappoint.ThefactthatSection14andSection16referonlyto
appointments within the Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies
onlytotheExecutiveDepartment.Thisconclusionisconsistentwiththerulethateverypartofthe
statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be considered
together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.
[84]
ItisabsurdtoassumethattheframersdeliberatelysituatedSection15betweenSection14and
Section16,iftheyintendedSection15tocoverallkindsofpresidentialappointments.Ifthatwas
theirintentioninrespectofappointmentstotheJudiciary,theframers,ifonlytobeclear,would
haveeasilyandsurelyinsertedasimilarprohibitioninArticleVIII,mostlikelywithinSection4
(1)thereof.
Fifth.ToholdliketheCourtdidinValenzuelathatSection15extendstoappointmentstothe
Judiciary further undermines the intent of the Constitution of ensuring the independence of the
JudicialDepartmentfromtheExecutiveandLegislativeDepartments.Suchaholdingwilltiethe
JudiciaryandtheSupremeCourttothefortunesormisfortunesofpoliticalleadersvyingforthe
Presidency in a presidential election. Consequently, the wisdom of having the new President,
instead of the current incumbent President, appoint the next Chief Justice is itself suspect, and
cannot ensure judicial independence, because the appointee can also become beholden to the
appointing authority. In contrast, the appointment by the incumbent President does not run the
sameriskofcompromisingjudicialindependence,preciselybecausehertermwillendbyJune30,
2010.
Sixth. The argument has been raised to the effect that there will be no need for the
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incumbentPresidenttoappointduringtheprohibitionperiodthesuccessorofChiefJusticePuno
withinthecontextofSection4(1),ArticleVIII,becauseanywaytherewillstillbeabout45days
ofthe90daysmandatedinSection4(1),ArticleVIIIremaining.
Theargumentisflawed,becauseitisfocusedonlyonthecomingvacancyoccurringfrom
ChiefJusticePunosretirementbyMay17,2010.ItignorestheneedtoapplySection4(1)toevery
situationofavacancyintheSupremeCourt.
Theargumentalsorestsonthefallaciousassumptionthattherewillstillbetimeremaining
in the 90day period under Section 4(1), Article VIII. The fallacy is easily demonstrable, as the
OSGhasshowninitscomment.
Section4(3),ArticleVIIrequirestheregularelectionstobeheldonthesecondMondayof
May, letting the elections fall on May 8, at the earliest, or May 14, at the latest. If the regular
presidentialelectionsareheldonMay8,theperiodoftheprohibitionis115days.Ifsuchelections
areheldonMay14,theperiodoftheprohibitionis109days.Eitherperiodoftheprohibitionis
longerthanthefullmandatory90dayperiodtofillthevacancyintheSupremeCourt.Theresultis
thatthereareatleast19occasions(i.e.,thedifferencebetweentheshortestpossibleperiodofthe
ban of 109 days and the 90day mandatory period for appointments) in which the outgoing
Presidentwouldbeinnopositiontocomplywiththeconstitutionaldutytofillupavacancyinthe
SupremeCourt.ItissafetoassumethattheframersoftheConstitutioncouldnothaveintended
such an absurdity. In fact, in their deliberations on the mandatory period for the appointment of
Supreme Court Justices under Section 4 (1), Article VIII, the framers neither discussed, nor
mentioned,norreferredtothebanagainstmidnightappointmentsunderSection15,ArticleVII,or
itseffectsonthe90dayperiod,orviceversa.Theydidnotneedto,becausetheyneverintended
Section15,ArticleVIItoapplytoavacancyintheSupremeCourt,orinanyofthelowercourts.
Seventh.Asamatteroffact,inanextremecase,wecanevenraiseadoubtonwhetheraJBC
listisnecessaryatallforthePresidentanyPresidenttoappointaChiefJusticeiftheappointeeis
tocomefromtheranksofthesittingjusticesoftheSupremeCourt.
Sec.9,ArticleVIIIsays:
xxx.TheMembersoftheSupremeCourtxxxshallbeappointedbythePresidentfromalistof
at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for any vacancy. Such
appointmentsneednoconfirmation.
xxx
TheprovisionclearlyreferstoanappointeecomingintotheSupremeCourtfromtheoutside,that
is, a nonmember of the Court aspiring to become one. It speaks of candidates for the Supreme
Court, not of those who are already members or sitting justices of the Court, all of whom have
previouslybeenvettedbytheJBC.
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Can the President, therefore, appoint any of the incumbent Justices of the Court as Chief
Justice?
Thequestionisnotsquarelybeforeusatthemoment,butitshouldlenditselftoadeeper
analysis if and when circumstances permit. It should be a good issue for the proposed
Constitutional Convention to consider in the light of Senate President Juan Ponce Enriles
statement that the President can appoint the Chief Justice from among the sitting justices of the
CourtevenwithoutaJBClist.
II
TheJudiciaryActof1948
The posture has been taken that no urgency exists for the President to appoint the successor of
Chief Justice Puno, considering that the Judiciary Act of 1948 can still address the situation of
havingthenextPresidentappointthesuccessor.
Section12oftheJudiciaryActof1948states:
Section 12. Vacancy in Office of Chief Justice. In case of a vacancy in the office of Chief
JusticeoftheSupremeCourtorofhisinabilitytoperformthedutiesandpowersofhisoffice,they
shalldevolveupontheAssociateJusticewhoisfirstinprecedence,untilsuchdisabilityisremoved,
or another Chief Justice is appointed and duly qualified. This provision shall apply to every
AssociateJusticewhosucceedstotheofficeofChiefJustice.
TheprovisioncallsforanActingChiefJusticeintheeventofavacancyintheofficeofthe
ChiefJustice,orintheeventthattheChiefJusticeisunabletoperformhisdutiesandpowers.In
eitherofsuchcircumstances,thedutiesandpowersoftheofficeoftheChiefJusticeshalldevolve
upontheAssociateJusticewhoisfirstinprecedenceuntilanewChiefJusticeisappointedoruntil
thedisabilityisremoved.
Notwithstanding that there is no pressing need to dwell on this peripheral matter after the Court
has hereby resolved the question of consequence, we do not find it amiss to confront the matter
now.
Wecannotagreewiththeposture.
AreviewofSections4(1)and9ofArticleVIIIshowsthattheSupremeCourtiscomposedofa
ChiefJusticeand14AssociateJustices,whoallshallbeappointedbythePresidentfromalistof
at least three nominees prepared by the JBC for every vacancy, which appointments require no
confirmationbytheCommissiononAppointments.WithreferencetotheChiefJustice,heorshe
isappointedbythePresidentasChiefJustice,andtheappointmentisneverinanactingcapacity.
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TheexpressreferencetoaChiefJusticeabhorstheideathattheframerscontemplatedanActing
ChiefJusticetoheadthemembershipoftheSupremeCourt.Otherwise,theywouldhavesimply
writtensointheConstitution.Consequently,torelyonSection12oftheJudiciaryActof1948in
ordertoforestalltheimperativeneedtoappointthenextChiefJusticesoonestistodefytheplain
intentoftheConstitution.
Forsure,theframersintendedthepositionofChiefJusticetobepermanent,notonetobe
occupiedinanactingortemporarycapacity.Inrelationtotheschemeofthingsunderthepresent
Constitution,Section12oftheJudiciaryActof1948onlyrespondstoararesituationinwhichthe
new Chief Justice is not yet appointed, or in which the incumbent Chief Justice is unable to
perform the duties and powers of the office. It ought to be remembered, however, that it was
enacted because the Chief Justice appointed under the 1935 Constitution was subject to the
confirmationoftheCommissiononAppointments,andtheconfirmationprocessmighttakelonger
thanexpected.
The appointment of the next Chief Justice by the incumbent President is preferable to
havingtheAssociateJusticewhoisfirstinprecedencetakeover.UndertheConstitution,theheads
oftheLegislativeandExecutiveDepartmentsarepopularlyelected,andwhoeverareelectedand
proclaimedatoncebecometheleadersoftheirrespectiveDepartments.However,thelackofany
appointedoccupantoftheofficeofChiefJusticeharmstheindependenceoftheJudiciary,because
the Chief Justice is the head of the entire Judiciary. The Chief Justice performs functions
absolutelysignificanttothelifeofthenation.WiththeentireSupremeCourtbeingthePresidential
ElectoralTribunal,theChiefJusticeistheChairmanoftheTribunal.Therebeingnoobstacleto
the appointment of the next Chief Justice, aside from its being mandatory for the incumbent
Presidenttomakewithinthe90dayperiodfromMay17,2010,thereisnojustificationtoinsist
thatthesuccessorofChiefJusticePunobeappointedbythenextPresident.
Historically, under the present Constitution, there has been no wide gap between the
retirementandtheresignationofanincumbentChiefJustice,ononehand,andtheappointmentto
andassumptionofofficeofhissuccessor,ontheotherhand.Assummarizedinthecommentofthe
OSG,thechronologyofsuccessionisasfollows:
1. WhenChiefJusticeClaudioTeehankeeretiredonApril 18, 1988, Chief Justice

PedroYapwasappointedonthesameday
2.WhenChiefJusticeYapretiredonJuly1,1988,ChiefJusticeMarceloFernanwas
appointedonthesameday
3. WhenChiefJusticeFernanresignedonDecember7,1991,ChiefJusticeAndres
Narvasawasappointedthefollowingday,December8,1991
4.WhenChiefJusticeNarvasaretiredonNovember29,1998,ChiefJusticeHilario
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4.WhenChiefJusticeNarvasaretiredonNovember29,1998,ChiefJusticeHilario
Davide, Jr. was sworn into office the following early morning of November 30,
1998
5.WhenChiefJusticeDavideretiredonDecember19,2005,ChiefJusticeArtemio
Panganibanwasappointedthenextday,December20,2005and
6. When Chief Justice Panganiban retired on December 6, 2006, Chief Justice

ReynatoS.PunotookhisoathasChiefJusticeatmidnightofDecember6,2006.
[85]
III
WritofmandamusdoesnotlieagainsttheJBC
MaytheJBCbecompelledtosubmitthelistofnomineestothePresident?
Mandamusshallissuewhenanytribunal,corporation,board,officerorpersonunlawfullyneglects
theperformanceofanactthatthelawspecificallyenjoinsasadutyresultingfromanoffice,trust,
[86]
or station.
It is proper when the act against which it is directed is one addressed to the
discretionofthetribunalorofficer.Mandamusisnotavailabletodirecttheexerciseofajudgment
[87]
ordiscretioninaparticularway.
Formandamustolie,thefollowingrequisitesmustbecompliedwith:(a)theplaintiffhasaclear
legalrighttotheactdemanded(b)itmustbethedutyofthedefendanttoperformtheact,because
itismandatedbylaw(c)thedefendantunlawfullyneglectstheperformanceofthedutyenjoined
bylaw(d)theacttobeperformedisministerial,notdiscretionaryand(e)thereisnoappealor
anyotherplain,speedyandadequateremedyintheordinarycourseoflaw.
Section8(5)andSection9,ArticleVIII,mandatetheJBCtosubmitalistofatleastthree
nomineestothePresidentforeveryvacancyintheJudiciary:
Section8.xxx
(5) The Council shall have the principal function of recommending appointees to the
Judiciary.xxx
Section9.TheMembersoftheSupremeCourtandjudgesoflowercourtsshallbeappointed
bythePresidentfromalistofatleastthreenomineespreparedbytheJudicialandBarCouncil
foreveryvacancy.Suchappointmentsneednoconfirmation.
Forthelowercourts,thePresidentshallissuetheappointmentswithinninetydaysfrom
thesubmissionofthelist.
However,Section4(1)andSection9,ArticleVIII,mandatethePresidenttofillthevacancy
intheSupremeCourtwithin90daysfromtheoccurrenceofthevacancy,andwithin90daysfrom
the submission of the list, in the case of the lower courts. The 90day period is directed at the
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the submission of the list, in the case of the lower courts. The 90day period is directed at the
President,notattheJBC.Thus,theJBCshouldstarttheprocessofselectingthecandidatestofill
thevacancyintheSupremeCourtbeforetheoccurrenceofthevacancy.
Under the Constitution, it is mandatory for the JBC to submit to the President the list of
nomineestofillavacancyintheSupremeCourtinordertoenablethePresidenttoappointoneof
themwithinthe90dayperiodfromtheoccurrenceofthevacancy.TheJBChasnodiscretionto
submitthelisttothePresidentafterthevacancyoccurs,becausethatshortensthe90dayperiod
allowedbytheConstitutionforthePresidenttomaketheappointment.FortheJBCtodosowill
beunconscionableonitspart,consideringthatitwilltherebyeffectivelyandillegallydeprivethe
PresidentoftheampletimegrantedundertheConstitutiontoreflectonthequalificationsofthe
nomineesnamedinthelistoftheJBCbeforemakingtheappointment.
ThedutyoftheJBCtosubmitalistofnomineesbeforethestartofthePresidentsmandatory
90dayperiodtoappointisministerial,butitsselectionofthecandidateswhosenameswillbein
the list to be submitted to the President lies within the discretion of the JBC. The object of the
petitionsformandamushereinshouldonlyrefertothedutytosubmittothePresidentthelistof
nominees for every vacancy in the Judiciary, because in order to constitute unlawful neglect of
[88]
duty,theremustbeanunjustifieddelayinperformingthatduty.
Formandamustolieagainst
theJBC,therefore,thereshouldbeanunexplaineddelayonitspartinrecommendingnomineesto
theJudiciary,thatis,insubmittingthelisttothePresident.
Thedistinctionbetweenaministerialactandadiscretionaryonehasbeendelineatedinthe
followingmanner:
Thedistinctionbetweenaministerialanddiscretionaryactiswelldelineated.Apurelyministerial
act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a
prescribedmanner,inobediencetothemandateofalegalauthority,withoutregardtoorthe
exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law
imposesadutyuponapublicofficerandgiveshimtherighttodecidehoworwhentheduty
shallbeperformed,suchdutyisdiscretionaryandnotministerial.Thedutyisministerialonly
whenthedischargeofthesamerequiresneithertheexerciseofofficialdiscretionorjudgment.
[89]
Accordingly,wefindnosufficientgroundstograntthepetitionsformandamusandtoissueawrit
ofmandamusagainsttheJBC.Theactionsforthatpurposearepremature,becauseitisclearthat
theJBCstillhasuntilMay17,2010,atthelatest,withinwhichtosubmitthelistofnomineesto
thePresidenttofillthevacancycreatedbythecompulsoryretirementofChiefJusticePuno.
IV
WritofprohibitiondoesnotlieagainsttheJBC
33/39
12/3/2016
G.R.No.191002
Inlightoftheforegoingdisquisitions,theconclusionisineluctablethatonlythePresident
canappointtheChiefJustice.Hence,SorianospetitionforprohibitioninG.R.No.191032,which
proposestopreventtheJBCfrominterveningintheprocessofnominatingthesuccessorofChief
JusticePuno,lacksmerit.
On the other hand, the petition for prohibition in G.R. No. 191342 is similarly devoid of
merit. The challenge mounted against the composition of the JBC based on the allegedly
unconstitutionalallocationofavoteeachtotheexofficiomembersfromtheSenateandtheHouse
ofRepresentatives,therebyprejudicingthechancesofsomecandidatesfornominationbyraising
theminimumnumberofvotesrequiredinaccordancewiththerulesoftheJBC,isnotbasedonthe
petitionersactualinterest,becausetheyhavenotallegedintheirpetitionthattheywerenominated
totheJBCtofillsomevacanciesintheJudiciary.Thus,thepetitionerslacklocusstandi on that
issue.
WHEREFORE,theCourt:
1. DismissesthepetitionsforcertiorariandmandamusinG.R.No.191002andG.R.No.
191149,andthepetitionformandamusinG.R.No.191057forbeingpremature
2.DismissesthepetitionsforprohibitioninG.R.No.191032andG.R.No.191342forlack
ofmeritand
3.GrantsthepetitioninA.M.No.1025SCand,accordingly,directstheJudicialandBar
Council:
(a)Toresumeitsproceedingsforthenominationofcandidatestofillthevacancyto
becreatedbythecompulsoryretirementofChiefJusticeReynatoS.PunobyMay
17,2010
(b)TopreparetheshortlistofnomineesforthepositionofChiefJustice
(c)TosubmittotheincumbentPresidenttheshortlistofnomineesforthepositionof
ChiefJusticeonorbeforeMay17,2010and
(d)Tocontinueitsproceedingsforthenominationofcandidatestofillothervacancies
in the Judiciary and submit to the President the short list of nominees
correspondingtheretoinaccordancewiththisdecision.
SOORDERED.
34/39
12/3/2016
LUCASP.BERSAMIN
AssociateJustice
WECONCUR:
G.R.No.191002
REYNATOS.PUNO
ChiefJustice
ANTONIOT.CARPIORENATOC.CORONA
AssociateJusticeAssociateJustice
CONCHITACARPIOMORALESPRESBITEROJ.VELASCO,JR.
ANTONIOEDUARDOB.NACHURATERESITAJ.LEONARDODECASTRO
ARTUROD.BRIONDIOSDADOM.PERALTA
MARIANOC.DELCASTILLOROBERTOA.ABAD
35/39
12/3/2016
G.R.No.191002
MARTINS.VILLARAMA,JR.JOSEPORTUGALPEREZ
JOSECATRALMENDOZA
AssociateJustice
CERTIFICATION
PursuanttoSection13,ArticleVIIIoftheConstitution,itisherebycertifiedthattheconclusions
intheaboveDecisionhadbeenreachedinconsultationbeforethecasewasassignedtothewriter
oftheopinionoftheCourt.
REYNATOS.PUNO
ChiefJustice
[1]
FiledonFebruary9,2010.
[2]
BegunonFebruary23,2010.
[3]
InitiatedonFebruary10,2010.
[4]
CommencedonFebruary11,2010.
[5]
DatedFebruary15,2010.
[6]
FiledonMarch8,2010.
[7]
A.M.No.98501SC,November9,1998,298SCRA408.
[8]
PetitioninG.R.No.191002,pp.34.
[9]
Id.,p.5.
[10]
[11]
[12]
Id.,p.11.
[13]
PetitioninG.R.No.191149.
[14]
PetitioninG.R.No.191342.
[15]
http://jbc.judiciary.gov.ph/announcements/JBCreCJ.pdf
[16]
http://jbc.judiciary.gov.ph/announcements/jbc_announce_2009/jan22%20%2710.pdf
[17]
CommentoftheJBC,p.3.
[18]
Id.
36/39
12/3/2016
Id.
[19]
Id.,pp.45.
[20]
Id.,p.5.
[21]
Id.
[22]
Id.,p.6.
G.R.No.191002
[23]
PetitioninA.M.No.1025SC,pp.56.
[24]
CommentoftheJBC,p.6.
[25]
Id.,p.7boldemphasisisintheoriginaltext.
[26]
CommentoftheOSG,pp.1314.
[27]
Id.,p.14.
[28]
Id.,p.15.
[29]
Id.,pp.2024.
[30]
Id.,pp.2527.
[31]
Id.,pp.2930.
[32]
Id.
[33]
Id.,pp.3233.
[34]
Id.,pp.3435.
[35]
Id.
[36]
Id.,pp.3536.TheOSGposits:
NationalinterestcompelsthePresidenttomakesuchappointmentforitisparticularlyduringthiscrucialperiodwhennational
leadersareseekingfreshmandatesfromthepeoplethattheSupremeCourt,morethanatanyothertime,representsstability.Hence,
afullcourtisidealtoensurenotonlyduedeliberationonandcarefulconsiderationofissuesbutalsoexpeditiousdispositionof
cases.
Indeed, such function becomes especially significant in view of the fact that this is the first time that the whole country will
experienceautomatedelections.
[37]
Id.,pp.3637.TheOSGstresses:
ThepossiblefalloutsorseriousaftermathofallowingavacuuminthepositionoftheChiefJusticemaybegreaterandriskier
thantheconsequencesorrepercussionsofinaction.Needlesstostate,theappointmentoftheChiefJusticeofthisHonorableCourt
(sic)isthemostimportantappointmentvestedbythe1987Constitutionto(sic)thePresident.
[38]
Id.,p.37.
[39]
Id.,p.38.
[40]
FiledbyAtty.PiteroM.Reig.
[41]
BlacksLawDictionary,941(6th Ed.1991).
[42]
G.R.No.155001,May5,2003,402SCRA612.
[43]
CitingKilosbayan,Inc.v.Morato,G.R.No.118910,July17,1995,246SCRA540,562563,citingBakerv.Carr,369U.S.186,7
L.Ed.633(1962).
[44]
CitingKilosbayan,Inc.v.Morato,supraBayanv.Zamora,G.R.No.138570,October10,2000342SCRA449,478.
[45]
65Phil.56.
[46]
G.R.No.117,November7,1945(Unreported).
[47]
G.R.No.2947,January11,1959(Unreported).
[48]
77Phil.1012(1947).
[49]
110Phil.331(1960).
[50]
84Phil.368(1949)
[51]
E.g., Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, July 9, 2002, 384 SCRA 152 (in which the Court ruled that the
enforcement of the constitutional right to information and the equitable diffusion of natural resources are matters of transcendental
importance which clothe the petitioner with locus standi) Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora, G.R. Nos. 138570, 138572,
138587,138680,138698,October10,2000,342SCRA449(inwhichtheCourtheldthatgiventhetranscendentalimportanceofthe
issues involved, the Court may relax the standing requirements and allow the suit to prosper despite the lack of direct injury to the
partiesseekingjudicialreviewoftheVisitingForcesAgreement)Limv.ExecutiveSecretary,G.R. No. 151445, April 11, 2002, 380
SCRA739(inwhichtheCourt,albeitconcedingthatthepetitionersmightnotfilesuitintheircapacityastaxpayerswithoutashowing
thatBalikatan0201involvedtheexerciseofCongresstaxingorspendingpowers,reiteratedBagongAlyansangMakabayanv.Zamora,
declaringthatcasesoftranscendentalimportancemustbesettledpromptlyanddefinitelyandthestandingrequirementsmayberelaxed)
37/39
12/3/2016
G.R.No.191002
andOsmeav.CommissiononElections,G.R.No.100318,100308,100417,100420,July30,1991,199SCRA750(inwhichtheCourt
heldthatwhereseriousconstitutionalquestionswereinvolved,thetranscendentalimportancetothepublicofthecasesdemandedthat
theybesettledpromptlyanddefinitely,brushingasidetechnicalitiesofprocedure).
[52]
LNo.40004,January31,1975,62SCRA275.
[53]
E.g.,Taadav.Tuvera,G.R.No.63915,April24,1985,136SCRA27(inwhichtheCourtheldthatitissufficientthatthepetitioner
isacitizeninterestedintheexecutionofthelaw,becausethequestionisoneofpublicdutyandtheenforcementofapublicright,and
thepeoplearetherealpartyininterest)Legaspiv.CivilServiceCommission,G.R.No.72119,May29,1987,150SCRA530(inwhich
theCourtdeclaredthatwhereanassertionofapublicrightisinvolved,therequirementofpersonalinterestissatisfiedbythemerefact
that the petitioner is a citizen and is part of the general public which possesses the right) Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa
Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan, L. No. 81311, June 30, 1988, 163 SCRA 371 (in which the Court disregarded objections to
taxpayerslackofpersonalitytosueindeterminingthevalidityoftheVATLaw)Albanov.Reyes,G.R.No.83551,July11,1989,175
SCRA264(inwhichtheCourtpronouncedthatalthoughnoexpenditureofpublicfundswasinvolvedinthequestionedcontract,the
petitioner was nonetheless clothed with the legal personality under the disclosure provision of the Constitution to question it,
consideringitsimportantroleintheeconomicdevelopmentofthecountryandthemagnitudeofthefinancialconsiderationinvolved,
indicatingthatpublicinterestwasdefinitelyinvolved)andAssociationofSmallLandownersinthePhilippines,Inc.v.Sec.ofAgrarian
Reform,G.R.No.78742,July14,1989,175SCRA343(inwhichtheCourtruledthatithadthediscretiontowaivetherequirementof
locusstandiindeterminingthevalidityoftheimplementationoftheComprehensiveAgrarianReformProgram,althoughthepetitioners
werenot,strictlyspeaking,coveredbythedefinitionofproperparty).
[54]
Davidv.MacapagalArroyo,G.R.No.171396,May3,2006,489SCRA160.
[55]
275Ky91,120SW2d765(1938).
[56]
19Wend.56(1837).
[57]
232NC48,59SE2d359(1950).
[58]
Boldemphasisisintheoriginaltext.
[59]
PetitioninG.R.No.191032,p.2.
[60]
PetitioninG.R.No.191057,pp.34citingthecasesofPHILCONSAv.Gimenez,15SCRA479PHILCONSAv.Mathay,18SCRA
300PHILCONSAv.Enriquez,235SCRA506andLambinov.COMELEC,505SCRA160.
[61]
[62]
See, for instance, Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000, 338 SCRA 81 (where the
petitionerquestionedthevalidityofthedeploymentandutilizationoftheMarinestoassistthePNPinlawenforcement,assertingthat
IBPwastheofficialorganizationofFilipinolawyerstaskedwiththeboundendutytoupholdtheruleoflawandtheConstitution,but
theCourtheldthattheIBPhadnotshownthatitwassotasked:Inthiscase,areadingofthepetitionshowsthattheIBPhasadvanced
constitutionalissueswhichdeservetheattentionofthisCourtinviewoftheirseriousness,noveltyandweightasprecedents.Moreover,
because peace and order are under constant threat and lawless violence occurs in increasing tempo, undoubtedly aggravated by the
Mindanaoinsurgencyproblem,thelegalcontroversyraisedinthepetitionalmostcertainlywillnotgoaway.Itwillstareusintheface
again.It,therefore,behoovestheCourttorelaxtherulesonstandingandtoresolvetheissuenow,ratherthanlater,andwentonto
resolve the issues because the petitioner advanced constitutional issues that deserved the attention of the Court in view of their
seriousness,novelty,andweightasprecedents).
[63]
Supra,note42,p.645.
[64]
Id.
[65]
SeeBuckleyv.Valeo,424U.S.1,113118(1976)RegionalRailReoganizationActCases,419U.S.102,138148(1974).
[66]
RecordofProceedingsandDebatesoftheConstitutionalCommission,Vol.V.,p.912,October12,1998.
[67]
Supra,note6,p.426427,stating:
ConsideringtherespectivereasonsforthetimeframesforfillingvacanciesinthecourtsandtherestrictiononthePresidents
powerofappointment,itisthisCourtsviewthat,asageneralproposition,incaseofconflict,theformershouldyieldtothelatter.
Surely,thepreventionofvotebuyingandsimilarevilsoutweighstheneedforavoidingdelaysinfillingupofcourtvacanciesor
thedispositionofsomecases.Temporaryvacanciescanabidetheperiodofthebanwhich,incidentallyandasearlierpointedout,
comes to exist only once in every six years. Moreover, those occurring in the lower courts can be filled temporarily by
designation.Butprohibitedappointmentsarelonglastingandpermanentintheireffects.Theymay,asearlierpointedout,infact
influencetheresultsofelectionsand,forthatreason,theirmakingisconsideredanelectionoffense.
Tothecontentionthatmayperhapsbeasserted,thatSections4(1)and9ofArticleVIIIshouldprevailoverSection15of
ArticleVII,becausetheymaybeconsideredlaterexpressionsofthepeoplewhentheyadoptedtheConstitution,itsufficesto
pointoutthattheConstitutionmustbeconstruedinitsentiretyasone,single,instrument.
Tobesure,instancesmaybeconceivedoftheimperativeneedforanappointment,duringtheperiodoftheban,notonlyin
theexecutivebutalsointheSupremeCourt.Thismaybethecaseshouldthemembershipofthecourtbesoreducedthatitwill
havenoquorumorshouldthevotingonaparticularlyimportantquestionrequiringexpeditiousresolutionbeevenlydivided.
Suchacase,however,iscoveredbyneitherSection15ofArticleVIInorSection4(1)and9ofArticleVIII.
[68]
Id.,pp.422423.
[69]
Id.,p.423.
[70]
RecordofProceedingsandDebatesoftheConstitutionalCommission,Vol.V.,pp.632633.
38/39
12/3/2016
G.R.No.191002
[71]
Dizonv.Encarnacion,G.R.No.L18615,December24,1963,9SCRA714.
[72]
Crawford,Earl.T.,TheConstructionofStatutes,ThomasLawBookCompany,St.Louis,Missouri,262264(1940).
[73]
Garciav.SocialSecurityCommissionLegalandCollection,G.R.No.170735,December17,2007,540SCRA456,472citing
Escosurav.SanMiguelBrewery,Inc.,4SCRA285,(1962).
[74]
According to Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U. S. 203, 212 (1984): Although adherence to precedent is not rigidly required in
constitutional cases, any departure from the doctrine of stare decisis demands special justification. The special justification for the
reversalofValenzuelaliesinitsintrinsicunsoundness.
[75]
No.L19313,January19,1962,4SCRA1.
[76]
Supra,note6,pp.424426boldunderscoringsuppliedforemphasis.
[77]
Aytonav.Castillo,supra,note74,pp.810(N.B.InthetimematerialtoAytona,therewerejudgesoftheCourtofFirstInstance
whowereappointedtodistrictsthathadnovacancies,becausetheincumbentshadnotqualifiedforotherdistrictstowhichtheyhad
beensupposedlytransferredorpromotedatanyrate,theappointmentsstillrequiredconfirmationbytheCommissiononAppointments).
[78]
Crawford,op.cit.,supra,note72,pp.248249.
[79]
Supra,note6,p.413.
[80]Id.
[81]
Section14.AppointmentsextendedbyanActingPresidentshallremaineffective,unlessrevokedbytheelectedPresidentwithin
ninetydaysfromhisassumptionorreassumptionofoffice.
[82]
Cruz,I.,PhilippinePoliticalLaw,253(2002)alsoRillorazav.Vargas,80Phil.297(1948).
[83]
Record of Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. V., p. 908, which indicates that in his sponsorship
speechdeliveredonOctober12,1986ontheflooroftheConstitutionalCommission,CommissionerTeofistoGuingonaexplainedthat
[a]ppointmentstothejudiciaryshallnotbesubjecttoconfirmationbytheCommissiononAppointments.
[84]
Rodriguez,StatutoryConstruction,171(1999).
[85]
CommentoftheOSG,p.37.
[86]
Section3,Rule65,1997RulesofCivilProcedure.
[87]
JGSummitHoldings,Inc.v.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.124293,November20,2000,345SCRA143.
[88]
Neryv.Gamolo,A.M.No.P011508,February7,2003,397SCRA110,citingMusniv.Morales,315SCRA85,86(1999).
[89]
Espiridionv.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.146933,June8,2006,490SCRA273.
.No.146933,June8,2006,490SCRA273.
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In Administrative Matter No. 1025SC,

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