Testate Estate of Ramirez vs.

Ramirez
Facts:
Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national died in Spain with only hi widow as
compulsory heir. His will was admitted to probate. Maria Luisa Palacios, the administratrix
submitted a project of partition as follows: the property of the deceased is to be divided
into two parts: One part shall go to the widow in satisfaction of her legitime; the free
portion shall go to Jorge and Roberto Ramirez. Furthermore, 1/3 of the free portion is
charged with the widows usufruct and the remaining 2/3 with a usufruct in favor of
Wanda. Jorge and Roberto opposed the project of partition on the grounds that the
provisions for vulgar substitution in favor of Wanda with respect to the widows usufruct
and in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horacio Ramirez with respect to Wandas usufruct
are invalid because the first heir survived the testator and;
(For fideicommisary substitution issue)
Jorge and Roberto opposed the project of partition on the grounds that the
provisions for fideicommisary substitution are invalid because the first heirs are not
related to the second heirs or substitutes within the first degree.
Widows legitime (Not entitled to any usufruct)
They admit that the testators dispositions impaired his widows legitime. Since
Marcelle alone survived the deceased, she is entitled to one half of his estate over which
he could impose no burden, encumbrance, condition or substitution of any kind
whatsoever.
It is the 1/3 usufruct over the free portion which appellants question. It appears that
the court approved the usufruct in favor of Marcelle because the testament provides a
usufruct of 1/3 in her favor of the estate. The court erred for Marcelle is entitled to of
the estate as her legitime and which is more than what she is given under the will is not
entitled to have any additional share in the estate. To give Marcelle more that her legitime
will run counter to the testators intention for it would have impaired her legitime and
tended to favor Wanda.
Substitutions
They alleged that the substitution in its vulgar aspect as void because Wanda
survived the testator or because she did not predecease the testator. But dying before the
testator is not the only case for vulgar substitution for it also includes refusal or incapacity
to accept the inheritance. Hence, the vulgar substitution is valid.
Substitution in its fideicommisary aspect, the appeallants are correct in their claim
that it is void because the substitutes are not related to Wanda, the heir originally
instituted. Substitution must not go beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted.

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Fideicommisary can only be either a child or a parent of the first degree. These are
the only relatives who are one generation or degree from fiduciary.
The testator even contradicts the establishment of a fideicommisary substitution
when he permits the properties subject of the usufruct to be sold upon mutual agreement
of the usufructuaries and the naked owners.

Perez vs. Garchitorena

Facts:
The amount of 21,428.58 is on deposit in the plaintiffs name with the association
La Urbana in Manila, as the final payment of the liquidated credit of Ana Maria Alcantara,
deceased, whose heiress is said plaintiff.
Mariano Garchitorena held a judgment for 7,872.23 against Joaquin Perez Alcantara,
husband of the plaintiff, Carmen de Perez, pursuant to a writ of execution, levied an
attachment on said amount.
The plaintiff, alleged that the deposit belongs to fideicommisary heirs of the
decedent Ana Maria Alcantara. The appellant contend that in the clauses in the will of the
testatrix, the testatrix ordered a simple substitution.
Ruling:
Fideicommisary substitution requires:
1. A first heir called primarily to the enjoyment of the estate.
2. An obligation clearly imposed upon him to preserve and transmit to a third
person the whole or a part of the estate.; and
3. A second heir
Clause XI provides for the administration of the estate in case the heiress instituted
should die afte the testatrix and while the substitute heirs are still under age.
In clause IX, the testatrix institutes the plaintiff as her sole and universal heir and
provides that upon her death and after the probate of the will, said heiress shall
receive and enjoy the whole hereditary estate.. The enjoyment of the inheritance is
in conformity with the idea of fideicommisary substitution, the heir instituted
receives the inheritance and enjoys it, although at the same time he preserves it in
order to pass it on the second heir. This is an indication of the usufruct inherent in
fideicommisary substitution.
In clause X, the testatrix limits the transmission of her estate to the children of the
heiress, that is to say that he heiress is required to preserve the whole estate in
order to pass it on in due time to the fideicommisary heirs.
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Thus, all the requisites of a fideicommisary substitution are present. The inheritance
does not belong to the heiress instituted but to her children.

Art. 863- Fideicommisary substitution

Art. 870- Dispositions not to alienate estate for more than twenty years.
Aranas vs. Aranas
Facts:
Fr. Teodoro Aranas died leaving a will which was admitted for probate. In the will, Fr.
Teodoro Aranas stipulated the following:
A.
The return to Aniceto Aranas or his heirs of all properties acquired by Fr.
Aranas from his brother Aniceto Aranas and ten (10) parcels of land described in the Will
inherited by the testator from his parents.
B.
The return to Carmelo Aranas or his heirs of all properties acquired by Fr.
Aranas from his brother Carmelo Aranas and ten (10) parcels of land described in the Will
inherited by the testator from his parents.
C.
The special administration of the remainder of the estate of the testator by
Vicente Aranas, a faithful and serviceable nephew and designating him also as recipient of
1/2 of the produce of said properties after deducting the expenses for the administration
and the other 1/2 of the produce to be given to the Catholic Church for the eternal repose
of the testator's soul. Said pertinent provision 1 reads as follows:
Fourth. It is my will that the lands I had bought from other persons should be
converged and placed under a "special administrator." The special administrator of these
lands, for his office, should receive one half of all the produce from which shall be
deducted the expenses for the administration, and the other half of the produce should be
received by the Roman Catholic Church and should be spent for my soul, Vicente B. Aranas
(Tingting), because he is a faithful and serviceable nephew, should be the first special
administrator of said properties, without bond, until his death or until he should not want
to hold the said office anymore. Anyone of the sons of my brother Carmelo Aranas can
hold the said office of special administrator, and none other than they. Their father, my
brother Carmelo Aranas shall be the one to decide who among them shall hold the said
office, but upon the death of my said brother Carmelo Aranas, his said sons will have
power to select the one among them ourselves. The special administration is perpetual.
The court ruled, upon petitioners' "Motion for the Declaration of Heirs and Partition;
and for Removal of the Administrator (Vicente Aranas) and/or for his Permission to Resign,
and appointment of His Successor" that the "perpetual inalienability and administration of
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the portion of the estate of the late Rev. Fr. Teodoro Aranas, administered by Vicente
Aranas, is nun and void after twenty years from January 19, 1954 ... " and declared in the
same order the heirs of the late Fr. Teodoro Aranas.
Ruling:
Art. 870. The dispositions of the testator declaring all or part of the estate
inalienable for more than twenty years are void.
It was the sincere intention and desire of the testator to reward Vicente Aranas for
his faithful and unselfish services by allowing him to enjoy one-half of the fruits of the
testator's third group of properties until Vicente's death and/or refusal to act as
administrator in which case, the administration shall pass to anyone chosen by Carmelo
Aranas among his sons and upon Carmelo's death, his sons will have the power to select
one among themselves. Vicente Aranas therefore as a usufructuary has the right to enjoy
the property of his uncle with the obligation to return, at the designated time, either the
same thing, or in special cases its equivalent. This right of Vicente to enjoy the fruits of the
properties is temporary and therefore not perpetual as there is a limitation namely his
death or his refusal. Likewise his designation as administrator of these properties is limited
by his refusal and/or death and therefore it does not run counter to Art. 870 of the Civil
Code relied upon by the petitioners. Be it noted that Vicente Aranas is not prohibited to
dispose of the fruits and other benefits arising from the usufruct. Neither are the naked
owners (the other heirs) of the properties, the usufruct of which has been given to Vicente
Aranas prohibited from disposing of said naked ownership without prejudice of course to
Vicente's continuing usufruct. The proviso must be respected and be given effect until the
death or until the refusal to act as such of the instituted usufructuary/administrator, after
which period, the property can be properly disposed of, subject to the limitations provided
concerning a fideicommissary substitution.
A fideicommissary substitution by virtue of which the fiduciary or first heir instituted
is entrusted with the obligation to preserve and to transmit to a second heir the whole or
part of the inheritance, shall be valid and shall take effect, provided such substitution does
not go beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted, and provided further, that the
fiduciary or first heir and the second heir are living at the time of the death of the testator.
Art. 871- Institution
Natividad vs. Gabino
Facts:
Salvador y Reyes contracted a valid and legal marriage with Anselma Nicasio, who
died leaving a daughter Higinia who married Clemente Natividad. Higinia Salvador died
and was survived by two children Emilio and Purificacion. Tiburcio Salvador disposed all his
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property in the manner recorded in the will executed instituting as sole heirs his
grandchildren Emilio and Purificacion. In the sixth clause of this will the testator left to
Basilia Gabino the legacy. Literally, this clause is as follows:
I bequeath to Doa Basilia Gabino the ownership and dominion of the urban
property, consisting of a house and lot situated on Calle Lavezares of the said district of
San Nicolas and designated by No. 520, and in addition eleven meters by two meters of
the lot designated by No. 419, situated on Calle Madrid. This portion shall be taken from
that part of the lot which is adjacent to the rear of said property No. 520. If the said
legatee should die, Lorenzo Salvador shall be obliged to deliver this house, together with
the lot on which it stands, to my grandson Emilio Natividad, upon payment by the latter to
the former of the sum of four thousand pesos (P4,000), Philippine currency.
The executor of the estate of the decedent is the decedent's own heir, Emilio
Natividad, who in due season and by counsel presented to the court for its approval a
proposed partition of the property pertaining to the estate, setting forth in the fourth basis
the following relative to the legacy made to Basilia Gabino:
The ownership of the property upon which this right and legacy are established
belongs to the heir Emilio Natividad who, by the express will of the testator, had been
made liable for these encumbrances.
Counsel for the legatee Basilia Gabino opposed the approval of the proposed
partition with regard to the adjudication to the legatee of the usufruct only of the property
at No. 520 Calle Lavezares, claiming that said legatee ought to be recognized as entitled
to the dominion and ownership of the same.
Issue: What construction must be given to the sixth clause of the will executed by
Tiburcio Salvador?
Ruling:
A person is entirely free to make his will in such manner as may best please him,
provided the testamentary provisions conform to law and meet its requirements. He may
impose conditions, either with respect to the institution of heirs or to the designation of
legatees, and, when the conditions imposed upon the former or the latter do not fall within
the provisions of those articles of the Civil Code touching heirs and legatees, they shall be
governed by the rules therein prescribed for conditional obligations, (Civ. Code, arts. 790
and 791.)
In the sixth clause of the will executed by the decedent Tiburcio Salvador y Reyes,
he bequeathed to Basilia Gabino the ownership and dominion of the property on condition
that if the legatee should die Lorenzo Salvador would be obliged, upon the payment of
P4,000 by Emilio Natividad, to hand over this property to the latter.
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The condition imposed by the testator in the double legacy depends upon the
happening of the event constituting the condition, to wit, the death of the legatee Basilia
Gabino, a perfectly legal condition according to article 1114 of the Civil code, as it is not
impossible of performance and is not contrary to law or public morals, as provided in
article 1116 of said code.
The moment the legatee Gabino dies the other legatee, Lorenzo Salvador, is obliged
to deliver the property to the heir Emilio Natividad who, in his turn and in exchange, must
pay the legatee Salvador the sum of P4,000, thereby fulfilling the double legacy contained
in the said sixth clause of the will, the first of these legacies being the voluntary
reservation to Basilia Gabino of the ownership of the said house, and the second, the
conditional legacy of P4,000 to Lorenzo Salvador.

Art. 873- Impossible or Illegal Conditions

Miciano vs. Brimo
Facts:
The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo,
one of the brothers of the deceased, opposed it. The court, however, approved it.
The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition i puts into effect
the provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's will which are not in accordance with the laws of his
Turkish nationality, for which reason they are void.
In regard with the exclusion of the appellant as a legatee, as he is one of the
persons designated as such in will, such exclusion is based on the last part of the second
clause of the will, which says:
It is my wish that the distribution of my property and everything in connection with
this, my will, be made and disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the
Philippine islands, requesting all of my relatives to respect this wish, otherwise, I annul and
cancel beforehand whatever disposition found in this will favorable to the person or
persons who fail to comply with this request.
The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that the
instituted legatees must respect the testator's will to distribute his property, not in
accordance with the laws of his nationality, but in accordance with the laws of the
Philippines.
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Ruling:
The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being contrary to law, for article
792 of the civil Code provides the following:
Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be considered
as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever,
even should the testator otherwise provide.
And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's
national law when, according to article 10 of the civil Code above quoted, such national
law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary dispositions.
Said condition then is considered unwritten, and the institution of legatees in said
will is unconditional and consequently valid and effective even as to the herein oppositor.
Thus, the second clause of the will is null and void being contrary to law.
Art. 874- Prohibition to Marry
Morete vs. Dela Santa
Facts:
The will of Consuelo Morente contains the following clauses:
2. That my said husband shall not marry anyone; should my said husband have
children by anyone, he shall not convey any portion of the property left by me, except the
one-third part thereof and the two remaining thirds shall be and remain for my brother
Vicente or his children should he have any.
Her husband, Gumersindo de la Santa, married again within four months of the
death of the testatrix. Elena Morente, a sister of the deceased, filed a petition to the
probate of the will of Consuelo Morente in which she alleged the second marriage of
Gumersindo de la Santa and asked that the legacy to him be annulled.
She claims that by the mere act of marriage the husband at once lost all rights
acquired by the will. It is neither alleged nor proven that any children have been born to
the husband since the death of the testatrix.
Issue: Did the testatrix intend to impose a condition upon the absolute gift which is
contained in the first clauses of the will?
Ruling:

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A prohibition against another marriage may in certain cases be validly imposed

upon the widow or widower. It is provided in the second clause that he shall not marry
again. To no one of these orders is attached the condition that if he fails to comply with
them he shall lose the legacy given to him by the first clause of the will. It was not
expressly stated that if he marries again he shall incur such a loss. But it is expressly
provided that if one event does happen the disposition of the property contained in the
first clause of the will shall be changed.
We cannot say that it was the intention of the testatrix that if her husband married
again he should forfeit the legacy above mentioned. In other words, there being no
express condition attached to that legacy in reference to the second marriage, we cannot
say that any condition can be implied from the context of the will.
By the subsequent marriage of the husband he did not forfeit the legacy given to
him by the first part of the will.
Art. 883- When without the fault of the heir, an institution cannot take effect
Jonny S. Rabadilla vs. CA
Facts:
In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was
instituted as a devisee of parcel of land. The Codicil provides that Jorge Rabadilla shall
have the obligation until he dies, every year to give Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza,
(75) (sic) piculs of Export sugar and (25) piculs of Domestic sugar, until the said Maria
Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza dies. Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died. He was survived by Johnny
Rabadilla.
Maria Belleza sued Johnny Rabadilla in order to compel Johnny to reconvey the said
land to the estate of Aleja Belleza because it is alleged that Johnny failed to comply with
the terms of the will; that since 1985, Johnny failed to deliver the fruits; and that the the
land was mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank, which is a violation of the will.
In his defense, Johnny avers that the term near descendants in the will of Aleja
pertains to the near descendants of Aleja and not to the near descendants of Dr. Rabadilla,
hence, since Aleja had no near descendants at the time of his death, no can substitute Dr.
Rabadilla on the obligation to deliver the fruits of the devised land.
Issue: Whether or not Johnny Rabadilla is not obliged to comply with the terms of the Will
left by Aleja Belleza.

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Ruling: No. The near descendants being referred to in the will are the heirs of Dr.
Rabadilla. Ownership over the devised property was already transferred to Dr. Rabadilla
when Aleja died. Hence, when Dr. Rabadilla himself died, ownership over the same
property was transmitted to Johnny Rabadilla by virtue of succession.
Under Article 776 of the Civil Code, inheritance includes all the property, rights and
obligations of a person, not extinguished by his death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr.
Rabadilla had by virtue of the Will were transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of his
death. And since obligations not extinguished by death also form part of the estate of the
decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Will on the deceased Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his death. It is clear
therefore, that Johnny should have continued complying with the terms of the Will. His
failure to do so shall give rise to an obligation for him to reconvey the property to the
estate of Aleja.

Art. 884- Conditional Obligations

Macrohon vs. Saavedra
Facts:
Macario Macrohon Ong Ham, widower and executor of the joint last will and
testament of Victoriana Saavedra and himself, presented said will for probate, which was
ordered by the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga in its decree of February 21, 1924.
Victoriana Saavedra died without descendants or ascendants, being at that time
married to Macario Macrohon Ong Ham, both of them having executed a joint will, which
joint will has been duly admitted to probate in this court. The only near relations of the
said Victoriana Saavedra, with the right to inherit her estate are her brothers Juan and
Segundo Saavedra; her nephews and nieces, Teofilo Saavedra, Manuel Saavedra,
Victoriana Saavedra, Mariano Saavedra, Froilan Saavedra, Josefa Saavedra, Encarnacion
Carpio and Macra Carpio, in case that the said Victoriana Saavedra died intestate, or did
not dispose of her property in said will. It was stated in the will that in case of the death of
Macario Macrohon Ong Ham before Victoriana Saavedra, the properties be given to Ong
Ka Chiew and Ong Ka Jian jointly, and should either of the two die before Macario
Macrohon Ong Ham, all the said properties be given to the survivor. In case that Victoriana
Saavedra should survive Macario Macrohon Ong Ham,Lot No. 838, Lot No. 817 and Lot No.

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768 shall belong exclusively to Victoriana Saavedra. Should Victoriana Saavedra die before
Macario Macrohon Ong Ham, Lot No. 817 be adjudicated to Segunda Saavedra, widow,
sister of Victoriana Saavedra, free of all liens and encumbrances. Lot No. 768 be
adjudicated to Segunda Saavedra and her heirs, on condition that she devote the products
of the same to having masses said for the repose of the soul of Victoriana Saavedra. In
case of the death of either of the two, the surviving spouse be appointed executor of this
our last will and testament.This executor submitted a scheme of partition and distribution
of the property in accordance with the terms of the joint will, to which Juan Saavedra and
others filed an opposition. The executor rejoined insisting upon the approval of the scheme
and asking that the opposition of Juan Saavedra and others be overruled.
The lower court solving the question raised by the parties in their agreement of
facts, held that the one-half of the property described in the will
ISSUE:
1. WON the trial court erred in holding that Victoriana Saavedra died partly
intestate.
2. WON the brother, sister, nephews, and nieces of the testatrix, were entitled
to receive her share in the said sixteen parcels of land, given to the legatees,
Ong Ka Chiew and Ong Ka Jian, under the terms of the said joint will.
HELD
1.
ART. 658. Succession is effected either by the will of man expressed by the
testament or, in the absence of a testament, by operation of law.
The first is called testamentary, the second legal succession.
It may also be effected partly by the will of man and partly by operation of law.

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According to this, there are three ways in which succession may be effected: by the
will of man, by the law, or by both at the same time. In the first case the succession is
called testamentary, because it is based on the last will and testament, which is the
orderly manifestation of the testator's will; in the second, it is called legal, because it takes
effect by operation of the law; and the third is called mixed, because it partakes of the
character of both testamentary and legal succession.
This is a refutation of the appellant's argument that no one who has executed a will
can die partly intestate. That the rule of indivisibility of the testator's will invoked by the
appellant does not hold good in this jurisdiction, is shown, moreover, by articles 764 and
912 of the Civil Code. According to the first of these articles, a will is valid even though it
does not contain any institution of an heir, or if such institution does not include the entire
estate, and even though the person instituted does not accept the inheritance or is
disqualified to inherit; according to the second, one of the ways in which legal succession
may take place is when the will does not institute an heir to all or part of the property, or
does not dispose of all that belongs to the testator, in which case legal succession shall
take place only with respect to the property which the testator has not disposed of.
2. Yes.
Yes. As we have said, the acquisition of right by the alleged legatees depends on the
occurrence of the event constituting the condition, that is, the death of Macario Macrohon
Ong Ham prior to that of his wife; and this condition not having been complied with, the
said Ong Ka Chiew and Ong Ka Jian have not acquired any right, and therefore the
testatrix's estate is to be divided among her heirs in accordance with the law

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