Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
LL.D.
EDITED BY
fT.
t E.
L. A.
CAPPS,
POST,
E.
PAGE,
PH.D., LL.D.
L.H.D.
E. H.
O.H., LITT.D.
W. H.
D.
WARMINGTON,
ARISTOTLE
THE CATEGORIES
ON INTERPRETATION
PRIOR ANALYTICS
ROUSE,
m.a.,
litt.d.
f.b.hist.soo.
AEISTOTLE
THE CATEGORIES
ON INTERPRETATION
BY
HAROLD
P.
COOK, M.A.
PRIOR ANALYTICS
BY
HUGH TREDENNICK,
M.A.
LONDON
i
I
PHnttd in
Gr^ BriUim
CONTENTS
PAQE
Preface
vii
The Categories
Introduction
Summary
of the Principal
On
Interpretation
Summary
of the Principal
.12
Themes
.112
.114
Introduction
Select Bibliography
The
Themes
Traditional
Mood -Names
.182
.196
.197
Book
Book
Index
198
II
406
533
PREFACE
With an eye to the English reader, who knows,
perhaps, Httle of logic and less in that case of
Aristotle's, I have tried in translating these texts
to bring out the philosopher's meaning as clearly as
How far I have succeeded in
was in my power.
doing so, provided I interpret it rightly, the reader
I cannot, in consequence,
alone can determine.
pretend that I literally translate the Greek, where
it seemed that a literal translation would fail to
Some scholars may
achieve this main purpose.
possibly object that at times I paraphrase Aristotle.
I can in that case only plead that a more or less
intelligible paraphrase does convey something to the
reader, unlike strict adherence to the letter.
Moreover, a literal translation might often repel EngHsh
readers and read like some alien jargon, as well as
in all probability demanding rather copious notes,
which are foreign from the scope of this series.
The Greek text here printed is Bekker's, except
for some slight deviations that are noted at the foot
of the page.
The short introduction that follows was submitted
to the Provost of Oriel.
I have to thank my friend
and former tutor, Lt.-Col. A. S. L. Farquharson, for
help and advice on certain points in regard to the
meaning of the texts.
H. P. C.
Cambridge, 1984
vii
ARISTOTLE
THE CATEGORIES
A 2
INTRODUCTION
What
In oidliiaffy
is the subject of the CaUgories ?
usage KUTrjyopLaf rendered in Knglish bm cMCigW//
meant nothing more than a predicate' Thli meaning it seems highly probable that it retains In this
text. The ten categories, then, arc ten predknUt.
What sort of predicates, however, and preoicates alto
of what ? Let us first raise another point here. If
we ask how Aristotle came bv them, the critk
The following
are not in agreement.
the whole, the most plausible view of the
Aristotle,' says Theodor Gompert, imagines a
standing before him, say in the Lyceum,
in successive review the questions which may be put
and answered about him. All the predicates wl^ch
can be attached to that subject fall under one or
other of the ten heads, from the supreme qoestloii
What is the object here perceived ? down to socfa a
subordinate question, dealing with mere externalities,
as
What has he on ? What equipment or aceoatrements, e.g. shoes or weapons ? Other questions are
concerned with his quahties and his site (white,
'
'
'
INTRODUCTION
Yesterday or To-morrow, the Doing and Suffering
" He is cutting or burning,"
" He is being cut or burnt." The enumeration is
intended to comprise the maximum of predicates
which can be assigned to any thing or being. A
maximum, be it observed for it can hardly be by
chance that the full number is found in only two
passages of the work, while the two which are at
once the most special and the least important, those
relating to Having, or possession, and to Lying, or
attitude, are in every other case passed over without
mention. And indeed, what sense could there be
in speaking of the possessions of a stone or a piece of
iron, or of the attitude of a sphere or a cube } We
by the sentences
'
'
too, for
ARISTOTLE
down the Ten Categories, as Smmwtm Gmerm for
predications which can be made about any |five
Subject, the Subject which he has wh<Uy, or at le*t
principally, in his mind is an individual Man.
understand, then, how it is that he declares /Maiv
and Jacere to be so plain as to need no furthrr
lays
all
by every
What
Is
one.'
be either an individual
man
or an
all
animaL
Of any
predicates.
They constitute, therefore, ' a navfas Theodor Gompers well puts it. To certain
mum,'
'
AruMU (ed.
*
ArutotU,
2. 1880), p. 7.
p. 9S,
INTRODUCTION
statement correctly, this means that the ultimate
answer to the question what is red is a quality,*
the ultimate answer to the question what space is
or time is a quantity.' On that view each namable
entity falls under only one category, having one only
for predicate. And surely one category only can tell
this
us what a thing is
at bottom.'
Now, a careful
inspection of the text shows, I think, that this view
is
correct.
Aristotle, in particular, of quantity
enumerates several examples, such as time, space,
speech, lines, solids, numbers. And if you were to
ask what these are, then the ultimate answer to the
question is quantities discrete or continuous.' Moreover, he expressly reminds us that only some things,
strictly speaking, belong to the category of quantity.
This implies that all namable things can be classed
under one or another. And the fact that he admits
the possibility of a thing's falling under two categories
scarcely affects the main point.
And this view is
consistent with our statement that one of the categories, at least, will belong to each namable entity.
These contentions, I think, will hold good. Not,
however, of the classification in its earliest form
and significance. For nothing, indeed, in that case
appears clearer, at least to my mind, than that all of
the ten were envisaged as the predicates of one single
subject. This is not to deny that the doctrine has
additional aspects or meanings and that it might
come to be made to serve purposes other than the
primal and, possibly, far more important.
So, again, we may properly argue that one subject
of our text is the meanings of uncombined,' isolated words (or of terms as opposed to propositions)
and the things signified by those terms. Thus the
*
'
'
'
ARISTOTLE
doctrine of the categories may fcrvc as a
of such meanings. It is only again in regard to
the primary sense of that doctrine that 1 do aol
It would seem,' to ho 9&f
quite follow Dr. Ross.
very briefly, that in its earhest form the ductllBO
was a classification of the meanings of, ijt* of tlM
things meant by, " uncombincd words,** ill Other
words an inventory of the main aspects of really*
so far at least as language takes account of them. *
<
'
'
its earliest
Gomperz has
'
ducUino
it
dJlloirtletl
questions.
individual
Some
scholars
deny
this
doubt
it,
ArittotU, p. S.
INTRODUCTION
we have
'
'
'
'
'
'
ARISTOTLE
what Aristotle says or impUea of the
is open to all the objcctioat that are rmhd
against I^ocke and othert. llie reader mmy
Truth, tba
pare this from I>ocke
t
in the proper import of the word, to alu ullW I
but thf joining or teparaitng of Signs, ms lit Tkimgi
selves, this
'
tignijied by
MMM
bm
C.5.
An
Umd^niamdimf, Bk.
hr.
^^ni-1:"i'.
.ii;;
THE CATEGORIES
Summary of the Principal Themes
The meaning of
Ch.
1.
Ch.
2.
Ch.
3.
Ch.
Ch.
4.
The
5.
Of Substance.
What
substances.
No
all
other predicates.
ARISTOTLE
Neither primary nor
present in a subject.
Primary substmnce individual,
stance a qualification of the indiridoaL
Substances have no contraries.
Substances never admit of degrees.
The characteristic peculiar to Mbttaiice
that contrary qualities are predkable of it.
Ch.
6.
la
Of QuanUty.
Quantity discrete or continuous.
The parts of some quantities have relatifV
positions, while the parts of others have not.
Quantitative terms may be used of things
other than quantity.
'
Great/
small
and similar tenns not
quantitative but relative.
Quantities never admit of degrees.
'
'
Ch.
7.
'
'
Preliminary definition.
Some
Some
relatives
have contraries.
The
relative
only so
must have
its
proper
name
knowledge.
Primary substance never relative, neither
any part of such substance.
Corrected definition of relatives.
10
CATEGORIES
Impossible to
unless
Ch.
8.
its
know
that a thing
correlative
is
is
relative,
known.
Of QuaUty.
Qualities defined.
Their kinds
(2)
(1)
capacities,
(3)
Most
If
is
the other.
we predicate
to
like
'
and unlike
*
'
is
that
in reference
it.
(2)
contraries,
(3)
(1)
cor-
positives
and
relation to
Ch.
Ch.
Ch.
Ch.
12.
13.
14.
15.
good and
evil.
11
API2TOTEAOT2
KATHFOPIAI
la
h Kara rovvofia
d7roha>Gi.
r^
Tff tfK)|ia
odalais
6
avros, otov ^a>ov o T dvBpomo^ koX 6 fiodf,
yap dvdpojTTos Kal 6 Poth Koii'<p Svofum trpoQ-
ayopeverai
10
C<{^^
f<**
o Xoyos
5c
rrjs
ovaCa^ o
\6yov diToBwaci.
rivos
hia<f)4povra
aur^
Trrcacrct
rriv
Kara rowofia
and
Univocal
"
12
Zcpoi'
'
in
ARISTOTLE'S CATEGORIES
Things are equivocally named, when they have
name only in common, the definition (or statement of essence) corresponding with the name being
I.
the
'
'
'
We
'
13
ARISTOTLE
olov dno rfji ypafAfMrunff 6
ano t^5 aSp(as 6 dv^pflof.
Kara avfurXoteifif
II. Tcov Xeyofievwv ra fiv
to fiv od irard
Acycrat, ra 8* dvv avfjLnXoKTJs
crvfjLTrXoKrjv olov dvdpwnog rpXi, dpdpomof Kurf
ra 8* dvv arvfjLTrXoKTJs olov aydpunroi, fioOf, T/Mx*'*
7Tpo<rqyopiav
15
Xi,
ypafXfjLaTLKos Kal
VLKa.
TcDv
ovrwv
Xeyerai,
20
rd
fiev
V7roKifMV<(}
Kad*
B
vnoiCi^Uvav
ou5cvi
iaruf,
rw6t
oUm
v (L iarlv), olov
-q
pLv
1 b
rj
tq
^Ifvxj,
mtt
dnXws Si T^Sroua
.2Uki
'
termination or inflexion.
14
mv
CATEGORIES,
i-ii
'
'
'
man,'
ox,*
'
'
'
'
'
We
15
ARISTOTLE
/cat v apidfiw Kar oiJSevoy viroKifUvov Xdy^rm,
iv v7roKLfivu) Se via oubv K(oXvi c&xu* ij ydp
ris ypaixfiaTiKT) riov cV vnoKifi4v<p iari}
Mpov Karqyopiinu wt
ooa KaTo. roO KarrfyopovfUyov
Aeycrai, Trdvra Koi Kar A rov U7roKifi4vou (nfi^'
crcrat, olov dvOpajnos Kara rod twos apBp$imov
KaTqyopelTai, to Sc ^wov Kara tow avBptimvuf
III. "Oral/
10
Kad*
Irepov Kad*
v7T0Ki,fjLV0Vt
coTt
t,wov.
/cat
Tcov Tpcjv
Kal
yvcjjv*
fiTj
aXX7}Xa rrray-
iJtr*
to
tovtvjv ov yap
iniGT-qiJir) inKrrqfirjs rw hinovs ttfai,
Tatv Be y tm* dXXrjXa yvdw ovStv KotXmi ras
avrag Bia<f>opa9 etuax' ra yap CTrayoi rtjv vn a^r^
yevLJV Karr]yopirai,, ware ooot tou tcarrfyopoV'
fiivov hia<j)opaL elm, roaavrax Kal rov vnoKtifUvov
Sc
iirLGrrni-qs
20
ovSfjua
eoovrai.
IV. T(x)v
25
Kaarov
irpos TL
Kara
tJtoi
rj
avfiJi^K^v XryofUpta^
ovalav OT^/tatVct ^ -noaov ^ noiO w
TTov
rj
p.i]Bp.iav
ttotc
Bekker reads
Tdv
'Co-ordinate'
what
rj
'
c;(tv
-
JUp icn,
rj
mt
voifu^
ij
^wmtyidp^
B.
is
16
Ke^Oax
T(ap iv inroicnftdpff
iTp<rffvCi
constitutes
rj
is
literally in
The
known
CATEGORIES,
ii-iv
some
III.
predicate this
a subject, the
also hold good
of a man ; so
Therefore, of
*
animal
man.'
When you
We
'
'
'
When genera are co-ordinate and different, differentiae will differ in kind.* Take the genera, animal
and knowledge.
Footed,' two-footed,' winged,'
aquatic are among the differentiae of animal. But
none will be found to distinguish a particular species
of knowledge. No species of knowledge will differ
from another in being two-footed.'
Where the genera, however, are subordinate,
*
'
'
'
'
building
'
difference,
is
we then have
'
'
the
'
17
ARISTOTLE
cm hk ovaia yikv ctfSL.xvir<^ hm^ ofcr
avSpwiTOs, Innos' nocrov 8^ otov hinrp^, rplwifx^*
54
TTOiov be otov XevKov, ypa^^xarucov npof
otov SnrXaGLOv, rj^iav, /ictfof noO 8<r olbr Jr
AvKux), v ayopq.' trorrk hk otov c'x^^y, niovow
olbr
KeloOai otov ova^ctrcu, KdOrjrax' CYCCV
Trdaxciv.
8 a
ovp.iTAoKr)v
10
15
f//vS6s
vol. iv.
4.
'
CATEGORIES,
iv-v
white
and
length
and the like, of Quality
half,'
double,'
grammatical.' Terms such as
greater are held to denote a Relation.
In the
market-place,' in the Lyceum and similar phrases
mean Place, while Time is intended by phrases like
yesterday,' last year and so on.
Is lying
or
*
sitting
means Posture, is shod or is armed
means a State.
Cuts or bums,' again, indicates
Action, is cut or is burnt an Affection.
Not one of these terms in itself will involve any
positive statement.
Affirmations, as also denials, can
only arise when such terms are combined or united
together. Each positive or negative statement must
either be true or be false that, at least, is allowed
on all hands but an uncombined word or expression
(for instance,
man,' white,' runs or conquers *)
can neither be true nor be false.
V. Substance in the truest and strictest, the
primary sense of that term, is that which is neither
asserted of nor can be found in a subject.^ We take
But
as examples of this a particular man or a horse.
we do speak of secondary substances those within
which, being species, the primary or first are included,
and those within which, being genera, the species
themselves are contained. For instance, a particular
man we include in the species called man and the
species itself in its turn is included in the genus called
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
19
ARISTOTLE
Sevrepai ovv adrai Xiyovnu oMai, cJam S t
dvdpwTTOs Kal TO (cpoi^.
^avp6v Sc K Tlov flprjfitvutv art rwv Katt wiro20 KLiJLvov Acyo/xcVcov cwayKoZou Kal ro&fOftM
rov ^oyev Ka'n)yopiadat rov {moKni4vov, olo 6
avdpamos KaB v7roKifivov A/ycroi roB rtP^
dvdpwnov, Kal KaTrjyop^lral yt rowofia' r^ yip
avOpwTTov rov rivo^ dvSpamov Karffyopfi^attf. tnl
6 Xoyos 8c o rov avBpwmov Kara rod rti^ <Jr25 dpwTTov KarrjyoprjOi^airai' 6 yap ris dyOpwmof Kal
dvdpcoTTOs iari koI /[ax>F.
oxttc koI rowQfta Kol
6 Xoyos Kara rov tmoKifivov leanyyo/yiy^ i^a c r .
Tcuv 5* v \moKniVif} ovrwv inl iiiv rui
nXUTra}v ovr rovvopua oud* 6 Xoyog KanyyopU'
rat rov \moKipiVov in tylatv hi rowofia tip
80 ovhev
Ka)Xvi KarryyopilaBaL iror roB ^aoMfifievov, rov 8c Xoyov a&vvarov, otov r6 AiiMr3r ip
imoKipLva) ov rtp awpiari Karrjyopilrai roO ivo*
KCLfjicvov (XevKov yap atjfia Acycrcu), 6
X&yo9
6 rov XevKov oiSdnort fcarcL ajjfxarof Korriyop^'
md
dijacrai,.
Td
86
^Z
2 b
8*
oAAa rrdvra
rjroi
*
the name* here ri Xn^, and moi
substantive XfVKinjt ;
both of ttiem ttenlfied
whiteness.* So also we use * white * in Ei^^lUi at aa
the Greek
*
SO
CATEGORIES,
*
animal.* These, then, are secondary substances,
that is to say, man and animal otherwise, species and
genus.
From what we have said it is plain that the name
and definition of the predicates can both be affirmed
'
of the subject. For instance, we predicate man
of an individual man as the subject. The name of
the species called man is asserted of each individual ; you predicate man of a man. The definition or meaning of man will apply to a man, in
like manner, for a man is both man and an animal.
The name and definition of the species will thus both
apply to the subject.
When we come, on the contrary, to things which
are present or found in a subject, we find that their
names and definitions we cannot, at least in most
cases, affirm or predicate of that subject.
Indeed,
the definition itself will in no case whatever apply.
But in some cases nothing prevents us from using the
name of the subject. Suppose we take white as an
Now white is, no doubt, in a body and
instance.
thus is affirmed of a body, for a body, of course, is
*
called white.' The definition, however, of white
of the colour, that is, we call white
can never
be predicated of any such body whatever.**
Everything else but first substance is either
affirmed of first substance or present in such as its
This is evident from particular instances
subject.
taken by way of examples.
predicate animal
of Vman.*
So we predicate animal' also of any
particular man.
Were there no individuals existing of whom it could thus be affirmed, it could
'
'
'
'
'
'
We
adjective,
when
it
'
'
'
81:
ARISTOTLE
avdpoynov
ovKovv
to
TroAtv
oAcos'.
/cat
iv rivl
awfiarr
yap^rj
navra
6
ovaicov
tJtoi.
"5
KaO*
Iv
XptofUM,
vnoKifJLV(itv
awfiori'
iv xtA Ta>r
utort
Acyrro*
ra oAAa
rwy npunwv
fit)
ot^vkf
etvai.
rfjs
npamjs owrla^
^^T&i,
rOof
& 6)pctf WO
<
>
avdpamov, ro hk Koivorepov.
dnoSLSovs yvcDpLfiancpov
StSous
rq
Koi t6 tI
a'rroh<tKri
hMpp9
bl^^pow dbro*
<I>vt6v.
15
ovoiai Xeyovrai.
(hs
ra oAAa ndvra
e)(ov(jw,
ovrw Koi r6
cfSof npos
r^
yiptr
23
CATEGORIES,
'
'
2S
ARISTOTLE
MpOU
TpOV
LLOXXOV
OLKeioTcpov a7roha>ais
yap fid^Xov 6
rU
rj
tcara rov
#cai
axSpoynos
tw
Xwpom
Mpov o^ia
ovS^ fiaXXov'^cpov
oMt f^
iiTTtV'
OXXJUX
itrrhf'
o^ia ^ 6 rU
OPW
fioOf.
aXXojv ra
rcu* itiva
y6p
rffopovfUvtav,
ri(
9v)Xei
iori, r^
({p^y
teal
ware
ri
otMar tAt
tear*
diro^iSoik*
rp^x^i
rj
i)
t6
Y^i^os
iwoUovt
Mput"
yyu^p^uurtptm wovffotk
vpeurrjtf
fUp cISoc
ootc^ox anoS<oa<i
trov
r^r
5*
iXXmn^ 6 rt wf
diroScftoMrctff ,
olbif
yovrai,.
8 a
ovTco
ra
ctSi; /cai
imriKov
/ci^cVa> luai,
24
-n
tup
y^
npilnrj
pMa
^hd*
oiht
CATEGORIES,
we
it is
also a genus,
'
'
'
'
'
'
25
ARISTOTLE
8 s
^wov
Kad*
v7roKifj,vov
fiv
(jjaavTOJS
AcyfTou
TOW
Kol t6
na^
rWV
C7Tt
TO
iv V7TOKLpLV(i}.
Ovk
tSiov
hLa<f>opd
25
OVK
roiv
5^
firj
rovTO
avOpcjTTos.
rd iv
26
6noKi,fivu)
CATEGORIES,
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
See the
definition,
a 24.
2T
ARISTOTLE
'Tndpx^i rals ovauus
p5
teal
toTs Si a^opais ra
10
Mf
rcpojv
ovaicjv
(faivcrat fiv
ofwlutf T<p
ay$uwi
IS rrjs
TTpoo-qyoplas
JO
28
CATEGORIES,
Differentia
and substance
alike
have
this charac-
'
'
'
'
29
ARISTOTLE
^ ^^
^oM
h' troio*
Kox TO ykvos 'rTpl ovaCav to noiov oi
TLva ovalav crr)fialvi. iirl rrAcIoK & t^ yA^c
to) l!8 TOP a(f>opi,<TfJL6v noulrai' 6 vap (4'*'*'
ctTToIv cVt nXcZov 7rpiAa/x/3ai^i ^ o T^r Mpo^tnm.
'TTraipxci 8^ Tais ovalais fcai ro firfih^ adraJr
ivavTiov etvcu.
rfj yap irpayrf) ovaiff. rl eb^ cwy
ivavrCov, olov r<p rivl avBpwiroi ^ t<J Ttvt C^*^*
ovSt y r& atSpamt^
ouScv yap (mv ivavrlov.
otMC Tiiot^ 0
Tip t,(x)ip ovhiv ioTiV evavriov.
ri
Touro TTJs ovalas, oAAd Kol in* aXXofy noXXia^,
\yap
\;
'
4/
'Y^u
olov
0
7rl
BiTJijx^i
rj
rpiwi^x^i
oM
rik^
-^f
Ao'/ct
80
8c
9]
CATEGORIES,
and genus determine a quality in reference to substance. They tell you what sort of a substance. In the
case of the genus, however, such determining qualification will cover a much wider field than it does in the
case of the species. Say animal ; you comprehend
more than you would, if instead you said man.'
Substances never have contraries. How could first
substances have them this man, for example, that
animal ? Nothing is contrary to them. And species
and genus have none. This particular characteristic
belongs not to substance alone. For it holds of a good
many things and, among them, for instance, of quantity.
Two cubits long has no contrary ; neither
has three cubits long ; nor has ten nor yet anything like it, unless, indeed, someone should say
large
and small,' much and little are contraries.
Definite quantities, however, can certainly
*
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
was
or, if
warm,
a substance
is
is
called
more
or less
warm.
But
ARISTOTLE
Xeycrar ovbe yap avdpwnos fiaXXov vOv avBpumoi
7}
iarrlv
TO
10
16
20
cf? /cat
o auTOS"
c5i/,
ore
ftcv Acvico;
ori
fiJXof
25
ns
(oorauTcuff
Sc
dXrjdcjs Sofa^ot
/cat
cm r^
5ofiK* c/
y^
80
82
false at another.
CATEGORIES,
it is.
For a man is not more of a man than
he was at some time in the past. And so of all
substances else. Therefore, substance can have no
substance,
degrees.
that, although
ing, numerically
it
'
33
ARISTOTLE
K
(f>avXov.
KaaTov avTwv fierapoXrju SxofUve Tftr A^oy6 b Xoyo^ koI 17 Mfa awra
rUx)v hcKTiKov cariv.
vpm/*''
85 fJLV aKLVTjTa TTOivrrj TTavTios hiafUyi, rov
fiaros KLVovficvov ro vavriov rrfpl cuiVrd yu^fTO**
o /xev yap Aoyo? 8iafivt 6 avros to icaB^aBal
I b Ttva, Toi5 8c TTpdyfiaTog KiyrjOtvro^ 6r^ fU oA^^^^
TO
Kara rqv
iauTTJs
yc
ZScoi'
av
firafioXfiv
irj riff
t^
odola4
5cimiC^
**
ivavTLCJV ctvoi.
Tt9 ^oi ratrra irapa&^xoiro, r^ X6yo mu
8of av heKTiKa rwv ivavruav thfox, ovtc iatm
dX-qOcg rovTo.
6 yap Aoyoj fcai 1} 5ofa od T^
aina hex^oBai ri rwv v<iyTiwv cImu ScffTurd
Acycrat, dAAa rw npl Irtpov
r^ w^B^f ytyt*
vrjadat.
tw yap ro npdyfui ttyat ^ /r^ tmu
rovro) Kal 6 Xoyos dXrfOri^ rj tf^vS^ clwu Xfvrrai,
ov rw avros SetcriKog ctoi ra>v Ivavruav, anXuH
yap ov^ev vn oiihevo^ ovr 6 Xoyos tciyura^ ovrt
Tj
8o^a, coore ovk ov etrj Scicrura rw iviurr{w
firjhcvos v avrols ywofitvov irdBous*
rj
hi y
ovala rat avrq rd evavrla hix^oBai, rovrtft Scirruo)
rcjv ivavrlcjv ttyai Acycrcu* voaov yap teal vyUttOP
Sc^fcrat, Koi XevKorTp-a koI p^Xai'lav koa Kaaro
r}v rotovrwv avrq SXop.V7j ru> va>rriijjv f&<at
SeKriKT) AcycTot.
coorc Siov ov ovaiag c2n mo
ravrov Koi ev dpidpup 6v hticriKov cimi noir ii
El 8^'
B 'n7i/
10
15
rioav
80
SI
*^
CATEGORIES,
v-vi
- For
the statement
he
but according to existing conAs with
ditions we call it now true and now false.
statements, so, too, with opinions. In its manner,
then, of coming about it is really peculiar to substance
to admit of the contrary qualities to wit, by a change
'
is
unchanged
in itself.
35
ARISTOTLE
oiitU
ra lt^6pttQi
avTOVy olov ra 7TVT ct corn rofv h4Ka fi6ptO,
TTpos ov^eva KOivov opov awdirrti ra nSrn Ktu
ra TTeWe, oAAa Stcupiorcu* Koi ra rpla yf tcai Ttt
eWd TTpos ovSeva Kotvou opov awdnrti' ovit*
oXojg av exois in* dptdfioO kowov opo Xafiuv tttfr
fxopLwv, oAA* dec Suopiorai* oKrrc o fiiv <yi||ii^f
TcDi' hLO)piapivu)v arw.
waavrot^ hk ccU ^ Jwyor
rcuv hiojpiGficvajv orw.
on fikv ydp irooi^ Artw
d Adyos", <f>avp6v' KarafXrpirai yap auXXafifj
TOTToj.
ioTL
80
6 a
TcDt'
KOivos
/xcv
opos,
ov
TTpog
fjLOpua
Gwairrti
ra ydp roO
^v^
'nuj>avias ypafijinv
**
These divisions are Dot oo-extensive. IJne, plane
solid and space are all called continuous auantities t
too, consist of such parts as have interrelated
Time
36
is
a continuous quantity
*
;
its
parts have,
and
all,
CATEGORIES,
vi
discrete or continuous.
Some quantities, moreover,
consist of such parts as have relative positions in refer-
are continuous
solid, to
And, indeed,
seven.
never
will find
'
'
37
ARISTOTLE
"En
rwv
he ra p,v k
TTOv,
y^
^ M^
38
CATEGORIES,
vi
39
'
ARISTOTLE
Koi 6 Aoyo9 Sc caGavTOJ^' ovShf yap vnoyJitt rum
85 fJLopicjv
rwv
ixovroiv
ra
fir^Sev vtto/acVci.
fiopuov
*fot
cirj
rwv
O^ai^
ow
yutv
aw(rrr)tc,
fAoplotv
iK Biaw
to hi
i(
c4it
t^oJ^^i' Biaw.
Bbrd
^
'
I(vc5
^^'^
ris
iToar)
r)
<m,
TTpa^is
av
T)
rt,
olttoSlSovs rfj
Aeyerat ra
avroy oAA*
rw
"Ert
yap
**
opitX'
wr^
rd>v
ipr)p,va,
ct
dpa, Kq^aGvp^p7)K6s
TToatp
oi55cV
d(t>wpiapJvu>v
>
iy^
ariv ivavriov,
ctvai
i'avTiov
ttotT
*
nl
rf
T/nm^x^i
rj
tj
tr
/i**
iorw
rj}
Tts
16 <pat7j
ydi/>
i7T(.<f>dveia if,
ai^ etvai.
10
Tri<l>avfUf.
XP^^ ^p^^t
Kal r6 Xtvtei^
An-
hmp
iXtytfi
CATEGORIES,
vi
good of speech, for the parts have no lasting existence. Pronounce them, and then they are gone,
so that, since they pass out of existence, they cannot
have place or position. Of quantities, then, to sum
up, some consist of parts having position and others
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
ARISTOTLE
aXXa
"\
A
9
rw
20
Trpo?
mpov
of fuyaXrj
Acycrat, K^y^pos
jJiiKpov
r<p
/lo
rfiv ftiv
6fioyva)v.
etye
25
Kad*
TO
Ti.
p.v SiTny;^
\,
^"
M^T^ ^
flUCpOlf
y^
85
yap
TTpos
fiev
avro Toirro
{jLLKpov
6 a
wore
a/xa
8oKi a/xa
ovcrias'
aXX
42
/x.cya.
oMp
rd cvavria inth^x^aOat.
TO.
oAA*
ivavrla ^7ri8cxcc7^oi, otov Inl r^f
ScKriKTi
p.kv
rwv
jjccu
fvavriotv
vyiolvti,
3occi
ttvoi,
oAA* ouS^
CATEGORIES,
Thus a
vi
called small, a
greater or smaller
than similar things of the kind, for we look to some
external standard. If such terms were used absolutely, we never should call a hill small, as we never
should call a grain large. So, again, we may very
well say that a village has many inhabitants, a city
like Athens but few, though the latter are many times
more ; or we say that a house contains many, while
those in the theatre are few, though they greatly
outnumber the others. While two cubits,' three
cubits long and the like, therefore, signify quantity,
great,' small and the like signify not a quantity
but rather a relation, implying some external standard
by comparison
grain large
only.
but we really
hill is
mean
'
'
'
'
'
'
4S
ARISTOTLE
oAA' ovSi i^5r
S^Xom
avrd
8'
teaX
ydp
auro ^rrw
tl
dfia ficya
tcDv TTpdj Tt
ravrd
t^
dXLy<^,
rij cpci
MoAtora Sc
17
r^
15
hoKl
imdp\iv.
tZrai.
ioucaai
fol
tw
rwv dXXcjv ivcarrlajv opiafiov and rovrutv hri<t>piv' rd ydp nXciarov d^ijXutv Stcon^fcora run
iv rep avrip ycVct ivavrla opl^otmu.
ao
"^
Ou
fidXXov BlTrq^.
ovS* irri rov dpiBfi4f&^
rd rpla rwv nivrt ovScv /aoAAov rd rpim,
ovSe rd Trevre rwv rpuov.
ov8i XP^*'^ ^*po9
iripov paXXov xpovos tlvai Xiytrai.
M.
otov
oW
44
CATEGORIES,
vi
and healthy, a thing black and white simultaneously. Neither can anything else be at any time
thus qualified. Then, if great,' small and so forth
were contrary, these to themselves would be contrary.
Granted for argument's sake both that great is the
contrary of small and that one and the same thing
can be at the same moment both great and small,
great or small ' to itself will be contrary. This
nothing to itself can be conis, however, impossible
Therefore, we cannot describe great and
trary.
sick
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
much
and
could such terms have
'
small,'
one should
call
'
'
little
as contraries.
Neither
quantity.
In dealing with space, the contention that quantity
admits of a contrary seems to have most plausibihty.
Above and below are called contraries, when by
below what is meant is the region or space at the
'
'
'
'
'
less.
'
this
45
ARISTOTLE
25 rai'
Lf}r)fjLvcjv
-^JTrov
Xlyirai.
TO fldXXoV
/cat
TO -^TTOV.
80
irdw
toT)
6 b
46
CATEGORIES,
vi-vii
'
We
'
'
'
'
We
'
'
'
We
'
'
'
'
'
'
4.7
ARISTOTLE
mpov
yb fuyd
np69
Acycrat 7rp6s
Acycrat to opos' koI to opxytov rtvl opuotov A^ytnUg
npo^
10 /cat TO, oAAa 8c rd roiairra waavrut^
Acycrat. crt Se kcu 17 omxAtai; 'co* ij (rrclaif ira2
hi $019 rwv npo^ rt.
Kadehpa OeacLS rwis,
tJ
TO dvaK^laOcu ^ caravoi ^ KoBrjoBai avra fihf
OVK clal 6aLs, TrapcjvvpLws hi ano rwv ifiti^Uvui
diawv Xeyerai.
15
'Yrrapxci' hi koI ivavriorr)^ iv roiy vp^ rt, olav
/xcya
"f}
Kal
7Tt,Gn^p.7j
ovhevL.
so
laov koI
avrwv
ovhev.
l^
pf^'
riai^a 8c Ta npos
trpd^ dvrurrp^vra Acycroi,
6 hovXog hecmorov hovXo^ A/ycrcu Koi 6
otov
ScoTTOTTys'
8oi;Aoi;
'qp,laos hiirXdaiov
48
8c<77rorT;5,
#fat
rd
SttrAooior
CATEGORIES,
vii
'
like
'
'
like
'
or
similar
'
to
something
It is
else.
is a relative.
these are not them-
To
lie
sit,
their
names
however,
are,
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
49
ARISTOTLE
Kai TO /ztJov cAarrovoy
^el^ovos
oAAcuv,
86
eXarrov.
rr
Xi^iv,
olov
(rrqixrj
kcu to iTnamjrov
7]
ataOrjais
1}
8^
cjcravrati
rwcc L
T^
77X171^
inLcrrqfn)
aloOr^rov
Aorrpr
T&r
Kard n^
Koi t6
fictfoi'
Aft
fol
cViore Siourci
itrianjTov Xiyrai
e-TTiorry/jijy
aloBrjai^
cirt-
entaTTjrotf, koa
kcu
to alaBfjrdi^
alodrio(. aladr^Tov.
OLKCLcos
firj
TTpos
XiyerojL
dnobodfj, dAAa
ro nrtpov
opvido^, ovK
opvij
dvriaTp<f>i
&
i^ aaroSoSfj
-rmpoO.
oi5
ydp
yap
ij
opvis, ravrj) to
TrrepcjTov iari'
iariVf
oAAcui'
^cat
impd
dnx)^o0j
*^vLor he
idv
fiTj
hodcLT), otov
10
KCLjicvov
tJ
dvofia
TO TTT^Sa^K.
17
dndhoais
etrf,
el
ovrm vca^
15
arpe<f>ei
50
yap
ir^Sci*
CATEGORIES,
vii
we mean
is
by
less,
less
'
We
'
'
51
ARISTOTLE
Xiorrov
cVt
TTrjhaXCa)
oAAoiv,
Tcov
yap
Xd^oL
/cat
oU
Tot?
firj
cd
yap r&
aiVd dvTiaTp<f>ovui
IttI
Ti^cii]
{^JMIT
dwo
#coi
tq <W-
OM^ roO
irfMUprnuvutv
rutv
TO TTTcpwrov
TTTcpov
ano&iSofUyfi'
TT/^os
a)G^p
fiara,
t,u>ov
ttal
ohcuyr4po9
K<f>aXri
rf
fojoi/,
fj
otov
K<f>aXayrov
amohoOeiri
uHravrat^
TnrjhaXiarrov.
nrfiaXiav wi
ro<?
Tn^SoAtCOTOl'.
^^
Tt,
TTpos
ofioj^yovfievai^
y
npof avro S
fitj
Xiyw hk cm oM^
dyriarp<f>ovra
rukf
Xeyofi^vtM^,
80
ScCTTTOTOU
dTToSodfj
dXX*
dvOpcJTTOV
TJ
r)
aipovficvwy
;^-)'^|
Tt 8* cor
dTToSoais <mv.
aTToSeSojU-cVov
tJ
twv
tt^oj
oXXcjjv
AcycTcu,
o<ra
fici'
fnii
^
yOp
StiroSo?
tcai
i^
Ol5
rt ouccuof
ircuToi*'
irc^-
avfiPfPrjKora
7<m,
85 ot/cta>9,
dXXwv
diravTOiv
oaa
au/i/St/SryKOTa
cori
rci
fitIt
52
CATEGORIES,
vii
'
We
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
53
ARISTOTLE
TO SiTToSt ctvai Koi TO iirumjfirjt o
aiTOTT), otov
adn
7 b
p-qdrjaerar 6
Xdycrat,,
Trepiaipovfiivwv fiv
XeiTTOfidvov
Be
rdv
rov npo^ o
dwoScSoo^ai
fxovov
aXXat,
MttTft*
ov
<tirco<wi|,
y^
hoCXof
cfi'Oi*
od y^.
16
/cav
ytVcTcu*
/xcv
tcDj'
so
KtifLVO,
ptfhla
i}
TrXeiarojv
eon
dXrjOes
iorw,
dfui
yap
ovofia
/ii^
7rl
,^
/>iv
aTrdSoorts'
54
CATEGORIES,
vii
two-footed/
levant attributes, such as his being
'receptive of knowledge or 'human,' and leave but
slave will be still the
his being ' a master,' then
correlative, slave meaning slave of a master.
On the other hand, let us suppose one correlative
'
'
'
'
'
named
Then,
incorrectly.
if
we
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
55
ARISTOTLE
TO yap 7n(mjr6v irpartpov op SofcM r^
vpoihrw^ yap hrl ro
'niarrnir)s ^Ivai.
etvai'
25
mM
apxovrwv
Tis av
"Ert,
oXlycjv yap av
in
Pavop,V'
irpaypLdrijjv
ratv
TO
fiv 7nar7iT6v
7TL(JT'qp,rjv ,
8c
Tj
avq^Oiv
eTTiarrjfiTj
tW
ovStv^
cV*
tf
ytvofUnp^
r^
avyaafaipi
ovv
to iirurrtfTW OQ
(ovhevos
RO crrrip.7)
he
ovoTjs ov8V
fir)
auTo?
p,V
iiTLcrn^pLrj
hk
7narrjr6v
<rrw.
ct*
C^v
<Ir
8*
htumfrOm
^i t^
ouT^i^cor
rwv
rd
Xt.
So/cel
elvai.
ro
p,v
ou owai^atpct.
at
ydp
yap
tj
alcS^/gtnf^
rrj/s
aloBrjTOtf
OfVipfMv
awfiaros 8c
ei5oT
koX
<i*<u-
/X17
oio-oy dt'at/Htrat
OT;yai/aipct
to
aladrjrov
#cat
rriv
1}
oiotfi^aif,
aloBfiaw,
1)
ToAAa
5Q
TTciiTa
ooa
cort*' aiaBrjrd,
CATEGORIES,
vii
57
ARISTOTLE
a/xa
yap
rco
l^uto)
rov l^wov
aia0rfaw c&oi*
rj
TTvp
10
^w
KaSdirtp Sokci,
rovro ii'hix*^^^
16
TTpos Ti AfycTai,
80
iwl fuv y^
iariv aCrt yip tA
oAa ovT ra p-^prj npos
ArycTOi.
6 ydp rtf
dvdpwTTos ov Acy^Tcu Tivoy Tiy opBpanros, ovS^ 6
Tts j8ou9 TWOS Tt9 /3ou9. cooavTcoy 5^ Koi TO /i/jpl}*
yap TLS xclp ov ArycTttt riv6^ Tiy )ftp oAAci
77
Kara
rii^a?
rj
aXrjd4^
'''^
'J
Toiv
A/yrroi
Kff>aXrj oJ
tu^
coaourcu^ S^
iroi
Ta>' 7rXurru}V,
Tiy
^4
otow
25
K(l>aXr)
TLVOS
XeyeraL
XcycTox
;^tp
Kal
ravra ra>v
80 t/carcDs
58
rf
<l>avp6v ort
rwv
-rrpos
Tcoj'
K<f>aXri
Kacrrov
Tt Sofetev
rtov
av
1}
x^^P np69
roiovrtjv, uxrrt
kcu
1}
tvax.
Ci /iv
o^
Ta
CATEGORIES,
vii
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
59
ARISTOTLE
'rrdw xo^^<^'
cl
54 |l4
ofj to <&
TwMv
"''^
ovSefila
7ra>y
^X**^"*
ov
toiJt<Jv
^1171'
to aura dntp
yrf^n
rwv
T19 toSc
clj'Ot
ori idv
t4
ttif^
wpot S Xfyrrtu
^Oi^pOV fUv o6
yap ofS^
OTt h TO
8 b Tt,
iarw
WpLGfldviOS U7Tai.
iarlv.
Mput
itrrht
XiyeoBai.
wpiGfievcjs
fv^^
trpos avrd.
85
Sri
ffol
If
OlM^
Ty Wp^
npos ri
TTCJS
e^** cmtctou.
d<f>oipiap,ivix)s
ori
art,
TrAaortdv
ioTiv vSvs
p,r)hv6s
rwv
tnl
icot
oloi'
StnAootov, koX
d<f>wpi<7fivwv otS^v
avro
10
5m
orov
Qjf>wpuTpLvws
BiirXiiatov,
(uaaimuf 34
$ca0^
Ci olSi
KGiAAtoi'
rwv
toSc T4
ireu
orov
dvayKOMV
c-
60
CATEGORIES,
vii
The former
definition
apphes to
all relatives
relative."
said this
is
plain
if
a relative
definitely
will
may
Provided, that
is,
that
'
'
61
ARISTOTLE
TOiovro yiveraL, ovk
yap
'7ri<m^firj' ot)
ns
npo^ o
KaKiyo
a(j>wpi.a^iiva)s
Krt atepipwf
yap ovrwf
wart ^av*pO
rCtv npof
a^otpt'
Atyrroi
<7/xeVa>9 ciScVai.
'^
^ieeurni9
Ti7r he y K<f>aXriv Kal rfiv X^^P^
a elaiv ovaiai, avro fikv Offtp iartt^
rojv roLouTCJv,
wpLCTfievco^
(mv
avayKalov.
ciScVai, irpo^ o hk
tIvos
yap
avrrj
rf
Xlytnu, owe
kc^oAi^
rj
Wm>$
iJ
20;^tp,
11]
npos
Tt,
dXrjOcs
ajv
117
5^ x*^*"^*'
to /xcWoi
caKCfifjievov
airrcjv
25
elvai XeyoiTai.
BLcideais
'Sirj7ropr)Kvai i^*
8c
17
rwv
iroioTrj^
Buu^pi 5c
Xeycadwaav.
TToAu
Xeyw koB*
he
cm
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TnGrrip,rj
Sofcct
Kai
cft^ai
Toiavrai 8e at re iTncrrfjfxai
yap
^^P "JW
woXXdxi^
iroiol
rail'
/ecu
^19 5ca^^9f<tff
tAOVifJLwrtpo^,
at QiKrat'
85
TWV
62
SiKaLocnjvT] Kal
TOLOVTCDV,
OVK
tj
rt
aoxf>poav%rq koI
eVKlVTJTOV
SoKL
Xafiji,
vno poaov
rj
idv 7Tp
fjLTj
ramf
7rAc2piX(of
SucrxrivT^TOii^,
olov
iw
iicdarov
Xeyofjidvcjv.
80
fitf
VIII. UoLorriTa
Toi
oMa
tacos
tf
dpnj,
(Kaarov
ttvOl
oW*
CATEGORIES,
vii-viii
useless.
'
mean
what we
call
habits
'
Comprised among
all
kinds of
ARISTOTLE
huxdiatis
cvfierdPoXov.
S< X^yovrax
a iarw ^
'
9a
dvdpcDTToSt
raxy hk
yv6fivo9
Kal
/xcra/^oAAci Ik dtpfiov
K rod
\ryiaiyi
mU to
rjv
voatu^,
nf
Kfd
rovTCJV nryxdiPoi
7rc<l)vaLwp,inr)
^fvxp^
dv Tiy taoi? ^w
rj&rj
hip,
^avtp^
ion iroAw-
irpoaayopvoi.
ci
ou
10
ndw
p,r)
<^a(7tv i^iv
TTjv 7Tt,(m^p,rjv
rj
$19 SiadeGccDS
rw
e^cLs
Sia/cetvrat
rard
war biOi^pfi
t^
CMn
M
W
oiiic
cf dvay/c7^9
ou TravTcos
cfetj* ot
/cat
cftv ^xovaiv,
Acycrat.
rojv
20
x^^P^^ ^ PXriov.
AfW
truti
16
XW Kairoi hidKurrai yi
ocra
roiovTCjjv
XIV <I>VGIK7IV
64
ttoiov
Tf
Acycrat,
dBwaflCof TOU
oAAd
r<p
hvvafuv
TTOliJGal Tt plfBujOf
CATEGORIES,
viii
'
c2
65
ARISTOTLE
*
rj
fjL-qSev
20 8tafft(T^at
<f>vaLKr)v
TTCu?
Tov
TToirjaai Ti
ex^t-v <l>vGiKr)v
25
TVXOVTOiV
p<fSuos,
tov
tov
firfikv
voow^a
fxr^Shf
6\kolui^
^w
rwv rvxovrwv
o^ itp
hpofiucol
rj
va/rxW ini
TOVTOi%
OTc he
Kol nddr].
80
TTlKpOTTjS
Ta ToiaS*
ofbi'
yXvKVTTjs T koI
Ttt
TOI/rOif
elm, <f>avp6v'
/car*
85
auraj,
to,
ofoi'
on
pAv
yap SfSfy/xo^
to
/xcAi T<p
yXvKvrjfra
h^xl^
Tots Kol
6
TTOLOTTjTes
Tj
deppoTTjs Kai
AcyoKTat
ov
rj
Tip
ilwxporrfs
66
traBTjTucai
aurd Ta hhypuha
CATEGORIES,
viii
So
it is
qualities that
given that
ARISTOTLE
**
war koI
T<Sv roiovTCJV
nadtov 7T7rovdv K
Tt
4 T19
wxP^\^^
yap vvv iv
n^
ttcaar^
rwwv
y^
^uaucdtv
iarw
avuirrw
aiMr*
raw irtpi
fyi
yivoir dv,
1}
IJU)VLfjLwv
rrjv
Xiyovrai.
<hxp6r7)s
(iToiol
i5
<l>vai
ylyvcadai.
fidrcDV
^7-''
war
citc
fj
yap
ev rfj
fJiaKpdv
wxpor7)s
rj
p.Xavia, Kal
firj
pq&ia>s anoKaOiaravrtu
ri
"Oaa
Sc
ciTro
ov*
68
CATEGORIES,
viii
them.
We
when
69
ARISTOTLE
^
oAAa
<foPrj$rjvai
wypiag,
ITO^ fMV
oJoTC
Ttt
y^
drp-LKal
eKaraoLs xal
dpyrj
-q
ttoioi
he
raxu
OLTTO
#(04
/iovuco/.
^vaiKol, iAA'
fti^
yyi%r/pmu Swottir-
ri
fcat
TotafJra*
rt fiavur^
hvoKWtfTwv
^(ro
nd^
yiytrok,
^
I
'^
o}v^
Tot?
Kal ica/xTTvAonyy,
ev6vrr]
ofjLOLov
'i'
16
rw
roiovro} ndBti
n,
ware Trddr] fiv Xdyerai rd rouivra, noidrrjrts 5' ov,
Teraprov he yevos TTOLorTp-os oryrjua t tcai i}
TTcpt eKaarov imdp\ovaa puop^, eriot trpof rowopyiXcorepos
eariv.
Xeyerai'
roi*
oAAci
fiaXXov
#cat
ft
ti
fJiop<f)'qv
evBv
t)
KafinvXov,
mu
70
TotrroAf
Kara rm'
neirovOiyai
TAB.
iroA
to
CATEGORIES,
viii
call a
'
qualities.
Of
and the
'
'
71
ARISTOTLE
ar^yuai^tp,
louu hk
oAAorpta
Wio
fjLopLa
crvvcyyvs
eardvai dn*
oAA^Aoiy, fuxpov Sf
etvai
oAATjAoii'*
TTCos
25
t<Ji
T<ji
t<J*
^'
Sc-
v$Uis
to fU^^vwtp*
TTOLOTTjros,
oi^Tot
tmv.
IlotoTTTTcy
Ttt
80
icaTtt
aAAa>9
/xfi'
o^
ciati'
cu ilprjp^^vai,
iroicl
^ oircuao<
Tcuf nXiurra^
aTT*
Kol ax^^ov
avToii'.
ctti
/av
o^i'
iirl
ol SiaKclfjLevoi. Xeyovrai.
KCLfievov
TTOiov
7a
toutwv
ov Acycrat trapwvvpxos to
Xeyofievov, olov
irapcjvvLUi>9
dno
rrjs
airr^
6 airov
^caT*
dprij^
CATEGORIES,
viii
first
from that
73
ARISTOTLE
yap dperriv X^^^ (mov^aio^ Acycroi, oAA
ov 7rapcjvvfiw9 oltto rij^ dpTfj^, oi5#c circ noAAair
8c TO TOLOVTOV ioTlV.
Salos' to)
10
riotd
lprjiJLvcov
an
avTCJV.
'YTrapxcL 8c /coi ivavriorris Kara t6 notav, alov
SiKaioavvrj dSiKUf, ivainrlov Kol AcuKonyj licAon^
15
Acyo/xcva,
tcai
T<ft
rCiv
25
jjf^^
80
oAAd rd
TrXcLcrra.
AcycTat
fiaiXXov
74
CATEGORIES,
*
We
quality, virtue.
term,
viii
'
contraries.
75
ARISTOTLE
crvvrjv
fiv
yap
hiKaiocrvmrj^
ot)
ndw
^<iai
Stftr
4^
Kor
so
avTTiv.
Ov
76
TTavrcjv
4v^
rwv
CATEGORIES,
viii
they contend, are not subject to such variabut people in varying degrees are possessed of
The same with gramhealth, justice and so on.
matical knowledge and all dispositions soever. And
certainly none can deny that the things that are
marked by such quahties have them in more or less
measure. This man will know more about granmiar,
be healthier or juster than that.
selves,
tions,
triangular,*
Terms that express a thing's figure
rectangular and so on can hardly admit of degrees.
For the objects to which the definition applies of
triangle or circle are equally triangular or circular.
Others, to which the definition of neither of these
things applies, cannot differ themselves in degree.
For the square is no more of a circle than is let us
say the rectangle. To neither of these the definition
we give of a circle applies. So, unless, in a word,
the definition of the thing or the term thus in question
is appropriate to both of the objects, they cannot at
all be compared. Not all qualities, then, have degrees.
The aforementioned characteristics are no way
peculiar to quality. What is peculiar is this, that we
predicate like and unUke with a reference to
For one thing is like to another in
quality only.
respect of some quaUty only. So this is distinctive of
'
'
'
'
quaUty.
It must not cause us trouble, however, if someone
objects to our statements that, quality being our
theme, we include in that category also a good
many relative terms. For both habits and disNow,
positions we admitted to be relative terms.
at least in
most
cases, it
ARISTOTLE
TcSv 8c KaB* Kacrra ovhtv.
fUv yap
ij
num^fi,rj,
avro
TLKrj
17
y/>a/i^rur^
rwog
fiovaitcrj
t)
7nrrjfirj
X^ytrai, ov
rwof
ftav'
aiK-q.
*QoT
at
KaS*
Katrra o^k
rojv
tltrl
np6^ n.
/cat
etT^orav,
cu
ert
Tt.
ct
rcji
^x*^
war a^cu om
7TiarT)fux>v rivd,
ica^'
o^at
tKaara, KaB* as
8^ ou#f
Tci>r
Cicri
TToiov ov,
11 b
;^/^
y^
Bpp,alviv
rw
ilnjx^tv
CTTtSc^erat
ivavriorrfra.
'fjrrov OcpfiaCveiv
rw
Xv7TLaBai,
wart
Kal ro fiaXXov 8^
koI
irriS^x^''^^
o^ ri
8c
78
Kol
V7Tp
ct^i/rot
rt,
on
CATEGORIES,
doubtless,
are
relative
viii-ix
not so the
individuals.
Of
'
these categories so
or position
we spoke
of,
ARISTOTLE
11 b
TrapwinjfUi}^
W t<j^
^X^tv,
aXXo
to x<iv /i^
<rqp,alvi, TO inroSebecrBai, to amXiadai, to S^ iroO
oloi' 1^ AvKcCw, Kol ra oAAa S^ oaa i/]r<p ovtom^
8ta TO
Acyerat
7rpo<l>avri
-^
ouScv
cft^at
oaa V apxfj
virip
avrCtv
ipfUBr), on,
ippddrj.
15
X.
Ta
X^nu
l^^
JO
]^i//r
5tf
rrtpom
rvnia
dyrltctirtu
l'ntlv
'qfiiai,
teaaro
rw
ifi
80
Tt
icat
17
irrianjfjLTj
duTtVctTai,
icai
^-
commonly regarded by
CATEGORIES,
ix-x
We
relation.
'
We
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
negatives.
Opposites, when relatives also, our custom it is
to explain by referring the one to the other and
using the genitive case or some other grammatical
Thus double,' a relative term, is
construction.
explained as the double of something. And knowledge, a relative term, is opposed to the thing that is
known and explained by a reference to it. The
thing that is known is explained by a reference to
for the thing that is
its opposite, to knowledge
known will be known by a something more preAll opposites, then, are
cisely, by knowledge.
*
81
ARISTOTLE
npos
Ti, atVra
St/ttotc
Td
icrrlv
ovSafjuos
fjLcvroi
aXXrjXcov
KaKov Acyerat
rrpos
oAArjAa
ArycTOi,
Acyeraf
oin-c ydf>
dya^di',
dAA*
dmi
ivovrta,
to aya^o*' rod
ovrt to
ivavrtov,
Aeu/cot'
ht,axf>povaiv
12 a
10
V \*
16
TrdvTa tJtol
ye
82
Tt
CATEGORIES,
83
ARISTOTLE
TO ^(uov KQx ro wxpov koI oaa d[XAa
rod hk <f>avXov koI airovoaiov to oirri
fidXavos
20
)^pwfjLaTa,
M*
ovT GTTovSaZov.
<t>av\ov
fiara
TO
rols
/cctrat
dm
ttTToSowtu,
iiiaov
5'
t^
iicaripov
T3f
CLKpajv ano<l>dGL
25
Otrr
dSlKOV.
1n-pr]GL he
Tt,
olov
17
oipis
KadoXov ht
Kol
-q
radi^
lniP, iv 4*
iartpijeSak
5crrucciiK^
ccm
cf
rdv
rrj^
so oTiiv
hf 4
ariprjGLS Sc
coTiv
rf
0^49,
ariprjais
yap
Tv^X^
ovSk
TO
ris
rwftXdrrj^ iartv,
rj
84
tvai
iorw.
o^
rv^Xonf^
to hk
en
rv^X^
^
CATEGORIES,
'
'
'
tives
'
and
privatives.*
'
Sight
'
for instance, a
is,
positive,'
'
'
85
ARISTOTLE
12 X
40
rv(t>X6r7)s
12
rw rw^kov
ravTOV
Kara
dfJL(t>6Tpa
rod
tlvat.,
tcartiYoptiro
oAAa
avrou'
rv^k^f
mM
fi^
6 dvdpUJTTOS.
*
TO
10
vno
kqI
dvTLKeLGdaL dXXrjXois
ws Kard^aais
ws ydp
avTos.
ovTO) Kol TO
v<f>*
Kadrjadai rep
fj.rj
"Oti 8c
rd
rj
koX dir6^atng'
r^
dtrridtata^f 6
KaTo^aaif irpoi rrpf aWolov ro KaBrjrai rtp oi) KoBifrtu,
Kdrpov wpdyfia dvTlKirtu, to
ttotc
<l>aaLv ovrt/ccirat,
16
dno^amy
rriv
iJ
Kadijadai.
Grpr)ais koI
ij
cf ly
ot5#c
cu^ucciTOA
ws
10 6iljajs,
Tt, <f>avp6v
oAAct
arepTjais
/xcv
otlf<jjs
rv^XSrrji
17
cTi Ttt
KOX
86
r)
rv<f>X6Trjs
vnp ^v
rwv npos
ti,
dyrdarpt^a^
CATEGORIES,
'
'
We
and
sight.
What
'
'
'
Positives
'
'
'
We
call
87
ARISTOTLE
12 b
oAA*
ov yap Acycrat
"Ort 8^
oi58'
oipis
1}
ci?
TO ivavria eU^wfciTtu tA
irard
tcov&c &^Aoy.
rw9
yap ivavTLwv, wv
fiv
iv
oj'ayKalov,
80
yap ovScv
'^v
am
#f
dya fUaow^
iariv
firfSiv
yivtoBai
irtifnjKt
a>
ddrcpov avrwv
rjyopcLTai,
ivrurrp^^i
oiJif
rw^Xomjros o^f
cut'
rar*
^vai)MiraSbr
<m
ovScTTore
ri
pJXav
n ovd fiJo^i^
navrl
dvaytcr)
yap \vk6v
Jrv bt
avdytcrj
vdv
ftvai
t6 htKTucdt^g
ri ovSfv Ka}Xvi
Ti
dvd
tJv
tw
otov
40
xmdpxw
fieaov, cjv
firj
heKTLKcpf t
r<p
XevKTJ.
TTvpl
inl
TO
18 a fjLcXaivav.
/i*^
8^ Tot^ro^f
yap evSc^cTcu to
coore
tovtuw
4f^
oU
teal
^v<Ti
cfvoi
depfjup
ddrepov imdpx^w,
lh% bi teal
r6
#co4
^
rrj
d^a>pu7/xva>;
wnifiXf^B
;(m^ ri
dvayKoZov
irvp tfaxpov
Traarri /icv
hai ovS^
ovk
rffv
x*^i
dpdytcr) rp 8irrue^
CATEGORIES,
blindness and
however, not
sight
so.
blindness.
That positives and privatives,' moreover, are
not in the same sense opposed as are contraries one
to the other seems perfectly clear from the following.
When contraries have no intermediate, we saw that
the one or the other must ever be present in the
subject in which they are naturally found or of
which they will serve as the predicates. Where
this necessity obtained, then the terms could have
no intermediates. Health and disease, odd and
But
even, were mentioned above as examples.
where contraries have an intermediate, no such
It was not every subject that
necessity obtains.
may be receptive of black and of white that must,
therefore, he black or he white.
And the same,
That is, something
too, with coldness and heat.
*
'
may be
89
ARISTOTLE
7T(f)VK6s
OxfjLV
eXfl-V
&l^
/)fC'
10
ovhirtpov
c5crr
ovk av
lrj
TTore
15
20
^^
"FiTi,
Kal
^Vl
\
TO
iirl
XcvKov
fidXav
yevioBai
koX
to
ifn/XP^
ic
^av-
K^
90
ovSi B.
CATEGORIES,
in cases like this
it is
definitely
either
is
of necessity
present.
'
'
91
ARISTOTLE
13 a
fJLLKpOV
t^ ^it>s
aca>9
7rt
p,ev6g Tis
7^<IAt^'
ort icar*
lSb<^avpo^
dvTtVciTat*
CTTi
oi)8cva rail'
iprjpL4vtai^
rp6mt
avaytciuoi^ dfl
ovr*
ivavTLwv drayKcuov del dartpov
dX-qdes etvai ddrepov 8^ 0ct>8o;, otrrc ^rri tcui' ir/)^
otatf ij
Tt, oirrc C77"t T^9 ^(jjs Kol TTJs <rrprjaa>s
uyteta /cat 17 voaos vavrla, kqX oihirtpdv yc olht
aXrjOcs ovT t[/vS6s icmv.
waavrtas
#fai r6
8t7rAdortoi' /cat to :7/xtov cis Td tt/h)? ti dt^ucciTOi, ici2
ou/c coTtv ai)Ta>v ovSercpov out dXr]dS otrrc ilfvSos,
ovbi y rd Kara ordprjoiv Koi i^iv, olov tj 0^15 Koi
oXws 8 rcov Kara firfSefuay (rvfinXo'
17 tv<I)X6t7)s*
KTjv Xeyofievcav ovSev ovt dXrjdes out t/KV^os rr%w
rrdvra he rd ci/n^/xcVa dvV avfiTrXotc^ A/ycTOi.
Ov firjv aXXd /xdAioTa dv 8d^ctc ro roioxrro avfi,^
TO
/xcv
yd/)
dvc/SAc^cj', oirrc
cTTt
Tcuv
10
truth
92
and
falsity.
CATEGORIES,
'
in
'
'
'
'
'
93
ARISTOTLE
TO yap
fiva)V'
16
r&v Kara
palvLV inl
vytalytaf
'Lcatcparqr
ry
woatip
cni TovrtMHf
Odrtpoy
Si
firf
TtCUKparovS'
*Emi be
so
oXcjs
rijs
o^^rpov
aXrjB^^,
otrro^
iitj
rt
XW YtWKpdrr^v
Kirai
&filf
areprjdis
u)S
StfTOt
ad*r
#ccu
(is,
$ccl
otrros
rf oJ
y^
del, idv re
T779 Karatf>da<M}s
ectv
fj
re
firj
Kal ro
pov
fiT)
on
85
ovros
ofjLotws'
ro be
fiTj
tStov dv
ro
p,ev
yap voaew
voaetv dXrjO^s.
elr\
rj
tfivSo9, icai
ftfi^
rj
^vSas
94
CATEGORIES,
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
95
ARISTOTLE
XI. "EvavTLov 8^ arw $ avaytnjf iyoB^ fih
he SrjXov rjj Kad Kiartj itmyt^vB^
olov vyicla voaos koI diBpelq, SccA/a, 6iiOUiis cw
/ca*c<p 8c ari fUy ayoB^
Kal irrl rwv dXXvjv.
KaKov rovro
14 a
kokov
ivavTLov, ore Sc
T)
rjj
ivavrlov Kaxov
vireppoXr)
ov
oiaa
ij
in
ayo06,
TrXcLcrrcDV del
dfia
rw KaKw
rut
dfjL<l)6Tepa
avrcp
vndpxew, ovk
atf
/v*
15
20
rf
etvai.
ev
rots
XevKov
evavriois yeveaw,
fxev
rw
adr<p ylrci
^ avrd
r<p
yirrj
avrtp
96
CATEGORIES,
xi
genera, those
we
call virtue
and
d2
vice.
Good and
evil
97
ARISTOTLE
14 a
26
Y^
.;
V^
r^ Tofci iariv.
T7y-irapa ra iprjfiva ro piAnov ircu to tc^uoi*
Tpov Tiporepov etvai rg ^vati 5oC4. CMu^oun &^
KoX ol noXXol rov9 ivrtfiorepovs Koi p^iXXov dya*
hvrjryrioews irporcpov
'
TTco/xeVou? VTT*
iari fiv
rpoTTwv ovros.
ctvai.
ii
hrq
Koi
grammar
98
ax^^v dXXorpujraroi
tenn in
it
maj
rCtv
Greek than te
rerj well i%lliiy
tlie
CATEGORIES,
xi-xii
'
'
'
'
longer.
'
'
'
'
'
'
99
ARISTOTLE
10
^
\
Ot
fJLV
TocrovTol ctaiv.
(^
16
<t)vai
AcyotT* op.
on
8'
cori
to^
rouivra,
so
W.^
80
S5
100
CATEGORIES,
xii-xiii
we may
3'et his
term
prior
'
in as
many
and
most correct meaning of things that have come into
being together. For neither in that case is prior, nor
XIII.
Simultaneous
'
'
'
'
101
ARISTOTLE
otov TO irrqvov r<^
15 a
w<"{tt'
'''^
'"**
MHiptft* ^raSra
t^
hm
(ojOI^,
iw^pov ctrai.
AcycTcu, ooo dyrurrp/^
*A/xa oiV T^
10
<f>v(ri
p.v
rov
avTov
Mpip
yevov^
ToO
etyoi
tan, koa ra
aMTiBijipfffUva
aAA^Aov
5c dfuif <5v T) y^ais v rd avriff XP^H*XIV. Kiirrjaws 8/ ^OTiv cSty cf , y/i^OK* ^^opd
av^ais, n eUom s. dXXoiwm^, ij icoTa rcJtrov firroolttXcus
vv
v\
r^^
i3oA|
16
At
p,v
dXXrjXojv elalv' ov
yap iarw
rj
yivtais ^Bopd
ovM
fo
oAAotoucr^at.
102
ripMf
ot)8c/ita;
raw dXXa/v
Kunffatom
CATEGORIES,
modes of
identical
*
winged
'
species
is
xiii-xiv
That
division.
called
'
is
to say, the
in nature
simultaneous
'
'
aquatic
'
'
'
'
'
'
a single exception
it is
plain that
all
by some that a
subject,
when
altered,
is
altered
by
ARISTOTLE
KOivojvovaw ovr yap av^taSai ovayKoZov r6 Kara
nddos
25
im
Ki,Povfivov
KwrjGis
7)
oAAouomj-
oAAotou/xcvov i5^uj
Ttva
dvayKT).
oAAt^v
80
ctiy
yap ^v
i}
Kai avftoBai
aAAa>v dicoAou^co'
rcDi'
ij
fUtovaOai
ijf
ij
owl
<SAA*
#fii'i}<Tttir*
T0l
a ovk
oAAotoTcpov' 8
roil'
ov8^
to
oAAototrroi, oloi^
7rt
mu
iyiJfi/T04
ycyanrp-ai- a>aavTa>9
wa^
fiaf
*fol
crr/xu
ai*
"EoTi Sc a7rAa>5
16 b
Sc Kad* KaGTa at
au^Tjact Sc
Kara
6 17
ica^'
fiUjt)<n9, rfj
Toiroy rjpfiia.
Trpd?
Karcodev
104
/Xv Kiyrjai
Tov
rj
cKaora, ytviati
fxv
^Bopd,
i}
vavriov
dvto,
rdnov
fjLraPoXrj,
r^ 8c dvwdev
-ff
kotcu.
o(a rfj
t]^
84
CATEGORIES,
xiv
"
The accompanying
figure
illustrates
\-0
what
is
meant
ARISTOTLE
dTroSodcuraw Kunjatajv
XoiTrfj rcjv
Sowat
avTjj ivavrlov, el
10
TO
rod
fi-q
rrfv cfe
<lw>-
r7)v els
dXXoLwais
Kclaerai.
to
/ATaj3oAi7 /card
Kara ro
rij
TTotov TjpffjLLa
rj
1^
rj
rrf^
Kor^
-fjptftiay
Icrri yoip
ij
wart atrn^
rroto'.
iroiov
Kara
t^ ivayrlctf
Kar^ r6nov
fierapoXrj^
rov ivavrlov ronov fierafioXriv
rrjv
roTTov
16 jSoAtJ,
pfUim
oiJ
riin)<7i
17
frard tA
fUXav y6^c7AaD^
nowO M^TO^
poXijg yLvofievrfs.
XV. To
7]
so
yap
^X^^v
(Lg ^lv
Kara
irXeiova^
koX hidB^atv
ri
rponov^ Xfytratu
ws noGov,
icai
dpcnjr.
(Ls
fJLpo9,
15
iopiw , otov iv
otov x^^P^
ficSLfjLvos
x^'-P*'
'''oba.
rovs Twpovs
Tj
rj
^xrvXiov.
utg v
^ji^i^^
awfutf. otov
TO KpdfJuov rov
otvoi^'
dyycCcp.
rj
Xcyofxeda.
Aeyofieda
80
Sc
icat
yvvaiKa
ex^iv
koI
rj
ywri
CATEGORIES,
xiv-xv
'
'
We
XV.
use
'
'
it
'
'
'
'
'
'
We
'
'
to
'
have
'
'
have
wheat.
And in cases like these we are thinking
of what is contained in the vessel. Once more, we
use have of a property, men having houses or
'
'
fields.
'
in like
In English, of course,
we say
hold.'
107
ARISTOTLE
15 k
ToO
/xv
Xw
t)
ori crvvoiKl.
KaTrjpCOixrjvrai.
lOS
'*
CATEGORIES,
far-fetched.
then we
When we
mean
xv
man
say that a
that he Hves
'svith
has a wife,
her merely.
foregoing summary.
109
1^^
ON INTERPRETATION
Ch.
Ch.
3.
Cases of nouns.
Definition of a verb.
Indefinite verbs.
Tenses of verbs.
Ch.
4.
Definition of a sentence.
Ch.
5.
Ch.
Ch.
6.
positions.
7.
Of contradictory propositions.
Of universal, indefinite and particular afiimuitive
Of contrary'
positions.
Ch.
Ch.
112
8.
9.
Of
ON INTERPRETATION
Ch. 10. Affirmative and negative propositions arranged with a diagram in pairs.
The correct position of the negative (ov).
Of the truth and error of certain propositions.
Of propositions with indefinite nouns or indefinite
The nature
of dialectical questions.
simple propositions, which have the
same subject, may be true but we cannot
of necessity combine the two predicates into
Two
one predicate.
Several predicates holding of one subject,
Ch. 12.
Ch.
13.
individually,
propositions.
The relation of the actual to the possible.
Three classes of entities.
Ch. 14. Of the proper contrary of an affirmation,
whether universal or particular.
lis
nEPI EPMHNEIA?
I.
16 a
"EoTi
6
Koi Xoyos.
/lev o^v ra v
'na6r)fidrcjv
ov/xj3oAa,
rfj
Kal
(fxjjvfj.
aiVra,
ouSc
ifxoval
arjficla rrpdnivs,
^v^
rwv hf Tg ^^vv^
rfj
Kal rd ypa^fuva, rwv tv
al
aural'
ravrd ndai
vjv
fUvroi
raOra
wv ravra
Kal
rrpl fxkv
10
M^
114
ON INTERPRETATION
I. Let us, first of all, define noun and verb, then
explain what is meant by denial, affirmation, proposition and sentence.
Words spoken are symbols or signs of affections
or impressions of the soul ; written words are the
signs of words spoken. As writing, so also is speech
not the same for all races of men. But the mental
affections themselves, of which these words are
primarily signs, are the same for the whole of mankind, as are also the objects of which those affections
are representations or likenesses, images, copies.
With these points, however, I dealt in my treatise
concerning the soul ; they belong to a different
inquiry from that which we now have in hand.
As at times there are thoughts in our minds unaccompanied by truth or by falsity, while there are
others at times that have necessarily one or the other,
so also it is in our speech, for combination and
division are essential before you can have truth and
<*
was the only critic who cast doubt on it. Finally, its style
and grammar seem to be genuinely Aristotelian. All that
can really be said against it is that much of it is somewhat
elementary but Aristotle doubtless gave elementary as well
{Aristotle, p. 10).
as advanced lectures
The Provost of
Oriel remarks that H. Maier suggests that the reference
in 16 a 8 should be transferred to 16 a 13 and relates to De
An. iii. 6.'
115
;
'
'
ARISTOTLE
*
16
Tf ouT yap
8*
G7]fxlov
OTt
crqp,aivi /icV
p.7)
TO Xvai
Ti,
17 /X17
tlttvoo^
Kal yop
ovttu) hk aXr)6S
ToOSc*
17
ifaro
arjiuiyruc)
Kara
^5^1 TTpoartdfj, ^
airXctff
X^povov,
JO
II. "Oj'o/xa
avvdrjKrjv
fiavTLKov Kxu}piap.vov' v
KoAos
oi|-
yop T^ KoAAiTnroj to
LTTTTos
86
<f>cjvri
ov
tTTTToj.
firjv
wamp
ou8'
iv
OHmtp
^ ^^
To
to KtXri^ oiSev
ouScV
iariv,
hrjXovai
BrjpLajv,
80
ar)fiaivi
To
3*
ye
(J)v
ri
Arti
olbr
ov /x^ odS^
avTo* ot/T yap Xoyo^
ouT
koB* avT6.
CLTTocfHims ioTLv.
OTOVOW
onroj.
ij dirXwy 4) rard xp^^op ; some would imdrr these wmds * In
the present or some other tense.*
I retain the Greek word
rendered ' goat-stag,' which stands for a fabuloot ninuil,
half of it goat and half stag, since the word can nowadajt be
found in a number of good English dictionaries.
116
ON INTERPRETATION,
i-ii
'
'
particular tense.*
II. A noun is a sound having meaning established
by convention alone but no reference whatever to
time, while no part of it has any meaning, considered
apart from the whole. Take the proper name GoodThe steed has no meaning
steed,' for instance.
apart, as it has in the phrase a good steed.' It is
'
'
'
'
'
117
ARISTOTLE
16 b
To
Be ^IXcjvos
rj
oaa roiaOra,
^tXuavi Kol
XSyof
avTov
eariv
TO. yLv
rj
-^v
W iaruf
rj
rj
iarw
odtc
iffvSrrtu,
fj
ovk
r6
iarw
oi)Scy
fiepos
'^^^
x^P^^
Xiym V 5n
^^^
vyUia
ovxyfia, to
fUv
XP^^^^
Se vyiaLVi pijfxa- npooarjfiaivti yap ro w^ im^
Kal del rwv koB* Mpov Xtyoft4O0
dpxiv.
KaB*
XtyofUvwv
crepov
ar^fitlov.
7rpoG<rrjfiaivt.
10
GTjfietov
ioTiv,
otov
Toip
KaS*
unoKifUvou
ij
A'
VnOKlfJLVa).
To
yap
Kara
firj
if>*
orovow vn-
oyro^.
TO vyiavcv ^ ro vytavi
hia^pei 5c tow
oiJ
^ua.
pu^fxarof,
Xfi^"'^'*'*
8c TO 7TpL^.
to
Avrd
jxev
(nj/xatVct rt
ON INTERPRETATION,
ii-iii
Of
Philo,'
to Philo,'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
ARISTOTLE
Tr)v
iariv
fXT)
25
7}
elvai
ovTTU} (rrifiaivr
fiTf,
rod irpdyfiaros,
avro KaB* cairro iftiXov. air^
(n]fii6v
<TTt
TO ov l7rrj9
ovh^v OTt, npoaarjfiau'ti
dvv roiv (wyKiiUvwv ovk
IV.
Aoyos 8/ fori
^ipCjv ri (rq^avTiKov
Ci
wSvBtow
ij
oW ^^
fihf
run.,
y^
Hcrrt voijoai,
<f>wyfi
<m
^W
tnjfiayrucfl*
rflpf
olov
npoLpr)Tai.
17
10
I'tJv
Bioipias.
,1
B. adds card
#tir^4cir'
^^___^_-__^_____.._
ON INTERPRETATION,
iii-v
'
'
'
'
whole.
in
them.
121
ARISTOTLE
17 k
ri
Aoyo?, idv
TO <mv ^
Xoyos
fi7)
77poor edij,
ovttoj
v ri ioTiv oAA* ov
ov yap
18
^ tarai
ij
f^^iarof
ti ro<o(mN^
dirotfxitrruco^,
woAAa to {<j^
avveyyv^
rat
Srj
^>'
itc
hi6fTi
irt {or
3/Dr*
ior%
"EoTt 8
Aoyoy awo^vTiifOj
cfy
rj
6 iv hrjXuMf ^
iroi fi^
Ir
ot dcrvvhToi.
To
djoTC
20
oAA*
oi^ ovopux
fii^
7TLbr)
OVK eOTLV
d7TO<f>aiVGdai,
TovTwv
8^
rj
i}
iparrwyros ru^of,
i}
/ii},
Xoyos Tis
rj
-fj^rj
S^ ^k TOi^Ctfr avy-
awStrof.
ion
hk
rj
dpxtv Tt
Tj
firj
VI.
KaTo^aty
Sc
TWOS.
drr6<f>aais
Sc
25
Tj
ri arro tw-os",
olov
KLp,V7j
OVTUt SljAotWd T4
irpoaipovfuvov,
aiVroi'
Kara twos
prj^ia
ri
CtTTCU'
cWtv aTro^ovaiV
coru'
rtniy teard
TtVOJ.
'Ettci 8c cart /cat
imdpxov Koi ro
xmdpxov
coy
ptri
/117
122
vndpxQV Koi
vndpxov w^
prise
'
firj
D/
ON INTERPRETATION,
v-vi
Of all
form part.
'
'
'
answer.
we repeat that one kind of prosimple, comprising all those that affirm or
deny some one thing of another, while the other is
composite, that is compounded of simple propositions."
And a simple proposition, more fully, is a statement
possessing a meaning, affirming or denying the presence of some other thing in a subject in time past or
present or future.
mean by affirmation a statement affirming
VI.
one thing of another we mean by negation a statement denying one thing of another.
As men can affirm and deny both the presence of
that which is present and the presence of that which
is absent and this they can do with a reference to
And
so, to return,
positions
is
We
123
ARISTOTLE
vndpxov, Kal nepl roif^ KT6f 04 rod vft
Xpovovs ojaavTwSt anav av cV&^'xoiTO ical 6 ifOTiijrqoi ns aTTCxfrfjaat koI o an^nja4 rif #rara-
80/117
ware
<l>rJGai,.
d7r6<f>aai,9
Kal
KLa6ai
85
rrji'
Kard^aat^
dXXa rwv
hk
okt**
/417
o/uo-
Xiyot
dvriKtljUvai.
at
d'n6(j>aGLS
Kara^aati darhf
irdajj
dvri^aiy roGro,
(mt)
Kal
(^acriff.
on
hrjXov
dvTiKifivrj
wpoa^-
rxHotirtMf
o
17 b
'n^vK
ttXciovwv
inl
cKaarov he o
KarriYOpia$ai,
firj,
KaOoXov
6
Tt
CTTt
Trds
rutv
KoB*
diTo<f>aixnp-ai. iirl
/xt},
t}
Se
oT
Ttvt,
rw wpay
p,dra)v
dvdpojTTos
dydytcrj 5^
Kaarov.
airo-
ia iihf oiV
rov KaBoXoo
&n
iMipx^^
drro<fHiv<ris.
dTTo<f>aivadai.
Acv/cos,
KoiSt
KtMXofi^f
p.r)
Govrax ivavTiat, at
Tov KaSoXov
ruftf
Xfyw
KoBdXov, ola0
dvBpumo^ XtvK6t,
KoBdXov h4,
firi
ovS^ls
p.kv
(jrLV elvai
10
ovk
dTTo<f)aivadaL
dvdpojTTos,
lolv cvarrlai,
ivavria irori.
cttI
OVK
pL%nroi hnrjIXov^uva
firj
koSoXou
ari
XevKos
rd
X4ya} hk rd
dvOpomo^'
cuj
klS6Xov
KaBoXov K^xprjrai
ON INTERPRETATION,
times that
may
lie
vi-vii
man
'
'
'
'
'
'
125
ARISTOTLR
17 b
rfj a7ro<f>dvai'
KaOoXov.
oTt
<L\A'
5c roO
(r/ffjuuifti
KarqyopoufjJvov
yap
ovhcfila
15
Karau^xiaii aXrfBri^
Sortu^ ht
9 T06
rqv
{<fiov.
KaTii^aw dno^dati
KadoXov
to
Xiytat
fn^taivovawt
tA
coTt
Kos,
TO0
Aw6^om9^
dvdpomos XevKO^
Traj
dvdpomos
SiVaio?.
Ato
85
Taifraff ftv
8c
TOLS
ou^ otov tc
din-iKifjivas
avrals
XevKos
/cat
coTt tis
^^
oAi^if
cj-Sc^rroi
ofoi'
cli^flu,
irorc
^vi
od nd^ dvSpumoq
dvdpamos XevKos.
oaai
fiiv
irepav
126
'
oXtjOtj cZvat
tj
^cuS^,
#cai
ON INTERPRETATION,
The
vii
every.'
having an
subject
every
'
'
of this.
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
127
ARISTOTLE
Kad^
c/coora,
otov
cm
"LwKpdrrji
Arvirofov#r
80 fiv,
fiT)
tjjvhris.
85
dfia cf avdyKTjs,
^aGiv oTTp
18 a
fi
xartt^
avrov,
ovhels
Tj
KaT<f>rjav
rcjv
Kad*
dvdpcjTTos
XevKos'
Tjj
hi
cotw dvBpwrrof
XcvKos
rj
din-i-
aSrai, tiprjTai-
128
TtVcff elaiv
distributed or undistribatcd.
ON INTERPRETATION, vii
for their subjects, as
Socrates is white * and ' not
white.' When, however, the two propositions are
not universal in character, albeit about universals,
not always do we find it the case that of these one is
true, the other false.
For, indeed, we can state very
truly that man is and man is not white, and that man
'
We
'
'
'
e2
129
ARISTOTLE
koI oti ov
ilprjrat,'
ndaa dXri$^
ij
1}
rj
16
Mux S4
VIII.
1^
i^tMjf hni*
^ ifKV^t.
fjLTj
ofioLws, otov
Xvk6v v
wv
cf
20
(Tr)fiawi,
tcard^aaif* olo ft
ioTiv V, oi fiia
fiij
ris
<Mi
(mv
ovScv
ioTLv
25
ovSev yap
fJiio..
dvdpwTTos
XevKos.
(rqp,aiiov(TL
koI
TTpixyrq tJtoi
iroXXd
rls
ctat
rj
noXXai,
dvdpwnos Ifmos.
*Em
/Av
Kal
^
130
5ri
oHrrt
-n^i*
5c
ovh*
irrl fikv
tt^v
rcov
O'
teal
ij
iarw
ravrats
c&cu ayrt'
f/nvSirj
yvofivw
kojL
drro^aaw
KadoXov
tcai
noXXA
a^rtu
iijXo
oiv
IX.
c^irrtv
toOto $^
tTTTTOS
hia<f>pi
tovto
Siatf>4pt
dXrj&r}
rj
coy tcaOdXov
ON INTERPRETATION,
vii-ix
'
No man
is
Some men
white.
are white.
'
'
'
'
necessity or false.
And
of those contradictorily
131
ARISTOTLE
18 s
0cv^
uxmtp
Kaara,
/ca^*
Toil'
KadoXov
KadoXov
fXT]
c2ku,
inX
tlprjnu,
odK
Acx^cWcof
teal
M
twv
oniyic^i
8c
'EttI
dXr)dr)g
firj
Se
ojjLOLCJs.
85
rail'
tpevSij^,
rj
vTrdpxfi'V,
^aci to avro
fxrj
rovro, hijXov
CTrt
XevKov
Ci
ri
XevKov, dXrj6s
a/i^ci
"^v
ifxiyai
rj
Ci
ware
dvaytcri
ttjv
dno^avai'
Kardif>aaiv
oOjf
Ol^yiCI}
^ o^
cart Acuir^
yip
t yelp (iAi;M(
ov Xvk6v, koI
dydyfoj
iraoa tcarA^ams
0ct;8i^.
Toiy rotoi^oty.
OTt AcVKOJ'
18 b CtTTCtV
clival
a/xa
rj
&n
ri
iceu
tl fi^
owx vndpx*
rrf daro^aaiv
ov6*
dnorep*
ervx^v,
ou&
iarai
rj
adic
ervx^V'
rj
yap 6
<f>ds
dXr)6vaL
rj
6 ononis.
it is
182
ON INTERPRETATION,
ix
versal.
133
ARISTOTLE
18 b
yap av iyivero
OTTOT^p
"Etc
10
OTt XevKOv
earat,
Tpov
or I
ciTTfLV
orioxjv
o%^k
fj
XevKov,
unrrt
rCiv ytvofidvwv
otov T
fi'f)
u aSwarov
elyai ovBi
fitf
larw
yVa6ai,
firj
fitf
aSwarov
i^SffBis
rj
TVXqSt OVK (
*AAAa
firjv
20 71 a'n6<f>a(Ti.s
/iT/Tc
di'dyKTis.
Kard<f>aGiv
Tovroij,
Set
a/i<^
earai
/X17
dXrjdes
avpiov,
ct
avpiov.
els
oAi^
ccVcu'
xmdpx^tv,
184
Kara^oacciK
rijs
ouftjSatKCi
t
xmdp^w^
fxT)
oi)ic
Mi'
iaim,
^ffuSoifr
fxtj
<2>xu.
tnl
ori
XtvKot^
koX
hk
vndpfti
tig
Si pxfrt iarai
C4
o^k ay
^vai^ra
avpLov,
fiij
S 5^
ov^ apa
ficya,
S hi
fi^ ytv^oOai'
oirorep
TTpos
Ivrttl*
iartu, o^x
eaioBai.
rifv
np6'
c^<iW
<icl
&n orw ^
olov re rovro
OVIWf
/i^
aXrjdi^
vih',
y^
iyivrro* f^
ofiolws
irj
yap dv
yeveadai,
vrdp^ti B.
ro amirrtp
/i^tc yv4cSai
ON INTERPRETATION,
ix
'
We
135
ARISTOTLE
Td
fihf
Tj
Tr)v
rwv KadoXov
XyofUv<jav
clvai
Tvxv
oTTOTCp*
rqv
dXrjdrj
fiv
raDra
&^
TOij
rwv
ws
tcoBoXov
ayructifUvuttf
4>v^,
o^v yap
(jj(TT
axnCjv
TOVTO
ixrj
wf
rm.
ctiTov
p,v
diro^pa&r^vai
etj pLvpioarov
'^v
fxevcjv del
rj
ianu ^
^ A*
XP^*^
ovtws cf^o'
T yap dXrjdcos
fH7
O^M
TOi fuSXXov
^^^ *t ^^ dnayri t^
mpov dXrjBetkaBai,
oTTOGOiovv xp^^V'
^r^ev c5<rrc to
oi?ra>9
|il|p
ovrl^aatP
Kaiov
dXXA
T^fv
hrjXoif
4ii^
roS^v
Tiv^
ptij
h(,a<f>pi,
p,r)
/tv (f>dvai
dXrjOh ^v flntiv
ctnov
Kov
(iAXcL
uxrvt ourt
M^T^
yiyvo/iA^tf,
fiv ToSl
koX
etrrcp
ctvaL
80
cVt
"q
<l>da0)s
arxma
avfipaiyoi^a
Toiavra Tpa,
(tKrT
elrri rtj
( dvaytcrj^ yp4aBai.
on
Et
hr)
TavTa aSuwrra
1S6
ON INTERPRETATION,
ix
provided
We
137
ARISTOTLE
10
aTTo
rod Trpd^al
al
evcpyovai to
iv ots ayufxxi
ri,
Swarov
iarw A
Kol
clitu
fii^,
TOiff fii)
6fU>ltitS*
fii)
oAA*
BiarfirjO-qacrai,
16
ofioLws Kol TO
av
vTTTJpxe
fiTj
hvvarov
tfiirpoaOiv
KararptfiifOtrai.
fiTj
roiavrrjv.
dvdyKTjS
20
OUT
TToXv Odrcpov, ov
rd Sc fiaXXov
firiv
6drpov, 6drpov 8^
To
26 civat,
p.v
orav
/itJ.
ovv cfrai TO
firj
fj,
ij
fiv
oi'
di'dytcq'
orav
ij,
#fal
tA
/ii)
/ii)
ovt r6 ov dmOf
ov fi^ ttyax.
06
ov
fxriv
y^
ifrrtt
Koi
80
ON INTERPRETATION,
ix
exists
by
necessity.
That what
is
must be when
'
it
mean
'
does not
139
ARISTOTLE
19 B
a>(7T*
85
fiara,
hrjXov
TVX
Kol
w<m
6w6r9p*
avayKf)
6fu>uo9
oaa ovrcoi ^1
ori
TavavTia
ci'&x*a^<u,
fti^
act odcnr
it^ iutk
p^
6^ rtpC p/Apujv
T^9 avri<j>daU}S dArjdi^ cfj-ai fj ifKH^Of, q6 fUrroi
roBc rj ToSc oAA* o7r6rp* crvx^t *f* pS}Xa fiiv
fjLri
ovmv.
Irlpav^ ov p^vroi
dX-qOij rrjv
19 b
aXrjBij
fjBrj
rwv diTtKtip^vww
ov yap cjcmtp
Kot aTTo^acoy^
ovTCJS ^1 Kal
3c tvai
*
tj
^Ii8f^
X.
p,r)
Tj
'Ettci
irrl
ratv
/X17
cZmi, oAA*
hi
<rrl
r^
wavtp
cifn/rou.
Kara rivo^
tj
fiiw iXtfirj
^nl rj Strrum^
ofo/xa
Kora^^aawf
1}
rj
r6 hnttirvpump
rj Kara^dati
ovopa (Iprjrai Kal to mtjjwpov ftpirr^poir
ro yap ovk dvBpayjros ovopa ptv oiu Xiyo dXX
v he Set etvai koi Kad* v6s to iv
(to 3c
dopiarov
IP
dopiarov
dopLorov
^ot?
rf
ovofia'
'
cv
yap
atoTrep koX ro
prjfia),
ttios
tnjftaiytt
ov\ vyiawi ov
Koi ri
pfjpo,
oAA*
rj
i( dopiOTom
&
15
rwv
140
Kciplvoiv
iarl'
7rpoG(rrjpatyi
yap
XP^*'*^*
ON INTERPRETATION,
ix-x
facts, it is clear in
We
'
'
141
ARISTOTLE
ojar
eariv dvOpajnos
ovK
<7Ti
0"Tt TTois
nds
Kal
20
St,x<^s
Xeyovrai at oiTt^cacty.
Xtyta hk otov
ri
^/U
fan
ouyicifdwu
pikv
hvo wpot
ttjf
25
hiKaios
hLKaios
80
Kard(f>aais,
i}
otov
Called
adjacent,*
142
t^rtii
by
adiac^ntis,
later logicians.
ov
propositioos
way corcv
of the
ON INTERPRETATION,
also.
And, therefore, man is,*
form the first affirmation and denial.
Not-man is,' not-man is not follow. Again, we
have these propositions, every man is and every
every man is not,' every not-man is
not-man is
a time-reference
'
man
is
not,*
'
'
'
not.'
'
'
'
'
'
'
Negations
not just.
not not-just.
Affirmations
Man is just.
Man is not-just.
Now is and is
Man is
Man is
just
'
'
or
not
'
not-just.'
Affirmations
Every man
Every man
is
just.
is
not-just.
Negations
ARISTOTLE
avOpomos ov SiKaios.
8ta/xTpov
ivhix^rai,
rrXrfv
<TvvfiXr^BVt'
iTore.
pikv o^ hvo avructiMTOX, oAAoi hk 5uo
npo9*
TO ovK dyBpwno^ cuy tmoKtifitvov
rcdevros,^ cart SiVatoj ovk 'dv0p<o no9 odtc Kim
Aurat
irpos
SiKaio9
20 a dpcoTTos
ovK-avdpayrro^t
vXu"
ovroi
vyuLLVL irds
vyiaivi
wpocrtHp B.
some
'
joined.
And in each case the four oroposttioai are dHfcr*
ently arranged in the dreek from tne order in the Fri&t
Analytics^ as the reader will see from the IbUoviiic tluU
stand for the three missing schemes :
144
Man
is
Man
is
just
Man
Is
notjust.
not not-just.
Man
is
not-just.
ON INTERPRETATION,
There
first
Negations
Affirmations
Not-man
Not-man
is
just.
is
not-just.
Not-man
Not-man
is
is
not just.
not not-just.
More pairs of opposed propositions cannot be discovered than these. But the last of these groups
should be viewed as distinct from the two that precede it from its having not-man for a subject.**
Where is does not suit as a verb and we use
has health and the like, then the same
walks,'
sort of scheme is produced as we get, when the verb
is
is used.
We have, for example, the following
Every man is healthy.
Every man is not healthy.
Every not-man is healthy. Every not-man is not
*
'
'
'
'
healthy.
Every man
is just.
is
not-just.
is
just.
Every man
is
Not-man
is
not just.
Not-man
is
not-just.
not-just.
Not-man
Not-man
The diagonal
is just.
is
not not-just.
lines in
and denials
respectively.
145
ARISTOTLE
ov yap
avopoynos.
to ou waj
(art
npoadcreov.
looAA*
oTi
dvdpwTTOs
nds
8^ oAAa
'E^TTct
Joiov
ctfcrrff
irpoatrrmah^i
to
^ in
Karo/^aaw ^ an6^aaw.
rj
t^ airay ^OTi
SUaiov
StVatoi',
Ka06Xov c&di.
oAAo
ovSiv
ovSls
rj
fiij
ij
crrjfjLaivovaa
ori oi^S/y
^<m {^'
ovScVoTf loot^roi
^ok))'
od itSm
coTiv
i<pot^
okoXovBoOgi S^
StVoiov.
iarw
i}
dvdpcoTTos SiVaioy
art ov
dvTiKt,p,vi)
i}
ndi ar-
Oavepov
t
aAT7^?
25 <f)TJGai
ifat
dX7]6g' otov
HcoKpaTTjs dpa ov
146
ort
eporrqOivra
ctti
#fa^ #fooTor,
/xcv toiv
aTTOifyfjoai,
ori
Kal Kara"
iirl
hi
rdv koBoXov
ON INTERPRETATION,
of speaking of
not every man.* For the not must be added to
man,* since the subject is not a universal in virtue
*
every
of having an
every,* but the adjective
indicates that the subject, as such, is distributed.
This will be seen from the following
*
'
Man is healthy.
Not-man
Man is
not healthy.
Not-man is not healthy.
healthy.
is
These
differ
'
'
is
distributed.
The
remain in
all
cases unchanged.
Every animal
is
just
'
'
'
'
147
ARISTOTLE
20a
OVK
a7T6j>ams , olov dpd yc wdy avdpamof ooi^it; oC
Tras"
80
apci
oAAa TO ou
avrr) hi iariv
At 8c
/card
tra^
dpa dvBpomo^
yop mHnof
ow^
ri
o^erfii^
^ Awrfa^
pT^fxara, otov nl
axmcp
iroi
ot'Ofiarttg
diro^jxiaiis dvtv
fr^fiarof
ovk cu7i h4.' cut yap oXrfitikw
Bo^eiav dv etvai.
tlwwv
85 dvdyicq -q ipevSeadax rriv dixo^aaw, 6
OVK dvdpwiTos oifhiu /idAAot^ rov tlnoyrof dpOponrof
oAAd Kal ^JTTov TjXTJdevKi Ti Tf hfrnfiirm,
i^/fn
TTpoaredfj. <n;/iatV(i hk ro cort nas oi^*<i^/MiMrof
hiKaios ov8fiLq. iKtivwv ravrav, ovhk ^ airruCifUrn
ravTT) 7j OVK cart Trdy ovK-di'Spurtros S/muof* to
he nd^ ov SiVaio? ovk dvOpomo^ tw o^8clc ft/imuof
40 ou/c dvdpwTTOs ravTOv arjfiaivti.
20 b
Mcrari^c/icva 8c rd di'd/iara ral tA p^fjugp^
ravTov (rqp.aLVi, otov ton XtvKo^ dv0punof, cbrcr
dvBpixyTTos XevKog.
l yap fi^ rovrd itm, roC
avTov TrXclovg caovrai aTro^ocif . oAA* ^8/5urTO
i^
d7r6<t>acrLS
'
ON INTERPRETATION,
If the
inference would rather appear to be true.
negative answer is true to the question Is every man
wise ? to infer that every man is unwise would,
in those circumstances, be false, and not every man
The latter is the contradictory
is correct.
is wise
and the former the contrary statement."
Indefinite predicates and nouns, such, for instance,
as not-man,' not-just,' might appear to be actual
negations without any noun, any verb, as those terais
are more properly used. This, however, is not really
so. Of necessity every negation must either be true
or be false, and whoever says not-man,' for instance,
provided that nothing is added, is speaking not more
but less truly or falsely than he who says man.*
Every not-man is just is a statement, which is not
in its meaning equivalent to any proposition we
mentioned, nor yet is its contradictory or not every
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
not-man is just.' Every not-man is not just,' however, amounts to the same thing as saying that
'
'
'
'
on
'
'
his interest
So-and-so
is
149
ARISTOTLE
^ " dpwTTOs
10
oAA*
XevKos.
rf
trtpa, ikiv
iarw aw64omi
17
aM)
yivtrax tcard/^aatt
teal
SrjXov.
To
Mi
Kara noXXatv
rj iroAAA Koff*
cav firi v ri f ro k rCiv
TToAAcDv Sr^Aou/icvov, oifK coTi Karoj^oMns fda
Acyoi 8c cv ouic idy oit>/ia i' j #f/d7T6<t>aais.
XI.
16
iw6^am9,
Kara^dvai ^
aTTOifHiyai,
o^
o dvQponm
hiirow koI ^fupoK, oAAa
Kat 1' Tt yw'CTat cV rovrwv iK 8^ tov An;rot;
cuort
ci'.
KoX rov dvOpamov Koi rod /3a8i{[civ
Kara rovrwv iraro^i^O]? ^^ M^
ovr edv v
Kard(f>aGis, dXXd ^vfj fiv fua KaraMatttf hi
TToXXal, cure idv Ka6* tvdf ravra, dXA dfiolatf
fjLcvov, firi
fi
8c
>'
T4 cf cVcutui', oloi'
J<ji>o'
#coi
o^
20
TToXXal.
Ec ovv
tpwrqots
-q
tj
hioXtKrucri
dtroKpiOtwi
^ Bartpov fjLoplov
rijs dvrufdaws, rj 8c irporaais dyrv^datwi fuas
p,6pLov, OVK dv cl-q dnoKpujis uia npd^ raOra'
ipwrtjois fxia, ovB toy j aXff&j/fs.
25 ovSe yap rj
iariv alrTjGLS,
rj
rrjs irporrdatuis
Lp7]rai,
<f>'qva(jdat,.
80
dXXd
Set toi'
ipwrwvra irpoahiopUnu
150
ws
ON INTERPRETATION,
x-xi
is
'
white,*
'
'
'
'
151
ARISTOTLE
nay
ou, ris
86
rwv
x^P*'^ Karrffopm^Uv^^,
Kara yap roO Mpamov
aXrjdes elntlv kol x^P*^ Joh)*' Kai x^P*^^ S/wow,
/cat raiha ws Iv, koI avBpwnov Koi XtVK6v, icoi
v TO
Ttt 8*
ravO*
KaTTjyoprjfia
(liS
17
v.
hixi<f>opa;
ct
ayoB^^
40
21 a
XcvKog
Koi
<^
"Ort
pLv
yiveadai,
OTTCJS
ovv
ras avfinXosdt
iroXXd
hijlko*
Tcuv
10
rovro woXXdmf
^^Kpdrrff fctd
dvBpamo^.*
^(OKpdrrjs
Kal
dvOpcjTTos,
6
Koi
Pabi^ojv
cri ct o ^cjKpdrrj^
TTCTrAcy/xcVa.'
hrj
Karrjyopovfii'a}V, Kal
<f>*
off Karrfyopt'
CTv/xjSatVct,
B. adds
e/(
Avctpor.
152
ON INTERPRETATION,
xi
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
153
ARISTOTLE
16
XlVK^
l^it>ov
hiTTOvv ov
"EiTi ovS*
to^
dvBponrov
rCjv
duTuf>aais,
dvriKcifUvww rt itrvnapxjj
OVK
aXrjd^s
aXXa
aX-qBist
orav Sc
wcmcp "Oprjpos
p^
^wrrdpxjl* ^*^^
(ttI
Tt,
Kara
Cfrmu
otop
orov
cwTrdpxjfj, aXriBts.
i^v^of,
ciircti',
^^
olov voifjr^.
^^
r^
fi^
^*
iXfjfi4it
ip* o&'
Koi coTW,
rj
ov;
<iufififirjKOS
tarw
ori
'OprjpOV TO OTW.
80
"Oore
oocu?
6 vtnnrii
B.
expresses
154
ON INTERPRETATION,
xi
And so being
If a
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
155
ARISTOTLE
TO 8e firi 6v, art Sofaorov, ovK aXrfi^i tniy S^
Tf Sofa yap ainov ovk Icrrw ori tarw, <{AA' on
OVK (mv.
XII. TovTWv Sc huopiayLivwv OKtirrio^ onatg
86 exovmv al aTro^aci; 'coI Kara^dati^ vpa^ oAAi^Aoc
at ToC Sm^aroi' cft'cu Kal /X17 St/varov ircu Mx6tVOtf
Tf
/cat /X17 i^xo/i^w', #cai ir<^ rov oS iW n
i yiip
Kat ovay/catou* cx<i yap anopla^ TU*aj.
Ta>v ovfinXeKOfUvcav ouroi oAAifAoi^ du^urcirroi
avTitf>dai^ , oaoA Kara t6 etfoi #rai /x^ cIhu T<r21 b Toi^at, ofov Tou tlyai avBpomov ano^aaif r6 fi^
cfvat dvdpwTTov, od ro cfwu fxri dvBpumov, koX toO
clvai XevKov dvBpomov ro firi cl^at XtvKOV avOpta*
TTOv,
oAA* ou ro cfvoi
rf
firj
Acvicov df$pufWO,
Kara^aai^
rj
iff
cM^amt,
tl
t6
must be
156
true, or
a 1(^
'
is
is
false
ON INTERPRETATION,
xi-xii
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
could have
'
man
is
not-
157
ARISTOTLE
li
Kal
fir)
Se,
oTt
/SoStJcti'
ttTTai/
Kcu
TO
fiif
ouTci*
oparov.
*AAAa
TOiS
20
17)
25
/ii7r
avrLKifivas
alpr6v.
firi
firj
TO
XcvKov ro
35
8* vnoKl^tva
8* dx'Opayno^t
ovrat^
hnaWa
KoX p.r)
Suvaa^at ^ot to evScvta^oi npo<jB4aif Siopl^ovaai, atcmcp ctt* Kiva}v ro tvai Kal uii
fikv lvaL
80
to
npdyvurra
r6
etvai w^ xmoKflfUvov ytymu, t6
etvai Trpoa^caciy,
fiv
p. 128).
158
'
intermittent realitiet
( Irirftlli
ON INTERPRETATION,
xii
may walk
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
it cannot
is
it cannot not be,' not
So on these grounds it appears that it may be
dictory, in turn,
'
be.'
'
159
ARISTOTLE
oAA^Aatj at Tov Suvarov ttvai
Swror^
fA^
tyai
ov yap
aXX^jXatv cu
routtmu, t^ 5vi<oT6r
lvai.
oXXa r6 5uvaroi'
din-i<f>d(Tis
Kcu
cfvat
Sin^aroi'
dfia
dfjM
/ii^
im
ov hvvarov
tlyai,
firf
(jLTi
elvai,
/Lti7
efi^at,
<l>a(nv
oAAa r6
4woT
fi^ dyayf^oZo^
dpoyKoiim
oAAd t^
/xi}
elvai. Set
fit)
dSvvarov
cZt'Oi*
dSiWror
toO
d^
efi^at
Kat KadoXov
10 /cat firj
<
ov TO dyayKoZov
Svvarov
roO adroG
ovbi ye t^
cZmc
fiij
cZi^Oi*
'OfjMiojs $
etvai'
ayru<unajL ydp,
tvai koI
fir)
koI fi^
dXrjOevovrai'
hwoTov
fcal
8c,
ci^n^oi, r6 fiir
cooTrcp
TiBivai
ws to
^nu
i^iccificva, iraTi*
et^at KOL
jiri
elvai.
aim-aTTCtv.
cai
Tavras oUa9<u
XpTj
chai Ta?
djTt/cct/icVo?
^curct?,
SwaTOro^
Mcxdft^vov, dBwarov
OVK dSvvaTov, dvayKoxov dvayKouov, dXrjd^^
OVK d^Tjdes,
Suvarov, cv8e;(o/xcvoi'
ou/c
ouic
160
ybmf
'
ON INTERPRETATION,
implies
it
may
xii-xiii
'
We
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
tradictory pairs
It
may
It
is
cannot be.
not contingent.
It is not impossible.
It is
It is not necessary.
It is
It is not true.
It is true.
XIII. From these affirmations and negations set
out in the foregoing manner certain consequences
It
be.
contingent.
impossible.
necessary.
It is
logically follow.
f2
161
ARISTOTLE
15
ttvan,
ivhex^crOai
#fot
TO
hvvarov
10
yap hwar^v
firj
vBxoiJivov
/ii^
(fi'ai
/X17
firi
cfi^i
/ai)
avoyireubr
/A17
Kol r6
hwarov
TO ovayKatov
Koi to
/i.^
lv(u, r<p hi
tvai
to
di'ayK'atb*'
/X17
tlvai
Stn^TOi'
i-
cImu koI t^
fiij
fiif
t3 dt'ayKOibi'
oiJif
c2mu
clt'Oi
c<u /a^
urol
t6
'i
oSwaTov
/X17
Otwp^iaBw hi ix
lvai.
rrjf
viro-
25
hvvarov ilvax
ov huvarov cu'ai
cVScxo/xcvov cfvai
ou#c
ovK a^vvarov
ohvvarov civcu
flvtu,
ovK avayKoiov
hvvaTov
fi-q
cfi'cu
OVK dhvvaTov
oitK
firj lvai,
dvayKoiov
firj
ovayiratoi'
fii^
ov hwarov
(U'ou
ttvai
clwii
cv5;(Oficn>i'
fii^
hfat
th^ai
ovk vhx6pLVO
dhvvarov
fi,'^
c2nu
^17 c2i*ai
dvayKoZov clyou
162
ON INTERPRETATION, xm
Implications
Propositions
/
1.
It
may
It is
be.
<J
2. It is
It is contingent.
It is
It
contingent.
not impossible.
not necessary.
may
be.
It
may be.
It
cannot be.
not contingent.
It is contingent.
It is
It is impossible that it
It
is
should be.
necessary that
should not be."
it
may
It is
not be.
It
It is contingent that it
It
It
it
is impossible that it
should not be.
It is necessary that it
should be.
163
It
ARISTOTLE
To
hwarw
aKoXov6i
fifv
ayri<f>arixtj^ ,
yap buvarov
ctrtu
<f>ams'
KardKJKLais
anx^^ooif
To
ovx
22 b
aAA
Xi,
dm^ooct; x^P^^'
dvayicq
firj
yap
ovayACOto)'
aiTioF 5c Tov
y^
cm
lvax' ct S
elvai'
ware
ct
ovic
ro
ai)ro
dSvvarov
cVcu^
Swdfuvov.
p,rj
164
nd
c&cu.
ofioui>;
ovtc
ttpoA
yap
dXX^
aTjfia{yi
dvrarpap^va)S .
<Sfi^or//>a(*
oyaynratoi'
dvayKaiov rotrro
clvax,
oi)ic
p,-^
a7ro3iSoTai,
dBvvarov
5*
^avpi 5^ 5r4
tou aim>0
cfixu
^117
r6
ctitu*
Kara-
cu cvovrtoi cvoiatu* cu o
^^
to
cfvcu
yap dXr)dVa$aA
fi-q
cfvoi,
ij
yap ro ahwarov
fii)
dyrtarpafi*
1}
rw yap
r<p cv-
86
ahwaro
/xv
wovp
tipnjrai,
ON INTERPRETATION,
Now,
xiii
impossible that it should be,* not imposshould be are implied in * may be,' is
contingent,' and cannot be,* is not contingent
*
sible that it
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
ARISTOTLE
ovrtos Kia$ai raf rov dyayKolov
*H ahvvarov
(u^t^acrciy;
etvar t yap
yap ^
tvai,
Kaiov
16
cfvoi,
/i^
cfi'at'
ro)
dyayKalov
cfvat*
yap
/iv
fti^
Suvarov
icatoi'
S*
avay^
dp<l>w,
/x^
clvoi,
cZ^at
&np
cfvoi,
TO oMiyKOtor
ot)5^
a/x^cu
^vS/^^rrtu
jj,
cfvoi
Acittctcu
/ii7
aviifiaivtw,
t<^
ircu
tooow to
ducoAov^cu'
/ai^
o^k^ti Iotcu
dXrjBrj.
t
^iMi)f^
r<p
5vMvr^
r6
firjv
<utxya4dr
^^>^ ot^^
hwaTov
Aov^ci TO)
fn^
cli^oi
oAAa
drorroF.
cImcu
oAAa
OTonov.
aSuvarov dpa
avayKoiov
TO
20
tvai'
o7rc/>
lvai
rovTw 3c TO
war*
atroifHivar
i)
<l>dvat,
dhvvarov
Sui^arov
fii^, rj
ovic
avay-
dtn^r^M
cImoM^
irrofidvjf
t^
dvayKaZov
OVK avayKalov
ai^at at
p.Tj
/x^
ctvai,
dvrL<f>d(TLS
ctvai,
oC
17
dno^aatf t6
Tpdrrov,
Anoprjacif 8* dv Tty
166
cc tcj
dvayKOxov ttvai t6
ON INTERPRETATION,
xiii
Or is it the fact that one cannot arrange in the foregoing manner contradictories predicating necessity ?
For that which must be also may be. For if not, the
negative follows, since one or the other must follow.
And so, if a thing is not possible, then must it needs be
impossible. Hence we pronounce it impossible for
that which must needs be to be. But that statement,
of course, is absurd. Upon may be,' however, not
impossible follows in logical sequence, not necessary upon not impossible,' and things that must
needs be need not be which statement, again, is
absurd.
It is necessary,' again, that it should be
cannot be inferred from it may be,' nor yet can the
negative statement, it is necessary that it should not
be.'
I mean that
it may be
implies a bilateral
Should one of the two propositions just
potentiality.
mentioned, however, be true, there will then not
be both the alternatives. The thing that may be
yet may not be. But if we suppose for the moment
it either must be or must not be, we rule one alternative out, and no need is there that it should not
be (which equally holds of what must be) must
*
'
'
'
'
'
'
We
follow, therefore,
*
'
'
'
'
167
ARISTOTLE
toSwarov
yap
cJ tc
cTr^rai.
tlvai
dvrufKLGis cwcoAou^^ct, r6
fiif
hrmu, 4
fi^
hwar^
cfroi*
tnl
adai
/cat etvai
Kal
firj
lortu rh iow/^
(tvai, utort
firf
ttvai'
roOro
M ^08of.
ov
Kal
dcpfialveiv
hwdfJLCLS
rovTo
rGiV
3c
rd
W9
x^P^^
oAAd
om
ircuva
din-LKifjLV(vv,
ou8*
hvvdp.is
ivepyeCa
168
ov
oaai
Xiyovrai
iatv,
ro yap
cISos".
oyuiiwpLoL
ov,
otov
iil.
ht^aoBoA.
elprjrai,
o-ctcv
Surar^
aXoyoi
h*
ovS*
din'iKLp,va
rourov
Kara ro auro
Eviai
/xtJ,
Surarcu kcu
dp,a
p.v
SvvafiLs
rwv ivavruov, al
Tracxai,
evia fivroi
hwapAiS
ii%hvvafiuf aXoyov.
tan Kar
on
im
ivp/3a5i-
ON INTERPRETATION,
If not,
follow.
xiii
'
or in contrary results or directions. Not so all irrational ones. That is, fire, to repeat what we said,
cannot both give and not give out heat, nor can anything else always actual have any such potentiality.
Some
issues.
'
ambiguous.
Possible
on the one hand, of
*
facts and of things that are actuaUzed it is possible
for someone to walk, inasmuch as he actually walks,
and in general we call a thing possible,' since it is
now realized. On the other hand, possible is
used of a thing that might he realized it is possible
for someone to walk, since in certain conditions he
would. It is only to that which can move that this
itself is
ambiguous.
is
It is used,
'
'
'
'
'
169
ARISTOTLE
8c aXrides eiTrtlv ro fiYf oSiWroy clmi fiM'
elvat, Kal ro pahi^ov rj&rj Koi httpyff^
ovrw bifvarov oidx
ro fihf
pahiariKov
dfJLffxo
Jcty
16
TO
mU
rf
o^
dXrjOcs
Sc oXqBls.
o)ar
Irrti
rat
atrXiv^ inW,
0drfpO
iv /i/pci r6
tcad^Aov
to
TTiaKOTTlv Sct.
rij
80
dTTOijtdaei,
rj
ij
8t/catoy
ro)
God and
Kard(f>aGii
rfj
tcara^dafi,
#ral
nds dvBpumoi
ou8cty dvBpumo^ huccuos, ^ to wo9
6 Xtyaty
ori
the
heavenly bodies.
*
is also eternal.
of the
priority of actuality is the following :
Whai ki cslcnMU
in
nature
to
what is perishable ; and nothing li cAenial
Erior
y virtue of potentiality. For that which has the potentUntj
of being has also the potentiality of not-being, while thie
eternal is that which from its very nature cannot fail to be.
In a sense, therefore, all the primordial entities in the universe are free from potentiality. God is in the fullest senst
actual, since He is always what He is at any tinte, and hit
no element of unrealised potentiality {ArisMU, p. ITT). '
*
170
ON INTERPRETATION,
xiii-xiv
senses.
I think,
Of being,
not-being, indeed,
may
necessity,
and
its
**
actualities."
XIV. Here
arises a
tive statement
is
'
'
world.
"
on.
Such as the
and so
171
ARISTOTLE
dvBpornos StVatoff rw way avBpomoi aSurof, o&p
loTt KoAAtas SiVatos ovK <m KaXXiai &mco40>
KoAAia? aSt^coy cWf nortpa 817 A'ovrio rovrwv;
t yctf)
ra
/xcv o'
t^
^*^
o/foAov^ci ToJy iv
tJ
toO ivayriov, oiov
avBpcanos dScicof,
ayayKti
rfj 4*<jjyfj
c^ 8< H'V ^'^^^ V ^^^ ivayriov
ofjLoicjg ^X^t'VSofa vavria arw, oiJW ^ $cara^aat9 rfj icoto<f>dai carat ivavrla^ oAA' i^ tifnjfi^vrj dttr^^acny.
oiOTC (7K7rrov nola Sofa oAi^^y ^kv^I Wfj^
vavria, ncmpov 17 1-79 diroi^atcjs fj ^ r6 AmvOTL
ij
^at
Tujv
7rl
rfj irds
Kara^xiofuiv
<7n nc
A/ycu 5 a5c.
Sofa^ouaa.
tou dya^ou ot4 ayo^c^, iE^Aei}
ort ouK dyadoi/ ^cuSi^, cr<7><i S< on iccucov.
TTOTcpa S17 Torrct>' o'cun-ux TJ dXrfitl; Ktu ti tan
h^tIov lvai
28 b
Sofa
/xta,
To
^a^* diTOTipav
/xv
817
rw
wpCadai,
5
oAryft^y
ri
ivavria.;
servations
172
'
ON INTERPRETATION,
xiv
Or
is
'
Callias is just,'
'
'
173
ARISTOTLE
o^k ayadov, <m hi <ZAAo t ^
8* art
""ScJfa, oAAt;
vndp(<u,
re
oEoi'
rtifv
{ih 3^
r6 /x^
oatu
ho$d^ovat to
ro
tnrdpx^iv
dTTdrrj.
cf
ctati'
dXX*
undpxov),
avrat 8
vndpxov
^117
wv
vmifixtw
fi^
(d7Tipoi
teal
oomc
al ycWacif.
inr-
oooi ^1^
i^rriy
^*f
ij
Tcur
Et odv TO dya^oF
fai dyci^oi'
yap avrw ov
{(TvjJLpeprjKC
Kd(TTov oArj^j
/cai dXrjdrjg.
rf
t}
*ca^*
fUv
ow
ifjevhrjs
rov dyadov
ivavrlov Sofa.
arov 6
rwv
^ci^Sify,
rrjv
rrjs
1}
ij
rij^
Sc Toy
hk roO
on
toart fiaXXov av
diro^aato}^
dvr(Af>d(j(x)s
1}
1}
roQ
rpa,
ij
hrjXov
on KaKov
on
yap ivavrla
r6 avr6.
1 o9i9
ivavruitrtpa
avrrj
op
ciiy
1}
iyama,
ro ayaOov crvfirrenXeyfurri
174
ON INTERPRETATION,
good and the other one that
it is
xiv
not,
and suppose
there exist other qualities such as are neither inherent nor could be inherent in good, no opinion,
notwithstanding, must be taken for the contrary one
to the true that opines that some quality inheres,
though it does not inhere, in the good or opines that
it does not inhere, though it does so inhere, in the
good, inasmuch as no limit of range is imposed on
these types of opinion.**
shall rather call contrary to the true ones those judgements, in which
there is error. And these have to do with generation.
Generation means passing or transition from one of
two extremes to the other
hence error is such a
We
transition.
What
is
good, then,
is
The
'
175
ARISTOTLE
yap
iari' koX
ayaOov
ori ovk
tntf Swo
dydytcrf
"Eti Sc,
^ yap
irov-
O^TOi ivOV'
1 Ol5v
"Ert opLOLOJS
85
X^i>
rov
17
p.T]
oTt ctya^ov.
T^ o^v rov
97
roO
cti}
oiJif
vavria;
17
raimu^
fn^
dyoBov
dyaB6
ov
p,7i
Miff
cm
d^
dX-qdels lvax.
yap Kal
y^
dXrjdijs, ovb7TOT 8c
yap
1}
irp6s
dyodov ort
firj
dv
a/o^^ mu
17
r)
ovh* av
1}
yap Kal ravra dv cfty. AcwrcTttt ow t^ rov fi-q dyadov ori ovk dyadov ivayria
24 i} rod fiTj dyadov on dyadov ilf^vSr^s yap avrtj.
cjcrre Kal rj rov dyadov on ovk dyoBov r^ roO
dyadov on dyadov.
40
avrrj.
Q>avp6v he
indwfiev
dfia
on
o av
176
TT)v Kard<f>aaLV'
rfi
ho^
dtv
koBoXov
-q
-q
rfj
on
ON INTERPRETATION,
xiv
is
not good
is
not good
is
good thing
is good, and that that which is good is not good is a
parallel judgement to judging that that which is not
good is good. What is contrary, then, to the true
one that what is not good is not good ? Not, at any
that might well at the same time
rate, that it is bad
be true, and true judgements can never be contrary.
Some things that are not good are bad, so that both
may together be true. Nor is judging it not bad the
contrary, seeing that, too, may be true, since both
attributes might be compresent. And so in the case
of the judgement that what is not good is not good we
similar or parallel judgement to one that a
177
ARISTOTLE
Si a
84
*^
178
iw6^0tp B.
ON INTERPRETATION,
xnr
to
179
INTRODUCTION
The Development or AmiroTUC*! Looic
I.
The
invention of the syllogism, or rather the tjttematic treatment of the laws of inference, was perhapt
Aristotle's greatest and most original achievement.
It stands to reason that his approach to logical t tudiea
must have been through the Dialectic of the Academy but although we can see something of the
practical application of Plato's theories in such dialogues as the ThratteluM, PanmenuUs, Sopkist and
PoUticuSt there is little ground for supposing that thej
were ever fully developed on the formal side. Indeed our evidence points the other way. MTien
Aristotle is consciouslv building upon Plato foundations, or upon those ot any other philosophical tcboolt
he is accustomed to point out and account for the
mistakes of his predecessors ; but in the AnaUfticM the
only overt reference to Plato (46 a 31) concerns the
practice of definition by dichotomy (as exemplified in
the last two dialogues mentioned above), and hia
description of it as " a kind of weak syllogism " scenw
to imply that it was Plato's nearest approach in this
direction.
It is moreover intrinsically probable th^t
the systematic treatment of the inferential ppoceaa
should be attributed to Aristotle's own remarkable
powers of analysis.
;
182
PRIOR ANALYTICS
The theory of syllogism, as we find it expressed in
the Prior Analytics, is clearly the result of long study
and experiment. Attempts have been made in
recent years by two German scholars, F. Solmsen
{Die Entwicklung der aristotelischen Logik und Rhetorik,
conveniently summarized by Professor J. L. Stocks
in C.Q., 1933, pp. 115-124) and P. Gohlke (Die
Entstehung der aristotelischen Logik) to trace the development of the theory. Solmsen arranges the main
logical works in the following order
(1) Topics IVII ; (2) Posterior Analytics I ; (3) Topics VIII and
:
IX (De
II
Sophisticis Elenchis)
Dr Gohlke on
the other
hand holds that the received order of the two Analytics is correct, and that Topics VIII and IX presuppose the Analytics. I do not find his arguments
Certainty about such a point
perhaps unattainable, but I am strongly inclined
towards the view that the Prior Analytics contains at
least some of Aristotle's maturest logical thought.
Of course the problem is complicated by the fact
that the logical works as we possess them are almost
certainly compilations from notes or rough drafts for
The material is not always
Aristotle's discourses.
well arranged (e.g. chs. xv-xxii of An. Pr. II would
come more naturally in the Topics, and there is no
reason to suppose that the present arrangement has
any chronological significance. It is moreover highly
probable that corrections and afterthoughts have
been inserted in the text without complete assimilaand that many of the minor inconsistencies are
tion
Dr Gohlke's attempt to
due to this procedure.
identify these later passages, and so to distinguish the
different strata of thought, is attractively worked
entirely convincing.
is
183
ARISTOTLE
out
jectural.
II.
dc
tbb Paiob
Analytics
The
halves.
first
The
Gu^
184
PRIOR ANALYTICS
of syllogism (cf. An. Pr. I. xxiv and xxxiii). The rest
of the chapter gives the rules for conversion of asserCh. iii. deals with the conversion
toric premisses.
of apodeictic and problematic premisses, which are
now mentioned for the first time. It is extremely
probable that this ** chapter " did not form part of the
'*
original course on the syllogism, but was " added
figure.
(l)p.
189-193).
185
ARISTOTLE
premiss at least must be universl : i>. the middle
term must be distributed.
Ch. XXV lays down the materials
drawing a svUogistic inference, vix.
^om
implicit
stated here.
186
PRIOR ANALYTICS
conclusions from contrary and contradictory preChs. xvi and xvii are devoted to the fallacies
misses.
of petitio principii and false cause, while in ch. xviii
Aristotle points out that falsity in an argument depends upon the first false statement which it contains.
Chs. xix and xx treat of the syllogism in argument
and refutation. Ch. xxi shows the possibiHty of being
mistaken in a particular judgement even when one has
knowledge of the universal truths upon which that
judgement, when properly conceived, depends. Ch.
xxii deals with the convertibility of terms, and with
the comparison of desirable and undesirable objects.
The last five chapters treat of argument by induction,
by example, by reduction, by objection, and by probabilities or " signs."
Aristotle* s view
of the syllogism
sistencies
are,
187
ARISTOTLE
that he expected more corrcjfpondence between the
conclusion of a syllogism and objective reality than It
compatible with the conception of the tylk^gtan et a
process of thought. At any rate in 54 b 14 f." he apparently denies the validity of a syUogtai
the conclusion which follows from a pair
stating a narrowly restrictetl relation pro
could be inferred from complete knowM|ge ti the
i**
The premisses arc :
facts.
maj
(at
a given time) hi
treme examples
PRIOR ANALYTICS
b 18 stresses the former
and throughout the early chapters of An. Pr.
I, when he is establishing the valid moods of the three
figures, he proceeds by taking different pairs of premisses and then considering what conclusion if any
can be drawn from them. Of course this is quite
and it comes almost
legitimate, but it is one-sided
as a surprise when in ch. xiii ad Jin. he reverses the
process and analyses the conclusion into its premisses.
Moreover, he is led to change his normal practice
the desire to show that a
here by a special motive
problematic conclusion can be drawn either from two
problematic premisses or from one problematic and
one assertoric premiss. Here again the section in
question has the air of an afterthought
at least it is
It is a
curious that the point was not raised before.
definition of syllogism in 24
aspect
b 2 and
An. Pr.
7.
It is only fair,
its
defects
ARISTOTLE
but in default of linguistic or styUstic e vfckoee
can only be entertained as a remote poadbUlty.
In the tirst place Aristotle never makes dear wlial
he means by the apodeictic, assertorie and problematic relations. It is practically certain that ne eoosiders the distinction to be grounded upoo
**
animal
objective, yet he uses the same terms
"
m an i n 25 a 25 26 a 8 , b 7 , and i8 a to iUtntrate
b 6 ete.
an assertorie, and in SO a 2i, b S8, 51 b 41,
One might topto illustrate an apodeictic relation.
pose the analysis of premisses as apodeictie, assei toi Jc
and problematic to refer to the predieatloQ of tlie
definiton^ genus or differentia, of the property, and of
the accident ; but the only evidence for
spondence seems to be in 43 b 6 IT. Hie
of the accident with problematic
perhaps also be inferred from a compaHaOB of TWef
102 b 6 with An. Pr. 32 b 10. But it is a aeriow dcfeet
that so important a point should receive no eiqplkit
treatment, and the omission in itself jnstlfiet vs in
supposing that the modal 83rstem was never brought
thesis,
it
'
to perfection.
190
PRIOR ANALYTICS
which underlies the main development of the modal
analysis.
But we also find (24 b 14, 32 b 4) the possible described as (S) that which, as contrasted mth the
purely contingent, obtains generally but not necessarily, i.e. the probable.
It has been supposed that
this is merely a particular case of (2)
that indeed it
is the normal case of that type, since the purely contingent is outside the proper range of logical science.
Aristotle's language (32 b 13-22) certainly suggests
this at first sight.
But on this view the " problematic conversion " which holds good of (2) is hard to
justify.
If " all A may be B " is possible qua probable, ** no A may be B "is possible only qua improbable
the two judgements differ fundamentally in
implication, and the substitution of one for the other
cannot but affect the inference to be drawn. Indeed
in the " earlier " passage (which is probably a later
addition) Aristotle states definitely that a universal
negative premiss of type (3) is not convertible, although a similar premiss of type (2) follows the
general rule.
Dr Gohlke thinks (pp. 73 ff.) that
Aristotle was driven to restrict the sense of the problematic premiss so as to preclude conversion of the
universal negative by the awkward results which
would otherwise have followed in the second figure.
This seems extremely probable. At least it seems
obvious that the non-convertibility of such premisses
ought to have been demonstrated in ch. iii, if the
doctrine formed part of the original system.
An even greater mystery surrounds Aristotle's
attitude towards the convertibility of the particular
negative problematic premiss. The question is discussed at length by both Maier and Becker, but it
can only be briefly considered here. The main point
;
191
ARISTOTLE
is this : why is it that Aristotle, after expratflj admitting its convertibility (25 b 15 ; Maier appears to
overlook this statement at least I cannot find that
he refers to it), apparently never avails himself of it ?
Becker (pp. 60-63) shows that while in certain ol
Maier 's examples there is a definite reaion tor not
employing this form of oonvertion. In othen no tocb
reason can be quoted, so that the failure to employ It
appears to be a genuine oversif^hL Gohlke dJMnJTi
the difficulty by supposing 25 b 15 to be a late addiI cannot quite follow his theory of the detion.
velopment of Aristotle's idea of potslbiUtj.
In point of fact the problematic prenin of type
(2) will not fit coasistently into Aristotle't mtem.
One of its most awkward features is thai It has no
single contradictory, and so resists the jptooe
of
proof fxrr impossibUt ; and so in ch. xv we nod that it
gives place to type (1). It is moreover almost vahieless for purposes of argument.
Why then did
Aristotle adopt it as the normal type ? Plresomably
because he felt that to call anything ** pnssJhlf
which was in reality necessary was an Intolerable
looseness of terminology. At the same time a desire
for symmetrical tripartition induced him to frame a
system in which apodeictic and problematie should
show a perfectly antithetical correspondence about
the assertoric mean.
The attempt was bound to
fail, because objectively there is no mean between
the necessary and the not-necessary ; the two conceptions together are exhaustive.
It follows that any satisfactory threefokl system
must depend upon a subjective distinction of modality.
judgement is apodeictic if it rests on demonstrable grounds, assertoric if the fact Is appre-
192
PRIOR ANALYTICS
hended but the grounds are unknown, and problematic if the fact is regarded as capable of realization.
But even so the dividing line between the first two
and the universal problematic
is hard to draw
judgement is more naturally expressed as a particular
When we say " all men may be white,"
assertoric.
we presumably mean " some men are white, some
but we know no reason why the notare not-white
white men should necessarily exist."
Thus the modal analysis, which depends for its
value upon genuine distinctions, becomes practically
It was continued, with modifications, by
useless.
Aristotle's immediate successors, but being httle
more than a formal exercise it fell more and more
;
into neglect.
III.
Urbinas 35
B Marcianus 201
C Coislinianus 333
d Laurentianus 72.5
n Ambrosianus L. 93
f Marcianus App. IV. 5
an. 955
saec. xi
an. 1320
u Basileensis F. 11.21
m Ambrosianus Q. 87
a AngeUcus C. 3.13
c Vaticanus 1024
i Laurentianus 72.15
saec. x-xi
saec. xi-xii
saec. xv
?
"
satis
"
uetustus
saec. xiv
"
Of these the first two are by far the best. Bekker
Waitz showed that B is generally more
preferred
;
193
G 2
ARISTOTLE
accurate, and this \iew is now generally accepted.
C is considerably inferior to either, but it tometimea
preserves the true reading. Of the others only d and
n have much independent value ; the rest are aometimes of use to decide a doubtful point. Light is abo
thrown on the text by the commentariei of Aleiander,
Philoponus, lliemistius and Padua, and the Latin
versions of Boethius and the uetus inlerpres Laliami,
The present translation aims at preserving loeie
thing of the effect of the original without too great a
I have tried to escape the
sacrifice of English idiom.
anachronism of interpreting Aristotle's meaning too
and
I
me
criticism.
much
PRIOR ANALYTICS
systematic treatment in this country
It became apparent, however, that
the appearance of this volume, already long overdue,
would be indefinitely delayed if I attempted to
examine all the points which interested me, and I felt
that I could not tax the patience of the editors by
keeping it back any longer. I hope that even in its
present form it calls attention to some points which
have not been noticed before.
received
for
many
little
years.
195
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY
I append a short list of the principal editioot,
translations and works of reference which are likelj
to be most useful to the student of the AnaUftkt,
EDITIONa
Since the pubhcaUon of Bekker text (Berlin 1851,
Oxford 1837) there has been only one critical edition
WaiU (Leipiig
lS4i^l46).
Translation!
T. Taylor, London 1812; O. F. Owen (Bohn
Oxford Translation (Prior
Library), London 1853
Analyhct by A. J. Jenkinson, Potierior Analwtici hy
;
196
Fig. 2
Fig. 3
Fig. 4 Bramantip,
Fresison.
Camenes,
Dimaris,
Bo-
Fesapo,
posed.
s (simpliciter) means that the premiss denoted by
the preceding vowel must be converted simply.
p (per accidens) means that the premiss must be
converted by limitation.
c (conversio) means that for the premiss the contradictory of the conclusion must be substituted.
197
ANAATTIKQN IIPOTEPQN
^^^
I.
OTL
(XTToSftfiv
TTcpi
^ ok4i^9,
16
voux
/icTct
ro Kara
^
wovr^
lireAify,
clmi roSt
fii^
rj
firfievof
KaTqyopi(T6ai
H poraais
amo^TiKo^
ri
iv
iJLpL
TTavrl
7}
jxr)
Tivo^
o^
Kara^rucos ^
iart Xoyof
Kara
rtpo^' o^roy hi
^ dSidpioTO?.
/iT^Sevl
/i<v
rj
KaB6Xao
Acyw 5^ KaBoXov
ficv
ri
fi^
rj
Kara fUpOi,
ro
TTjv rjbovfjv
Ai,a(l>pL
XeKrLKTJs,
he
ori
17
17
fiTf
lvai
dyadov,
d7ToBLKriKrj
p.v
nporaai^
aTrohcucrucfj
198
rrj^
S*a-
A^i9 Barpov
yap
ip<trr^ aXXa,
PRIOR ANALYTICS
BOOK
Our
duty
first
is
^rTa^ise^
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
199
ARISTOTLE
o aTToStiKvviov), rj Si StaXKTUcfi iputniatt
ovScv 8^ Scourci npo^ t6 yavTujxxaews iariv.
vladai rov eKarepov avXXoyiofiov' Koi yap 6 do-
26 Aa/Ltj3ai'ct
beLKvvojv
Kal
crnXXoyicmKr}
ovAAoytJmu
pijjrCjv
Ttvo? \mdpxiv
/caret
y.v
/X17
xmdpx^iv,
Xaptlam Tt
wort laroi
Tivos
ToTTiicotj iprfrai.
Ti
fihf
XoyiariKr}
16
rd vvv.
"Opov 8c KoXof
2uAAoyt<7/xoy S4
20
ercpov Tt
rwv
ravra ehai.
(m Aoyoy
cv at rt94wrunt rtvwv
dmyioyy avfifialvti rw
raOra cS^cu to 8a tovto
KifjLvwv cf
Xeyoj Sc rep
<*
'.. that which is either self-evident
or oceptcd
for the immediate inquiry.
Cf. An. Po0t, I. but
100 a 27.
"
dialectical
premiss
native
aoo
TbMCV.
^
may be
form
Is X Y or not Y ?
or the a&sumpCkm of ooe
by a person reasoning indepcodeatly.
*
alter-
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
I.
Topics.^
What
is
is
Term
^
to be.
is
'
'
**
104a 8;
cf. also 100 a 29.
Demonstrative in An. Post. I. vi.-ix. dialectical in Topics.
;
201
Syllogism
ARISTOTLE
24 b
(Tu/LtjSatVctv,
Koiov,
TT/KJcrSfOfio^i' ir<x^
oAAou
6 <l>avfjvai
npo^ to
tiXrjfifuva
t^
irpo<r^6fifvoi
v6s
Tf
ttAcioku*',
v7TOKifivwv opujv,
80
ra
TO awiy#cau)i', cLtcA^ S^
oi)
25 a
'Ettci 5c Trdaa
nporaaU
^ Tou cf dmyiojj
xmdpx^iVt rovTcov h
d7ro<^aTi*cat Ka^*
6 KaTa<f>aTt.Kcov
8c
ci'
tariv
(mapxtiv
al fuv
Kd(mjv
^ roO
^vtl^^j^ffir
tou h^ix^oBai
KaTo^rucal
rrpoapr^QUf, iroAiV
Oi 5^
Taii
dpxW KadoXov
orpci^ctv,
olov
fi-qbfiia
riiv
dvayKatov, ov
1780107
opois dyri-
dyaOov,
op8*
8c #ran;yopan^ dyrt-
KoOdkov oAA*
dyaBdw
10 Tt cfvat tJSoi^v tcDv 8c cv ficpct r^v fih tcara*
<f>aT(,Krjv dvTL(TTp<l>iv avdyKT) Kara fiJpo^ (ci yap
'qSoirq Tts- dya^dv, /cat dya^di' t4 cotcu rfiotn^, rqw
202
(TTp<f>(,v
p.v
fiifv
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
I. i-ii
mean
'
some
subject.^*
may
pos-
assertoric,
JP^'^j.obiem
ians.
many modern
logic-
ARISTOTLE
Be
arcpnrjTitcqv
dpamog
fiT)
avayKaXov' od yAp
koI i^kiP cwJ^
ovk
undpxi
rivl ^uxt),
W &n
'^''''fWC**
''
TLvl dvdpwTTO).
UpWTOV
AB
flV
TTporacri^.
ft
J^
r^
KadoXov
80 /^ttTct
dvrL(TTO<f>i,
p,pos.
VTrdpx^f-Vt
t /xev
dvdyKT] Kal to
Toi
/xi^Scvi tJwttpx**^'
ydp
rw
85
904
TOW
Ta C\ Bekker.
B vndp^n oodd. dett.
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
I.
ii-iii
for it does
negative is not necessarily convertible
not follow that if man does not apply to some
animal, neither will animal apply to some man.
First, then, let us take a negative universal premiss "
having the terms A and B. Then if A applies to no
B,^ neither will B apply to any A ; for if it applies to
some, e.g. C, it will not be true that A applies to
no B, because C is a B. If on the other hand A applies
to all B, B also applies to some A ; for if it apph'es
but ex
to none, neither will A apply to any B
Similarly too if the
hypothesi it applies to all B.
premiss is particular. For if A applies to some B,
B must also apply to some A since if it applies to
none, neither will A apply to any B. But if A does
not apply to some B, it does not necessarily follow
that B does not apply to some A e.g., if B is animal
and A man ; for man does not apply to every
animal, but animal apphes to every man.
III. The same principle will also obtain in the case
of apodeictic premisses. The universal negative converts universally, whereas each of the affirmatives
converts as a particular premiss. For if A necessarily
applies to no B, B also necessarily applies to no A ;
for if it may apply to some, A might also apply to
;
'
'
'
'
'
'
necessarily apply to
necessarily so, neither will
some B. The particular negative statement is not
convertible, for the same reason which we have
already stated.*'
"
equivalent
*
is
'
No B
is
formula the
The modern
A.'
Ch. iL ad Jin.
05
(&)
*^
*^ ^'
ARISTOTLE
25 s
/X17
40AyO/lv),
25 b
y^
TO ^MiyiciaSor
ivhtx^odai (kox
dvay#cubv kqX to 3viT6r /iMS^yfoAai
TO
Acycrou
^ai TO
^cttTci
T17V
navrl
rj
tlvI
ci^fvcTcu,
t^ B tiW t^ A
ovS* ov to A o0mi4
coi
yap fir)dVi,
yap toOto np6rpov)' A' S^ TOi!p
d7To<l>aTiKots oux uHiavTws, dXX* ooa ftv iMxit"
o^at AcycTOi ^ T<p cf ovavKi^; vndpxu^ fj rt^ -jl^
ivhixoiro dv
B-
Toi
tw B
(ct
Sc'^^ticrai
imrov
^o^ t^
to Xcvir6r
/xr/Sevi Ifiariw xmdpx^^v rovrutv yap rd fUv
dvdyKT^y ovx vndpx^i, to 8^ ou#c dvaYKti vndpx^w
dvBpojTTov vhXadax
firj
ttvai
ff
10
15
ficvov,
^
fi-fj
vndpxfiv
vndpxfw
AB
(tLTi
recc.
06
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
I.
in
is
(c)
problem-
'
is
capable of being),
mil take place
'
'
'
'
'
2oa
18ff.
25a
32.
207
premisses.
ARISTOTLE
ovK
avriGrp<f>i,
Sc
carat
Nvv
20 hrjiXoVf
-fj
<l>avp6v
S^ ev
Mn
^Upa avrurrp
orav
Trcpi
Karqyoprjraif
80
KardufHUjw
atl
c^^ymu Ty
yap
(rriv, oTy
av npoa*
irpoi aAAv|Aou{|
koi ndif
ciwi^
dvdyKT) rtov oKpwv tvai GvXXoyiafi^ rikgum,
koXu) hk fieaov fiv o Koi avro aXXat mil
oAAo V TOVTO) COTtV, O Koi Ttj B4al yiyVfTOl fJLtOO^
aKpa 8c TO avTo tc cv dAAa> ov Koi v tL dXXo
COTtV
t yap TO A Kara iravros rov B Koi ro
B KaTo. iravTos tov F, dvdyKT) to A KtXTa travroy
TOV r KaTTjyopelodaL' nporcpov yap ipnjTai rrw^
fieaov
85
.
toBto
ivSXOfUvou
26
roO
oXat
rat
irpwrrtp
r^
fX4a(p
tlvax
ri
firj
"
Chs.
xiU.
*Ch.zlTi
ff.
208
24 b 28.
ft
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
iii-iv
I.
may
regard this
much
as clear,
that the
to apply to no B or
said
'
for
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
209
ARISTOTLE
40
* fiv A
rw
firjSevl
axarut
oAk Iotou
vndfl)(i,
ipoyKolow
t(rvfiPaivi, rw raOra ttvai' #reu yap murrl teal
fi'qBvl v8X(rai ro npurrov r<p iax^rt^ ^apxttv,
war our ro Kara fUpog ovrt ro koBoXov
yiyvrai dvaYKoZov fiffStvos Si orros apayKoiov
opoi roO
8ia rovrwv ovk coroi crvAAoyur/M^;.
navrl vndpxftv iaK}v dvBpumof Iinroi, tow /tiyavXXoyiafJLOs
Scvt ^<x>ov
dvOporrro^Xi$os.
OvS* orav
10
yiip
fi'qr
M^*
dpoi
GvXXoyiofxoS'
ypafifiij
ypafifirj
iarpucq,
yMvds
Ka^oAov
rovro)
16
rw
fiii
^dpi)(i
irrumjfirf-^
yikv
ax^jfiarL
opwv
iijXov
hf
Et
8'
on
<rrat
ro
ro
ouAAoy10/109.
o /xv KaOoXov
fo
rod
p,l^ov
orav
Qjcpov
rj
rwv
fiv
opatv 6 h* iv ^Upi
ro kolBoXov
KarrjyopiKOV
rj
tc^
rrpos
ortpftfriK^v,
ro cXarrov
210
rj
Kal
aAAoi;
ntos
rjfftKnv
oi opoi,
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
I.
iv
stone.
Again, when the first applies to none of the middle, eband the middle to none of the last, here too there can
be no syllogism. The positive relation of the extremes
may be illustrated by the terms science line medicine ; the negative relation by science line unit.
Thus if the terms are in a universal relation it is
when
will not.
there
It is
is
211
(2)
One
universal
particular
p^^^*^
ARISTOTLE
20 a
8c fitlCov fA axpov hr ^ r6
eXarrov B( to vno ro fUact^ 6y,
xmapx^rw yap ro fiv A nayrl Tp B, r^ ft^ B rwi
rw r. ovKOVv 1 <m Travro? icaTriYopta0<u ro
S6 iv dpxfj Xex^^v* dLvdyfcrj ro A rivi rtp V vndpxay*
Kal t ro fjLv A p.7jSvl roj B {mdpxt rd
B ruA
rw r, dvaymj ro A rivl rtv T fi^ V7mpXiv' wpiortu.
yap Kal ro Kara firjhticK; nuts A/yoftcv* okttc <jrai
avXXoyt(7p.6s r^Xtio^.
ofxolw^ hi Koi ci aMpurrov
17; TO Br KarrjyopiKov ov 6 yap avro^ toroi avA90 XoyiapM^ dhiopiarov rt kox iv fupi Xrf^ivros.
*Kdv hi npos ro IXarrov oKpov ro Ka66Xov rtdfj
^ KarrjyopiKov ^ arpr)ruc6v, ouk tartu avXXo'
yLGiMog, ovr Kara<f>ariKov ovrt dno^rucov ToG*
dSioplarov rf Kara p,po^ oyro^, oUnr c^ to yAp A
rivl ra> B vnapyet rj firf ^rrapxi^, T^
B wiuni
85 To> r xmdpxd' opoi rod vrrdpxtw Jtyafi6-^(i^
(f>p6vT]ais rod fi-q vndpxtiv ayaWv
t(i9 A^iaBla
UaXiv 1 ro fxv B p.rjhvl rat P, t^
A Tt*a
ra> B imdpxi ^ ft^ xmdpx^i ri firi iravrl vir4pxi,
ovh* ovrujs (rrai crvXXoyiafi6^
opoi XVk6v
tTTTTOS'
KVKVOSp XcVKOV ITTTTOy tc6pai
ol OI^TOi
8c Kal 1 ro AB dhiopiarov,
*
Oi5S' orav ro p.v irpos ra> fui^ovi oKpw koBoXov
yimqrai ^ KarrjyopiKov rj arprfruc6vt ro Si wpo^
ra> iXdrrovi arep-qriKov Kara yUpos, ovk lanu avX-
dSvvaTOv.
fiGOv
Xeyw
iarlv,
'
Tou
f.
Waits
ovrt.
212
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
I.
iv
other way, this is impossible. (By the major term Major and
I mean that in which the middle is contained, and by ^J.^g
the minor that which falls under the middle term.<^)
apply to all B, and B to some C. Then if DariL
For let
*
to be predicated of all means what we stated at
the beginning,^ A must apply to some C. And if Ferio.
appHes to no B, but B applies to some C, A must
necessarily not apply to some C (we have also defined
what we mean by to be predicated of none ^). Thus
we shall have a perfect syllogism. Similarly too supposing the proposition BC to be indefinite, provided
that it is affirmative ; for we shall have the same
syllogism whether BC is indefinite or particular.
If, however, the universal statement, whether ia^^~
affirmative or negative, refers to the minor term,
there will be no syllogism, whether the indefinite (or
particular) statement is affirmative or negative ; e.g.,
if A applies or does not apply to some B, and B appHes
The positive relation of the extremes may
to all C.
be illustrated by the terms good state intelligence
the negative relation by good state ignorance.
Again, if B applies to no C, and A applies to some, ie^^"
or does not apply to some or all of B ; in this case
too there will be no syllogism. We may take as
terms white horse swan, white horse crow. The
same terms will also serve if the proposition AB is
'
'
'
indefinite.
is
"
naturally a
more
24 b 30.
213
ARISTOTLE
28 b
Aoywr/xos
olov t TO fiv
6
Tivi TO)
Tivi
firj
vnoKtloButtnuf
dKoXovui^ai TO irpunov.
opoi l^ipov dvBpuyno^ Av#f<5v cFro ml
tov firj KaTrjYoplrai XVicafV 6 oiSpumo^ glXi^^Sw
KVKVOS Kol ^UjJV' OVKOW TO ^t^OV TOV fUv TrOUT^
Karqyop^lrai rov ht ovSv6i, utort owe Monu
ov8vl
yap
10
ol
/ii^Scvi
T<p B
ndXiv ro fiiv
imapxtro), to 5c B tu4 rip T fci^ vmifixirwt kqX
ol opoi aru>aav dtlwxov at'dpaf wos XttfHOv cfrs
^IXr^wuaVt atv firi KarrfyopiTtu Xttmwv 6 drdpaynost kvkvo^ kcu ;(ui!iv* to yap dt^^ uyor rov fihf
Trarros" Ka'rqyoplrai rov
ovhv6s.
"En inti dSiopiarov r6 nvi r^ F r^ B fti^
V7rdpxiv, dXrj6Vrai 5^ Koi ci fii^dm ^irdfp^t rau
c( fti^ TTovrt on Ttvi 01^ inrdpvci, }crf^$PTUt 5^
TotovTcov oocui' cooTc /xT^ocvt vnapf^ttv oC y/yvcTO*
<TvAAoyta/xoy (toOto ydp cipTTOt np6rtpov), ^avtpw
ovv oTt Toi oiJra>y c^civ Tovy opov9 oi5#f litrroi
ouAAoyto/idy ij*' yap av icoi ctti tovtoiv. ofioiufs
Se Sci^^^acTOi jccu ct to ca^oAov rtBtLri artpfif*
GvXXoyiafioi.
15
to
riKov.
15
AcUKOV
^CpOV
tTTTTOy,
{[oM)
VAcVICC^KAt^Off
S14
tats
iop
jj
avX'
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
I.
iv
minor premiss
all
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
26 a 2.
215
ARISTOTLE
Aoyta/iOS' v rovrta
rovs
avayicf)
80
r&
^V^P^t
^*'
tinofAtr'
t6
(rx^fian tcar^
ovrw^
opov^
yap to
T4VI
fXTJ
Trayri
mu
VWafi)((U.
M^
87 a
KaTqyopeiadw yap to
tou
/4v
fir/Stvog
roO
V7rdp^(,.
* Toi
ydp to
216
A, Philoponus (?),
Trendelenburg : to H t<J> N BCdf.
TO
WaiU:
t^
r^ H miu,
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
I.
iv-v
its
means of the
position.
Now
i.e.
'
imperfect 24 b 22
In Celarent, 25 b 40.
;
ff.
217
ARISTOTLE
27
ov8vi
dpa
rw M' TO h4
ovSevl rw N
rrayri rtp
&wffpx^ v r^
TO npwrov ax^jfJ^.
ovBe ro N owScvi r^ S Owapfti, war
cori 3J Scucvvrai
coTOi o at)ro; auAAayur/xo;.
15 ravra Kal ls to dBuvaTov dyovraf,
'Otl fiv ow yiyvcrat avXXoytOfiof ovtuk
Tiuv Tojv opcjv, tl>avp6v, oAA* 06 T^Xttot' o^ ydip
fiovov K Twv f cipx^y oAAa ical ^f SXXu hnr
TcActrat TO d>^y#fcubi'.
*Ea>' TO
TraiTOj rou N cal TO0 S #faf^
^XM rov vv*
Tiyoprjrai, ovk cotou auAAoyu7/i4^.
^atov dvdpumoi, T06 /i^ vndpxny
20 dpxciv ovGUL
ovoia l^i^v dpiOfio^- fUaov ovqIol,
ow&* ormv
fi'qrc rov N tnjr rov S firjSv6t tcarrjyoprfnu ro M.
opoi rov \mdp\iv ypap^rf-^t^o^havOpoamo^, rov
prjTLKov,
^X^
firj
vndpx^iv
<J>avp6v
opwv
25
{<pov
ypofifiij
o^
OTi dv
-j
XiSoi,
avXXoyuTfJLOi
ct7ro/iv aAAa>;
koBoXov rwv
^^fiXD
^Xf^ <*^
yap ixdvrwv ov ytyytrai r6 dvay^
KOZOP,
TTpos rov Tpov "j KaB6Xov TO fjUaoy,
npo^ rov fici^co ytyrpru KaB6Xov rf iwrrrjyopiKU}^ ^ <rrprjriKw^, npo^ 5^ rov Ikdmn Karii
fjLcpog Kai dvriKtifUvu}^ rat KaSoXov (Xiyto Si ro
*E,dv 5c
orav
ficv
218
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
I.
But ex hypothesi
to no O,
will apply to no M.
Therefore
will apply to no
applies to all N.
;
And since the
for again we have the first figure.
as well.
'^
necessity.
If on the other hand the middle term is universally
related to one of the others, when it is in a universal
relation, either positive or negative, to the major
1.
term, and in a particular relation
the opposite sense
to that of the universal relation (by in the opposite
^.T
1.^.1
m
and
27 a
3.
219
(2)
One
and^one*
particular
premiss.
ARISTOTLE
;>o
TO KaOoXov arprjnic6, r6 ip
KarrjY^piKOv to fca^^Kov,
TO iv fipi artprjTucov), avdymj yiyvtaBax ouArtp
XoytayMv crrprjTiK6v Kara fjupo^. ci yap ro
fiv N ftryScvt rat Sc S rtvi imdpxi, dvdyKJj to N
rwl Tco S /ii7 xmdpx^^v. cVci yap airrurrpt^i to
tmdp(i to N* to
crTprjTUc6v, ov^vl Tut
yt
avTucLfji^vto9, 1 fjLv
fi^pt Kara<f>aTiK6v tl 8c
s&
uTTcVctro Tii^
T^ S vnapx^w wqt r^
tii4 ti^
ti k
Kopaf.
10
fjLv
220
KaBoXov KiaBw
irpi^
t6 iut^O
Vu.
in Ferio, 26 a 25.
In point of fact it is the
same
syllogism.
There
no
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
I.
real distinction
'
M
"
between
'
'
and
all O.'
;
cf.
previous note.
221
ARISTOTLE
aKpOV, otov TO
to)
TO
fidXavXiwy
20
rod &
rw S
oi5Sm
xmapxit-v.
ouroj
N, TO
5i^
fil^^cW
navri
run. fiv
to
to
Si
Ttft
koI nairri
v7Tdpxiv.
Ca>ov'
OTt XapTv, l TO
/at}.
T<p flV
vnapx^rcj- ii'Sex^rai
15 firi
E, Tttft
tcai fttfinv^
^ndpxft9
fiij
vwdpxiny odn
vnapx^i rtvi 84
WM
E vndpfti' oAA*
fiiv o^ ovk tyxoipti
to)
fti^&CM tiJ
^n^ictiro
rtA
Xafiibf fyoffS$
to
Tivt fi^
vndpxit
undpxiv TO
pir}hvl
np S
^dpxpvTO^
hi
ural
odic
iirjSA
ci
ovAAo*
ijr
fortoaav
IlaAtp
Ka-niyopucax, koX
r6 KaB6Xtm
fUV N ITOVTi T^
^c S T(V( vnapx'iTw. tvS^x^rai 817 t^ N r^ H koI
7ravT4 icat /njScvt tmdpxtiv.
opoi tov /xi^Scvi iJr
dpx^iv XevKov KVKvo^ X160S' TOV hi nayrl ovk
15 KL(jdo)
OpMUJJS, oloV TO
TO!
ti7'
80 /cat
imdpx^t't ivhXT(u to
Sevt
Kopa^t
Sc
TOV
/X17
9S
Tfp
xmdpx^w
KarrjyopiKal
vndpx^Lv XcvKov
t,lOOV
opoi tov
vndpx^iv.
KVKVOS
ai
mii
fiiy-
XcvkovXaBos^^dpaf*
npordacis,
^a>ovx^^*
#coi 7r<ivT4
imdpx^w
'''^^
XiVk6v
opoi
{^'^'i^
tov
fi^
xmdpix^w XevKOV
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
I.
Then
it
and for it to
possible both for
to apply to all
apply to no O. The negative relation of the extremes
may be illustrated by the terms black snow
animal ; but we cannot find terms to illustrate the
positive universal relation, since
applies to some
although it also does not apply to some. For if
applies to all O, and
to no N,
will apply to no
;
but ex hypothesi it applies to some. Thus it is not
possible to find terms under these conditions, and our
proof must be drawn from the indefinite nature of the
particular premiss.
For since it is true to say that
if it in fact applies to
does not apply to some
none, and we saw that when it applies to none there
is no syllogism, evidently there will be no syllogism
in the present case either.
Again, let us take the premisses as affirmative, and ailet the universal relation be the same as before ; i.e,
let
apply to all
and to some O. Then it is possible both for
and for it to apply
to apply to all
to no O.
Examples of terms where it applies to none
are white swan stone ; but it will be impossible to
find examples where it applies to all O, for the same
reason as before ; and our proof must be drawn from
the indefinite nature of the particular premiss.
If the universal relation belongs to the minor term, OEi.e. if
applies to no
and does not apply to some
N, it is possible both for
and for it
to apply to all
to apply to no O. Examples of terms where it does
apply are white animal crow where it does not iaapply, white stone crow.
If the premisses are
affirmative, examples of terms where the relation of
is
N
O
the extremes
where
it is
is
positive, white
snow
223
ARISTOTLE
27 b
85
rdaLS Koi
fi7)STp(i}^
TTCLVTOiv
17
yikv
iravTi,
rj
dBiopiarcji,
l^wovdvOporTTO^,
\Vk6v
opoi hi ttou^Oi
AciNr^r-{^lOT*-
dt/njxov.
^avcpov
28 a
e^^ciXTiv
o^
K rwv
tiprjp4vt$iv
on
idw rt ovruK
ytyvmu
(( dvdyKrj^, dv r* ^ ovXXoyum^i
dvdyKTf Touy opou^ ovrojs <X'**'' ^T^^W' hi kqI ori
navrtg dTXi^ ciatv 04 v rovrtp Ttp o^pjfUiTK OIM*
avXXoyiap,6s
Xoyujp,ol (7ravT9
fjLevwv TLVwv,
Tf
roU
dpoit i( aioy*i^
iq
10
dm
15
224
HrjS'
Mpm u. WaiU.
27 a 3-5, 26-33.
Aristotle has in mind the formula which he use* in L 18,
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
Thus
v-vi
I.
when
evident that
is
position.^
but there
will
be a valid
h2
for the
(i)
Both
i.e.
for the
imperfect.
225
ARISTOTLE
KadoXov rwv opwv ovrwv npof ro fUoot^.
KaOoXov fiv ovv ovTUiVt orav koX to FI koI to V
nainl rut S vno-pxT), ori rivl t^ P to FI xmdpiti
cf avayia)S' iirel yap avrurrpliUi ro Karrf^opuci,
{nrdpiet ro 2 rwl rat P, war* cwei rt^uiv muni
ro n rai 8c P nvl ro 2, avdytai to ft to4 t^* P
VTTapx^iv ylyverai yap GvXXoviafio^ 8ia rov itpwrov oxi]fiaros. <m 8c kcu did tow oSiWtoi; teal
/cat firj
20
26
In DarU, 26 a 23.
This does not, of course, mean that the oondusioo ll
apodeictic, but that it follo^^ necessarily from the jiii iiilfl
226
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
I.
vi
'
<*
tive.'
227
ARISTOTLE
n b ro
II
yap ro fiv r iravri rip 2< to
ro fl rivt t<J* P vndpxtw intl yap
dtrTurrpi^i ro Kartuftarucov , imdp^ti rd tw\
rip n, aHTT* CTTct to ftci' P weu^i Ty to 5^ ^
Ttl/t TOi n, KQt TO P TtW T^ 11 Vndp(l' OKITC
TO n rivl rp p. TTClAlV 1 TO fciv P Tm T<J TO
8 n Trarri vnapx^i, dvaytcri r6 11 to4 rat V
\mdpxLV' 6 yap avros rpdiro^ t^ airoSctfcciv.
<m 8* a7ro8rfflu #fai 8ia tou i&wdroo fccu t^
Twv
opojv.
CI
Tivi, avdyict)
10
16
JO
By
Darii in the
Se.
syllogism in Darii.
228
first figure.
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
I.
vi
"
Barbara.
229
ARISTOTLE
28 b
26
dvdpomos
^ofov
rov 8^
firjSvi
auK tan
Xafituf
m^
5^ fi^*
\mapxi rat to P
P ru^ r^
t yap TTavrl to 11 roi 21 imdpxti to
S, Kol TO n rwl rw P tmdpiti' vn^KtiTO
firfitU
6pov9,
1 Tivl /xv
V7Tdpxiv.
fiif
VTrdpxiw
tcai
to
90 firjStvi
86
fXT)
29* o fiv
* %.e.
is
cm. Cm.
universal
230
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
but
vi
I.
we cannot
universal
relation
to
is
some S
although
'
'
>
27 b 20, 28.
28 a 30.
In Ferio, 26 a 25.
231
ARISTOTLE
*
P
8
T^ 8^
Z, Kol TO
Tivl TO)
T^ ' ^WlCWTO
TCW
fir)SvC),
rj
Aoyw7/Lu>9 ot^/xa>s>.
10
dvBpomo^
\Vk6v,
dBiopurrins, ovtc
rj
dilnrxpvXmvkov.
v^
(t>avp6v
Twv
15
ovTtjJS
fj
{ndvT^ yap
uv^XoytOfiids, dvdytcii
^vtpov
^X^iv.
&n
ytyvrrcu ouA-
AoyuTfto? cf dvayio;?, dv
rovs opovs
M^
ionu ouA-
ndvTW {<iw
h tcoivoi
o/)oi
l^wov
<J
tovtw
koI
6rt
t<^ o^pifUiTi
ouA
8^
rcAttoiWai frpoaXn^ipavo^
ficvojv Tivcuv)
OVT KaT<uf>aTiK6v,
VII. A^Aov
20
orav
7]
/Lti7
/cat
oXcos
ylyvrai
KadoXov
OTcprjTiKOv,
del
dvayKalov,
ylyvTai
Xrj<f>$VTOi
avXXoyiafios
rov
282
TO 8c
p,-qSvl
Tw r*
rwv
Spojv odShf
KarriyopiKov
8^
koI
roG aTtptjrucod
iXdrrovos
navri
dxpov
rw
dirrurTp<f>ofivcjv
rj
yap
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
I.
vi-vii
white.
there is a syllogism
the terms must be so related. It is evident also that
all the syllogisms in this figure are imperfect (since
they are all completed by assuming certain additional
premisses)
and that it will be impossible to reach a
universal conclusion, either negative or affirmative, by
means of this figure.
VII. It is clear also that in all the figures, whenever
we get no (direct) syllogism, where the terms are both
affirmative or both negative, there is no necessary
conclusion at all
but where one term is affirmative
and the other negative, if the negative term is
universal we always get a syllogism establishing a
relation of the minor to the major extreme.^ ^-^-i i^
A apphes to all ^ or some ^ B, and B to no C ; for if
necessarily follows
if
(3)
other
tions of
f["^oo-^'
lo-^, oi-.'
Cf. 27 b 20.
28 a 18, 26, 28 b 5, 15, 31.
The minor being the predicate and the major the subject.
Fapesmo in the first, Fesapo in the fourth figure.
^
**
Frisesomorum
233
General
on"th?three
figires.
conclusion.
ARISTOTLE
ribv Trpordaeiov avayio) ro
rivi
rw A fit)
vndp)(Uf,
avAXoyuyfi/ov
9roti/<7Ci
ax^pjoxnv.
(!>avp6v Be Kal on TraiTc; ol artXtts avAAoyur/xoi
rots'
ij
TcAcioiWcu 8id rov irporrov ajf^ftaroff.
yap
heiKTiKoti ^ 5(a rov dhuvdrov vpaivovrai ndvrts'
dfut)orepws 8c yiyvrrai ro npurrov ov^fia, StucriKws fJLv rXiovp.vwv, ort &td t^ ayrurrpo^iji
7rpalvovro ndvrtg, ^ 8' dvriarpo^ ro vpdnov
inoUi axfjp^a. Bid 5c rov d&wdrov StucwfjJvoMt,
ori rdvro^ rov 0ci;5ov9 o avXXoytafios yiyvrrai
Bid. rod npanov axi^fuxro^' otov iv rtp rfXtvrauf
ax^fiari, ct ro A Koi ro B rramri r<p T imipvn,
ort ro A rivi rut B vndpx^i' i ydp firfiv(, ro
B Travrl rat P, ouScvt rat F t^ A* cUA*
wurrl.
fikv
In either case
we get by conversion
.'.
234
C
B
applies to
applies to
do
no
B
A
Is eflTected
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
I.
vii
'^
applies to no C.
But ex hypothesi it applies to all
Similarly too in the other cases.
It is possible also to reduce all syllogisms to the All
universal syllogisms in the first figure. Those in the redSbie^
second figure are obviously completed by their help, ^ ^^^
but not all in a similar manner the universal syllo- syllogisms
C.
235
gg^Je.^^''^
ARISTOTLE
29b
rov Svrpov crx^fiaros Scucvwoi 19 oMtwrop <ltrdyovra^, otov 1 to A navrl rtft B to 8i B rufl
10 Toi r, OTt TO A Tll't Toi V.
i fop firfSvl, rtf^ hi
B navri, ovScvl Toi F to B vndp(t' rotho yap
iGfiev 8id Tov h\n(pov ax^fiaro^. ofiotw^ hi Hoi
ct yap to
CTTt tou crrpTjTiKov arai ij ciTroSfi^i;.
UwScVt T<p B TO 3c B TIKI Tip T VnOpYti, TO A
Tti'i Ta> i
oux if^op^i' ci /oi) iravTi, Tfp d< li
p.Tih^vl xmap\i, ovScvi Ta> F to B vnap(i' roOro
16 3*
t^
TO fUaov axfjfML. war* circi oc uv
1J1;
p,aa) ax^fiari avXXoyiofLOi rrdvr^^ dvayoviru %/s
TOV9 V rip nparrw KaBoXov avXXoytafAovf, Oi 3c
Kara p.pos v rw rrpotrtp Cip rov^ i rip fUatp,
<f>avp6v ori Kai oi Kara p^po^ dva)($i)ourai tU
rovs iv rw npwrw axrjpari Ka06Xov avXXeytapov^
*>
or 3* v rw rpirw KaBoXov piv ovrwv rCrv ^pojv
vBvs 7nrXovvrai 3i* K(ivwv rwv av^Xoyiapwv,
orav 3' v ppi Xrji^wai, Sia rwv iv pipi ovA-
rwv
XoyiapAjjv
dvi^X^^^^
f5
4 J Kivot>s,
a^pan
KaBoXov avXXoyiapovs
Ot pv ovv rwv avXXoyiapwv vnapxwv rj pil
tmdpxiv SeiKvwres tiprjrai ttw^ xovai, koI KoJf
avrovs ol k rov avrov axrjparos Kai npos dXXi^Xoot
oi CK riuv ctc/xov axrjpdrwv}
VIII. ^Errel 3* rp6v iariv vndpxfUf vt ircu i(
*
236
Camestres.
i.t.
axfjfJMTWf
am.
d.
96 b S4.
firat figare.
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
of the second figure
if
I.
vii-viii
we employ
reduction ad
A
A
impossibile
e.g., if
For if
applies to no B, and
applies to some C,
will not apply to some C.
For if it applies to all C, but to no B, B wall apply to
no
and
this
is
we
described
gisms in the
first figure.
Thus we have
'
237
ARISTOTLE
SO
yap vndpx^i
UO
fiiv,
S* ( vBXOflVWV,
y^
10
Bwaofiev.
*Ev
fi
10
fjL^v
Y^acTcu
Sia
note on 35 a 2,
25 a
5.
'Mb 6.
238
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
viii
I.
are
apply
'
or
'
'
'
'
We
ARISTOTLE
Kauos inl rouTuiy ct & Kara roO itmS^yrof iorvf
iicnBhf
avayKoios, kqX Kar Kwov rtvo^' r6
y^
16
20
yiyucrai &
rwv avXXoyiOfuav
ovx
(rj
yap
^a/);fi)
<l>avp6v ori
Trayrl rip
cf <miyn^
to A, to &
Koi ra^
Tt rttv
vtmDxu
4ari,
rourcjv.
!>
BP
Et Sc to fiv AB /xt; <mv avaytcaiov to
dvayKaZov, ovk cotcu to avfin^paafia dpaytauov.
t yap cm* <Tvp.p-qar(u to A rwi ra> B vndpx*op
cf dvdytcri^ hid tc tou trpurrov teal hta rov
rpLTov crxqp-aros* roOro & iptvSoi* ^i^)^CTai yap
roLovrov ^tvai to B a iyxwptl ro
iA,rjlbvl 6n'
dpx^iv. in Kal k rwv opatv <f>ai'p6v ori ovk ctrrcu
to avp.'nipaapxL dvayKoioVt olov ci to fiiv
41}
KivrjaLs, ro B ^<pov, c^* at h r6 T avOpamos'
^<pov jiev yap 6 dvOpojrros cf dvdyKffs iarl, Kwtirai
TO i,a)ov OVK eg avayKrjs, ovO
Q avfJputvo^.
80
>
.^.,
we have
in
TV ABC: ToBdiu.
<TTi
ABdu:
Baroco
loraiQfu
240
;:
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
I.
viii-ix
necessary conclusion. And if the conclusion is necessarily true of the selected examples, then it will be
necessarily true of some of the original term, since
that is identical with the selected example." Each
of these syllogisms is effected in its own figure.^
IX. It sometimes happens that we get an apo- An
^
deictic syllogism even when only one of the premisses Sajor'^
not either of the two indifferently, but the major ^on^^t-^eg
premiss is apodeictic e.g., if A has been taken as gives an
necessarily applying or not applying to B, and B as JJnciusSn
simply applying to C. If the premisses are taken in even if the
this way A will necessarily apply (or not apply) to C. premLs
For since A necessarily applies (or does not apply) ^irgt^^ure^'
to all B, and C is some B, obviously A must also apply (a)
(or not apply) to C/
FytgTiL
If, however, the premiss AB is not apodeictic, but
BC is, the conclusion will not be apodeictic. If it is,
it must follow, both by the first and by the third
figure, that A applies to some B.
But this is false
for B may be such that it is possible for A to apply to
no B. Further, it is also evident from a consideration
of the terms that the conclusion will not be apodeictic
e.g., supposing A to be
motion,' B animal,' and C
man.' Man is necessarily an animal, but the animal
is not necessarily moved
nor is the man. Similarly
'
we take
'
241
ARISTOTLE
to*
o^
TO
* TiQi'vi]
242
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
I.
ix-x
(6)
fyUogi^Sl
Then
some
But
when one
i.e.
"
Cf. notes
and
of the premisses
is
on 30 a
negative.
on 26 a 22, 30 a 15-23.
243
ARISTOTLE
sob
TrpwTOV
JO
yfyvmu yip t
ovk dpa ovSi t6 B Ty F*
dvTiarp(t>i yap ofWiw^.
Et 8' 17 KaTrjyopiKTi rrporaatV ^arw dvayKaia, o^k
vrro^Wrcu vdp
eorat to avfiTrfpaa^a dvavKoiov.
TO A navrl rw B cf dvayicny, r^i 5^ r /ii^Ocvi
imapxirui p.6vov. dvriarpcj^vro^ odv roO <yrpi-
ovScvl
rwv
(Txfjfia
T<i
o^/x^^^***
ndXiv.
cti;
dAAa rovruw
ovTwv dvayKaiov. olov crr(o to A ^tpov, rd 8c
B dvdpomo^, TO 8c r XVk6v, kou eu irpoTOocif
85 ofiolws lXri<f>Stoaav vhX(rai yap to (okn^ ftrjStvi
XcvKoj \mdpxiv. ovx vndp(i 817 ou8' d dSpumo^
TTcpaofia OVK
(mv dvayKalov
dtrXut^,
8*
oi5#f
dvay/catoi/.
81 *
'O/xoicu? 8* cf t *ccu
244
em
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
I.
figure
first
and
'
'
'
'
The same
30 a 23
principle
ff.
will
In 30 b 20.
245
ARISTOTLE
81 a
r*
KoX
A rm
10
16
opoi
'
246
vudpxu A.
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
I.
x-xi
particular syllogisms.
When the negative premiss (^
universal and apodeictic, the conclusion will also syllogisms.
be apodeictic ; but when the affirmative premiss is
imiversal and the negative particular, the conclusion
will not be apodeictic.
First let the negative premiss
be universal and necessary, and let it be impossible
for
apply to some C.
to apply to any B, but let
Then since the negative premiss is convertible, it is
is
247
ARISTOTLE
>cai ro V rivi t^ B vnap(4i Sea to
ro KadoXov rtft Kara iiipos' war tl
iravrl rw V ro A cf dydyfcrj^ undpx**^ fcal to V
80 Toi B rivi, Kai rat B rivi ovayKolov ^nd^xiuf r6 A*
ro yap B vno ro V ariv. yiyvtrai ody r6 wo&ro
ofioLws & SciYdijarnu urol wl to HP
crx^fia.
iarlv dyayKoZov dvnarpi^i vap ro T rw A tiW,
COOT* ct navrl rat V ro B cf avdytcrf^ V7rapxi, Kai
rat A rwl vndp(i cf avdy#ojff.
BF
rioAt^' araj ro fiiv AT artptjriK^, r6
intl
85 Kara^ftariKov, dvayKoiov & to artptirufdv.
oi;y dvriarp^i rivl T<jt> B to F, to 5^ A o^Sm
r<ji
r cf d>^y#oyy, ou& rift B Tivi vndp(i ii
dvdyKT)^ ro A' ro yap B vtto to F ioriv. ct 5< ro
KarT)yopuc6v dvayKoiov, ovk cotcu to crv/iWoao/ta
carui vdp to BF fcarifvopurov cai
di'ay/caioi'.
40 dvayKalov, to AF <rrprjrtKW koi fr^ OMiyiailbr.
enel ovv dvriorp^i ro Kara^rtKOv, ihrdpftt Koi
ro r rivl rat B cf dvaynrf^, war* tl t6 fUv A
81 b firjhcvi ratv F to 8c F rtvt rwv B, t^ A rtwt rw B
ovx uTrdpfci* oAA* ou#f cf <mxy#riyy ScScuktcu yap A'
rat rrpatTot ax^jp-ari ori riji <rrp>rjrucrk npordau>i
to avfiiripaofia larai
firj dvayKaias ownis ouSc
rw r
vndpxfi,
dvTi,<rrp4<t>w
dvayKolov.
"En
10
ydp
248
/Ltv
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
I.
xi
'
'
'
'
'
states.
"
The
reference
is
presumably to 30 a 32.
I
249
ARISTOTLE
ot^ oi opoi KoBoXov npoi to fuaov tlaiy,
norc arcu ro avfintpaofia dvaycaZov ci 3*
o fiv KadoXov o y
fi^pi, tcarqYoputwv fUP
ovTUiv anJu<f>orpwv, orav ro koB^Xou ydyrfrai tt**ay
a:w6*
16 Koiov, Kal ro avfiTrepaafia tartu ovayftoibr.
Sci^iS b* 7) avrij rj kou trportpov drrurrpi^
Kal ro v tipi KarrjYopiKOv. tl od avaycri to B
A {m6 to F iariif,
Trarri rto V {mapxiv, ro
avdyKT) ro B rwl rto A V7rdpxiv' ci 5c to B t^ A
rwl, Kal TO A T<p B rivl ihrdpx^w dvayKoZoi^'
avri(rrp<f>i yap. ofioiat^ 5^ iral ct T^ AT cTi^
dvayKalov KaSoXov ov ro vdp B vn6 r6 T iarlif,
Et hk ro v fi^pi ^arly ovayKoxov, oO<c iarai r6
corcu /oip t6 BF iv
avfjL7rpaafia dvayKoXov.
fipi re /ecu d>^y#catbi', to 5^ A wayri r& T
\map\4roit firj fjUvroi cf ovayin^* dynarpo/^dKUK
ovv rod BF TO npatrov yiyvtrai uxf)iJLa, kqx iJ fUv
16 Ka^oAou rrporaais ouk dyayKOia, ^ 8* A' /U/>ct
dvayKaCa. or 5* ouTa>9 txpuv ax npordati^, ovk
'^v ro iTviiTTtpaapxi dvayKoIov war* ovS* irri toJrwv. Tt 8c Kol K rwv opwv ^vp6v. orw yap
ro fiv A ypijyopai9, to 8c B 8tVow, id>* <f
8c TO r ^wov ro fiv oSv B Ttt4 Tuji F avdy80 #o; imdpxciv, ro 8c A Toi F ct^x^nu, kcu to A
Toi B oi5*c dvay^ccubi'* ou yap avaynci^ hinoxfv ri
Et
fjLcv
ctprjraL
v^
Kadcvbeiv
Tj
yprjyopvai,
ofioiws
to
&
AF
f04
cti;
8ia Tciui'
cv f^p<*
Tc Kal dvayKoiov.
Et 8* d /xcv KarrjyopiKos 6 8c artpirgrucos
31 a 24 ff. ; it is of course equallv inTalid.
i.e. C applies to all A ; which by conTersioo give*
relation '
applies to some C*
"
*
250
tfat
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
I.
xi
falls
under C.*'
however,
it
apodeictic, the
'
'
'
apodeictic.
If,
is
positive
and the
251
(^)
s/uoSsais,
ARISTOTLE
'^ ^
Koi
3} to koBcXov orpftfTuc^ rw
to avfi7rpaafia tonu Amytciuoir
rat r /at/Scvi ^pW^ctcu, 1^ 5^ B Ttt4
1 yap TO
Toi r vnapx^i, ro A Tiw t<J* B oi^oymy ft^ vira^iy.
orav 3c TO KaT(uf>ariK6y dvayircubv tc^, ^ iratfoAov
01/ t} v fupct, ^ TO <rTfrqTU(6y Kara fUpos,
dUAa
coTOi TO crvfxnpaafia avayKouov. to fiiv
40rat)Td d /ecu iirl rwv rrpor4puw ipoviuv, ojpot h*
orav fiv ^ TO koBoXov KaTTfyopucw <mxyro2ov,
85
opwv, orav
di^ayicaM)!',
/*v
icai
o^
y^
Jcjiov
avdpomoi, fUatw dydparwof,
iyprffopais
cv fxcpci to Karriyopucov dvayKOtoy, iyp^
orav 8
yop<ns
iutovXvk6v
({<j^ov fiiv
y^
dwdyteJi
tm
oTttv 8^
8(7rouv
TO rrpnjTU(6v iv
Ki,vovpLVov
XII. Oavc^i'
{<{>ov,
oiJv oTi
ovAAoyto/xd; cdv
/X17
ok dMayKoToi'
fiVpci
{a>ov
Toy
fiiv
ij,
fUao}
xmdpx^^
^^*^ *<"^
iv Tip
10
16
(^
om.
u.
252
C/. 31
87
if.,
b 20
ff.
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
I.
xi-xii
other negative,
for if it
is
is apodeictic, waking
animal
being the middle term)
(2) when the
affirmative apodeictic premiss is particular, waking
animal white (for animal must apply to something
white, but waking may apply to nothing white, and
it is not necessary that
waking should not apply
to some particular animal)
(3) when the negative
particular premiss is apodeictic, biped moving
animal (animal being the middle term).
XII. It is evident, then, that whereas there is no Deductions
assertoric syllogism unless both premisses are in the foregoing
assertoric mode, there is an apodeictic syllogism even analysis.
if only one of the premisses is apodeictic.**
But in
both cases, whether the syllogisms are affirmative or
negative, one of the premisses must be similar to the
conclusion. By
similar
I mean that if the conclusion is assertoric the premiss must be assertoric,
and if the conclusion is apodeictic the premiss must
affirmative premiss
man (man
'
'
'
deictic or assertoric.
On
30 a 23 note.
253
ARISTOn.E
82 a
Tiva
20
80
2i;/x/3atVct
8<
TToaay
85
C/.
25 a 37.
* This is not proved by the precrdlng argument
It b
indeed implied there that unless antyireuW iw ^ii c<ir
apaymuov /ii7 vrrapxcu' it cannot be equivalent to tiitxit^o
imapxiw. But one would expect explicit proof of to important
a point, and I am therefore disposed to agree with Becker
i
254
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
xii-xiii
I.
from the assertoric, we have given, broadlyspeaking, a sufficient account. XIII. Next we shall
state with regard to the possible, when and in what
sense and by what means we shall get a syllogism.
I call a thing possible if when, not being necessary,
differs
'
'
'
'
'
'
their contradictories,
'
'
'
'
'
all
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
argument'
is
the addition of a
II.
255
ARISTOTLE
ovK <mv apayHoIov, ro 04 un 6ifVyKaBto9
firi vndpxiv, ^avtpov on tl cw^ytT Oi to
rw B vnapx^iv, ivh^rrm tcaX ft^ ifimfxiw iral
iravrl h^i^^^^ imapytw, koX itwnl iMxtnu
fiVOv
Y)(U)pl
A
40 t
S2h
vndpxtiv.
firf
<f>da0}V'
H^
10
oMw
ic
ovroj^ 7r<f>vKv
dopiorov ra>
rj
^vavritv^.
/xt^Scv
25 b
21.
* The distinction is not drarly exprrmed^
aad
ttoAli^
to do with necessity.
In the former aoiK the imrtftritr fe
probable but not necessar>', and its opposH^ It thcrefbr*
Wi
possible
opposite.
256
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
I.
xiii
not necessary
is
may
;
'
'
another.
*>
257
ARISTOTLE
82 b
fiv
20
vxMnf
XoyiayLOV, ov
fi-^v
Mc^o-
vvv
4nofivois'
tft
twB4 yt {ipfSotfoA.
o^
Tairra /xcv
/liUW
5io/>M7^>fafT04
Tolf
TO aS^xfoBai
caTiv iKXafitlv
rj
yap
rc^
t^iSc
vndpxti
iM^cy &x4f
ro^
rai TO
ou TO
rj
irpunov ovv
iMxtrai
to
A A^
arrffiaivti
TO
AeyoiTO TO
rj
A i>^x^^^
rp
B
oiJ
TO
irayrl
t^ B t^
^awpor &n
natrrl
lira*fiv, ct
85
/y
k6ym
cl
or
ivS^xfoBai ^wdpxtn^*
Kaff*
3ixuf
o^ r^
ro
B A^
ci^j^co^oi, orav S^
proximftte cauwi
For the gencnl
sense e/. Met, VI. (E), ii.. XI. (K). vUL. An, P<mt. I. du
* There is no obvious fulfilment of this pronriie.
Jcaldo*
c/.
258
I. viii.
ff.
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
I.
xiii
259
ARISTOTLE
^ f*^ ^'
wot* air6 T&it ifUKO'
trxrjfiovojv^ dptcrtov, KaBantp Koi iv roit Smhs,
XIV. "Orav oSv r6 A ttovtI t^ B A-SAwu icai
TO B rravrl r<f> T, avXXoyujfWf Imtu r^u>f &n
tovto
40 TO A navrl rip T /8xcr<u (rndpYftv,
Knl>avp6v K Tov opiop^ov' TO yoD hnix^adoi ircurl
vndpxfi'V ouTOJS Xiyop.v. oimowh hk kox i to /iiy
A cv5x*Tou fii/Scvi tJi B t6 5^ B frarrl r^ r
TO A M4Xru ffti^Scvi t^* F* t^ yap ira^ o^ Tt^ B
cvScVcTcu TO A firi iv^YtaOai rovr ^, r6 M^T^
f aTToActTTciv rwv xmo r6 B MtxofUpwy,
'Orav h TO A imvTi rat B ?iWy7Ttu t^ 5^ B
Kad* o5 TO
dpxowra 1}
vndffxi
8*
vSXOfUvn'
r6
A IMx'F^*
hScx^cu
npordaiov
10
ou^ct;
TO B /xi^Scvi T<p
vndpx^iv {rovro
/xci*
iTtti^i T<J>
r
8'
V7rd/);(ii',
^'5<';(CTai jcoa
tlprjrai irporrtoov),
TO 8*
VQyri rtL
15
20
woit^
wor* ti t4
B, iroAu' ^
260
6iAoto<rx^fUMi
A*.
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
I.
xiii-xiv
<*
'
32 b 25
fF.
'^
32 b 38-40.
32 a 29
fiP.
261
ARISTOTLE
*Eav
h*
rj
4i
hf
rivl rto
woKiv CI TO
rOV l^XaB(U TravTi.'
/x7;5cvt T^i B to 8^ B Ttvi rwv V cvWvrnu
V7rdpxLV, avdyiof to A ii'btxtaOai run. rwv I frn
fb opLGfJLOV
ivBdxcrai
hk fn^nffTutii
dndh^iii^ 8* 17 oi>t^.
v tupi nporams i} hi tcoB^Xoo Kara*
olor to fjUm
rfj hi Biati ofAOtwt cxcixny
xmdpx^w
Xr)<l>(ffj
Tj
<l>artKri,
so
TraKTi
to)
^vd^X^^TOi
V7rap;(ii^8<i
ei^X^'''** M*^
7rpordawv ov yiyvrat
orpa<l>i<jr]^
Tivt
to)
T^ 6^ B TU4 T^ 1}
fi^ rflr MnfifUmm
^Vp69
hi rrj^ iv fxVpcc
vhX<yBfii
ovXXoyurfiif,
irol
drrw
rMrrof roO B
nBokfw idv
tc <nrcpiptnu ^ay tc
idv r dft^tortpai aBiOpumi ij
Kara fiipos* ovhafuits cotcu ouAAoyiaft^* ovhiv yap
kcjXvi ro B vTrpriviv rov A #ccu ^117 KurtryopAf
<o a^at in Igcjv tu 8* V7rprivi to B toi) A, ciAi^^M
38 b to r* rovru) yap ovr navri ovrt fitfhtwi ovrt rofi
ovre f^LT) rivi ivh^xcrat ro A inrdpx^w, tlir^p dvrw*
arp<f)ovmv at Kara r6 ^vS^;(t^cu rrpordatt^ koX
ro B TrActooiv ivScx^rai -^ to A {hrdpYiv, en 84
#cai K rcov opwv <f>ayp6v ovrw yip ix
p
Kara<l>arLKal
fir)
6fJLoio<Tx^fiovs
Mf^
* iravrt (delete,
B: om. Bekker.
262
quod
cet.
omncs
fere
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
I.
xiv
32 b 25
ff.
1.
24.
32 b 5-17.
263
g*)
j^^
syllogisms.
ARISTOTLE
ft
TcDv
ix^vrwv TcSf
if yap roO
imdpx^^v ri rov cf avdytcK "^ rov ivStx^oBcu vas
rov fuv oi5v vndpxtiv kqx tqO
ioTi avXXoyiafjLOS.
dvayKolov ^>avp6v ori ovk iarw, 6 fUv yap Karai^rucos dvaiptirai rtp ar^pftructft, 6 hi artpntfrucog
rw Karafharucof AciVcroi &Tf roO hfh^x^aBai ttpoi*
abuvarov' ScSciicrai yap on oCrun
rovTO 8
ixovTUJv rtov opwv K(d nami rtp iax4^r(p t6 rrpunn^
dvdyKTj Kal ovSvi tvStx^rai vndpxtuf* wot* o4iC
dv flrj rov o^cyco^cu <niAAayioyi4$(* ri yi^
dvayKoXov ovk "fjv <v5;(o/i<it>v.
^aVp6v hk OTL KoBoKoV TiOV OpUiV OVTWV iw TtUf
vSxofUvats TTpordatoiv cUt yiywrai ovXXoytafM^
v Tw TrpwTW (Txrjfiari, koI Karqyopucwv Koi
crrcpTfTLKCJV omwv, nXrjv KarrjyopiKwv piv r{kiu>i,
rp6rtti3
10
15
H)
<rrp7jTt,Ka>v
8c drtXijs-
Act 3c
86
MXHf^
rwv
rrp^
aKpov ivh^x^oBax arjpawrj, rtXtioL r*
caovrai rravres ol orvXXoyiGpol koI rov ^v8;f0'^<
Kara rov clprjfievov htopurpov, orav 8' ij frp69 r^
XafjLpdvr)rai
ro
TrpoTCurcoiv,
orov piv ^
p,L^ov
264
no
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
xiv-xv
I.
when the
it
related in this
all,
'
265
ARISTOTLE
tcaX oi aTfmruccX rum
ouAAoyta/KSv ou tou icara t^v bu>piafti A^Bcxo*
tL^tfytrv^
trovri
ficvov, oAAa Tou ftiyScj'i 5
vndpxew ct yap /i-nSevl tj fti^ wovri i( aniy#r7^,
ivhlx^cfdaL <f>afiv koi firj^vi koI utj ttovti i^dpycty.
'^^ A Tram r^ 'B, r6 ei B
*EvSx^<^^<^
TravTL TO) r KiaBw vndp)^iv iirtl o9y vrro r6 B
icrrl TO F rof Sc B waiTi v&<;(Tai to A, ^av^pw
on Kol T<J> r nayrl cv^cVctcu. ytyvcTOi b^ r^Xitoi
GvXXoyujfjLOS'
onoloas O^ cai artfnjTucrjs ovorjs
y^
85
Tfjs
AB
Ku
rrjs
rijs hi BF Kara^runjt,
ivStx^oBai rrj^ Si iwdpx^uf Xa^'
iwSdxtt^
PavovoTfg, T^tos> avXXoyujfio^ oti r6
40 firjStvl Tw F \mdpxiv,
M *Oti fici' oiJv Tou imapx^^^ rtS^fUtnv npo^ r6
(Xarrov aKpov tcAcioc ylyvovrtu avXXoyujp,oi,
<j>avp6v'
oTt 8' ivavriw^ rxovro^ ^aovrai avXXoyiGfjLol 8ta TOU oSiWtov htucr^ov dfia S* cora*
BrjXov Koi oTi aTcAciff* i} yo/) Sctftff oif ^t T5r
6 tXrjfifivwv TTpordatwv.
YlpWTOV 8c AcKTCOl' OTI CI TOU
OKTOJ dwyXT^
TO B ^Ivai, Kox hwarov ovtos rov
SuvoTOf tarai
TO B cf dmy/cijy. c<rrcu yap otn-co; ixovrwy r6
fikv <l>* <L TO
hwarov, to 8' c^* <fi to B o8wvaTov. 4 ouv TO /icv 8yvaTdv, ore 8inMTd' cZvoi,
dv, TO 8* dSuvaToi', or* oSvkitoi', ovk
10 ycvoiT*
dv yvoLTo, dfia 8* ci to
8uvaTdi' tcai ro B d8i/wiTov,
cv8c;^otT* di' TO
yVG$ai dvV rov B, C4 8^
npordGiiPS
fiv
A
A
266
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
when
I.
xv
the minor premiss, they will all be imperas are negative will not be possible
in accordance with the definition, but will be to the
effect that the predicate does not necessarily apply
for if it does not
to any, or to all, of the subject
necessarily apply to any or to all, we say that it may
apply to none or may not apply to all.*
For example, let A possibly apply to all B, and let
Then since C
it be assumed that B applies to all C.
falls under B, and A may apply to all B, evidently
A may apply to all C. Thus we get a perfect syllogism. Similarly too if the premiss AB is negative
and BC affirmative, the former being problematic
and the latter assertoric, there is a perfect syllogism
to the effect that A may apply to no C.
Thus it is evident that when the assertoric sense
refers to the minor extreme we get perfect syllogisms but to prove that syllogisms will result when
it is in the opposite relation we must employ reduction ad impossibile.
At the same time it will also
become apparent that these syllogisms will be imperfect ; for the proof will not be drawn from the
premisses originally assumed.
We must first observe that if when A is, B must
fect,
it is
'
and such
^'Jo^gj^J
atic,
minor
^e^toric.
B must
Proof that
if
necessarily be andAi?
possible.^
For assuming this relation ^ between
g^^^sjf^igo
and B, let us suppose
to be possible and B im- be possible.
possible.
Then (1) if the possible, when it is possible
for it to be, may come to be, but the impossible,
when it is impossible, cannot come to be and also
is possible and B impossible, then it may be
(2) if
possible for
to come to be apart from B ; and if
be, then if
is
possible,
267
'
ARISTOTLE
84ft
16
Tl TO Olios'
10
TOO
TO
A
B
TO
cfvOl
OUY
v^
SA
A am
*
is
The
never proved
268
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
I.
xv
We
'
'
'
'
'
'
A is possible B is possible.
As the result of this proof it is evident that if a Hence if a
hypothesis is false ^ but not impossible, the result polsibie,^^its
which is reached by means of the hypothesis will be Qo^j'^Jy^Sd'.
For example, if A is false ate the
false but not impossible.
conclusion.
is, B is, then B
but not impossible, and if when
For since it has
will be false but not impossible.
been proved that if when is, B is, when A is possible,
B will also be possible ; and since it is assumed that
is
false
'
269
ARISTOTLE
o5v TO A wavTi rat F M^xtoBai wrdpYtu^, ft^i yap
hh^x^aBo), TO 8c B iravrl T<ji F KWfBia wf 4wm
6va r^ i
dpxov rovTo 8^ iltv8o^ fiiv ov fUrrm
H tWWTl
Cl O^V TO fJLV A ^-f) M^X^''^*' TW F Ti
vnapx^i rat F, to A ow wokti t^ B A'S/j^mu*
ytyvcTot yap avXXoyiafios 8ta tou rpirov ax^uarofi
oAA* v7rKiro navri ivStxtoBai vndpxiv' avdymj
apa TO A nayrl rtp F ivStxtaOoi' ^fvSov^ yap
reddvroi Koi ovk ahuvdrov to avfifiaZvov iarm
dhvvarov.
40
Mb
%.$.
it
Cf.
A.T,M,Ut
Mdvmu
wm
of the argument
' The form of the an^ment (and Its fiUlacy) oan be dearly
seen in the following example, for which I am indebted to
Professor T. M. Knox :
If(a)
and
Assume
Some
{b) substitute
..
(c), ria.,
graduates cannot be
270
Fellows are
graduates may be Pelkme
All graduates may l>e
the contradictory of
(d)
For
AH
ib) All
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
I.
xv
may
'^
But
incompatible with
(a) All Fellows [may be] are wise
is
&
271
ARISTOTLE
S4 b
*Eyxo)pi
TTOiijaai
1
*
cVSc'xcTcu,
Kav T^
IMxOfro ri A*
trcu^l
oAA* \mKiro fiTj navTi tyx^P*^Act $ XafipavLV TO Tra^Ti vnofiY^Uf fi^ Kara
vpovov opiaavrast olov vvv ^ ^v r<JOc rtp XP^^
oAA* ciTrAcDs" 3ia roiovTutv yap irpordinwv Koi rws
10
avXXayiofjLovs
iroioOfitv,
XafiPavofjUvrjs
rrj^
yujfios'
itrti
npordatut^
icartL
odtc
ircuAwci
y r6
ianu
mni
tcai
vw
<rvAXo-
mrrl
TO
S'
pvgmpb
The
272
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
xv
I.
We
'
'
'
'
'
'
text.
is
Ul thought out.
now
'
contains.
273
ARISTOTLE
t4 b
ij
AB
so Kttt lXrj<f>dcj
F
F
vndpxiv.
fiti
KtioBcj vndpxov,
TO
t5
ftev
rip
rivi
B t^
yap Mx^^^f t^
KaSdnep npSrtpov omyici; &^
vrrop^fcii'* yiyvrroi yap avXr
rovro hk
ToO rplrov ax^yuaroi.
ahvvarov war vS4x^r av ri A fiffiff^ tw F*
tjjcvhov^ yap rtShrro^ ahvvarov r6 avfifialvop.
oiJtoj ovv 6 avXXoytafjLO^ ovk i<m raO tcara r6ip
hiopiap^v vhxofuvov, aXXa roO /iv^Scvt i( av^n^
avrr) yap iariv 1} avrt^aat^ rif^ YvopJvff9 ^wor
Olatuis, MOr) \^p if dpdyKtj^ r6 A run, rtp V
vnapx^^v, 6 Sc oia rov dhwdrov avXXoyuifio^ rrjf
Aoyi<7fio9
&a
ti
i,.
S4a86.
31 b 30
'
C/.
ellipse
274
that
teal
to
some
ff.
34 b
of
must apply
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
I.
xv
'
'
Let
for
'
'
32 a 18.
This excludes the possibility that A may apply to all C,
which would be implicit in a truly problematic conclusion.
275
ARISTOTLE
coTco
40
yap ro
h* >' <^
TO
fiv
Kivoufitvov,
dvepomo^.
vndpiti TO S^ B fravrl
ovK ccrroi to avfintpaafia
U avdyicrj
^rjS^va
avdytaj rtm.
rov
firjhVi
i(
o^
^trum^fuy,
dvayKoXor' od
&v$pcjnoy, oAA*
ydp
ori ro crvfin^paOfLd
i<m
KivtioBai
S^Aov
r^ 5i
fihodvA 4Mmfi r^
t<P T M^xtnu, teal
r6
dvay*^^ vndpxU^
owe
Xifirriov
St
I
ft
^-
BP
10
AB
8i*
avrwv yikv yap raw tiXrififUvwv
ovSap^s yiyverat ro dvayKoZov, dyrurrpa^Un^
hk TTJs Kara ro vS<;(or^<u npordatu}^ tarai
avXXoyia^S'
ctAiJ^co yap ro fiv A firjSvt rtp
aripxiivri'
16
yLV
B
to
Sc
76
AB
^^^^i*'
o ovroff cotoa
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
I.
xv
in motion
for let A stand for
and B
knowledge and C for man.' Then A will
apply to no B, but B may apply to all C," and the
For it is not
conclusion will not be apodeictic.
rather
necessary that no man should be in motion
Thus it
it is not necessary that any man should be.
apodeictic
for
'
'
'^
<*
'
"
'
277
ARISTOTLE
Mft
i<oovx^^'
w/tto.
15
''*'*'
H-V
vndpxtw
Xnm^
M^xtoBai XtvK6yC^mt
%^XGBax
ij
^^ttof
QJcpQ
yiyvcTOU
ot fuv ^f avTwv ot 8' avTi-
Xafifidynrai
avXXoyujfjLOS , irXriv
irpof to
nporaois,
teal
al
278
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
I.
xv
AB
is
Terms
negative or affirmative.
common
to both cases and showing a positive apodeictic relation of predicate to subject are white
showing a negative apodeictic relaanimal snow
tion,
white
animalpitch.
'
of the
problematic
examples.
We
shall also
version
premiss,
in
as
the
previous
when the
Cf.
34 b
19.
"
33 b 33
ff.
279
ARISTOTLE
ovaa ro ivS^xtaBat
b arptrjTiKr\
nlow
Ka^ifidyfi,
Tw B vndpxfi rj
{hrdffxti, r6
hi B nvi rw r M^xfTtu firi 6mipXfiV' dvrurrpa<l>vros yap rov BF Kara ro Mix^aBai ytyvtrai
TO
fihf
Traio-i
av^Xoyiafio^.
fi'fj
rj
10
17
ai>n7
rj
Karri
rwv
rtportpov,
opoi hi
Xivic6
AcvmSr
to
flft
tfidriov.
280
26 b U. 27 b 20.
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
I.
xv-xvi
animal
<*
But
(3)
Major
mirJor"^^'^'
universal.
kind.
'
33 a 34
ff.
In ch. xv.
281
ARISTOTLE
Hfe
6napxiv
40
B v^x^^^
as a drcAi^s
ort,
irovTt r<p
F* coreu
81^'
ovAAoyta/io;
nayrl rw T xmdpx^w,
ori ^vS^x^'"'^'^ '''^
dreXrjs Ik rr]s aTToScifccoy S^Xok* rov avrofv
Aovio/io; or4 ro
nayrl rip F cv8<x<^^'^ ^^)^'^
oAA* owx c^t vndpxi, Koi rcXfioy oAA* ovic drcA^*
cv^us yap CTTircActrcu Sid rdiv cf dpx^; npordaiwv.
Ei 8c U17 6fioioaxjjfjLovS ai nporaatis, arw
TTpwrov 1) arcprjriKti avayKoia, koI ro fiV
firjhcvl
10
navrl rw F
F vndpx^iv.
rw
hk
*
'
A
B
rw B
[cf avdytcrfsi],* rd 8^
/ii78cvi rdi
ci^c;^^<T^a>* avdytcrj 8^ rd
v^X&9a}
v7rKiro p,rjOvl
carat &^ B,
c^ oMaynts otti.
Waitx iariu ii
Cn, Alexander :
:
rj
navri
ev^Xo6at.
i :
rtvi'
o{^
A : vw^fvtv
vwiin^
Mym^i d.
carat
ityfitn
rj
cttci
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
I.
xvi
'
C/. 33
30, 84
27.
34 a 34
ff.
283
ARISTOTLE
o^Scvl
dmi<TTp<^i t6 arfnjTuc6, ov5^ ri B rtp
ev^fX^rat' to 8^ A to* F -^ ^f^yri rj rtpl frctreu
vnaf>\w war* oi^i^i ^ ov irayrl r^ V r6 H
ci^x^ir* OF imdpxtiv untKtiro Bi vnvri If
5<
#(cU
ei^xia^a*
/xi^ocvi tcuk*
^dpxu^$ to
r xmapxirw
t( dvay#oy?. o /iiv
oSv avXXaviafJLOS corcu rcAcio^, oAA* ov top fii}
vndpxfuf oAAa tou i%^^a$<u firj unapx^w ^ T
ydp irpoToat; otrrcu9 iXi^^iOrf i) ano tov /iCiCovo;
ojcpov, Kox 19 TO a^vFOTOK ouK ^(Triv ayayciF* it
vop ^7Ttyrdirj ro A T(jt> P Tua* vnanx^tv, KCiTiM
TTOi^i TO*
Ta>
B MXa6<u
/ii^6cvi
^ira^vciv,
ov8^
ts avfJLpatvi
so
X^^'
irirra,
Joioi'
'"'*'
'
TiM Bekkcri
TvC.
m^I^ oodd.,
Alexmader.
284
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
since the negative premiss
is
xvi
I.
convertible, neither
apply to any A.
{A.T.M.
p. 44) aro:ues plausibly that the expression represents the expansion of an originally indefinite premiss
'
applies to
^ This being the contradictory of the conclusion (A applies
to no C) which it is hoped to establish.
The resultant syllogism will be the
C/. 35 a 14, b 1, 7.
same as in 35 b 38 ff.
"^
285
'
ARISTOTLB
T6v avTOv hi rponov c^ci Kanl rutv hf lUpi
av^XoyiafJuov orav yap f ro <rrpnrfru(6v OMiyicaZor,
Koi TO avfJL7rpaafjLa cotoa tov /x^ vrrapx^iv. otov
TO
fiiv
firjSvl
Tiw rwv
rwv
B Mtx^rai
imapx^w to
hk
oi^m rw F
t6
nayrl rtp T,
/i^x'TOi* oAA* vw*
10
tucptp
^
286
r^ iXimm
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
I.
xvi
The same
When
some.''
When
(viz.
BC)
AB)
is
287
ARISTOTLE
^
Kara fUpos, ovh* oimcK /<Mtu <ruASpot Si KOivol roO ;iV imapx^w (^oiM
afitf>6rpai
Xoytauo^,
15 Acvicoi/
so
V,
ij fxiv
vndpxtiv tf h* ivh^x*^^
pJv Karat^rucrj^ vndpxtiv ar^pai'
vov<rqs ovh'nor
lorait ttis hi orpTtrucfjs rrk
KadoXov act. rov avrov hi rpdnov koi orav ^ pi
pjpos' orav hi
80
arjpatyj),
rrjs
Maier.
888
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
xvi-xvii
I.
'
'
'
before.
'
**
K 2
289
ARISTOTLE
Mb
npufTOV oZv htucrtov
15
^i
ovK ayrurrp^^i to
koX h^ix^oBui
vnaDXiv. ovkouv intX avriarp<fovaiv <u cv r^i /vo<x*a^cu Kara^dati^ raii
ano^doiai Koi oi A^oyruu Koi ai ayrurctftCMcu, to
fii/Scvi
TO
4f>
37
B^ B
/ii^S^vi T<j>
r<p
^K^^cTOi
firfiwi
^napxnw, ^afp6
on
dvrurrp^^i to arprjru(6v.
"E^ri 8* ou5^ #ccuAtAC( T^ /i^ A T<J> B iMYtoBai
firfitvi, TO 8^ B Tivl rwv A ^f eWym/ff u^ 6napxtv,
otov TO /i^ Acvrov ffovTi dvdpumcj evo^xtrai /X17
vndpx^w {koI yap imapx*w), dvvpamcv 8* ovic
oAi}^^;
ciTTcti^
1^ Cv8;(0/il^V.
*AAAa firfv ovB* K rod dBwdrov 8cix^v|acTcu
dirriorp<fov, otov ci ris d(ia}0iv, intl ^JkCoo^ r6
v8;i^a^(u TO B rw A fxrfBtvt \mdpxW, dXtfdis r6
fiif vhXadaA firf6vl {^idais yap koa ano^amg),
ci 8^ TOVT*, aXr)d(^ ( dvdytcrf^ rtvt rwv A to B
*
imxtifirtrai
S90
'
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
I.
xvii
of Negative
we must show that there is no conversion
problematic
-j^
11
^-L
premiss
e.g.,
that
it
problematic
AA premisses
negative
the
may apply to no B, it does not necessarily follow convertible.
that B may apply to no A. Let this be assumed First proof.'
Then
i.e. let us take it that B may apply to no A.
since affirmations in the problematic sense convert
with their negations, whether contrary or opposite,
and since B may apply to no A, evidently B may also
for it does not
apply to all A. But this is false
necessarily follow that if one term may apply to all
of another, the latter may also apply to all of the
former. Therefore the negative (problematic) statement is not convertible.
should not possibly Second
Again, there is no reason why
^^^
apply to no B, although B necessarily does not apply
any
apply
to
white may not
to some A. E.g.,
man (for it may also apply to every man), but it is
not true to say that man may apply to nothing
man necessarily does not
for
that is white
apply to many white things, and (as we have seen ^)
the necessary is not possible.
Furthermore, this type of proposition cannot be Third proot
shown to be convertible by reduction ad impossibile,
e.g., if it were to be claimed that since it is false
that B may apply to no A, it is true that it cannot
apply to no A, since the latter statement is the
contradictory of the former ; and if this is so, it is
therefore A
true that B must apply to some
;
First
<
'
'
'
<*
B i A and B
to
no
B.'
291
ARISTOTLE
14
to
B* roOro 8'
oSin^TOV.* od yap cc /117 /iW;(rnu fiTScvi t^ B
T^ A, dHiy#oj rivl vndp)^iy, to ydp fii^ /iS/yco^cu /z^Scvi 5ix<^ A/ycrcUy to fiiv c& ^( cu^ym^f
rivi V7rdpxi, to 5* Ci i( dvayiof^ rtvl fjJi ^dpyt^*
TO yap i^ avdyta^ tu4 twv A /ii^ 6ndpxow odi
dXTjd9 inTv 09 fravTi M^x^''^'^ M^ ^mipx^w,
\mdp\iv* wart koX t6
uxrrrtp ovSt
rtvi roir
avaym^ cm
iravA
Sia rovTO
16
^fuv
^ytiocf
iratrrl
01)
i( dwdytctff iwdfxti,
ivb4xto0<u,
/X17
rt^
rravTi
c^c;(o/ivoi', cu; cv
opx^ BujpiaafiMV, 06
TO
to
wart
MtxttrOai
fiovot^
to ^f
rourov
oit^tv avfipaiyti a3iWror, war* od
\ri<f>Bivros
yiyvtrai avXXoytofios. ^avp6v oSv Ik rutp ififj'
fivwv OTi OVK dyTurrp<^i ro OTtprjTucov.
Toi^ou Bt btix^tvro^ KtiaBcj r6 A rtp ficr B
ci^cxco^cu
rfj^
/xijScFi
rwv B-
roim>
^
o^vKtrov* uolgo.
^
cm. AC.
om. AL
' ft6*o
'
Koi
5'
T<J>
dtrrurrpo^S ovk
Travrl.
nfol*
ccrrcu iTvXXoyuifids'
o^i
ror.
Maieri rwr B.
ccpi/TOi
revro
I'
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
must also apply
<The reasoning
xvii
I.
some B
'
'
'
'
32 a
18.
293
ARISTOTLE
&
ydjp art
ovk avrurroi^i
dbwarov
Y^
^^ TO
oXtjj^ S* ci
oAA*
17 roiavrq trpoTaaii.
rtSivro^ yap roO B warr^
Toi
#coi
muni
koI pLrfiA
&n
y^
warn]
fi^ watrrl
vw6fix*tp] nif
Mc^^
Maier.
vwapxtuf
Makr.
i.,
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
I.
xvii
'
B man
may apply
white,'
'
'
and
'
horse.'
Then A,
i.e.
white,
to all of the one and to none of
the other ; but it is not possible either that B should
or should not apply to C. That it is not possible
that it should apply is evident, for no horse is a man.
But neither is it possible that it should not apply ;
for it is necessary that no horse should be a man,
and the necessary, as we have seen,*' is not possible.
Hence no syllogism results.
There will be a similar proof if the negative is
taken with the other premiss instead, or if both
premisses are taken as affirmative or both as negative
for the proof will be drawn from the same terms.
The same holds good when one premiss is universal
and the other particular, or when both are particular
or indefinite, or for any other possible combination
major premiss would g:ive A may not apply to some C,'
which is not incompatible with the minor premiss. Maier's
emendation gives the right sense, but it has no support from
Mss. or commentators, and is at best a clumsy and unnatural
* 32 a 28.
form of expression.
*
ARISTOTLE
roac&f*
y^
del
rmv air&v
5ui
iforai
rdatwv
Kara ro ivhixtadai
ylyyercu avXXtyyiafios.
opatv
i)
odotlt
rt$fUUf
10 <rrjfiaivi,
hixadai
orav
S'
i}
/4^v
Kara/^riKt)
iv
ik
tftyi(rfi09.
6p.oUas
iccU ci ir/>^
r0irj rd artfrrjntcdv.
0
*EIav 8' dfuf>dT(p<u iikv uxn (mprjrixal, orj^ialiTf
8*
fxh^ fiii undpxiv ^ 8' c^;((7^ai /xij wr-
Toi
1}
'npoTdaQJ9
yiyvtrox
avXXoyioiid^
on
B t^ r
ro
idv
CTvAAoyta/xo;.
^-dvBporrros ,
ovk cotcu
opoi rou ftcv VTrdpxiv vyUia ^t^o
rov hk fitf vndpx^iv vyUia hnroi
'dvOpiono^.
(rv^Xoyiuficjv.
S96
orav
fthf
cfci
Kdni rwv iv
f^p^*^
ydp ^ to Kara^rtKOV
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
I.
xvii-xviii
i/>
The proof will be the same as before, and drawn
from the same terms. But when the affirmative is
1
premisses
universaL
34 b 19
ff.
35 a 6
fF.
297
ARISTOTLE
I
^A
^,
ou^U
opaw Sc^mrreu
airroiv
rwr
hf roi9 Ttp^tftov.
OT^/xaro
rrprfTUc6.
Xtj^Ofj,
*E>dv hi (nrdpxpv
Xrj^djj,
10
rrj^
Mpas
irpardatiMH' otJ^'
ofi/^ortpai
^rucal
rj
"fj
8c
navri vSXaBax.
TO B
aTprfTiKrjs oi)8c
so
8c
rravrl Ttp
Tou npwTov
vSXT(u
dvTurrpa^iarii
T^
ci^8c;fCTO'
o^
yiyvmu 8^ iriAiy
^t to B
o^fTj/iaroy o ovAAoyia/xo?
p,r)Bvi
ou8' v7Tdpxi>^ TO
VTrdpx^iv oifKOuv
vndp\iv.
oiJScvt
to
8^
to*
TcDi'
Toi
rrjs
ouScvi vndp^i' to
F.
KtioOu)
p,rjlSv\
yop
ivh^xfrai
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
I.
xviii-xix
statement that
same terms
^^^
Sc. universal.
C/. 36 a 15
ff.
299
ARISTOTLE
Ma
TO 5c
15
Tov avrov
&
Toi
ry
Bartpov
B M^x^^^
r<^ fiiv
i(
virapx^rui
travTi
<rrcu ya/)
i^apj(ii'.
5c to
dvOpanros i^*
to
fxcv
5c to
avdytof^,
Acvicw ^'
S*
ivhXrai
cf
dvay#n;y.
m
ouic
/Xv
UTTO
evScxctr^oi
In hk koX
r vndpxiV'
T(j>
ti7
Toi
TO
Sc
clvtU
^f
dMty#07y
TO 8c
iyprjyopo^ to 5^
^<pp
Sc
eyprqyopos ^wov.
wrapx^i-v, ciTTcp
tj
he
t^
iyxeopZ
artpr^'
raivrwv
T<ji
ftCV
VOMTt
kLvtigis,
800
icvtcvtp
^v5cj(ca^a4 ovif
p,riv
KiyJvwv TO
88 b a
roO
^vpcv to yop
(JWpaivv,
fJLV
ouv
if dpj^orlputv dvayKaiwv
Tf
TiKrjs
TO
/icv
Mptimtp
dvOpamos o^5cv2
ci'Sc^dficvoi'.
'AAAa
KoZov
TO
oti
ovAAoycafto?
^v
cal
firfivi,
4^
to 5^
#n;#noj'
40
oiJ#c
ovTca^ o^ tXovrwv rwv optav ovS^U ianu ouAAoyt<7/xo5* avfiPaivti yap t^ B tw F ^f <Wyfi;j
fti7
t&
ir/>o;
urariTyo/HJifdi' oiayiifotov
cuSe^ofitvov, icai to
/i7/5cvi
coTw TO
rioAtt^
rwv T iwl
^iKiro l\^x*^^^*
to ortprjTiKov.
re6irf
8*
ci
{a>ov t6 5* i^*
yap iyprjyoport cf
<miy#ciy5
koI
ndv to
ov^
rod
TTCirrt
ivB^x^rai,
<f>avp6v
o^
ori
fiij
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
I.
xix
all.
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
This
is
fallacy.
Cf. note
on 36 a
15.
32 a 28.
30 b 7, 31 a 21.
"
301
ARISTOTLE
nh
ovS^
rwv
avTUCifUvuv
'O/iOAOx hi Scix^^CTOi
ft
'Exxv
5*
tcara/^aotunf f
icoi
6fioio<rxrjfjLOVg
war*
avdwaXt rtBtlarfq
waiv
al
nparaatii,
TO
Tip fih^
ciAi/^ai ydp
r^
wou^i
axfjfJM.
T<jii
Kov
r
l
npordatittv ro ^ikv
hi
waadrcaS"
rtBakrw, ovk lartu ouAi*
rov fUv ya/> fii^ vndpxfiM ^ roO i$
dpaytcji fi'tj vnapx^iv ^avp6v on ovk iarax hiii
r^ fi^ c&A^^oi ortfnfTucipf nporaaw fv/fr iv rtp
*Eav hi
16
KarrjiYopucai,
XoyioyiOi.
^apx^iv
fiijv
^if/JT*
rw
i( avdytaj^ vndpxti^,
firi
oAAa
vndpxt^v' i( tivaym/;
yap OVTCJ9
to
'
irara^crrciir n,
$cQTai^dirf<0
n:
SOS
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
xix
I.
(<>)
'
'
'
'^
all results.
The same
will also
affirmative premisses).
i.e.f if
premiss
is
803
(2) Particu-
larsyllo-
gisms.
ARISTOTLE
2:>
onw
to
wk
Sid rdv
atVrcui' opcuv,
#r
artprjTiKrj^ rrjs
40
t9
fallacy
ef,
<
SO*
Actually by the
first
figure onlj.
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
When
ticular syllogisms.
T.
xix
is
same terms.^
Nor will there be a syllogism when both premisses
are taken as affirmative. The proof of this also is
the same as before."
When, however, both premisses are negative, and
that which has the non-attributive sense is universal
and apodeictic, although there will be no necessary
conclusion from the assumptions as they are, when
the problematic premiss is converted there will be a
syllogism, as before.
If, however, both premisses are assumed as indefinite or particular, there will be no syllogism. The
proof is the same as before, and is effected by means
of the same terms.
General
Thus it- is evident from the forec^oinff analysis deductions.
...
,
1
(a) that when the negative universal premiss is taken
as apodeictic a syllogism always results, giving not
only a conclusion of the negative problematic type
but also one of the negative assertoric type,^ but
when the affirmative universal premiss is so taken
a syllogism never results ; (b) that a syllogism results
or does not result from the same arrangement of
'^
...
It
is
305
ARISTOTLE
XX. *Ev hi rqt rtXevToua ax^fion ral dlft^ordpwv ii^yoyuivtov koX Tm ertpaf 4<mu ouA*
OTov fikv oiv vh4x^aBaL arjfuuvoHnv
Xoyujfi6s.
ai irpoT64ii9, fcal r6 avfiir^paafia iarai h^^xpfivov' Kol OTOV ij fihf M4xo^ ^ 5* ^mp)^cv.
orcLv 8* ij fr/pa tc^ dvaycaJa, iop fih J iraTa^Tuc/j, ovK laroA r^ avuir^paafui ovt ivay
10 KoZov ovB* vndpxov, iop 8
f ortprfruc^, roG fi^
V7rdpxiv tcnai avXXoyta^LOf, KoBdntp koI iv roi?
i
nportpov.
Xfftrriov ok
u KOi
3^
ivh^xoiT* Qv*
8^X*^<** TO 8^
10
MF
Ttvi t^ B
WOT t TO fihf A iravTt rtf) V A>r rivt rwv B, fai t^ A tu4 tw B /r-
irovTi T(p
r M/yrnu,
icol Tti
tft
dvrurrpo^njs*
0
S06
/*^
cm.
cett.
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
xx
I.
Third
^^^
remarks.
'
before.^
First, then, let
let
both
and
a. Both
problem-*
^jV^niversai
syllogisms.
will
as they stand,
307
(2)
Particu-
g^ms.
ARISTOTLE
^1
w rwv B
BF
rtBtlf) to
vS<x*Ta4. Koi ci trpo^ T<ii'
ira^oAou, oKTairra;;. 6fu>iu>g 3c iccu ct to ficv
ortprjTucov tirj to 5^
Kara(f>aTU(6v' tarai yo/)
AF
BF
10
15
r^i)
C/: 98
T^ Cdfn.
529 a .
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
xx-xxi
I.
as before.
are taken as
be no syllogism
for A necessarily applies both to none and to all of
B.^ Examples of terms where the predicate applies
to the subject are animal man white
where it
indefinite or particular, there will
r-i
33 b 25-40.
309
ARISTOTLE
rdatcav iv rtft npantft a^tfr^/iari arifiaiyoi ^rSc^^aBu, KoX TO avfintpaafia i^v 4tSY6fiVQ,
6iioUis
hi KoX 1 TO ^Uv Br xmaoxw ro
oBaX, Kol l TO flkv
OTtpTfTUC^ t6 hk BP
Karqyopucov, vndp^pi S* anoTpovouVf d/i^orcpcu;
ivhx6fiVOV tarax to avfintpaofui' yiyvtrai yap
art rik
to wdkw TO irpunov a}njfui, ScBcucroi o
h'ipas vpcmiatoK tMxtoBai arjiuuvovafjs i^
Ci
ouVr<p iroi to ovfin^paofAa ioTox /yocyofuvov.
hk TO [^vSc^^/iCHOI^]' OTtfr/JfruCOV Ttd^ilJ wpoi TO
tXarrov axpov ^ iroi a^i^ XtM^irj aTpnfrucd,
Si* avTW fuy Twv KttfUvojv ovK coTcu nfXXoyurii6s,
u dvTurrpa^kdvTtJV 5* c<rrcu, KoBdiup iv Tor wpdrpo,
U KT M^-
AV
Ei
O*
17
lj
^TiK^,
0
TTovrcy
coOTC
ouMf Tp6nos
ioToi
tC^ avXXoytafuii^
y^
V7Tdpxi i^ dvayKT^s to 8i
V7rdp;^iv,
TO
trovrt Ta>
'Otov
3*
{mdpx^w.
810
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
I.
xxi
om.
*
30 a 15-23.
n, comm., Waitz.
om. AC Bekker.
311
ARISTOTLE
aurfj
teal
OpOtV,
'!
'
XXII. E^
ft
10
ft'
S*
wtmtp
1&
TO
p.v
Sf
teol
iv^XOflVOV.
TloAii' corco t6 pkv KaTTjyopucov to 5^ OTtpn^
ivh^xioBo}
p,7j^Vi
Tcui^
vndpxiv to 8c
#ccu
oi trpo^
to avfiwpaapa
cvScxofzcvof.
Et
8*
i}
*
TcSi'J
818
6m to avfintpaapa
ra>
T^ Cmii.
post
to ovft*
trarri nra.
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
I.
xxi-xxii
c.
One
and^on?
problematic
DF6II11SS
-r
(i)
Both
SSveSaf.
^"^ ^9^^
premisses
affirmative.
first
is
apodeictic,
but the reference there (11. 9-10) to the terms of the preceding
chapter shows that Aristotle had in mind the section 39 b 2-6.
* C/. 40 a 30-32 infra,
35 b 3836 a 1.
36 a 17-25.
L
313
W One
a..d^ne^^^
"Jf^j^
ARISTOTLE
ndpofffia aTtu teal on Mtxtnu run /i^ vwdpxtut
Koi ori
rw F ^17
K^laBta yap ro
{miipxfi.
o^
u>
dvOparrro^.
40
rw
6pim
6 fuv KoBdXov
npos ro pdaov- Karrfyoput^iw pJtv yi^p
b ovrojp
dfi^ortpatv roO M^x^oBat K<d od roO
vndpx^tv <rrai crvXXovuTfio^ , teal &rap r6 pkv
Kara^rucdv, dyayKCuai^
arcprfTiKOv XT)<f>9n ro
8 TO Kara(f>ariKov. orov 5c to artprjrucov dvay'
KoXov, Kol ro Gvp.npaapa tarai rov pr) vnapYtiy
b d yap avros rpOTTO^ tarax rrk 3f i!f ceo; koI KaBoXav
Kal pT) KaddXou riov dputv ovroiv dvdyta^ yap hid
rov TTpwrov ax^paros tcAciovo^cu rous ouAXoyio/ious", tooTC Kaddncp v Kivoi9, Kai i-nl rovro^v
dvayKoXov avpirinriv,
orov & to artprjrucov
KadoXov Xrf<f>$v reOfj irpd^ ro iXarrov ojcpov, idv
'OfiouiM! Sc (41 f<u 1
^6
h* hf fi4pi
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
I.
xxii
there will be not merely a negative particular problematic but a negative particular assertoric conclusion.
For let us assume that A necessarily does
not apply to C, and that B may apply to all C. Then
the conversion of the affirmative premiss BC will give
the first figure, and the negative premiss is apodeictic.
But we saw" that when the premisses are in this
relation it follows not merely that
may not apply
but that A does not apply to some C
and so it
must also follow ^ that A does not apply to some B.
When, however, the negative statement refers to
the minor term, if it is problematic there will be a
syllogism after substitution of the premiss,^ as before ;
but if the statement is apodeictic there will be no
syllogism ; for A both must apply to all B and must
apply to none. Terms to illustrate the former relation are sleep sleeping horse man ; to illustrate
the latter, sleep waking horse man.
The same principle will also apply if one of the (2) One
(extreme) terms is in a universal and the other in a parScSar.
particular relation to the middle term.
If both statements are affirmative the conclusion will be problematic and not assertoric ; and also when one is taken
as negative and the other as affirmative, the latter
being apodeictic. When, however, the negative statement is apodeictic, the conclusion will be negative
and assertoric ; for the proof will take the same form
whether the terms are universal or not, because the
syllogisms must be completed by means of the first
figure, and so the result must be the same in these
as in the former examples.**
When, however, the
negative statement, taken as universal, refers to the
''^
"
^6
315
ARISTOTLE
10
fihf
hf^x6nvov,
dyrurrpo^ij^, iop
)($rj<jr<u
r^
avWoyuffto^ Sea
dvayKoXov, ovk tarat,
Itrroi
8*
S-
^avp6v
ira>;
icai
o(iv
^oTOi <n;AAoyio/i<^,
drcAci9, teal
an
teal irorrt
icfu
rov ci^j(ca^a4
rcAcioOvroi
5i<L
tov
npanw
ox*?*
/iaro9.
XXIII.
Qn
ovXXoynofiol
axi^fian
to
/i^
o^
04 iv Tovroc? TOcy
rcAciotVrcu Sia
rail'
otmnf
cfci,
vw
ax^fiam
r^)
tls
on
nparrtft
rovrovi
5*
anXuts
iarai ^avtpow,
t5
*fal
frovra crwA-
XoyiOfJLOv
fj
VTTodeaccj^.
to
Et
Scot TO A #caTd Tou B avXXoYurauBajL rj
vndpxov rj firi vTrdpxov, dvaytcq Xafieiv ri icard
rivos. t fXv o^ ro A Kara rod B Xrjif>$irj, ro cf
dpxrjs arax iXT)fifjLvov. ct 5^ Kara rou F, ro hi
S16
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
I.
xxii-xxiii
minor term,
syllogism
first
figure.
All syiio-
fff^tedTby
the three
Ostensive
And DVPO*
theticai
Proofs.
ostensive or hypothetical.
One kind of hypothetical
proof is proof per impossihile. First, then, let us deal
for when we have shown the
with ostensive proofs
conditions which govern these, the facts will also be
made clear with regard to proofs by reduction ad
impossihile and to hypothetical proofs in general.
Supposing, then, that it is required to draw an Ostensive
inference that the predicate A applies or does not Requires
apply to the subject B, we must assume some predica- premisses.
tion of some subject.
Now if we assume that A is
predicated of B, we shall have a petitio principii. If
we assume that A is predicated of C, but C is predi;
317
ARISTOTLE
40b
o^Sh^ avfifialptt i(
Xrf^$fjvai
A,
#rard rot?
Aoyia/iOF ovShf
40
r6
Xrfif>$fj
Kara roO
rj
KcoAuci,
ovS* orov t^
fnfj
oAco;
ya/>
ori
iTTOfiv
$rfYopiais'
rdatwv
fiiv
tariv,
fiif
Xrj^^rros
Totff icar*
yap
ainov
10
Aa^('
p/rfT
firjhiv
ov^vort
TO
rr4p<p,
B avXXoyf
oiStlf
irwdnrji S^
<AAo
B mW
vpo; fUvroi t6
ttXrjfifititjjv.
41 AraKcttx>
Kar* <{AAov
hi.
rrpordotijafv,
nporaaiv
firjSiv
dnapvovpevovs ,
rf
oStWror 8c
np6i9
fiyr Karrjyopouvra^
'naXiv
rod
npof to
Tcov Ti
i7Tp <rrai
^
S18
rovS irpos
rd^
av^Xoyiafidf,
Bfii.
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
I.
xxiii
premiss.
25 b 32.
319
ARISTOTLE
8'
TOVTO
u t6 r
rod
^ a/x^
axrjfJMTa,
M^x^rat rpiyw^
#f
(^
aTT/yop^oavros',
y^
A
#f
^vpov on
roH
koX
or' ofx^oiv,
tA
tlfn^iUva
r6
^ ro F
6 yap
axflfjuxratv.
^ai^p6v
on
S^
ircU
#fVtAOtWIV,
OTCIV oSin^Tc^ir
&n
Tl
Tfjt
OVflfiaiVJ)
daiSfifLrrpof
ircptTTo
ioa
i)
OITi-
^uifLtrpos
Toty
<^>ruM(
0 oiKTtv,
^1
tlfvSo^
avri^aw*
and Menge).
820
EUnunU,
x.
app. 97 (Heiberg
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
I.
xxiii
Since, then, we must take some common term which The differrelated to both, and this may be done in three ways, binaSs
of C and C of B, or C of both, of the
viz., by predicating
or both of C, and these are the figures already give the
described, it is evident that every syllogism must be ^^^^^^
effected by means of one of these figures ; for the
is connected
same principle will also hold good if
is
with
* i.e.
clusion
to
is
show that the contradictory of the required conincompatible with one of the original premisses.
l2
321
Procedure
JJ[^JJi
proof.
ARISTOTLE
dSiWrou
avXXoyiafjtol
(rxfifidriov,
vnoB^a(ja9'
Sia
dwaat yap 6
/liv
avXXoytaiAOs yc-
ofioXoyw
iTp<uytrai hi*
5^
ct
tout'
aXrjBis,
QvXXoyiafAov
hijXov
6
w^ anas
air6Si(a^ fcai
ylyvtaBax
ax^fiaTwv,
^XV
ndaav
avdytcrj
7rpOiprjfiPwv
rj
hia
rpuHtv
8^
rot^rtw
vdrra
rCw
hix04rrot
ica^oAou ovAAoyta/ioiA;.
XXIV. 'Bri
roO KaBoXov ^
Kip.vov,
10 T17V
ri
oi)#(
iarai avXXoyujfio^
rj
TO cf opx^y oiTiJacTCU.
Kia6<A}
ov irpof to
Ci ficv
yap
odr
irpooBtis t6
p,'^
TO tCtipCVOV,
1 8*
OVT^
322
AB.
ow
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
I.
xxiii-xxiv
figures.
this figure.
ment
"^^^"^^
is
'
is
petitio principii.
process referred to belongs rather to dialectic reasonOne's opponent is induced to concede that the proposition to be proved is true if some other proposition is true
the latter is then proved syllogistically.
* i.e. one of the premisses must be affirmative.
*
ing.
323
ARISTOTLE
Urrjv
r TJ A
tW
an
AV
XfifLpavoi rrpf
dfiuHW
r^
ujutv
ovawv rwv
to atfyrjpnrjfitywv ftray
thnu
tcai urwv
rdy EZ,* t^ i(
ano rwv tautv lawv
oXljv yutvujjv
raj" Aoitra;
dnjiaipovfidvcjv
tt
ao
oMas Korqyopuis.
^Hivp6v hk Kol dnXujs iroT* corcu koI v&r* ovk
* Aristotle
88i
fiirure irivea
hoe.
A and B
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
I.
xxiv
ZD
of petitio
prtjicipii.
Thus it is evident that in every syllogism universality must be involved, and that a universal conclusion can only be proved when all the terms are
universal, whereas a particular conclusion can be
proved whether the terms are or are not all universal
so that if the conclusion is universal, the terms must
also be universal, but if the terms are universal the
It is clear also
conclusion may not be universal.
that in every syllogism one or both of the preI do not
misses must be similar to the conclusion
mean merely in being affirmative or negative, but
;
We
predication.*'
It is,
'
'
by
satisfactory.
" This is inconsistent with the view, stated in 38 a 15-25,
that an assertoric conclusion may be drawn from one apodeictic and one problematic premiss.
" i.e. any other form of predication which appears in the
conclusion must also appear in at least one premiss.
325
(3)
At
least
must'S^or
^^^*"'
j^
conclusion.
ARISTOTLE
II
S6
AB
40
A r*
KOX
HP
4t cfveu KOiAtAfi),
AB
ciatv oi avXXoytofxoi'
ri
vraXiv
ciAAa
ifol
oirrcoy
irAc/ovf 04
10
15
Ti cf
tnl
AF
Bn
onu A.
C/.
28*
<*..
40 b 30.
826
16,
note
pr<-
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
I.
xxiv-xxv
A
A
*'
327
Three term;
^^quired foi
^.emoustra-
ARISTOTLE
Us
FA
rd 8^
oAov TO
rjToi
10
fifpo^,
cus*
r6
&ar
l fihf Xi ovru>s
8*
rj
rwv
Harm
AB
to
radra,
tcax
irAU>V9
aovTtu oi avX^oytafiol,
rat^o Sta
5*
oAAo
^;^ T^ r
r6
tr/>^
^S/;(rro
Kpwl$ijJ9
Elh* ^K
ratv
AB
fi^
firj
rwv rxHOvrwv
rtvos aXXov
rj
ooi^
mI Si
fti^
froutv cniA-
c5<yr
cuf
frAciovciiv
airroi Oi
otmi>9
l fiy
t^ /i^ c^
clvoi
hrayurytji
x^^^P**^*
ix 8i rwv
ovfiir^f>aafia,
roi
rov avAAoyioj^v.
ci 8i
/ii7
^^
'"'''
TA
avfi'-
patvi kqI
firi
TovTov
opwv
7r/)OTaay), ci
fir)
49 a
6.
{ol
yap
W9
koI iK Bvo
fiovov,
36
y^Y*'^^^'^
tc ttXrj^ai avra
<l>avp6v
T17V
odv cu;
U. by
rcAcuuaiv
ci'
a>
conversion
84 b 23.
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
drawn from
A and B
alone.
I.
xxv
are
be some
either (a) E or one of the
conclusion from these too
propositions A and B or (h) something else apart
from these, (a) If it is E or one of the propositions
A and B, either there will be more than one syllogism,
or it follows that the same conclusion is reached byseveral terms in the way which we saw" to be possible.
(6) If, however, the conclusion is something
else apart from these, there will be several syllogisms
which are unconnected with one another, (ii.) If, on
the other hand, C is not related to D in such a way
as to produce a conclusion, they will have been
assumed to no purpose, unless with a view to induction or obscuring the argument or some other such
in the relation of
will
object.
329
ARISTOTLE
fifl aprtai law eu nponiattf Si* Af yfyi^mu
t6 ar)^7T^paafjLa to kv/hov {ana /df> rtm^ oPutBtv
avfJLnpaafuiT<jjv avayKoZov tyai npoTdaii), odrof
6 X&yos rj ov ovAAcAoyurrou rj nXtiui rwv hrayKoiuiV
(TTiKt^
ttk
Kara fuv oSv ras tcvpias Trpordatis Aofi/SayofjJvwv rcjv ovXXoyiayMiv, dira^ i<rrai avXXoytafi^
K TTporraatiuv fiiv aprrUov if opatv Si ittpirrutv hn
yap nXfiovs ol opoi, rutv npordatwv. corcu bi Kol
rd cfVfinpdafiara rifuarj rCw itporaatittv, orav 84
hia npoavXXoyuTfjuuv ntpaiyrpai ^ h*a nXuovwv
ota rta FA), to
fiiawv [/ii^j* awfyow (olov ro
AB
fihf nXijSof
Trpordattf
^^
y^
>&
dvdyKT)
^aaif,
npoaO(<To>s
yiyvoyJvnqs
'
^1^ ova. n,
*
* Sc. in
SSO
As
Trpoy
ftdvov
secL Waits.
in sorites.
the simple
syllo^n.
yap t6v
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
I.
xxv
raached
'
'
thesis.
331
Prosyiiogo^^Jes*'^^
ARISTOTLE
taxorov ov
#fOi
rod^ aXXovs
avfxndpaafia, npof
np6<rKirai to A, ciJ^wy
<TVfinpdafiaTa hvo np6aKirai, r6 T irpof to
iroct
irdvra^t otov ct ra
ABF
r6vo}v Bva7riXiprfroTpov.
To fUv
Kk
rov
M^
rpiX^'
43 a
OoVCpOV OlJv OTl TO KodoXoV KaTTfyopiKOV #fOTOOfccvoocu pev ;(aA7rcuTaTov, ovaoKcvamu hk p^'
OTOV. oXaj9 8* *OTiv dvaipoOvri p4v rd KodoXov rcav
832
Barbara.
Cesare and Camestres.
>
Cdarent
*
DarU.
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
I.
xxv-xxvi
E.g., if
elusions with all the terms except the last.
is added to the terms A, B and C, two
the term
further conclusions are added ipso facto, viz., those
severally to
which are given by the relation of
and B.
Similarly too in
all
'
Ferio.
*
Festino, Baroco.
333
Relative
dtfficu"^ of
Pr2i^'s
types of
proposition
ARISTOTLE
mil yap
/^/>t P9<u'
ifv fArjbtvl
rwt
ical rJ
ft'ff
dnoQi rot;
Kol yap
rovro
koI
1 irayrl
h*
ro hi
firiSVt
iv roii
ct
^ v hvo <r^p.aaw.
fiovaxo}^,
10
axrjfiaat Scuoorrou,
Bvalv,
nayrl
rj
5<ifavra ^ndpx^uti
/xi^Scvi
rj
Y^ ^
'^^^
on
rd koBoXov
dvaaicciK(aai /i^
rCtv hf fUpti
hta,
hi
roOr' tOTiv,
o^
Ilto9 fiiv
8i* iKtivcav
p^v.
ccu
hid
npoi
XXVII.
riBcficvov
Xrjipofjicda
Ylta>S
act
lprjfi,vwv.
V7TOpl^<JOfJLV
auToi
vpdf TO
9it>id;
TJht]
iA
the premisses
c/.
43 b S6.
ohou
XeKrdov
Mn chs. xxiii.-zxTL
4cibS&,
*
S34
twv
hi
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
I.
xxvi-xxvii
is
the hypothesis
appHes to all
ject, and we
two figures.
tion can only
But in particular propositions the refutabe effected in one way, by showing that
the predicate appHes to all, or to none. For constructive purposes, however, particular propositions
are easier, since they can be proved in more figures
and by more moods.
We
Construc-
we
syllogisms.
ourselves shall find an adequate supply of syllogisms to meet any given problem, and by what
method we shall apprehend the starting-points
appropriate to each problem ; for presumably we
'^
335
ARISTOTLE
ov yap
ijl6vo
avXXoYiafiwv,
Imas ^1
aXXa koI
rrpt
rrjv
hwofutf 4c*^
^^
'AiroMrrcjv
aKTT
KoX
40
7rl
on
hk
8S6
An,
Pott, I. zix.-xziL
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
xxvii
I.
them.
Now all existing things either (1) are such that Three
they cannot be truly predicated in a universal sense pSSibies.
of anything else (e.g., Cleon and Callias and anything
which is individual and sensible), but other attributes
can be so predicated of them (for each of the two
examples just quoted is a man and an animate
or (2) are predicated of other things, but
being)
or
other things are not first predicated of them
(3) both are themselves predicated of other things
*
and have other things predicated of them (as man
animal of man). Thus
is predicated of CalHas and
it is obvious that some things are naturally predicable
of nothing, for broadly speaking every sensible thing
is such that it cannot be predicated of anything
except in an accidental sense for we sometimes say
That white thing is Socrates or That which is
approaching is CalHas.' We shall explain elsewhere "
that there is also an upward limit to the process of
for the present let this be taken as
predication
assumed. It cannot be demonstrated, then, that
anything else is predicated of this class of things,
but they are predicated
except by way of opinion
of other things. Individuals, on the other hand,
are not predicated of other things, but other things
are predicated of them. Things which are intermediate between universals and individuals, however,
for they both are
clearly admit of both processes
predicated of other things and have other things
predicated of them. It is with this class of things,
broadly speaking, that arguments and inquiries are
chiefly concerned.
;
'
'
'
337
ARISTOTLE
**
^1 h^ ray npordfr^i^
Xafipdviv,
v7ro6^fii'ov
opiafioik re xai
ooa
tTrtrai
trcpi
avro
trpwrov
rw
{mdpxiv oU
h* aiVro
fti^
fti)
V^';(rrat
ivBdx^raA
o^k
tirofUvtov
o^iy
iKXrjtrrioi^,
Buitptr^QV 8i
Saa tc iv r^ ri iari
teal
ooo
rous
teal
iarw, 9lra
dX^cco!
rota iraT*
Bdrrov hnvS^trai
of
cLAiy-
5*
^xXtytw
fi'^i
ra ^nd/xcva
6vro9 dSrjXov
Sc <f>avp6v.
KaBoXov
o^oUo^
17
S*
npdraai^, hiwpiapivov
cVAc/rrcov
mu
olov
rj
pjovauc^
so Tco^o/Ltc^a* icoi
S3S
oTy
naaav
ayro
adro S^ rd
dXXd
oAA' ooa
Tivi,
5' orbv
^numjfirpf^
Kaddntp
teal
irpty
ndvTa dvBpwnov
lvax
ndv
{^ak>v
rj
BiKOioavrrjw
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
I.
xxvii
proof.
We
'
'
'
'
'
'
339
ARISTOTLE
&
CTrcroi,
in iKtwoo t6 warn
A/ycTcu.
ra
ciro/icva Set
/ii)
Xa^lv, ra
Oi^
ao
3i7
Tfp
yap,
avdytcrj
npixofivop,
Ci
iifxp
oti
Ctpow, koI
olKv6rtpa hk ravra
TO
ofs"
ts
ctrrroi nd
cu^pamof*
avBpomot axoXovSti r6
enmu
rwv yap
tntrax'
cuf ^iri
cuj cwl
That
;
oOy
fiovkofUvons
fiv
it is
but
yap
COTCU hijXov.
XXVIII. KaraaKvdiw
true
oi5
8t* ^j* 5*
it is
Literally
starting-points.^
340
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
I.
xxvii-xxviii
and
useless
all
'
or
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
original premisses.^
to estabUsh a proposition
S41
ARISTOTLE
40
44 A
Oct
an vndpyiy^
cfroftcva.
is
rovriov
a un
yap
ci
ovrutv
rwv avratv
ovtotm^
pcjvovv, ou8cvt
10
^ndpx^iVf
4*
vrrdpxtiy,
/X17
H^ ^^
&
/ti7
8woTai'
15
a h
ow
p,rj
vBXf^ox avT<p
iarat rwv
ravTo
^ m, Wailx.
rd iinntva, ^
oodd., sed ^
pro 3
*
^* '^ f^
Z, dvdymj to A
<V* ^^^
rivl rutv
a]
* tis
' Off
U 5ci
M A^
/i^
om. AB'Cdu.
Barbara,
Darapli.
Ccsmn,
* Camestrcft.
converting the major premiss in Cesare or the minor
'
Camestres.
Kdapioa.
*
*
in
vndpx^^
S4A
By
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
I.
xxviii
A
A
343
ARISTOTLE
44
to
&
to
y^
40
44 k
S44
rw
corr.
E AB-CdV
Af ;
:
ri Bdun.
H BM'fmn^
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
I.
xxviii
all E
for F applies to all E, and C
A, so that A applies to all E. (2) If
C and G are the same, A must apply to some E.
For A is a consequent of all C, and E of all G. (3) If
F and D are the same, by a prosyllogism A will
for since the negative proposition is
apply to no E
convertible, and F is the same as D, A will apply to
no F but F applies to all E. (4) Again, if B and H
for B will apply
are the same, A will apply to no E
for B is ex hypothesi the same
to all A, but to no E
as H, and we assumed that H applies to no E. (5) If
D and G are the same, A will not apply to some E.
For it will not apply to G, inasmuch as it does not
apply to D. But G falls under E, and so A will not
apply to some E. (6) If B is the same as G, there
For E will apply
will be a syllogism by conversion.
to all A, since B applies to A and E to B (since B is
A must
apply to
applies to
all
<
KF
and
KC
F and C
respectively.
545
Terms
considered
*
^^^^
versai form,
ARISTOTLE
iyxtjp^l
l'!i
r$ Z
<LcoAoi;^ct
viro TafJra
iyxwp^l.
.',
rc2>v
hvo nporaatwv 1} aK^ts, teal S*a rwv v/xxipi}^ifUvwv <rx>)tio.rwv ol CFvAAoytafUH v<^<ff.
fcwrai yap vinipx*tv ftcv vorrt rw R ro A, Stop
10
T<?
H.
<I>a^p6p odv
on
SicL
on ovk ^icAcmt^ot
to firfi^va yiyvtoBcu. avX"
Xoyiofiov cf aiVra>v. KaTaaKvdl^w fuv yap oXtas
ovk ifv c T(2>v iiroyuevwv, dnoartptZv h* owe h^
hdx^Toi 8ia Tou vaaw itropJvov' hti yap Tj yubt
m
ihrdpx^w rw 8^ fiif ^inipx^iv,
!
-JO*
u
7 18, b 23.
'^ C/. 43 b 36.
-
rmv
ooa
5i6
i..
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
I.
xxviii
under these
former,
:
it
may
still
'
and
will
is
because
other.**
as a
common
figure).
give
a negative
conclusion.
S4n
sySoSfm,
ARISTOTLE
ao
Ci 5* o2ir cirrroi
to
Tcpcu oi irporautii,
rj
r^
npo/rtp
ri
hf rip fuatp
A^Aov 8<
r^
Afol
on
diroid
x4p^ 4
IvovrSa^
ri
Ai^^^vcu vayria ^
fi'fj
fvS\6fifva
rp&novs, otov
^infiXtilfif,
S4
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
I.
xxviii
gism at
all is possible.
349
ARISTOTLE
ovSvi vndpi^ii war* dvaynn;
U!l
toiW
c&oi rd
rivl
10 rcciv
8^ E* ov nvi* vndp(i,
irairrl Toi
B
1*
ro
iroAiv c/
TO
to
iroi
ratv
TO
rwv 0.
war avdvinj to
u^ h^v^aOai
ovo^ Bui^ipti ^
t3 ya^
Tcl /ii}
:
>
TO
B TOiv
rifr
fcoi
jTOi
ra^Mrrjra TtBv
rw9 0.
hk rponrov t^own
Ktd
ydp
tttd ol tU r6
roH^ SciKTUfoij- *f<u
circTcu K6,rtpov.
TOV a3uyaTou
on
vndpxi,
0 CSrCi
TO
B TTOl^i
TiUnf
rajv
Tm
ro
A.
ouScm
EB*u*
to
ircUiy
fo
t^ 5^
U oolgD.
44al.
850
^m
-^1
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
I.
xxviii-xxix
'
still
as assumed in
351
The same
apply ST*
syllogisms
Tstabiished
^^^'^p^^'
ARISTOTLE
If
40
YTovri
rw H,
fra^rt
\nrf\p\v.
ovSfvt
4f k ftv^Scvi
oibvl
Btpiivoi^
xmapxtw
ra>
rtvt
^^
rm
10
roaovTOv
u htiKTucws
rjpXv
urw
hrjIXov,
To^rd COIT.
u.\a replaced
U%
C
by
raSha oodd.
its
II. xir.
oootradictorj.
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
I.
xxix
will apply to no
applies to all G,
but ex
;
Similarly with all other
hypothesi it applies to all.
propositions ; proof per impossibile will always be
all cases by means of the consequents and
antecedents of the extreme terms.
Moreover, in every problem the procedure is the
same whether it is required to employ an ostensive
syllogism or reduction ad impossibile
for both proofs
are effected by means of the same terms. E.g.,
supposing that it has been proved that A applies to
no E, because (if A applies to some) it follows that B
also applies to some E, which is impossible
if it is
assumed that B applies to no E but to all A, it is
evident that A will apply to no E. On the other hand
if the conclusion that A applies to no E has been
reached ostensively, if we assume that A applies to
some E, we can prove per impossibile that it applies
Similarly too in all other examples ; for
to none.
in every case we must take some common term (other
than those which have been laid down) to which the
syllogism proving the false conclusion will refer, so
that when this premiss is converted" (the other
remaining unchanged) the syllogism will become
ostensive by means of the same terms.
For the
difference between ostensive proof and proof per
impossibile is that in the former both premisses are
assumed as true, while in the latter one is assumed
possible in
as false.
25S
ARISTOTLE
46k
^ hi
dbvvarov ayayct^.
rponos 6 avros
h<
to 7riaKt/taa$ai
rrjs
impXalffots.
ol i(
noaax^
uno6ata>sAciVoarroA uhf
tKoarov ratv nfMpXrifKirati
kqX oXXdv rponow 4vta ouAAoyum*
ovrws, ton
0004, rovrtoy, otou rd KaSo^v bia rqs icara fjJpos
intPki^Kuts ti v7ro$4awf. i yap ra F #ccu ra
ravra itj, fiovois Bi Ai^c&i^ rocs'
rd vvapxiv
o^
S6
murri dv r<p
ouScvi
to
rd
rd
r6
vnapfti.
rd
A mu
/ton^yopoiro,
dn
icai
K>
C/. 41 a :.
*
fortiori or aiudogica] arguments (AJexander 984. 19).
* t.g.^ the hypothesis In the inunediately foUovii^ ex' S3 b
amples, that
applies to
only.
ff.
,
'
854
t..
propositions expressing a
that of necessity or possibility.
modal
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
I.
xxix
We
syllogisms.
f^^J^^J
hypothesis.
way also.
The same method
in this
and
'^^ method
of selection
11
,.
n
i?
xir
problematic syllogisms
tor the process or inquiry is is the same
the same, and the syllogisms will be effected by means
^^^H
of the same arrangement of terms, whether it is
problematic or assertoric. In the case of problematic
propositions, however, we must include those terms
which, although they do not apply, might possibly
for it has been shown ^ that the problematic
do so
syllogism is effected by means of these also. The
same principle will hold good in the other modes of
predication.*
Thus
only that
all
S55
ARtSTOTLE
yap avXXoyiafiof h^umu bid, rtpos rOm
ox^yArwv ytyi^/xvo$>, raSrra 8* o^
8i* oAAoii' crvaraBrjvou nX^ StA rwv hro^
diras fihf
40
npoifnifjJvutv
iyX(M>pi
UBfUvcjv Koi oh
vpordatis
tcai
row fUaov
Xrjdtis,
war*
y^
ov^
al
avX-
oAAfCur.
XXX. *H fuv
iy
fiiyS*
avcu7#(fiMi(o^(,
rawra rara<7irva{ovr<p
ftrfi^
rar(U7Kfua(oKrcV tc
ic<u
icard
u navros
larooror
mu, Bckker.
3tat Alexander.
WaiU: OUf
850
codd.
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
I.
xxix-xxx
effected
scribed,
plausible premisses.
The principles ^ of syllogisms have now been de- The general
scribed in general terms, both how they are consti- now^iSen*
We
357
ARICTOTLR
Ma
to ifxirttpiav rrj^
yap
ratv ^aivofUvtav
i#(ai'a>(
doTpoAayi#c(u
aTroSct^et^.
^fjLrpov
$^
^^
npl
ffol
ivianjfirjv.
Xr)^$ij
yjSnrj
wouh^ ^p6v.
Ka^dAov fUy oiv,
iK\lyiVt
10
''*
riyyri^
atOT*
ovrw^ 6p^^<mv al
ofiouos
tXpfffrai,
cAY}Ai^a/xv v
Set
cyj^cWr*
dtcpiPtlaf
S^
r^
5i-
8ca-
rt fiopiw
t6
roO Tt arw war ovrt 6 ri iv^x^rai av^Xoyioaudai hiaipoufi^vov^ (wUaop, ovrt on ovrw^
ivh\ro aKTTTcp lpiJKafiv. iv fiv o9v TOi? ano40
4t k
TO fieaov,
^
84* oi5
iiatpovft^vt
nm,
AleicandcT,
Topie$, I. xhr.
S5S
"fjrrov
WiU
^'^
*^^'
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
I.
xxx-xxxi
Criticism
^atonic
definition
"
ff.,
359
by
ARISTOTLE
'fj
yi^ mBiXon
Xnfifiopti fi^aov,
dvBpamov ^
$vrfT6v
/iiv
^ d^rfroTor ayayicaor
{[<iKH'
BvtfTou hi
ifoShir^B
OTTOuv ct'Oi
300
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
I.
xxxi
mortal
'
and
'
The
svllogism, then,
C,* so that
will be either B or
Every
necessarily be either mortal or
is
man must
'
'
'
'
361
'
ARISTOTLE
11
TO nOTtpOV CoSc
10
aavfifierpo^,
fjirrpov
rj
Xoyurrcu
71
^ov ya/>
davfip.rpov,
on
A</377
i}
l)
^tOfUTpOf
rj
avfi"
ci
Ai/^rcu.
oucapal(rr5cifcu*
iv ofy ayvo^titu
i^
^a4V
r6 davftfM4rpo ^ a6fifLrrpo
^^'
*EI#(
ira>;,
40 fiXrjfia,
^a9p6v in rwv
XXXII.
47
tKcumv
irai
irpS'
lpfffi4vuv,
rico; 8*
panepa
*
lv<u
Apparently the
processes in general.
S6
word
is
here used to
mean
iafcr^siSSa]
^* ' *^'
'
"
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
r It is evident that
by
this
I.
xxxi-xxxii
method
it is
impossible
is
it
'
Thus
it is
be especially suitable.
Thus it is evident from the foregoing account by
what means and in what way demonstrations are
effected, and what kind of attributes should be taken
to
We
XXXII.
must next explain how to reduce Reduction
this menS^to
syllogisms ^ to the figures previously described
part of our inquiry still remains. For if we examine syllogistic
^'
the means by which syllogisms are produced, and
possess the ability to invent them, and can also
reduce the syllogisms when constructed to the
figures previously described, our original undertaking will be completed. Incidentally our previous statements will be further confirmed, and their
accuracy will be made more evident, by what is now
;
363
ARISTOTLE
9rfaofitvwv'
yap
5ci
OfwXoyovfUvov
trdy
ttvax ndyrjj.
o^
YlpdfTov fiv
hi nipda6ai
hf tUpi, KoX l
u rtdlvra r^v
(Lpj^
fjcff
Iripav.
iXrifA^dvai tUw,
yap tt^
iviort
a:M
Kod^ko^
ypoj^vTt^ ovr
Ttlvown,
84*
ipurrutvrt^'
5*
cSv
^ ravras
av
tXBjj Tif 19
o^K
ro
fiiv
dn^ov to
5*
a^aiprriop iuff
oimoy
^pamjfUvovs
firi
moi
rai
oyayiccudir r avfifiaivtuf
Xrf<^lrj
ct
oMayicauuy iropa*
$ Aov^ovovai
tft
n rcuv
Xoyovs*
wpo-
OKmriov odw
fihf
iK rtav
f(ifUvajv, otov
ot^uxy avaipovfidvrjt
fiij
dpaipta6U
ndXiv
ct
S64
i<pov ttvai
^yoynr Adno.
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
to follow
I.
must be
xxxii
in all respects
self-consistent.
First, then, we must try to select the two premisses The pro^^
of the syllogism (since it is easier to analyse into the SJ nghwy
chosen,
greater than into the smaller parts," and the composite is greater than its constituents), and then and^proconsider which is universal and which particular, Jf^f^^g^'
supplying the missing premiss ourselves if only one
has been assumed ; for both in writing and in
argument people sometimes, while stating the universal premiss, fail to mention the premiss contained
in it, or they state the immediate premisses, but
omit to mention the premisses from which they are
inferred, and unnecessarily ask for the concession of
must consider, then, whether anything
others.
superfluous has been assumed, and whether anything
necessary has been left out, and we must posit the
latter and reject the former until we arrive at the
two premisses ; for without these we cannot reduce
We
ARISTOTLE
0
oMatf
npordatif
cuj ttnofuy.
toIj toiovtoi^ Sta to <miy'Awarcofic^a 8'
OV/i/SouWiV X
ICOiC^ Ti
T<^l^
9rd9
(TuAAoyiom^^* d fiiv
'^ <{
inl nXiov hk t3
yap
avAAoyui]piot
yiofios,
WOT* ovK
ft ri avfiPaiyti n Biwr
wv
riMtir
hvo npordafiiSi
fVSt ovrut
yap t6 fuaov ^9
awaat rocf ax^fuunr, iia^
^^fX4V ovv Karrjyop^ koI Karriyopijrai r6 pJacfV, ij
auTo fi<v Ka-rqyopj aXXo 5* iKwov dirapt^rjfrai, to
npordatai
40
Acyd/ivoi>*
opfiytcrf
dfi4^oT^pais ^rrdp^tw iv
irpufTO
teal
t<arqyop
icai
KOT tjryopfiTaif ij
to <Txarov' ovrw yap cfj^cv /v tKoarta
ofiotws Bi iccu cav fii^ KoBdXov
tTXTJfiarL TO fUaov.
iLoiv ai irpoToacif* d yap aurd; huipioyuoi roQ
if>aifp6v oSv ca$- cV a Adyc^ /i^ Xtytrai
fUaov.
ravTo irXeovaKig, ori ov ytyvmu tTvXXoytOfto^' oi
riyopfjrai,
10
OTa>
ei'
a;^fuiTi
rtVt
nepalverai
rGtif
\mr
866
^ icch
npopXTjfidrtaif, iral
25 b 35, 96 b 36. 8 a
Ig.
^app^
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
xxxii
I.
scribed.
'
is
a syllogism.
Hence
if
figures.
versal
is
is
367
ARISTOTLE
w^ o^K
TO
axfjfia.
XXXIII.
10
ioriv o
ytapuo^
iftdaprrov
ovros
Aptarofitvov^
IIoAiv eoTco TO
80
fjiv
t<y <L
MucKoXos, ro
h*
^*
wB
ro
47a
81.
oiS
ydf ]
ouic
ofM n Bekker.
WaSO.
368
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
xxxii-xxxiii
I.
369
ARISTOTLE
K
icoAoy*
iari
r6 h4 y
roO
np&rtpov
rtft
iroAof fiovaucd^
rovro
Ztf
rovror
yap
oi)
on
0cuSo(.
:r01H*I
dXrfS^f tcoBoXov
o^
Avrri fihf
"fi
dndrrj
ytyvmu
iw
rw mp^
rj
XXXIV.
16 o*
dBtWTOv
4 ^ij
cv6<';(crai
vndpx^iv vyUtav,
WaXiv ini rov fUaou o^/iaTos
^IfcvSog' riiv
yap vyUiay
ofioiuti
ovSm
arai to
dvOpionw
dvBpumtp
,u;26a30.
.!
This should
The reading
^0
strictly
be a problematic premiM.
an apoddctic c
v^oo implies
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
I.
xxxiii-xxxiv
syllogism.
This mistake, then, has its origin in a slight disfor we assent to the argument as though
;
there were no difference between the statements
this appHes to that and this applies to all of that.'
XXXIV. It will often happen, however, that we Fallacies
are entirely misled through failure to set out the fJuityS^terms properly in the premiss: e.g., supposing that Ji^^o^^i* o'
A is health,' B disease and C man.' For it is
true to say that A cannot apply to any B (since health
applies to no disease) and again that B applies to all
C (since every man is Hable to disease).^ Thus it would
seem to follow that health cannot apply to any man.
The reason of this is that the terms are not properly
expressed in the proposition, since if we substitute
for the respective states the objects corresponding
I mean supposing
to them, there will be no syllogism
that the healthy is posited instead of health,' and
the diseased instead of disease.' For it is not
true to say that being healthy cannot apply at any
time to the diseased ; but if this is not assumed, no
syllogism results, except of the problematic type.
This is not impossible, since health may apply to
tinction
'
'
'
'
'
no man.
Again, in the middle figure the fallacy will occur
health cannot apply to any disease,
in a similar form
but may apply to every man hence disease does not ^
:
'
in
is
it is
read voaos.
371
ARISTOTLE
avfiPalvti r6 i/KvSo^,
KoX
inurrrjfirjv
rovTO
yap
Tip adrtp
^avp6v otV
nylyvmu
amun
ir
roihiHS
avarrj
o^ on
ffci$-
<Mh^ ylyrrmi
npo^
n^v roiovrrpf
rpLyuivov, i^*
{ijnyau', otov
iarw rd
h^
&n
ra/
A hvo opBal, r6
laooKtXd^.
rw fU
u o^ r
* {..
S7
an
rtfoof f
ry. 39 a 14-19.
represent them by single words.
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
I.
xxxiv-xxxvi
above,** for it
was
laid
down
that
when
several things
may
'
triangle
373
ARISTOTLE
lOlOT
tcai
Tovro
itft
dtcpt^
cA hi
Xofifioput^ ut9
<ici
tear*
aiM
rotnw
roOro,
^vfxfiaiyti 8* ar<
/itfv
XiytoBai ro hk fuaov
olov ci
1}
^I
iirl
1}
TO0
iarw
7riarT^fjLfj'
OTv^fii},
ro
yuev
8^ dyo^oy
1}
8* <iya^oo forly
6n
rov aya0o0
ou#c Ibni'
ori Bi r6
^mn
fiif,
pAoov
art hk or
iirjr
icara rov
mi
rrpCrrttv
Ka,ra Torf
vpdmm
Xcyofievov olov
i^i J-
prffTt
.5
ct
oS eirum^fui
*<muBdtker.
<rrtp,
m
*
fu!^
roJroti
^ ^-^
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
I.
xxxvi
applies to the middle and the middle to the extreme * The terms in
in the sense that they will always be predicated of ^gg^^^ay
one another or that the first term will be predicated stand in
of the middle in the same way as the middle is pre- than'^the
dicated of the last (the same caution applies also to nominative.
negative predication).
must suppose that the
expression to apply has as many different senses as
there are senses in which we say that a thing is, or
that it is true to say that it is. Take, e.g., the statement that there is one science of contraries.^ Let
stand for there being one science,' and B for things
contrary to one another.* Then
appUes to B, not
in the sense that the contraries are there being one
science ' of them, but in the sense that it is true to
state of them that there is one science of them.
We
'
is
minor term.
that both members of any given pair of contraries
health and disease) are studied by the same science.
i.e.
*
{e.g.
i.e.
375
ARISTOTLE
iarw ^wumjfiti, avfin^paafm
roC ayoBoO tan ydvo^* KarrfyofKinu 5* od5^
&n
u Kar*
ov^v6s,
ct
Xfytrcu.
Xrfnr^ov,
Wr^^
ttJSc
tcunrfots
dpa
T^
cJyOi
oAA* ^l^tOTC T^
Tf
in ovK
iraXi
rj
S^ o^k
arifittav
arjiutov 6 ylkuii,
on
ion
6fioluf9
&tU
fi'^
iari Kurfyjtioi
urrw
o^
y^Xurros fUw
Icm
rj
Tf^yfi yiins'
atf^tiov,
tft
T^,
8'
war* <A
arffulov,
ii!
iroAiv
on 6
K<up69 ovk
um
^
y^
Biov, rfjv 8^
40
iravTojv,
an
jcA^oci?
rmv
vavrla,
ro
touj
ftv
hiirXoLaiaVt
ayoBifv
fj
olov ro laov,
on
rj
ovk avBpumov
yap on rovrw,
^0
Xrjnrdov
aTrXHt^
8c 7Tpordai^ XrjTrrtov
rj
npoToaw
fJMros irrtoaw,
fj
&n
rovrov, olo^
i}
opw>v
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
I.
xxxvi
'
We
'
'
'
'
'
'
877
ARISTOTLE
iriirrti
XXXVII.
T<J h*
V7rdpxt9 TtJSf r^Sc tnX to
aAT7^cw<7^cu To3 #card rowSc To<7airro;(ai^ Xrjrrr^ov
oaaxuts ai KaTqyopiai
rj
TO fi'fj vndpxtiv,
hiopurr^ov P^Xnov,
io*ca*
XXXVIII. To
Xdyw
lU<n^.
rfj^
ift
Koi ravra^
nv
rj
ofioiats Sc
hnatcrnriov b^ ravra
8* rrrapaUmJio^Sii4PO iv raZ^
#c2
npo-
i*
hucaioawrj^ iartv
aya^oi'
yap TO
c^* <^
KarrjYopijaai, tow
dyoBov
10
hi^frrjinxu,
^ aviuti'nXtyyJvQS'
cirumj/iiy
on
coTiv i-niGTrjTov
ts
ov,
rj
fj
dyo-Bov,
dvBpcjiros if>daprr6v
rj
rpaytXa/^os^
alaBrjrov' v
jj
fifj
dwaai yap
* Uteimlly * goat-deer *t
oonventkNial emnple of
fabulous animaL C/. Plato, Rtpublie 488 a, Aristophanes.
Fro98 937.
* t.4. it
878
b known
not to exist
Thb
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
nominative,
e.g.,
xxxvi-xxxviii
I.
man is an animal
or in any other
Y and Various
true of
must be understood in as many
difFerent senses as there are distinct categories ; and
the categories must be taken either in a particular
or in an unqualified sense, and further as either
simple or compound. Similarly too with negative
attribution.
These points, however, call for further
consideration and more adequate analysis.
XXXVIII. Any term which is duplicated in the
premisses should be attached to the first extreme and
not to the middle. I mean, e.g., that supposing we
should have a syllogism to the effect that there is
knowledge of probity that it is good,* the expression
*
that it is good or qua good should be attached
stand for knowledge that
to the first term.
Let
good and C for probity.' Then
it is good,* B for
of B, for there is knowledge
it is true to predicate
of good that it is good. But it is also true to predicate B of C ; for probity is identical with one form
of good. Thus in this way an analysis can be effected.
Supposing, however, that the expression * that it is
good be attached to B, there will be no analysis ;
for
will be true of B, but B will not be true of C,
since to predicate of probity that it is good that
it is good is false
and unintelligible. Similarly
too supposing that it be proved that the healthy
"
is qua good an object of knowledge, or that a unicorn
is qua non-existent an object of knowledge,^ or that
a man is qua perceptible perishable ; for in all
that
is
'
879
the^Steg^^j^.^
Syllogisms
qualified
premisses.
ARISTOTLE
IH
rtft
BinXoHTiv Brrlov,
OvX 4 aMi
oTov
rayiiBav
art
itnarrjTov^
rl ov,
TOW
on
t6
8^ TO
^ r
ya/> i<^*
apa
tnurrrffiTj
rij^
&lov
ov
Komfyopiw,
i}v
on
ora^f
to
aya^cW.
yh^ hrum^firj
A roO
tov F^
F. lorroi
aya66v' ^v yap r6 rl
S^ to or yJoo
on
inurrqfiri
<ff
^AAa koX to
rl o%r
rayadoC
atcpi^
/a4v
H^
ro
rx^
orjfiMiov ovaiaf.
kqI
anXu^ im^
fciv
hk}^ 6v
trtif, X/yctf T*
tti^fi^
ct
tana yap ro
oAi;^^;
tft
i^ ^
<SAA*
tj
ayodov, r6 il .
on
iirtQrrjTOv
aya$6v
h^ucTot,
OTijr ov
trj
rj
TO ^v anXw^ koX
fiij
Stf
M0fi
r6 rl Sv
^avp6v
on
6v,
o^ on
<j>*
iv
at
rots
ov, c^'
iv fUpei
dyo^oi',
avXXoyuifUHS
XXXIX.
imua ni twf
n oodd.
om.
Boethluft, Watti.
* L$, nuOor.
880
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
I.
xxxviii-xxxix
instances of supplementary predication the reduplication must be attached to the extreme ^ term.
The arrangement of terms is not the same when a
syllogism is proved without qualification and when
the proof relates to a particular thing or sense or
condition ; I mean, e.g., when the good is proved
to be an object of knowledge and when it is proved
If it
to be an object of knowledge that it is good.
is proved to be the former, we must posit as the
middle term * that which is ; if to be the latter,
with the qualification that it is good,* we must posit
as the middle * that which is something.'
Let
stand for * knowledge that it is something,' B for
*
that which is something ' and C for good.' Then
it is true to predicate
of B, for ex hypothesi there is
knowledge of something that it is something. But
it is also true to predicate B of C, for that which C
represents is something. Hence it is also true to
predicate
of C. Therefore there will be knowledge
of the good that it is good for ex hypothesi the expression that which is something refers to the thing's
particular form of being.
But if we had posited that
*
'
'
which
is
'
'
'
this
way.
word
for
381
ARISTOTLE
ft
i'l
\6yo9V KoX ovofJLa koI X6yov, Koi act dvrl rtw XSyou
rowofia XoLufiavtiv p^wv yap 1} riuv opaiv Ik^cok.
otov 1 firfiiv hia^pi cttrciv r6 tWoAiyirror rod
So(aarov /xi^ ttvai y4vo^ i) /*^ tXvai ontp viroX tfitr ^v
ri TO So^curTOv (ravrov yap to arjfxxuvofuvov) , avrl
rov ^ovov rov Xc)fiivTo^ r^ jJiroAiprTw koX r6
hoiaxrrov opovs Btriov.
>
XL.
'Eirci 8* oi5
ayadov koX t^
1ft
TaiWi'
^^n-i
IS
8e, Indefinitely.
888
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
I.
xxxix-xli
and
pleasure
propositions
'
is
'
'
applies to
*
beautiful
all
white.*
presumably,
to
applies to white,' but not,
Thus if applies to B, but not to everything of which
B is stated, then whether B applies to all C or merely
not apply to all C, but
applies to C, not only need
If on the other hand
it need not apply to C at all.
applies to all that of which B is truly stated, it will
is stated of everything of all of which
follow that
*
'
stated.
all of which
If,
is
however,
is
stated" of that of
is
S83
ARISTOTLE
10 oataif
r6
TO A.
16
^^
^'^
rovru/v auAAayi(((-
Mv
8* i^fiay
on
iv -no
axm^
ciDlXov.
hijXov
noajfT^ov,
10
Cf.
884
An,
O&MT
Pott. 76
B*df.
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
I.
xli-xliii
of
all.
The setting
SS^Jged^oT^
illustration,
Semonstra**-
We
n2
S85
'
The several
ofTslng??
compound
may
be
jr^J^^^^J^
figures.
Choice of
gy'j^gjs'^g
used to
definitions.
ARISTOTLE
Ma
u fiiJKOS'
om
vyp6v inn6, t6
iTorov Kol TO
XLIV. Tin
o2bv
ct
yap
ov
dvdyf^v.
viro$4tivos,
ivairrUuv,
avXXoy%afioO
5ia
ov StW/u^ rt;
hrurrfuLrp^
firfi*
fdatf
fiia ft^
vyuwov
r6 avTo iyutvov
Ion
icoiTOi
&ri S*
Hav
ofua,
ipayritaw^
yap
Icrroi
o/ioAoycty
rcui^
&a-
voawStg,
Ta>v
trttKTXor
Ilia
Sucnu*
mu
cImu, cfro
Ktt^Uvtttv
b^tyfi/^mtr
oAA*
ot)
5/5ucrai.
oi^
rovrav
fihf
ouA-
aiv adm
yap
itcivo 8* vir60aii.
lacj^ koI
^v atMoytafiS^,
'Opuouof 5^
m pOAVOfi^vcav'
oAAa r^v
odSi
/liv
teal
y^
cif
dSiWrov
Xoyi^aaaOai
w /AMI
art
irc-
cv
iarw
hia^povai ht rum
npoBiOfio^
ay Sc^X^
3iWfU9 ran' ivavriutv, Koi inumyitfv tlvat, rqv
*
ci
iwtMnKToi A*Bc*
^oS^urr<u AVrMfm.
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
I.
xliii-xliv
e.g., if it is
'
Further, we should not attempt to reduce Hypothetlhypothetical syllogisms, because it is impossible to ^smrcanreduce them by proceeding from the premisses laid ^of b
down, since they have not been proved by a syllogism,
XLIV.
hypothesis.
Similarly too in the case of arguments which are
These too cannot be
established per impossibile.
analysed.
The reduction ad impossibile can be
analysed, because it is proved by a syllogism ; but
the rest of the argument cannot, because the conThese types
clusion is drawn from a hypothesis.
differ from those described above in that in the former
if the conclusion is to be admitted some preliminary
argument is necessary, e.g., that if it be shown that
there is one potentiality for contraries, the science
which studies them is also the same. But in these
887
ARISTOTLE
u
10 k
XLV. 'Oaa
10
S* cv irActbat
^ ^
fipi
drpo^
iofii75Vi Toi
hk
fjLOvav.
There
CcUrcnL
888
is
arw yap ro
irovri
vndpxov.
C/. 41 a
A rw
p.kv
i<.
no such descriptioa to
ayrurrpa^>4vrol^
vhkh we
can
refer.
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
I.
xliv-xlv
*^
particular, e.g., if
appUes to no B and B applies
to some C ; on the conversion of the negative
4
proposition we shall have the middle figure.
Of syllogisms in the second figure, those which are (2) Second
^^
universal can be reduced to the first figure, but only fif^
one of the two particular syllogisms can be so reduced.
Let
be taken as applying to no B but to all C,
ARISTOTLE
o9v roO OTtpfrp^KoG t6 npwrov arai axfj^^^' t6 fih
B ovScvl r<ff A, ro B^ A nayri rift V \mdpii.
iav hk r6 Karrjyopueiv fj np^ rip 3 r6 hi artpnrf
riK^v npo^ rat V, npanov opov Brriov r6 T' roOro
yap ovhvl rip A, ro hi A navri r<p B* oNrr* o^8ci4
ovS* apa r6 B r^ T oiChvl' arr%r
tf r<p B TO r.
orpi^i yap ro anpfjriK^v, cav h* iv f^idpti f 6
avXXoyuifios, orov fiiv fj r6 artptfriKOV npo^ r<p
/ic^oM dtcptp, dtmxl^ijarrai tit r6 vpisncv, otov <i ro
r TUfi- dynarpai^Strot yap
fjnfifA T^ B T^
rod artprjrucoiO ri irparrov <rrai ayfjpA' r6 fUv y6p
to B ovScvi rtp A.ro hi A rwi rtp r.
&raw hi r6
yap
fuv
40
1
ft
Twv
399
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
I.
xlv
be posited as
to
all
S91
ARISTOTLE
*I
la
10
war* Urnu
47ri pUpov^' vmifix^i dpa run rt^ B.
TO itptuTov axfjfia, i r6 fuv A trayrl rw V r6
Bt r nvt rwv B. #fo2 ci to fUv A wavH rt^ T
r6 b^ B Tivi, 6 cuJro? X6yo^' dvrurrp4^i yAp
vpo^ T^ r TO B. ^av &< TO fihf B woMrri Toi r t
S< A rivl T^ r, vpwroi opos B^rlo^ to B* to yap
B murrl Ty T to Si F rwl r^ A, iZart to B rtvi
A.
r4*
^cl
rtvl T(p
5*
dvTurrpi^
iv
i*^^> ^<^
xmapiti,
U xrtrapiti t^
tw
fo
9r/>oTaaciS'
Oavcoov 5c
^ra ax^jfuiTa
U yap
#cou
i}
firaTi6fUin)s
rj
yA.rafiaai^ ylyi'To.
TitfV 5*
/xv
to
Se. first
mnd
thhtl.*^'^
Jv.Vii
llr.- '.
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
I.
xlv
these terms.
we
shall
Therefore
have the
it
first figure, if
A
A
**
of this premiss.
Of the syllogisms in the middle figure, one can be
resolved into the third figure and the other cannot,
(1) When the universal statement is negative, resoluapplies to no B, but to some
tion is possible ; for if
C, both statements alike are convertible with respect
and C to some A.
to A, so that B applies to no
is the middle term.
applies
Therefore
(2) When
(5)
^^
S9S
Second
fhird!
ARISTOTLE
Tm
^^
40
o^
aW
it k
'
trwv lpnr)yJW.
XLVI. Aio^jpci hi
i Tip icaTaa(cua{tfcy ^
avaaKciHxCciv to vTroXofifiS^iv rj ravr^ tf enpam
arjfiawtiy ro firi cti^u roH rcu clyoi fn^ toOto, oCdt
10
hwarai
oi)
yo^
c;(4
/3a^'{eiv
T<ji
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
I.
xlv-xlvi
Thus
evident
it is
(1)
how
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
395
ARISTOTLE
ilk
axm
hwanu
/Safety o^K
ri o^k ion, 5tWyufvo^ PahHiv ravro oij/iaiVfi koX <m ^wdfLVO^
od PaSif^tv rj /xi) pahl^tiv, raCrd yt ofM vn^pfti
ravrtft (o yap avro^ Sinxxroi koX fiahil^tw koX /i^
to Pa&iiut,
Koi rttO
t(ai CTrumj/uuv rayadov
dyadoG iorC^' ^ai^ h^ koI dnd^am^ o^ vwdp'
KoX rd oi^urcifMua, ov
tl
o^
fit)
i&
ovS^,
o^
hi6i7tp
laov yukv
ri
dyujov
ot) itdv,
urov 8*
Loov vav,
a^
(vXw
tmopx***
XtVKdv, coTO* fvAoK* TO &^
to ftJAov
oi)^
**
fii^
#fcu ow#c
cart Xcvkov
dvdyin;
85
(u^v
cZhu.
wart ^avtpdv
'_
S96
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
I.
xlvi
walk,'
is
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
897
ARISTOTLE
vndp(i ^ TO A ^ T^ B, Kol <Miii Tip odrtp' teal tj
r6 r rj r6 ^, Koi <Mvl r<^ avrw. KtaX w to F,
t avdytaj to B ircarrl ifrapx^iv.
ci yap aXrfii^ i'ni
oTi oiJ XfVK^v, fcal &n ovk lari Xrvtc^ dXriO^^'
aBwarov yap dfui c2xu XtVK6v Koi ttvai ^^ XivKOt^,
rj ttvai (vXov ov Xtwcov koI ttvai (vXov XtvKOV war*
C4 fitf
Kard^aaii, ^ ano^aan vnap(i. rift 5^
th t6 r owe (Ui* o vop oA&tff fiTi (vXoVt ov^ (vXa
coTOi od XitVK^v, ardnaXuf roiyvy, ^ ro A, r6 k
noMrri,
Tf yap to F ^ t6 A* ^c2 h' ovx otiv rt
cKfia cZmi /ii^ XtvK^v KoX \tvK6v, t6 A vw^pfn,
iraTcl yap rod ovro^ XtvKoO aXrfii^ cfirfcr Sn odtc
loriv oi XtvKov. Kara & rod A oi napr6f r6 A'
10 jraTa yap rov oXu>^ fi-fj ovros (vXov ovk dXrfi^^ r6 A
lnlV, WS COTt (vXo^ XfVK^V* waT TO A oAi^^/ip, r6
S* A OVK aXrfiis, on (vXov XiVKOv,
&^Aov 5* &rt
Koi TO AF o06<vi Tip ainip koI to B kqX r6 A
40
"fj
iMxrrai rwi
*Ofioioai 8*
rtp
a^tp vndpfai.
c^oiKn
iroi
oi artpfTfatu trpoi
t^
^f
10
oS A.
S98
ft*
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
I.
xlvi
Then
'
'
'
399
ARISTOTLE
JI'I
15 Ol^flOtVCt
s&
pownKw,
jj
TO^
'ATrAiuff 8'
fii)
ti<tu
/iouour^r
iraTd
u^
j.
koX to
(Mnr.
40 cT/za
I k
to
KoX 8/5currai.
^ ov
#079
r
i
OVK ev5<x^T(u.
ri/MUTOI/ flV Ol5v OTi
^>arp6y'
crrci
yap
opdytcq^, 4 & to
^
'..
400
riA
T<j>
trovrt
oiJic
TO
Toiv
A VnU* MM
FA $drpov i(
ci^Sc^rTXtt
to
hia r6
ABC
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
I.
xlvi
'
is
'
'
'
'
'
"
Celarent, Cesare
and Camestres.
401
ARISTOTLE
aweni^ptw r6 A, to
hi
koI
fi^
M^oai
10
Xov$iv
rtf)
^avp6v
iirinp
'Lvfifialyti b* iviorrt
opatv
koX iv
dnaraoBai SmL r6
fiavtiv 6f>dw^
otov ci TO
&v
A mu
fi'^
rfj
roiwirQ nifti
tA ayrtxtlfLfva
rtijv
Aofi-
ivdyKTi S* ^mipx^iv,
ndXiy TO
circTcu
10
mil
r6 A.
ffttOhof.
tlXif^Bw
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
I.
xlvi
A, and
and
C and D
and wherever C
are similarly related
implied ; then it will follow that where
(which is false).
applies B necessarily applies
*
and B, and
Let F be taken as the negation of
as that of C and D. Then either
or F must apply
to everything, since either the assertion or the negation must so apply. Again, so must either C or G,
applies
since they are assertion and negation. Also
ex kypothesiwhere C applies. Hence G applies to everything to which F applies. Again, since one or other
of the terms F and B applies to everything, and
similarly with
and D, and since G is a consequent
for we know
of F, B will also be a consequent of
;
this." Then if
is a consequent of C, so also is B of
D.* But this is false ; for we saw that in terms so
constituted the reverse consequential relation obtains.
The explanation is that it is presumably not necessary
that either
or F should apply to everything, nor
applies,
is
'
C/. 52
4-13.
403
ARISTOTLE
'HI
ttk
Z 4
rd Z.
av
raM
8' OTi
o{h* o^k
T^ B*
ayad6v.
TO
01)
Y^
^y^6v dn64Kiaii'
OVK ayoBov Tw oirr' dya^ov
ofioiut^ hi
404
ttaiy.
y^
airo-
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
I.
F or B should do so
F is
xlvi
for
is
405
B
I.
ifeM
40
*Ev iroaoi9
fJL^v
ft icoi
iroLa^
'Eirrci
5* ol
trtpi curcurrov
apx4^t
V^
Oi S^ icard fi^pos, ol
i}
5^
ayriorpt^i- ro hi uvfintpaafta rl
Kara rivos iarw wa6^ oi fih^ aXXoi avXXoytafiol
10 frAcuo auXXoYiJ^ovTOi, otov ci to A S/Scurroi irovri
r<jii B ^ rivi, Kol TO B rtvi rtp A dvayicotov vnap^
XCiv icoi t fiT/Scvi to) B to a, ou& to B ovScvi t4*
A (tovto 8* mpov Tov fiiTpoa6v)* mI hi rtvi fiif
^rrdpxi, ovK dvdytcrj #ceu to B tu^ t^* A fiif thrdp'
X^^' cv$;(Tai yap navrl undpxw.
arfnjTUcfi ovic
t.#. premisseA.
C/. 43 b 36.
Because the relation of subject and predicate
C/. 95 a M.
406
it
BOOK
I.
We
II
ii.
syllogism is effected ; also the nature and number of of sylloothe premisses by which it is effected, and the circumgj^^^gj,
stances and conditions by which it is governed, arguments.
'
Further, we have explained what kind of attributes
should be considered when one is refuting and when ciis. i.-xxvL,
one is estabUshing a proposition, and how to set xxxL
about the appointed task in every given method of
approach ; and further by what means we are to
arrive at the starting-points <* proper to each case.
Now some syllogisms being universal and some Syllogisms
particular, those which are universal always give more^than
more than one inference ; but whereas those parti- 9^^'
cular syllogisms which are affirmative give more than
one inference, those which are negative give only
the conclusion. For all other premisses are convertible, but the particular negative premiss is not ; and
the conclusion consists of an attribute predicated of
a subject. Thus all other syllogisms give more than
one result : e.g., if
has been proved to apply to all
or some of B, B must also apply to some
and if
;
it has been proved that
appUes to no B, then B
appUes to no A. This is a different conclusion from
the former.^ But if
does not apply to some B, it
does not follow that B also does not apply to some
; for it may apply to all.*"
S?7
407
ARISTOTLE
Aim; fuv oSv kow^ trdyrtov atria, rwv tc koB'
6Xov Koi rwv Kara ^upo^' corn hk ntpX rwv
KadoXov Kol dXXcjs iiTiv. ooa yap rj uiro ro fUaov
rj xmo ro avfintpaofid iartv, anavriMtv <rrai 6 avro^
ouAAoyia/ios", tav to fuv cv T<p fUa<p ra h* v rw
n avfinfpdafxart rSn' olov ci to AB avfindpaapa 54a
rov r, ooa vno to B ^ to F iariv, ovoyio; #caTd
Sktp t^ B
navrofv X^aBai r^ K* u yap r^ A
t6 5^ B /v T<^ A, ttaX TO A ^<rr<u /r t^' A. inAiy
16
;T0E^0Aa)TJ>rT05^r^TUlA. KoItoE
iv Tip
<rrai,
n (TvAAoyia/io;. ^i
o/iota>9 5^
r<xl
6
uw^
t artprirucdf
iM
'.:.
t.
mkidk term.
points out ad loe. that in Cameitrea nothing
inferred about subordinates to the middle term.
.J;*
Se. as
^ Waits
400
can be
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
II. i
AB
D
D will also be contained in A.
Again, if E is wholly
contained in C, and C in A, E will also be contained
Sinularly too if the syllogism is negative.
In
in A.
the second figure, however, the inference will only
hold good of that which is subordinate to the conclusion.
E.g., if A applies to no B but to all C, the
conclusion is that B applies to no C. Then if D is
subordinate to C, it is evident that B does not apply
That it does not apply to terms subordinate
to D.
to A is not shown by the syllogism, although B does
not apply to E if E is subordinate to A. But whereas
it has been proved by the syllogism that B apphes to
no C, that B does not apply to A has been assumed
without proof; so that it does not follow by the
syllogism that B does not apply to E.^
As for particular syllogisms, there will be no necessary inference concerning the terms subordinate to
the conclusion (since no syllogism results when this
premiss " is taken as particular), but there will be
one which holds good of all terms subordinate to the
middle, only it will not be reached by the syllogism ;
e.g., if we assume that A applies to all B, and B to
The conclusion of
now
409
ARISTOTLE
Ma
fiv
0 Tov
fivov.
u k fiv
rwv
<rrai ovXXoyurfAO^,
hi6.
r6v npoyyV9j'
f koI
rf
h*
iv TOi&
ra \m6 to
teal
rj
nl TOVTtOV,
II.
'Eari
fjLv
o^
0vS<if ,
<TTi 8'
oKrrc
TO 8 avfiw^paafta
iK
ilfvStov 8*
TO0 yo/)
^i' 8*
8ttJTt
fUv
T171'
aXr)$s
<m
c&oi
8* ciMrrc
rj
i/kvSos i( avdytcrf^,
oiHv
o^K /oTiv
^ic
^cvScov auAAoyui;^!^*
8i"
mparrov
fjLv
ovXXoyUjaaOai
15
rj
ovAAoyur/M^,
c( oAi^^cDi' fAv
10
OVTW9
cSi' <$
avayKf) ro
h^ai.
oiJv
dXrjBes tvai,
hrnvQw
tlvai,
rov
hrjjXov.
firi
tl
yap tov
A okto;
ovro^ dt^yKri r6
p:^
rw
410
ott
53aS4).
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
some C
11.
i-ii
be no inference concerning
subordinate to C, but there will be one
not,
with regard to that which is subordinate to B
however, by the syllogism already effected. SimiThere will be no
larly too with the other figures."
inference concerning that which is subordinate to
the conclusion, but there will be one concerning the
just
other subordinate, only not by the syllogism
as in the universal syllogisms the terms subordinate
to the middle are proved, as we have seen, from a
premiss which is undemonstrated. Thus either the
principle will not apply in the former case, or it will
apply here too.
II. It is possible for the premisses by which the
syllogism is effected to be both true, or both false,
or one true and the other false. The conclusion,
however, is true or false of necessity. Now it is
impossible to draw a false conclusion from true
premisses, but it is possible to draw a true conclusion
only the conclusion will be
from false premisses
true not as regards the reason but as regards the
It is not possible to infer the reason from false
fact.
premisses why this is so will be explained later. ^
Firstly, then, that it is not possible to draw a false
conclusion from true premisses will be clear from the
;
that which
is
True and
missed^'
True
Snnoryfeic
has been
that, because
posited as a single term, it is possible for any necessary inference to be drawn from any one assumption,
The necessary inference is the
for this is impossible.
conclusion, and the fewest means by which this can
411
ARISTOTLE
It k
8vo
o^
avAAi;^cu7eu.
t^
^uas^,
raurrjs 5*
oux onortpa^
ctijvcv
oAAa t^9
XapfiavofUvrfs
dvBpwnw
&
nam
^atoy.
412
'.#.
aXXk
rifs
6in4pas
C/. 54 4.
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
II. ii
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
false.
413
ARISTOTLE
^v5o09 owrq^, otov rij^ AB, ovic tanu to
X4yw 5*
avfJLn^paaua dXrjdtf, rrj^ 5^ BF iartu,
oAt;v iltVoij rffv Ivavriav, cXov ci fiiTScvi vndpxpm
corrcu
irovTi ctAT/irrcu ^ ci nayrl fiiiScvt 6ndffYfW,
yoip TO
Tw B /xi^Scvt {mtipx9y to
B t^ T
navri. av hri r^v fiiv BF nporaaw Xdfiw dXrj&rj
Tfjv 8^ to
^t;5^ oXrjv, koI Travrl ^7rtipxiv tcJ
B TO A, oSiWtov to avfiTrdpaaua aXrjSis ctitu*
10 ovSvi vof) V7rfjpx rdv F, ciircp <^ t^ B, ui^ScW r6
B mxyrX rt^ F. ouoiw^ 8* ou8 ci rd
A, TO
t4> B iravTi vndpxti koX to B t<J> F travrlt ^i^^Bn
8' ij /xv TO BF dXri&^i nporraaii iff
t6
ilfv&rf^ oXrj, Koi fii}8m a TO B to A, to ov/nr^m*
a/io iltvSo^ coTTOi* trarrj yap vndp^ti t^ F to A,
1* Cfrircp Ji T^ B, troi^i to A, to 8c B varri rtp F.
oXrf^
Ad
^avtpov
o^ on r^
iJKvSov^, ^<v T*
T^y
8*
Mpa^
frvfi-nipaayui.
*>
npumj^
oXtf^ Xa^LfiavofUvrff
fiij
yap t^
coTOi.
Ci
TO 8^
TivC,
15
AB
&
414
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
II.
ii
false,
(")
9"
"tliS!^^
'
Major
feise,
minor
t^-
assumed
true,
is
a form which
is
'
'
'
'
415
ARISTOTLE
'
0
yap
itpoy Kol
iTrrrtp
ouScvi avBpionip.
uB
t6B
Kol
ia
Cfjui
BF
npordau>i,
rdoftj^'
/iTjSw ^ndpxiv,
firfi^
t6
AB
/x}t rtp
firjUA
-rip
npo-
fii/jrn
rip
F, alov
* oirrc
Xt^hno^
larpucfj,
rov b
Kal
<rrai
f
odit
rov phf
prfStvl rtp
l /i^ SXrj
to avpurtpaapja dXfi$ts,
r^ B
vnapx^w, to fidrriH
B Ttvi T<Ji F, otov TO yri'05' tw cJSci ica* t^ Sco^opf
TO yap ([o>ov traiTi avdpamtp Koi murrl frtlip, 6 5'
avBpwnos Tivi 7re2[<p '^c^ <'^ iravrL Ci oiV to A
TO
Kol
#f04 rip
oXut
10
TravTi rip
irovTt Toi
F vndp^r
Kal to
iravrl
oirp
rw F
Xij^tirj, r6
Taaccaj.
T^i
evhcx^rai yap ro
/xT^Scvi
yap
416
^tpov
\mdp\iv, ro y^vroi
<f)poyi^i
0X1)6^9
T^ AB
irpo*
t^ B
ftifrc
/iifrc
rwl
rip F, clo
ouSc/xi^
^irapx^^
ro
ovrt
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
But
if
the premiss
AB
which
is
II. ii
assumed
wholly
is
Major true,
JJi^^[
false.
'
'
'
'
'
o 2
417
Major tme,
^JQor partly
ARISTOTLE
ift
TO fUv A
r, ou&vi T<p r TO
XrjiftdtiTj
fiT/Scvt
10
o^
1ft
Xrj^irj TO fi^
oA<^ T(o
vndfixf^ t^
Toi r. i} ucv ABSX^^'^^.;^
TO
avfintpa/Tfjia aXrjdtf.
ical
ical
AB
fUv
10
M B tu4
^ Br <U^,
ar^ptfrucfj^
ofioiws W
oJ^i vnapxiv
AB
^u5^
AB
Tm
418
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
nor to
whereas
speculative,'
'
II.
ii
thought
applies to
true.
In the case of particular syllogisms it is possible tSiSarsyibe true both (i.) when the first logisms.
premiss is wholly false and the other is true
and
(ii.) when the first premiss is partly false and the
other is true and (iii.) when the former is true and
the latter partly false and (iv.) when both are false.
For (i.) there is no reason why
should not apply to Major
no B but to some C, while B appUes to some C, as, SiS^inor
e.g., animal applies to no snow but to some white,' true.
and 'snow 'applies to some 'white.* Supposing,
then, that snow is posited as the middle term, and
animal as the first, and it is assumed that A applies
to the whole of B and B to some C, AB is wholly
false, but BC is true, and the conclusion is true.
Similarly too when the premiss AB is negative.
For
it is possible for A to apply to the whole of B and
not to apply to some C, and yet for B to apply to
some C, as, e.g., animal applies to every man, but
is not a consequent of some
white,' and
man *
applies to some white ; so that if man is posited
as the middle term, and it is assumed that A applies
to no B and B applies to some C, the conclusion will
be true although the premiss AB is wholly false.
(ii.) Also, if the premiss AB is partly false, the Major partly
'^
conclusion can be true.
For there is no reason why Jru.'
A should not apply both to some B and to some C,
while B applies to some C as, e.g., animal applies
to some beautiful and some large,' and beautifor the conclusion to
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
ful
'
applies to
some
'
large.*
Thus
if
is
assumed
419
ARISTOTLE
ft
y^
HcOiv
ianu to
dXrj0s
TO
^ fUv
4*
T^i fiv
r<JLi
AB
iXftB^ iiSi
avfiir^paofia.
oAoi
vndpxW
atrdSciffi^J
BF ^cv^,
rtp bi
Kvtcvtgt fiv
ct
nayri T<ji> B to
#co4 to B rivi t^ F, oAi;^i( CffTOi TO avfurdpaafia t/rnvSoCi ovroi to BF.
'Ofwuof hi Kal artpffTuefji XofifiayofUvrf^ rij^
Xrf<^irf
mu^
war*
AB
irporraatcaf.
/y^^cupci ydip
rd
ti^ /lir
fti;-
Scvt Ta> $
F,
Ta>
lA
dpiBfju^ fiiv
KoX
*>
ri
Kat
fiv
AB
irporaais dXr)urjs,
1^
ij
Sj
AB 0t^;
BF
5^
^vOik.
iccu
1;
oF
A nam
420
rm
ov Philoponus
(?),
Jenkinson :
nW oodd.
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
II.
will
i'i_.
Major tme,
minor falsa
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
421
Both
fake!^^*^*
ARISTOTLE
Ha
yap auTol opoc koI (jooovtw^ tc^^ooktcu
np^
rffw
ccrrcu
ro
an68t(t.v.
Koi o/i^or/pcuv hi
0
^v^v o^<a
rw fih^
avfirrtpaafia aXrjd^s' iyx<^pt yap t4
^i^Scvi
fir)hvl rCi hi r rwl vnapvtiv, r6 nivroi
r^ avp^PriKOTi
i/fvhovs
owrrji
fjJyriSp fcal ci
oXrjs,
ap.^>orpai ini ri
10
^vois,
teal ci
tf
fiiv
4S2
r(u
These words,
not inserted
by
error in antSdpstkm of
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
taken as negative
be posited
will
II.
ii-iii
in the
of the proof.
The conclusion can also be true when both preto apply to
For it is possible for
misses are false.
no B but to some C, while B applies to no C ; as, e.g.,
a genus does not apply to a species from another
genus, but applies to an accident of its own species ;
animal applies to no number but to some
for
white,' and number applies to no white.* Thus if
is assumed to apply to all B and B to some C,the conclusion will be true although both premisses are false.
Similarly too if
is negative ; for there is no
should not apply to the whole of B
reason why
and yet not apply to some C, while B applies to no
C ; as, e.g., animal applies to every swan but does
not apply to some black,' while swan applies to
no black ; so that supposing
to be assumed to
does
apply to no B, and B to apply to some C,
not apply to some C. Thus the conclusion is true
although the premisses are false.
III. In the middle figure it is possible to reach a Second
true conclusion by false premisses in every combina- (i^uni[if each ^':rj'*\g
tion
(i.) if both premisses are wholly false
^^ ^^^^
is partly false ;] (ii.) if one is true and the other
'
'
'
AB
'
(iii.) if
wholly false, whichever is falsely assumed
both are partly false (iv.) if one is absolutely true
and the other partly false and if one is wholly false
and the other partly true ^ both in universal and
;
in particular syllogisms.
(i.)
^ ^
If
animal
A applies
to no B but to all C,as, e.s.,'
^^
the wording in ch. iv, are at least tautologous with (iii.), and
spoil the analysis.
* This case is not treated in the discussion which follows.
423
Both
premisses.
ARISTOTLE
66k
hk navri,
av h^vrluts rtBuknv al nporaoti^ khX Xtf^Sn^ ro
A rut fi(v B navri T<Ji 8< F /iTyScrt, ^k il$viCjv oAufv
rcjv irporaatwv aXrjBts coroi r6 av^itripatryji,
oyLoiois S^ Kol ct r<(t fuv B travri r^ hi T ftijScvt
vndpxi TO A' 6 yap ovroy corcu auAAoyur/ios-.
0X17^7^*
01^ V yo^
trai^i i^ap;fv,
icaiAuci
ri fuvroi
to
ncoi
r^ B
/it;3ct4 roi
itcu r(p
F,
otiO
F
r6
to iTrir^
0iXq6^]i,
iyxwpi yap to
* aAi;^7jy.
Toj 8^
wovri, TO fUvTOi
Kopatci.
firfitvX
T<ji>
cVt Tt 0t>8i79
17
iav
o^
Xtf^Bj r6
oXip \map\iv,
8*
AF
fikv
A r^ fU B
AB nporauif
to avfind'
90 paofjLa
8i
dXr)ds.
424
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
II.
iii
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
.., if
'
'
is
'
negative.
425
ARISTOTLE
imdpxtw rathk T
Ar
firjStvt,
iff
fUv
AB
Mn
0cv5^,
TO avfin^paafia 0^17^^?.
^cvSctf^,
Ka2 tl dfu^OTtpat eu npordati^ <Vt
coTOi TO avfin^paafia dXrjdt^. ^y^cupci ydp t^ A
Kol r(f} B ICU T(ft r TtVt VTtdpXtW, TO 5^ B ftl^Scvt
Toi r, ofov (a>ov tcQx XtVKtfi run, koI fUXavt rivC, r6
8^ XVk6v ovOvl jUXavt, ap odv Xtf^S^ t6 A rw
yLv B iravrl rt^ 0 V fiTfivit a/i^ fUy al nporrir
aci9 CTTt Ti ^cuScif, TO & ovfin^poafjui aXrjBtf.
ofioiw^ 5< Kcu furartdtioTjs Ttjs artpvirttcfj^ Sea tum*
ij
40
66
cu)Ta;i' oputv,
Oovcpoi' 5^
iral
Ttfy
'^P^^ ovAAoyiOftoir'
ovS^
ya/> urcuAuf i
Tiw AcvKoi
10
fiw&vi
ou;^ tmdpfti.
^dpxttv
KadoAov rrpdraat^
rtv hi
oArj
AB* tyx^P^^
Tii'i firj
19
y^
'''^
xmdpx^Lv, koX to
rfis
B fiT;$vi Toi i
T Tivt fi^ vndpxfiv,
Toi fio'
oZby TO
rip
Acuicai
v7Tdp^i
5^ Tivt
otf;(
rwt X(VK<p,
AB
AF
dXrjds,
Kcu T^y
10 p.pi
o^
4S6
ft<v
^vhov^.
vjrapxti
m, Bekkers ov
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
II.
iii
true.
'
'
'
Similarly too if the negative premiss is transproof being effected through the same
posed,** the
terms.
It is evident that the same also holds good of
For there is no reason why
particular syllogisms.
should not apply to all B and some C, while B does
animal applies to
not apply to some C
as, e.g.,
every man and to some white,' but man will not
is taken to apply
apply to some white.' Thus if
to no B but to some C, the universal premiss is wholly
false, but the particular premiss is true, and so is the
conclusion.
taken as
is
Similarly too if the premiss
for it is possible for
to apply to no B,
affirmative
and not to apply to some C, and for B not to apply
applies to nothing
animal
as, e.g.,
to some C
inanimate and does not apply to some white,' and
inanimate ' will not apply to some white.' Thus
if
is taken to apply to all B and not to apply to
will be wholly
some C, the universal premiss
will be true, and the conclusion will be
false, but
'
'
'
(?)
Par-
syllogisms.
^^^ojjy^"^
false,
minor
^^""
'
AB
'
'
AB
AC
true too.
So too if the universal premiss
For there
particular premiss false.
"
is
is
427
Oi) Major
false.
ARISTOTLE
Ma
/xY^e
rw r
nvi rw
Kol KQTa^TilC^ S^
Y^
o^
ao
T^
Ka$6XoV
ri6fliVfK
ataavTut^.
iff
avfin^paofux d}ifj$4f.
OawpoK Si Koi ori ^( afx^or^ptav ^fttvb&9 iarai
koX
r6 (rvfin^paafia aXrjBt^, tintp ^ii^)^rnu r6
rp B Koi rw V oA<^* vndpx^tv, ro fUvroi B rvA, rw
iirtavoi,
fi-fj
Xri*ft0^vro9
yAp toO
r<^ fiv
/XT/Scvt
rtf)
Si
riyi
40
dXrid4^.
>
oA^]
488
r<^
/Uv
r^
ct JenldoMa.
'
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
II. iii
'
'
'
be true.
Similarly too if the universal premiss
is
affirmative
'
'
429
(i")
Both
Fa^il^^^^
ARISTOTLE
IV. 'Earat S^ koI iv
ft
t/tvS<jjv
aXrfiis,
teal
rtf^
d^^Kyr^panf
ifKV^w o^awv
ais.
irl
ov^v yap
kcuAucc fu/frt r6
/i'^rc
r6
lofiiT^cvi
rift
vnapx^^*')
4yxtM>pi
y^
to fUv
vnapx^u^ r6
A natrrl, teal r6 A rufi
r<p B fii^ vndpx^iy, oto ro fUXii odSvi KVtOHif
i^v 8^ TrtUTTi, Kol TO {<pov oi5 troi^l ft4Xavi' war
av Xrf4^$^ TO fUF B TTovTi Tji r TO 8c A firjSvt, t6
10 A TiVi T^ B o^ vndpfti' Kol ro fUr ov^n^paafia
dXr)d4s, oi 8^ 'trpardaif i/ki^U.
Kol ci cVi Ti txar^pa ^vhri^, tonu ro avfiv^'
paxTfia oAtj^cV. oi58o' yof) iccuAtAct Kai ro A Koi ro B
Tivi TO* r VTrdpxfty* f<u r6 A ru% rtp B, otor ro
Aeuicov KOi TO KoXov rivl ^{(hv indpxti, koX r^
u\vk6v rivl KoX^. av o^ rc^ ro A teal ro B
navrl r<^ T vndpx^^t <** fiiv npordatis ivi ri
^tvSls ro 8 avfinpaafui dXif$4i,
teal irrtpfi'
ovShf yap
rucffs 8c rij^ AV riBtfjUvrf^ oyMtotq,
K<oXvi ro fiv A rivl r<p V fiif U7rdpxu^ ro 8^ B
rivl tmdpx^iv, Kal ro A rtp B fi-fj natrri undpxtp,
4S0
/lY^Scvt rtft
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
II.
iv
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
431
ARISTOTLE
80
o^
r6 XevK6v
av
X'r)^Bj
TO
fiV
^ndflx^i, r6 S4 iroA^r
oi^ iroprl
/xi^Scw
rcjJ
iirl
KoXot' war*
r^ 5^
^^cvftcip,
vayri,
t6 8^
cvtiTT^paafia aXrfi^^.
fUv
rrj^
^cuSoiV
8Xri^
rtj^ 8*
Tip
/xi)
iff
Ci
K(jj\vi
oA^
t
KOi
yap
otov
MA
fi^
Tivi
(4^*
t^ B vnapxW,
M^^
8*
o<^0i4
AF
AF
a7ro3(^i9.
r^
8* cirt
WaiU.
scd.
488
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
II.
iv
to
'
'
pne
'
("i.)
'
'
'
<*
'
'
'
'^
ini
'
(according to the scholiast on 189 a 5-11) from the lost commentary of Alexander, who saw that a fresh set of examples
was needed.
433
(iv.)
One
ARISTOTLE
noprl diSparmp, KoXiv S* ot) vturri, mu r6
KoXov ran, hiwohi unapv^^* ^^^ <^ ^V^^ '^^
A Kol TO B oXw rJi r V7rap;(ti', ij /i^v BP oXrj
oAi^^iW 1} 5^ A r cVt n ^fv&Tf^, T^
avfintpaofjta
dXrj$^. ofioiw^ bi Kol T^f fih^ AT aXrjdoC^ 1*179 &
BF i/teuSov^ im ri XafjLpavofi/vri^* iitrartBhnwv
/iV
IS
&
yap
Kcd rfjs
1} diro^ifif.
icara^riKffi ovari^. iml
yap iyx<i*pi to fUv B oXtp rip V vndpxnv to S^
nvi, Koi otov ourco; CYOHJiy ot) nayrt rip S ro A,
^av ^ri^>^ ro fUv B oAtp rw F ^napYtu^ r6
A
fti^Scvi, ij fi^ artpfirucfj hti rt ^^wji^, ij
oAy) aXrjBrff Koi ro avfin^paofia,
miXuf ^ni MScurrcu ori tow /xir A fiTf6vi vviLpycvros rtp F to0
5^ B Ttvi YXtopl r6 A rutl r^^ B u^ ^dpxtu^,
rG)v axnuiv oputv tartu
to
V Mpa
ts
^avpov
rv79 M.
on
$cal
BF ^^
rrk
ptkw
T ^pcvioOr
AF oA^
dXi^i^
ovai;^
^yX^P*^ ^ avfiw^paofia
lvai dXrj$4^.
'
fXT^Scvi
*
iS4
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
II.
iv
'
AC
AC
partly false,
be true.
it is still
For
if
B to all C, AC will
It is evident, then, that in the case of particular (2) Parsyllogisms also it will be possible under any conditions syuiSsms.
to reach a true conclusion by means of false premisses.
For the same terms are to be assumed as when the
premisses are universal affirmative terms in affirmaFor it
tive and negative in negative syllogisms.
makes no difference to the positing of the terms
whether we assume that that which apphes to none
applies to all, or that that which applies to some
Similarly too in the case of
applies universally.
negative syllogisms.
Thus it is evident that whereas if the conclusion why it is
is false the grounds of the argument, either all or premisses
:
54 a
1.
435
ARISTOTLE
orav h* aXfj6^9, o^k avdytcyj aXri$s c&Oi ovrt rl
ovrt irdvra, oAA* tart fitf^vo^ ovrttf iXrfdoBf ttSr
40 cv ra> avXXoyiaiuff ro avfimpaafia Suolatt tvai
VI k aXrfii^, oi5 yL^v <f avdyia^,
axriov S* on orav hvo
XD ovTCj npos aXXrjXa wart dar^pou wroi i(
avayKfjs ttvai Odrtpov, rovrov uri oyrof fikv ov5^
6drpov <7Tat, oirroi S* ovk at^ytaj tlvai Odrtpov,
rov 5* avrov oyros cai firi oito^ dhuvarov i(
avay#n79 thnu ro avro. Xiyw h* clov rov A ovros
XtvKov ro B ttvai fUya i( dydyfcq^, jcoi fiff ovros
XtVKoG rov A 7^ B tlvai fUya <( dvdytcrf^. orwf
yap rovhi ovroi Xtwcov roC A ro& (Myin; fUya
ttvai ro B, fuydXov ht ro$ B StfTOf ro V ft^i
XfVKdv, dvdyKTf, ci to A Acvkok, r6 T fi^ ttvai
fcal orav hvo ovrwv Bar4pov avros avdytcn
10 XfVKOv,
Bdrtpov ttvai, rovrov fi'^i ovrog dvdytnj r6 A fitj
rov
ttvai.
B /ii) oi<T09 fJuydXov ro A ovx oUv
re AcvKov ttyai. rov Si A u'fi ovrog ^Vkov, mI
dvaytcrj ro B lUya ttvai, av^ipoivti <f dvdyKri^ rov
B /xcyoAou yiti oktos avro ro B ttyai yuiya. rovro
15 S* dhvvarov ct yap ro B fii} fori ii/iyo, ro A ovk
coroi AcvKov cf dvdyiais, ci ouv fii^ ovros rovrov
XevKov ro B corou ftiya, ovpfiaivti, Ci t^ B /ai}
^OTi yiya, th^ai fUya, a9 hid rpuav,
V. To 5c kvkXw KOi c( oAAt^Acui' htucwoBai ion
r6 hid rov ovp,rrpdafiarof Kai roO dvairaXiv rij
ft
10
vaaSai
* us. premiss.
*
c/.
4^
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
II.
iv-v
can yield
true,
conclusion.
it is
itself is great.
But
this is impossible
for if
is
not great,
will necessarily
ARISTOTLE
V7nipx*^$ cScc^c 5^
TO
A rw3
M,
trrrdpxft, Aa/3cuv
Tiji
rrcpov.
t&
v 8<
TOiff
40
F avTiarpli^vaw
BBixj9w yap ri
t6 AB 8ca tc tow
avfi7rpdafiaTos <al hia rrjs BF Trporoacax <unaarpa^urqs, uHjavruti hk koX to BF 8ia tc tov
TO
AF
oAA^Ao&r.
M avfinpdafiaTos
p^vTj^.
Set 8^
aTroSctfoi*
ical TroAiv
Koi
rrj^
ttJi^
tc
Tatmuy yap
AB nporaatw^ atrrtorpap^"
Koi rrpf BA np6raaw
FB
eU^TroScurroiS'
cc;(/>^/xc^a
F imapx^W
KoX TO F TTOJ^i Toi A, <7vAAoyU7flO; COTOi TOU B
TroAiv cdv Xrj^Bj to ftcv F irarrt T<p A
5 irpos TO A.
TO 8c A TTOvrt Ty B, travTi T<ji B to F dvdy$cri
fjLovcus.
489
cav
oiJv
Xrj^&j to
irojTi Toi
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
II.
means of B,
original syllogism it
is predicated of B.
impossible
assume a different
is
ARISTOTLE
10
nairrl
rtft
anohBiYiJLfvai
ovdyicri
vndf^w.
8t*
a7ro5iifci9> A'
fiipoif tocs-
dmarp^^ovai
dXXi/jXcov
r^
Scurvu/Wyyi
10
F irard tou
hid
TOVTUfv Scucvirrai ra/v frpordotwv, atart rtp avfi"
n^pdafiaTt \p!}yLda irpo^ rijv dfroScifiv.
Kara row
XlytoBai, ro 8^
ts
ori TO
fiV
firfievl
dydnaXiv
17
trporom?.
avfincpavaaBai, ovkI^
ct
8*
on
6p,ouo^
rd
roi
ScI
dyriaTp7rTov ro
r<Ji
440
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
II.
'
same
Let
<
A
A apply to no C, which was the conclusion before,
is guilty of petitio principii
required to be proved.
Aristotle
what
is
this is exactly
441
ARISTOTLE
Ma
8i n)
ai
aLvdyKT)
vnofixtuT'
r^
Y^
y^
arpa^
10
TO
to
rivi
AB
fiTi
uxmip
<mv*
i^
Kaitl ra>v
vndpxti, ro
rivl
opolws ayrt'
KodSXov* dov <^
xmap^iv
dXXuff
Tnv cv
/x^'^c
VI. 'v 3c
>
Si*
* <*dv
uolgo.
44
T<jj
2 Buhle: iii.
vporaaiv,
Sci/r^M^ ax^fioTi to fUv icaTa
Xvwoui.
Ou Bekkcr.
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
and let it be assumed that
none of which A applies.
II.
v-vi
applies to
all
of that to
to
allC.
is
evident
Reciprocal
^rtUiixiar
syllogisms
for the
Moreover,
results
if
;
Cf.
58 a 29 note.
44S
Reciprocal
proof in th
ARISTOTTLE
ion
4>aTuc6v o^K
Bi arprfTtK6v ^oriv.
Stuanmu
5ia to
fitf
r {map\W
'^
S* iv
/Wpci
ou
Trayri,
to
twI tw
AF
j5
yap
GVfJipaLVi
ylyvioBai
apuds.
^
ri^ hi
iirfifvi
Cm ct in
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
II.
vi
premiss."
If the syllogism is not universal, the universal
premiss cannot be proved, for the same reason which
we have explained above ^ but the particular premiss
can be proved when the universal statement is affirmaLet A apply to all B, but not to all C. The
tive.
conclusion is BC. Then if B is assumed to apply to
all A, but not to all C, A will not apply to some C.
The middle term is B. If, however, the universal
premiss is negative, the premiss AC cannot be proved
by the conversion of AB for it follows that either
one or both of the premisses become negative, so that
there will be no syllogism. It can, however, be
proved in a similar way to that which was used in the
i.e., if it is assumed that
case of universal syllogisms
;
**
i.e.
58 a 36
ff.
445
ARISTOTLE
SSb
KadoXov, ^av
Xrjif>$^ t^
r6
rtA
fti)
vndp^
t6
rwi vndpxtv.
VII. *Eml 8^ roO rpirov OY^fiaros irav liitw
al irpordatis Kad6Xov Xrj^waiv, ovK
(vhtx^rai hl(ai Si* aWi^XufV' to uh^ yap koBoXov
H^htiKwrai 5id rwv koBoXov, to b iv rovrtp avfi'
^vtpov ori oXw^
wipaaiia dci Kara lUpos,
OVK ct^xcTOi Scifcu Sia ro&rov roG ax^fxaro^ rtiy
KoBoXov vp6rtuny. iop 5* tf fUv f koBoXov ^ O
iv ^pi, voT^ /iv <<rrai trori 5' ovk iartu, oror
fiv o^ dfu^ortpai iran/yopurcu As^^oxn mu to
uro^oAot; yhnrjTox npof rw cActTTom &icpa), iartu,
ortuf hi np6^ Bar4p<^, ovk coroi.
^napx^rw
r6
iravri r^ F r^ 5^ B rtW* av/tiMpaaua r6
40
afJL^6r(pcu
axm
y^
AB.
10
14
JO
ita^dAov
8*
i}
Karrjyopucj, hi)firiarai
ij
r4pa,
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
II. vi-vii
if
C, and
is
'
'
'
Cf. 58 a 29,
9.
447
ARISTOTLE
v7Tcipxi,
F nam
Tip
inr
/ii^
A firfitvi r^ V r6 b^ B
rivt' ovftir^patTfia
ri A TUi t^ B o^ ^ir^ivrt.
<iv o^ ^vi*^ <L r6 A rtvl u^ unj^x^i to F
Tii't i^ap;(ii', <ii^yin} to F Tin tcuk B vndavffw.
toaXAoi? 5' oi)#c /oTii' avnarp^^ovra r^ koBcXov
QvXXoytauos*
^avtpov odv
on
Mpav'
TOU T/HTOV
1)
3i*
CcU Oitt
^ ^
81'
58 a 29, b 9, S7.
C/. 58 b -7. 59 a 6-14.
* t..
448
fMYf
changing
its
change of
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
11. vii-viii
'^
P 2
449
ARISTOTLE
Ik
fUv TO
TTOKTl Toi
^vam-uo^ hi TO
OU TTCU^l
ir<xKri t<}>
tcol
ovSfvi
rtvl &mipxiy).
fjJaov rod B.
1&
<o
irporaai9.
Kal
<rrfpirfr c6s
6 avXXoyujfid^
<jjoavrti>f.
Mpa
Cf, J)4
JnUrp, 17 b 1
89a
450
1.
&
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
II. viii
'
'
'
'
'
'
451
ARISTOTLE
M a6w
ovKoOv
ovTuts,
5^
firj
navri
oi5
rw T ro
Bi
navTt, T^
yap TO
rii'i
TO
Tiyl
rep
r^
T^
oi)
irayrt
iravrl,
dvAa>; ouScvi'
*Efr2
rt^
ri /x^
to A od iravri r^ B.
OTtpTjTitfos 6 ovAAoyuj/i^.
c2
F vndpxi T<p 8^ B /ii^dcW, t6
fihf
a^Xn
r^ V
8^ Tuv /y
ft^jp<^
ovAAo/ur/iJ)!'
#(a2
uHmp
iv
orov /uv
5cSix^ ydf> TO A
Ay;^^ to a fii^ScW
T^
t4>
*
T<J)
T<Ji
TtW
avcufWirvTai
o^
oi^KoOv dv
^rmpxtiv t^ 5^
imdpiti' KoX l r6
T<p
ofi^OTCfxu.
cdi^
5*
Twi,
iM:tfiv\
to B-
ivayrui}^
omtt'
dyri-
ovmo
vndpx^iy xai
Tfjs
10
t^
AB
TO
452
dirdScifi^
^
"*
5*
i]
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
let it
II. viii
Then
to
some B.
In the case of particular syllogisms, (1) when the b. Parconclusion is converted in the contradictory sense, syUogLms.
but (2) when it is con- Refutation
both premisses are refuted
verted in the contrary sense, neither premiss is re- by^ontra^
futed.
For the result is no longer, as it was in the ^jjj.*^^' ^"*
universal syllogisms, a refutation in which the con- contrary
conversion.
elusion after conversion lacks universality ; on the
contrary, there is no refutation at all. (1) Let it be
proved that A is stated of some C. Then if A is
assumed to apply to no C but to some B, A will not
apply to some B. And if A appHes to no C but to
Thus both premisses are
all B, B will apply to no C.
refuted. But (2) if the conclusion is converted in the
contrary sense, neither is refuted. For if A does not
apply to some C, but applies to all B, B will not apply
to some C. Yet the original assumption is not yet
refuted, because it is possible to apply to some and
yet not to apply to some.
As for the universal
premiss AB, no syllogism at all can be obtained to
refute it
for if A does not and B does apply to some
C, neither premiss is universal. Similarly too if the
For if A is assumed to apply
syllogism is negative.
to all C, both premisses are refuted ; but if to some
C, neither is refuted. The proof is the same as
;
before.
453
ARISTOTLE
tOa
1ft
IX. *Ev
rw
n^
ovk arw
lUv
nf>6f
ovcPUftr hffu^
rujj^,
act
yap
Mpav ofiolw^
tq avrtarpo^ (^y**^
ououos, 1 fiv cvoKTUos avTUTToi^nu, ivoyTtw^,
1 8 ayru(ifi4V(o^ t avrucifi4v<jj^)
irayrl rw B
f /ii^Scvi'Tnapx^'ra} yap ro
B vani r^ F
avfi'npaafui BF. ^dv oi^ ^^7^^
vndpxiv teai ro AB fi^>77 to A iroyri np F vnapl hi r6 B
(ci* ViyifTOi /op r6 vp&rov ax^fia.
murri rw F to oi A firjSvi rw F, ri A ou noMtri
rip B' oxfjfui r6 rxanm,
iip 8' OMrrufttfUvwt
avrurrpoMfm r6 BI^, 17 fiht AB 6fMoiw^ btix^ ifatroA ,
tl yap r6 B rtvt rip V r^
1} 8^ AF arructifUywf.
Si A firfivl rip r, r6 A rwi riL B o^x vJi^pfci.
fnlAiv ci T^ B Tn^ Tp F TO 8^ A vavrt rw B, r6
A Tivi rw T, COOT* omxcifi/Mo^ ytyrrreu o ovAAoavoxprffooiuv
TO
10
^^^
yujfioi,
pukv avriarpif>op4vov
Sft
TCtfi^
^^
99 a 16
*
454
</.
59 b
u. refuted.
15.
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
II.
ix
'
^^{^^J^^^^
^^ ^sisms.
59 b
3960
1,
60 a 5-14.
4^55
Particular
ARISTOTLE
\mapYw, iroXu^ ct ro B ru4 t^ P icai r6 A
rwl Tiff r, ovK 0TO4 (TvXXoytOfAOs* ovhtTtpov yo^
KodoXov ru>v ttXrififLtvcav war ovk araiptlrxu ro
40 fiif
0 k
hB
r6 A.
i)
a^
8* dir<$8c{i9 #cal
ro ira^<SW
iraTTyyopufOv.
X.
'Etti 5^ rod rpirov ax^uaros Srav fUv ^mivQvriarp4^0A ro avfinipdafia, ov^rtpa rtDr^
nporaxrtutv outupcircu kot ovStva rufv ovAAoyi^,.
Gfiatv, orov 5* ayructifUvutf, au^6rpai fcal i^^
aTToaiv.
hbi)(6w yap ro A rwt. rt^ B \mafx^
fuaov 5* ctAi^^tdctf ro F, iortoaav hi kq$6Xo al
rluis
10
A nW
i&
avdyfcrj
10
Kara
r^
ivrurrpo^rjs,
arrurrp44^ai Philoponus
codd.
*
456
(?),
Jenkinsooi
jmar^l^au rm
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
ix-x
II.
Refutation
.1
..-I
J
the contrary sense, neither premiss is re- is not by
verted
futed in any syllogism but when in the contradictory ^^^^?^
sense, both are refuted in all syllogisms.
For let it be by conproved that A appUes to some B, and let C be assumed cSfJersUm.
as the middle term, and let the premisses be universal. (D 'Q
^^^
Then if A is assumed not to apply to some B, and B to * ^"^
apply to all C, we get no syllogism relating A and C.
Again, if A does not apply to some B, but apphes to
all C, there will be no syllogism relating B and C.
There will also be a similar proof if the premisses are
for either both premisses must be
not universal
particular as the result of conversion, or the universal
statement must become attached to the minor extreme and under these conditions there is no syllogism, as we have seen,** either in the first or in the
middle figure.
If, however, the conclusion is converted in the conFor if
tradictory sense, both premisses are refuted.
A apphes to no B, and B to all C, A will apply to no C.
Again, if A applies to no B but to all C, B will apply
to no C. The same also holds if the other premiss is
to
m
.
26 a 17-21, 27 a 4-12.
457
ARISTOTLE
Mb
yap TO
t&
rivl rtp
rto Si
nrjSvi r<^
ro S^
rivi
r ovx vndpfti' i Bi r6 A rw
r navri, oi^Scvi rQ T r6 B.
'Ouoiw^ 8^ Kcd
aTfrrjTuca9
r&
fiv
V, t6 A
B firfivl
S trvAAoyumoy.
tivi T<p
SbixiBw yap TO
fi^ vTrapYov, <mia
airo^ruc^ o2 t^ AT*
h KaTqyopucov fikv r6
BF
auAAoyu7/xof .
Tip r,
TO A
Kol rov
ci
yap to
ct
rivi t<^
to St
B muni
ovK
ot)8'
rtvi
fi'qSvi,
tram-l r<p
dXXa navrl
r<p 8i
^7rrjif)(V.
irtiAir tl
r6
ft'rjSv{,
to
ofioitjjs
5^ Scurvirreu kou
od8cvt r<p F*
ci
ylyvmu yAp t6
fiTjSevi,
ov6* ovrco^.
458
8 b
1-4,
irdrr
15 a
hnsTrion^
10.
Tg
rrpiO'
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
II.
m a 30-36.
27 b 6-8.
459
ARISTOTLE
on iv uhf T^
rov fUoov koI roO iax^rou
yiyvovTOi ol avXXoyurfioi, teal 1} fiv npo^ rifk
iXdrrovi dKpu> act Sta rov fUaov apfup^rtu, ^ h^
npos Tip fiiCovt hta rov iax^Tov hf
np hVT4(taf
hia rod nparrov Koi roO iaxorov, tad ij yJtv npi^^
rw iXdrrovi dtcpw ocl ZiA rod nparrov erx^fuirof,
1} S^ i^pos r<p /i^opi 5id rov iax^rov iv hk rxp
rpiTip oca rov irpunov koX Sux rov tuaov, koi
^
fUi' npos r(p pui^oyt Sea roC irputrov ati, rj hi irpos
r<p tXarrovt Bia rov fUaov.
XI. Ti fUv oSv iarl ro avrtarpi^w iral mug.
v Kdortp ax^fiart Koi rig yiyvrrai avXXoy%ffpAfl
rooci
icoi
9r(^*
arTuctifUvot^, kqI
10
ift
^avtpov.
'0 hk
Kwrai
hia
fi4v
iff
whose contradictorj
460
aMuined
m*
;;
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
II.
x-xi
conclusion is the contrary and in what the contradictory of the original premiss, and (3) that in the
first figure the syllogisms are effected by means of
the middle and last figures, and the minor premiss
is always refuted by the middle figure and the major
by the last ; in the second figure they are effected
by the first and the last, and the minor premiss is
always refuted by the first and the major by the last
and in the third figure the syllogisms are effected by
the first and middle figures, and the major premiss
is always refuted by the first and the minor by the
middle figure.
XI. Thus it
is
it is
* i,e.
the contradictory.
461
ARISTOTLE
aXlfuLranf'
S^mu,
ttal
r^
firi
iravri
6ndpxtiy to
Tip
B,
oiS
>^-
I k y>>rrai
^ri^Ojj,
ft
y^
t^ A, t^ A cii^vi Tip A.
Tovro 5* <rrcu a5tWrov* ^uSo9 apa to /iiTdcvi t^
B TO A vvrdpxw. dXX* o^tc ti to firfivl ^uSo9 to
r<^
TO
nayrl dXqd^S'
TravTi
^dv S*
1}
PA
ov ytyvcTOi
nayTi Tip B
irpoaXrj^iSj,
firi
10
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
II. xi
for all
possihile in all
But
A
A
apphes
appUes
B is true. (2) And if CA is further assumed,
we get no syllogism, just as we get none when A is
assumed not to apply to all B. Thus it is evident
it is
false that
to no
to all
'
appUes to no B.
is false, it
if
'
that
loTo;
...
TO
Proof of the
PffirSfve,
ARISTOTTLE
Ik
npo^
T^i*
Xrj^Bfj
ij
Mpa
vp^rtunf, ot^K
H^
hnxu
av^itrtpd'
FA.
c/ S*
i)
np6i rt^
fS^Tirroi
np6mmtf,
odtc
coTOi (TuAAoyujfio;.
tor S^ to ivavrlov &mn0,
GvXXoyiafiO^ lUv
kqX t6 aZwaTQ, oi ScZ*
KWTQi hi. TO npoTtO^. vnoK^UiBw yap vatfrl
hmu
TO A vn(ipxUf, teal t6 V r^
tlXri^Bm am
o^KoOv oniy^n} t6 T ffotrri Ttjt B vfrQp)(iy, toOtq
B* ahvvaTO, woTM ^fti&of to murrl r^ B to A
inapx*uf, oAA' oimtm yt ayayircubv, c2
warrl,
fiifScvl ^apx<iv.
6fAouoi hi Koi cj trpo; t^ B
to
Arj^flrj
Mpa
Trp6raaiq-
avX^oyum&f fc^
i}
y^
^v^cok,
Ttjt B Td
{modTov trovTi vndpxiv' ct ydp t^
irain'i t^* B
fcai TO r wayrl t<^ A, to F fra^ri Tip B' war*
TOVTO oSlWrOf, l^vSoS TO ^Or$V, OfUHWS 34
Kat t 9rpo9 T<p B cAi^^^ i) CTfjpa np6r<unq. koX
1 aTpfrfnK6v ^v to FA ci<mvTa>y fcol ya^ oimtf
yiyvTfu avXXoyurp^,
^av 5c trpof toi B ^ t6
aTpirjTuc6v, ovhiv Scurvirrcu.
car 54 fi^ irarri
ts
>
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
II. xi
465
ARISTOTLE
40
dXXa
rivl
8c
Trat^i roj
Toirr'
TO A, axrr* aXriBh r6
^VTos
nvl
sn^v
fA4v wrfjpix^,
^oBtaw
>w
o^oi'
B*
T<jii
imyrl.
10
rwl
i( aXijBwy fi^
8* ^OTU' dXffS^s,
cixrr*
ftfj
o^
odx
17
0Vadai'
oi) irofMi
A Tm
tf
oMf
cc
firi
^datf
ij
fitf
t^
vwapxiiv
a^u^ow an6St(is.
^Mk
hnyriam
dno^oaif, dvdyfcfj
mxXiv
r6 Amueti*
oStw
citrroi
rj
Ttn
ci
an6^<un9, Sci^^/i^ro^
rfp^
KarA^aatv
0X17-
ano^aaw.
to
yap
KaTd<f>aatv, vBo(ov to
8*
^ni)f>)(w.
Tai^ro to Tun,
oi) Ti^
yap TO avayicalby
ydp #raTd mwTo^
ort
fcai ci
yap
narrl vwofxtt^,
fifvov xmoBtrlov
15
A r^ B
ofioujjs
^avpov
Sct-
yap
&tu(vuocfi<v* Ci
Kol
o^
5*
tovtov
^rfitvl.
TrpoaovcupciTOi TO dXrjd4i' to
avayK<uov,
ovT
ct
Moiov
to
a^uoooi
Ttfy
/xi^Scvi tlfvSo^,
u>s Ci
dartpav
to murri aXrfi^s,
^v^,
an
6dTpo
oAi^^cV.
10
4^
tw
wpcoTfp oxifjum
-ri
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
II. xi-xii
applies to
proved
is
'
'
'
in the
467
ARISTOTLE
fiiv
cEAAa
o^ BtlKnmA.
t5
yap to
irovrl t^*
fi-^
6jrdpXt9, l\if^Sw
T<ji
irai^i
id
M t^ Iwatmov
{nrtyrtBfj,
0 oi; fitjv
T(p
T^) 5^
a5viaTor,
ciKTTff
tronri, ou^cia
^^fu8of TO
t^ B tA
M^T^^
F* Toim>
^v^fgiffiy.
vwdpxtv. Tip 8^
8*
oAA*
irorrl vnapx^rta.
f(i78vt
40 tlfv^os
*Otc
vmxipxiTo.
V7rapxiv,
/ii9
TO xmoTtOhf'
8'
avdyto) oiv t6
aXXa murri
urrfjpxti^,
to
tii4
atart
vnapfti.
vnoKfiadw wayri
9ihvndpxiv TO* 8^ F /ii^ScW.
dydytctf od r6 F
/iT^Scvt Ta> B V7r(ipxiv.
roGro 8* o8waTOV, aJor*
oAt^^cs* TO /i:^ navri vndpx^iy.
^avp6v oSv on
ou wcu^i TO
468
Toi B,
r^i/^*
iormu
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
II. xii
whereas
all
impossibile,
to all B.
When A
Particular
^ffl-^^^ative.
figure.**
Universal
"^s^txve.
to no B.
61
b 39
ff.
Particular
g^*'^'
ARISTOTLE
&a
XIII. 'Ofio(at9
roO fUaou
KtioOut
F nayrl' ro
yap t6 a Twa rw D /117 VTrdpx*^ to
dfM A TiW rut r ouv ^apYi, ci ody roCr aSvvarov, 0ci>8<K t^ rtviuri (miffytw, &ar dXtfi^f r6
vtrorcdg uyjIUn. ^wdnrw, avXXonavri.
iav
yuifi6s nh^ ioroi koI to dStWror, 00 ocufWTOi
TO -npoTtSiv' ^av yap t6 Ivavrlov ^hroTff^, ravr'
10
coTOi*
dntp
ifrl
rdf irporrtpov.
r.
4i
oAAd
Ci oiH'
ToGro ^uSo9,
a^arfiit
p^
r6 Tua
c ydlp Tii
tnroBtoii.
r6
od
murn rw
Tiri t4>
vfnu>xciv.
>*
Tivi U7ra^;^<(>',
to
1)
^rr^Stai^,
yo/>
TO
7TpOLprjfJL^VWV .
o&Wtov
ravr* <ara n
&ijXov S<
470
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
that
all
II. xii-xiii
figure.**
Then
"
62 a 28
61
ff.
39.
second figure.
*
The
case
is
471
ARISTOTLE
tk
hi 5urrun7
apxtnu
a&
/xtav $
'n7'
irc/H afufKHv.
40
oSwaTov
ouAAoytofiof
T(^
T<jii
^aai
5* iv
Tti
8^ miTiTyopurov iv
rw piaw
r^
6 avXXoyuifWf, r6
dXrjOi^ v r(p irpcurtp M.
rwv vpopX^fidratv orav h* iv rtp iaxdrtp 6 auAAo/ia/K^, t6
<rxdra>-
orov
fj
mmwv
^Tuca
iv Tip
TTpfifTip
ra hi
/ua^, to
fw
#caTO-
rp
10
'
^^r.
ABC
>T;^^^^^^r
uoigo.
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
be made.
II. xiii-xiv
tive proposition is
the procedure is
is affirmative or negative
the same in both cases.
Every proposition which is established ostensively
can also be proved per impossibile, and vice versa, by
means of the same terms. For when the syllogism *
will appear
is effected in the first figure, the truth
the negative in the
in the middle or last figure
middle and the affirmative in the last. When the
syllogism is in the middle figure, the truth will appear
in the first figure with respect to all propositions.
When the syllogism is in the last figure, the truth
affirmative in
will appear in the first or the middle
the first, negative in the middle figure.
For example, let it be proved by the first figure
that A applies to none, or does not apply to all, of B.
apphes to some B,
Then the hypothesis was that
clusion
'^
* i.e.
*
473
Reduction
dfrect^roof
^y Baroco.
ARISTOTLE
I*
ovTW yap
watrrl
t^tr^pyciy
r^
Si
6 av^XoyutiJu^ koX t6
to y4acv OYfjfia, tt r6 V ry
ahvvarov. rovro
fuv A iravrl r<p 5^ B firfiA ^wnf^^i' mx ^aytp6
K rOVTWV DTI OvScVI TOI B fMlpYCi t6 A.
u '0/xoui>; $ Ku ci /ii) novTi Mcurroi vtrdpyov.
n fiv yap un6$*aii iari nayri vnapx**^, to
C
B ov nayrC.
tXafifiavtro rtp yAv A vavrl t^
Koi Ci arfnfTuc6v X^ifiavoiro r6 PA waavrun' Ka\
yap ovTto yiyvtrai to ^Uqov ayyi^*
llaAii' hhi^w run vmipx^^ rtft B r6 A,
1} fUw
B ^Xoftfiiyrro
fo odv ^7r6$ai9 H'l^^ vndpxav, to
marrl rtp V iMlJpyfiV Kai to A ^ irovri ^ rtA r^ F*
toOto hk r6 liiyiftir
ovTijj yap itmu to oSiWtov.
o;;^fia, ci to A icaX r^ B iroKrl rtp F* iral ^limp^
K rovTUfV art avdytcri r6 A Twt r& B vnApx^w,
ofiouitf Si ral Ci TtW t^* F hf^lfi ivfipxP^ r6
B J TO A.
riaAiv v Tip pAatp ax^pari StStiX^ot to A irovri
T<p B vndpxov.
ovKoCv 1} ucy tnr6$ais ^v /x^
7r(UTi Toi B TO A i^opyciv, ctAmrTOi Sc to A troKn
rat i KOI ro 1 vavri rtp 1>* ovtoi yap caroi to
dotWrov.
tovto 5c to vpCnov ar^ffta to A
ao Ttavrl rtp F #cai to F mxvri tu> B.
OfiOiWf Si Koi
i rivi Sc'SciKTOi vndpxov' 17 fc^ yap ^n6$ins ^v
/xTjScvi rai B TO A inro^ctv, iXrf7rrai S^ to A
iravrl rat F cai to F tivi tw B.
ci 5^ <rrprfTiK^
6 avXkoyiayu&^ , 17 ^liv vnodtm^ ro A rtpt r<p B
^apx^iv, cZAt/tttcu 8< to A firjSvi r<p F irol r6 F
tt TravTt Toi B, oKrrc yiyi^Tou to npumv axr^yua,
icaX
Ci /ii7 KadoAov o ouAAoyia/xo^, oAAa to A Tivt r^ B
ovSVi'
iyiy^^tro
Sc^iicTOu
474
fii^
VTTdpyiv, waavr(as
vn6d<ns liiv
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
II.
xiv
and
C was assumed
this
negative
we get
FenoCesare.
the middle
figure.
Again,
let it
be proved that
is
that
it
that
A BarocoA Barbara,
A
A
475
ARISTOTLE
t
yap w<WT4 T^
firjS^vt Tiff
TO
Koi r6
vwafix*iy, ctAiprcu hk r^
B* otmu ydip
V run r^
h
r6
npanov av^fta.
o
rioAiv
Tw B
I k
5i to F tc^ fih^
nayri' rovro Si to pJaov o^f^fia.
yciv, cL^Ttrroi
>41)0va
T<ji
5^
ofUHWf Si Koi
ci fii^ #ca^dAou ii airc$&ci(c9.
ufro^at; /lir yap
10 ccrroi navri rtp B r6 A inapxtw, CL^ifirra* 3^ t6
F T(p fi^ A firfitvi rtp Si B rttfl' Totffo
r6
pAaov axfjpa.
Oavtpov oiV OTi SuL Toir oiVrc^v opcin^ koI Sccir*
TU(a>9 cart Scucvuvcu rwv vpopXri^rutv K<urro9
Ucal Sid rov dSwdrou],*
opiouj^ S* l<rr<u kqX
15
yvovrax yap ol
10
Scucvtrrou
Kar
rov dSwdrov
476
ra2
^5w>Tov
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
hypothesis was that
the assumptions were
and C to some B
applies
xiv-xv
to
all
B,
and
that
for in this
II.
appHes to no C,
way we get the first
figure.
Again
applies to
do'es
all
B.
not apply to
applies to
all
be proved that
A
A
that
B, and the assumptions were that
B and A
to
all
for it
is
in this
way
and this is
that the proof per impossibile will result
the first figure. The same also holds if the demonstration proves a particular conclusion, for then the
hypothesis was that
applies to no B, and the assumpto all C.
tions were that C applies to some B and
If the syllogism is negative, the hypothesis was that
applies to some B, and the assumptions were that
C applies to no A but to all B. This is the middle
Similarly too if the demonstration proves a
figure.
the hypothesis will
particular negative conclusion
be that A applies to aJl B, and the assumptions were
that C applies to no A but to some B. This is the
;
middle
figure.
Thus
terms.
Conclusions
from
477
ARISTOTLE
nporaatcjv avXXoyiaaaBiu koI hf noup odtc ^aruf,
Xiyw S* dyrtsftifidvat c2mu
Karat ^avtpov.
a5*
TTpoTdais
vovrl
r|f>
rirmpoi, cla r6
worn, koI ri
t6 nvt r& od rivi, Kar* dXi^uuf
hi rpU' TO
yap
nvi. rtp
avTueirai ftovov,
Ka06Xov, TO
ov
rm
rovrutv 5*
murri rat
M^^
#card
t^
X/fiy
o^
40
rw fUaw ax^fian
*Ev hi
fcai
itc
rwv
arructi"
hi c^' ad B koI V,
l htj irdaav intOTTovhaiay tXafie koI fnfitua^, to
r^i B
7TurrqfiTj
OTT^/iijv
irayrl
ft
vndpxti koI
T<Ji
ovhvi, onrrc to
B t^ F
ot)6/AU&
Ofiouo^
hi
478
KOX
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
II.
xv
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
'
479
ARISTOTLE
10
li
ro pAoov WOT* fj ravra tlyai ^ oXo vpos l^poioAXco; 5* (iSiWTor* ov ya/> iaorrai odhofiwf ai
npordtnif oCr* hmrriax our dyTuc ifLtvai.
ao
*Ev hi r^ ^pi'rfp <rx^fian jcara^arur^ fiiv
oHhimn i<mu
avXXoytafi6f
rdatwv hia
t5
rfjv
tlpmUrrp^
A.
/ii^Sc/xuiv iaroucriv
to
toi
hi
hfavrlai
KaBoXov
ax
rwv
piv
tr/xyraactf,
oparv
iay h*
XapficLvofUvotm
iv pipi
dyriKflpxvai,
^
i80
BA ABC
Waits:
AB notgo.
artpot
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
II.
xv
is
belief,
ticular science
is belief.
or contradictory.
In the third figure there can never be an affirmative Third
^'^*
syllogism from opposite premisses, for the reason
but there can
stated in the case of the first figure <*
be a negative syllogism, whether the terms are uniLet B and C stand for science, and
versal or not.
Supposing then that we assume that
for medicine.
allmedicine is science, and that no medicine is science
then we have assumed that B applies to all A, and
C to no A, and therefore some science will not be
Similarly too if the premiss
which we
science.
for if some medicine is
assume is not universal
science, and again no medicine is science, it follows
The premisses are
that some science is not science.
contrary if the terms assumed are universal, but con;
BA
tradictory if one
term
is
particular.
63 b 33.
Q 2
481
ARISTOTLE
Act Bi icarovocu^
dvrucftfifva
fr
Xa^ifidi^nr,
M^x^rat
warrtp
anovSalop ttvai
fihf
aShw rA
tiirofiv
frdaay
miXiv /iijScfuov
rj rtva /x^ cnrouSauty (aire/) oi)( cScu^c AoWorrci^f
coTi 5c 5i* aAAa;v ipum)fidTOf auXXoyiaaoBai Bd'
inum^firp^
rtpov,
w^
rj
*Enl h^
40
i1
tcai
rp^^
teara^datwv oa dwr%04ati9
TCtfT
M k fccu
nayrl rep
B r^
S^
fiiyScW,
^ r^
F worn n^
fj r^ fMv iravTi t^
/a^ momi, koX
ToDro dMrrurrphjfai ttard ra^ Spoof, dftolwt
5^ Kol hri ToO rpiTtJv ax^fiarof wart ^aytpdv
fJLrfSVi,
froLAiv
* oao)^ci>^
roil'
re
icoi
dmuifUvtMf
nporduwy
ytv^aOai
avXXty
ytofjiov.
Ttav din'ucifivwv
10
avXXoYiGfjLOf
dyadov,
fir)
ytyvmu
rtft
cZitu dyoBdv,
itpdyiiari' 6to ca
fj
ct i^ftov,
fAt^
iarw
Iwot^, h*a
u dvri<f>aaLV,
K yap Tcuv
OKTi/ccifiO'cuv
Topic*. VIII.
482
I.
irpoTdawv ivavrios
CI.iL-iT.
ijv
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
II.
xv
4SS
ARISTOTLE
4
fe
fo
XVI. To
to
6*
ion
fidv, tiff
yap
tcai
ct
oAok
firi
ouAAay^ntu,
fro! c^ 8i*
dyvw-
<u fiv
yap apxai
St* dXXutv),
*
vwoXifilns
OTOV
di
fATf
B^n\ Waits
*
|ii)
avrutv,
rd* Si*
imi\^^
ro] r^
|fti^
$cmi
o^
iw6^^f^u ttolfo.
* L*.
elusion.
4M
:
;
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
xv-xvi
II.
'
man
one of them.
contrary."
XVI.
sists (to
Beffffinff or
issue.
485
Petuio
ARISTOTLE
inmipjj hucvwai, r&r* alrttrai r6 4( ipXV'
rovTO o MOTi fUv ovrw iroiccv coot* tiSt^ ifuaaoA
TO 7rpoKifiPov, MfytToi St tcol /UTafidirraf hr*
40 oAAa irra rwv nt^wcortuv Si* itctlvoo ttucwoBfu
I Smx roimuv anohtucvwax ni ^f iLpxfl^t **^*' ' ''^ A
ScixvuoiTo 5(a Tou B TO S^ B Sia rov F^ r^ 5^ F
nt^vKos tirj htucwoBiu tta rov A* ovfifiaSt^ti yip
avTo Bi avToO to A Sfiicvvwu tov; ovrw ovXXoyi*
{ofifMovf.
09r^ troioCatv ol Tap iro^nAAiJAov; o2j
ypd^iv XavOiivouai yap avrol feuroAf
ftcvoi
TOioimi Xofifidafoirrts ovy o*^
^hro&ctfoi fii^
TI9
omu
lA
^(
rj
&
>
SU] ik
8.^ C*.
Um
486
which
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
knowable by means of
itself,
II.
then he
xvi
is
begging the
point at issue. This may be done by directly postulating the proposition which is to be proved ; but we
may also have recourse to some other propositions of
a sort which are of their very nature proved by means
of our proposition, and prove the point at issue by
is proved by
means of them e.g., supposing that
B and B by C, and it is the nature of C to be proved
by A ; for if anyone argues in this way it follows that
he is proving
by means of itself. This is exactly
what those persons do who think that they are drawing parallel lines ; for they do not realize that they
are making assumptions " which cannot be proved
unless the parallel lines exist. Thus it follows that
those who argue in this way are saying that any
given thing is so, if it is so. But on this principle
everything will be self-evident ; which is impossible.
applies to C, and Petitio
Thus if it is uncertain whether
equally uncertain whether it applies to B, supposing wTeTfi)
applies to B, it is not yet ^^^ '^^J'
that anyone claims that
clear whether he is begging the point at issue, but
for that
it is clear that he is not demonstrating it
which is no less uncertain ^ is not the starting-point
If, however, the relation of B to
of demonstration.
C is such that they are identical, or that they are
clearly convertible, or that one applies to the other,**
for he could
then he is begging the point at issue
also prove by these premisses, if he were to convert
As it is, the conditions *
applies to B.
them, that
method
of argument does
although
the
this,
prevent
'^
65 a
1-4.
487
ARISTOTLE
TO B ixp r Xapfiavoi imfx*^$ ^ioluf ShiXow
OM Kol c/ r6 A, ovmo r6 ^( ^fiX^ o/rrcrcu, oAA*
o^K andtlKViHTw. iav 5^ ru^riv f r6 A Koi B
to ci
fj
Tw dvTurrp^^w
rj
rtv
na$fu
oMiv
ScurvuMcu TO
Kl
o^
fitf
hi
avTov
T<Ji
to A, ri ^f
to yap i(
to di* o^roO
curituf'
tf^Liy,
on
hfjXcnf,
Scurvtntu t6
Btucvwai orov <^iOia>9 oSr^Aofv oktoiv toC Sci5i* oS htiKwrai rj rift ravrd rtjt avTift
9orj r<ft TttiVr^ TOi^ auroif vwapx^w, iw fuy Yy fUoift
ox^/mTi tccd Tpirtp dfi/^<n^pa>f Sy M/yorro r^ iw
/ii7
KWfUvov Koi
t5
rplrtft
koI
t<j>
miTT^yopiiru) aiAAoyuiyi4>
vpom^' orav
5* ^wo^Turo^f',
^ M^ TCU5
a^'*
roU
XVII. To h
^u5oS-,
*
firi
O TToAAoiCir
irapd
TOiC*
rovTo avfifiaum rd
Ao/Oif tUp&OfLtV Xiyt,
64bS!-*4.
the minor or in the major promlM.
Because Uie aeoood figure does not pcmiil afimiatlfv
* t.. rither in
*
syllogisms.
' Sc, * or the
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
II.
xvi-xvii
therefore the petitio principii must be in the negaThis whole section is involved and inaccurate.
In point of fact petitio principii can occur (1) in Barbara
(major and minor) and Celarent (major) ; (2) in Camestres
(minor) ; (3) in Darapti and Felapton (major).
premiss
tive premiss.
489
ARISTOTLE
Ma
40
^ t^
a&tfi"aTor
ouA-
y^
"En
ft
10
5'
^rav dinup$n
n Scurrurtu^
twi'
ABP,
ovvapA
t6 Ki^uv9 ytyitnfnu
6 avXXoyiafi6f. t6 yap fi^ rrap^ roOro Wywo^iu
T6rt A/yo/xcv oroy aimpB4vroi ro<uT9U uofoh^ ^[mm
ntpcuyrfToi 6 avXXoytafi6t, &np odtc wrtp hf mif
htiKTucoli' avoAptBtUrq^ yap rift Bimtits iM* 6
npoi TavTfiv coTOi ovXXoyurfAOf, ^avtpi^ O&r &r%
cV TOif ci( TO ahvaro Xiymu t6 /gif a^ roOro,
Kou oTott oihun fyn npo to odiWror 4 if ^^IK'k
vnoBtats wart koI o&njt koI ^i^ otfa^ rwirift
ovSty i^rror avpLfiaJb^w t& <i5Wror.
'O fco' o^ ^wpctfTttTor tpoirof /crW to0 ^^ ira^
r^v Btaiv ttvai t6 ^^08or amy
r6^ vnoff^atuK
(UTvvatrro; ^ aird
fUata^ npi^ to ^iWtot ^
ovAAoytofu^, oir</> tiprfrai xal iv TovuroTf
to yap
TO avacTtov <of amov nBtvcu rotho iarw, olo %l
ovc coTtv tinttv Off
dM
n^
PovX6fivo^ Sci{<u
on
aavfipuiTpos
hidpLtrpo^ iwi'
EL
167 b 91 ff.
iUesitimate to try to refate a hypotJiiiii bf
reduction when tjfie impotdbte oonriiwhwi doot aot dcpead
upoD that h^-pothmia.
C/. PAyric, VI. fau
b 10
Soph,
!.#.
it
is
490
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
II.
xvii
in our arguments,
'
'
.1.1.1.
J.
^^
491
ARISTOTLE
Mk
15
X^w
<i
/ii^^^
^rrw
ihrd(-
to
WMr ^
cti;
Mm
t^ working towmrds
or
term.
* UM. that
49t
applies to D.
Se. In
Uk
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
II. xvii
We
sible conclusion is
that F applies to
for in this case too the impossible
conclusion will follow none the less if the original
hypothesis is eliminated.
The impossible conclusion must be connected with
the original terms, for then it will be due to the hypothesis.
E.g., if we are regarding the connexion in
the downward direction, the impossible conclusion
must be connected to the term which is the predicate.*
For if it is impossible that
should apply
to D, when
is ehminated the fallacy will no longer
exist.
In the upward direction the connexion should
be to the term of which the other is predicated.*
For if F cannot apply to B, when B is eliminated the
fallacy will no longer exist.
Similarly too if the
syllogisms are negative.
Thus it is evident that if the impossible conclusion
is not related to the original terms, the fallacy is not
due to the hypothesis. Indeed even when the conelusion is so related, the fallacy will not always be
due to the hypothesis ; for supposing that
had
been assumed to apply not to B but to K, and K to C
and C to
even so the impossible conclusion *
;
remains. Similarly too if one takes the terms in the
;
To avoid
tionof Fais<
Cause the
mu8t"^^
f^^jJe
original
P'"^^^^
Even so the
may^sometimes be
*
^'
ARISTOTLE
Xofipdvovn rove opovi, coot*
10
cim
ttai
TO
fj
otrrof
firi
cfii
rovrov M^T^*'
^jrrov ytyvta^ai
fiii(iiv <rrlv
lA c;(Ci
r^
1}
T^pas*
^(rrt
cf^u ^vSci(*
GV^XoyiayL6s
rwv tTTovw
itc
louti
hi
Kivii}v
Mpa
aA]|tfuiv
S^ Sia rutv
fMr o&r
1)
yap oCk
iral
AEZH,
iff
dfn^O'
^ if'Mfi
tovtwv
Std
n iartnk
XIX. IIpo; 3c TO
rrjprjrdov,
ti^v
*lfvho^t 'foi
Tt (TVfifiaiyti
y^yrcTOi iropd t^
ovAAoyiOfi^.
^f
i *
A<(yof
yc^
fj
rovTwv (ivaym;
tq)v Si^,
/x^
iraTounAAoyi{oi?ai yap#">
49^
oMp
^v%
i//vSos.
CK irAcu>>^>' 9rdf
15
^^ciTSof
XVIII. 'O hk
/c
irpunov
to
toiM
nXuavwv vm)B40W
Sia
Srwro, ola
iirtl
5Sbll-5.
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
II.
xvii-xix
upward direction ; so that since the impossible conclusion follows whether the original assumption holds
or not, it cannot follow from the hypothesis. Probably the fact that when the assumption is eliminated
the fallacy results none the less should be taken to
mean, not that the impossible conclusion follows
when some other assumption is made, but that when
the original assumption is eliminated the same impossible conclusion results through the remaining
premisses ; since presumably it is by no means incon- since the
gruous that the same fallacy should follow from ^r/fSlow^
several hypotheses, e.g., that the impossible conclu- from more
sion parallel lines meet should follow both on the hy^thSis.
hypothesis that the interior is greater than the ex*
'
terior angle
angles.
false
results.
XIX. If we are to avoid having a syllogism con- Counterstructed against us when our opponent, without dis- howto '
closing the conclusions, asks us to admit the grounds escape,
495
ARISTOTLE
rov X6yo, onti^
ov yiyvrrcu, fUao
ofiot
T7ipiv
roM^
S*
iarl
iv
nut
irpfO*
r^ wXtOfdtag
Xy6fivov,
to
So$^ 61^
fiii
iKdarw
roGro S*
ScurKi/roc.
o^^Tj/iart
iJifiOf
od
Bdvtiv.
afiara
8*
rovro
fitf
f,h%biaifft^rA
avaytcaUatv d&rfXa
ipurr^ dXX*
^ fidXuna
QVfiTTtpaiytaBai r6
&i o^
40
fc
ipandif ti
rw
o^iryytf^
T6^rwE,
kov
^4*
tcdwtira
lr6Br^r,
cw fUoov ytyrrfrai 6
XX.
opctfi'
jccu
'Etrci S'
dwoKpt^ofuvov.
y/yvcTcu avAAoyc<7fu>r
nor*
odtc
KpuTWv (otov
^
tj
TTJt
iwi>
ix^yrwp tSt
^vtpow koa
nor* caroi
tirrcu
avYXU^povfidvcjv
iXeyxof*
496
r^
40 b
941 a M.
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
II.
xix-xx
497
ARISTOTLE
^TiiriJ^) yx<^pti yiyvtaSai iktyxQW iff yip vvXXoyuffio^ teal ovrta k(u ^icu*m9 i)(6iF9WP li^ Spmi
10
WOT*
TO KtflVOP
tltj*
^VOPTtOI^
T^
y^
OVIAtftpdoiMartf
ikiyx^
im4
M^
l\yx^'
16
tvai,
uHjavrws
icpioiv <V
ccu
ci fiffSiv
rtdtixi
i<rrai
Kara
ri^v
r^
diopuTfi^ iXtfyxp**
ayXXoyiaiUfC.
irai
XXL
rwv
yiyvaBai
y^
tft
498
41
6.
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
II.
xx-xxi
'^
tion as to syllogism.**
XXI. Just as we are sometimes mistaken in setting How error
out the terms, so it sometimes happens that a mistake judgements.
occurs in our thought about them ; e.g., if the same
predicate may apply to more than one subject immediately, and someone, knowing one subject, forgets the other and thinks that the predicate applies
For example, let
be applicable to B Two
to none of it.
and C per se, and let B and C apply in the same way
Then if he thinks that A applies to all
to all D.
B and B to D, but that A applies to no C and C applies
to all D, he will have knowledge and ignorance of the
same thing in relation to the same thing. So again
supposing that someone should be mistaken about
terms in the same series,* e.g., if A applies to B,
B to C and C to D, and should suppose that A applies
he will at the
to all B but on the contrary to no C
same time know that it appUes and not think that it
does so. Does he then actually profess, as a result
;
41 b 6.
both premisses.
terms contained in the same genus and subordinate
one to another. Cf. Bonitz, Index Arist. 736 b 33.
i.e.
i.e.
**
499
examples
of contrary
"^
ARISTOTLB
rj
o iitUrrarai, rovro
A r^
iniararxu yap irat^ mi
rovTcjy
fti^
^woXapifidptw
Mi^pfjan Sa to6
B,
(o;
eVurraroi,
oAa/9
rotrro
a(iOi
/i^
ca^or*
^ cc
vncXa^ifiiittw
6np dhvvarov.
'E^rt 5c rou np6rpo XfxB{rro$, fi ft^ /ir r^
ovr^y <7v<rroi;(ui9 to fi4aot^, tcuff itt6mpo fUv rufw
fUauiv dfi^OT^paf ra^ trpor^wit odte iyxtaptl
vnoXajifiavtiy, olov t6 \ rtft fUv B warri r^
T
firjBvi, ravra 5* Oft^OTcpa wavrl r^ A.
ovfAfiawu
yap
t
anXufi
Tj
rj
iiti
n^To A
rd
B
S^
vnoXa^ifidvti
^apxtw rd
npcimfv -np&mow,
yap
vvd^^i, wwrrl
B T^ A oOc
#fai
/xi^Sci'i
Ovrw fUv o^
oi%r
/i8/;(rr(u
vwoXafi^-
ttaff
olov 4 Toi
iravTi,
TO
OTt TO
A
oJ
TTtti^i to*
TO
anarwfuBa ntpi ra
mivri to
wrapxtt t^
tmop^ci.
TO
fiv
600
cc
8uo op^ai TO
P on
8* c^* <^
W
o^
h^ lUp^
Tp
Ttf otScr
lUrrw, oto cl
TpcyBMMor to 5*
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
II.
xxi
But there
that
is
C exists
e.g., if
A stands for
two right
angles,'
501
ARISTOTLE
15 it^*
y^
Ap
rif
^r^
icai eiri
rwv
aXXufv.
ntpl avrd,
M^
""^
ivavria
17
* 1^.
former.
' Plato, 3/eiio 81.
The point of the comparlaon il that
on the Platonk riew the study of partksdan reavakcBt our
latent knowledge of the unirersal.
*
'
66 b 20-30.
502
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
B
for
triangle
'
and C
for
II.
xxi
sensible
triangle,' ^
his knowledge.*'
cases.*
503
Error
may
the faUure
^'jf'^*'^^'
misses^ia
ARISTOTLE
97
ft
ficGCJV vnoXrftffi^.
TO
oXu) rat
85 olrjOrjvai
firf
67 b
ouScv yd/>
Tcui'
T(p
y^
avraxiJti^.
OuScv
rairro,
#fa^*
01%^
7rAi7>'
ouc tvayriufi.
|i(
^<af/i-
npoTcpow vnoXimfiavatv yap ir^cr tiji' ij^ovov oi5*c ej(i TT^v #faTd to h^pytu^ hnan^ipf, iM*
av Std T17V imoXri^iiv tvavriav awdnjv r hrurr^jn'
ovAAoyta/idy yap ij rtxivr^ dirany rg KaB6Xov.
'0 3* vnoXoififidvufv TO d/a^ cImu ikok^' cfro*
/xcvo)
10
'
504
"
w
oli!^ we
1
are
la
lo
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
terms contrary.
There
II.
xxi
no reason why a
is
man who
B and
conjunc-
A does
again that B
not apply to C
e.g., if he knows that every mule is
sterile, and that X is a mule, he may think that
is in foal
because he does not comprehend that A
applies to C, unless he considers both premisses in
conjunction. Hence it is clear that he will also be
mistaken if he knows the one but not the other and
this is just the relation of universal to particular
knowledge. For we do not know any object of sense
when it occurs outside our sensation not even if
we have actually perceived it except by universal
knowledge together with the possession, but not the
actuality," of the knowledge proper to that object.
For there are three ways in which we can be said to
know an object by universal knowledge ; by the
and in actuality.
knowledge proper to the object
:
Hence we can be
said to
many
be mistaken in as
different ways.
The
error
Jfontm^
reality,
505
ARISTOTLE
67 b
16 <l>*
ouv
oAt^^c; ko^* oJ td
to #cai
^oTo ToO r T^
r^ B irai raT o6
A aMf$h
o^rc*
t}*^*
tid
tml
v4 A,
t0
^ioi<i>r
Kol
mroAoftjScii'ctv.
to0 flmt* rairciB
yap om-os roO V Kal B, Koi w^Xut to B koI A ii2
TO r Toj A ravTov ^' wart teal ^vl ro^ Sof^iV
dp* oiv toOto fUr aa^yHoio^, mI rm
ofjLouoS'
TO npwTov; oAA* ukok
^<!toc, T^
^uo
ts
Pdviv riva
80
W |t^
irttTA
rroXXaxuff
ro
There
The
'
i..
506
is
ohiifration
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
II.
xxi-xxii
thing
Let
is
'
**
The
(6)
BaA
CaB
(c)
CaA
(a)
(c')
CaB
AaC
(a)
AaC
BaA
(a')
AaB
(6')
BaC
(6)
(c')
507
ARISTOTLB
87 k
y^
A
ft
10
o^
t^
nA
t A)
>
T^
ayrurriH^,
Jcnkin^oo.
*
* ri
A, ri
AB'Cnnif.
A>B*cut r^
ira
T B)
f4
PadBs.
iwrwrp^m <mi
fit
*
cf.
B>,
m^
t4
r.
f
*
bi
CuDeatrcs, bat
accept TV
508
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
II. xxii
am
509
'
ARISTOTLE
lb
b TO
y^' wart
Koi A.
TOVTO
8*
i^
t4
dhvvaro,
Tnurri
r<f
yap Kara
to
V, avdytcrf ro
fxovtuv
pirai Si TO
rw
ncoi ai>n^
a^roO
irai
ro^ F, ^ampiif
m4 fwif vAi)r
A rcu r^ B Xtx^^troA
aim>v TOW A.
JloAiy oTov ro A iroi ro B
r^ V ^im^y^,
dyriarpt^ 5^ t^ F rc^ B, opdytnif r6 A aa^
ra> B vndpxtw i^^l yap iroKri ro* V t6 A, r^
F TOi B 8a rd ayrtarpi^ut, irai r^ A vorrt r^
B vndp(n.
'Orav hi Svouf oyroiy r^
roO B tuprrwrtpoif
f, ovrwy dyT%KipAviM9, tctu ri A ro6 F jto^rfrwi,
i alprwrpa rd AF nur BA, r^ A r^ A a^ptrBJ
S^
15
r^pov.
ao
6fioCua9
dvriKtiVTOi) ,
ci
B r^ F
Koi ro
o/Aotcu9 4>VKr6v
AF
roi;
BA.
^cuirroy* ^jrartpov
huvKTw- oKTrc
tirci
BA
5< /idAXov,
iTol
o^
yv^ ^Kcrr^^
rd il^A^c* nk
ot^
Tf 4M^^<if
t6 A roO
^rror ^tmcrdv' rd
ydp cAarroi' rw IXdrrovt dvr^crrtu. aiprurrtpO
hk TO /it{ov dyo^dt' kcu tXarro^ murdr ^ r^ Aarror
Kat ydp dv rd
A
t5
A irol ^UKr^ t6 B
t6 F ro^ A {tcai yip ruSha
odv ro A rip A o^uhws aiprrdf^,
yap ftuuirr^ r6
ofioito^ 'fjoar.
aipranpov, koI rd
dya^di'
row
AF* vw
8*
rd drrop dpa rd BA
oiW corty. rd A dpo
alpTorrpov rov
510
tl
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
II. xxii
applies to it ; and if
applies, so does C,
since they are convertible.
Therefore C and
both
apply at once ; but this is impossible.**
When applies to the whole of B and of C, and is other
clearly
will also
apply to
all
^nv^ersion
B.
When,
as
D,
is
as
much
AC
AC
BD
511
ARISTOTLE
if
68 a
alpranpov too A,
kqjL
F ipm
t6
toi9
^rrof
<f>VKr6v,
40
68 b
r^ m
Tov, ^Oi
WAof
XXIII.
JJpttK
oite
lonr
i)
lvai,
yiyvo%rrai
dnXcj^
f^v,
TO apa ovMiKU
Toiho.
ip^ 6
l\itn
dvTurrpo^i
10
iSXXo
nciu
vw
dXXA
<rxrifidTW,
iffTUTovr
av
num^
irj
Sid avX^oytofwO
0/ f^fT^piMol tcmi
Jtoi
leal
Ac rr/oir*
i( inayojyijf.
iarl kqI 6 i( iwayuyljf
avXXoyiQ^oi TO Sid toO Moov BdTtpot^ ^Mpotf tu
/ica^ ovXXoyuixiaBai, olto ca tcmt
yUoa^ Td o,
hid ToC r Sclfoi to
r^ B ^ir<(^^u^ omi> ydp
noiovfida Ta; cVaycayas*. oZov corctf rd
fuuepo'
SO/SiOl', TO 5* >* <2 B T^ XO^l^
4^, ^* <^ r
"
ff
AT
o^frwrt^ot 4
512
i>
^ f<fy
miTffT? sad
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
xxii-xxm
II.
fact
it is
therefore
not.
is
less to
from induction.
Induction, or inductive reasoning, consists in estabbetween one extreme term and the
middle term by means of the other extreme e.g., if
B is the middle term of A and C, in proving by means
for this is how we effect
appUes to B
of C that
stand for long-lived,' B for
inductions. E.g., let
that which has no bile and C for the long-Hved
lishing a relation
'
r2
cf.
An.
Post. 71 a 9-11.
513
Rules for
i^^i^ction-
ARISTOTLE
fXm hSmrn mo^ KtX
V ^1^ Mpx^^ ^ A-
rtft
bj
iXXi iml t6 B,
fioxpofiuHf,*
YOV X^V*'* ^**^* VW^fXtl Ttft V. tl oA>
ayTiarp4i>i to F ty B nfoi fci^ vwtmUn r6 lUow,
vp^
S6 avayKT) to A r<p B Cndfix^at' Mcurrm
roov OTi ay Svo dm. Tcp o^r^ ^V^plffl <U p^
0aTpov avrufv ayrtarpi^ r6 wpo^, in r^ drri'
QTfK^vrk HoX $6rpo vwdp(i rut KQtniYOfmf
yjvwv. 5ci hi voco^ t6 F to ^f im^rrtm Ttwr ica^
Kaarov avyK%^iifC* 1} va^ ^gaw)^ did w^amm'.
'Ecrrt S* o TOiotmK cruXAoyio|if r^T W^ti npi irfli
0
<ro6
dfidaov nponiatutf' utv ^iir yo^ ion f mo9
ficaov o (TuAAoyurfUK, iv
fi:j iart, 6i ^wayotyrf^.
jcoi rponoy rtv^ iMrruntmi if ^Wttytf/^ ti^ ouASm Tt>0 fi4otm r6 iirpO r^
AoyuTj^^i^' o fiiv
5cd ToO rpirop r6 Arpor t^
ts T^T<^ 0ucvvau^,
^vati fiiv o^ npirtpot mi ym^ptfuurfpot
fidao).
6 bta ToO fUaov avXXoyuipi69, 'fjfiik 5* ivapyiompos
6 hia rr^ hrayaryij^.
XXIV. TlapaStiypa 5* /crriir Stop ry fUa^ t6
dxpov vndpxov htix/^ Sea roO 6iioiov r^ ^'^'
40 Set Sc #cai TO fi4cmv rtp rptrtp Kol t6 v/x^ror rij
fXTf
y^
y^
iff
I
C/.
berr,
X)i#
Pari.
^iimmI.TO a fO,TTl5-b
II.
OM
hm
614
DMpU
BC
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
II.
xxiii-xxiv
We
induction
wTth'^*
syUogism.
68 a 21-25.
Induction supplies, without the aid of a middle term, the
universal proposition which stands as major premiss for
purposes of inference.
" Because the abstract logical process is from universal to
particular, but the human mind proceeds from particular to
universal.
Cf. Met. VII. (Z) iv. 1029 b 3-12.
Cf. An. Post. 71 a 10, Rhet. 1356 b 3.
515
Proof by
E^a^^piS"
ARISTOTLE
69 KaKOV, TO
*^'
<S 5^
&
B Vp^
rd
6ft6pOVV <iMUf>ciOPAu
9^$W9,
*A^mu>vr p^ khfiiUtm. t6
5*
w^Xmth^ KOtW^*
TovTov 5< nCtrris itc rutif 6iuhm, otatt 9n Bftfiaiott
6 npos ^wKiS iwtl o&r TO wp6f tWf J$i4famt
irpor BfiPaiovs 9p6t i$i6paift iari,
KOicov, TO
mmm^.
^vtpov oTi TO wpos Srifiaiovf
woX^A
oTi fiv
ifyrfrl^ni
l$i6p 9m t
A T^ A
(OiAfaif |4p ;
w^AciiOfl|*
fo
t^
WMt r6 d^po^,
^aytpiv oiv ort to wap^^yptd iarw aCm <ur
fi4poi npo^ oXoy ovrt atg iXo wp6t f^pof JiXX* uk
y^pt>s irpoii M^poff* orw^ ^4*4^ f^ j ^*^ TatVr^,
ycytxMTO Tov fUaov
IS
vndpxtw
rtp fuaip
tcai
wpis t6 4jtpO ov
awf^mru
cu
u^
Ty
^aut to
vndp)(0 rtp Si ^oyot^ to p4aov
wrjXov fUv, ofiouos ci -murrov ^ ftAAor to0 cn;fi-
XXV.
TrpdtTov hijXov
fj
* Ejwmple proceeds nrithir (Mke iadacttai) tmm ptrticakr to general, nor (like sylloplMi) omv WiM. km hmm
ooe co-oitmuite pvticuUr to notfccr.
68 b 97-9.
010
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
II.
xxiv-xxv
third.
first
E.g., let
'
'
similar term.
Thus
it is
<'
We
69 a
7.
ARISTOTLE
Kol rov fitaov' ndvrwf yap iyyvrtptm c2m4 OKf^-
tTrurrqfirj
on
hiSatcrw ^aj>^*
S'
ij
iprn^
I k
y ^ Z
m^icAor- c^
ToC
EZ
n^ AP
oIop Ci to
ccn
ti^yy/w^i^ior, to
^y |^Mv tUi
lUmm,
avAAoyiafu>i9.
&^
> wpowi^jf^vai,
Pacius, Tricot
rV AT]
AT r^
518
yoofc^^ ^ A > r
15.
BT,
QiIm i ^.
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
xxv-xxvi
II.
'
'
circle
becomes equal to a
^
we should
rectilinear figure
by means
approximate to knowledge.
When, however, BC is not more probable than AC,
or there are several intermediate terms, I do not use
of lunules
the expression
tion
BC
reduction
immediate
is
'
nor
for such a
when the
proposi-
statement implies
knowledge.^
XXVI. An
objection
is
a premiss which
is
contrary
And
J.
method of approxi-
mation to knowledge,
519
Objection
*^^^-
objections
particular oi
universal;
they can be
raised in
ARISTOTLE
e9k
orxxv
yap
aJ^%AM>frQ
o^
<wSvi
rj
firjBtvl
oTi Ttvl
an^firfy, ^^*
cj^
fft^ Ar
<&B* ^Hv
^varria' Mpcmimm^t 34 |ite
olo itrrw r6
rou iaxoifov.
to
oWf
M
U tiW
fUoir
Morraroi, tA
ytyvrroA to
/pttrr fo^
vpuno9 ox^^iOy ^
fo
^it1
r^
OTMpiffT cSjf
wporAotu^ woaihwf^
Twr ^m^rMur j At
ruwr Jwy^& ^
X^yofLfv, olo
oiV tr<unxo
ii
Tii /ir
itc
TpiTov o;;^/iaTO$'.
*>
roQ
!
'AirAiu^
ovayici}
tvavTuov,
(otmo
5* ai^xyKi^
IS B4,
8k>ns; 98 a
520
7.
^
1)
M^i^
wp^
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
II.
xxvi
premiss, and opposites can be proved only in the first the first
and third figures." For when our opponent claims figures!
that the predicate applies to all of the subject, we Objection
object that it appUes to none, or does not apply to affirmative
some. The former objection is brought by the first p^^^'^s,
figure, and the latter by the last.
E.g., let
stand
for to be one science,' and B for contraries.'
Then
when it is premised that there is one science of contraries, the objection is either (1) that the same science
does not treat of opposites, and that contraries are
opposites so that the first figure results ; or (2) that
there is not one science of the know able and unknowThis is the third figure ; for to state of C, viz,
able.
the knowable and unknowable, that they are contraries, is true ; but to state that there is one science
of them is false.
So again in the case of a negative premiss. When and to a
it is claimed that there is not one science of con- prfm^ss?
traries, we reply either that all opposites or that
some contraries, e.g., the healthy and the diseased,
are studied by a single science. The former objection is raised by the first figure, and the latter by the
'
third.
The general rule is that in all cases one who is Rules for
raising a universal objection must state his contradic- J^fvefaai
tion with reference to the universal including the
terms premised e.g., if it is claimed that the same
science does not treat of contraries, he must maintain
that there is one science of all opposites. In this
way the first figure must result for the universal
which includes the original term becomes the middle.
But when the objection is particular, the contradiction must be stated with reference to the term which is
included by the subject of the premiss as a universal
;
521
and
Sbject?on8.
ARISTXyTLB
raatf, otov yvcjaToO teal dyreMyrov |ft^ ti^v oMjfr
^vatrrla tea06Xov wp6f raOra (irai yty^trat
TO rpirov ox^/ia* y.iao yip t^ hf lUpti Xnifiap6'
ra yap
fivov, otov
TO YvuHrr6v
t6 ^yMPoror).
icai
rt>dim:mio,
itc
if
Af
roi&rum iccX
fUaov
&
ax^ifiarof, iio cc
iij\
hoiyi
ni
A Tt^ B iM^
mpav
M^
irpcfraow.
&^
ircu
r^ ai|fwior
^ n^Qg
ml
XXVII. Euro9
ft
/ivov
fiuTiv
TOUT 4^CoGras
arjfiio
oi'
hi
in
oi,
fii^
povXmu
87.
The arjnimrt b
ri
AaC BcC,
.-.
Be\.
proofl^
Wt
'
9/'
70 a S4
RhM.
ff.
II.
XXT.
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
II.
xxvi-xxvii
must be stated that the science of the knowable and the unknowable is not the same, for these
are included in contraries as a universal ; and the
third figure results, for the term which is assumed as
particular, viz. the knowable and unknowable, becomes the middle. It is from the premisses from
which it is possible to argue the contrary that we try
to infer objections. Hence it is only by these figures
that we try to raise them, because in these only are
opposite syllogisms possible, since (as we saw <*) an
e.g., it
figure.
Difficulty
bythr^^
^^^^^^
'^^
*^
We
<*
This question
is, I
523
a prob?^fshld
from a
sign.
ARISTOTLE
avaytcaia
^ Mo(tK' oi
fi^viw np6Tpa
10
Jf
iv rt^ npofTift
rj
tf
utt
^ r^ 1^^
4^
wt
15
rift
rpirw,
/^Xa ix^u^ CK
y^
if ^
Y^^it^tt
y^
y^
'
16
y^
10
necessity
5S4
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
II.
xxvii
'
'
Pittacus
In this
is
good and
a syllogism in the
is
also wise.
true, since
it is
first
but whereas
be refuted if it
effected
figure cannot
Refutabuity
^raS^from
^igns in
the several
!>ucni:-i!
Strictly
figures.
an enthymeme.
525
ARISTOTLE
TOt
Kov aXrfiU
ov yap
oAXou;
ii
^'^
Uimuc^
tWt
avdyfcrj raimf.
roi^
Ttk
'
y^
To
aiv
10
fti^ara md
a^
ivrw
tC tif
t^
Miv
^h^Xh^ ^^^
y^
t^
rwv ^voi
KurriiOuv).
ci
"^
tcHM
Tf 8o#f6|
ICOi
ho
and
a univenal coodiukm.
when both premivsca are afirawtWc
may be dasatfied
invArtabk (Ut Ifwt) Mid
fails to establish
i.e.
Signs
6S6
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
II.
xxvii
'
'
'
'
refutable (2nd and 3rd figures), and the name index may
be attached to their middle terms, either in all figures or
(more probably) only in the first, where the middle is dis*
'
tinctively middle.
**
Alternatively the
figures,
name
'
sign
'
may
be restricted to the
'
index
'
in the
first
527
ARISTXTTLB
fu0a ^iKnoymi/iorrcW.
^OfdyfOf
tnnulcm
ircu
n-
OMyiprfgyfir
ri w^0at,
ToM
tfol
i^
t<d
aiyutor* h^ yap
Mr
oij^ui cfvXXifiu
To6 r tQ C^pr 4
)^
o^ ;Av
ttml
hi4p(m
2AA^ y^Mi
O^ to4 y^'
ydp iirnp
c2ra4
SMr Von
^.
cf
TO
1^
&rw^ r6
'Exrri hf^
li/SmtiF
#4 ^^^^ ^^'
^ 7^ Mjp^bf
^vaur/viMtpaiftlit
ry*
Ty wptin^
^w,
^ odm. Waitas
tcai fuj
WCitwdL
oirrurrpi'
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
II.
xxvii
529
ARISTOTLE
^%, clo d^la t6 A, tA ^pamj^ f^^Y^^
if o6B.T6Bi r Xiutw,
54 T^ r ra B wfUFtl,
dUa Kol tOAoif ^U r^ B,r6 K wmrl tad 0^
<jS
890
PRIOR ANALYTICS,
II.
xxvii
581
'*!
lU
;;
4^
INDEX
(Ccrf.= Categories,
)(
acci;
essential qualities
23bl6
Action lb2T, 2a3, llbl-7
Actuality 19a9, b3, 21bl5,
23a8, 67b3-9 ; and necessity 23a21 ; prior to potentiality 23a22
AiFection lb27, 2a4, 9a28lOalO ; and quality 9a28,
bl2, 10a9 ; admits of contrariety and degree llbl-7
natural a.s 70b8 ;
and
signs ib, 12-38
Affirmation defined 17a25,
19b5 ; )( negation 2a5,
llbl9, 12b6, 13a37-b35,
18a34,
16a2, 17a8, b38,
19bl2 ; a. and negation of
contingent, possible, necessary. Int. xii., xiii. ; a. and
contrariety ib. xiv.
See
Contradiction, Negation
All, to be predicated of
See Wholly
Alteration a kind of motion
15bU
Analytics (Prior)
quoted
19b31
Apodeictic )( assertoric and
problematic
premisses
25al,29b29; a. syllogisms
APr.
I. viii. ;
apodeicticassertoric syllogisms i6. ix.-
atic
Necessary
Aristomenes 47b22
Article, definite
49blO
gisms
APr.
I.
iv.-vii.
xxi.,
533
IKDEX
BcniM
ttwpoliil !
iiiitoMirtu
oalnnr
CallUft43*fT
CaUipfMtt 16^1
CafMkdty, Mteml. kind of
Cmm CbO.
Caliiifk
QiMM
iibl. 4bil
hr^ leltfl.
CM.
Jbll.aat
ytafaaoiialfft
iibl7rrqaat.
lOblfi oTaciiMiaad
aibctlMi libit aad a>
iimin Ifbl^Mi
Ify
liavri
labUi
Itelf.
kati
of
ihSmiId fnIK
Mbi.JA,fUt.
Problnnatk
lorin
llaSSt
KoMlmnr ITbl.M.
Mi^
MC
St>
Ibia.
at. fttell. flSbail, 40,
tela. SI t mad tnMi and
fBk^ ItaM <^. b7).
I>>f7,
flail, bit,
1
17h, Malts 61
rxprraskNM ltaS&, Ibl. xtU
xiiL
in ptaof p^r immm9ihil4 4lmi\ tUlt, bit,
:
5S4
idLi
AM.
p-
CiraUar praoCi tn
meal
Ilbl0
on:
Mi
labS. !
dhMnd
INDEX
b25, 32a29, 36b35-37a31
APr.
II. viii.-x.
names
existent
tion
for
ib.
7b 15.
Counter-syllogism
APr.
II.
Anima quoted
16a8 ?)
43b2 ; unity of
17al4 ; arguments relating to 50a 11
{De
Dialectic,
treatise
on;
see
Topics
)( demonstrative
premiss or syllogism 24a22,
46a9, cf. 65a35 ; d. ques-
Dialectical
tion 20b22
Differentia lbl7,
3a22, 33,
46b22
Diminution 15a 14
Disposition 6b2, 8b27, 35,
9a3, 10b3, 32, lla22
Distribution of subject 1 7bl2,
20a 12
Division by genera APr, I,
xxxi.
Definition
substance
Degree, not
3b33 ; in quantity 6al9 ;
in relation 6b20 ; in qualin
10b26 ; in dispositions
32 ; of action and aflFection llbl
Demonstration 24all, 25b27,
40b23; )( syllogism 25b29;
Enthymeme 70a3-b38
Equality 6a26
Equivocal lal
Error APr. II. xxi.
Essence 43b7, 46a36
ity
Essential
ib.
23b 16
Even and odd
41a27, 50a37
from
and essence 46a36
dewhat is prior 64b32
;
monstrative )( dialectical
24a22, cf. 65a35, 68blO.
See Proof
Denial, 12b6, 16a2, 17a25;
)(
accidental quali-
ties
Example APr.
numbers
xxiv.
II.
induction 69al6
Exposition 28a23, cf. 30a9
Expression 17a 17
)(
See Major,
Minor
see Negation
15al3
Sophisticis Elenchis quoted (as Topics) 65bl6
Diagonal of square incom-
De
sides
with
mensurable
41a26,46b29, 50a37, 65bl7
34a25
no
false
Falsity in
46. xviii,
535
IKDRX
^/V.
A.
I. ir4U
sir.
4UIS.
unrL
t oirfy
44liT.
app> iMwi
5m
FkK.
octoimIc Tnlfo
I.
Uttrcs^
hr:, (I
mrtt
tie)
iiow
tiw
f^m faW
tofX A.
proei to
It. tt.i'
fX A. w^ mflBt
CUQIVfllafl
In f.f. A.
TlloyMM
Of
Ttit.
ti
^^HM%
^J*
ffliBtoi
ffliBtodNrrii4taOT
fMi
W- bfn^vaito
fltoltolig
pfmiJMin CSbf 1 1 m4
tlom to W9i iigm
CMltwArtorf
For
Fwhu9
to-
I/.
I1^
.1
|iiiiiiiwHtoi
ktoiif
tails
IM4^
ItolSt andcrfw;
4>bas
5S6
KM
mcttioas 4lbl9^
tvbi^
m
fftaM.
i
ffUlf.
ITbtl. 47ltfit
M^
i>it%
4IM4^
il
Mf^
I
;;
INDEX
no previous knowledge of
i.s 67a22
Induction 42a3, 24, 67a23,
68bl4; )( syllogism 68b32
)(
example 69a 16
individual
uses all
68b28,
cases
69al7
Intermediates 12a2, b28, 13a7
Isosceles triangle
Knowledge
41bl4
8b3,
relative
Ila24,b27; ahabit8b29;
object of k. prior to k. itself 7b23 ; k. and thought
paruniversal,
66b29 ;
ticular, actual 67al7, b4
I/ikeness peculiar to quality
llal5
lyine continuous Sal
parts
'
it is n.'
Negation
affirmation
)(
llbl9, 13a37, b2, 27, 34 ;
a simple proposition 17a9,
25, 62a 13 ; contradictory
APr.
Lunules 69a33
All
Non
first
figure
in second 26b37 ;
;
See Term
in third 28al3.
26a21
in third 28al4
Motion Cat. xiv.
kinds of
15al3
Natural
tions
32b7,
70b8
I. xlvi.
None, to be predicated of
24b30, 25b40, 26a27. See
of ib. 17
Ix)ve 68a39
Major term, in
16
affec-
Cause
Noun
16al, 13,
Int.
ii.
simple )( composite n.
16a22, b32 ; indefinite n.
16a30, 19b8 ; cases of n.s
16a33 ; )( verb 16b8, 19 ;
expression 17al7 ; as
)(
subject 19b6
Number
4b23, 30
537
vmi
llltanM 10U4,
Ilbl7,t4. I{
of
3lblA. UblSi
iuifi.
JPr.U.
r
MOii
ftnt
Md
ouft
pfovHl
oiilir
la
temi
llilid
at, iirf-Aiii
tl. in,
oCiMimWki4i
oC
!>.
Id
pw
ivlllMi
m%t%,
8m
ouVudi, iHnkr
Id nrlbli
pw iMiUv*
cooirartlble JSft7
tuUrrml
pw
luvvltdgr
67af7. SA
PricFplloo
(imw-) Tb8S*
6bl2, Jtel
Perfect jrlkgiMM hi inl
isUtt, MslT.bMi
noi la the 9eaamd tTal, c/l
M4t Qol la the iMtd
fiinire
Pfil*o
pnad^
APr, XL
5S8
STaM^M.
suit
INDEX
24a22-bl2
assertoric,
apodeictic,
problematic
25al ; affirmative, negative ib. 2
two required
syllogism
42a32, 44b6, c/.
40b36,
53b20,
for
Starting-point
Priority, four (five) senses of,
Cat. xii.
Privation
and
opposition,
)( posi-
llbl8; privatives
tives 12a26-13a36,
Probabilitj; 70a3
Problematic
and
25al
52al5
apodeictic
)(
premisses
p. syllogisms APr.
assertoric
;
xx.
p.-
syllogisms ib.
XV., 36b29, xviii., 39a7,
xxi. ;
p.-apodeictic syllogisms ib. xvi.,
36b31,
xix., 39a8, xxii. ; conversion 32a29, 36b35, 37a33 ;
selection of terms for p.
syllogisms 45b29
Proof, ostensive )( hypothetical 40b25, see Deassertoric
Reduction
Property 43b2
Proposition 16a2, 17a2, Int.
V. ; contains truth and
falsity 17a3; simple, single
)( composite, many 17a8,
15, 20,
20bl3
requires
con-
miss
Prosyllogism 42b5
Quality, a category lb26,
29 ; discussed Cat. viii.
qu. and habit or disposition 8b27 ;
and contrariety 10bl2 ; and natural
capacity 9al4 ; and affection 9a28, bl2, 10a9 ; and
form or figure lOall
and contrariety 10b 12
and degree 10b26, llal4
and
likeness llal5
relation lla20, 36
and
Quantification of predicate
43b 17
Quantity, a category lb26,
28 ; discussed Cat. vi. ;
continuous
)(
has parts 5al5 ;
secondary or accidental
5a39 ; has no contrary
5bll, 30; )( relation 5bl6;
and equality 6a26
discrete
4b20
Reciprocal proof,
APr,
65al9
Recollection 67a22
Reduction APr. II.
11.
v.-vii., cf.
xxv.
539
^.
ofMAwbl
mi
fonM Ai^, I.
HrfllUttPJI^/V. U.
iriitk*
Oil BlLt
14bttt bi
ss.t
Gal.
itliroMiit
vtt.1
of ooolmhrty ibIA
aUi
omI
*8.lff. Ilbti
il]rllSQ.Mt
<
tloa libit,
Mt
N
BtolK
DBOMOllT 9
lib
wckm
SetentiiekwMiii,
pmdii.dofloi>^
oiMvlaric)
v4Pr.
(problemotle) B^rlU
I.
puowiiftitt
<
MOHiMi^nib'
(podcidiB
xix.
problKOBBlic)
tfvc oomoNmIoim
bi ILULt
bi A.
qfoHI'
t cuo t tii
Aon
fa90(
^ratbiikM
MO
Sbidl
Ml
iiijbwlilijblt,
tA.bft|</.lHaii..ait
;;
INDEX
movers 23a24 ;
secondary = species or
genus 2ai4, b7, not present
in a subject 3a9 ; whether
relative
8al3
s.
and
celestial
47a23-bl6
sity
apparent
Tense 16bl7
Term
defined
term
41b6
must
24bl6 ; one
be positive
i6.
xxxviii.
of
49b3;
substitution
in same
t.s
See Major,
Middle, Minor, Premiss
Thebes 69al
series 66b27.
(assertoric)
APr.
(apodeictic
APr.
I.
vi.,
assertoric)
(problematic)
(assertoric - proble-
I.
XX.,
xi.,
UblO
and present
and future ib. 33
and
past
18a28
541
INDEX
AFt. IL %A9^
UmI. aMii
Mi
. tlt, 411
Unksoni
Uallsr
IM
flf
<rMiingobu
UnKriMl
tmnaar
liilriliHi
tfblOi
M MM
ltail.tOBi .
Mia.htT.
4lbt. 4inii
Id
iubiih(i
partlciiUr
br
aBi I
or
iMi|
itMntt
UnhroQillmMlatt
ZcAoSbl
frn^ttd
Omti
Britmim ly IL ft R.
CtA.
^ibl4
of libit I
A. I9t pvt oT
OulT
Vbto
mwM
Adling*-
St. Augustine
Way.
Caesar Civil Wars. A. G. Peskett.
Caesar Gallic War. H. J. Edwards.
Cato and Vahro De Re Rustica. H. B. Ash and W. D.
;
:
Hooper.
Catullus. F. W. Cornish ; Tibullus. J. B. Postgate and
Pervigilium Veneris. J. W. Mackail.
Celsus De Medicina. W. G. Spencer. 3 Vols.
Brutus and Orator. G. L. Hendrickson and
Cicero
;
H. M. Hubbell.
Cicero De Finibus. H. Rackham.
Cicero De Inventione, etc H. M. Hubbell.
Cicero
De Natura Deorum and Academica.
ham.
:
:
:
H. Rack-
CKBBOt Db S BBBL'I V I fc
W. A. FbIommt.
CacBBoi
la
Ds
AjOCtftA,
Db Dl^lBAfMBS.
^m
LobIk el Lord.
Placoo.
Ckbboi LnrTBBi yo
CicBBOi
mmnam
S. IL
WbMl
BAtiBo.
R. GBfttoer.
Pbo
Mimb^
Ib PIiibi.
Ljbamo. Pto
Ckbbo i Pbo QonMno, Pbo
CoBTBA Rt*u^*. J. H. Pi
PBoSapno, I VATtvtvw. R.
fCKxao) lUnroBKA a llBBmtcs._H^
t
C
Ooa AVD EpoBBib C E.
J.
Rotfe.
S Vok.
BbbmIL
LucAN.
D. DufF.
W. H. D. Rouse.
Martial. W. C. A. Ker. 2 Vols.
Minor Latin Poets from Pubulius Syrus to Rutilius
Namatianus, including Grattius, Calpurnius Siculus,
Nemesianus, Avianus, with " Aetna," " Phoenix " and
other poems. J. Wight DuiF and Arnold M. Duff.
Ovid The Art of Love and other Poems. J. H. Mozley.
Ovid Fasti. Sir James G. Frazer.
Ovid Heroides and Amores. Grant Showerman.
J.
LucHETius.
:
:
Ovid
Ovid
:
:
TcafTvtxiAv
a R. FaliiiBifti
VtMii.
ViTsvTiOTt
tVoli.
Dm AmamnwmwmA. W.Otmmm. V^
Afttiai TATtm. S.
AUA Os TBS Katvss or
t
^-*i^
A. F.
SVok.
aaA^Mt.
AwKmrxm, H. Wdr5iik. i Vli.
Auirao, Asua* aw rnmiBjni
Lcrtvat.
BcMMraiiaF.aFota.
AftATtA.
Qf.CALUMuatm,
AunoTLB
**On
lltMM Wofto.
W.
S. Ufltt.
lodhrWbfe
WiodA.**
Abototls
**
t
Ob Hi
HteoMMMMAM Bnno.
**
On
A. IL
W.
Hett
Aristotle The Categories. On Interpretation.
Cooke Prior Analytics. H. Tredennick.
S.
H.
P.
Aristotle
Posterior
Analytics.
H.
Tredennick
E. S. Forster.
Sophistical Refutations. Coming-to-be and
Passing-away. E. S. Forster. On the Cosmos. D. J.
Topics.
Aristotle
Furley.
2 Vols.
Poetics
Aristotle
ford.
:
:
Athenaeus
:
:
A. T. Murray.
Funeral Speech,
Demosthenes VII
Exordia and Letters. N. W. and N.
Dio Cassius Roman History. E. Cary.
:
Erotic
J.
DeWitt.
9 Vols.
Essay,
aa
Umm
'
&
Galbv
0 Ts NiiYmA& W^cwnm^
TnGansAMMtMV.
A. J.
W.
R. l>Mo^ #Vakk
Poava (Tanootttaa. Rmmk. M4
iUlmoMk. tVoK
Gaaw M ATWMUtttcat
HCTODonm. A.
W aaa.
I>.^d^
laarllMiM
"
f Vaia
4 Valic*^'"
W. U. H
laiaaa
ff riiHw
Vaa llaak. S Vali.
laocaATaa. Gaotya NoHIa aad
8t. Joks Hawaarawa t BAmiAAM *vs loAtAaM. Raa. O. IL
Woodward and lUroU Mattiaflf.
Joaaraaa. H. Sl J. ThadMray ai Ralpb Maioia. t Vain
UKoa
Voh. I-Vll.
JvuAW. WttMOaaa WrMtf. S
V^
W.
R.
M.
S Vok.
Lamk
K. J. Maidment and
O. Burtt.
NoNNos Dionysiaca. W. H. D. Rouse. 3 Vols.
Oppiak, Colluthus, Tbyphiodobus. A. W. Mair.
Papybi. Non-Litebaby Selections. A. S. Hunt and C. 0.
Edgar. 2 Vols. Litebaby Selections (Poetry). D. L.
Page.
PaBTHENIUS. Cf. LONGUS.
Pausanias
Description of Gbeece. W. H. S. Jones. 5
Vols, and Companion Vol. arranged by R. E. Wycherley.
Philo. 10 Vols. Vols. I-V. F. H. Colson and Rev. G. H.
F. H. Colson
Whitaker
Vols. VI-X.
General Index.
Rev. J. W. Earp.
Two Supplementary Vols. Translation only from an
Armenian Text Ralph Marcus.
Philostbatus
Imagines
Callistbatus
Descbiptions.
A. Fairbanks.
Philostbatus The Life op Apollonius of Tyana. F. C.
Conybeare. 2 Vols.
Lives of the Sophists.
Philostbatus and Eunapius
Wilmer Cave Wright.
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