DNV 2009-1115 Recommended Failure Rates For Pipelines Report

DET NORSKE VERITAS AS
Energy Report
Recommended Failure Rates for
Pipelines
Report no/DNV Reg No.: 2009-1115

Rev 1, 2010-11-16
2008 Det Norske Veritas AS
All rights reserved. This publication or parts thereof may not be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means,
including photocopying or recording, without the prior written consent of Det Norske Veritas AS.

Recommended Failure Rates for Pipelines
Table of Contents
1
CONCLUSIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................ 1

1.1
Introduction ................................................................................................................ 1
1.2
Recommended failure data......................................................................................... 3
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 6
2.1
Background ................................................................................................................ 6
2.2
Objectives................................................................................................................... 6
2.3
Definitions.................................................................................................................. 6
FAILURE FACTORS AND MECHANISMS................................................................. 7

3.1
Introduction ................................................................................................................ 7
3.2 Physical factors .......................................................................................................... 7

3.2.1 Process medium ................................................................................................... 7
3.2.2 Installation ........................................................................................................... 8
3.2.3 Corrosion prevention ........................................................................................... 8
3.2.4 Pipeline material .................................................................................................. 9
3.2.5 Material utilization factor .................................................................................... 9
3.2.6 Age..................................................................................................................... 10
3.2.7 Size .................................................................................................................... 10
3.2.8 Length of line..................................................................................................... 11
3.2.9 Location ............................................................................................................. 11
3.3 Failure mechanisms.................................................................................................. 12
3.3.1 Corrosion ........................................................................................................... 12
3.3.2 External interference.......................................................................................... 14
3.3.3 Design and construction failures ....................................................................... 15
3.3.4 Material, weld and manufacturing failures........................................................ 15
3.3.5 Operation and maintenance ............................................................................... 16
3.3.6 Monitoring and inspection................................................................................. 16
3.3.7 General observations ......................................................................................... 17
4
DATA SOURCES ............................................................................................................ 18

4.1
Introduction .............................................................................................................. 18
4.2
PARLOC .................................................................................................................. 18
4.3
Concawe ................................................................................................................... 19
4.4
Onshore gas pipelines............................................................................................... 19
4.5
Risers........................................................................................................................ 20
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FAILURE FREQUENCIES ........................................................................................... 21

5.1
Introduction .............................................................................................................. 21
5.2 Offshore pipelines, gas and oil................................................................................. 22

5.2.1 Well stream pipelines ........................................................................................ 24
5.2.2 Transport pipelines ............................................................................................ 25
5.2.3 Assessment of individual pipelines, pipeline characteristics............................. 27
5.2.4 Parameters not applicable for score assessment ................................................ 34
5.2.5 External loads within the platform safety zone ................................................. 34
5.2.6 Summary of recorded failure data for offshore pipelines.................................. 35
5.2.7 Flexible pipelines............................................................................................... 37
5.2.8 Production availability....................................................................................... 37
5.3 Onshore gas pipelines............................................................................................... 38
5.4
Onshore oil pipelines................................................................................................ 39
5.5
CO2 pipelines onshore / offshore .......................................................................... 40
5.6 Hole size for pipelines.............................................................................................. 40

5.6.1 Hole size for offshore pipelines......................................................................... 40
5.6.2 Hole size for onshore pipelines.......................................................................... 41
5.7 Risers........................................................................................................................ 42
5.7.1 Risers - Position of leaks ................................................................................... 42
5.7.2 Hole size ............................................................................................................ 43
5.7.3 Production availability....................................................................................... 43
5.8 Subsea equipment..................................................................................................... 43
5.9
6
Example of application of recommended failure data for pipelines ........................ 44
REFERENCES ................................................................................................................ 46
Appendix A
Appendix B
Appendix C
Appendix D
Appendix E
Appendix F
Issues related to materials and its impact on failure frequency for steel pipes
Failures, Failure Modes and Causes
Flexible Pipelines
Failure Frequencies for Pipelines Caused by External Loads
Unintentional Anchor Drops from Ships Under Way
CO2 Pipelines- onshore and offshore
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1 CONCLUSIVE SUMMARY
1.1 Introduction
On behalf of Statoil ASA and Gassco AS, Det Norske Veritas AS (DNV) has revised the
previous version of the report Anbefalte feildata for rrledninger (Recommended failure data
for pipelines) /1/. The report presents a number of different sources for pipeline failure data, a
model for estimation of failure frequencies for offshore oil and gas pipelines and a simple model
for other pipelines.
Compared to the previous revision issued in 2006, there has been no general update of the
underlying statistical material for offshore pipelines, but rather adjustments and increased level
of detail with respect to anchor damages, trawl damages, onshore thick walled pipelines and CO2
pipelines. The failure estimates for onshore gas pipelines have been updated on the basis of upto-date statistics.
The purpose of this document is to provide failure frequencies for:
Gas and oil pipelines offshore, steel and flexible pipelines

Gas and oil pipelines onshore
Risers, steel and flexible
The failure frequencies are to be applied in risk assessments, availability analysis and
contingency analysis. Frequencies are presented for both leaks and other damages requiring
repairs. For subsea equipment it is referred to the OREDA handbook /2/. The data presented is
meant to provide failure frequencies for use in relatively coarse risk assessments of pipelines.
Some failure mechanisms must be studied in more detail if these are believed to be significant
for specific pipelines.
Chapter 2 contains a brief introduction with definitions used in this report. In chapter 3, failure
mechanisms and factors influencing the failure frequencies are discussed and chapter 4 contains
a description of applied data sources. Chapter 5 presents an approach to estimate failure
frequency for pipelines and risers. The approach involves five main steps. The steps are shown in
Figure 1.1 and discussed in detail below and in chapter 5.
Figure 1.1 Approach to estimation of failure frequency

The first step in the approach is to divide the pipeline into different segments in order to apply
appropriate failure frequencies to different parts of the pipeline. This is dealt with in detail in
chapter 5.1, and shown in Figure 1.2.
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Figure 1.2 Pipeline segment division

The failure frequency contribution on the midline section of offshore pipelines is dependent on
various characteristics. To evaluate the effect of these (e.g. to assess the loads and impacts a
specific pipeline might be exposed to) the participation of pipeline expertise is necessary, so that
a pipeline specific failure frequency can be obtained.
The different failure frequencies are based on different data sources, and different models are
developed. After dividing the pipeline in question into segments, each individual segment needs
to be assessed with one relevant model and failure frequency for the calculation of the failure
rate. The relevant model and failure frequency is selected from the alternatives shown in Figure
1.3
Figure 1.3 Selection of model and failure rate

A failure frequency is selected from data tables, as shown in Figure 1.3, where failure
frequencies are given for specific values of the most significant factors, like transported fluid and
diameter of the pipeline. Finally an assessment should be made to ensure that the failure
frequency reflects all relevant conditions. The failure frequencies are relevant for both safety
considerations (i.e. failures causing leaks, distributed over different leak sizes) and to production
availability.
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1.2 Recommended failure data

Table 1.1 shows recommended leakage frequencies forwarded in this study.
Table 1.1 Recommended failure frequencies
Pipeline
Description
Failure
frequency
Unit
Reference
Offshore pipeline, open

sea
Well stream pipeline and

other small pipelines
containing unprocessed
fluid
Alt. 1: 5.010-4
Per km-year
/3/
Alt. 2: 2.510
-4
Per km-year
Alt. 2: 1.410
-3
Per pipe-year
Processed oil, gas or CO2

with pipeline diameter
24
2.510-5
Processed oil, gas or CO2

with pipeline diameter
26
6.810-6
8.210
8.110
Failure frequency from

inadvertent dragging of
anchors by ships under
way
-5
-5
fDragged Anchor
Per km-year
/3/
Per score grade

and pipeline year
Per km-year
/3/
Per score grade

and pipeline year
Per pipe-year
Appendix E
Pipe specific (see

Appendix E)
Offshore pipeline. External Diameter 16

loads causing damage in
Diameter >16
near platform zone
7.910-4
Per year
/3/
1.910-4
Per year
/3/
Flexible pipelines
2.310-3
Risers
Oil pipelines onshore
Subsea
Per km-year
/3/
Steel-diameter 16
9.110
-4
Per riser-year
/3/
Steel-diameter 16
1.210-4
Per riser-year
/3/
-3
Per riser-year
/28/
Dynamic flexible
4.510
Diameter < 8
1.010-3
Per km-year
/4/
-4
Per km-year
/4/
Diameter 16- 22
-4
1.210
Per km-year
/4/
Diameter 24- 28
2.510-4
Per km-year
/4/
Diameter 30
2.510
-4
Per km-year
/4/
Wall thickness 5 mm
2.710-4
Per km-year
/5/, Appendix F
Wall thickness 5-10 mm
1.510
-4
Per km-year
/5/, Appendix F
4.510-5
Per km-year
/5/, Appendix F
1.810
-5
Per km-year
/5/, Appendix F
1.710
-5
Per km-year
/5/, Appendix F
Wall thickness > 25 mm
1.110-5
Per km-year
/5/, Appendix F
Diameter 8- 14
Onshore gas and CO2

pipelines
Subsea equipment
8.010
See OREDA handbook
/2/
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In order to perform a correct failure frequency assessment for a subsea pipeline, the failure
frequency related to external loads in the platform zone should be added to the failure frequency
for the part of the pipeline at open sea.
Table 1.2 and Table 1.3 displays the hole size distribution for leaks on pipelines and risers
respectively.
Table 1.2 Hole size distribution for offshore and onshore pipelines
Hole size
Offshore pipelines
Onshore pipelines*
Onshore pipelines**
Small (<20 mm)
74%
46%
46%
Medium (20-80 mm)
16%
20%
10%
Large (>80 mm)
2%
20%
10%
Rupture
8%
14%
34%
* Applies to onshore pipelines with a utilisation <70%

** Applies to onshore pipelines with a utilisation 70%
Table 1.3 Hole size distribution for risers

Hole size
Steel
Flexible
Small (<20 mm)
50%
26%
Medium (20-80 mm)
20%
37%
Large (> 80 mm)/ Rupture
30%
37%
Total
100%
100%
Table 1.4 shows the distribution over localisation of riser leaks.

Table 1.4 Area distribution over riser leaks
Leakage area
Distribution
Above water
30%
Splash zone
30%
Subsea
40%
Repair
The following approach is recommended to calculate the failure frequency for immediate and
postponable repairs of pipelines:
Estimate failure frequency as described in chapter 5 (for leak incidents) and apply the
estimate as frequency for failures requiring immediate repairs (i.e. leaks).
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Use the same failure frequency (see explanation below) as the basis for estimating
frequency of failures that result in postponable repairs (corrosion, small dents etc.).
The model implies that one out of two failures causes leaks. The same model applies to risers,
but then 1 out of 3 incidents results in leaks.
The failure frequencies in Table 1.1 are based on statistics for pipelines in the North Sea and
Western Europe. The failure frequencies are applicable at other locations where environmental
conditions, requirements on engineering, construction, operation, inspection and follow ups are
comparable to the conditions for pipelines in the current population (North Sea and Western
Europe).
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INTRODUCTION
2.1 Background
Risers and pipelines often contain large volumes of oil or gas at high pressure. Although
accidental releases from them are rare, they have the potential of catastrophic consequences, both
in terms of safety and monetary values, and detailed analysis are required. Riser and pipeline
leakage frequencies are crucial inputs to risk assessments, contingency analysis, environment
assessments and regularity studies.
2.2 Objectives
This technical report presents available data on leakage frequencies for:
Offshore oil and gas pipelines; both steel and flexible pipelines
Onshore oil an gas pipelines; steel pipelines
Risers; both steel and flexible risers
The frequencies may be be applied in risk assessments, availability analysis and contingency
analysis. Hence leakage frequencies as well as other failure frequencies requiring repairs are
presented. For subsea equipment it is referred to the OREDA handbook, ref. /2/. The data
presented in this report is meant to provide failure frequencies in connection with relatively
coarse risk assessments of pipelines. Specific failure mechanisms for a specific pipeline should
be analysed in more detail.
2.3 Definitions
External corrosion:
Corrosion on the outside of the pipeline
Internal corrosion:
Corrosion on the inside of the pipeline.
Failure frequency:
Number of failures per time unit. Pipeline failure frequency is

often given as number of failures per km pipeline and year.
Failure mechanism:
A physical, chemical or operational process leading to a failure.
Production availability:
The ratio between actual produced or transported volume and

planned produced or transported volume over a specified time
period.
External interference:
Denotes deviant human actions, i.e. where the cause of failures is

attributed to circumstances that normally are not related to the
failing part, e.g. excavation, drilling, damage caused by anchorage
or dropped objects.
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FAILURE FACTORS AND MECHANISMS
3.1 Introduction
For a pipeline, there are numerous individual factors influencing the failure frequency. This
section contains an overview of those factors together with a description of how and to what
extent they are expected to affect the failure frequency. In appendix A, B and C, underlying
failure causes are discussed in more detail.
By mapping the relevant causes to failures and linking these to the described factors, the impact
of each factor on the overall failure frequency can be described. Detailed reports for the incidents
in the statistics are however scarce and since the number of incidents to offshore pipelines are
few compared to the population, a narrow categorisation of failure causes into subgroups will
lead to unacceptable levels of uncertainties. Therefore, the information in this chapter is
independent from the other parts and contains a general overview of relationships between
failures and influencing factors which can be used when detailed risk analyses are performed for
specific pipelines.
3.2 Physical factors

3.2.1 Process medium
There are several sources pointing out that pipelines carrying oil are more prone to failures than
corresponding pipelines used for transportation of gas /6/, /7/, /8/. These sources or reports
contain data gathered from different locations for offshore and onshore pipelines. Similar
differences have also been recorded for risers /9/ . The underlying reasons for differences in
failure frequencies between oil and gas pipelines are driven by variations in conditions.
One reason to why gas pipelines seem to be less prone to leakage than oil pipelines is related to
the fact that gas pipelines in many cases have larger diameter and therefore, larger wall thickness
than oil pipelines /6/, /8/. In addition, a number of factors such as quality of material (see
Appendix A), protection against external interference and resistance to external corrosion
indicate that pipes with larger diameter and wall thickness will have lower failure frequencies
than others under similar conditions.
For the pipelines in the population, there are variations in where the pipelines are located.
Location is in some aspects linked to the medium being transported in the respect that gas
pipelines are often found to be main lines, transporting gas over long distances. Oil pipelines are
on the other hand often shorter, for example when connecting units within one and the same field
/6/, /8/. Looking at failure frequency per time and distance, oil pipelines may therefore have a
higher failure frequency due to external interference.
The difference between oil and gas pipelines may however in some cases be misleading. Data
from Concawe /6/ indicate that mechanical defects and external interference are the dominating
reasons for failing crude oil pipelines while more than 50 % of the failures on processed media
pipelines are due to corrosion. More than two thirds of these were related to fuel oil pipelines.
The reason behind the increased likelihood of failure on these pipes is explained by the fact that
transported media is warm and the pipe is thermally insulated. Damage to the insulation will lead
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to water ingress in the warm space between the pipe and the insulation, causing most
advantageous conditions for external corrosion.
The possible presence of other aggressive components than the actual media being transported is
a central issue when estimating the corrosion potential. For pipelines and risers transporting
processed, dry and non contaminated gas the issue of internal corrosion can be disregarded, as
opposed to pipelines transporting oil or gas with free water or significant amounts of CO2 or H2S
/9/.
In order to get an idea of how variations in failure frequency depend on variations in transported
media, internal corrosion and the subset of external corrosion linked to properties of the media
(e.g. temperature) must be looked into. Snamprogetti /8/ reports that available data on internal
corrosion indicate that the impact on failure frequency when comparing gas and oil
transportation respectively is negligible. The statement is supported by SINTEF /7/ which has
looked into data collected by the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate. No differences between
failure frequencies for large diameter oil and gas risers have been identified.
From the available statistical data, it is not possible to conclude on any significant variations to
the failure frequency depending on oil or gas transportation as an isolated parameter. It is
however reasonable to assume that the internal corrosion is a larger problem for unprocessed
well stream than for an export pipeline carrying processed gas or stabilised oil.
3.2.2 Installation
As a result of pipeline stability requirements the pipeline is often buried (trenched) during
installation. The action does however not always provide any actual protection against falling
objects /6/. The trenching tool and operation itself may actually pose a larger threat against
pipeline integrity than what is gained with respect to increased protection. The number of
damages to pipelines derived from the laying and trenching operation is larger than damages
occurring in operation /6/.
3.2.3 Corrosion prevention

The method for corrosion prevention is an important aspect during the design phase of pipeline
and likelihood for corrosion strongly depends on location. Data from Batelle /10/ show that 63 %
or all reported failures due to corrosion on onshore pipelines are caused by external corrosion
while internal corrosion is dominating for offshore pipelines (71 %). This is because i) Offshore
pipelines corrosion prevention system is more effective and reliable since the surrounding
seawater provides stable conductivity which is a requirement for effective protective anodes and
ii) A larger proportion of the offshore pipelines carry unprocessed gas or oil than land pipelines.
Data from gas pipeline networks in the USA /6/ illustrates the importance of corrosion
prevention. Between 40 % and 50 % of all failures described as corrosion are found on the 15 %
of the pipeline network lacking corrosion prevention (coating). In addition, the frequency for
failure due to corrosion on pipes with cathodic protection is only about 1/6 compared to the
corresponding frequency for pipes with cathodic protection.
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3.2.4 Pipeline material

For pipelines made of steel, there is a recorded increase in failure frequency with increased
material strength /8/, /11/. This effect, which is significant, is unlikely to have anything to do
with the material itself. When other conditions are equal, increased material strength normally
leads to reduced wall thickness and reduced ability to withstand external interference and shorter
time period for an initiated corrosion to become critical. Increased material strength also
increases the frequency for a number of other failure mechanisms. These are further discussed in
Appendix A.
Available data on flexible pipes is limited but for flexible risers in specific, a failure frequency
five times higher than for steel risers is recorded /12/. The number of failures is however low and
the population is small making the results uncertain.
3.2.5 Material utilization factor

The material utilization factor describes the relationship between the tension in the
tangential/circular direction of the pipe due to the pressure difference between inside and outside
and the material strength (Specified Minimum Yield Stress). For pipelines on land, this factor is
normally found in the interval 0,4-0,8. For offshore pipelines the factor is normally found in the
interval 0,72-0,85 and lower for risers.
The material utilization factor may affect the failure mechanisms, but the wall thickness itself
must also be looked into. A thick wall will be more resistant against local corrosion since it will
take longer for initiated corrosion to reach critical levels than for a thin wall. Limited local
corrosion will normally not affect the pipes ability to withstand the pressure difference, and the
utilization factor will therefore not have any impact on this failure mechanism. For corrosion
over larger areas, the utilization factor will however be of great importance. A large utilization
factor will lead to a shorter time period for the corrosion to result in failure. Other parameters are
also of importance, such as increased difference in pressure between inside and outside, large
diameter and low material strength will result in a thicker wall, which again will allow more
corrosion in absolute numbers, making the pipe more robust.
Leakage will occur when the corrosion has penetrated the pipe wall, while rupture occurs when
the remaining wall thickness is decreased over an area so that the wall no longer can withstand
the pressure difference. In case of low utilization factor, a large proportion of the material must
be corroded in order to cause rupture, i.e. 70-90 % over a larger area. If the corrosion is uneven,
it may just as well lead to a leak at one spot instead of resulting in a full rupture. If the corrosion
is local and limited to a small area (pitting like), a leak before rupture can be anticipated,
regardless of utilization factor.
For other failure mechanisms, e.g. impact, actual wall thickness is an important factor. When
increasing the wall thickness, reaching the level of impact levels necessary to cause a rupture is
less likely. Variations in utilization factor will in this case however have low effect on ability to
withstand impacts.
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3.2.6 Age
Existing reports are fairly uniform when concluding on the impact of pipeline age on failure
frequency /6/, /7/, /8/, /11/, /13/, /14/. The pipelines normally go through a burn-in time where
the failure frequency is higher than during the remaining part of design life where the failure
frequency is approximately constant. However, for pipelines 30 - 50 years old, an increase in
failure frequency can be observed (Following the bath-tube curve).
The burn-in time differ between 1-2 years /7/and 10 years /14/. During the burn-in time, an
increased failure frequency related to external interference, operational issues, material failure
and defect welds are recorded /8/. A number of reasons to this increase can be assumed. During
the burn-in time, it is likely to assume an increase in surrounding activities in the area,
subsequently leading to an increase in frequency for falling objects etc. During the first years, the
pipeline will also be exposed to those actual loads and tensions which will reveal fabrication
related defects in material or welds. During the burn-in time, an increase in cases of corrosion
is also recorded /8/. This effect is seen in parallel with a decrease in frequency for other failures
which is normal since corrosion takes a certain amount of time to develop into a failure. After
the burn-in time, the frequency for failures related to corrosion is stabilized. For pipelines from
the seventies with cathodic protection, no increase in cases of corrosion as a function of age have
been recorded /8/, but these pipelines have not reached the age where the effects from aging
become visible.
The increase in failure frequency for older pipelines is likely to be linked to the year of
construction just as much as the actual age. During the seventies, a number of extensive R&D
projects focusing on steel and pipe production, resulting in a substantial increase in the quality of
pipelines. In addition, knowledge within fracture mechanics and quality assurance were further
developed. This work resulted in new and improved standards for qualification of steel pipes,
manufacturing, welding technology, qualification of welds, non destructive testing, and
acceptance criteria. During the eighties a lot of projects focused on pipeline stability and
hydrodynamic loads /8/. According to current records, failures due to material defects constitute
a small part of the total number of failure for pipelines in general. However, for large diameter
pipelines in specific, these failures constitute a substantial part of the total number of failures. It
is however expected that failures related to material defects is to decrease since an increasing
part of the pipelines is produced in accordance with new guidelines. It is also assumed that future
increase in pipeline age will not cause an increase in failure frequency.
3.2.7 Size
There are several sources pointing out that failure frequency for risers and pipelines decrease
with increasing diameter /6/, /8/, /9/, /11/, /13/, /14/, /15/. The data underlining this fact originate
from different geographical locations and for both gas and oil pipelines. In general, pipelines
with large diameter also have large wall thickness compared to pipelines with smaller diameter.
Large diameter pipelines therefore generally have a larger load resistance against external
interference and can withstand more corrosion (in absolute terms) than small diameter pipelines.
Records point out that the proportion of failures caused by corrosion is larger for small diameter
pipelines than for large diameter pipelines. According to Concawe /6/, more than 50 % of the
failures on western European oil pipelines with a diameter <20 is represented by failures
related to corrosion. On the other side, for oil pipelines with a diameter >20, corrosion does not
contribute to failures at all. Therefore, the conclusion drawn by DNV /14/ pointing out that
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corrosion is essentially the only failure cause for pipelines with a diameter >20 may seem
contradictory. However, the DNV report also points out that the failure frequency for large
diameter pipelines is lower than for small diameter pipelines.
Large diameter pipelines are often mainlines, transporting media over longer distances, while the
small diameter (offshore) pipelines are often found in the near platform zone with higher traffic
density, hence higher frequency for external interference. According to SINTEF /7/, this is the
actual reason why pipeline diameter seem to affect the failure frequency and that actual negative
correlation between pipeline diameter (as an isolated parameter) and failure frequency cannot be
proven.
For risers, the failure frequency is according to some sources found to be higher for large
diameter risers. This is found both in data containing information about risers in the North Sea
/7/, and data from the Gulf of Mexico /9/. However, a later study by DNV /12/ concludes that
there are no significant differences between risers of varying size. Neither are there any
significant dependencies between pipe diameter and failure frequencies related to material or
construction defects /16/ .
3.2.8 Length of line

Failures related to corrosion and material defects seem to be strongest correlated with the length
of the pipeline /12/, probably due to the high flow rates in short pipelines compared to longer
ones. This relationship is confirmed in a study evaluating the failure frequency as a function of
different variables. In this study, the length of the pipeline is concluded to have the largest
impact on the failure frequency. Long pipelines have got a lower failure frequency per unit
length than short pipelines /11/. However, the longer pipelines are exclusively of larger diameter
type than the shorter ones making the isolated effect of the length of the pipeline hard to
determine.
It is obvious that variations in diameter include variations in other important parameters to such
an extent that it is most complicated to separate and isolate those parameters having actual
influence on the failure frequency. It is therefore very likely that effects from one parameter is
taken into account multiple times when trying to specify effects of diameter, wall thickness,
length or location on the failure frequency rather than trying to differ between failure modes and
map the underlying conditions causing the individual variations.
3.2.9 Location
Variations in failure modes and frequencies due to variations in location are notable. There are
obvious differences in surrounding conditions between onshore and offshore pipelines. One
could however argue that failure frequencies related to material defects and internal corrosion are
independent of whether the pipeline is located onshore or offshore but frequencies for any other
failure mode will vary depending on location.
For offshore pipelines, there is a distinct difference in failure frequency for pipelines located
within the near platform zone and for pipelines located a certain distance away from the platform
or fields /6/, /7/, /11/. In the near platform zone is where the highest failure frequencies are found
and most of the damages occur during construction activities in the area /11/. Increased failure
frequencies are recorded both related to external interference and corrosion. The increase in
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failures related to corrosion is linked to the increased traffic and activity in the area which could
lead to damage to coating due to dropped objects and dragged anchors etc.
As described in Appendix A, many of the parameters affecting the failure frequency are linked
together. In the near platform zone, a larger proportion of the pipelines are of small diameter
type and the failure frequency could be expected to be higher because of this fact alone.
When evaluating different sets of data, local conditions that cause variations to the failure
frequencies must be taken into account. The frequency for failure to offshore pipelines due to
forces of nature is for example significantly higher in the Gulf of Mexico than in many other
parts of the world since the likelihood for waterspouts, land slides etc. is larger here. Compared
to the North Sea, the Gulf of Mexico shows an increased frequency for failures related to
corrosion, due to the higher temperature in surrounding waters and/or the higher age for parts of
the pipelines and corresponding standards for design and corrosion prevention /8/.
For risers, the majority of the failures are found in the splash zone. Conditions in this zone are
such that there is an increased probability for both external interference and corrosion /6/.
There is an increased level of uncertainty in the area where offshore pipelines approach shore
and become onshore pipelines. In this area, two zones can be defined; the landfall zone and the
tidal zone. It is likely that there is a slight increase in likelihood for external interference in the
landfall zone compared to the midline stretch. In the tidal zone, the likelihood for dropped
objects (anchors etc.) can be assumed to be low but instead there will be an increase in likelihood
for corrosion.
For onshore pipelines, there is a recorded increase in failures related to corrosion in the transition
from buried to not buried and at crossings of roads and railroads /6/.
3.3 Failure mechanisms

3.3.1 Corrosion
In general, water in liquid form is a necessity for internal corrosion. Water may origin either
from the liquid from the process or gas condensing into liquid under certain pressure and
temperature conditions. In order to avoid internal corrosion, the water concentration must be
known and monitored in the process. Even dry gas can develop liquefied water under certain
operational conditions and water concentration must therefore be meticulously monitored in
order to exclude corrosion as potential failure cause.
Internal corrosion is not considered to be total pipe length dependent. Either internal corrosion is
an issue for a specific pipeline or it is not. It is observed that when internal corrosion is an issue,
this is often located a few kilometres downstream the pipeline starting point. This is where
changes in temperature and pressure cause condensation and where the temperature is high
enough to cause corrosion. After an additional few kilometres the internal corrosion is likely to
decline.
For offshore pipelines, it is considered unusual to have external corrosion to such an extent that
safety or availability is affected. Mounted anodes are designed to prevent external corrosion and
may be changed in case of abnormal rate of degradation before external corrosion reaches
critical levels.
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For risers in the splash zone and pipelines on land, anodes cannot be applied. For risers, it is
therefore crucial that the coating is intact and inspected regularly. For pipelines on land, a system
with applied voltage is used to prevent external corrosion. In order to confirm the system
function, CP-measurements (cathodic protection) must be carried out. The CP-measurement is
basically a measurement of the electric potential between the pipe and the surrounding medium,
earth or water for example. The electric potential, denoted Ec should be in the interval of [-1.0 V,
-0.8 V] /17/.
Loss of pipe wall material can be inspected and if logged, the rate of degradation can be
estimated. The effect of inspection depends on the accuracy of the method. In case of severe
corrosion and substantial loss of wall thickness, the operational pressure may be lowered so that
corrective maintenance may be planned well in advance and effects of production disturbances
minimised. For internal corrosion other measures such as increased use of corrosion inhibitor
may help to decrease or stop the rate of degradation.
Both internal and external corrosion result in a gradual deterioration of the pipe wall thickness,
generally at a very limited area. The thicker the wall, the longer it takes for initiated corrosion to
cause leak or rupture of the pipeline. Large diameter and wall thickness will increase the
likelihood of discovering corrosion by pigging. Partly because current pigging equipment is
better suited for large diameter pipelines and partly because the large diameter pipelines
generally has got larger wall thickness, hence providing a larger time slot for corrosion to be
detected before resulting in failure.
Records from the USA and Western Europe show a distinct decrease in failures related to
corrosion with increasing pipeline diameter and wall thickness.
There are a few other issues with respect to a pipelines susceptibility to corrosion related to
medium and location that are worth mentioning;
Internal corrosion primarily depends on the composition and the presence of possible
impurities in the medium while external corrosion primarily depends on the quality and
function of the corrosion preventive actions or systems in use.
Export pipelines for oil and gas in the North Sea generally transports media processed or
prepared (corrosion inhibitor) in such a way that corrosion should not develop.
Development of severe internal corrosion in these pipelines is therefore unlikely. Interfield
pipelines and well stream lines are more prone to internal corrosion since the media are
often a mixture of oil, gas and water under high pressure and temperature with aggressive
elements such as carbon dioxide and hydrogen sulphide. These circumstances might be one
of the reasons why small diameter pipelines are more prone to failure due to internal
corrosion than large diameter pipelines.
The high and even conductivity of seawater together with coating and sacrificial anodes
provides a reliable protection for offshore pipelines against external corrosion. For pipelines
on land, the situation is however different since the earths conductivity varies and the
method of applied voltage is a more complicated method for corrosion prevention. External
corrosion is therefore more likely to be found on onshore pipelines than on offshore
pipelines.
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The following major conclusions can be drawn:
Large export pipelines for oil and gas are less prone to corrosion than field internal
pipelines
The frequency for failure related to corrosion is linked to wall thickness
Offshore steel pipelines are less prone to external corrosion than land steel pipelines
In addition there are corrosion issues that need to be addressed for the specific pipeline subject to
analysis, not discussed in this guide. Such issues are
Stress induced corrosion

Hydrogen induced corrosion
Bacterial corrosion
3.3.2 External interference

In general, failures related to external interference are linked to the prevailing exposure and a
division into areas with different activity intensity is therefore a reasonable action when
establishing failure frequencies linked to external interference. An area with reduced or strictly
controlled activities will lead to a reduction in failure frequency for pipelines.
Failure mechanisms related to external interference are generally but not always of immediate
nature, meaning that the time between initiation of interference and failure is short and
inspections will therefore have little effect on pipeline availability. As always, there are
exceptions where e.g. anchor damages have developed into leaks after some time, making
regular inspections an important tool for detecting and planning the corrective maintenance.
Besides being the immediate cause of a failure, external interference may also cause minor
damages which in the long run can develop into failures if not detected and dealt with within the
required time frame. An example of such damages are anchor or trawl damages to coating which
my induce corrosion, subsequently leading to leak or rupture if not detected and taken care of.
A pipelines load resistance against external interference primarily depends on the pipeline
diameter and wall thickness. In general, for pipelines of equal design pressure and material
properties, the wall thickness will increase proportional to the diameter of the pipeline. Both
diameter and wall thickness will contribute to increased load resistance against external
interference. Tests have shown that the most commonly used excavators and construction
equipment do not exercise enough load to cause leaks or rupture to pipelines with a wall
thickness larger than 11-12 mm /8/. There are however examples of ruptured pipelines due to
external interference from special purpose cutting and grinding machines used to even and
homogenize ground.
Wall thickness for the largest gas pipelines in the North Sea and the corresponding land parts are
20 mm and 30 mm. Pipelines with larger wall thickness are planned.
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3.3.3 Design and construction failures

Construction failures are here defined as failures caused by unacceptable strain or bending of the
pipe due to unrestrained thermal expansion, inadequate or faulty constructed fixed points or pipe
geometry. Large diameter pipelines will normally be more prone to such failures than small
diameter pipelines.
Construction failures such as missing support, missing fixed points, too much expansion or too
little coverage are important issues close to platforms and in the landfall zone for offshore
pipelines and in relation to bends, road crossings etc. for pipelines on land. Such failures will
generally be evident at maximal operational temperature and pressure and can therefore be
detected early if the pipe from start is exposed to the conditions governed by design. This is
however not always the case and construction failures may therefore lead to extensive damages
if not detected at an early stage.
Construction failures constitute a large part of failures to large pipelines on land. Compared to an
offshore pipeline, there are in general a large number of crossings with roads, railroads, channels
etc. It is therefore reasonable to assume that these kinds of failures are more common for
onshore pipelines than for the corresponding offshore pipelines. Crossings with other pipelines is
however something that should be given extra attention irrespective of the pipe being a land or
subsea one. At a pipeline crossing, the distance between the two pipelines must be adequate so
that they can cause no damage to each other. The distance must be assured both during lay and
operation when pipe movements can occur.
3.3.4 Material, weld and manufacturing failures

Failures caused by material or weld failures can be reduced by adequate quality checks with
extensive testing and monitoring of all processes related to the material, production of pipes and
welding.
Failures related to material or welds are in general proportional to the volume of material and
welds, causing the failure frequency to increase with increasing diameter, wall thickness or
length of the pipeline.
In data from the North Sea, no such increase in absolute numbers can be seen but there is a
relative increase compared to other failure mechanisms.
Mistakes that originate from manufacturing and that are not discovered during testing rarely
cause any leaks alone. Together with other processes and mechanisms such mistakes may
however increase the rate of degradation or make the consequences more severe.
Large diameter pipes (diameter > 24) are normally manufactured through rolling plate and
welding of seams which enables methods well suited for quality control of both roller procedure
and dimension.
Small diameter pipelines are however normally manufactured as seamless pipes, formed by
drawing a solid block of pipe steel over a piercing rod to create the cylinder. Performing
continuous quality checks of the internal surface of the pipe may in this case be more
complicated and there is potential for disequilibrium in material distribution in the pipe wall.
These issues are further discussed in Appendix A.
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Based on the discussions above, different failure frequencies related to material and weld defects
may apply depending on if the pipe is a seamless one (small diameter pipes) or a rolled plate
pipe (large diameter pipes).
In addition, it can be noted that the actual procedures for quality control of joint welds most
likely are carried out under more favourable conditions when performed on a pipe laying vessel
than when carried out in situ when laying pipes on land. Material and weld defects are further
discussed in Appendix A.
3.3.5 Operation and maintenance

Adequate monitoring of operational conditions will enable early alerts in case of unfavourable
events or development, enabling early implementation of suitable measures, preventing possible
escalation to failure. Situations arising due to faulty operation of the platform or terminal, e.g.
presence of water which may lead to corrosion can be prevented by continuous monitoring of
water contents.
3.3.6 Monitoring and inspection

The following monitoring methods are applicable for pipelines in general:
Pressure and temperature monitoring
Dew point measurements
Measurements of inlet and outlet composition
Corrosion measurements through use of corrosion probes which gives an indication of
corrosion frequency
Accelerometers at free spans for monitoring of movements
What methods to use for a specific pipeline must be evaluated in each individual case. If
operational conditions suddenly change, monitoring is important in order to reveal the initiation
of potential harmful processes caused by the change. In general, the monitoring measures change
in a process related to the failure mechanism rather than the failure mechanism itself. E.g. water
content is measured to prevent corrosion and movements are measured to prevent fatigue
Description of monitoring methods
In general, there are two fundamental approaches for pipeline inspection:
1. External - Visual
2. Internal - Intelligent pigging
For offshore pipelines, external visual inspection is done through the use of remotely operated
vehicles (ROV) or divers that collect data either through camera recordings or sonar. Such
inspections comprise:
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CP (cathodic electric potential) measurements, and when applicable, visual inspection of

anode consumption rate
State of pipeline coating (damages)
Location of the pipeline (stability and displacement)
Supports (free span)
Parts of the risers can also relatively easy be inspected visually above the surface and inspection
of wall thickness can be carried out through ultrasonic measurements.
Intelligent pigging is performed by sending an intelligent pig into the pipe, letting it travel along
the stretch to be inspected. The pig is equipped with various instruments for the necessary
measurements and normally comprises
Wall thickness
Location of the pipeline (with geo-pig)
In general, intelligent pigging provides reliable and precise information but the method may be
costly and is therefore only carried out every 3rd or 5th year.
Loss of wall thickness due to corrosion is best registered when the corrosion is evenly spread out
as opposed to pitting. Cracks caused by material or weld defects which are not discovered at
early inspections or testes are difficult to reveal through intelligent pigging.
3.3.7 General observations

Some general observations related to the different phases of a pipeline project are given below.
Failures related to the engineering phase will in general:
only be discovered in the occurrence of extreme conditions

or cause failures after a short period of operation (e.g. material defects leading to high
corrosion rates)
Such failure mechanisms are normally not easy to predict. On the other hand, a pipeline is rarely
exposed to the extreme conditions necessary to cause the failure mechanisms related to design to
result in a full failure.
Defects related to the manufacturing are normally discovered through testing and quality checks.
Defects that are not discovered are not all critical but they may develop into a more severe
failure after some time of exposure. E.g. a crack in a weld may develop into a full scale leakage
in combination with corrosion.
In most cases, the failure frequency for a specific pipeline will decrease after the installation
phase and a period of stable operation. Material properties of anticorrosion and isolation coating
and their corresponding long term relation with potential failure development is a complicated
issue but until today no major failures linked to this issue are recorded.
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DATA SOURCES
4.1 Introduction
Various data sources and reports have been applied to conclude on the recommended failure
frequencies in this report and in related preceding projects. This chapter contains a brief
description of these data sources. Some of the sources are mentioned in chapter 3.2 when
mapping what factors having influence on the failure frequencies.
4.2 PARLOC
PARLOC The Update of Loss of Containment Data for Offshore Pipelines /18/ provides a
good overview over the incidents in the North Sea. Incidents are described for gas and oil
pipelines, steel and flexible pipes and risers respectively.
The objective of the report is to update the available statistical material describing incidents in
the North Sea and to use this for failure frequency estimations.
In the report, an incident is defined as a situation that has caused or has the potential to cause
external leakage. Estimates for leaks and incident frequencies are given together with
information on hole size distribution and failure mechanisms. For the incidents not resulting in
leaks, information on whether repairs have been required or not is given.
The report distinguishes between incidents to risers, pipelines within the near platform zone,
pipelines outside the near platform zone and landfall zone. Failure mechanisms are divided into 9
different categories.
By the end of year 2000, 248 incidents (including 96 leaks) have been recorded for risers and
pipelines and 148 incidents (including 92 leaks) to adjacent subsea equipment. The population
consists of 1567 pipelines with a total exposure of 328858 km*year. The corresponding exposure
for risers is 17857 riser years.
When analysing PARLOC, it is evident to the reader that the following factors are vital when
evaluating the frequency for leakage:
Cause / Failure mechanism
Location of failure (riser, safety zone, midline, landfall)
Dimension of pipeline
Length of pipeline
Transported medium
In section 2.3.4 in PARLOC 2001 /18/, the authors discuss how the failure frequency has
changed over the years and it is pointed out that as the industry continuously gains experience in
operating pipelines and risers, a number of failure mechanisms are decreasing and ultimately
eliminated. Given that introduction of new failure mechanisms is prevented, it could be argued
that the overall failure frequency is to decrease with time. The authors claim that such an effect
is visible.
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In addition to PARLOC 2001 /18/, DNV have received unprocessed data from Mott MacDonald
/19/. The unprocessed data is based on the same data as PARLOC 2001, but differs slightly in
structure compared to PARLOC 2001.
PARLOC has not been updated since the 2001 revision, which was issued in 2003. It has
therefore not been possible to update the frequency estimates for offshore pipelines in the present
report.
4.3 Concawe
Concawe annually issues reports on statistics describing leaks to pipelines on land. Data from
Concawe /20/ used for this guide covers the years 1971-2000 and includes pipelines in the
Western Europe. There are 379 recorded leaks on approximately 250 pipelines of a total length
of 30800 km. Only leaks larger or equal to 1 m3 are recorded and the report includes adjacent
equipment such as valves and pump stations in addition to the actual pipeline.
The report contains the following detailed information linked to the recorded incidents of
leakage:
Item (pipeline, valve, pump station)
Pipeline diameter
Transported medium
Lost volume
Leakage detection
Characteristics of the area where the leak occurred (city, suburbs etc)
Failure mechanism/cause (external interference, corrosion, mechanical, operational etc)
Description of failure
Extent of damage
4.4 Onshore gas pipelines

Failure frequencies for gas pipelines on land are gathered from the technical memo
Recommended failure rates for pipelines /5/. The memo is based on experience data primarily
gathered from a large population of pipelines in Europe.
The EGIG report from 2007 /24/ concludes that the failure frequency for gas pipelines is reduced
by more than 80 % over the last 37 years, and that the failure frequency based on events from the
last five years (0.14 failures per 1000 km years) is 62% lower than the corresponding failure
frequency based on events from all years measured (0.37 failures per 1000 km years). The
dominating failure cause is external interference (50 %), followed by manufacturing and material
failures (16 %) and corrosion (15 %). The report also states that increased protection in terms of
burial depth significantly decreases the failure frequency related to external interference.
Since May 1998, United Kingdom Onshore Pipeline Operators Association (UKOPA) has also
gathered and recorded failures and data on exposure for pipelines on land in the UK. The
database covers pipelines on land in the UK operated by Transco, BP, Huntsman, Shell UK and
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Powergreen UK. The data given in /21/ covers the years 1961 to 2000. In total, the population is
close to 600000 km*years with 171 recorded incidents. Compared to the 1635 incidents
described in /5/, data from UKOPA considered too limited in order to conclude on specific
failure frequencies and therefore, the data has not been applied in this guide. For informative
reasons, it could be mentioned that the total failure frequency results in 0.29 failures per 1000
km years which is of the same magnitude as concluded by EGIG.
Available data for pipelines with larger wall thickness is scarce. In order to estimate failure
frequencies for these pipelines, a separate analysis which is a combination of quantitative and
qualitative approach has been adopted /4/. The results are given in section 5.3 page 38.
4.5 Risers
A technical memo /28/ by MCS Advanced Subsea Engineering (MCS) contains information on
number of loss of containment incidents from 1990-2008 plus part of 2009 for dynamic flexible
risers, flexible flowlines and flexible jumpers recorded on UK and Norwegian continental
shelves. The technical memo states that there are 19 loss of containment incidents for dynamic
flexible risers in the period. The belonging exposure up to October 2009 is 4224 riser years.
Since MCS does not contain sufficient data on steel risers, PARLOC 2001 has been used to
establish leak frequencies for these risers. According to PARLOC 2001, there has been 10
incidents during the 16916 riser years.
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FAILURE FREQUENCIES
5.1 Introduction
This chapter presents models for estimation of failure frequency for various pipelines and risers.
The main principle is to present recommended failure data on different segments of a pipeline.
Thus, assessment of specific pipeline is done by combining frequencies from relevant segments.
Figure 5.1 shows how a pipeline is divided into several segments.
The sub models used to assess different pipeline segments varies. For some segments it is
recommended to use a distance dependant model. Other segments require additional factors in
order to reflect individual conditions. Some segments consist of a combination of both.
External damage in near platform zone:
Should be acquired through risk analysis. Otherwise:
16: 7.9 10-4 per pipe
>16: 1.9 10-4 per pipe
Segment I:
Safety zone
Segment II:
Offshore midline
Segment III:
Landfall zone
Segment IV:
Onshore
Figure 5.1 Main model of pipelines, segment division
Segment I: Safety zone

The safety zone consists of the platform (installation) and a predefined surrounding area
(normally within 500 m of the installation).
Segment II: Offshore midline
The midline is located between the safety zone and the landfall zone (or between zafety
zones)
Segment III: Landfall zone
The landfall zone consists of pipelines in coastal zone.
Segment IV: Onshore
Offshore pipelines at are described in section 5.2, onshore gas pipelines are described in section
5.3, onshore oil pipelines are described in section 5.4 and risers are described in section 5.7.
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Additional background information on the adjustments of failure frequencies is given in

appendices A, B, C, D and E.
When estimating the failure frequency for a specific pipeline, all available information on that
pipeline (such as operational experience, inspection results etc.) should be taken into account.
Pipeline expertise should be involved in order to judge how different loads or defects may affect
the integrity of the pipeline. The failure frequency model developed for offshore transport
pipelines includes such assessments.
5.2 Offshore pipelines, gas and oil

The estimated leakage frequencies in this report are based upon pipelines in the North Sea.
Further, experience show that pipelines with a large diameter have fewer leaks per unit length
than pipelines with smaller diameter, and that offshore pipelines are less prone to leaks than
onshore pipelines.
Experience data regarding exposure and failures to pipelines and risers in the North Sea are
included in Parloc, ref /18/. The number of failures is relatively scarce, especially failures
causing leaks of oil or gas, and especially on large pipelines. According to Mott MacDonald /18/
a total of 45 failures associated with gas and/or oil leaks on steel offshore pipelines in the North
Sea have been registered and 4 leaks on large pipelines (> 24).
The majority of failures occurred on small pipelines close to platforms, i.e. local pipelines or
well stream pipelines. Only two failures are registered outside the safety zone on a 26 pipeline
or larger. One of these leaks occurred on a 34 pipeline caused by external damage, while the
other one occurred on a 30 pipeline due to weld defects. As only 4 leaks in Parloc (ref. /18/) are
registered on large pipelines and large pipelines constitute 50% of the total exposure, it is
unlikely that the failure causes and modes dominating the smaller pipelines are relevant to the
larger export pipelines. Therefore, a separate model for large export pipelines has been
developed.
Experience from other pipeline systems (i.e. gas pipelines in Western Europe and UK, and
onshore oil pipelines in Western Europe) also shows the same trend regarding relation between
diameter and failure frequency. Certainly, the total failure frequency for some of the large
pipelines in the systems is somewhat higher than for the large pipelines in the North Sea.
From the discussion above, the following conclusion is made: Failure frequency estimates for
offshore pipelines must be based on experience with pipelines of same dimensions, area of
operation and transported medium. The best way to achieve this, based on available experience
data from the North Sea is to categorise the pipeline according to:
Transport pipelines with a large diameter: diameter 26

Transport pipelines with medium diameter: 18 diameter 24
Smaller pipelines, not well stream pipeline: 2 diameter 16
Well stream pipelines for unprocessed oil and gas from production wells
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The most significant parameter when deciding on failure frequency is the pipeline diameter.
Compared to small diameter pipelines, the larger pipelines have proven to be more resistant to
external damage due to wall thickness and pipe strength. This is the reason for differentiating
failure frequency based on pipe diameter for offshore steel pipelines.
Table 5.1 displays failure frequencies calculated from /19/. The data constitutes the basis for
recommended data presented in section 5.2.1 to 5.2.5. The smallest diameter class, 2 16, is
divided into pipelines for oil and gas respectively. The failure frequency for small diameter
pipelines for transportation of oil are presented separately since they often are well stream
pipelines of unprocessed fluid associated with higher failure frequencies. Incidents related to
external damage within the safety zone are not included in the generic failure frequency since
that failure frequency should be established through a separate risk analysis, alternatively from
historical data as presented in 5.2.5.
Table 5.1 Failure frequencies based on recorded incidents for offshore pipelines - basis for
recommended data
Diameter
2-16
Fluid
oil
gas
18-24, oil and gas

26, oil and gas
No. of leaks
30
3
3
2
Exposure
60033 km-years
36925 km-years
59003 km-years
147608 km-years
Failure frequency
Unit
5.010
-4
Per km-year
8.110
-5
Per km-year
5.110
-5
Per km-year
1.410
-5
Per km-year
A failure scenario that has increased in frequency and caused pipeline owners and operators to
pay extra attention over the last years is the threat of anchors being unintentionally dropped
while ships are underway and subsequently dragged. After the latest revision of PARLOC, there
are recorded incidents to both offshore pipelines and cables that can be linked to the threat in
question. Since this level of threat depends on a large number of factors such as pipeline
location, size, protection, number of ship crossings per time unit and ship size distribution, a
separate and detailed analysis of the frequency fDragged Anchor and its impact is included in
Appendix E. It is recommended that the frequency contribution from this threat is evaluated and
added to both transportation and well stream pipelines when the number of ship crossings per
time unit is large.
Previously, the common practice has been to use a simple model where the failure frequency is
proportional to pipeline length. However, experience has shown that some of the failure
mechanisms depend on length while others dont. In addition some failure mechanisms are
partially length dependent (e.g. damage caused by trawl). For particularly long or particularly
short pipelines the previous model or approach could result in unrealistic failure frequencies.
When assessing large pipelines, it is therefore recommended to apply a model that includes
pipeline length and an assessment of to what extent the pipeline is exposed to different failure
mechanisms (trawl, corrosion, unintentional anchor drops etc.), see section 5.2.2.
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5.2.1 Well stream pipelines

The two most important factors for failure frequency of small diameter pipelines are whether the
transported medium is processed or not, and the level of activity in the area where the pipeline is
located affecting the likelihood of external interference.
According to PARLOC, 2001 the two most frequent failure causes for small diameter pipelines
(2-16) are represented by:
External loads (38%)

Internal corrosion (33%)
It is assumed that the medium transported in these pipelines mainly consists of well stream or
semi processed fluids. For these pipelines internal corrosion will partially be length dependent
because the length will affect the likelihood of developing corrosive conditions. In very short
pipelines the fluid will not be sufficiently cooled to enable a corrosive environment. In longer
pipelines conditions are more likely to be corrosion favourable with respect to temperature and
condensate generation. Corrosion will also depend on the corrosive properties of the transported
fluid and the resistance of the internal surface. Accordingly, it can be concluded that internal
corrosion is partially length dependent. The likelihood of experiencing an external force causing
damage to the pipeline depends on whether there is activity in the area where the pipeline is
located or not. Provided that there is activity in the pipeline area, the failure frequency will
depend on the length of pipeline in this area. Assuming that:
External interference (accountable for 38% of all failures), is not dependent of pipeline
length
Internal corrosion (accountable for 33% of all failures), is proportional to pipeline length
The remaining failure causes are equally distributed between length dependent and length
independent failures. Those causes are
o External corrosion
o Material defects
o Structural failures
It is then reasonable to apply a 50% / 50% distribution of length dependent and length
independent failures for small diameter pipelines.
Due to some uncertainty whether the failure frequency for small diameter well stream pipelines
is length dependent or not, two different models for failure frequencies for pipelines equal to or
smaller than 16 are presented. Alternative 1 is a simple model based on proportionality between
failure frequency and pipeline length. Alternative 2 is based on the assumption that the failure
frequencies for some failure modes are proportional to the pipeline length, while other failure
modes are independent of length. The two models are presented below:
Alternative 1: Failure frequency is proportional to pipeline length.

f f km Pipeline Length f Dragged Anchor
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Alternative 2: Half of all failure modes is proportional to pipeline length and the other
half is not (same frequency for all pipelines)
f f km Pipeline Length f Pipeline f Dragged Anchor
Based on the data presented in PARLOC, ref. /18/, 2 - 16oil pipelines, the results and inputs
for each model is presented in Table 5.2.
Table 5.2 Recommended failure frequencies for 2- 16 pipelines transporting unprocessed
fluid
Well stream pipelines and other
small pipelines containing
unprocessed fluid
Failure frequency
Unit
Alternative 1: fkm
5.010-4
Per km year
-4
Per km year
Alternative 2:
fkm
2.510
fPipeline
1.410-3
Per year
To be evaluated according to
appendix E.
Per year
Alternative 1&2: fDraggedAnchor
The failure frequency for well stream pipelines and other small diameter pipelines containing
unprocessed fluid is merely an indicator and should be used with caution. Amongst the pipelines
there is extensive variation within choice of materials, composition of oil and gas, temperature
and other operational conditions. If a pipeline is located in an area without activity and thereby
little risk of damage due to external forces, the failure frequency can be reduced by 30%. If a
pipeline transports fully processed fluid, the risk of internal corrosion is reduced, and it is
recommended to reduce failure frequency by 20%
5.2.2 Transport pipelines

It is recommended to apply separate data for transport pipelines, i.e. pipelines transporting
processed medium. Processed medium in this context means oil, gas or condensate processed in
a way that prevents corrosion, or keeps corrosion rate within established acceptance criteria.
A comparison between the failure frequencies presented in Table 5.1 shows that failure
frequencies for small diameter gas pipelines and medium size oil and gas pipelines are not
significantly different. Hence these two categories are merged. Failure frequencies for pipelines
equal to or less than 24, and larger than 24 are presented.
In order to estimate failure frequency of transport pipelines a model consisting of two elements
has been developed. The fist element in the model is directly length dependent whereas the
second one is not. The second element results from pipeline characteristics and surrounding
conditions.
Leakages from large diameter pipelines are rare. One incident registered in Parloc, ref /18/, in the
midline zone, was a result of material defect, and another due to external interference. Looking
at incidents to large diameter pipelines within the safety zone, another two incidents have been
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recorded, where one was caused by material defect and the cause behind the other incident is
unknown. Assuming that:
Material defects are length dependent by nature.

Damage due to external forces depends on the activity level in the pipeline area, and is
not explicitly dependent on length.
Remaining failure causes can be equally distributed between length dependent and non
length dependent failure causes. The remaining failure causes are:
o Corrosion (internal and external)
o Structural failures
o Natural hazards
Then, a plausible distribution of length dependent failures and failures that are not explicitly
length dependent is 50 % / 50 %.
The model for transport pipelines at open sea is expressed as:
Frequency f km Pipeline Length f Score Pipeline Characteristics f Dragged Anchor
Based on historical data from the North Sea given in ref. /19/, recommended failure frequencies
are presented in Table 5.3.
Table 5.3 Recommended failure frequencies for offshore pipelines containing processed
fluid /19/
Factor
24
>24
Unit
Length dependent failures

(fkm)
2.510-5
6.810-6
Per km year
Length independent
failures (fScore)
8.210-5
8.110-5
Per year
Failures related to dragged

anchors from ships
underway (fDragged Anchor)
To be evaluated according
to appendix E.
To be evaluated according
to appendix E.
Per year
The factor (fScore) is described as length independent, or more precisely; indirectly length
dependent see 5.2.3. For example, it is more likely that a short long pipeline will be exposed to a
trawling than a short one. However, the score should reflect to what extent the pipeline is
exposed to trawling regardless of its length.
In order to reflect various conditions described as length independent, a score is applied to each
pipeline subject to analysis. The score should be based upon operational experience and the
internal and external loads that may impact the pipelines integrity. The estimated failure
frequencies are based upon experience and engineering judgement. It should be pointed out that
the failure frequency reflects the uncertainty related to the operation of the pipeline. Process
monitoring and inspections during operation is of great importance for the detection of
developing failures.
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Guidelines on how to assess pipelines according to scoring system are given in section 5.2.3.
5.2.3 Assessment of individual pipelines, pipeline characteristics

Each pipeline subject to analysis shall be assessed by a group of specialists within the fields of
pipeline technology and risk analysis, and shall possess detailed knowledge about the pipeline in
question. The assessment shall result in a total score for the pipeline based on assessment of each
failure mechanism. The total score is the sum of sub scores:
Pipeline Characteristics Score for each failure mechanism
This section describes how to assess different failure mechanisms. It should be noted that the
assessment is based on engineering judgement and that the method can not reflect all details or
all situations. The threat assessment could be performed according to RP-F116 /ref/ and thus
used as a basis for assigning the scores.
There are generally two main causes that could result in pipeline failures. The first is related to
external loads exceeding the pipelines load resistance, usually originating from an isolated
incident. The second is related to effects gradually weakening the pipeline over a period of time
which eventually results in a failure.
Examples of isolated incidents:
Loads from trawl boards
Anchor interaction / Ship loss
Examples of mechanisms acting over time:
Corrosion, internal/external
Open spans causing fatigue
Buckling
The score to be set ranges from 0 to 10 with the following values and implications:
No or little significance:
Some importance:
Medium importance:
Significant importance:
0
1
3
10
The following sections describe potential failures and mechanisms related to the method of
assessment. In order for the assessment to be balanced and consistent, detailed descriptions on
how to judge and weight the different mechanisms and conditions related to the pipeline or the
location are included.
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The pipelines are designed to withstand the loads defined during the design phase. However, it is
known that large loads can be subject to a portion of uncertainty and therefore contributes to the
failure frequency.
Pipelines in the North Sea are designed according to different standards with different
requirements with respect to tolerances and utilisation factor. Current standards allow for higher
utilisation of the material, i.e. thinner characteristic wall thickness in relation to internal pressure.
This is with a result of improved material characteristics and finer tolerances, in addition to
reliable monitoring of the production and installation process. Therefore the safety level in
current standards is assumed to be in line with previous good design practice. A possible
increase in failure frequency due to increased material utilisation is therefore deemed
unnecessary and probably incorrect. Nevertheless, reducing the wall thickness will for example
reduce the time necessary for initiated corrosion to develop into a failure, emphasising the
importance of adequate monitoring of the integrity of the pipe and its protective systems.
5.2.3.1 Loads from trawl boards
In this section, the possible interaction between the pipeline and trawl gear is described. The
information is retrieved from the DNV Recommended Practice F111 Interference Between
Trawl Gear and Pipelines /1/. The recommended practice contains an extensive description of the
combination pipeline integrity and trawling.
Depending on design criteria, pipelines located in areas where trawling activity takes place may
suffer immediate damage or long term deterioration. In general, pipelines are designed to
withstand loads from a trawl gear in areas where trawling activities is anticipated. The typical
scenarios where the trawl gear could cause damage to the pipeline are impact, pull over and
hooking.
-
Impact, i.e. the initial impact phase when a trawl board, beam shoe or clump weight hits a
pipeline. This phase typically lasts some hundredths of a second. It is mainly the local
resistance of the pipe shell, including any protective coating and/or attached electric cable
protection structure that is mobilised to resist the impact force.
Pull-over, i.e. the second phase where the trawl board, beam trawl or clump weight is
pulled over the pipeline. This phase can last from about 1 second to some 10 seconds,
depending on water depth, span height and other factors. This will usually cause a more
global response of the pipeline.
Hooking, i.e. a situation whereby the trawl equipment is stuck under the pipeline. This is
a rare situation where forces equal to or larger than the break load of the warp line are
applied to the pipeline.
Both pull over and hooking can cause buckling to the pipeline. Impacts caused by the trawl
board or other related gear (e.g. clump weights) combined with free spans could have negative
impact on the pipe. Trawling with clump weights is a relatively new practice and consequently
most pipelines are not designed to withstand loads from such equipment. Even though no serious
damage due to clump weights are registered at this point, a hit by a beam trawl or clump weight
could cause serious damage to the pipeline.
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Trawl gear can also interact with related pipe equipment such as exposed flanges and bolts, and
for small diameter pipelines, hooking may result in rupture.
Over the recent years, a scenario that has been given extra attention is when modern trawl boards
with sharp edges hit and scrape field joints which are not protected by concrete coating but a
rather soft material. Having these kinds of trawl boards frequently scraping the field joints may
result in unprotected field joints with subsequent corrosion and crack initiation as well as loss of
mechanical resistance. This being a relatively new phenomenon (both the sharp trawl boards and
the new field joint coating) and the fact that possible negative impacts most likely will take time
to develop into a leak makes failure frequency estimation for this scenario alone a complex
matter. With a well adapted inspection programme, potential initiated damages should be
discovered before developing into a leak and repairs may be scheduled to a suitable time slot.
Table 5.4 Criteria for score assessment, loads from trawl
Criteria
Score
The pipeline is located in an area where there is no trawling activity

or
The pipeline is buried

The pipeline is located in an area where there is trawling activity
and
The pipeline is designed to withstand loads from such activities *)
and
There are no free spans along the pipeline in this area
and
The pipeline is designed to withstand loads from such activities *)
and
There are free spans along the pipeline in this area
and
The pipeline is not designed to withstand loads from such activities *)
and
There are no free spans along the pipeline in this area
and
The pipeline is not designed to withstand loads from such activities *)
10
and
There are free spans along pipeline in this area
*) According to criteria related to trawling described in DNV-RP-F111 /26/ and related RPs, and standards or
criteria equally adapted to this purpose.
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Table 5.4 contains a description of criteria when establishing the score for trawling.
In order to decide upon score, the pipeline and its design subject to analysis could be compared
to recommendations given in DNV-RP-F111 and DNV-RP-F107 which among others take
intensity of trawling and assessment techniques into account.
5.2.3.2 Ship loss, emergency anchoring and dragged anchors
Pipelines located in areas with ship traffic are exposed to threats such as dragged anchors and
ship loss. For pipelines located in areas with intense ship traffic, a separate failure frequency
contribution based on statistical ship traffic should be added. This contribution includes impacts
from sinking ships (ship loss), dragged anchors from emergency anchoring and dragged anchors
from anchored ships.
Whether the ship traffic poses a threat to the pipeline or not depends on a number of factors. The
most important ones are
-
Number of ship crossings per time unit (e.g. per year)

Ship size distribution. Affects anchor size and chain length and strength.
Water depth. Affects whether the anchor can reach the pipe or not.
Protective measures (trenching, rock dumping etc.)
The following table for score criteria is valid only if the ship size distribution can be said to be
typical, i.e. comparable to the distribution presented in Appendix E (Hooking and damage to
pipeline). If not, a more detailed analysis is required. An example of the results from such a
detailed analysis is given in Appendix D.
Table 5.5 Criteria for score assessment, threats related to ship loss, emergency anchoring
and dragged anchors from anchored ships
Criteria
Score
The pipeline is located in an area where the total number of ship crossings is less than 90 000 per
year
or
Water depth is larger than the chain length for the majority of the ships crossing the pipeline
or
The pipeline is adequately protected through a dedicated stable cover (e.g. trenched and rock
dumped).
The pipeline is located in an area where the total number of ship crossings is between 90 000 and
180 000 per year.
The pipeline is located in an area where the total number of ship crossings is larger than 180 000
per year.
Applying score 0 will still include a small contribution from ship loss etc. since this is included
in the generic frequency. The score assessment above does not include dragged anchors from
ships under way which is given as a separate contributor, fDragged Anchor, as seen in 5.2.2. The
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failure frequency contribution from this scenario is not based on historical leak data and depends
on a number of factors e.g. soil stiffness. A straight forward scoring system has therefore been
proven complex to establish and the failure frequency contribution fDragged Anchor needs to be
estimated separately. How to estimate this contribution is described in examples in Appendix E.
5.2.3.3 Hazardous explosives from war activities
There are pipelines located in coastal areas which were mined during years of war. These areas
are cleared before installation of the pipeline, but even so there could still be left explosives
posing a threat.
Table 5.6 Criteria for score assessment, war related material left behind
Criteria
Score
Pipeline located in an area where no naval explosives (mines, depth charges etc.) have been
deployed
Pipeline located in an area where naval explosives (mines, depth charges etc.) have been deployed
5.2.3.4
Corrosion
Corrosion could cause leakage through one of two ways. First, local corrosion limited to a small
area of the surface of the pipe could result in a small hole. In this case, the most significant
parameters are wall thickness and rate of corrosion.
Secondly, corrosion could also develop over a larger area of the pipewall, causing loss of
integrity, ultimately resulting in rupture. The capacity and integrity of the pipeline depends on
the wall thickness, strength of material, difference between internal and external pressure,
diameter and shape and size of the corroded area.
For corrosion to develop into a hole or rupture, time is required. With proper methods for
inspection and monitoring of operation, failures due to corrosion can be reduced to a minimum.
Internal corrosion
The presence of internal corrosion is strongly dependent of the transported medium. For
pipelines transporting dry gas, internal corrosion is highly unlikely. In order to confirm that the
properties of the gas are within acceptance criteria, monitoring is essential. Proper maintenance
of the equipment used for monitoring (e.g. dewpoint measurements) is required for the
monitoring to be effective and reliable.
Pipelines where inhibitor is used to prevent corrosion have got an additional potential source of
failure since corrosion could reach critical levels if the effect of the inhibitor is changed or
supply is interrupted. For pipelines requiring inhibitor, reliable monitoring of the system for
inhibitor is therefore utmost important.
Some corrosion mechanisms could cause leakage or rupture within a short period of time. One
example is sulphide stress cracking (SSC) which could have severe consequences if there are
high levels of H2S present and this has not been taken into account in design and choice of
material. If there are high levels of H2S and if an operational/technical assessment suggests that a
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pipeline could be operated outside initial design criteria, it is recommended that such a pipeline
is given a score 3.
Table 5.7 Criteria for score assessment, internal corrosion
Criteria
Score
Pipelines where it can be concluded that internal corrosion will not be present
Oil and gas pipelines where inhibitor is used to prevent internal corrosion
Pipelines with confirmed internal corrosion but the corrosion is monitored and under control
Pipelines with high levels of H2S and where the material does not fulfil design criteria
External corrosion
For offshore pipelines (excl. splash and tidal zones), external corrosion is unusual. However, as
the coating is ageing and if the anodic protection is no longer adequate, corrosion may develop.
If the sacrificial anodes are consumed at normal rate, the system for corrosion prevention is
effective. For offshore pipelines connected to installations, the pipeline and the installation are
often galvanically connected, meaning that the pipeline and the submerged parts of the
installation will share sacrificial anodes. Monitoring the rate of anode consumption can therefore
be easier than if the structures were galvanically isolated. If anodes are consumed over a large
distance, this could indicate that corrosion is ongoing and a score 3 is recommended.
Table 5.8 Criteria for score assessment, external corrosion
Criteria
Score
Sacrificial anodes are consumed at normal rate
Sacrificial anodes are consumed at high rate or are fully consumed
5.2.3.5 Fatigue and free spans
Issues related to design of free span pipelines are described in detail in the DNV-RP-F105 Free
Spanning Pipelines. Free spans can cause fatigue if the spanned section is excited and enters a
vibrational mode by the flow. Under misfortunate circumstances the pipe may then burst in
relatively short period of time. Some spans arise as the soil beneath the pipeline is washed away,
and the length of the span can thereafter increase relatively fast since the free span affects the
local currents close to the pipeline.
Table 5.9 Criteria for score assessment, fatigue free span
Criteria
Score
A pipeline with short stationary or no free spans
A pipeline with few non-stationary spans or underpinned spans
A pipeline with non-stationary span/spans at or outside design criteria
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At the time of writing, there is only one recorded incident where free spans have caused leakage.
The pipeline in question had been exposed to extreme weather conditions over a period of time
and the pipe had a free span exceeding the maximum free span length specified by design
criteria.
In the past, vortex induced vibrations (VIV) have caused leakages, but todays pipelines are
designed to resist loads related to such vibrations.
5.2.3.6 Buckling
Buckling could occur if the pipeline is prevented from expanding when forces in axial direction
arise as a result of changing pressure and temperature. This could cause buckling sideways or
upwards. Some pipelines are designed to allow for a controlled buckling to relieve axial tension.
It is important that the buckling is distributed over distance long enough not to cause
unacceptable strain in the pipe. In misfortunate situations, the buckling could be constrained to a
very limited part of the pipeline, causing large strain which ultimately could result in leakage or
repairs. The phenomenon is most common during the first years of operation when temperatures
for some pipelines are at the highest, but may occur if operational conditions are changed.
Table 5.10 Criteria for score assessment, buckling
Criteria
Score
Standard
Pipelines that are designed for controlled buckling and where such buckling occurs
Hot pipelines younger than 2 years or pipelines with varying operational conditions
Pipelines that are designed for controlled buckling and where such buckling does not occur
5.2.3.7 Avalanche
Providing an accurate failure frequency contribution from avalanches is a complex task and
depends on the pipes load resistance against this hazard. However, provided that the pipeline is
designed in accordance to the DNV-OS-F101 Offshore Standard for Submarine Pipeline
Systems or an equal standard, the failure frequency should be lower than 110-4 per year and
pipeline.
Table 5.11 Criteria for score assessment, avalanche
Criteria
Score
Standard
Pipeline located in an area with increased likelihood for avalanche
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5.2.4 Parameters not applicable for score assessment

The following parameters should not be assessed in terms of scoring:
Length of pipeline
Material defects or material failures
Composition of transported medium
Unknown causes
All these are counted for explicitly in the tables.

5.2.4.1 Length
Length is included as one of the parameters in the overall failure frequency model. Length will
also affect the score assessment implicitly:
Failure frequency contribution from trawling depends upon the length of the pipeline
exposed to trawling.
Failure frequency contribution from corrosion is to some extent related to length but
strongly depends on what is causing the corrosion. If corrosion is caused by humidity in a
gas pipeline, the length is not of importance.
The length of areas where seabed conditions are such that free spans may arise will affect
failure frequency. Long free spans will affect the failure frequency.
5.2.4.2 Material defects/Material failures
Failures and defects related to material are by nature explicitly length dependent and are
therefore included in the length dependent part of the failure frequency. Adjustments may be
justified if the pipeline subject to analysis is suspected to be especially prone to failures related
to material.
5.2.4.3 Composition of transported medium
Gas (wet and dry) and oil should be properly processed and monitored in order to prevent
corrosion or keep corrosion under control. As long as monitoring of composition of medium is
confirmed to be adequate there is no need to add a failure frequency contribution related to the
composition of medium.
5.2.4.4 Unknown causes
In addition to the known causes of failures to pipelines, as discussed above, new or unforeseen
factors may cause failures to pipelines. Estimating the contribution from such unknown causes is
not possible, nor is it possible to claim that some pipelines are more prone to failures related to
unknown causes than others.
5.2.5 External loads within the platform safety zone

Within the platform safety zone, the pipeline can suffer damage caused by dropped objects,
visiting vessels or neighbouring anchored installations.
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According to /18/ incidents within the near platform zone are dominated by damage caused by
supply boat anchors. Consequently, the failure frequency should be estimated based on the
activity level on and near the platform, and primarily found in relevant risk analysis.
Table 5.12 contains generic failure frequencies for external load damages in the near platform
zone for offshore steel pipelines based on /19/. The pipelines are divided into the two categories
as there is an empirical difference between frequencies for these intervals of diameters. It is
recommended to use data from the risk analysis for the platform in question since the failure
frequencies from /19/ are based on historical data while failure frequencies in the near platform
zone depends on the local conditions around the platform.
There are no occurrences of leaks from pipelines >16 in the near platform zone. However, this
does not imply that leaks on large diameter pipelines will not occur. The assumed failure
occurrence of 0.7 leaks corresponds to 50% confidence of 0 incidents within the Poisson
distribution.
The estimates given in Table 5.12 can be applied provided that no risk analysis is available for
the platform in question. The numbers should be added to the failure frequencies given in Table
5.12.
Table 5.12 Generic failure frequencies for external damage loads to pipelines in the near
platform zone /19/
Diameter
No. of leaks
Exposure time
Failure frequency
Per year
Per year
16
8836
7.910
>16
0.7*)
3734
1.910-4
*)
Unit
-4
Statistical estimate
5.2.6 Summary of recorded failure data for offshore pipelines

Table 5.13 below contains a summary of the recorded data and failure frequencies for offshore
pipelines.
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Table 5.13 Recorded failures for offshore pipelines based on /19/

Pipeline description
unprocessed fluid, alt.1
No. of
leaks
Exposure
Failure frequency
Unit
30
60033 km-years
5.010-4
Per km-year
60033 km-years
2.510-4
Per km-year
10576 pipe-years
1.410-3
Per year
59003 km-years
2.510-5
Per km-year
4320 pipe-years
6.910-4
Per year

unprocessed fluid, alt.1
30
Processed oil or gas, Diameter

24
Processed oil or gas, Diameter

26
)
-6
147608 km-years
6.810
Per km-year
2949 pipe-years
6.810-4
Per year
External load causing damage* ,

Diameter 24
8836 years
7.910-4
Per year
External load causing damage*),

Diameter > 24
0.7*)
3734 years
1.910-4
Per year
*) In the near platform zone
The information above could be used if a complete assessment of the pipeline as descirbed in
5.2.25.2.5 cannot be carried out. In general, a thorough assessment of the pipeline is the
preferred approach in order to reach adequate estimates. Before applying the data in Table 5.13
to the pipeline subject to analysis, one should make sure that the conditions having impact on the
failure frequency are not extreme but rather comparable to average conditions for offshore
pipelines. See section 5.2.3 for a complementary description of conditions having impact on the
failure frequency. Main issues are:
The correlation between diameter and wall thickness is significant for many of the failure
causes and the frequency should therefore be adjusted when analysing pipelines with
extreme wall thickness.
The level of activity around the pipeline has got impact on the failure frequency.
Construction work will normally take place during the first years after installation.
Cover up or burial of the pipeline increases the probability of damage to the pipeline
during the trenching operation. Visual inspection of a buried pipeline is more complex
than visual inspection of a pipeline lying on top of the seabed.
If design parameters are not in line with actual conditions, this will have impact on the
failure frequency.
Depending on what source is studied, the distribution of failure cause varies slightly. However,
Table 5.14 contains one distribution of failure cause that could be applied if adjustments of the
failure frequency are necessary. If adjustments due to extraordinary conditions are necessary, the
table could be used as a first step to estimate how the overall failure frequency is affected when
increasing or decreasing the likelihood for individual failure causes. If adjustments are
considered necessary, a more detailed analysis than what is presented in this guide is
recommended.
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Table 5.14 Distribution of failure causes for rigid pipelines /19/

Failure mechanism
Contribution
Corrosion
36%
Material defects
13%
External interference
38%
Construction damage
2%
Other causes
11%
For tidal zones, failure data for onshore pipelines should be applied. The tidal zone is defined as
the area where the pipeline is either submerged or not, depending on time of the day. Regardless
of time of the day, the soil will be humid, allowing the anode system to function. In general,
onshore pipelines are more prone to failures due to corrosion than pipelines in the tidal zone.
Applying failure frequencies for onshore pipelines will thus be conservative.
5.2.7 Flexible pipelines

The table below presents the failure frequency for flexible pipelines in the midline zone. The
estimates are derived from /19/ and are valid for all subsea flexible pipelines (excl. risers).
Table 5.15 Estimated failure frequencies for flexible pipelines in midline zone /19/
No. of leaks
11
11
Exposure time
3447 km years
3898 pipe-years
Failure frequency
Denomination
2.310
-4
Per km-year
2.810
-3
Per pipe-year
5.2.8 Production availability

For analysis of production availability all incidents requiring production shut downs or reduction
of transport flow are of interest. However, repairs may often be postponed to more convenient
periods, minimising or avoiding loss of production.
The available statistical data for pipelines are unreliable when it comes to incidents not having
impact on safety. Available databases show that the number of leaks constitute between 10 %
and 95 % of the total number of incidents having impact on production.
A reasonable assumption is that failures causing leaks require immediate repairs while other
failures can be postponed.
The available sources do not describe whether failures cause reduced capacity or not. It is
therefore assumed that incidents in /19/ will not affect the production availability until actual
repairs take place. During repairs, the availability is assumed to be reduced to zero.
Based on the available statistical data and the assumptions above, the following approach is
recommended when estimating interruptions in production availability:
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Estimate the failure frequency as described in section 5.2 (leaks) and use this as basis for
estimating frequency for failures requiring postponable repairs.
As described above, adjust the frequency if conditions are considered extreme
(unfavourable or favourable).
Assume that the frequency for failures not resulting in leakage (but requires postponable
repairs) equals the frequency for leakage.
Based on available statistics /3/
o For rigid pipelines, approximately 50% recorded failures result in leakage
o For flexible pipelines, approximately 100% of the recorded failures result in
leakage
The assumption that the two frequencies (frequency for failures causing leakage and frequency
for failures causing postponable repairs) are equal is based on available statistics in /19/. The
statistics for flexible pipelines actually imply that the frequency for failures only causing
postponable repairs is considerably lower than the frequency for leakages. The data is however
scarce and it is assumed that failures causing leakage are reported to larger extent than failures
that do not cause leakage. The proportion of leakage frequency is therefore suspected to be over
estimated, hence a one to one relationship between the two frequencies is considered reasonable,
both for rigid and flexible pipelines.
5.3 Onshore gas pipelines

The failure frequencies in this section apply to the following failure mechanisms: construction
defects, material failure, corrosion, external interference, ground movements (settlings,
landslides etc.), hot tap made by error, other causes (e.g. lightning) and unknown causes. All
failure frequencies are given per km-year. Pipelines laid through areas associated with certain
types of threats, for instance frequent crossings of roads, railways or unstable soil conditions,
should be assessed in terms of an upward adjustment. Generic failure frequencies are given in
Table 5.16.
Internal corrosion is very unusual, provided that the transported medium is dry gas. The
likelihood of having water or other substances in the pipeline required for internal corrosion is
very low when the transported medium is dry gas. The failure frequency due to corrosion is
dominated by corrosion on the outside of the pipe wall caused by damaged or defective coating
and/or cathodic protection, and weaknesses in connection with road or railway crossings.
Based on available statistical material, there is a relationship between wall thickness and some of
the failure mechanisms. For a few failure mechanisms (i.e. corrosion, external interference and
ground movement), the relationship is strong, meaning that there is a rapid or sudden decrease in
failure frequency with increasing wall thickness
Due to the relation between failure mechanisms and wall thickness, the failure frequency is
presented in wall thickness categories rather than diameter categories. The experience data
presented in Table 5.16 is primarily based on pipelines with an operational pressure of 55-75
bars and wall thicknesses far below those of higher pressure pipelines (>150 bar). The population
of pipelines rapidly decreases with increasing wall thickness above 15 mm and there are no
recorded failures to pipelines with wall thickness larger than 20 mm. Due to the relatively small
population and the fact that there are no recorded failures for these pipelines, a combination of
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quantitative and qualitative approach have been applied in order to estimate failure frequencies
for these larger wall thicknesses.
More detailed analysis should be made for a specific pipeline when required, especially if there
are particular problem areas or risk reducing measures that need to be addressed. Such an
analysis could be based on the assessment of the likely contribution from the various failure
mechanisms, again based on the relative contribution from these mechanisms for the pipeline
population available in statistical reports (e.g. the EGIG report). The analysis should be done by
qualified personnel, representing experience both in pipeline design and operation, as well as
statistical analysis. Even if the assessment should conclude that several failure mechanisms are
not relevant for the pipeline in question, a certain minimum frequency should be retained,
representing unforeseen causes.
Table 5.16 Failure frequencies for gas pipeline onshore /16/
Wall thickness (mm)
Failure frequency
Denomination
2.710
-4
Per km-year
5-10
1.510-4
Per km-year
10-15
4.510
-5
Per km-year
15-20
1.810-5
Per km-year
20-25
1.710
-5
Per km-year
> 25
1.110-5
Per km-year
These data are also recommended for landfall areas, if more specific data is not available.
5.4 Onshore oil pipelines

In /20/, data material from CONCAWE from the years 1971 to 2000 is analyzed and documented
in tables and figures. The data is based on 379 failures and 250 pipelines of a total length 30800
km. CONCAWE /20/ shows that the exposure for pipelines containing crude oil and products is
approximately 667000 km-years. The failure frequency for onshore oil pipelines distributed on
diameter class is estimated based on these figures and are presented in Table 5.17 below.
Table 5.17 Failure frequencies for oil pipelines onshore /4/
Diameter class
Failure frequency
Denomination
<8
1.010-3
Per km-year
8-14
8.010
-4
Per km-year
16-22
1.210-4
Per km-year
24-28
2.510
-4
Per km-year
30
2.510-4
Per km-year
All diameters
4.610-4
Per km-year
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The data contains no information on the number of incidents causing immediate or postponable
repairs without leakage. Compared to offshore pipelines, the repair time is short and the
contribution to unavailability could therefore in most cases be neglected.
5.5 CO2 pipelines onshore / offshore

Compared to HC pipelines, operational experience and pipeline exposure is very limited and
todays aggregated incident data is scarce. Therefore a qualitative analysis on CO2 pipelines has
been conducted. The analysis is found in Appendix F.
For CO2 pipelines, monitoring of operational conditions, presence of and compliance with
effective operational procedures is required to avoid initiation of processes leading to potential
failures. As long as such monitoring and procedural compliance is in place, it is suggested that
failure frequencies for corresponding HC pipelines is applied to CO2 pipelines as well.
Should there be any doubt in adequacy related to monitoring of operational conditions or
procedures, failure frequencies for HC pipelines can not be applied and a detailed analysis of the
CO2 pipeline in question is required instead.
5.6 Hole size for pipelines

5.6.1 Hole size for offshore pipelines
The hole size distribution given in /3/ is shown in Table 5.18. To obtain the largest possible data
material, leaks both in midline zone and safety zone are included in the distribution. Both oil
leaks and gas leaks are included. Hole size is often assumed from limited information, hence the
justness of the distribution is uncertain. All hole sizes larger than assumed pipeline diameter is
interpreted as rupture. This interpretation implies that 3 out of 5 leaks from hole size larger than
80 mm is equal to rupture. The two remaining incidents have hole size 100 mm and 150 mm.
These leaks have occurred on pipelines with a diameter between 10 and 16. A conservative
approach has been chosen interpreting one of them as leakage and one as rupture.
Table 5.18 Hole size distribution for offshore pipelines /3/
Hole size
Number of leaks
Distribution
Small (<20mm)
37
74%
Medium (20-80mm)
16%
Large (>80mm)
2%
Rupture
8%
Total
50
100%
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5.6.2 Hole size for onshore pipelines

Hole size for onshore pipelines is defined differently in /5/ as opposed to /18/. Circular holes, are
assumed to be small holes and interpreted as the smallest category in Table 5.19. These represent
46% of the leaks. Cracks and rips are assumed to include both small and large leaks, and this
category represents 40% of all leaks. It is assumed that this category could be divided into the
categories medium and large in Table 5.19. The largest size is rupture and represents 15%. This
distribution is based on data from all leaks independent of pipeline size or wall thickness. For
pipelines with wall thickness > 10 mm, the equivalent distribution is 23%, 59% and 18%, i.e. the
contribution from crack formation and full rupture increases with increasing wall thickness.
If the middlemost quantity (cracks/rips)is divided equally between the categories medium and
large, the hole size distribution is 46%, 20%, 20% and 14%. This is significantly different
compared to the hole size distribution for offshore pipelines, hence a separate hole size
distribution should be applied to onshore pipelines.
The hole size is affected by several factors, for instance the mechanism causing failure, degree of
utilisation (pressure), pipeline dimensions and whether the pipeline holds compressed gas or
pressurized liquid. Next to initial failure mechanisms, degree of utilisation is considered to have
the greatest impact on hole size.
The maximum allowed degree of utilisation for onshore pipelines is lower than for the equivalent
offshore pipeline. Offshore pipelines are allowed to operate under pressure that results in steel
material utilisation around 70-85% of specified minimum yield strength. Corresponding value
for onshore pipelines is typically 40% in densely populated areas, with a gradually increasing
exploitation with decreasing population density. In uninhabited areas, i.e. desert, the same degree
of utilisation as for offshore pipelines is allowed.
The degree of utilisation is not known for the onshore pipelines subject to leakage. However the
degree of utilisation for onshore pipelines in ref /2/ is assumed to be less compared to oil and gas
pipelines on the Norwegian continental shelf. Holes on pipes with a high degree of material
utilisation are larger compared to holes on pipes with lower degree of material utilisation. Three
quarters of all medium and large holes is assumed to develop into rupture. For pipelines with a
material utilisation degree larger than 70% the distribution shown in Table 5.19 should be
applied.
Table 5.19 Hole size distribution for onshore pipelines /5/
Hole size
Distribution*
Distribution**
Small (<20mm)
46%
46%
Medium (20-80mm)
20%
10%
Large (>80mm)
20%
10%
Rupture
14%
34%
Total
100%
100%
* Applies to onshore pipelines with an average degree of utilisation< 70%

** Applies to onshore pipelines with an average degree of utilisation 70%
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5.7 Risers
Table 5.20 contains failure frequencies for both dynamic flexible risers and steel risers. The
failure frequencies for steel risers are given according to two diameter intervals. In the report
Failure data for pipelines from 1991 (Ref. /19/) the failure frequencies for pipelines are
classified according to whether the pipeline is inside a shaft or not. A closer study of the data in
/18/ does not support this conclusion. The data is rather indicating the opposite (higher failure
frequency for internal risers). Consequently the failure frequency is only classified according to
diameter. In 5.7.1 an overview is given over location of failures on risers and in 5.7.2 the
distribution of hole size is given.
Table 5.20 Failure frequencies for risers /3/, /28/
Description
Steel
Flexible, dynamic
Diameter
No. of leaks
Exposure
Frequency
Denomination
-4
Per riser-year
16
10
10979 riser years
9.110
18
0 (0.7)
5937 riser years
1.210-4
Per riser-year
4224 riser years
-3
Per riser-year
N.A.
19
4.510
5.7.1 Risers - Position of leaks

Riser leaks in /18/ are distributed for zones as shown in Table 5.21. This distribution is based on
a small number of incidents and predictions based on these figures are therefore uncertain.
Table 5.21 Distribution of leak location /18/, /28/
Leakage location
Steel risers
Flexible risers
Above splash zone
Splash zone
Subsea
Unknown
Total
12
19
A large part of material and corrosion defects are expected to occur subsea since the largest part
of the riser is submerged and more difficult to inspect.
The following relative distribution of leak localization is recommended and reflects the figures
from the table above.
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Table 5.22 Location of leaks for risers

Leakage location
Proportion
Above water
30%
Splash zone
30%
Subsea
40%
5.7.2 Hole size

The hole size distribution given in /18/, /28/ is presented in Table 5.23 below.
Table 5.23 Hole size distribution /18/, /28/
Hole size
Steel risers
Flexible risers
Number of leaks
Proportion
Number of leaks
Proportion
Small (<20 mm)
50%
26%
Medium (20-80 mm)
20%
37%
Large (> 80 mm)/ full

fracture
30%
37%
Total
10
100%
19
100%
The available information describing hole size distribution is scarce, hence the distribution is
uncertain. All leaks from /18/ come from risers with a diameter less than 16. Even though there
is no available information on hole size distribution for large diameter risers, it is recommended
to apply the distribution above for large diameter risers.
5.7.3 Production availability

Estimation of frequencies for failures leading to postponable repairs of risers is done in the same
manner as described in 5.2.8, but the relation between leaks and failures leading to postponable
repairs is different. 1 out of 3 incidents results in a leak. This relation is found in /3/ where 11 out
of 35 reported incidents on steel risers resulted in leakage. For flexible risers in /3/, 3 out of 3
incidents resulted in leakage. The available statistical data is too scarce to confirm that flexible
risers have a different ratio than steel risers. Applying the same ratio for flexible risers as for
steel risers will most likely result in an overestimation of the failure frequency for failures
resulting in postponable repairs.
5.8 Subsea equipment

Subsea equipment related to pipelines is typically valves, flanges and couplings and fittings. In
the OREDA handbook subsea part /2/, failure frequencies are found for a number of different
pieces of subsea equipment. More detailed information on failure frequencies is found in the
OREDA database which is available to the contributing oil and gas operators.
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5.9 Example of application of recommended failure data for pipelines

In the following section an example on how recommended failure data could be applied to
estimate the failure frequency of a pipeline is presented. The pipeline subject to analysis is
assumed to have an outer diameter of 32 transporting processed gas. The submerged part of the
pipeline is 400 km long. The 0.5 km landfall zone and 10 km onshore part comes in addition. On
the seabed, the pipeline is assumed to be exposed (on top of seabed) and positioned in sand. At
one point, there is a shipping lane with crossing ship traffic. The depth at this point is 80 m and
the annual number of crossings is estimated to 15000. The ship size distribution is unknown but
is assumed to be similar to many other shipping lanes.
The pipeline is assessed by a team with relevant competence within pipeline technology and risk
analysis in order to establish a failure frequency that reflects the actual situation. According to
the method described in 5.2.3 the team concludes that the pipeline (the stretches at sea) should be
given a score 3 as a result of the following contributors.
Table 5.24 Example of score assessment
Assessed Conditions
Score
Loads from trawl boards
Hazardous explosives from war activities
Ship loss, emergency anchoring and dragged anchors
Corrosion, internal
Corrosion, external
Fatigue and free spans
Buckling
Avalanches
Total
Based on the information of water depth, pipeline diameter, seabed soil, protection philosophy,
annual number of ship crossings and ship size distribution, the failure frequency contribution
from dragged anchors (fDraggedd Anchor) is calculated in accordance with appendix E.
By using the recommended failure frequencies the resulting frequency is given Table 5.25.
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Table 5.25 Failure frequency for example pipeline for individual segments
Segment
Segment I: Safety zone
Segment II
Unit
Failure frequency
Riser
External loads causing
damage in near platform
zone
Pipeline, length dependent
frequency
Pipeline, score dependent
frequency
Pipeline, dragged anchors
from ships under way
-4
Unit
1.210
1.910-4
Per year
Per year
400 (km)6.810-6=2.710-3
Per year
38.110-5=2.410-4
Per year
150005.810-8=8.710-4
Per year
0.5 (km)1.710-5*)=8.510-6
10 (km)1.710-5*)=1.710-4
Per year
Per year
410-3*)
Per year
(fDragged Anchor)
Segment III: Landfall
Segment IV: Onshore
Pipeline
Pipeline
Total
)
* Assuming a wall thickness between 20 mm and 25 mm.
This pipelines yearly leak frequency is estimated to 410-3, i.e. in average 250 years between
each leakage. Note that the failure frequency does note include failures caused by components
such as valves and fittings etc.
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REFERENCES
/1/
Feildata for rrledninger, DNV report 2005-1221, rev. 4 September 2006
/2/
Offshore Reliability Data (OREDA) Handbook, Topside / Subsea equipment, 2009
/3/
Raw data from Mott MacDonald. Received by Christian Hvam 10. June 2005 (Ref:
221281/E/0004), revised version received by Christian Hvam 21. June 2005 (Ref:
221281/E/0005).
CONCAWE Pipeline Performance Report and Analysis, D. Lyons, Concave
/4/
/5/
Anbefalte feildata for rrledninger, Grusell C, DNV Technical memo no 1278QK0-7,

2010.06.21
/6/
/7/
Pipeline Reliability: An investigation of pipeline failure characteristics and analysis of

pipeline failure frekvens for submarine and cross-country pipelines. T. Andersen, A.
Misund, Journal of Petroleum Technology, April 1983.
Reliability data for subsea pipelines , P. Hokstad, Sintef Report STF75 A89037, 1989
/8/
Offshore pipeline reliability, R. Bruschi, F. Tura, Snamprogetti S.p.a.
/9/
Riser leakage frequencies in the North Sea, T. Andersen, N, M. Berg, D. Taberner

Veritec Report 85-3773, 1985
/10/
BATELLE, An analysis of Reportable Incidents for Natural Gas Transmissions and

Gathering Lines, June 1984 through 1989, October 15
/11/
Predicting Pipeline Reliability Using Discrimant Analysis: A comparison between

Nortl and Gulf of Mexico performance. R.F. de la Mare, Y.L Bakouros.
Proc. of the fourth (1984) int. offshore and polar engineering conference.
/12/
DNV Technica, Technical Note, Riser/Pipeline Leak Frequencies, Rev. 1
/13/
Failures and failure frequencies in various pipeline networks, T. Andersen, DNV

Report 80-0082, 1980
/14/
Feildata for rrledninger, K. Haugen, K. Ulveseter, Veritec Report 91-3387, 1992
/15/
Pipeline Reliability, R.F. de la Mare, . Andersen, DNV Report 80-0572, 1980
/16/
Concawe, Performance of cross country oil pipelines in Western Europe. Report no.
1/02
/17/
Recommended practice DNV-RP-B401, Cathodic Protection Design, 1993
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/18/
Parloc 2001 The Update of Loss of Containment Data for Offshore Pipelines,
Prepared by Mott MacDonald for the Health and Safety Executive, the UK Offshore
Operators Association and the Instistue of Petroleum, 2003
/19/
Feildata for rrledninger, K. Haugen, K. Ulveseter, DNV Report 97-3420, rev 2,

October 1997
/20/
Concawe, Performance of cross country oil pipelines in Western Europe. Report no.
1/02
/21/
United Kingdom Onshore Pipeline Operators Association: Pipeline Product Loss

Incidents, Advantica Report R 4798, June 2002
/22/
DNV Energy Report, Project Specific Guideline for Safe, Reliable and Cost-Effective
Transmission of CO2 in Pipelines JIP, Draft version 2009
/23/
Transmission of CO2 - Safety and economic considerations, Gale J, Davison J, Energy

29 2004
/24/
7th EGIG Report Gas Pipeline Incidents, December 2008
/25/
Failure frequencies for heavy walled pipelines, Grusell C, DNV Technical memo no
1278QK0-8/GRUSE, 2010-01-19
/26/
Recommended Practice DNV-RP-F111, Interface Between Trawl Gear and Pipelines,

October 2006
/27/
Shapiro, S, Murray J, Gleason R, Barnes S, Eales B and Woodward P, Threats to

Submarine Cables, SubOptic97, San Francisco
/28/
G. Watson, Technical Memo Flexible Riser Loss of Containment Incidents

UKCS/NCS PR-09-0533/Rev.03, MCS Advanced Subsea Engineering
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APPENDIX
A
Issues related to materials and its impact on failure frequency for steel pipes
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A.1
Failure rates and causes depending on diameter and age
When presenting failure frequency for pipelines as function of the diameter, one should be aware
of the fact that there is a number of other parameters that are likely to change with the diameter
and therefore also affect failure mechanisms with corresponding frequency.
Examples of such other parameters are:
Wall thickness: In general, large diameter pipelines have larger absolute wall thickness
than small diameter pipelines which provides increased protection against some of the
relevant failure causes, e.g. corrosion and third party interference.
Method of manufacturing: Small diameter pipelines are produced as seamless while

large diameter pipelines have a longitudinal weld along the pipe.
Transported medium: Gas pipelines often have larger diameter than oil pipelines.
Location: Large diameter pipelines are often used as main transmission lines over longer
distances while small diameter pipelines are often used in the near platform zone where
the frequency for failure is higher.
Variations in diameter cause variations in load resistance against third party interference and
penetrating corrosion. In addition to variations in diameter and wall thickness, there are
variations in failure mechanisms and their proportion in the underlying statistical material.
Correlation between failure mechanisms being dependent on diameter and the pipeline age may
be linked to the method of manufacturing. The method of manufacturing has large impact on the
failure frequency for steel pipelines and the possibility for detecting defects before the
component is taken into operation.
In general, two main manufacturing methods can be identified; seamless pipes and pipes with a
longitudinal weld. The use of longitudinal welds introduces variations in the radius of the pipe
and possibilities for defects in the weld itself. These welds are however performed as part of
multiple productions and with approved and tested weld procedures under controlled
circumstances. The frequency for failures related to these longitudinal welds is therefore by
experience proven to be low. Circumstances for controlled and well defined welding
environment and non destructive testing of the material are more favourable for rolled and
welded pipes than for seamless ones.
Using seamless pipes eliminates the failures related to the longitudinal weld and the time
consuming step in production is also eliminated. In these aspects, seamless pipes are preferable.
Due to these positive features, the use of seamless pipes has increased over the last decades and
the technology for manufacturing has developed rapidly as a result of the increased demand.
Previously, only small diameter pipes were manufactured as seamless but today, pipes up to 20
are being produced with seamless technique. Seamless pipes compared to longitudinal welded
pipes do however show increased rates related to failures derived from the actual manufacturing
since the interior of a seamless pipe is more complicated to inspect than the plates prior to the
rolling.
A relation between failure frequency and both diameter and age can be noted, but it is rather the
year of manufacturing than the actual age or operating hours that has got impact on the failure
frequency. Pipelines older than approximately 15 years have stronger negative correlation
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between failure rates and diameter than pipelines produced more recently. This is due to the fact
that early large diameter pipelines exclusively were manufactured by longitudinal welds and
therefore had low frequency for failures related to the actual manufacturing.
A number of other aspects linked to both diameter and year of production will also cause
variations in the quality of the material and the likelihood of installing a pipe with a non-detected
failure.
A potential over roll will be larger in terms of relative surface for thin walled pipelines and
constitutes a larger proportion of the total wall thickness. Over rolling the external surface on
seamless pipes, and both (internal and external) surfaces on longitudinal welded pipes, will
normally be detected and is shown as cracks in the surface. The likelihood of over rolling
increases with the degree of roll. Over rolling is more likely to be undetected for seamless pipes
than for longitudinal welded pipes.
The likelihood for having incrustations pressed into the material during the rolling is also larger
for seamless pipes. The likelihood of having slag does not depend on the wall thickness or
diameter of the pipe but for thin walled pipelines, an embodied piece of slag will relatively
speaking constitute a larger part of the wall than for a thick walled pipe. Slag may be detected in
some cases but doing this is more difficult on the interiors of a seamless pipe.
For failures related to over rolling or the presence of slag inside the pipe wall, it is more likely to
find these at the internal surface of a seamless pipe than at the external surface or at any of the
surfaces on a longitudinal welded pipe since the internal surface of a pipe is the most difficult
surface to test and inspect during manufacturing.
The likelihood for laminations is proven to be relatively independent of diameter and wall
thickness. For thin walled pipelines, the laminations will however be rolled out over a relatively
larger area and at the same time constitute a larger proportion of the wall thickness than for thick
walled pipes. Lamination may in some cases be detected through ultra sound or x-ray testing.
During the seventies, problems related to lamination and subsequent step-wise cracking in the
pipe were an issue. In an effort to increase the yield stress and tenacity of the material, one
introduced a new method of controlled rolling of pipe steel, i.e. rolling at lower end roller
temperature than done before. Doing so resulted in an unfavourable degree of MnS embodiments
with subsequent risk of cracking. Manufacturing methods and material technology are now
developed and modified in such a way that the likelihood of having these failures is significantly
reduced for pipelines produced after 1980 compared the ones produced during the seventies.
Another failure mechanism linked to seamless pipelines is variations in diameter. Measurements
of variations in diameter and wall thickness are normally only performed at the ends of the pipe.
Since the ends are weld points for the adjacent pipe, quality checks of wall thickness and
diameter are crucial at these points. There are occasions where the drift shaping the internal
diameter and surface moves radial causing the wall thickness to be too large at one part and too
small at the diametrically opposite, Figure A.1 below.
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Figure A.1 Resulting cross sectional shape from a moving drift (schematic).
The reduced wall thickness may be critical with respect to strength and corrosion. The increased
wall thickness may be critical with respect to level of tension during lay and installation of the
pipeline which could lead to cracks.
Compared to the past, pipes with larger diameter can be produced as seamless pipes, meaning
that failures typically linked to seamless pipes today are present for a wider range of diameter
than before. Some failure modes that previously have had a strong negative correlation between
diameter and failure rate are now applicable to large diameter pipes as well. However, it can not
be concluded that the likelihood for failure to large diameter pipes has increased over the last
twenty years. This is partly due to the fact that the failure mechanisms typically linked to
seamless pipes are more likely to occur and cause failure in thin walled pipes, i.e. small diameter
pipes.
Another reason for that no relative increase in failure rates, linked to seamless pipes and
diameter is noted is that the quality checks in steel production has gone through a tremendous
development over the last twenty years. Knowledge of production methods and chemical
composition has also increased. In steel pipe production of today, the production with respect to
chemical composition and mechanical features are more even than before. Requirements on
quality and check procedures have also increased over the years which all together increase the
likelihood of the pipe fulfilling requirements on specified properties all along the pipe and along
its circumference. The likelihood of having defect welds is therefore also reduced since the weld
procedure is tested on a well defined material which now is very likely to mimic the actual
material.
Despite the positive trend in steel and pipe production over the last twenty years, so called
unpredictable failures or sources to failure occur at regular intervals. To some extent, past failure
sources tend to reappear after some time, when focus on preventive actions is decreased as the
specific failures disappear. One should also be aware of the fact that regardless of the level of
quality management and monitoring one can never completely eliminate the likelihood of having
human or equipment failures resulting in the installation of a defect pipe.
Another important issue from the last years of development is the production and application of
more high tensile steel. As a result of the increased competence and knowledge about the
production process one now produces steel pipes that are highly dependent of having the
important parameters within strict margins. Deviations from the production parameters are more
likely to have severe consequences for pipes of modern high tensile steel than for pipes made out
of older types of steel. E.g., from a chemical point of view, modern steel has a reduced
likelihood of brittle fracture. However, this property is linked to the microstructure of the
material and in some cases a correct heat treatment. If the heat treatment is faulty carried out, the
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impact on the likelihood of having brittle fractures at low temperatures is significantly increased.
Such faults may also appear locally if ovens or the cooling process equipment wont ensure a
uniform environment throughout the whole pipe wall and all along the pipe.
The likelihood of having a faulty heat treatment does not depend on the diameter of the pipe.
Such mistakes or failures may occur independently of the quality of material and dimension. For
larger wall thickness, there is however an increased likelihood for variations in the heat treatment
cycle in the radial direction. The consequence of such a failure will in general increase with the
steel tensile strength. Faulty or inadequate heat treatment of high tensile steel normally has larger
impact on the material property than in the case of steel with lower tensile properties. Increased
tensile strength could also contribute to increased likelihood of stress corrosion.
The quality and strength of the material can to some extent be related to the diameter and wall
thickness of the pipe. Using high tensile steel will enable the use of pipes with smaller wall
thickness given that operational conditions are identical. Doing so will increase the likelihood for
a number of other failures causes typical for thin walled pipes.
Since there is an increasing trend of using high tensile steel for pipes and the production methods
of seamless pipes are constantly developing, it is reasonable to believe that previous recorded
differences in failure frequencies due to variations in pipe diameter will be less significant. Other
parameters, such as wall thickness, manufacturing method and steel quality should be evaluated
in order to reach a reliable estimate on reliability and failure frequencies for newer pipelines. For
older pipelines, year of production should be taken into account when establishing the
corresponding failure frequencies.
A.2
Weld failures
Defective welds are found both among the longitudinal welds (where applicable) and in the
joints connecting the individual line pipes. The likelihood for having defective welds generally
depends on a number of factors.
-
The material used

Weld procedures
Weld execution
The most important factors for how the likelihood for defective welds is affected are:
- The chemical composition of the steel since this is related to strength. In addition, the
homogeneity of the chemical composition is essential since weld procedures are
developed and tested for a certain composition.
- The purity of the steel. One should minimise the level of impurities both in the initial
material and in the remaining production process.
Developing weld procedures includes evaluating a number of factors essential to achieve a weld
with a minimal level of defects. This task is most complex for high strength steels and complex
for some stainless steels. For these steels, deviations from the weld procedures are more critical
than for other steels.
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Added material. The added material is normally chosen so that the strength slightly
exceeds that of the pipe material. The properties of the weld and pipe metal should as to
the rest be matched in the best possible way. Large differences in chemical composition
could result in potential gaps, resulting in galvanic corrosion.
Geometry of the seam. A narrow seam is more efficient compared to a wide seam in the
sense that less material is required to fill the groove. However, a narrow seam increases
the likelihood for hot cracks due to tension, and detection of lack of fusion and slag along
the seam is more complex in case of steep seam edges.
Cleaning of seams. Effective cleaning of seams prevents formation of slag and pores.
Heat supply. The supply of heat is essential in the weld procedure. The heat cycle which
the weld and the heated area around the weld is exposed to defines the microstructure,
which in turn defines the hardness and residual tension. Large heat supply results in high
tension after cooling, which affects the likelihood for hot cracks, stress corrosion and
hydrogen embrittlement.
Gas supply. A stable and clean gas supply is essential to avoid formation of pores.
Heat treatment. Heat treatment could be used to reduce the level of tension in the weld
and in order to reach desired micro structure and hardness. The heat treatment must be
carried out within a certain amount of time after the completion of the weld in order to
avoid letting hydrogen embrittlement and cracks develop.
Testing. The procedural weld needs to be tested in order to confirm that the weld will
withstand the conditions relevant during operation. Except for some load tests, this is
done when testing is performed in accordance with prevailing standards.
The welding itself must be carried out in accordance with the developed procedure and within
the specified paramters. The external conditions differ depending on whether the welding is
productional or procedural. It is likely that conditions are more favourable or easier to control
and monitor during a procedural weld compared to a productional weld. When developing the
weld procedure, this must be taken into account so that the conditions required by the procedure
are realistic and achievable. Exclusion of moist during the welding is one of several essential
factors. Adequate physical coverage in order to prevent wind disturbances to the gas coverage is
another important factor. Achieving adequate welds are easier for the longitudinal seams carried
out in a controlled environment during production of the line pipe, compared to butt joints
welded during lay.
The most frequent failures and defects are:
-
Hydrogen cracks / hydrogen embrittlement. Could develop when hydrogen is present and
there is a critical microstructure and sufficient tension. High tensile steels are more prone
to this failure than most other steels. The likelihood for failure also depends on geometry,
heat supply, heat treatment and weld execution. Hydrogen embrittlement affects the
material toughness locally. Compared to other weld failures, this failure is a common
phenomenon.
Hot cracks due to tension. Arrise in the melted zone or heat affected zone during cooling.
The likelihood depends on chemistry, geometry and level of tension.
Lack of fusion. Caused by insufficient melting in the melting line or between welds. The
likelihood depends on choice of heat supply.
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Pores / inclusions / slags. Caused by impurities in the material, seam or gas. The
likelihood primarily depends on cleaning and gas coverage.
Faulty or infavourable geometry. Affects fatigue properties. Depends on design
(geometry / local tension) and execution.
A weld represents an inhomogeneity and therefore increases the likelihood for local corrosion.
Remaining stress in the weld increases the likelihood for stress corrosion. Remaining stress is
normally largest for high tensile steels, and depends on heat transfer and treatment. Variations in
microstructure and chemical composition cause local variations in potential and thereby a slight
increase in likelihood for galvanic corrosion. This could cause corrosion either in the melted
zone or in the heat affected zone, depending on conditions.
In general, the longitudinal welds do not significantly contribute to failures as long as they are
carried out under monitored and well defined conditions. Relatively, butt joints represent a larger
source of failure, both for seamless pipes and longitudinally welded pipes. The likelihood for
faulty welds depends on routines for quality control, control and monitoring of the welding itself
and non destructive testing after completion. The use of high tensile steels contributes to a
significant increase in likelihood for faulty welds.
-o0o-
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APPENDIX
B
Failures, Failure Modes and Causes
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B.1
INTRODUCTION
When reporting to statistical databases, failures for pipe systems are often sorted into groups,
describing the mechanism and the outcome of the failure, e.g. a leak or not. All failure causes
leading to the same mechanism are placed in one group. The underlying causes of the
mechanisms are reported only to a certain extent.
In the following section, possible causes for typical failure mechanisms on pipe systems are
being reviewed. The purpose is to try to support the differentiation of failure consequences on a
lower level. By differentiating the failure consequences, it is possible to a larger extent to allow
for specific conditions that can vary for different pipes. E.g. for pipe systems where one has
included the possibilities for some typical failure causes and eliminated these through design,
operation or maintenance, the failure frequencies might be reduced.
Unfortunately, this study has shown that the individual cause reports are not easily accessible.
For offshore pipelines, there are only a few failures and splitting them into smaller groups will
lead to even more uncertainty concerning the estimates of the failure frequencies. This appendix
is therefore an independent general assessment of the connection between causes and can be
used as a support in the assessment of failures on specific pipeline systems.
B.2
DEFINITIONS
The main elements that are used when describing failures (and thus failure frequencies) are:
Cause
The underlying event that results in a failure mode is called a

cause. The causes are grouped as project, production or operations
related.
Mechanism
For a given cause, a mechanism or process can be started. This

includes corrosion, fatigue, plastic deformation etc.
Defect, Damage type
A mechanism results in an observable defect. Defects can be

fractures, pitting, loss of wall thickness and denting.
Failure
Failures arise when a defect exceeds a certain limit state. This can
for instance be when a leak occurs, or when normal operation of
the pipeline has to be reduced. The limit state is predetermined, but
varies between different databases.
The relationship between causes, mechanisms, defects and failures is given in the figure below.
There can be a lot of causes, but mostly there are only a few failures.
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DNV Reg. No.: 2009-1115

Figure B.1 Schematic relationship between cause and failure.
Monitoring
Causes and to a certain degree mechanisms can be monitored. This means that it
is possible to control and thereby prevent the defect from happening or limit the
mechanism so that a defect does not develop into a failure. Monitoring is a
(partly) continuous process that follows the development of the mechanisms in
the pipeline.
Inspection
Inspection gives information about defects and their conditions. This gives an
instant picture of the conditions for a pipeline.
The difference between monitoring and inspection is sometimes a bit diffuse. For instance a one
time inside inspection of the pipeline can give information regarding possible loss of wall
thickness, while repeated inspections can give additional information on the development of the
process.
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B.3
CAUSAL CONNECTION
In Table B.1 below an overview of causal relations that can result in failures on a pipeline is
given. The failure mechanisms are divided into general groups that coincide with the groups that
are found in failure databases:
Corrosion
Third party activity
Production
Material and components
Welding
Operation & maintenance
Environment
An assessment of the border line between defects and failures has not been made. Only the most
probable extreme consequence for a failure is considered.
For additional explanation, short comments are given for some of the causes. An assessment of
relevant references for different causes has also been performed. This has been done to
investigate the matter that failure frequencies in general are reported per km, while this may be
too conservative for long pipelines. The causes are not ranked.
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Table B.1 Causal connections for failures on pipelines
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Page B-4
DNV Reg. No.: 2009-1115

Cause
Description *
Corrosion
D P
Bad water during water filling
Defect
Failure
(extreme
consequence)
Comment
Unit
Internal
corrosion
Leak
Effect from undesired water in the process

has to be inspected. Continuous corrosion
can be reduced by using inhibitor.
per pipeline
Internal
corrosion
Loss of wall
thickness (local
pitting or uniform
corrosion)
Loss of wall
thickness
Leak
Uncertain whether corrosion stops if the

pipeline is dried before use.
Internal
corrosion
Loss of wall
thickness
Leak
The amount of inhibitor can be increased

after an inspection has identified the
problem. Recurring inspection is necessary
to document the effect.
Choosing regular carbon steel instead of
stainless
See detailed section for welding failures
New anodes can be installed later
per pipeline,
or per water
filled section
per pipeline
O
x
Unwanted (extra) water in the process. (Can be

monitored).
Mechanism
Not enough/no inhibitor (can be monitored)
Wrong steel material
Internal
corrosion
Loss of wall
thickness
Leak
Welding, welding procedures

Wrong corrosion coating (offshore)
External
corrosion
External
corrosion
Damage to corrosion coating, during

construction or through impact (offshore)
Damage to corrosion coating, during

construction or through impact (riser)
External
corrosion
Damage to corrosion coating (onshore)
External
corrosion
External
corrosion
Consumption of
anodes
Consumption of
anodes, damage to
coating
Loss of wall
thickness, damage to
coating
Loss of wall
thickness
Loss of wall
thickness
External
corrosion
Loss of wall
thickness
Wrong corrosion coating (offshore)
Not enough flow pressure (onshore)
New anodes can be installed later, new

coating can be applied
per area
Leak
Anodes only help under water, new coating

has to be applied to stop corrosion.
per riser
Leak
Damage can be fixed (does this stop the

corrosion?)
Effect from flow pressure must be
documented (CP measures). Higher flow
pressure may help.
Amount of flow can be adjusted after
discovering corrosion. The effect has to be
documented through recurring inspection.
per area (or

km)
per pipeline
Leak
Leak
Revision No.: 1
Page B-5
per pipeline
Cause related to the following phases: D Desin, P Production (includes everything from production of the steel to innstallation and completion), O Operation
Date : 2010-11-16
per pipeline
DNV Reg. No.: 2009-1115
per pipeline

Cause
Description *
Extreme
accidental
load
D P
Mechanism
Defect
Failure
(extreme
consequence)
Comment
Unit
Hydrogen
induced cracks
Stress induced
corrosion
Crack
Leak (full
rupture)
Leak (full
rupture)
May lead to hydrogen embrittlement and

cracks.
May lead to hydrogen embrittlement and
cracks. Increases with higher steel quality
(problem over X70) and presence of
hydrogen?
May damage coating, and thereby increase
the possibilities for corrosion.
Requires the presence of sand.
per pipeline
Too high flow pressure (onshore)
To high flow pressure (onshore)
To high flow pressure (onshore)
Erosion
Erosion
Loss of wall
thickness
Leak
Crack
Collision with ship (riser)
Impact load
Denting/hole in pipe
wall
Leak
Collision with ship (pipeline)

1. Ship running aground close to the shore
2. Sinking ship
Impact load
wall
Leak
Collision with train, cars etc. (onshore)
Impact load
Leak
Construction activity nearby (offshore)
Impact load
wall
wall
Construction activity nearby (onshore)
Impact load
wall
Leak
Fishing (trawling)
Impact load
wall
Leak
Leak
Ships traffic close to riser can be restricted

and monitored. Damage to coating may
initiate external corrosion.
Can not be monitored or limited
satisfactory. Protection against run around
through additional burying, dumping of
rocks etc. Damage to coating may initiate
external corrosion.
Same as over
Can be restricted and monitored. In general,
construction activities offshore are few,
limited, carefully planned and involves the
relevant parties. Damage to coating may
initiate external corrosion.
Might be restricted. There can be a lot of
construction activities onshore, and the
communication between the relevant parties
is not always satisfactory. Damage to
coating may initiate external corrosion.
May include capacity against fishing
activities in the planning phase, e.g. bury
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DNV Reg. No.: 2009-1115
per pipeline
per pipeline
per bend or
per valve
per riser
per area with

regular
shipping
traffic
per area with
regular traffic
per operation
and area (or
pipe)
per km (or
area)
per area with

fishing

Cause
Description *
Production
D P
Defect
Failure
(extreme
consequence)
Impact load
wall
Leak
Falling anchorage (dragged anchor chains)
Impact load
wall
Leak
Vandalism/Terrorism/Actions of war
Impact load
Hole in pipe wall
Leak
Comment
Unit
small pipelines.
Reported failures relates to small pipelines
that are not buried.
May include a certain capacity against
dropped objects in the planning phase, e.g.
bury or protect through constructions.
Can be limited and monitored close to
platform. Can not be limited or monitored
in general.
Anchoring (also emergency anchoring)
only real close to shore or platform.
Maybe possible to include capacity against
anchorage in the planning phase, e.g.
additional burying, dumping of rocks, etc.
Can not be limited
activity
Dropped objects from platforms
Welding, welding procedures

Incautious treatment of pipelines during
transport and storage
Incautious application of coating, wrong coating
type
Too high installation loads
Material
Mechanism
per area close

to platform or
area with
regular
shipping
traffic
per pipeline
See detailed welding section

x
x
Impact load
Increased ovality
Collapse of
cross-section
Can be measured before installation

May initiate corrosion
Extreme
bending
Increased ovality
Collapse of
cross-section
Too high pressure testing

Damage from burying and filling
x
x
Rupture
Impact load
Fracture
Denting/increased
ovality
Leak
Leak
Sealed surfaces badly jointed
Leak
Damaged piece has to be removed before

the pipeline can be used. Extent of damage
can be reduced through use of bulgestoppers.
Page B-7
per pipe
section
per pipeline
per x m (with
bulgestoppers)
Can be inspected. May occur as a result

from using wrong equipment for relevant
soil type. Damage to coating may initiate
corrosion.
per pipeline
per
pipeline/area
with difficult
soil type
Discovered through pressure testing.
per comp.
Revision No.: 1
Date : 2010-11-16
per area close

to platform
DNV Reg. No.: 2009-1115

Cause
&
Components
Mechanism
Defect
Failure
(extreme
consequence)
Comment
Unit
Rupture
Crack
Leak
per pipeline
Fatigue
Crack
Leak
In addition to the material being brittle,

there has to be another load (i.e. blow)
present to initiate a failure.
Probability and extent relative to wall
thickness increases with roll degree, can be
detected from the surface.
Reduced
statically
strength
Reduced
statically
strength
Fatigue
Corrosion
Crack
Leak
Crack
Leak
Extent relative to wall thickness increases

with roll degree, can be detected from the
surface.
per pipeline
Crack
Loss of wall
thickness
Crack
Leak
Leak
Leak
Probability and extent relative to wall

thickness increases with roll degree, can be
detected through ultra sound.
per pipeline
Rupture
Leak
Most relevant for high tensile steel
per pipeline
Crack
Bulging
Leak
Leak
per pipeline
Crack
Leak
The end pieces can be measured, but

variations may occur in the length direction
Can be detected after welding
Loss of wall
thickness
Burst
Leak
Dependent on welding execution, the most

serious can be detected (for steel)
per weld
Description *
D P
Brittle material when cool down as a result of

choking of gas pressure
Over rolling
Embedded slag
x
x
Weld
Lamination
Insufficient/wrong heating treatment
Non-roundness/insufficient thickness
x
x
Reduced
resistance
against tearing
in connection
with welding
Reduced
strength
Chemistry not according to specification.

Increased probability for jointing in connection
with welding.
More brittle
Reduced
strength
Fatigue
Pores / embodied slag
Corrosion
Reduced
strength
Leak
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DNV Reg. No.: 2009-1115
per pipeline
per pipeline

Cause
Description *
Wrong procedures
Operation
&
Maintenance
Defect
Failure
(extreme
consequence)
Fatigue
Fatigue
Crack
Crack
Leak
Leak
x
x
Fatigue
Reduced
strength
Crack
Rupture
Leak
Leak
x
x
Fatigue
More brittle
Multiple
Crack
Rupture
Leak
Leak
Leak
Rupture
Waxing/
Hydrateformation
Waxing/
Hydrateformation
Condensation
Crack
Smaller inner
diameter
Leak
Stop
per pipeline
per pipeline
Smaller inner
diameter
Stop
per pipeline
D P
Coagulation fractures / Lamination fractures

Geometry failures / unfortunate geometry
Hydrogen-brittleness
Mechanism
Unit
Dependent on tensions and the local

chemistry of the base metal, can be detected
Dependent on design and execution
Non-detectable if there is no fracture,
highest probability for high tensile steel,
also dependent on execution/procedure
per pipeline
Should be avoidable through procedure

testing of the right material
per weld
x
x
Comment
Poor pressure monitoring

Not enough inhibitor
x
x
Too low temperature
Too low temperature
Large and frequent pressure variations

Large and frequent temperature variations
Upheaval buckling (thermal expansion)
x
x
x
Fatigue
Fatigue
Extreme
bending
Increased cracking
Increased cracking
Increased ovaling
Leak
Leak
Collapse
End-expansion (thermal expansion)
Extreme
bending
Increased ovaling
Collapse
Precipitation of water, leading to corrosion

Wrong insulation coating may lead to too
low operation temperatures.
May come as a result from failures during

the design phase, insufficient burying or too
high temperatures. Normally only pipes
smaller than 16 are buried.
Can come as a result from bad design, bad
installation in addition to too high
temperatures
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DNV Reg. No.: 2009-1115
per weld
per pipeline
per pipeline
per pipeline
per pipeline
per pipeline
(buried)
per end piece

Cause
Environment
Description *
D P
Lateral buckling (thermal expansion)
Mechanism
Defect
Failure
(extreme
consequence)
Comment
Unit
Extreme
bending
Increased ovaling
Collapse
Same as over, but may also occur for larger

diameters
per pipeline
Hot-tapping
Storm damage
Multiple
Hole
VIV
Wave loads on riser
Foundation washed away
Foundation washed away
x
x
x
x
Fatigue
Fatigue
Fatigue
Extreme
bending
Earthquake
Landslide
Sinking into the ground
x
x
x
Leak
Leak
Increased cracking
Increased cracking
Increased cracking
Increased ovaling
per operation
Relevant storm criteria shall be included in
the design phase
Leak
Leak
Leak
Collapse
per span
per riser
per span
per span
Leak
Leak
Leak
per area
per area
per area
- o0o -
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Page B-10
per pipeline
DNV Reg. No.: 2009-1115

APPENDIX
C
Flexible Pipelines
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DNV Reg. No.: 2009-1115

C.1
FAILURE MODES IN FLEXIBLE PIPELINES
Due to production aspects, mainly unbounded flexible pipes are used in offshore pipelines and
risers. Bonded pipes have restrictions on length, normally dimensions up to 16 and lengths of
about 200 metres are produced. The following list contains the most important failures and
failure modes:
-
Leakage/delamination between flexible pipe and nipple, i.e. problems with the coupling
between fixed and flexible element.
Ageing of thermoplastics/rubber
Blistering of rubber materials and plastics because of gas diffusion
Internal wear, erosion and fatigue
Internal and external corrosion of end couplings
Damage from overload and bending
External tearing
Internal erosion damages because of sand production
Production failures
Missing binding in layers (bonded pipes)
Fraction in wires, spiral and internal coating
Collapse or ovaling of the pipe structure by quick pressure relief
Leaks through layers or through the whole pipe structure
Fire
Failures on sealing rings in the end couplings
Production failures:
Failures that have occurred during production and are discovered through pressure testing or final
inspection are not counted as failure modes because these cases do not result in a repair or
renewal of the failure area/line. However, it is possible to list some production failures that over
time can result in leaks or fractions in the operation period. Some production failures can also
result in a reduced life time.
Incorrect amount or mixture of Epoxy

Incorrect material type
Failure in installation of end couplings
Moisture in the construction during installation of end couplings and injection of Epoxy
Incorrect welding quality
Bending of pipelines that exceeds specified limits
Insufficient binding between the layers at vulcanization
Failures due to external interference:

Some failures can be traced back to damages to the pipeline caused by dropped objects, wear
from crossing pipes or wires. Damage to external layers of plastics or rubber coating can result in
penetration of water, which will again cause corrosion in the armour layers. This process happens
over time and will cause leaks, but it can also result in a full burst of the pipeline.
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DNV Reg. No.: 2009-1115

C.2
FAILURES CAUSED BY OPERATIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES
Leaks in pressure layers:

This happens when the pressure layer withdraws itself from the contraction connection in the end
coupling. The problem normally relates to pipes with a relatively high service temperature and
where Coflon (HDPF) is used in the pressure layer. Changes in the plastics develop over time as
the softener disappears. This increases the firmness and reduces the fraction extension. The pipes
will experience temperature and pressure cycles connected to shutdown and possible regulations.
This leads to heavy forces in the length direction of the pipeline, and may also cause free
movement of the layers relative to each other, and that the pressure layer withdraws from, or
breaks, at the fastening point. This may cause a leak so big that a potential drainage of gas can
not handle the pressure in the pipe structure, and the external coating is punctuated. The leaks
will normally be limited because of the flow resistance out of the pipe structure.
If weakness in the pressure layers or irregularities in the zeta spiral has occurred, it may be
possible that this will result in a leak over time, although it has not been registered through
pressure testing. The pressure testing is executed at low temperature, and the reduced strength
and the flow resistance in the plastics at a high operation temperature may result in that a
weakness leads to a leak during operation. In case of an irregularity in the zeta spiral, the pressure
layer may, if exposed to high temperature and high pressure over a certain period of time, be
extruded out of the irregularity and thereby cause a leak. As for the situation above there is no
reason to expect a full blowout or a major leak.
At production flows with a high level of sand quantity, there will be a possibility for wear inside
the pipe. Normally this is expected, and the pipe is designed with an inner carcass to resist the
wear. It has not been reported incidents caused by such failures in pipes where the level of sand
quantity has been taken into consideration.
Damage to wire:
In pipes exposed to dynamic loads, fractions caused by fatigue can arise in the zeta wire,
especially at potential welds or surface damages on the wire. The claims experience will probably
be the same as described above for weakness in pressure layers.
At particular high levels of H2S in the well flow, there might be a risk of hydrogen brittleness of
the zeta and armour wires as a result from diffusion through pressure layers. This may later lead
to wire fraction. For the known levels of H2S concentration in the North Sea, this is not regarded
as a problem.
For pipes that are dynamically loaded one may also experience fatigue fractures in the armour
wires. The most relevant fracture locations will be connected to welds or surface defects on the
wires, or close to the end couplings or bend restrictors. It is not considered probable that a
fracture in a wire caused by weakness in a random part of the pipe will lead to any further
damage development. However, if this were to occur in a coupling between firm and flexible
material related to an end coupling or a bend restrictor, the probability that the development of
the damage will continue by a transfer of the loads to adjacent wires must be considered higher.
If this is the case for an end coupling, it is possible to imagine a development that would lead to a
blowout, although such accidents are not known from history.
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DNV Reg. No.: 2009-1115

Corrosion on wires:
May occur if sea water enters the structure as a result from coating damage. This will in most
cases be related to external interference, but may also occur if an internal pressure in the pipe
structure punctures the coating. Experience has shown that the corrosion will occur close to the
damaged area, and with no relevant extent along the pipe structure.
Corrosion on wires may also come as a result from diffusion of H2S or CO2 through the pressure
layer. Insufficient access to oxygen will however normally lead to that such corrosion attacks are
being limited. However, even small corrosion pits will create a concentration of tensions that
under dynamical restrictions might lead to wire fractures.
- o0o -
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DNV Reg. No.: 2009-1115

APPENDIX
D
Failure Frequencies for Pipelines Caused by External Loads
Revision No.: 1
Date : 2010-11-16
DNV Reg. No.: 2009-1115

D.1 Failure Frequencise for Pipelines caused by External Loads

This appendix contains background information necessary when estimating failure frequencies
for larger pipelines as a result of a few failure causes related to ship traffic in three distinct areas
in the southern parts of the North Sea. The failure causes included in this appendix are
-
Dragged anchors (intentional anchoring, e.g. due to emergencies)

Dropped anchors (intentional anchoring, e.g. due to emergencies)
Ship foundering
Failure frequencies related to dragged anchors from ships under way (unintentional anchoring)
are not included in this appendix but are thoroughly analysed in appendix E.
The estimates are based on previous analysis on pipelines located in these three areas, such as
Zeepipe, Europipe and Langeled and the methodology described in DNV-RP-F107 /1/ with
respect to damage criteria, damage distributions and impact energies.
The three areas of interest are
1. German sector south of 5410N
2. Dutch, Belgian and French sector between 5410N and the channel
3. British sector at Easington
The belonging intensity of ship traffic for each area has been retrieved from COAST in 2005 /2/.
The location of each area and corresponding shipping lanes and pipeline crossings are illustrated
in Figure D.1, D.2 and D.3 below with crossings encircled.
For new analysis the data sources should be updated.
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DNV Reg. No.: 2009-1115

Figure D.1 Overview over area 1
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DNV Reg. No.: 2009-1115


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DNV Reg. No.: 2009-1115

For each of the areas and each circle, the following annual ship crossings are recorded in COAST
/2/ from 2005.
Table D.1 Ship traffic data for area 1
Shipping
lane
DWT*
100-500
1.1
149
1.2
1200
Sum
1348
Spread
4%
* Deadweight tonnage
2
5001600
299
2099
2398
8%
Ships class
4
1600-10000
10000-60000
60000-100000
>100000
Total
1811
14391
16202
48,50 %
1326
10494
11820
35,50 %
75
899
974
2%
75
899
974
2%
3735
29982
33717
100 %
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Page D-4
DNV Reg. No.: 2009-1115


Shipping
lane
DWT*
100-500
2.1
805
2.2
3538
2.3
3145
2.4
2704
2.5
3204
2.6
4377
2.7
3389
Sum
21162
Spread
14 %
2
5001600
1611
7075
6289
5408
6407
8754
6779
42323
28 %
Ship class
4
1600-10000
10000-60000
60000-100000
>100000
Total
1668
7328
6514
5601
6636
9066
7021
43834
29 %
1496
6570
5840
5022
5950
8128
6294
39300
26 %
115
505
449
386
458
625
484
3022
2%
58
253
225
193
229
313
242
1513
1%
5752
25269
22462
19315
22883
31263
24209
151154
100 %

Shipping
lane
DWT*
100-500
3.1
1930
Spread
14 %
2
5001600
3861
28 %
Ship class
4
1600-10000
10000-60000
60000-100000
>100000
Total
3999
29 %
3585
26 %
276
2%
138
1%
13789
100 %
Table D.4 Estimated failure frequencies

Area
Leak frequency
German sector South of 5410 N
3.610-5 per year
Dutch, Belgian and French sector between 5410 N and

the channel
1.410-4 per year
British sector at Easington
1.110-5 per year
The frequencies apply to unprotected large diameter pipelines crossing the ships lanes outside actual countries. An
analysis considering pipeline strength, protection and traffic pattern in actual areas should be performed if more
detailed results are required.
References:
/1/
Risk Assessment of Pipeline Protection, DNV-RP-F107, March 2001
/2/
North Sea Pipelines Pipeline Vessel Crossing Survey, Safetec, Oct. 2005
- o0o -
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DNV Reg. No.: 2009-1115

APPENDIX
E
Unintentional Anchor Drops from Ships Under Way
Revision No.: 1
Date : 2010-11-16
DNV Reg. No.: 2009-1115

E.1
Introduction
The last decade, there have been incidents where pipelines or cables have been hooked and
damaged by anchors from ships underway. From the industrys point of view, there is a concern
that this incident scenario has not been adequately taken into account in earlier coarse and
detailed analysis on pipeline risk. This appendix suggests the frequency for failure to pipelines
due to uncontrolled anchor drops with subsequent dragging per ship crossing as function of
Pipe diameter
Ship size
Pipeline protection philosophy
Focus is limited to the dragging of the anchor and not the potential impact from the actual anchor
drop.
E.2
Approach
In general, earlier DNV studies on suggested failure frequencies to pipelines estimate failure
frequencies based on historical data. This method is preferable when the number of incidents is
large, the population is well defined and the incidents are distributed over a wide range of
pipeline diameters. For the case of damage to pipelines due to anchors dragged by ships
underway, the number of incidents is currently too small to establish reliable failure frequencies
for different pipeline diameters. Nevertheless, since there is a concern that this issue may be in
increase, an alternative approach needs to be adopted.
Instead of only studying the actual number of recorded damages to pipelines due to uncontrolled
anchor drops, the frequency for uncontrolled anchor drops has been estimated based on data on
lost anchors recorded by insurance companies and DNV. The process of transforming the
number of lost anchors per year into actual failure frequencies for pipelines has been a
combination of quantitative and qualitative analysis.
Areas given special attention due to their impact on the final result are
Ship
o Speed
o Mass
Anchor
o Dimensions
o Chain length
o Chain strength
o Bitter end strength
o Penetration depth
Soil
Water depth
Pipeline load resistance
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DNV Reg. No.: 2009-1115

E.3
Scenario
The scenario of concern is a ship that underway for some reason deploys one of its anchors. To
understand what can trigger such a situation, a brief description of a ships anchor winch and
related routines is included below.
The anchor winch is used to pay out and haul the ship anchor. The winch itself can be of
hydraulic type and is generally equipped with a band brake. There are also a chain lock and a
turnbuckle.
Chain lock
Winch with band brake
Chain stopper
(turnbuckle)
Figure E.1 Explanatory sketch of anchor winch arrangement
When the ship is at anchor, the chain lock is used to secure the chain and to take the load from
the winch. The chain stopper is not used. When the anchor is hawsed (i.e. in secured position at
ship), the chain stopper turnbuckle is applied and tightened. At this point, there is no load to
either the winch or the applied chain lock but the band brake should nevertheless be applied.
Other designs on anchor winch and chain arrangements can also be found.
Based on actual findings, there is a concern that the turnbuckle with its hook not always is in
good condition or incorrectly applied. In bad weather when there is movement both in the ship
and the anchor, snatches may cause the chain stopper to break or jump. Since there is no load in
the part of the chain between the winch and the chain stopper, a braking chain stopper would
cause a jerk in the chain. Since the chain lock is primarily used for securing the chain while the
ship is at anchor, it can not be said for sure that the lock is always applied or applied in an
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adequate way at all times while the ship is underway. There are numerous recorded incidents
involving unsatisfactory maintained or dysfunctional band brakes /3/ from related industries
meaning that a band break not necessarily will be able to stop a free falling anchor.
When the ship approaches port or navigates through narrow passages, the anchor is prepared for
quick drop, meaning that both the anchor stopper and chain lock is removed. This is done in
order to minimise the time from a possible machinery or steering failure to initiated emergency
anchoring. Since the anchor then only rests on the band break, there is an increased likelihood
for uncontrolled anchor drop.
After having unintentionally dropped the anchor, the following alternative sequences of states
are considered relevant (Figure E.2) given that the length of the anchor chain exceeds the water
depth.
75 %
Anchordrop
1. Drop discovered within 1 km

and actions are taken.
25 %
25 %
75 %
2. Anchor seated within 1 km, maximum

penetration depth and anchor holding
power.
3. Anchor does not get seated. One
projected fluke length penetration
depth. Dragged in/along seabed for
longer distance.
Figure E.2 Event tree for the case uncontrolled anchor drop
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In addition to manned ships there are also ships and barges being towed. There is a concern that
the likelihood for unintentional anchor drops from such ships/barges is higher than for manned
ships under way. One reason for the concern is that the towed ship or barge may be unmanned,
increasing the likelihood for the drop to remain undiscovered. Another reason is that some of the
ships being towed are towed to distant yards for scrapping. The condition and technical integrity
of such ships including equipment for anchoring can be expected to be significantly lower than
for ships registered for traffic. On the other hand, for general shipping lanes the amount of towed
ships and barges is small compared to other traffic. In areas where the amount of towed ships
and barges is significantly larger than what is common elsewhere (outside scrap yards etc.) a
detailed analysis is recommended.
1st outcome - Drop is discovered within 1 km

It is assumed to be more likely that an uncontrolled anchor drop is discovered within a relatively
short distance than not. The assumption is based on the following influencing factors:
+ Noise - Paying out an anchor chain will cause noise (on some ships, the distance
between the anchor and the bridge may however be considerable)
+ Vibrations - Paying out an anchor chain will cause vibrations to hull and possibly the
bridge
+ Velocity - The force from a dragged anchor will affect both speed and manoeuvring
ability of the ship.
- Weather - It is likely that the uncontrolled drop occurs in bad weather when there is
extra movement in both ship and anchor. Bad weather has a reducing effect on the
positive factors above.
The anchor is not assumed to reach maximum penetration depth and therefore, no anchors are
assumed to be lost due to holding power exceeding the chain strength or bitter end arrangement
in this scenario.
2nd outcome - Anchor seated

Whether the anchor settles or not is a complex matter which depends on many factors such as
speed of ship, length of anchor chain, water depth, size of anchor, type of anchor and soil
characteristics. Assuming that the anchor in most cases (3/4) does not get seated is considered a
conservative estimate.
Assuming that parameters related to anchor size and chain length enable hooking, all three
outcomes above may result in pipeline hooking. However, the first two outcomes are limited to
relatively short distances, while the third outcome is more likely to cause damage to a pipeline
due to the longer dragging distance.
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Looking closer at outcome 2, it is not obvious that a ship underway with an anchor settling into
the seabed actually will cause chain or bitter end breakage. This outcome has therefore been
studied in more detail.
If the anchor is fully seated and reaches both its maximum penetration depth and holding power,
there is a chance that the anchor may be dragged at maximum penetration depth over a longer
distance. What needs to be compared is the anchors holding power and the chain break and
bitter end break load.
3rd outcome - Anchor not seated

For the third outcome, it is assumed that the anchor is not seated and can be dragged over a
longer distance without large holding power and without being discovered. Due to the low
holding power, it is assumed that the anchor penetration depth is limited to one projected fluke
length.
This outcome is the most critical one in the sense that the anchor will be dragged undiscovered
over long distances and thereby poses serious threats to pipelines and cables.
The numbers in Figure E.2 is set based on the experience above
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E.4
Damage criteria
Dragging an anchor towards a pipeline will require a number of conditions to be fulfilled in

order to actually cause damage. This section presents the criteria deemed relevant for causing
damage to pipelines of different diameter and protection. Issues covered are
Water depth related to anchor chain length

Projected fluke length
Anchor penetration depth
Applied load forces from anchor related to
o Anchor chain break load
o Force and energy from propagating ship
Pipe load resistance depending on
o Pipeline diameter
o Protection philosophy
o Soil
An equipment number (EN) is calculated for all ships, dependent on the ships displacement and
geometry. For each EN, there are specific requirements for onboard equipment such as anchors
and anchor chain. When studying traffic data and statistics, equipment number may be difficult
to retrieve. Therefore, an approximate relationship between ship class, displacement, GRT and
equipment number has been used in this analysis. A table with this approximate link, inclusive
anchor mass and anchor chain length is given in Table E.1 below.
Table E.1 Approximate relationship between ship class, displacement, GRT, equipment
number, length of anchor chain and mass of anchor /4/, /8/
Class
Displacement
[tonnes]
I
II
III
IV
V
VI
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
GRT
from
100
500
1600
10000
60000
100000
GRT
to
499
1599
9999
59999
99999
-
Equipment
number
from
Equipment
number to
280
450
980
2870
5800
8400
320
500
1060
3040
6100
8900
Length of
Anchor
anchor
mass [kg]
chain [m]
179
207
248
317
372
385
900
1440
3060
8700
17800
26000
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Water depth
This analysis suggests a conservative philosophy when relating water depth to chain length.
Assuming that a ship moving forward at very large water depth suddenly loses one of its
anchors, the anchor will not be hanging vertically down from the hawse. The anchor and the
belonging chain will be forced astern by the interaction between anchor/chain and the seawater.
This fact causes the relation d/l in Figure E.3 to be less than one, meaning that the anchor chain
length needs to be larger than the water depth for the anchor to reach the seabed.
Estimating reliable relations between d and l has been proven difficult since ships within the
same ship class have varying speed. Even though the relations between ship size, anchor
size/mass, chain size/mass/length are well defined (/4/, /9/), the large variations in ship speed
within one and the same ship class will cause large variations to the relation d/l making such
estimates unreliable. Therefore, this guide suggests using a relation between d and l equal to one.
One should be aware of that if an anchor just reaches the seabed, it is highly unlikely that the
anchor will be able to penetrate fully into the seabed.
Ships crossing the pipeline where the water depth exceeds the chain length should not be
accounted for in the final frequency estimation of damage to the pipeline.
Figure E.3 Explanatory sketch towed anchor
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Projected fluke length

The following criterion describes the requirement for a stockless anchor being physically able to
hook a pipeline;
C d/2, where
C
C
d
Figure E.4 Size of anchor related to pipeline diameter
= Angle between fluke and shank, max 45 for stockless anchors.

C = Length of fluke.
C = Projected fluke length
D = Outer diameter of steel pipe (excluding coating).
The diameter of the pipeline is chosen without taking the coating into account since this might be
damaged by the dragged anchor chain. The length of the flukes is related to type of anchor and
the mass of the anchor which in turn is related to ship characteristics. In Table E.2 below, a worst
case angle of 45 has been chosen. Anchors used in this analysis are of stockless type.
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Table E.2 Relationship between ship size, anchor mass and fluke length
for stockless anchors
Displacement
[tonnes]
Anchor mass [kg]
C, fluke length [m]
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
900
1440
3060
8700
17800
26000
0,84
0,91
1,26
1,83
2,31
2,64
C , Projected
fluke length
[inches]
23,4
25,3
35,1
50,9
64,3
73,5
C , Projected
fluke length [m]
0,6
0,6
0,9
1,3
1,6
1,9
Anchor penetration depth

For a trenched pipeline to be hooked by an anchor, the penetration depth of the anchor needs to
be sufficient in order for the fluke to hook the pipeline. Two different studies including anchor
fluke penetration depth in seabed have been used to estimate anchor penetration depth. The first
one, performed by AT&T and Alcatel /10/ applies data from NCEL /5/ and expresses penetration
depth as multiples of fluke lengths for two kinds of soil. The other study based on practical
centrifugal tests carried out at the University of Western Australia /10/ suggests a similar
penetration depth, given in multiples of fluke length.
5
4,5
Penetration depth [m]
4
3,5
3
2,5
2
1,5
1
Sand / Hard clay
0,5
Mud / Soft clay
0
0
20
40
60
80
GRT * 10
100
120
140
Figure E.5 Anchor penetration depths for stockless anchors

depending on soil and size of ship
Other anchor types than stockless anchors may be used within the shipping industry but the
stockless type is the most common one.
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Table E.3 Estimated anchor penetration depths for seated anchors

Displacement Penetration
[tons]
depth [m]
Hard soil
Soft soil
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
0,60
0,65
0,89
1,30
1,64
1,87
1,79
1,94
2,68
3,89
4,91
5,62
Fluke
length
[m]
0,84
0,91
1,26
1,83
2,31
2,64
0,84
0,91
1,26
1,83
2,31
2,64
Hard and soft soil refers to sand / hard clay and mud / soft clay respectively.
This study has not taken into account potential effects from backfilling / dumping of rocks over
the exposed or trenched pipeline. Such actions may cause the dragged anchor to raise and
potentially slide over the pipe.
Load from anchor

In general it is reasonable to assume that if the force originating from the ships thrust is
sufficient to cause damage to the pipeline, the thrust force can be used as the applied external
load to the pipeline rather than the load derived from the retardation of the ship when hooked to
the pipeline. However, especially for the larger pipelines (typically 32) and midsized ships,
there are cases where the thrust force is smaller than the pipe load resistance and the chain break
load is larger than the pipe load resistance. Even though the thrust force is smaller than the load
resistance, it can not be concluded that the pipe will suffer no damage since the ships kinetic
energy will be transferred to a force as the ship retards. Therefore, a contribution from the force
from kinetic energy has been added to the thrust force to reflect the actual load for theses specific
cases.
The force from the retarding ship has been roughly estimated through fundamental relationship
between kinetic energy and force depending on the distance required to bring the ship to a stop.
That distance is set to the lateral displacement causing inacceptable strain, meaning that if the
force required to bring the ship to a stop is larger than the force resulting in inacceptable strain,
the pipeline will suffer damage. Equally, if that distance is exceeded, the pipe will suffer damage
due to inacceptable strain as a result from the increased lateral displacement. Strain and lateral
displacement is further discussed in section Damage due to strain.
The relationship between ship thrust and chain break load is further discussed in this section.
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For the anchor chain, different steel qualities may be used within each equipment number. The
required chain break loads for different steel qualities in Table E.4 are based on information
from DNV Rules for classification of ships /4/.
Table E.4 Chain break loads for different ship sizes /4/
Displacement
[tons]
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
Anchor
mass
[kg]
900
1440
3060
8700
17800
26000
Chain Break Load [kN]

NV K1
368
581
1220
3230
5720
-
NV K2
389
655
1370
3610
6510
9030
NV K3
476
735
1540
3990
7320
10710
Except for anchor and chain characteristics, the anchors holding power will depend on soil
characteristics. Two different soils (sand and clay) have been chosen when estimating the
holding power for stockless anchors of different size.
In these estimations, the break load for the bitter end has not been used when deriving the
limiting force from the anchor for conservative reasons. According to rules for classification for
ships /4/, the strength of the bitter end should be between 15 % and 30 % of the chain break load.
When the anchor is unintentionally dropped while underway, it is likely but not certain that the
full length of anchor chain will be paid out leaving the bitter end as the weak link. When the
anchor chain pays out, it could get stuck or some other scenario could cause a part of the chain to
remain in the locker. There are confirmed occasions where pipelines have suffered damage from
dragged anchors from ships underway and the anchor chain rather than the bitter end has broken
due to stress.
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Table E.5 Overview of chain break load, bitter end break load and stockless anchor
holding power for different ships and soil at maximum penetration depth
Displacement
[tonnes]
Soft soil
Hard soil
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
Steel grade, break load [kN]

K1
K2
K3
368
581
1220
3230
5720
368
581
1220
3230
5720
-
389
655
1370
3610
6510
9030
389
655
1370
3610
6510
9030
476
735
1540
3990
7320
10710
476
735
1540
3990
7320
10710
Average bitter
end break load
[kN]
Anchor holding
power [kN]
92
148
310
812
1466
2221
92
148
310
812
1466
2221
24
37
74
194
375
532
69
101
185
426
756
1024
From Table E.5 above it can be concluded that the anchor holding power is less than both the
anchor chain break load and the bitter end break load. Depending on the conditions related to
soil, anchor size and chain strength, the difference relation between anchor holding power and
bitter end break load varies between 24 % and 80 % with the bitter end being the stronger part.
When the anchor is dragged in the seabed at maximum penetration depth over longer distances,
it is however likely that the anchor at some point will hit or get stuck into objects causing an
instantaneous power in the chain significantly larger than the estimate for the anchors holding
power. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the dragged anchor at maximum penetration
depth in many cases will cause the bitter end to break. This is particularly likely for the smaller
ships. For the larger ships (displacement 45000 tonnes), the likelihood for bitter end break is
slightly less but on the other hand, the ships thrust in relation to the anchors holding power is
larger, meaning that it is more likely that the dragged anchor will be discovered by personnel on
the bridge as a result of disturbances in the ships manoeuvring ability. This requires the anchor
to be well seated as dictated for outcome 2.
An overview of a number of ships bollard thrust is given in
Figure E.6 below. For ship sizes up to 100 000 GRT, the diagram gives a good indication of how
the two variables relate to each other.
For outcome 2 it can therefore be assumed that the result will be either i) chain/bitter end
breakage or ii) notable impact on ship speed or manoeuvring ability meaning that the dragging
distance in both cases is limited. The penetration depth may however be significant for this
limited distance.
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DNV Reg. No.: 2009-1115

Figure E.6 Relation between ship size and thrust
Pipe load resistance

In this section two different causes to damage are treated. The first one is damage due to strain
exceeding 5%. The other cause is dent exceeding 15% of the pipeline diameter caused by an
anchor hooking and pulling the pipeline. Depending on what occurs first, either strain or dents
will be the limiting factor. In this analysis, the pulling force rather than the actual impact of the
anchor has been applied.
Damage due to strain

For strain, the load resistance for an actual pipeline on or below the seabed has been calculated
by the use of FE-analysis. In the analysis, 5% strain has been chosen as a criterion for damage
and the choice is based upon fracture mechanics analysis for certain types of welds that could
cause crack or rupture at such levels of strain. The following variables have been taken into
account
Pipeline diameter
o 4
o 12
o 20
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DNV Reg. No.: 2009-1115

o 32
o 44
Pipeline protection
o Exposed: Pipe located on top of seabed
o Fully embedded: Top of pipe directly under seabed (flushed)
o Trenched: Top of pipe 1 m beneath seabed
Soil
o Soft soil
o Hard soil
For parameters pressure and temperature, default values have been used. The pressure difference
between pipe inside and outside is set to 100 bars. An increase in pressure will decrease the bend
resistance of the pipe, meaning that 5 % strain will be reached earlier if the pressure is increased.
The difference in bend resistance decreases with increasing strain limit, i.e. the difference in
bend resistance at 5 % strain is larger (in relative terms) than at e.g. 10 % strain. The results from
the analysis are presented in Table E.6 below.
Table E.6 Pipe load resistance - Strain
Pipe
Hard soil
4"
12"
20"
32"
44
Soft
soil
4"
12"
20"
32"
44
Anchor force at 5% strain [kN]

Exposed
Fully embedded
Trenched
400
320
300
1880
1720
1200
2260
940
1580
2520
1340
2640
3700
2640
4600
290
1920
2100
2600
4200
120
440
700
1360
2560
250
810
1260
2200
3600
From Table E.6 above, it can be concluded that exposed pipelines in many cases are less
vulnerable when hooked by anchors than embedded or trenched ones. A pipe subject to high soil
resistance will experience more local bending than a pipe that is not embedded and subject to
high soil resistance. The likelihood of being hooked by an anchor is however less for a trenched
pipeline than for an exposed pipeline.
The corresponding lateral displacement of the pipe is given in Table E.7 below.
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Table E.7 Lateral displacement of pipe at 5% strain

Pipe
Lateral displacement at 5% strain [m]

Exposed
Fully embedded
Trenched
Hard soil
4"
12"
20"
32"
44
100
65
54
60
65
55
33
5,8
5,0
5,0
1,4
2,1
1,5
1,4
1,5
Soft
soil
4"
12"
20"
32"
44
98
73
62
60
61
5,5
4,1
2,6
2,6
3,2
-*
2,1
1,6
1,6
2,1
* Within the accuracy of the model, no displacement is allowed (i.e. 5 % strain is reached before
1 m displacement)
Damage due to dent

Based on /6/, the required force from a knife-edge rigid object perpendicular to the pipe wall to
cause dents of varying size have been calculated and is showed in Figure E.7 below. A dent
equal or larger than 10% of the pipeline diameter is considered damaged since this could cause a
leak.
Force versus relative dent depth
6000
5000
4000
Force [kN]
4
12
20
3000
32
44
2000
1000
0
0%
5%
10 %
15 %
20 %
25 %
Relative dent depth [%]
Figure E.7 Force versus relative dent depth for different pipeline diameters
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DNV Reg. No.: 2009-1115

An anchor hooking the pipeline will always have at least two (in general three) contact surfaces
between the anchor and the pipe; one or two between the pipe and fluke(s) plus one between the
shank and the pipe. Therefore, the force from the ship must be at least twice the force of the dent
force from Figure E.7 above. The model resulting in the estimates in Figure E.7 above assumes a
knife edge shape striking the pipeline. In general, no parts of the anchor will actually be knife
edge shaped, making the estimate conservative.
Table E.8 Force causing 10 % relative dent depth for different pipeline diameters
Diameter
4
12
20
32
44
Dentforce [kN]
82
741
1120
1863
3522
Chainforce [kN]
164
1482
2240
3726
7044
Strain versus dent

Based on the results above, it can be seen that strain in general is limiting the pipes load
resistance and not dents. Table E.9 below displays when strain or dents respectively constitute
the limiting phenomena while Table E.10 displays the corresponding forces.
Table E.9 Limiting damage causes for different pipelines with
Limiting damage cause
Pipe
Sand
Clay
4"
12"
20"
32"
44
4"
12"
20"
32"
44
Exposed
Dent
Dent
Dent
Strain
Strain
Dent
Dent
Strain
Strain
Strain
Fully
embedded
Dent
Dent
Strain
Strain
Strain
Strain
Strain
Strain
Strain
Strain
Trenched
Dent
Strain
Strain
Strain
Strain
Dent
Strain
Strain
Strain
Strain
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Table E.10 Limiting force from anchor causing either strain or dent
according to criteria above
Pipe
Sand
Clay
E.5
4"
12"
20"
32"
44
Limiting force from anchor

Fully
Exposed
Trenched
embedded
164
164
164
1482
1482
1200
2240
940
1580
2520
1340
2640
3700
2640
4600
4"
164
120
164
12"
20"
32"
44
1482
2100
2600
4200
440
700
1360
2560
810
1260
2200
3600
Recorded lost anchors
To investigate the occurrence of lost anchors, primarily information from DNV surveyor records
have been studied and a major insurance provider /1/ for the shipping industry has been
contacted. The insurance provider has noticed an increased number of reported lost anchors
during the last five (ca) years. There are also strong indications from DNV records pointing in
the same direction.
The figures from the insurance provider and DNV differ since insurance records and DNV
records have different aims and purposes.
Insurance records
In case of a lost anchor, depending on what insurance the ship has signed, the lost anchor may or
may not be reported to the insurance provider. In basic terms, there are two types of insurance
that could be signed related to a lost anchor
i)
ii)
H&M (Hull and Machinery) compensates for the lost anchor in it self.
P&I (Protection and Indemnity) compensates for third party damages and possible
search and retrieval of the lost anchor.
If the cost associated to the own risk exceeds the value of the anchor, the ship owner will not
claim compensation through the use of the insurance. In some areas and harbours, local
authorities require that the lost anchor is searched for and removed. The cost for such an
operation or damage to structures on the seabed may be covered by the P&I insurance.
This means that if the cost for a new anchor is less than the cost of own risk and there are no
damages to neighbouring structures or requirements on removal from local authorities, the lost
anchor will not be reported to the insurance provider.
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Up to now, no explicit reasons for the increase in reported lost anchors have been found. As it
seems, the number of anchors lost per ship has increased and not only the reported number.
However, part of the increase might derive from more stringent requirements from local
authorities when it comes to retrieving lost anchors in and nearby harbours.
DNV records
DNV surveyors have recorded an increase in number of lost anchors over the last three years.
The system for recording lost anchors (and other deviations) was adopted in 2005 and data from
2006 and ahead is considered reliable.
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
2006
2007
2008
Figure E.8 Number of lost anchors recorded by DNV between years 2006 and 2008
Looking at how the lost anchors are distributed over different types of ships, no certain
variations can be identified pointing out any ship type being more susceptive to anchor loss than
others. Based on the figures from 2008, there was in average 1 anchor lost per 100 ships and
year. A comparison with figures from insurance companies indicates that approximately half of
the anchors lost are reported and claimed by the ship owners.
Figure E.8 displays lost anchors due to all kinds of reasons and not exclusively due to
uncontrolled anchor drop and loss while the ship is underway.
To compensate for an increase in the number of ships surveyed by DNV over the last years, the
number of recorded lost anchors has been divided by the number of ships for each year. Figure
E.9 below displays number of lost anchors per ship over the years from 2006-2008.
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DNV Reg. No.: 2009-1115

1,20 %
1,00 %
0,80 %
0,60 %
0,40 %
0,20 %
0,00 %
2006
2007
2008
Figure E.9 Number of recorded lost anchors per ship from 2006-2008 by DNV surveyors.
The time period in Figure E.9 is short but indicates an increasing trend of the phenomena where
the frequency is more than doubled between 2006 and 2008. Based on findings recorded by
DNV surveyors between 2005 and 2009 it can be concluded that the number of severe remarks
on inadequate band breaks and chain locks specifically is about the same as the number of
recorded lost anchors as described in Figure E.10. The records also reveal that anchors in many
cases are lost while at anchor or manoeuvring but there is also a large part of the incidents where
details about the event are unknown. Lost anchor due to uncontrolled anchor drop while
underway is expected to be found in this group of unknowns.
Revision No.: 1
Date : 2010-11-16
Page E-19
DNV Reg. No.: 2009-1115

Band brake
20 %
Lost anchor
51 %
Chain lock or turnbuckle

29 %
Figure E.10 Distribution of DNV remarks on lost anchors, band brakes and chain locks or
turnbuckles 2005-2009
Information from related industries

Figures from the International Cable Protection Committee indicate an increase of damages to
cables due to anchors being dragged by ships underway /2/. During 2007 and 2008, there were
ten recorded incidents around the UK where cables suffered severe damage from ships dragging
anchors while underway.
E.6
Frequency estimation
Based on the recorded lost anchors per ship and the assumptions above describing the scenario, a
coarse estimate of the number of uncontrolled anchor drops per ship and year can be calculated.
Subsequently, this can be used to estimate frequency for anchor - pipe interaction and pipe
damage.
Uncontrolled anchor drop

It is concluded that the frequency for anchor loss is 10-2 per ship and year. Assuming that 10% of
the anchors are lost due to uncontrolled anchor drops and the sequence and distribution of
outcomes described above are valid, the frequency for uncontrolled anchor drops per ship and
year can be estimated to 4,6*10-3.
Running hours per year for ships varies depending on several factors such as type of ship,
distance of normal route and port time linked to type of goods. However, a utilization of 70%
and an average speed of 15 knots are considered estimates accurate enough for this analysis. This
gives an estimated travel distance of 1,7*105 km per ship and year. Combining this with the
frequency for uncontrolled anchor drops per ship and year gives a frequency of 2,7*10-8
uncontrolled anchor drops per ship and travelled km as described below.
Revision No.: 1
Date : 2010-11-16
Page E-20
DNV Reg. No.: 2009-1115

Accidental anchor drops / year

Lost anchors per year Correction factor 1 Correction factor 2
1
0,01 / year
0,1 4,6 10 3 / year , where
0,218
Correction factor 1 = 1/0,218 since not all anchors dropped uncontrolled are lost. For
outcome 1, no anchors are assumed lost. For outcome 2, half of the anchors are assumed
lost. For outcome three, all anchors are assumed lost.
Correction factor 2 = 0,1 since it is assumed that only 10% of the recorded lost anchors
are related to accidental anchor drops.
Accidental anchor drops / km
Accidental anchor drops / year
Travelled dis tan ce
4,6 10 3 / year
2,7 10 8 / km
70% 8760h / year 15nmi / h 1,852km / nmi
Anchor - Pipe interaction

The three different outcomes all result in a situation where an anchor may interact with a
pipeline. An interaction in this case is defined as a scenario where the anchor gets in contact with
the pipeline or is dragged above the trenched pipeline. I.e. interaction is not limited to damage or
hooking of the pipeline. The scenario where the anchor chain is too short to enable the anchor to
reach the seabed is not included here.
The frequency for anchor - pipe interaction is the sum of frequencies for each outcome 1, 2 and 3
resulting in 1,9*10-7 pipe - anchor interactions per ship crossing. Each frequency contribution
from each of the outcomes is described below.
Outcome 1
The first outcome describes the situation where the anchor is dropped uncontrolled but
discovered within 1 km without having reached its maximum penetration depth. Since it is
believed that most uncontrolled anchor drops are discovered within 1 km and having the anchor
not seated, the first outcome was assigned 75% of the drops giving a frequency of 2,0*10-8
anchor - pipe interactions per ship crossing (0,75*2,7*10-8drops/km*1km). In this case, it is
assumed that the anchor does not get seated but is discovered through noise and vibrations etc.
when being paid out. Penetration depth is therefore limited to one fluke length and anchors are
assumed to be recovered and not lost.
Revision No.: 1
Date : 2010-11-16
Page E-21
DNV Reg. No.: 2009-1115

Outcome 2
The second outcome describes the situation where the anchor is seated into the seabed within 1
km. The holding power of the anchor and the ships thrust together with its kinetic energy will in
some cases cause the chain or bitter end to break. In other cases, the holding power of the anchor
is so large that it has notable impact on the ships manoeuvring ability, making personnel on the
bridge aware of the fact that one anchor is out. It is estimated that half of the anchors cause the
chain or bitter end to break while the remaining half will cause major disturbances of the ships
manoeuvring ability. Half of the anchors are therefore assumed to be lost. The frequency for
anchor - pipe interaction from a seated anchor is therefore estimated to 1,7*10-9 per ship crossing
(0,25*0,25*2,7*10-8 drops/km*1km).
Outcome 3
The third outcome is more complex when it comes to distance compared to outcome 1 and 2. For
outcome 1 and 2, the distance was limited to 1 km. For outcome three, the dragged unseated
anchor could be assumed to be dragged until hooking to a pipeline or possible other obstructions
on the seabed. In areas where the seabed mainly consists of different kinds of clay or sand, it
could be assumed that such obstructions consist of artificial objects such as pipelines and cables.
For outcome 3, all anchors are expected to be lost.
Disregarding offshore cables would contribute to a conservative estimate when calculating
average distance between obstructions on the seabed. Based on information from PARLOC 2001
/7/, there is a total number of 1069 steel pipelines in the North Sea (end 2000) with a total length
of 22847 km. The vast majority of these pipelines are located in the North Sea itself even though
some of the pipelines are located to limited parts of the Norwegian Sea and Skagerrak.
For conservative reasons, the anchor hooking the pipeline is assumed to be striking the pipeline
perpendicular to the stretch of the pipeline. In reality there will be occasions where the anchor
approaches the pipeline with an angle less than 90 degrees or almost parallel to the pipeline and
damage may or may not be an issue.
Assuming perpendicular anchor approach, and that pipelines are evenly spread out in the North
Sea area of 750000 km2, gives and average distance between the pipelines of 33 km. For a
specific pipeline where the neighbouring pipeline is at a distance of 33 km, the frequency for
anchor interaction is therefore 1,7*10-7 per ship crossing (0,25*0,75*2,8*10-8 drops/km*33km).
Revision No.: 1
Date : 2010-11-16
Page E-22
DNV Reg. No.: 2009-1115

Hooking and damage to pipeline

Whether the pipeline could be hooked and subsequently damaged by a dragged anchor or not,
depends on various factors as described above. In this analysis, five different pipeline diameters
have been chosen when estimating damage frequency. The diameters chosen for analysis are 4,
12, 20, 32 and 44. In annex 1, a table of sequency criteria for each of the outcomes 1, 2
and 3 is presented with branches for pipeline diameter, protection, soil and ship displacement.
If the number of crossings per time unit and distribution of ship size are known, the frequencies
in outcome 1-3 can be combined with this data to form the aggregated frequency of damage to
pipelines due to uncontrolled anchor drops. The complete table for such an analysis is given in
Annex II.
When the ship size distribution is unknown, a default distribution may be applied.
Based on collected data from five different shipping lanes in the North Sea (/8/, /9/) the
distribution in Figure E.11 may be applied as a default distribution to reflect a typical lane with
ship traffic in the North Sea. The result from applying the default distribution is given in Table
E.11 below. The table assumes that the water depth is such that the anchor chain is long enough
to allow the anchor to reach the seabed. In those cases where the anchor chain for a ship class is
too short, that frequency contribution should not be included in the estimates for final failure
frequency (ref section Water depth above)
Fraction
35 %
30 %
Ship
Class
Proportion
25 %
12 %
20 %
II
24 %
III
32 %
IV
28 %
10 %
2%
5%
VI
1%
15 %
0%
I
II
III
IV
VI
Ship Class
Figure E.11 Default distribution of ship size in the North Sea
Revision No.: 1
Date : 2010-11-16
Page E-23
DNV Reg. No.: 2009-1115

Table E.11 Estimated damage frequencies per ship crossing for pipelines
based on a default ship size distribution
Diameter
Protection
[inches]
Exposed
4
Flushed
Trenched
Exposed
12
Flushed
Trenched
Exposed
20
Flushed
Trenched
Exposed
32
Flushed
Trenched
Exposed
44
Flushed
Trenched
Soil
Soft
Hard
Soft
Hard
Soft
Hard
Soft
Hard
Soft
Hard
Soft
Hard
Soft
Hard
Soft
Hard
Soft
Hard
Soft
Hard
Soft
Hard
Soft
Hard
Soft
Hard
Soft
Hard
Soft
Hard
Fdamage per
ship crossing
assuming a
fixed ship
class
distribution
1,9E-07
1,9E-07
1,9E-07
1,9E-07
1,1E-07
1,1E-07
1,2E-07
1,2E-07
1,9E-07
1,2E-07
1,1E-07
1,1E-07
5,8E-08
5,8E-08
1,6E-07
1,2E-07
1,1E-07
5,8E-08
5,8E-08
5,8E-08
1,2E-07
1,2E-07
5,3E-08
5,2E-08
6,5E-09
5,8E-08
5,8E-08
5,8E-08
5,3E-08
6,5E-09
Revision No.: 1
Date : 2010-11-16
Page E-24
DNV Reg. No.: 2009-1115

Examples
The section contains two examples of how to estimate the damage frequency (per year) due to
uncontrolled anchor drops for a pipeline in the North Sea. Example 1 is applicable when the
number of ship crossings and distribution of size is known. Example 2 is applicable when only
the number of ship crossings is known but not the distribution of ship size. The standard
distribution of ship size in Figure E.11 is applied in the second example.
Example 1
Estimate annual damage frequency to the pipeline due to uncontrolled anchor drops.
Given:
Pipeline diameter: 20
Protection philosophy: Exposed
Soil: Sand (Hard)
Water depth: 100 m
Annual number of ship crossings
Ship class I: 100
Ship class II: 100
Ship class III: 150
Ship class IV: 150
Ship class V: 20
Ship class VI: 2
Solution:
Apply the table given in Annex 2 to reach the damage frequency per ship crossing for individual
ship crossings through Diameter -> Protection -> Soil. Depending on water depth and ship size
(anchor size) remove possible ship classes that have anchor chains too short compared to the
water depth by studying Table E.1 above.
Ship
displacement
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
Chain/anchor size
allows contact
with seabed
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Damage frequency
per ship crossing and
ship class
1,9E-07
1,9E-07
1,9E-07
Number of crossings
per year
100
100
150
150
20
2
Total:
Damage frequency
per ship class and
year
2,9E-5
3,8E-6
3,8E-7
3,3E-5
The annual damage frequency is reached by the dot product of Number of crossings per year and
Damage frequency per ship class and year, resulting in 3.3*10-5 per year.
Revision No.: 1
Date : 2010-11-16
Page E-25
DNV Reg. No.: 2009-1115

Example 2
Estimate annual damage frequency to the pipeline due to uncontrolled anchor drops.
Given:
Pipeline diameter: 32
Protection philosophy: Exposed
Soil: Clay (Soft)
Water depth: 100 m
Annual number of ship crossings: 400
Solution 1 disregarding potential effects from water depth:
Since the distribution of ship size is unknown an assumed distribution must be applied.
Assuming that the distribution of ship size given in the figure below can be used to reflect the
actual distribution, Table E.11 can be applied to estimate annual damage frequency from
uncontrolled anchor drops. Diameter -> Protection -> Soil in Table E.11 gives a damage
frequency per ship crossing of 5.8*10-8 per crossing, resulting in an annual damage frequency of
2.4*10-5 when multiplied by the number of annual ship crossings.
Solution 2 including potential effects from water depth:
If correction for water depth needs to be included, Table E.11 can not be applied. Instead, a
similar approach as in the previous example needs to be applied.
Apply the default distribution in Table E.10, the estimated number of ships per ship class is
calculated. Continue as in the previous example.
Ship
displacement
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
Fraction
(from default
distribution)
12 %
24 %
32 %
28 %
2%
1%
Number of
crossings
per year
48
96
128
112
8
4
Chain/anchor
size allows
contact with
seabed
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Damage
frequency per
ship crossing
and ship class
1.9E-07
1.9E-07
1.9E-07
Total:
Damage
frequency per
ship class and
year
2.2E-5
1.5E-6
7.6E-7
2.4E-5
When comparing the two different solutions, there can be a slight difference between the results.
This is due to the fact that the underlying calculations in solution 1 include a larger number of
significant figures, making the result in solution 2 less accurate. In addition, a difference may
arise from water depth / chain length effects.
Revision No.: 1
Date : 2010-11-16
Page E-26
DNV Reg. No.: 2009-1115

E.7
REFERENCES
/1/
Insurance provider Gard
/2/
International Cable Protection Committee, Loss Prevention Bulletin, 18 March 2009
/3/
PTIL, Recorded incidents to mooring systems in the oil and gas industry, 1990-2007
/4/
DNV, Rules for Classification of Ships, Part 3, Chapter 3, July 2009.
/5/
NCEL (U.S. Naval Civil Engineering Laboratory), 1985
/6/
DNV, Recommended Practice F107 - Risk Assessment of Pipeline Protection, March

2007
/7/
Mott MacDonald Ltd, PARLOC 2001 - The Update of Loss of Containment Data for
Offshore Pipelines, July 2003 5th Edition
/8/
Statoil, Europipe 2 - Risk from external interference, D052-XX-P100-F-RS-020, Rev 3

2004.
/9/
Statoil, Zeepipe Development Project, DO24-A-P50-F-RS-005-01, Rev 6 1990
/10/
Gaudin C., Vlahos G., Randoloph M.F., Centrifuge Tests to Design Pipeline Rock
Protection Report no. C: 2090, Centre for Offshore Foundation Systems, The
University of Western Australia 2006
-o0o-
Revision No.: 1
Date : 2010-11-16
Page E-27
DNV Reg. No.: 2009-1115

ANNEX 1
CRITERIA FOR DAMAGE TO PIPELINES
Revision No.: 1
Date : 2010-11-16
DNV Reg. No.: 2009-1115

Outcome
Diamater
[inches]
Protection
Soil
Soft
Exposed
Hard
Soft
Flushed
Hard
Soft
Trenched
Hard
Ship
displacement
[tonnes]
Possible
hooking
I
Possible
hooking
II
Chain
strength
> Load
resistance
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Thrust +
Force from
kinetic
Damage
energy
>Load
resistance
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Revision No.: 1
Date : 2010-11-16
Page E-29
DNV Reg. No.: 2009-1115
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes

Outcome
Diamater
[inches]
Protection
Soil
Soft
Exposed
Hard
Soft
12
Flushed
Hard
Soft
Trenched
Hard
Ship
displacement
[tonnes]
Possible
hooking
I
Possible
hooking
II
Chain
strength
> Load
resistance
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Thrust +
Force from
kinetic
Damage
energy
>Load
resistance
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Revision No.: 1
Date : 2010-11-16
Page E-30
DNV Reg. No.: 2009-1115
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes

Outcome
Diamater
[inches]
Protection
Soil
Soft
Exposed
Hard
Soft
20
Flushed
Hard
Soft
Trenched
Hard
Ship
displacement
[tonnes]
Possible
hooking
I
Possible
hooking
II
Chain
strength
> Load
resistance
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Thrust +
Force from
kinetic
Damage
energy
>Load
resistance
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Revision No.: 1
Date : 2010-11-16
Page E-31
DNV Reg. No.: 2009-1115
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes

Outcome
Diamater
[inches]
Protection
Soil
Soft
Exposed
Hard
Soft
32
Flushed
Hard
Soft
Trenched
Hard
Ship
displacement
[tonnes]
Possible
hooking
I
Possible
hooking
II
Chain
strength
> Load
resistance
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Thrust +
Force from
kinetic
Damage
energy
>Load
resistance
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Revision No.: 1
Date : 2010-11-16
Page E-32
DNV Reg. No.: 2009-1115
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes

Outcome
Diamater
[inches]
Protection
Soil
Soft
Exposed
Hard
Soft
44
Flushed
Hard
Soft
Trenched
Hard
Ship
displacement
[tonnes]
Possible
hooking
I
Possible
hooking
II
Chain
strength
> Load
resistance
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Thrust +
Force from
kinetic
Damage
energy
>Load
resistance
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Revision No.: 1
Date : 2010-11-16
Page E-33
DNV Reg. No.: 2009-1115
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes

Outcome
Diamater
[inches]
Protection
Soil
Soft
Exposed
Hard
Soft
Flushed
Hard
Soft
Trenched
Hard
Ship
displacement
[tonnes]
Possible
hooking
I
Possible
hooking
II
Chain
strength
> Load
resistance
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Thrust +
Force from
kinetic
Damage
energy
>Load
resistance
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Revision No.: 1
Date : 2010-11-16
Page E-34
DNV Reg. No.: 2009-1115
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes

Outcome
Diamater
[inches]
Protection
Soil
Soft
Exposed
Hard
Soft
12
Flushed
Hard
Soft
Trenched
Hard
Ship
displacement
[tonnes]
Possible
hooking
I
Possible
hooking
II
Chain
strength
> Load
resistance
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Thrust +
Force from
kinetic
Damage
energy
>Load
resistance
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Revision No.: 1
Date : 2010-11-16
Page E-35
DNV Reg. No.: 2009-1115
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes

Outcome
Diamater
[inches]
Protection
Soil
Soft
Exposed
Hard
Soft
20
Flushed
Hard
Soft
Trenched
Hard
Ship
displacement
[tonnes]
Possible
hooking
I
Possible
hooking
II
Chain
strength
> Load
resistance
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Thrust +
Force from
kinetic
Damage
energy
>Load
resistance
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Revision No.: 1
Date : 2010-11-16
Page E-36
DNV Reg. No.: 2009-1115
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes

Outcome
Diamater
[inches]
Protection
Soil
Soft
Exposed
Hard
Soft
32
Flushed
Hard
Soft
Trenched
Hard
Ship
displacement
[tonnes]
Possible
hooking
I
Possible
hooking
II
Chain
strength
> Load
resistance
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Thrust +
Force from
kinetic
Damage
energy
>Load
resistance
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Revision No.: 1
Date : 2010-11-16
Page E-37
DNV Reg. No.: 2009-1115
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes

Outcome
Diamater
[inches]
Protection
Soil
Soft
Exposed
Hard
Soft
44
Flushed
Hard
Soft
Trenched
Hard
Ship
displacement
[tonnes]
Possible
hooking
I
Possible
hooking
II
Chain
strength
> Load
resistance
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Thrust +
Force from
kinetic
Damage
energy
>Load
resistance
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Revision No.: 1
Date : 2010-11-16
Page E-38
DNV Reg. No.: 2009-1115
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes

Outcome
Diamater
[inches]
Protection
Soil
Soft
Exposed
Hard
Soft
Flushed
Hard
Soft
Trenched
Hard
Ship
displacement
[tonnes]
Possible
hooking
I
Possible
hooking
II
Chain
strength
> Load
resistance
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Thrust +
Force from
kinetic
Damage
energy
>Load
resistance
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Revision No.: 1
Date : 2010-11-16
Page E-39
DNV Reg. No.: 2009-1115
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes

Outcome
Diamater
[inches]
Protection
Soil
Soft
Exposed
Hard
Soft
12
Flushed
Hard
Soft
Trenched
Hard
Ship
displacement
[tonnes]
Possible
hooking
I
Possible
hooking
II
Chain
strength
> Load
resistance
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Thrust +
Force from
kinetic
Damage
energy
>Load
resistance
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Revision No.: 1
Date : 2010-11-16
Page E-40
DNV Reg. No.: 2009-1115
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes

Outcome
Diamater
[inches]
Protection
Soil
Soft
Exposed
Hard
Soft
20
Flushed
Hard
Soft
Trenched
Hard
Ship
displacement
[tonnes]
Possible
hooking
I
Possible
hooking
II
Chain
strength
> Load
resistance
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Thrust +
Force from
kinetic
Damage
energy
>Load
resistance
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Revision No.: 1
Date : 2010-11-16
Page E-41
DNV Reg. No.: 2009-1115
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes

Outcome
Diamater
[inches]
Protection
Soil
Soft
Exposed
Hard
Soft
32
Flushed
Hard
Soft
Trenched
Hard
Ship
displacement
[tonnes]
Possible
hooking
I
Possible
hooking
II
Chain
strength
> Load
resistance
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Thrust +
Force from
kinetic
Damage
energy
>Load
resistance
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Revision No.: 1
Date : 2010-11-16
Page E-42
DNV Reg. No.: 2009-1115
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes

Outcome
Diamater
[inches]
Protection
Soil
Soft
Exposed
Hard
Soft
44
Flushed
Hard
Soft
Trenched
Hard
Ship
displacement
[tonnes]
Possible
hooking
I
Possible
hooking
II
Chain
strength
> Load
resistance
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Thrust +
Force from
kinetic
Damage
energy
>Load
resistance
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
-o0o-
Revision No.: 1
Date : 2010-11-16
Page E-43
DNV Reg. No.: 2009-1115
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes

ANNEX 2
DAMAGE FREQUENCIES FOR PIPELINES PER SHIP CROSSING AND
SHIP SIZE
Revision No.: 1
Date : 2010-11-16
DNV Reg. No.: 2009-1115

Diamater
[inches]
Protection
Soil
Soft
Exposed
Hard
Soft
Flushed
Hard
Soft
Trenched
Hard
Ship
displacement
[tonnes]
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
Fdamage per
ship crossing
1,9E-07
1,9E-07
1,9E-07
1,9E-07
1,7E-09
1,7E-07
1,9E-07
1,7E-07
1,9E-07
Revision No.: 1
Date : 2010-11-16
Page E-45
DNV Reg. No.: 2009-1115

Diamater
[inches]
Protection
Soil
Soft
Exposed
Hard
Soft
12
Flushed
Hard
Soft
Trenched
Hard
Ship
displacement
[tonnes]
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
Fdamage per
ship crossing
1,9E-07
1,9E-07
1,9E-07
1,9E-07
1,9E-07
1,9E-07
1,9E-07
1,9E-07
1,9E-07
1,9E-07
1,9E-07
1,9E-07
1,9E-07
1,9E-07
1,9E-07
1,7E-07
1,9E-07
1,9E-07
1,9E-07
1,7E-07
1,9E-07
1,9E-07
1,9E-07
Revision No.: 1
Date : 2010-11-16
Page E-46
DNV Reg. No.: 2009-1115

Diamater
[inches]
Protection
Soil
Soft
Exposed
Hard
Soft
20
Flushed
Hard
Soft
Trenched
Hard
Ship
displacement
[tonnes]
Fdamage per
ship crossing
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1,9E-07
1,9E-07
1,9E-07
1,9E-07
1,9E-07
1,9E-07
1,9E-07
1,9E-07
1,9E-07
1,9E-07
1,9E-07
1,9E-07
1,9E-07
1,9E-07
1,9E-07
1,7E-07
1,9E-07
1,9E-07
1,9E-07
1,9E-07
1,9E-07
1,9E-07
Revision No.: 1
Date : 2010-11-16
Page E-47
DNV Reg. No.: 2009-1115

Diamater
[inches]
Protection
Soil
Soft
Exposed
Hard
Soft
32
Flushed
Hard
Soft
Trenched
Hard
Ship
displacement
[tonnes]
Fdamage per
ship crossing
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1,9E-07
1,9E-07
1,9E-07
1,9E-07
1,9E-07
1,9E-07
1,9E-07
1,9E-07
1,9E-07
1,9E-07
1,9E-07
1,9E-07
1,9E-07
1,9E-07
1,7E-07
1,9E-07
1,9E-07
1,7E-07
1,9E-07
1,9E-07
Revision No.: 1
Date : 2010-11-16
Page E-48
DNV Reg. No.: 2009-1115

Diamater
[inches]
Protection
Soil
Soft
Exposed
Hard
Soft
44
Flushed
Hard
Soft
Trenched
Hard
Ship
displacement
[tonnes]
Fdamage per
ship crossing
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1500
3600
10000
45000
175000
350000
1,9E-07
1,9E-07
1,9E-07
1,9E-07
1,9E-07
1,9E-07
1,9E-07
1,9E-07
1,9E-07
1,9E-07
1,9E-07
1,7E-07
1,9E-07
1,9E-07
1,9E-07
1,9E-07
-o0o-
Revision No.: 1
Date : 2010-11-16
Page E-49
DNV Reg. No.: 2009-1115

APPENDIX
F
CO2 PIPELINES- ONSHORE AND OFFSHORE
Revision No.: 1
Date : 2010-11-16
DNV Reg. No.: 2009-1115

F.1
CO2-pipelines
There is currently little operational experience of CO2 pipelines and available statistics is scarce.
In order to estimate failure frequencies for CO2 pipelines, a list of relevant threats to CO2
pipelines has been produced and analysed. The list of threats starts off with threats known to be
relevant for HC pipelines with subsequent adjustments to fit CO2 pipelines. After having
produced the list of relevant threats, an additional list of factors having impact on the threats was
produced. Each impacting factor has been analysed to reveal potential differences in how the
level of threat might be affected when changing transported medium from HC to CO2. This
appendix contains the result from that analysis and starts with the list of threats and continues
with the list of factors having impact on the threats. As presented below, no significant
differences in how these factors influence the level of threats were identified and it is therefore
recommended to use the same failure frequencies for CO2 pipelines as for gas pipelines.
F.2
Threats that may result in pipeline failure
The threats listed as relevant for HC pipelines are all considered relevant for CO2 pipelines. In
addition, it is concluded that the pipeline material could suffer from damages of other kinds than
corrosion due to possible accidental actions related to operations and operational procedures. In
theory, HC pipelines are to some extent subject to similar threats related to material damage
related to operational procedures but since faulty operations is explicitly covered by any of the
available data bases for HC pipelines, this threat has not been further analysed. Threats
considered relevant;
F.3
Anchor damages (dropped and dragged)

Other impacts (dropped objects, trawl, etc.)
Corrosion (internal and external)
Material and weld defects (from fabrication/installation)
Natural hazards (ground movement e.g. settlings, land slides etc.)
Structural damage
Construction faults
Material failures (due to temperature- and pressure-variations outside spec.)
Factors affecting the threats
The factors affecting the threats for HC pipelines are all considered relevant for CO2 pipelines as
well. In addition, the point operational procedures were added to the list.
Design
Diameter and pipe wall thickness
Material
Operational conditions
o Medium
o Temperature (variations)
o Pressure (variations)
Location
Revision No.: 1
Date : 2010-11-16
Page F-1
DNV Reg. No.: 2009-1115

Protection philosophy
Inspections
Operational procedures
F.3.1 Design
There are no evident differences in design philosophy between HC and CO2 pipelines. Parts of
threats exclusively related to design can therefore be considered similar for the two kinds of
areas of application.
F.3.2 Diameter and pipe wall thickness

Existing reports conclude that diameter and wall thickness both are factors affecting the expected
failure frequency of a pipeline. This is partly related to the ability to withstand external loads but
also variations in the time interval where corrosion can be detected and taken care of before
causing a failure. However, it has been concluded that there are no general differences in
diameter and pipe wall thickness, whether one deals with HC or CO2 pipelines. Parts of threats
exclusively related to diameter and pipe wall thickness can therefore be considered similar for
HC and CO2 pipelines.
F.3.3 Material
As above, there are no general differences between materials used for CO2 or HC.
F.3.4 Operational conditions and Procedures

There is little doubt about this being the main point of focus when describing differences in
factors influencing the threats and potential failures. The fact that one deals with another medium
may have impact on several of the threats listed above.
Keeping the CO2 composition within design specification could be more challenging compared
to process HC. The consequence of impurities is potentially higher for CO2 pipelines than for
HC pipelines due to an expected higher rate of corrosion /1/. Impurities that together with CO2
could cause severe corrosion are water, H2S, NOX, SO2, O2 and solvent.
The presence of water could possibly also cause the formation of hydrate plugs which in turn
could result in damage due to pressure build up.
If procedures related to decrease in pressure (blow downs etc.) are not followed or the
procedures are incorrect, the result could be very low temperatures and formation of dry ice
which in turn could cause pressure build up and damage to material. Erosion may also be a
concern. The low temperature itself may also cause material damage.
However, assuming that
Systems and routines for monitoring and handling levels of impurities are in place,
correct and reliable.
Operational procedures describing activities that may cause temperature and pressure
variations are correct and followed.
It can not be said that failure frequencies related to internal corrosion or other material failures
should be adjusted.
Revision No.: 1
Date : 2010-11-16
Page F-2
DNV Reg. No.: 2009-1115

Even if experience with CO2 lines compared to HC pipelines is limited, there is information from
operating onshore CO2 pipeline systems indicating that problems related to impurities are rare. It
is however easier to find and eliminate water in an onshore system where the pipelines low
points can locally inspected through NDT compared to the offshore case.
F.3.5 Location
There are no major differences in the nature of locations for CO2 pipelines and HC pipelines that
would imply general differences in threat exposure. Threats related to locations are anchor
damages, external impact and natural hazards.
F.3.6 Protection philosophy

CO2 and HC pipelines are assumed to be protected in the same way when it comes to trenching
and rock dumping etc. No differences in threat exposure can therefore be identified.
F.3.7 Inspections
There might be a slight difference in inspection routines between CO2 and HC pipelines. It is
however assumed that the inspection and maintenance routines for CO2 pipelines are adequate
and adjusted to ensure integrity.
F.4
Conclusions
The factors affecting the threats to CO2 pipelines that may be different compared to HC pipelines
are related to operational conditions and procedures. On the other hand, as long as monitoring of
impurities and operational procedures are reliable, correct and followed, it can be said that the
threats related to these factors are at the same level as for the HC pipelines. Possible differences
in level of threats must be considered small compared to the overall precision of the suggested
failure frequencies and should therefore not be taken into account. Provided that operational
conditions and procedures are as described above it is suggested that the failure frequencies for
pipelines carrying processed gas is applied when estimating failure frequencies for CO2
pipelines. Should there be any doubt in the required reliability or correctness of either monitoring
of impurities or the (intended or actual) operational procedures, the suggested failure frequency
is no longer valid and dedicated analysis is required.
A scenario where the CO2 composition is out of specification may result in consequences that
differ much compared to the HC case, e.g. with respect to rate of degradation /1/. When
analysing a specific CO2 pipeline in detail, it is therefore advised that a sensitivity study
including the case where the gas composition is out of specification is performed.
There is some accumulated experience on incidents (i.e. not necessarily leaks) to onshore CO2
pipelines, mainly from the USA /2/. The amount of experience is limited in terms of km years
but suggests an incident frequency of the same order as for onshore natural gas pipelines.
Experience from offshore CO2 pipelines must be considered so limited that the derived future
statistics today cannot be used for reliable failure frequency estimations.
Revision No.: 1
Date : 2010-11-16
Page F-3
DNV Reg. No.: 2009-1115

F.5
References
/1/
DNV Energy Report, Project Specific Guideline for Safe, Reliable and Cost-Effective
Transmission of CO2 in Pipelines JIP, Draft version 2009
/2/
Transmission of CO2 - Safety and economic considerations, Gale J, Davison J, Energy

29 2004
-o0o-
Revision No.: 1
Date : 2010-11-16
Page F-4
DNV Reg. No.: 2009-1115
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CONCLUSIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................ 1

Recommended failure data......................................................................................... 3

FAILURE FACTORS AND MECHANISMS................................................................. 7

3.2 Physical factors .......................................................................................................... 7

DATA SOURCES ............................................................................................................ 18

Onshore gas pipelines............................................................................................... 19

DNV Reg. No.: 2009-1115

DET NORSKE VERITAS AS

FAILURE FREQUENCIES ........................................................................................... 21

5.2 Offshore pipelines, gas and oil................................................................................. 22

Onshore oil pipelines................................................................................................ 39

CO2 pipelines onshore / offshore .......................................................................... 40

5.6 Hole size for pipelines.............................................................................................. 40

Example of application of recommended failure data for pipelines ........................ 44

Page iii of iii

DNV Reg. No.: 2009-1115

DET NORSKE VERITAS AS

Gas and oil pipelines offshore, steel and flexible pipelines

Figure 1.1 Approach to estimation of failure frequency

DNV Reg. No.: 2009-1115

DET NORSKE VERITAS AS

Figure 1.2 Pipeline segment division

Figure 1.3 Selection of model and failure rate

DNV Reg. No.: 2009-1115

DET NORSKE VERITAS AS

1.2 Recommended failure data

Offshore pipeline, open

Well stream pipeline and

Processed oil, gas or CO2

Processed oil, gas or CO2

Failure frequency from

Per score grade

Per score grade

Pipe specific (see

Offshore pipeline. External Diameter 16

Oil pipelines onshore

Wall thickness 5-10 mm

Wall thickness 10-15 mm

Wall thickness 15-20 mm

Wall thickness 20-25 mm

Wall thickness > 25 mm

Onshore gas and CO2

See OREDA handbook

DNV Reg. No.: 2009-1115

DET NORSKE VERITAS AS

Small (<20 mm)

Medium (20-80 mm)

Large (>80 mm)

* Applies to onshore pipelines with a utilisation <70%

Table 1.3 Hole size distribution for risers

Small (<20 mm)

Medium (20-80 mm)

Large (> 80 mm)/ Rupture

Table 1.4 shows the distribution over localisation of riser leaks.

DNV Reg. No.: 2009-1115

DET NORSKE VERITAS AS

DNV Reg. No.: 2009-1115

DET NORSKE VERITAS AS

Onshore oil an gas pipelines; steel pipelines

Risers; both steel and flexible risers