AMERICAN Scientist New Dilemmas for the Prisoner I oe pole steno ube ecard in eprtcons, Whee ahs a ge he ee! dea ctv a em uy A a the puns lye for ps ach payer mun chase eter to onpeah (oly alent orto fet cofest) an mast mate te ne before elog the obers detion erat (cc, Hey earn ree pots each; i bot detect (os), they Oe stone point fone payer Gees an the fete pnts rathe tha threw ry opponent cetacts,{ algun by aelecergeave pont versus none. Beeston ne ‘arting cecovery las: year revealed a whole now dass of strategies, including some bizarre ones. For example, over a tang series of gore one player can unlataraly dictate the other player's acare (wha corain range. Ora way player can contol the ri of the Tit-for-Tat Subjects dea wth stuatons of conc, they recrulted two colleagues to play 100 matches in quck Suceession. Without any prearrange sratogy the players achieved mutual cooperaten In 60 percent Undertoak further exgeriments and analy. Then inte 19005 Robert Axelrod, abo of Meh, srotagies, clog somited by Rapoport. A teforat player always coopertes nthe st opponent; avays plays fora be Neverteless, ora performs remarkably well against wide varity of ober strategies. From the sucess ofthis mle ule Axelrod extract some lessons for I plyers= Never be the feo dates reales medal when betrayed volt ner 9 single cycle Short-Term Memory Biota Freeman J yson ofthe iste for Aevancea Stay Princeton renowned Ses ysis mathematician, aihor, sonar, and siradne seep Tey aon Mes ad Dyan ceo mate er seen aos os teat oe edt i ahve a ere ‘might seem that savers witha longer morery would have an agvartaze against such forget opponents, out tures out te “shortest memory DBy ‘F 100 plays. Press eng Dyson show thet tere is @ memory-one strategy tat would have exactly the same effect on Your apparent, players prosablty of cooperaing folowing each ofthese events. For example, He or tat suategy is encoded in the secuence of 5) slays cooperate ater coor de, aluniye detec ster ed or 09, Knatne® Interesting strategy, nckrames Pavlov, nae te slgnaors (0 aoperate when you ond your opponent have race te same cole (rode), detect we You difered an ne previous move ed + e). Bot ofthese ‘rtegies re determine whl probabltes either Oar, but ats not necestery. The stateay (i, yy) deserbes a player who choases moves completely atrancom ven any two strategies, a computer program can slnulate an IPD matzh between the players, Keeping trac of how often eaehoutzome (cc; a ee.) appears inthe resus, With a bng enough run, tesefrequences converge to a “stationary state” which represents te expected outcome ofthe match Ranay property af memory-one sates ir that ts nek seslly necesaryf9 run nchm prsram; ere ravonary mate canbe aleustes ect, ‘sthout cing Urough te pame move by move. Ts shortet moked heasy to explore & wide spectrum of ame stelagies,‘he one-sided rules are members of «newly recogrzed class of strategas that Press and Opson cal zero-determinant strategies. The name reels the Ine of reasoning that le tothe dicovery—the strategies appear when te determina ofa certain max of probabies ae to zero butts face not erpecally hell uncerstancing how te sratenes work, Wnae sete sem apart ior cher memery-one rratesjs= ithe presence of cera igedraic relations between the four prabeblie. For example, none subset af zera-deterrinant strategies ony te probabllnes for ce ad events tre frenly chose; they then Geternine the cf and de probabil, ha a rasutof such dependence the statonary state ofthe game i controled ‘nurey by one payers svategy, witout any Input om the opponent. This se Stuaton tet allows much mise Press and Dyson We Dictators and Extortionists ‘ne mischievous strategy might be calld the cictator: Ie unitraly sts te other players lng-torm average score to any vale Between she rmutal= ‘efecion payment ond the mutua-cooperaton payment (For the standard paya wales 9, 1,3 5, that means anywhere Between I and 3.) Consider the strateay (4/5, 2/5, 2/5, 1/5), here the four numbers again inet the arobabilty of choosing to eaoperate ale ce, ee de, Fespecsvely. FY slays tis Suategy agaist X, ten X's average scare per ‘ound will converge on he value 2.0 efter a suffice long series of games, Io matter wnat statepy x ctooses to play In he lower lustrason on the pravieus page X responds te Vs coercon with four deren svatele, uth Saen ease W's avernge tooe ravatneinelsablytownrd 2. It shouldbe emphases ma cng Xr score Jove nat requ Yt make any active Sdjusumentsorreaponces os the gore proceed. Y ean set the four prabablives and then "gat lunch” os Brass and Dyson put ‘A second form of rishi manipulates the rao between Xs score and Ys score. I Sy and Sy ae the players’ lang average score, the strategy allons ¥ to enforce the tinear relation Sy = 1+ M(Sx- 2), where Mis an arbtway constant greater than 1. has te oason of paying an alnays-deect strategy, whienconsians Sat players othe minal pyot of one pent par rune. Bu FX takes any saps to prove this retin, every increment Sy Wiline-ease 5y by M umes as much, Press and Dyson cal the tchnique extortion. As an example they ce the strategy (11/1, 1/2, 726, 0), whieh sets = 3. acopt this rue, can play almays-cetect or ort to tn beth payers 9 one point per roune. When Xenooses other srteges, however eomes out ahess: [Fx pays Pavey the scores ate aparoximetaly Sy = 1-46 she Sy = 2.96. Io moximae his or he ore, X must cooperate unconaivonaly, earning an average of 1.91 points, but then ¥ gels 3.73 pins “The escovery of dictatorial ad extortionate strategies came a aurea surprise, and yet ere were precedents, Aspects ofthe discovery were antcpated in se 19905 by WaartenC.Boersy Wart A. Nowak, and Kal Sigmund. Moreover, not ale be zero-delerminantsvateges ate exo3c eas thot ne one ever thought of ying. tora me most mous oH IPD rule, len fac an extortonatezerosetermnant strategy. ieeateM =I, fren tuslty of sees ‘Watching the coercive stratesesn ction (or playing againt them), Ica help feeling ret samething uncanny going on. In 9 game whose stoctre is tuly symmetical naw can one contestant wei such power over te ler? i Ue case ofthe catia rate, the syoimaty so much broken as vanstormes: When Iaka conrel ef your safe, | bse contol of my own; although there's ntting you can doo ler your own Score, You hove te power to est ine ‘ho extoreonatesttogies cant be axpaines away So easi. Theo realy san asymmesy, wth one player aabbing an una share ofthe spol, and twnere all begen Darwinian Dilemmas ‘One possible escape isto pute game In the larger context of evolutionary Seog, where Prscner's Demme fers a framework ‘or understanding naw cooperation might arise nan enuironment tat seem toreward only selfanners. The arminan mechenam-coses the loop” on the gare: Each agents a Eompostion of ta: pool depende = urn en nin ayers suced Sn al ” ‘oon afte the Press-Dyson report appearee Christoph AGaM and Arend Hinze of Michigan State Univeraty este various zeroaeterminan sateen an evshtonary simulation. The coercive strategies di wellagains carta opponents, but svertally ey were placed by ster players, most nelabHy Pavlov. The eason Is tata “nasty layer can Become a icin of onn success. Te Fewer for wining Inn evehtonary ame ist become mare common the poultien wth the res fat you encounter ‘Rao an tatze concluded tat Zro-daterminent stooges ae Ulikly to evolve inthe wil Over a long series of games one player can unilaterally dictate the other player’s score. But tsi not the and ofthe story. Ie tuns out that not al zero-detarminat statagias are weapons wed ay brutes and bulls. Alexander J. Stewart nd Jesh B Plotin of the Unversty of Pennsylana nave idered 9 ret of "genergur zerovSetrmirant players tat frm 9 mirtr mage toe fitorsonate anes. An extra West claim more than his or he for share, but when tis gambt fib must accep the low pay for mal defection. A ‘Generous player offers to accep ss than afar share of the average pay as an inddcemantt Mutual cooperacan. Ih oter wards, the generous Paver is wing tobe a patsy ats what fakes secure cooperate, ‘enerous benavor might seem tke a malacaptve nvation to abuse, but Start ane Plotkin found oterwise, Ina series of evoutonary experiments, the generous subset of rera-docerminant strates were tre dominant speces inal antes except ace with 2 very mal opuation (ewer han bout 10 indvduab). Slewert and len went afta prove at generosity is a "robust states, able to etabsh kaa and preerate ino verse Bepataten and en teelnvasian ae noisy ones Agpaendy pays pup wine ie uses fat hac ret opportunites or 1s that ee moral of the story? The players of these games are vory simple and mechanistic; they are aloritims, not personalities. Neverthabs, I hora to revit giving nem value-laden abel suc af “xtorvonate” or"generautAxelaa= analyst of Weare carly eenaes tre fundamental Prince of ex tls: take an eye for an eye (out ne ore than thal). The evolonar resus of Stewart a Pltkn Mh e a New slepensation: Merey Fe greater an juste, soeran Hayes Bibliography ‘+ Adami, C. and A Hintze, 2052, Evoltonary instablty of ero-determinantstrategle demonstrates that winning Is nat everything, Nature Commanieatons #2193 + ck, R 1988, 2006. The Evolution of Cperation. New York: Base Books. 1 boetistu.C, H. A. Nowak, ana X Sgmund 1997. Equal pay for al prisoners, Amerian Mathematica! Monthy 104:303-305+ ress, WH, and F.2. Dyson, 2012 trata prisoner’ dilemma contains srategia tat dominate any evolutionary apponant. Proceedings of the ‘atonal Academy of Sclences of be U.S.A. 109:10409-10813. + Stonarty A, ad J Bs Pst 2013, From extortion to generosity, the evolution of zero-teterminan suatgies inthe prisoner’ lemma, Proceedings of he tstonalAcadeny of Sciences of the U.S: 110:15948-15355. ca fn hs 83 pom arercaneent raien/nunainenaormae nthe gros seme (©2016 signa X, The Scotte Resear Soaty siecoureee