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1932
HL

31
Donoghuev.Stevenson.

No.5.
26May1932

HL
LordBuckmaster.LordAtkin.LordTomlin.
LordThankerton.LordMacmillan.

(POOR)MRSMARYM'ALISTERORDONOGHUE,Pursuer(Appellant)Morton,K.C.Milligan.
DAVIDSTEVENSON,Defender(Respondent).Sol.Gen.NormandClydeT.ElderJones.
NegligenceWhetherdutyowedtopersoninjuredDutyofmanufacturerofarticletoultimate
consumerBottleofgingerbeerboughtfromretailerBottlecontainingdeadsnailPurchaser
poisonedbydrinkingcontentsLiabilityofmanufacturertoconsumer.
Wherethemanufacturerofaproductintendedforhumanconsumptionsendsitoutinaformwhichshowsthathe
meansittoreachtheultimateconsumerintheforminwhichitlefthisfactory,withnoreasonablepossibilityof
intermediateexaminationbytheretailerorconsumer,andwiththeknowledgethatwantofreasonablecareonhis
partinthepreparationoftheproductmayresultininjurytotheconsumer,themanufacturerowesadutytothe
consumertotakesuchcare,andwillbeliabletothelatter,indamagesifhesuffersinjurythroughthefailuretotake
suchcare.
Soheld(rev,judgmentoftheSecondDivision,diss.LordBuckmasterandLordTomlin)inanactionofdamages
broughtagainstamanufacturerofgingerbeerbyapersonwhoaverredthatshehadbeenpoisonedbygingerbeer,
whichwasboughtfromaretaildealerinanopaquesealedbottleinwhichithadleftthemanufacturer'spremises,
andwhichcontainedadecomposedsnail.
Georgev.Skivington,(1869)L.R.,5Ex.1,approved.
DictaofBrett,M.R.,inHeavenv.Pender,(1883)11Q.B.D.503,atpp.509to511,considered.
GroundofjudgmentofLordOrmidaleandLordAndersoninMullenv.Barr&Co.andM'Gowanv.Barr&Co.,1929
S.C.461,disapproved.
Authoritiesreviewed.

(INtheCourtofSession13thNovember1930.)
On9thApril1929MrsMaryM'AlisterorDonoghuebroughtanactionagainstDavidStevenson
aeratedwatermanufacturerPaisley,inwhichsheclaimed500asdamagesforinjuriessustainedby
herthroughdrinkinggingerbeerwhichhadbeenmanufacturedbythedefender.
Thepursueraverred,interalia:(Cond.2)"Atorabout8.50 P.M.onoraboutthe26thAugust
1928,thepursuerwasintheshopoccupiedbyFrancisMinchella,andknownasWellmeadowCaf,
atWellmeadowPlace,Paisley,withafriend.Thesaidfriendorderedforthepursuericecream,and
gingerbeersuitabletobeusedwiththeicecreamasaniceddrink.Herfriend,actingasaforesaid,
wassuppliedbythesaidMrMinchellawithabottleofgingerbeermanufacturedbythedefenderfor
saletomembersofthepublic.Thesaidbottlewasmadeofdarkopaqueglass,andthepursuerand
herfriendhadnoreasontosuspectthatthesaidbottlecontainedanythingelsethantheaerated
water.ThesaidMrMinchellapouredsomeofthesaidgingerbeerfromthebottleintoatumbler
containingtheicecream.Thepursuerthendranksomeofthecontentsofthetumbler.Herfriend
thenliftedthesaidgingerbeerbottleandwaspouringouttheremainderofthecontentsintothe
saidtumblerwhenasnail,whichhadbeen,unknowntothepursuer,herfriend,orthesaidMr
Minchella,inthebottle,andwasinastateofdecomposition,floatedoutofthe
1932
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Donoghuev.Stevenson

32

saidbottle.Inconsequenceofthenauseatingsightofthesnailinsaidcircumstances,andofthe
noxiousconditionofthesaidsnailtaintedgingerbeerconsumedbyher,thepursuersustainedthe
shockandillnesshereinaftercondescendedon.ThesaidMrMinchellaalsosoldtothepursuer's
friendapearandice.Thesaidgingerbeerbottlewasfittedwithametalcapoveritsmouth.Onthe
sideofthesaidbottletherewaspastedalabelcontaininginteralia,thenameandaddressofthe
defender,whowasthemanufacturer.Itwasfromthislabelthatthepursuer'ssaidfriendgotthe
nameandaddressofthedefender."(Cond.3)"Theshockandillnesssufferedbythepursuerwere
duetothefaultofthedefender.Thesaidgingerbeerwasmanufacturedbythedefenderandhis

servantstobesoldasanarticleofdrinktomembersofthepublic(includingthepursuer).Itwas,
accordingly,thedutyofthedefendertoexercisethegreatestcareinorderthatsnailswouldnotget
intothesaidbottle,renderthesaidgingerbeerdangerousandharmful,andbesoldwiththesaid
gingerbeer.Further,itwasthedutyofthedefendertoprovideasystemofworkinghisbusiness
thatwassafe,andwouldnotallowsnailstogetintohisgingerbeerbottles(includingthesaid
bottle).Suchasystemisusualandcustomary,andisnecessaryinthemanufactureofadrinklike
gingerbeertobeusedforhumanconsumption.Inthesedutiesthedefenderculpablyfailedand
pursuer'sillnessandshockwerethedirectresultofhissaidfailureinduty.Thepursuerbelieves
andaversthatthedefender'ssystemofworkinghisbusinesswasdefective,inrespectthathis
gingerbeerbottleswerewashedandallowedtostandinplacestowhichitwasobviousthatsnails
hadfreedomofaccessfromoutsidethedefender'spremises,andinwhich,indeed,snailsandslimy
trailsofsnailswerefrequentlyfound.Further,itwasthedutyofthedefendertoprovideanefficient
systemofinspectionofsaidbottlesbeforethegingerbeerwasfilledintothem,andbeforethey
weresealed.Inthisdutyalsothedefenderculpablyfailed,andsocausedthesaidaccident.The
defenderwellknew,oroughttohaveknown,ofthefrequentpresenceofsnailsinthosepartsofhis
premiseswherethegingerbeerbottleswerewashedanddried,and,further,oughttohaveknown
ofthedangerofsmallanimals(includingsnails)gettingintohisgingerbeerbottles.Thepursuer
believesandaversthatthesaidsnail,ingoingintothesaidbottle,leftonitspathaslimytrail,
whichshouldhavebeenobvioustoanyoneinspectingthesaidbottlebeforethegingerbeerwasput
intoit.Inanyevent,thesaidtrailofthesnailshouldeasilyhavebeendiscoveredonthebottle
beforethebottlewassealed,andaproper(orindeedany)inspectionwouldhaverevealedthe
presenceofthesaidtrailandthesaidsnail,andthesaidbottleofgingerbeerwiththesnailinit
wouldnothavebeenplacedforsaleinthesaidshop.Further,thedefenderwellknew,orinany
eventoughttohaveknown,thatsmallanimalslikemiceorsnailsleftinaeratedwater(including
gingerbeer),anddecomposingthere,renderaeratedwaterexceedinglydangerousandharmfulto
personsdrinkingthecontaminatedaeratedwater.Accordingly,itwashisobviousdutytoprovide
cleargingerbeerbottles,soastofacilitatethesaidsystemofinspection.Inthisdutyalsothe
defenderculpablyfailed,andthesaidaccidentwasthedirectresultofhissaidfailureinduty.Ifthe
defenderandhissaidservantshad
1932
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Donoghuev.Stevenson

33

carriedouttheirsaiddutiesthepursuerwouldnothavesufferedthesaidshockandillness."
Thepursuerpleaded,interalia:"(1)Thepursuer,havingsustainedloss,injury,anddamage
throughthefaultofthedefender,isentitledtoreparationthereforfromthedefender."
Thedefenderpleaded,interalia:"(1)Thepursuer'savermentsbeingirrelevantandinsufficient
tosupporttheconclusionsofthesummons,theactionshouldbedismissed."
On27thJune1930theLordOrdinary(Moncrieff)repelledthefirstpleainlawforthedefender
andallowedaproof.
Thedefenderreclaimed,andon13thNovember1930theSecondDivisionrecalledthe
interlocutoroftheLordOrdinaryanddismissedtheaction.*
ThepursuerappealedtotheHouseofLordsinformapauperis,andtheappealwasheardon10th
and11thDecember1931.
Arguedfortheappellant,Theappellanthadstatedarelevantcaseuponrecord.Admittedlythe
presentcasewasindistinguishablefromthecaseofMullenv.Barr&Co.,1andindecidingthe
presentcaseagainsttheappellanttheSecondDivisionhadmerelyfollowed,astheywerelogically
boundtodo,theirdecisioninMullen.1Thepresentappealwas,accordingly,anappealagainst
Mullen.1Itwasadmittedthat,onthepresentquestion,thelawofScotlandandthelawofEngland
werethesame,andtheSecondDivisionhadreachedtheirdecisionuponaconsiderationofcertain
Englishcases.Thesecaseswerenotconsistent,andthecasesreliedonbytheSecondDivision
differedessentiallyintheirfactsfromthefactsinMullen1andinthepresentcase.Nocastcouldbe
foundwhere,incircumstancessimilartothepresent,the,Courthadheldthatthemanufacturerwas
undernodutytotheconsumer.TheCourtbelowproceededontheviewthatamanufacturerowed
nodutytoanyonewithwhomhehadnocontractualrelation,excepteitherwherethearticle
manufacturedwasdangerousinitselfor,althoughnotnormallydangerousinitself,wasknownto
themanufacturertobedangerousowingtosomedefectorforsomeotherreason.Thatviewofa
manufacturer'sobligationwastoonarrow,andthequestionwhetheradutyofcareonthepartofthe
manufacturerexistedtowardspersonswithwhomhehadnocontractwasonewhichineachcase
dependedupontheparticularcircumstancesofthecase.Whereamanufacturerputonthemarket
anarticleoffoodordrinkinaformwhichprecludedanexaminationofthearticlebytheretaileror
theconsumer,hewasliabletotheconsumerifhedidnottakereasonablecaretomakesurethat
thearticlewas
*TheCourtheardcounselfortheparties.ThereaftertheLordJusticeClerkstatedthattheywouldfollowtheir
decisioninMullenv.Barr&Co.,1929S.C.461.Hefurtherstatedthathenolongerreservedhisopinionuponthe
questionoftheliabilityofthedefenderstothepursuerifnegligenceontheirparthadbeenproved,andagreedwith
theopinionsofLordOrmidaleandLordAndersonthattheywouldnothavebeenliableevenifnegligent.Lord
Ormidale,LordHunter,andLordAndersonadheredtotheirformeropinions,LordHunter,whodissented,explaining
thathefeltjustifiedindissentinginrespectthattheactualgroundofjudgmentinMullenv.Barr&Co.wasthat
negligenceonthepartofthedefendershadnotbeenproved.
11929S.C.461.

1932
HL

Donoghuev.Stevenson

34

notinjurious.Inthepresentcasethegingerbeerbottleswereopaque,andweresealedandlabelled
beforetheyleftthemanufaturer'spremises,thesecircumstancesmakinganyexaminationbythe
retailerorconsumerimpossible.Nevertheless,themanufacturertacitlyinvitedthepurchasersto
consumethecontentsofthebottles,andhewasliabletotheconsumerif,throughcarelessnesson
hispart,thecontentswerenoxious.1ItwastruethatGeorgev.Skivington2hadnotalwaysbeen
favourablycommentedon,butithadneverbeenoverruled,andithadbeenreferredtobythe
HouseofLordswithoutdisapproval.3IntheUnitedStatesthelawhadbeenlaiddownascontended
forbytheappellant.4Referencewasalsomadetotheundernotedauthorities.5
ArguedfortherespondentThegeneralrulewasthatamanufacturerowednodutytoa
consumerwithwhomhehadnocontract.Tothisrulethereweretwowellrecognisedexceptions(1)
wherethearticlewasdangerousinitself(2)wherethearticlewasknowntothemanufacturertobe
dangerousforsomereasonorother.Thepresentcasedidnotfallwithineitheroftheseexceptions,
andtheappellantwastryingtointroduceintothelawathirdexception,viz.,goodsintendedfor
humanconsumptionandsentoutbythemanufacturerandsoldtotheconsumerinaforminwhich
examinationwasimpossible.Therewasnohintofanysuchexceptioninanyofthereportedcases.
Therewasnosuggestionoftheexistenceofatrapinthepresentcase,andtherewasnological
reasonfordifferentiatingbetweenarticlesoffoodordrinkandotherarticles.Theprincipleof
liabilitywasstatedtoowidelybyBrett,M.R.,inHeavenv.Pender6andinLeLievrev.Gould7he
himselfandA.L.Smith,L.J.,modifiedhispreviousstatementofthatprinciple.Cotton,L.J.,and
Bowen,L.J.,inHeavenv.Pender6explainedthelawcorrectly.InBlackerv.Lake&Elliot8
Hamilton,J.,andLush,J.,regardedGeorgev.Skivington2asoverruled.Theprinciple,accordingto
Hamilton,J.,wasthatthebreachbyAofhiscontractwithBtouseskillandcareinthe
manufactureofanarticledidnotperseentitleC,ifinjuredbythearticle,tosueA.Heregarded
Georgev.Skivington2insofarasitproceededupondutytotheultimateuser,asbeing
inconsistentwithWinterbottomv.Wright.9Thegeneraltrendoflegaldecisionswasadversetothe
appellant.10
1Georgev.Skivington,(1869)L.R.,5Ex.1Heavenv.Pender,(1883)11Q.B.D.503,Brett,M.R.,atpp.509et
seq.DominionNaturalGasCo.v.CollinsandPerkins,[1909]A.C.640,LordDunedinatp.6.
2L.R.,5Ex.1.
3Cavalierv.Pope,[1906]A.C.428,atp.433.
4Thomasv.Winchester,(1852)57Amer.Dec.455,6N.Y.R.397.
5Dixonv.Bell,(1816)5M.&S.198Langridgev.Levy,(1837)2M.&W.519,(1838)4M.&W.337Longmeidv.
Holliday,(1851)6Ex.761Batesv.Batey&Co.,[1913]3K.B.351WeldBlundellv.Stephens,[1920]A.C.956,
atp.985.
611Q.B.D.503.
7[1893]1Q.B.491.
8(1912)106L.T.533.
9(1842)10M.&W.109.
10ReferencewasmadetoPollockonTorts,(13thed.)pp.570and571andBevenonNegligence,(4thed.)vol.i.,
p.49.

1932
HL

Donoghuev.Stevenson

35

Atdeliveringjudgmenton26thMay1932,
LORDBUCKMASTER(readbyLordTomlin).Thefactsofthiscasearesimple.On26thAugust
1928theappellantdrankabottleofgingerbeer,manufacturedbytherespondent,whichafriend
hadboughtfromaretailerandgiventoher.Thebottlecontainedthedecomposedremainsofa
snailwhichwerenot,andcouldnotbe,detecteduntilthegreaterpartofthecontentsofthebottle
hadbeenconsumed.Asaresultshealleged,andatthisstageherallegationsmustbeacceptedas
true,thatshesufferedfromshockandseveregastroenteritis.Sheaccordinglyinstitutedthe
proceedingsagainstthemanufacturerwhichhavegivenrisetothisappeal.
Thefoundationofhercaseisthattherespondent,asthemanufacturerofanarticleintendedfor
consumptionandcontainedinareceptaclewhichpreventedinspection,owedadutytoheras
consumerofthearticletotakecarethattherewasnonoxiouselementinthegoods,andthathe
neglectedsuchdutyandisconsequentlyliableforanydamagecausedbysuchneglect.After
certainamendments,whicharenowimmaterial,thecasecamebeforetheLordOrdinary,who
rejectedthefirstpleainlawoftherespondentandallowedaproof.Hisinterlocutorwasrecalled
andtheactiondismissedbytheSecondDivisionoftheCourtofSession,fromwhosejudgmentthis
appealhasbeenbrought.
Beforeexaminingthemeritstwocommentsaredesirable:(1)thattheappellant'scaserests
solelyonthegroundofatortbasednotonfraudbutonnegligenceand(2)thatthroughoutthe
appealthecasehasbeenarguedonthebasis,undisputedbytheSecondDivisionandnever
questionedbycounselfortheappellantorbyanyofyourLordships,thattheEnglishandtheScots
lawonthesubjectareidentical.ItisthereforeupontheEnglishlawalonethatIhaveconsidered
thematter,and,inmyopinion,itisontheEnglishlawalonethat,inthecircumstances,weoughtto
proceed.
Thelawapplicableisthecommonlaw,and,althoughitsprinciplesarecapableofapplicationto
meetnewconditionsnotcontemplatedwhenthelawwaslaiddown,theseprinciplescannotbe

changednorcanadditionsbemadetothembecauseanyparticularmeritoriouscaseseemsoutside
theirambit.Now,thecommonlawmustbesoughtinlawbooksbywritersofauthority,andin
judgmentsofthejudgesentrustedwithitsadministration.Thelawbooksgivenoassistance,
becausethework,oflivingauthors,howeverdeservedlyeminent,cannotbeusedasauthority,
althoughtheopinionstheyexpressmaydemandattention,andtheancientbooksdonotassist.I
turn,therefore,tothedecidedcasestoseeiftheycanbeconstruedsoastosupporttheappellant's
case.OneoftheearliestisthecaseofLangridgev.Levy.1Itisacaseoftenquotedandvariously
explained.Thereamansoldagun,whichheknewwasdangerous,fortheuseofthepurchaser's
son.Thegunexplodedintheson'shands,andhewasheldtohavearightofactionintortagainst
thegunmaker.Howfaritisfromthepresentcasecanbeseenfromthe
12M.&W.519,4M.&W.337.

1932
HL

Donoghuev.Stevenson

36
Lord
Buckmaster

judgmentofParke,B.,who,indeliveringthejudgmentoftheCourt,usedthesewords(atp.53&of
2M.&W.):"Weshouldpausebeforewemadeaprecedentbyourdecisionwhichwouldbean
authorityforanactionagainstthevendors,evenofsuchinstrumentsandarticlesasaredangerous
inthemselves,atthesuitofanypersonwhomsoeverintowhosehandstheymighthappentopass,
andwhoshouldbeinjuredthereby"andinLongmeidv.Holliday 1thesameeminentjudgepoints
outthattheearliercasewasbasedonafraudulentmisstatement,andheexpresslyrepudiatesthe
viewthatithasanywiderapplication.ThecaseofLangridgev.Levy,2therefore,canbedismissed
fromconsideration,withthecommentthatitisrathersurprisingithassooftenbeencitedfora
propositionitcannotsupport.
ThecaseofWinterbottomv.Wright3is,ontheotherhand,anauthoritythatisclosely
applicable.Owingtonegligenceintheconstructionofacarriageitbrokedown,andastrangerto
themanufactureandsalesoughttorecoverdamagesforinjurieswhichheallegedweredueto
negligenceinthework,anditwasheldthathehadnocauseofactioneitherintortorarisingoutof
contract.Thiscaseseemstometoshowthatthemanufacturerofanyarticleisnotliabletoathird
partyinjuredbynegligentconstruction,fortherecanbenothingintheconstructionofacoachto
placeitinaspecialcategory.Itmaybenoted,also,thatinthiscaseAlderson,B.,said(atp.
115):"Theonlysaferuleistoconfinetherighttorecovertothosewhoenterintothecontractif
wegoonestepbeyondthat,thereisnoreasonwhyweshouldnotgofifty."
Longmeidv.Holliday 1wasthecaseofadefectivelampsoldtoamanwhosewifewasinjuredby
itsexplosion.Thevendorofthelamp,againstwhomtheactionwasbrought,wasnotthe
manufacturer,sothatthecaseisnotexactlyparalleltothepresent,butthestatementofParke,B.,
inhisjudgmentcoversthecaseofamanufacturer,forhesaid(atp.768):"Itwouldbegoingmuch
toofartosaythatsomuchcareisrequiredintheordinaryintercourseoflifebetweenone
individualandanother,that,ifamachinenotinitsnaturedangerousbutwhichmightbecomeso
byalatentdefectentirelyunknown,althoughdiscoverablebytheexerciseofordinarycare,should
belentorgivenbyoneperson,evenbythepersonwhomanufacturedit,toanother,theformer
shouldbeanswerabletothelatterforasubsequentdamageaccruingbytheuseofit."Itistrue
thatheusesthewords"lentorgiven"andomitstheword"sold,"butifthedutybeentirely
independentofcontractandisadutyowedtoathirdperson,itseemstometobethesame
whetherthearticlebeoriginallygivenorsold.Thefactinthepresentcasethatthegingerbeer
originallyleftthepremisesofthemanufactureronapurchase,aswasprobablythecase,cannot
addto,hisduty,ifsuchexisted,totakecareinitspreparation.Ithasbeensuggestedthatthe
statementofParke,B.,doesnotcoverthecaseofnegligentconstruction,buttheomissionto
exercisereasonablecareinthediscoveryofadefectinthemanufactureofanarticlewherethe
duty
16Ex.761.
22M.&W.519,4M.&W.337.
310M.&W.109.

1932
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Donoghuev.Stevenson

37
Lord
Buckmaster

ofexaminationexistsisjustasnegligentasthenegligentconstructionitself.
ThegeneralprincipleofthesecasesisstatedbyLordSumner(thenHamilton,J.),inthecaseof
Blackerv.Lake&Elliot,1intheseterms:"Thebreachofthedefendant'scontractwithAtousecare
andskillinandaboutthemanufactureandrepairofanarticledoesnotofitselfgiveanycauseof
actiontoBwhenheisinjuredbyreasonofthearticleprovingtobedefective."
Fromthisgeneralruletherearetwowellknownexceptions:(1)inthecaseofanarticle
dangerousinitselfand(2)wherethearticle,notinitselfdangerous,isinfactdangerousbyreason
ofsomedefectorforanyotherreason,andthisisknowntothemanufacturer.Untilthecaseof
Georgev.Skivington2Iknowofnofurthermodificationofthegeneralrule.Asto(1),inthecaseof
thingsdangerousinthemselves,thereis,inthewordsofLordDunedin,"apeculiardutytotake
precautionimposeduponthosewhosendforthorinstallsucharticleswhenitisnecessarilythecase
thatotherpartieswillcomewithintheirproximity"DominionNaturalGasCo.v.Collinsand
Perkins.3Andasto(2),thisdependsonthefactthattheknowledgeofthedangercreatesthe

obligationtowarn,anditsconcealmentisinthenatureoffraud.Inthiscasenoonecansuggest
thatthegingerbeerwasanarticledangerousinitself,andthewordsofLordDunedinshowthatthe
dutyattachesonlytosucharticles,forIreadthewords"apeculiarduty"asmeaningaduty
peculiartothespecialclassofsubjectmentioned.
Oftheremainingcases,Georgev.Skivington2istheonenearesttothepresent,andwithout
thatcase,andthestatementofCleasby,B.,inFrancisv.Cockrell 4andthedictaofBrett,M.R.,in
Heavenv.Pender,5theappellantwouldbedestituteofauthority.Georgev.Skivington2relatedto
thesaleofanoxioushairwash,andaclaimmadebyapersonwhohadnotboughtitbuthad
sufferedfromitsuse,basedonitshavingbeennegligentlycompounded,wasallowed.Itis
remarkablethatLangridgev.Levy 6wasusedinsupportoftheclaim,andinfluencedthejudgment
ofallthepartiestothedecision.BothKelly,C.B.,andPigott,B.,stressedthefactthatthearticle
hadbeenpurchasedtotheknowledgeofthedefendantfortheuseoftheplaintiff,asinLangridge
v.Levy 6andCleasby,B.,who,realisingthatLangridgev.Levy 6wasdecidedon(thegroundof
fraud,said(atp.5):"Substitutetheword'negligence'for'fraud,'andtheanalogybetween
Langridgev.Levy 6andthiscaseitscomplete."Itisunnecessarytopointoutemphaticallythatsuch
asubstitutioncannotpossiblybemade.Noactionbasedonfraudcanbesupportedbymereproof
ofnegligence.IdonotproposetofollowthefortunesofGeorgev.Skivington2fewcasescanhave
livedsodangerouslyandlivedsolong.LordSumner,inthecaseofBlackerv.Lake&Elliot,1
closelyexaminesitshistory,andIagreewithhisanalysis.
1106L.T.533,atp.536.
2L.R.,5Ex.1
3[1909]A.C.640,atp.646.
4(1870)L.R.,5Q.B.501,atp.515.
511Q.B.D.503,atpp.509etseq.
62M.&W.519.

1932
HL

Donoghuev.Stevenson

38
Lord
Buckmaster

Hesaidthathecouldnotpresumetosaythatitwaswrong,buthedeclinedtofollowit,onthe
ground,whichis,Ithink,firm,thatitwasinconflictwithWinterbottomv.Wright.1
InFrancisv.Cockrell 2theplaintiffhadbeeninjuredbythefallofastandonaracecourse,fora
seatinwhichhehadpaid.Thedefendantwaspartproprietorofthestandandactedasreceiverof
themoney.Thestandhadbeennegligentlyerectedbyacontractor,althoughthedefendantwasnot
awareofthedefect.Theplaintiffsucceeded.Thecasehasnobearinguponthepresent,butinthe
courseofhisjudgmentCleasby,B.,madethefollowingobservation(atp.515):"ThepointthatMr
MatthewsreferredtolastwasraisedinthecaseofGeorgev.Skivington,3wheretherewasaninjury
tooneperson,thewife,andacontractofsalewithanotherperson,thehusband.Thewifewas
consideredtohaveagoodcauseofaction,andIwouldadopttheviewwhichtheLordChiefBaron
tookinthatcase.Hesaidtherewasadutyonthevendortouseordinarycareincompoundingthe
articlesold,andthatthisextendedtothepersonforwhoseuseheknewitwaspurchased,andthis
dutyhavingbeenviolated,andhe,havingfailedtousereasonablecare,wasliableinanactionat
thesuitofthethirdperson."Itisdifficulttoappreciatewhatistheimportanceofthefactthatthe
vendorknewwhowasthepersonforwhomthearticlewaspurchased,unlessitbethatthecasewas
treatedasoneoffraud,andthat,withoutthiselementofknowledge,itcouldnotbebroughtwithin
theprincipleofLangridgev.Levy.4Indeed,thisistheonlyviewofthematterwhichadequately
explainsthereferencesinthejudgmentsinGeorgev.Skivington3toLangridgev.Levy,4andthe
observationsofCleasby,B.,uponGeorgev.Skivington.3
ThedictaofBrett,M.R.,inHeavenv.Pender5arerightlyreliedonbytheappellant.Thematerial
passageisasfollows:"Theproposition,whichtheserecognisedcasessuggest,andwhichis,
therefore,tobededucedfromthem,isthatwheneveronepersonisbycircumstancesplacedinsuch
apositionwithregardtoanotherthateveryoneofordinarysensewhodidthinkwouldatonce
recognisethatifhedidnotuseordinarycareandskillinhisownconductwithregardtothose
circumstanceshewouldcausedangerofinjurytothepersonorpropertyoftheother,adutyarises
touseordinarycareandskilltoavoidsuchdanger.Letusapplythispropositiontothecaseof
onepersonsupplyinggoodsormachinery,orinstrumentsorutensils,orthelike,forthepurposeof
theirbeingusedbyanotherperson,butwithwhomthereisno,contractastothesupply.The
propositionwillstandthus:Wheneveronepersonsuppliesgoods,ormachinery,orthelike,forthe
purposeoftheirbeingusedbyanotherpersonundersuchcircumstancesthateveryoneofordinary
sensewould,ifhethought,recogniseatoncethatunlessheusedordinarycareandskillwithregard
totheconditionofthethingsuppliedorthemodeofsupplyingit,therewillbedangerofinjuryto
110M.&W.109.
2L.R.,5Q.B.501.
3L.R.,5Ex.1.
42M.&W.519.
511Q.B.D.503,atpp.509etseq.

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thepersonorpropertyofhimforwhoseusethethingissupplied,andwhoistouseit,adutyarises

touseordinarycareandskillastotheconditionormannerofsupplyingsuchthing.And,fora
neglectofsuchordinarycareorskillwherebyinjuryhappens,alegalliabilityarisestobeenforced
byanactionfornegligence.Thisincludesthecaseofgoods,etc.,suppliedtobeusedimmediately
byaparticularpersonorpersonsoroneofaclassofpersons,whereitwouldbeobvioustothe
personsupplying,ifhethought,thatthegoodswouldinallprobabilitybeusedatoncebysuch
personsbeforeareasonableopportunityfordiscoveringanydefectwhichmightexist,andwhere
thethingsuppliedwouldbeofsuchanaturethataneglectofordinarycareorskillastoits
conditionorthemannerofsupplyingitwouldprobablycausedangertothepersonorpropertyof
thepersonforwhoseuseitwassupplied,andwhowasabouttouseit.Itwouldexcludeacasein
whichthegoodsaresuppliedundercircumstancesinwhichitwouldbeachancebywhomthey
wouldbeusedorwhethertheywouldbeusedornot,orwhethertheywouldbeusedbeforethere
wouldprobablybemeansofobservinganydefect,orwherethegoodswouldbeofsuchanature
thatawantofcareorskillastotheirconditionorthemannerofsupplyingthemwouldnotprobably
producedangerofinjurytopersonorproperty.Theeasesofvendorandpurchaserandlenderand
hirerundercontractneednotbeconsidered,astheliabilityarisesunderthecontract,andnot
merelyasadutyimposedbylaw,thoughitmaynotbeuselesstoobservethatitseemsdifficultto
importtheimpliedobligationintothecontractexceptincasesinwhichiftherewerenocontract
betweenthepartiesthelawwouldaccordingtotheruleabovestatedimplytheduty."
"Therecognisedcases"towhichtheMasteroftheRollsrefersarenotdefinitelyquoted,butthey
appeartorefertocasesofcollisionandcarriage,andthecasesofvisitationtopremisesonwhich
thereissomehiddendangercasesfarremovedfromthedoctrineheenunciates.Nonethelessthis
passagehasbeenusedasatabulainnaufragioformanylitigantsstrugglingintheseasofadverse
authority.Itcannot,however,bedivorcedfromthefactthatthecasehadnothingwhatevertodo
withthequestionofmanufactureandsale.Anunsoundstaginghadbeenerectedonpremisesto
whichtherehadbeenaninvitationtotheplaintiffstoenter,andthecasereallydependedonthe
dutyoftheownerofthepremisestopersonssoinvited.NonethelessitisclearthatBrett,M.R.,
consideredthecasesofmanufacturedarticles,forheexaminedLangridgev.Levy,1andsaysthatit
doesnotnegativethepropositionthatthecasemighthavebeensupportedonthegroundof
negligence.
Inthesamecase,however,Cotton,L.J.,inwhosejudgmentBowen,L.J.,concurred,saidthathe
wasunwillingtoconcurwiththeMasteroftheRollsinlayingdownunnecessarilythelargerprinciple
whichheentertained,inasmuchasthereweremanycasesinwhichtheprinciplewasimpliedly
negatived.HethenreferredtoLangridgev.Levy,1andstatedthatitwasbaseduponfraudulent
misrepresentation,andhad
12M.&W.519.

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beensotreatedbyColeridge,J.,inBlackmorev.BristolandExeterRailwayCo.1andthatin.Collis
v.Seldon2Willes,J.,hadsaidthatthejudgmentinLangridgev.Levy 3wasbasedonthefraudof
thedefendant.TheLordJusticethenproceededasfollows(atp.516):"Thisimpliedlynegativesthe
existenceofthelargergeneralprinciplewhichisreliedon,andthedecisionsinCollisv.Seldon2
andinLongmeidv.Holliday 4(ineachofwhichtheplaintifffailed)are,inmyopinion,atvariance
withtheprinciplecontendedfor.ThecaseofGeorgev.Skivington,5andespeciallywhatissaidby
Cleasby,B.,ingivingjudgmentinthatcase,seemtosupporttheexistenceofthegeneralprinciple.
Butitisnotintermslaiddownthatanysuchprincipleexists,andthatcasewasdecidedby
Cleasby,B.,onthegroundthatthenegligenceofthedefendantwhichwashisownpersonal
negligencewasequivalent,forthepurposesofthataction,tofraud,onwhich(ashesaid)the
decisioninLangridgev.Levy 3wasbased.Indecliningtoconcurinlayingdowntheprinciple
enunciatedbytheMasteroftheRolls,Iinnowayintimateanydoubtastotheprinciplethat
anyonewholeavesadangerousinstrument,asagun,insuchawayastocausedanger,orwho
withoutduewarningsuppliestoothersforuseaninstrumentorthingwhichtohisknowledge,from
itsconstructionorotherwise,isinsuchaconditionastocausedanger,notnecessarilyincidentto
theuseofsuchaninstrumentorthing,isliableforinjurycausedtoothersbyreasonofhis
negligentact."
WiththeviewsexpressedbyCotton,L.J.,Iagree.
InLeLievrev.Gould6themortgageesoftheinterestofabuilderunderabuildingagreement
advancedmoneytohimfromtimetotimeonthefaithofcertificatesgivenbyasurveyorthat
certainspecifiedstagesintheprogressofthebuildingshadbeenreached.Thesurveyorwasnot
appointedbythemortgagees,andtherewasnocontractualrelationshipbetweenhimandthem.In
consequenceofthenegligenceofthesurveyorthecertificatescontaineduntruestatementsasto
theprogressofthebuildings,buttherewasnofraudonhispart.Itwasheldthatthesurveyorowed
nodutytothemortgageestoexercisecareingivinghiscertificates,andtheycouldnotmaintainan
actionagainsthimbyreasonofhisnegligence.InthiscaseLordEsherseemstohavequalifiedto
someextentwhathesaidinHeavenv.Pender,7forhesaysthis(atp.497):"Butcantheplaintiffs
relyuponnegligenceintheabsenceoffraud?Thequestionofliabilityfornegligencecannotariseat
alluntilitisestablishedthatthemanwhohasbeennegligentowedsomedutytothepersonwho
seekstomakehimliableforhisnegligence.Whatdutyistherewhenthereisnorelationbetween
thepartiesbycontract?Amanisentitledtobeasnegligentashepleasestowardsthewholeworld
ifheowesnodutytothem.ThecaseofHeavenv.Pender8hasnobearinguponthepresent

question.Thatcaseestablishedthat,undercertaincircumstances,onemanmayoweadutyto
anothereventhoughthereisnocontractbetweenthem.Ifonemanisneartoanother,oris
1(1858)8.E.&B.1035.
2(1868)L.R.,3C.P.495.
32M.&W.519.
46Ex.761.
5L.R.,5.Ex.1:
6[1893]1Q.B.491.
711Q.B.D.503,atp.509.
811Q.B.D.503.

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neartothepropertyofanother,adutyliesuponhimnottodothatwhichmaycauseapersonal
injurytothatother,ormayinjurehisproperty."InthatsamecaseA.L.Smith,L.J.,said(atp.
504):"ThedecisionofHeavenv.Pender1wasfoundedupontheprinciplethatadutytotakedue
caredidarisewhenthepersonorpropertyofonewasinsuchproximitytothepersonorpropertyof
anotherthat,ifduecarewasnottaken,damagemightbedonebytheonetotheother.Heavenv.
Pender1goesnofurtherthanthis,thoughitisoftencitedtosupportallkindsofuntenable
propositions."
InEarlv.Lubbock 2theplaintiffhadbeeninjuredbyawheelcomingoffavanwhichhewas
drivingforhisemployer,andwhichitwasthedutyofthedefendant,undercontractwiththe
employer,tokeepinrepair.TheCountyCourtjudgeandtheDivisionalCourtbothheldthat,evenif
negligencewasproved,theactionwouldnotlie.ItwasheldbytheAppealCourtthatthedefendant
wasundernodutytotheplaintiff,andthattherewasnocauseofaction.InhisjudgmentSir
RichardHennCollins,M.R.,saidthecasewasconcludedbytheauthorityofWinterbottomv.
Wright,3andhepointedoutthatthedictumofLordEsherinHeavenv.Pender1wasnotadecision
oftheCourt,andthatitwassubsequentlyqualifiedandexplainedbyLordEsherhimselfinLeLievre
v.Gould.4Stirling,L.J.,saidthat,inordertosucceedintheaction,theplaintiffmustbringhiscase
withinthepropositionenunciatedbyCotton,L.J.,andagreedtobyBowen,L.J.,inHeavenv.
Pender,1whileMathew,L.J.,madethefollowingobservation(atp.259):"Theargumentofcounsel
fortheplaintiffwasthatthedefendant'sservantshadbeennegligentintheperformanceofthe
contractwiththeownersofthevan,andthatitfollowedasamatteroflawthatanyoneintheir
employment,or,indeed,anyoneelsewhosustainedaninjurytraceabletothatnegligence,hada
causeofactionagainstthedefendant.Itisimpossibletoacceptsuchawideproposition,and,
indeed,itisdifficulttoseehow,ifitwerethelaw,tradecouldbecarriedon.Noprudentmanwould
contracttomakeorrepairwhattheemployerintendedtopermitotherstouseinthewayofhis
trade."
InBatesv.Batey&Co.5thedefendants,gingerbeermanufacturers,wereheldnotliabletoa
consumer(whohadpurchasedfromaretaileroneoftheirbottles)forinjuryoccasionedbythe
bottleburstingastheresultofadefectofwhichthedefendantsdidnotknow,butwhichbythe
exerciseofreasonablecaretheycouldhavediscovered.InreachingthisconclusionHorridge,J.,
statedthathethoughtthejudgmentsofClarke,B.,inLongmeidv.Holliday,6ofCotton,L.J.,and
Bowen,L.J.,inHeavenv.Pender,1ofStirling,L.J.,inEarlv.Lubbock,2andofHamilton,J.,in
Blackerv.Lake&Elliot,7madeitclearthattheplaintiffwasnotentitledtorecover,andthathehad
notfelthimselfboundbyGeorgev.Skivington.8
111Q.B.D.503.
2[1905]1K.B.253.
310M.&W.109.
4[1893]1Q.B.491.
5[1913]3K.B.351.
66Ex.761.
7106L.T.533.
8L.R.,5Ex.l.

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Sofar,therefore,asthecaseofGeorgev.Skivington1andthedictainHeavenv.Pender2are
concerned,itis,inmyopinion,betterthattheyshouldbeburiedsosecurelythattheirperturbed
spiritsshallnolongervexthelaw.
Onefurthercasementionedinargumentmaybereferredto,certainlynotbywayofauthority,
buttogainassistancebyconsideringhowsimilarcasesaredealtwithbyeminentjudgesofthe
UnitedStates.Thatsuchcasescanhavenocloseapplicationandnoauthorityisclear,foralthough
thesourceofthelawinthetwocountriesmaybethesame,itscurrentmaywellflowindifferent
channels.ThecasereferredtoisthatofThomasv.Winchester.3Thereachemistissuedpoisonin
answertoarequestforaharmlessdrug,andhewasheldresponsibletoathirdpartyinjuredbyhis
neglect.Itappearstomethatthedecisionmightwellrestontheprinciplethathe,infact,solda
drugdangerousinitself,nonethelesssobecausehewasaskedtosellsomethingelse,andonthis
viewthecasedoesnotadvancethematter.

InanothercaseofMacPhersonv.BuickMotorCo.,4whereamanufacturerofadefectivemotor
carwasheldliablefordamagesattheinstanceofathirdparty,thelearnedjudgeappearstobase
hisjudgmentontheviewthatamotorcarmightreasonablyberegardedasadangerousarticle.
Inmyview,therefore,theauthoritiesareagainsttheappellant'scontentionand,apartfrom
authority,itisdifficulttoseehowanycommonlawpropositioncanbeformulatedtosupporther
claim.
Theprinciplecontendedformustbethis,thatthemanufacturer,orindeedtherepairer,ofany
article,apartentirelyfromcontract,owesadutytoanypersonbywhomthearticleislawfullyused
toseethatithasbeencarefullyconstructed.Allrightsincontractmustbeexcludedfrom
considerationofthisprinciplesuchcontractualrightsasmayexistinsuccessivestepsfromthe
originalmanufacturerdowntotheultimatepurchaserareexhypothesiimmaterial.Norcanthe
doctrinebeconfinedtocaseswhereinspectionisdifficultorimpossibletointroduce.This
conceptionissimplytomisapplytotortdoctrineapplicabletosaleandpurchase.
Theprincipleoftortliescompletelyoutsidetheregionwheresuchconsiderationsapply,andthe
duty,ifitexists,mustextendtoeverypersonwho,inlawfulcircumstances,usesthearticlemade.
Therecanbenospecialdutyattachingtothemanufactureoffoodapartfromthatimpliedby
contractorimposedbystatute.Ifsuchadutyexists,itseemstomeitmustcovertheconstruction
ofeveryarticle,andIcannotseeanyreasonwhyitshouldnotapplytotheconstructionofahouse.
Ifonestep,whynotfifty?Yetifahousebe,asitsometimesis,negligentlybuilt,andin
consequenceofthatnegligencetheceilingfallsandinjurestheoccupieroranyoneelse,noaction
againstthebuilderexistsaccordingtotheEnglishlaw,althoughIbelievesucharightdidexist
1L.R5Ex.1.
211Q.B.D.503.
357Amer,Dec.455,6N.Y.R.397.
4(1916)217N.Y.R.382,Ann.Cas.1916C.440.

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accordingtothelawsofBabylon.Weresuchaprincipleknownandrecognised,itseemstome
impossible,havingregardtothenumerouscasesthatmusthavearisentopersonsinjuredbyits
disregard,that,withtheexceptionofGeorgev.Skivington,1nocasedirectlyinvolvingtheprinciple
haseversucceededintheCourts,and,wereitwellknownandaccepted,muchofthediscussionof
theearliercaseswouldhavebeenwasteoftime,andthedistinctionastoarticlesdangerousin
themselvesorknowntobedangeroustothevendorwouldbemeaningless.
InMullenv.Barr&Co.,2acaseindistinguishablefromthepresentexceptingupontheground
thatamouseisnotasnail,andnecessarilyadoptedbytheSecondDivisionintheirjudgment,Lord
Andersonsaysthis(atp.479):"Inacaselikethepresent,wherethegoodsofthedefendersare
widelydistributedthroughoutScotland,itwouldseemlittleshortofoutrageoustomakethem
responsibletomembersofthepublicfortheconditionofthecontentsofeverybottlewhichissues
fromtheirworks.Itisobviousthat,ifsuchresponsibilityattachedtothedefenders,theymightbe
calledontomeetclaimsofdamageswhichtheycouldnotpossiblyinvestigateoranswer."In
agreeing,asIdo,withthejudgmentofLordAnderson,IdesiretoaddthatIfindithardtodissent
fromtheemphaticnatureofthelanguagewithwhichhisjudgmentisclothed.
Iamofopinionthatthisappealshouldbedismissed,andIbegtomoveyourLordships
accordingly.
LORDATKIN.Thesolequestionfordeterminationinthiscaseislegal.Dotheavermentsmade
bythepursuerinherpleadings,iftrue,discloseacauseofaction?Ineednotrestatetheparticular
facts.Thequestioniswhetherthemanufacturerofanarticleofdrinksoldbyhimtoadistributor,in
circumstanceswhichpreventthedistributorortheultimatepurchaserorconsumerfromdiscovering
byinspectionanydefect,isunderanylegaldutytotheultimatepurchaserorconsumertotake
reasonablecarethatthearticleisfreefromdefectlikelytocauseinjurytohealth.Idonotthinka
moreimportantproblemhasoccupiedyourLordshipsinyourjudicialcapacity,importantboth
becauseofitsbearingonpublichealthandbecauseofthepracticaltestwhichitappliestothe
systemunderwhichitarises.ThecasehastobedeterminedinaccordancewithScotslaw,butit
hasbeenamatterofagreementbetweentheexperiencedcounselwhoarguedthiscase,andit
appearstobethebasisofthejudgmentsofthelearnedjudgesoftheCourtofSession,that,forthe
purposesofdeterminingthisproblem,thelawsofScotlandand,ofEnglandarethesame.Ispeak
withlittleauthorityonthispoint,butmyownresearch,suchasitis,satisfiesmethattheprinciples
ofthelawofScotlandonsuchaquestionasthepresentareidenticalwiththoseofEnglishlaw,and
Idiscusstheissueonthatfooting.Thelawofbothcountriesappearstobethat,inordertosupport
anactionfordamagesfornegligence,thecomplainanthastoshowthathehasbeeninjuredbythe
breachofadutyowedtohiminthecircumstancesbythedefendanttotakereasonablecareto
avoidsuchinjury.Inthepresent
1L.R.,5Ex.1.
21929S.C.461.

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Atkin
casewearenotconcernedwiththebreachofthedutyifadutyexists,thatwouldbeaquestionof
factwhichissufficientlyaverredandforpresentpurposesmustbeassumed.Wearesolely
concernedwiththequestionwhether,asamatteroflawinthecircumstancesalleged,thedefender
owedanydutytothepursuertotakecare.
ItisremarkablehowdifficultitistofindintheEnglishauthoritiesstatementsofgeneral
applicationdefiningtherelationsbetweenpartiesthatgiverisetotheduty.TheCourtsare
concernedwiththeparticularrelationswhichcomebeforetheminactuallitigation,anditis
sufficienttosaywhetherthedutyexistsinthosecircumstances.TheresultisthattheCourtshave
beenengageduponanelaborateclassificationofdutiesastheyexistinrespectofproperty,
whetherrealorpersonal,withfurtherdivisionsastoownership,occupation,orcontrol,and
distinctionsbasedontheparticularrelationsoftheonesideortheother,whethermanufacturer,
salesmanorlandlord,customer,tenant,stranger,andsoon.Inthiswayitcanbeascertainedat
anytimewhetherthelawrecognisesaduty,butonlywherethecasecanbereferredtosome
particularspecieswhichhasbeenexaminedandclassified.Andyetthedutywhichiscommontoall
thecaseswhereliabilityisestablishedmustlogicallybebaseduponsomeelementcommontothe
caseswhereitisfoundtoexist.Toseekacompletelogicaldefinitionofthegeneralprincipleis
probablytogobeyondthefunctionofthejudge,forthemoregeneralthedefinitionthemorelikely
itistoomitessentialsortointroducenonessentials.TheattemptwasmadebyBrett,M.R.,in
Heavenv.Pender,1inadefinitiontowhichIwilllaterrefer.Asframed,itwasdemonstrablytoo
wide,althoughitappearstome,ifproperlylimited,tobecapableofaffordingavaluablepractical
guide.
AtpresentIcontentmyselfwithpointingoutthatinEnglishlawtheremustbe,andis,some
generalconceptionofrelationsgivingrisetoadutyofcare,ofwhichtheparticularcasesfoundin
thebooksarebutinstances.Theliabilityfornegligence,whetheryoustyleitsuchortreatitasin
othersystemsasaspeciesof"culpa,"isnodoubtbaseduponageneralpublicsentimentofmoral
wrongdoingforwhichtheoffendermustpay.Butactsoromissionswhichanymoralcodewould
censurecannot,inapracticalworld,betreatedsoastogivearighttoeverypersoninjuredby
themtodemandrelief.Inthiswayrulesoflawarisewhichlimittherangeofcomplainantsandthe
extentoftheirremedy.Therulethatyouaretoloveyourneighbourbecomesinlaw,youmustnot
injureyourneighbourandthelawyer'squestion,Whoismyneighbour?receivesarestrictedreply.
Youmusttakereasonablecaretoavoidactsoromissionswhichyoucanreasonablyforeseewould
belikelytoinjureyourneighbour.Who,then,inlaw,ismyneighbour?Theanswerseemstobe
personswhoaresocloselyanddirectlyaffectedbymyactthatIoughtreasonablytohavethemin
contemplationasbeingsoaffectedwhenIamdirectingmymindtotheactsoromissionswhichare
calledinquestion.ThisappearstometobethedoctrineofHeavenv.Pender1aslaiddownbyLord
Esher(thenBrett,M.R.),whenitis
111Q.B.D.503,atp.509.

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limitedbythenotionofproximityintroducedbyLordEsherhimselfandA.L.Smith,L.J.,inLe
Lievrev.Gould.1LordEshersays([1893]1Q.B.atp.497):"Thatcaseestablishedthat,under
certaincircumstances,onemanmayoweadutytoanother,eventhoughthereisnocontract
betweenthem.Ifonemanisneartoanother,orisneartothepropertyofanother,adutyliesupon
himnottodothatwhichmaycauseapersonalinjurytothatother,ormayinjurehisproperty."So
A.L.Smith,L.J.,(atp.504):"ThedecisionofHeavenv.Pender2wasfoundedupontheprinciple
thatadutytotakeduecaredidarisewhenthepersonorpropertyofonewasinsuchproximityto
thepersonorpropertyofanotherthat,ifduecarewasnottaken,damagemightbedonebytheone
totheother."Ithinkthatthissufficientlystatesthetruth,ifproximitybenotconfinedtomere
physicalproximity,butbeused,asIthinkitwasintended,toextendtosuchcloseanddirect
relationsthattheactcomplainedofdirectlyaffectsapersonwhomthepersonallegedtobebound
totakecarewouldknowwouldbedirectlyaffectedbyhisact.Thatthisisthesenseinwhich
nearnessor"proximity"wasintendedbyLordEsherisobviousfromhisownillustrationinHeavenv.
Pender3oftheapplicationofhisdoctrinetothesaleofgoods."This"(i.e.,therulehehasjust
formulated)"includesthecaseofgoods,etc.,suppliedtobeusedimmediatelybyaparticular
personorpersons,oroneofaclassofpersons,whereitwouldbeobvioustothepersonsupplying,
ifhethought,thatthegoodswouldinallprobabilitybeusedatoncebysuchpersonsbeforea
reasonableopportunityfordiscoveringanydefectwhichmightexist,andwherethethingsupplied
wouldbeofsuchanaturethataneglectofordinarycareorskillastoitsconditionorthemannerof
supplyingitwouldprobablycausedangertothepersonorpropertyofthepersonforwhoseuseit
wassupplied,andwhowasabouttouseit.Itwouldexcludeacaseinwhichthegoodsaresupplied
undercircumstancesinwhichitwouldbeachancebywhomtheywouldbeusedorwhetherthey
wouldbeusedornot,orwhethertheywouldbeusedbeforetherewouldprobablybemeansof
observinganydefect,orwherethegoodswouldbeofsuchanaturethatawantofcareorskillas
totheirconditionorthemannerofsupplyingthemwouldnotprobablyproducedangerofinjuryto
personorproperty."IdrawparticularattentiontothefactthatLordEsheremphasizesthenecessity
ofgoodshavingtobe"usedimmediately"and"usedatoncebeforeareasonableopportunityof
inspection."Thisisobviouslytoexcludethepossibilityofgoodshavingtheirconditionalteredby
lapseoftime,andtocallattentiontotheproximaterelationship,whichmaybetooremotewhere
inspectionevenofthepersonusing,certainlyofanintermediateperson,mayreasonablybe

interposed.WiththisnecessaryqualificationofproximaterelationshipasexplainedinLeLievrev.
Gould,1IthinkthejudgmentofLordEsherexpressesthelawofEnglandwithoutthequalification,I
thinkthemajorityoftheCourtinHeavenv.Pender2werejustifiedinthinkingtheprinciplewas
expressedintoogeneralterms.
1[1893]lQ.B.491.
211Q.B.D.503.
311Q.B.D.503,atp.510.

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Therewillnodoubtarisecaseswhereitwillbedifficulttodeterminewhetherthecontemplated
relationshipissoclosethatthedutyarises.ButintheclassofcasenowbeforetheCourtIcannot
conceiveanydifficultytoarise.Amanufacturerputsupanarticleoffoodinacontainerwhichhe
knowswillbeopenedbytheactualconsumer.Therecanbenoinspectionbyanypurchaser,andno
reasonablepreliminaryinspectionbytheconsumer.Negligently,inthecourseofpreparation,he
allowsthecontentstobemixedwithpoison.ItissaidthatthelawofEnglandandScotlandisthat
thepoisonedconsumerhasnoremedyagainstthenegligentmanufacturer.Ifthisweretheresultof
theauthorities,Ishouldconsidertheresultagravedefectinthelaw,andsocontrarytoprinciple
thatIshouldhesitatelongbeforefollowinganydecisiontothateffectwhichhadnottheauthority
ofthisHouse.Iwouldpointoutthat,intheassumedstateoftheauthorities,notonlywouldthe
consumerhavenoremedyagainstthemanufacturer,hewouldhavenoneagainstanyoneelsefor,
inthecircumstancesalleged,therewouldbenoevidenceofnegligenceagainstanyoneotherthan
themanufacturer,and,exceptinthecaseofaconsumerwhowasalsoapurchaser,nocontractand
nowarrantyoffitness,and,inthecaseofthepurchaseofaspecificarticleunderitspatentortrade
name(whichmightwellbethecaseinthepurchaseofsomearticlesoffoodordrink),nowarranty
protectingeventhepurchaserconsumer.Thereareotherinstancesthanthoseofarticlesoffood
anddrinkwheregoodsaresoldintendedtobeusedimmediatelybytheconsumer,suchasmany
formsofgoodssoldforcleaningpurposes,wherethesameliabilitymustexist.Thedoctrine
supportedbythedecisionbelowwouldnotonlydenyaremedytotheconsumerwhowasinjuredby
consumingbottledbeerorchocolatespoisonedbythenegligenceofthemanufacturer,butalsoto
theuserofwhatshouldbeaharmlessproprietarymedicine,anointment,asoap,acleaningfluidor
cleaningpowder.Iconfinemyselftoarticlesofcommonhouseholduse,whereeveryone,including
themanufacturer,knowsthatthearticleswillbeusedbyotherpersonsthantheactualultimate
purchasernamely,bymembersofhisfamilyandhisservants,andinsomecaseshisguests.Ido
notthinksoillofourjurisprudenceastosupposethatitsprinciplesaresoremotefromtheordinary
needsofcivilizedsocietyandtheordinaryclaimsitmakesuponitsmembersastodenyalegal
remedywherethereissoobviouslyasocialwrong.
Itwillbefound,Ithink,onexaminationthatthereisnocaseinwhichthecircumstanceshave
beensuchasIhavejustsuggestedwheretheliabilityhasbeennegatived.Therearenumerous
cases,wheretherelationsweremuchmoreremote,wherethedutyhasbeenheldnottoexist.
Therearealsodictainsuchcaseswhichgofurtherthanwasnecessaryforthedeterminationofthe
particularissues,whichhavecausedthedifficultyexperiencedbytheCourtsbelow.Iventuretosay
that,inthebranchofthelawwhichdealswithcivilwrongs,dependentinEnglandatanyrate
entirelyupontheapplicationbyjudgesofgeneralprinciplesalsoformulatedbyjudges,itisof
particularimportancetoguardagainstthedangerofstatingpropositionsoflawinwidertermsthan
isnecessary,lestessentialfactorsbeomittedinthewidersurvey,
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andtheinherentadaptabilityofEnglishlawbeundulyrestricted.Forthisreasonitisvery
necessary,inconsideringreportedcasesinthelawoftorts,thattheactualdecisionaloneshould
carryauthorityproperweight,ofcourse,beinggiventothedictaofthejudges.
Inmyopinionseveraldecidedcasessupporttheviewthat,insuchacaseasthepresent,the
manufacturerowesadutytotheconsumertobecareful.AdirectauthorityisGeorgev.
Skivington.1Thatwasadecisiononademurrertoadeclarationwhichaverredthatthedefendant
professedtosellahairwashmadebyhimself,andthattheplaintiffJosephGeorgeboughtabottle,
tobeusedbyhiswife,theplaintiffEmmaGeorge,asthedefendantthenknew,andthatthe
defendanthadsonegligentlyconductedhimselfinpreparingandsellingthehairwashthatitwas
unfitforuse,wherebythefemaleplaintiffwasinjured.Kelly,C.B.,said(atp.3)thattherewasno
questionofwarranty,butwhetherthechemistwasliableinanactiononthecaseforunskilfulness
andnegligenceinthemanufactureofit."Unquestionablytherewassuchadutytowardsthe
purchaser,anditextends,inmyjudgment,tothepersonforwhoseusethevendorknewthe
compoundwaspurchased."Pigott,B.,andCleasby,B.,puttheirjudgmentsonthesameground.I
venturetothinkthatCotton,L.J.,inHeavenv.Pender,2misinterpretsCleasby,B.'s,judgmentin
thereferencetoLangridgev.Levy.3Cleasby,B.,appearstometomakeitplainthatinhisopinion
thedutytotakereasonablecarecanbesubstitutedforthedutywhichexistedinLangridgev.Levy 3
nottodefraud.ItisworthnoticingthatGeorgev.Skivington1wasreferredtobyCleasby,B.,
himself,sittingasamemberoftheCourtofExchequerChamberinFrancisv.Cockrell,4andwas
recognisedbyhimasbasedonanordinarydutytotakecare.ItwasalsoaffirmedbyBrett,M.R.,in
Cunningtonv.GreatNorthernRailwayCo.,5decidedon2ndJulyatadatebetweentheargument

andthejudgmentinHeavenv.Pender,6although,asinthatcasetheCourtnegativedanybreachof
duty,theexpressionofopinionisnotauthoritative.
TheexistenceofthedutycontendedforisalsosupportedbyHawkinsv.Smith,7whereadock
labourerintheemployofthedockcompanywasinjuredbyadefectivesack,whichhadbeenhired
bytheconsigneesfromthedefendant,whoknewtheusetowhichitwastobeput,andhadbeen
providedbytheconsigneesfortheuseofthedockcompanywhohadbeenemployedbythemto
unloadtheshiponthedockcompany'spremises.TheDivisionalCourt,Day,J.,andLawrance,J.,
heldthedefendantliablefornegligence.
Similarly,inElliottv.Hall,8thedefendants,collieryowners,consignedcoaltotheplaintiff's
employers,coalmerchants,inatruckhiredbythedefendantsfromawagoncompany.Theplaintiff
wasinjuredintheCourseofunloadingthecoalbyreasonofthedefectiveconditionofthe
1L.R.,5Ex.1.
211Q.B.D.503,atp.517.
34M.&W.337.
4L.R.,5Q.B.501,atp.515.
5(1883)49L.T.392.
611Q.B.D.503.
7(1896)12T.L.R.532.
8(1885)15Q.B.D.315.

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truck,andwasheldbyaDivisionalCourt(Grove,J.,andA.L.Smith,J.)entitledtorecoveronthe
groundofthedefendants'breachofdutytoseethatthetruckwasnotinadangerouscondition.It
istobenoticedthatinneithercasewasthedefectivechattelinthedefendants'occupation,
possession,orcontrol,orontheirpremises,whileinthelattercaseitwasnoteventheirproperty.
Itissometimessaidthattheliabilityinthesecasesdependsuponaninvitationbythedefendantto
theplaintifftousehischattel.Idonotfindthedecisionsexpressedtobebaseduponthisground,
butratherupontheknowledgethattheplantiffinthecourseofthecontemplateduseofthechattel
woulduseitandthesupposedinvitationappearstometobeinmanycasesafiction,andmerelya
formofexpressingthedirectrelationbetweenthesupplieranduserwhichgivesrisetothedutyto
takecare.
AveryrecentcasewhichhastheauthorityofthisHouseisOliverv.Saddler&Co.1Inthatcase
afirmofstevedoresemployedtounloadacargoofmaizeinbagsprovidedtheropeslingsbywhich
thecargowasraisedtotheship'sdeckbytheirownmenusingtheship'stackle,andthen
transportedtothedocksidebytheshoreporters,ofwhomthepursuerwasone.Theportersrelied
onexaminationbythestevedores,andhadthemselvesnoopportunityofexamination.Inthese
circumstancesthisHouse,reversingthedecisionoftheFirstDivision,heldthattherewasaduty
owedbythestevedorecompanytotheporterstoseethattheslingswerefitforuse,andrestored
thejudgmentoftheLord,Ordinary,LordMorison,infavourofthepursuer.Ifindnotraceofthe
doctrineofinvitationintheopinionsexpressedinthisHouse,ofwhichminewasonethedecision
wasbaseduponthefactthatthedirectrelationsestablished,especiallythecircumstancethatthe
injuredporterhadnoopportunityofindependentexamination,gaverisetoadutytobecareful.
IshouldnotomitinthisreviewofcasesthedecisioninGrotev.ChesterandHolyheadRailway.2
Thatwasanactiononthecase,inwhichitwasallegedthatthedefendantshadconstructeda
bridgeovertheDeeontheirrailwayandhadlicensedtheuseofthebridgetotheShrewsburyand
ChesterRailwaytocarrypassengersoverit,andhadsonegligentlyconstructedthebridgethatthe
plaintiff,apassengerofthelastnamedrailway,hadbeeninjuredbythefallingofthebridge.Atthe
trialbeforeVaughanWilliams,J.,thejudgehaddirectedthejurythattheplaintiffwasentitledto
recoverifthebridgewasnotconstructedwithreasonablecareandskill.Onamotionforanewtrial
theAttorneyGeneral(SirJohnJervis)contendedthattherewasmisdirection,forthedefendants
wereonlyliablefornegligence,andthejurymighthaveunderstoodthattherewasanabsolute
liability.TheCourtofExchequer,afterconsultingthetrialjudgeastohisdirection,refusedtherule.
ThiscaseissaidbyKelly,C.B.,inFrancisv.Cockrell,3intheExchequerChamber,tohavebeen
decideduponanimpliedcontractwitheverypersonlawfullyusingthebridgethatitwasreasonably
fitforthe
11929S.C.(H.L.)94,[1929]A.C.584.
2(1848)2Ex.251.
3L.R.,5Q.B.501,atp.505.

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purpose.Icanfindnotraceofsuchagroundinthepleadingorintheargumentorjudgment.Itis
truethatthedefendantsweretheownersandoccupiersofthebridge.Thelawastotheliabilityto
inviteesandlicenseeshadnotthenbeendeveloped.Thecaseisinteresting,becauseitisasimple
actiononthecasefornegligence,andtheCourtupheldthedutytopersonsusingthebridgetotake
reasonablecarethatthebridgewassafe.

ItnowbecomesnecessarytoconsiderthecaseswhichhavebeenreferredtointheCourtsbelow
aslayingdownthepropositionthatnodutytotakecareisowedtotheconsumerinsuchacaseas
this.
InDixonv.Bell 1thedefendanthadleftaloadedgunathislodgingsandsenthisservant,a
mulattogirlagedaboutthirteenorfourteen,forthegun,askingthelandlordtoremovethepriming
andgivetheguntoher.Thelandlorddidremovetheprimingandgavetheguntothegirl,wholater
levelleditattheplaintiff'ssmallson,drewthetriggerandinjuredtheboy.Theactionwasincase
fornegligentlyentrustingtheyoungservantwiththegun.ThejuryatthetrialbeforeLordEllen
boroughhadreturnedaverdictfortheplaintiff.AmotionbySirWilliamGarrow(AttorneyGeneral)
foranewtrialwasdismissedbytheCourt,LordEllenboroughandBayley,J.,theformerremarking
thatitwasincumbentonthedefendant,whobychargingthegunhadmadeitcapableofdoing
mischief,torenderitsafeandinnocuous.
InLangridgev.Levy 2theactionwasincase,andthedeclarationallegedthatthedefendant,by
falselyandfraudulentlywarrantingaguntohavebeenmadebyNockandtobeagood,safe,and
securegun,soldtheguntotheplaintiff'sfatherfortheuseofhimselfandhissons,andthatoneof
hissons,confidinginthewarranty,usedthegun,whichburstandinjuredhim.Pleanotguiltyand
nowarrantyasalleged.Thereportisnotverysatisfactory.Noevidenceisreportedofanywarranty
orstatementexceptthatthegunwasaneleganttwistgunbyNock.Thejudgelefttothejury
whetherthedefendanthadwarrantedtheguntobebyNockandtobesafewhetheritwasinfact
unsafeandwhetherthedefendantwarrantedittobesafeknowingthatitwasnotso.Thejury
returnedageneralverdictfortheplaintiff.Itappearstohavebeenarguedthattheplaintiffcould
recoverwhereverthereisabreachofdutyimposedonthedefendantbycontractorotherwise,and
theplaintiffisinjuredbyreasonofitsbreachbythisismeantapparentlythatthedutyneednotbe
owedtotheplaintiff,butthathecantakeadvantageofthebreachofadutyowedtoathirdparty.
ThiscontentionwasnegativedbytheCourt,whoheld,however,thattheplaintiffcouldrecoverifa
representationknowntobefalsewasmadetoathirdpersonwiththeintentionthatachattelshould
beusedbytheplaintiff,eventhoughitdoesnotappearthatthedefendantintendedthefalse
representationtobecommunicatedtohimseeperParke,B.,2M.&W.atp.531.Thesameview
wasadoptedbytheExchequerChamber,theuserbytheplaintiffbeingtreatedbytheCourtasone
oftheactscontemplatedbythefraudulentdefendant.Itisunnecessarytoconsider
1,5M.&S.198.
22M.&W.519,4M.&W.337.

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whetherthepropositioncanbesupportedinitswidestform.Itissufficienttosaythatthecasewas
based,asIthink,inthepleading,andcertainlyinthejudgment,onthegroundoffraud,andit
appearstoaddnothingofvaluepositivelyornegativelytothepresentdiscussion.
Winterbottomv.Wright1wasacasedecidedonademurrer.Theplaintiffhaddemurredtotwoof
thepleas,astowhichtherewasnodecisionbytheCourtbut,onthehearingoftheplaintiff's
demurrer,theCourt,inaccordancewiththepracticeoftheday,wereentitledtoconsiderthewhole
record,includingthedeclaration,and,comingtotheconclusionthatthisdeclarationdisclosedno
causeofaction,gavejudgmentforthedefendantseeSutton'sPersonalActionsatCommonLaw,p.
113.Theadvantageoftheprocedureisthatweareinapositiontoknowthepreciseissueatlaw
whicharosefordetermination.Thedeclarationwasincase,andallegedthatthedefendanthad
contractedwiththePostmasterGeneraltoprovidethemailcoachtoconveymailsfromHartfordto
Holyhead,andtokeepthemailsinsafeconditionthatAtkinsonandothers,withnoticeofthesaid
contract,hadcontractedwiththePostmasterGeneraltoconveytheroadmailcoachfromHartford
toHolyheadandthattheplaintiff,relyingonthesaidfirstcontract,hiredhimselftoAtkinsonto
drivethemailcoachbutthatthedefendantsonegligentlyconductedhimselfandsoutterly
disregardedhisaforesaidcontractthedefendanthavingthemeansofknowing,andwellknowing,
alltheaforesaidpremisesthatthemailcoach,beinginadangerousconditionowingtocertain
latentdefectsandtonoothercause,gaveway,wherebytheplaintiffwasthrownfromhisseatand
injured.Itistobeobservedthatnonegligence,apartfrombreachofcontract,wasallegedinother
words,nodutywasallegedotherthanthedutyarisingoutofthecontractitisnotstatedthatthe
defendantknew,oroughttohaveknown,ofthelatentdefect.Theargumentofthedefendantwas
that,onthefaceofthedeclaration,thewrongarosemerelyoutofthebreachofacontract,and
thatonlyapartytothecontractcouldsue.TheCourtofExchequeradoptedthatview,asclearly
appearsfromthejudgmentsofAlderson,B.,andRolfe,B.TherearedictabyLordAbingerwhichare
toowide,astoanactionofnegligencebeingconfinedtocasesofbreachofapublicduty.The
actualdecisionappearstohavebeenmanifestlyrightnodutytotheplaintiffaroseoutofthe
contractandthedutyofthedefendantunderthecontractwiththePostmasterGeneraltoputthe
coachingoodrepaircouldnothaveinvolvedsuchdirectrelationswiththeservantofthepersons
whomthePostmasterGeneralemployedtodrivethecoachaswouldgiverisetoadutyofcare
owedtosuchservant.
WenowcometoLongmeidv.Holliday,2thedictainwhichhavehadconsiderableeffectin
subsequentdecisions.Inthatcasethedeclarationincaseallegedthattheplaintiff,Frederick
Longmeid,hadboughtfromthedefendant,themakerandsellerof"theHollidaylamp,"alampto
beusedbyhimselfandhiswife,Eliza,intheplaintiff'sshopthatthe
110M.&W.109.

26Ex.761.

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defendantinducedthesalebythefalseandfraudulentwarrantythatthelampwasreasonablyfitfor
thepurposeandthattheplaintiffEliza,confidinginthesaidwarranty,lightedthelamp,which
exploded,wherebyshewasinjured.Itisperhapsnotanextravagantguesstosupposethatthe
plaintiffs'pleaderhadreadthecaseofLangridgev.Levy.1Thejuryfoundallthefactsforthe
plaintiffsexcepttheallegationoffraudtheywerenotsatisfiedthatthedefendantknewofthe
defects.TheplaintiffFrederickhadalreadyrecovereddamagesonthecontractofsaleforbreachof
theimpliedwarrantyoffitness.Thedeclarationmadenoavermentofnegligence.Verdictwas
enteredatthetrialbyMartin,B.,fortheplaintiffs,butwithlibertytothedefendanttomoveto
entertheverdictforhim.Arulehavingbeenobtained,plaintiffs'counselsoughttosupportthe
verdictonthegroundthatthiswasandaction,notforabreachofdutyarisingsolelyfromcontract,
butforaninjuryresultingfromconductamountingtofraud.Parke,B.,whodeliveredthejudgment
oftheCourt,heldthat,fraudhavingbeennegatived,theactioncouldnotbemaintainedonthat
ground.Hethenwentontodiscusscasesinwhichathirdpersonnotapartytoacontractmaysue
fordamagessustainedifitisbroken.Afterdealingwiththenegligenceofasurgeon,orofacarrier,
oroffirminbreachofcontractcommittinganuisanceonahighway,hedealswiththeoasewhere
anyonedeliverstoanotherwithoutnoticeaninstrumentinitsnaturedangerous,orunderparticular
circumstances,asaloadedgun,andreferstoDixonv.Bell,2althoughwhatthiscasehastodowith
contractitisdifficulttosee.Hethengoeson(atp.768):"Butitwouldbegoingmuchtoofarto
say,thatsomuchcareisrequiredintheordinaryintercourseoflifebetweenoneindividualand
another,that,ifamachinenotinitsnaturedangerousacarriageforinstancebutwhichmight
becomesobyalatentdefectentirelyunknown,althoughdiscoverablebytheexerciseofordinary
care,shouldbelentorgivenbyoneperson,evenbythepersonwhomanufacturedit,toanother,
theformershouldbeanswerabletothelatterforasubsequentdamageaccruingbuytheuseofit."
Itisworthnoticinghowguardedthisdictumis.Thecaseputisamachinesuchasacarriage,notin
itsnaturedangerous,whichmightbecomedangerousbyalatentdefectentirelyunknown.Then
thereisthesaving,"althoughdiscoverablebytheexerciseofordinarycare,"discoverablebywhom
isnotsaiditmayincludethepersontowhomtheinnocentmachineis"lentorgiven."Thenthe
dictumisconfinedtomachines"lentorgiven"(alatersentencemakesitclearthatadistinctionis
intendedbetweenthesewordsand"deliveredtothepurchaserunderthecontractofsale"),andthe
manufacturerisintroducedforthefirsttime,"evenbythepersonwhomanufacturedit."Idonotfor
amomentbelievethatParke,B.,hadinhismindsuchacaseasaloafnegligentlymixedwith
poisonbythebakerwhichpoisonedapurchaser'sfamily.Heis,inmyopinion,confininghis
remarksprimarilytocaseswhereapersonisseekingtorelyuponadutyofcarewhicharisesoutof
acontractwithathirdparty,andhasneverevendiscussedthecaseofamanufacturernegligently
12M.&W.519,4M.&W.337.
25M.&S.198.

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causinganarticletobedangerousandsellingitinthatconditionwhetherwithimmediateor
mediateeffectupontheconsumer.Itisnoteworthythatheonlyrefersto"lettingorgetting"
chattels,operationsknowntothelaw,wherethespecialrelationstherebycreatedhaveaparticular
bearingontheexistenceornonexistenceofadutytotakecare.
NextinthischainofauthoritycomeGeorgev.Skivington1andHeavenv.Pender,2whichIhave
alreadydiscussed.
ThenextcaseisEarlv.Lubbock.3TheplaintiffsuedintheCountyCourtforpersonalinjuriesdue
tothenegligenceofthedefendant.Theplaintiffwasadriverintheemployofafirmwhoowned
vans.Thedefendant,amasterwheelwright,hadcontractedwiththefirmtokeeptheirvansingood
andsubstantialrepair.Theallegationofnegligencewasthatthedefendant'sservanthad
negligentlyfailedtoinspectandrepairadefectivewheel,andhadnegligentlyrepairedthewheel.
ThelearnedCountyCourtjudgehadheldthatthedefendantowednodutytotheplaintiff,andthe
DivisionalCourt(LordAlverstone,C.J.,Wills,J.,andKennedy,J.),andtheCourtofAppeal,agreed
withhim.TheMasteroftheRolls,SirR.HennCollins,saidthatthecasewasconcludedby
Winterbottomv.Wright.4Inotherwords,hemusthavetreatedthedutyasallegedtoariseonly
fromabreachofcontractfor,ashasbeenpointedout,thatwastheonlyallegationin
Winterbottomv.Wright,4negligenceapartfromcontractbeingneitheraverrednorproved.Itistrue
thatheciteswithapprovalthedictaofLordAbingerinthatcasebutobviouslyIthinkhisapproval
mustbelimitedtothosedictasofarastheyrelatedtotheparticularfactsbeforetheCourtof
Appeal,andtocaseswhere,asLordAbingersays,thelawpermitsacontracttobeturnedintoa
tort.Stirling,L.J.,itistrue,saidthattosucceedtheplaintiffmustbringhiscasewithinthe
propositionofthemajorityinHeavenv.Pender,2thatanyonewho,withoutduewarning,suppliesto
othersforuseaninstrumentwhichtohisknowledgeisinsuchaconditionastocausedangeris
liableforinjury.IventuretothinkthattheLordJusticeismistakenlytreatingapropositionwhich
appliesonetestofadutyasthoughitaffordedtheonlycriterion.Mathew,L.J.,appearstometo
putthecaseonitsproperfootingwhenhesays(atp.259)thattheargumentoftheplaintiffwas
thatthedefendant'sservantshadbeennegligentintheperformanceofthecontractwiththeowners

ofthevan,andthatitfollowedasamatteroflawthatanyoneinthisemploymenthadacauseof
actionagainstthedefendant."Itisimpossibletoacceptsuchawideproposition,and,indeed,itis
difficulttoseehow,ifitwerethelaw,tradecouldbecarriedon."Ientirelyagree.Ihavenodoubt
thatinthatcasetheplaintifffailedtoshowthattherepairerowedanydutytohim.Thequestionof
lawinthatcaseseemsverydifferentfromthatraisedinthepresentcase.
ThecaseofBlackerv.Lake&Elliot5approachesmorenearlythefactsofthiscase.Ihaveread
andrereadit,havingunfeignedrespectfortheauthorityofthetwolearnedjudges,Hamilton,J.,
andLush,J.,who
1L.R.,5Ex.1
211Q.B.D.503.
3[1905]1K.B.253.
410M.&W.109.
5106L.T.533.

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decidedit,andIamboundtosayIhavefounddifficultyinformulatingtheprecisegroundsupon
whichthejudgmentwasgiven.Theplaintiffhadbeeninjuredbytheburstingofabrazinglamp
whichhehadboughtfromashopkeeperwhohadboughtitfromthemanufacturer,thedefendant.
Theplaintiffhadusedthelampfortwelvemonthsbeforetheaccident.Thecasewastriedinthe
CountryCourtbeforethatexcellentlawyerthelateSirHowlandRoberts.Thatlearnedjudgehad
directedthejurythattheplaintiffcouldsucceedifthedefendantshadputuponthemarketalamp
notfitforuseinthesensethatapersonworkingitwithreasonablecarewouldincurariskwhicha
properlyconstructedlampwouldnotimposeuponhim.Thejuryfoundthatthelampwasdefective
byreasonofanimpropersystemofmakinganessentialjointbetweenthecontainerandthe
vaporizerthatthedefendantsdidnotknowthatitwasdangerous,butoughtasreasonablemento
haveknownit.Hamilton,J.,seemstohavethoughtthattherewasnoevidenceofnegligenceinthis
respect.Lush,J.,expresslysaysso,andimplies"Ialsothink"thatHamilton,J.,sothought.Ifso,
thecaseresolvesitselfintoaseriesofimportantdicta.Hamilton,J.,says1thatithasbeendecided
inauthoritiesfromWinterbottomv.Wright2toEarlv.Lubbock 3thatthebreachofthedefendants'
contractwithA,tousecareandskillinandaboutthemanufactureorrepairofanarticle,doesnot
itselfgiveanycauseofactiontoBwheninjuredbythearticleprovingtobedefectiveinbreachof
thatcontract.Hethengoesontosay,Howisthecaseoftheplaintiffsanybetterwhenthereisno
contractprovedofwhichtherecouldbeabreach?Ithink,withrespectthatthissayingdoesnot
givesufficientweighttotheactualissuesraisedbythepleadingonwhichalonetheoldercasesare
anauthority.Iftheissueraisedwasanallegeddutycreatedbycontract,itwouldhavebeen
irrelevanttoconsiderdutiescreatedwithoutreferencetocontractandcontractcasesceasetobe
authoritiesfordutiesallegedtoexistbeyondorwithoutcontract.Moreover,itisamistaketo
describetheauthoritiesasdealingwiththefailureofcareandskillinthemanufactureofgoods,as
contrastedwithrepair.TheonlymanufacturingcasewasLongmeidv.Holliday,4wherenegligence
wasnotalleged.Hamilton,J.,recognisesthatGeorgev.Skivington5wasadecisionwhich,ifit
remainedanauthority,boundhim.Hesaysthat,withoutpresumingtosayitwaswrong,hecannot
followit,becauseitisinconflictwithWinterbottomv.Wright.2Ifindthisverydifficultto
understand,forGeorgev.Skivington5wasbaseduponadutyinthemanufacturertotakecare
independentlyofcontract,whileWinterbottomv.Wright2wasdecidedondemurrerinacasewhere
theallegeddutywasbasedsolelyonbreachofacontractualdutytokeepinrepair,andno
negligencewasalleged.Lush,J.,saysintermsthatthereareonlythreeclassesofcasesinwhicha
strangertoacontractcansueforinjurybyadefectivechatteloneisthatoffraudthesecondof
articlesdangerousornoxiousinthemselves,wheretheduty
1106L.T.,atp.536.
210M.&W.109.
3[1905]1K.B.253.
46Ex.761.
5L.R.,5Ex.1.

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isonlytowarnthethirdofpublicnuisance.HedoesnotbringthecasesrepresentedbyElliottv.
Hall 1(thedefectivecoalwagon)withinhisclassesatall.Hesaystheybelongtoatotallydifferent
class,"wherethecontrolofpremisesorthemanagementofadangerousthingsuponpremises
createsaduty."Ihavealreadypointedoutthatthisdistinctionisunfoundedinfact,forinElliottv.
Hall,1asinHawkinsv.Smith2(thedefectivesack),thedefendantexercisednocontroloverthe
article,andtheaccidentdidnotoccuronhispremises.Withallrespect,Ithinkthatthejudgments
inthecaseerrbyseekingtoconfinethelawtorigidandexclusivecategories,andbynotgiving
sufficientattentiontothegeneralprinciplewhichgovernsthewholelawofnegligence,i.e.,theduty
owedtothosewhowillbeimmediatelyinjuredbylackofcare.
ThelastcaseIneedrefertoisBatesv.Batey&Co.,3wheremanufacturersofgingerbeerwere
suedbyaplaintiffwhohadbeeninjuredbytheburstingofabottleofgingerbeerboughtfroma
shopkeeperwhohadobtaineditfromthemanufactures.Themanufacturershadboughttheactual

bottlefromitsmaker,butwerefoundbythejurytohavebeennegligentinnottakingpropermeans
todiscoverwhetherthebottlewasdefectiveornot.Horridge,J.,foundthatabottleofgingerbeer
wasnotdangerousinitself,butthisdefectivebottlewasinfactdangerousbut,asthedefendants
didnotknowthatitwasdangerous,theywerenotliable,althoughbytheexerciseofreasonable
caretheycouldhavediscoveredthedefect.Thecasediffersfromthepresentonlybyreasonofthe
factthatitwasnotthemanufacturersofthegingerbeerwhocausedthedefectinthebottlebut,
ontheassumptionthatthejurywererightinfindingalackofreasonablecareinnotexaminingthe
bottle,Ishouldhavecometotheconclusionthat,asthemanufacturersmusthavecontemplated
thebottlebeinghandledimmediatelybytheconsumer,theyowedadutytohimtotakecarethat
heshouldnotbeinjuredexternallybyexplosion,justasIthinktheyowedadutytohimtotake
carethatheshouldnotbeinjuredinternallybypoisonorothernoxiousthing.
Idonotfinditnecessarytodiscussatlengththecasesdealingwithdutieswherethethingis
dangerous,or,inthenarrowercategory,belongstoaclassofthingswhicharedangerousin
themselves.Iregardthedistinctionasanunnaturalonesofarasitisusedtoserveasalogical
differentiationbywhichtodistinguishtheexistenceornonexistenceofalegalright.Inthisrespect
IagreewithwhatwassaidbyScrutton,L.J.,inHodge&Sonsv.AngloAmericanOilCo.,4acase
whichwasultimatelydecidedonaquestionoffact."Personally,Idonotunderstandthedifference
betweenathingdangerousinitself,aspoison,andathingnotdangerousasaclass,butby
negligentconstructiondangerousasaparticularthing.Thelatter,ifanything,seemsthemore
dangerousofthetwoitisawolfinsheep'sclothinginsteadofanobviouswolf."Thenatureofthe
thingmayverywellcallfordifferentdegreesofcare,andthepersondealingwithitmaywe
contemplatepersonsasbeingwithin
115Q.B.D.315.
212T.L.R.532.
3[1913]3K.B.351.
4(1922)12Ll.L.Rep.183,atp.187.

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thesphereofhisdutytotakecare,whowouldnotbesufficientlyproximatewithlessdangerous
goodssothatnotonlythedegreeofcarebuttherangeofpersonstowhomadutyisowedmaybe
extended.Buttheyallillustratethegeneralprincipal.IntheDominionNaturalGasCo.v.Collins
andPerkins1thedefendantshadinstalledagasapparatusandweresupplyingnaturalgasonthe
premisesofarailwaycompany.Theyhadinstalledaregulatortocontrolthepressure,andtheir
mennegligentlymadeanescapevalvedischargeintothebuildinginsteadofintotheopenair.The
railwayworkmentheplaintiffswereinjuredbyanexplosioninthepremises.Thedefendantswere
heldliable.LordDunedin,ingivingthejudgmentoftheJudicialCommittee(consistingofhimself,
LordMacnaghten,LordCollins,andSirArthurWilson),afterstatingthattherewasnorelationof
contractbetweentheplaintiffsandthedefendants,proceeded(atp.646)"Theremaybe,however,
inthecaseofanyoneperforminganoperation,orsettingupandinstallingamachine,arelationship
ofduty.Whatthatdutyiswillvaryaccordingtothesubjectmatterofthethingsinvolved.Ithas,
however,againandagainbeenheldthatinthecaseofarticlesdangerousthemselves,suchas
loadedfirearms,poisons,explosives,andotherthingsejusdemgeneris,thereisapeculiardutyto
takeprecautionimposeduponthosewhosendforthorinstallsucharticleswhenitisnecessarilythe
casethatotherpartieswillcomewithintheirproximity."This,whichrespect,exactlysumsupthe
position.Thedutymayexistindependentlyofcontract.Whetherisexistsornotdependsuponthe
subjectmatterinvolvedbutclearlyintheclassofthingsenumeratedthereisaspecialdutytotake
precautions.Thisistheveryoppositeofcreatingaspecialcategoryinwhichalonethedutyexists.
Imayadd,althoughitobviouslywouldmakenodifferenceinthecreationofaduty,thatthe
installationofanapparatustobeusedforgasperhapsmorecloselyresemblesthemanufactureofa
gunthanadealingwithaloadedgun.Inbothcasestheactualworkisinnocuousitisonlywhen
thegunisloadedortheapparatuschargedwithgasthatthedangerarises.
Idonotthinkitnecessarytoconsidertheobligationofapersonwhoentruststoacarriergoods
whicharedangerousorwhichheoughttoknowaredangerous.Asfarasthedirectobligationofthe
consignortothecarrierisconcerned,ithasbeenputuponandimpliedwarrantyBrassv.
Maitland2butitisalsoadutyowedindependentlyofcontract,e.g.,tothecarrier'sservant
Farrantv.Barnes.3Sofarasthecasesaffordananalogytheyseemtosupportthepropositionnow
asserted.
IneedonlymentiontodistinguishtwocasesinthisHousewhicharereferredtoinsomeofthe
caseswhichIhavereviewed.CaledonianRailwayCo.v.MulhollandorWarwick,4inwhichthe
appellantrailwaycompanywereheldnotliableforinjuriescausedbyadefectivebrakeonacoal
wagonconveyedbythemtopointinthetransitwheretheircontractended,andwherethewagons
weretakenoverforhaulage
1[1909]A.C.640.
2(1856)6E.&B.470.
3(1862)11C.B.(N.S.)553,atp.563.
4(1897)25R.(H.L.)1,[1898]A.C.216.

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forthelastpartofthejourneybyasecondrailwaycompany,onwhichparttheaccidenthappened.
Itwasheldthatthefirstrailwaycompanywereundernodutytotheinjuredworkmentoexamine
thewagonfordefectsattheendoftheircontractualhaulage.Therewasampleopportunityfor
inspectionbythesecondrailwaycompany.Therelationswerenotproximate.
Inthesecond,Cavalierv.Pope,1thewifeofthetenantofahouseletunfurnishedsoughtto
recoverformthelandlorddamagesforpersonalinjuiresarisingfromthenonrepairofthehouse,on
thegroundthatthelandlordhadcontractedwithherhusbandtorepairthehouse.Itwasheldthat
thewifewasnotapartytothecontract,andthatthewellknownabsenceofanydutyinrespectof
thelettingofanunfurnishedhousepreventedherfromrelyingonanycauseofactionfor
negligence.
InthemostrecentcaseBottomleyv.Bannister,2,anactionunderLordCampbell'sAct,the
deceasedman,theplaintiff,hadtakenanunfurnishedhouseformthedefendants,whohadinstalled
agasboilerwithaspecialgasburner,which,ifproperlyregulated,requirednoflue.Thedeceased
andhiswifewerekilledbyfumesfromtheapparatus.Thecasewasdeterminedonthegroundthat
theapparatuswaspartoftherealty,andthatthelandlorddidnotknowofthedangerbutthereis
adiscussionofthecaseonthesuppositionthatitwasachattel.Greer,L.J.,states,withtruth,that
itisnoteasytoreconcilealltheauthorities,andthatthereisnoauthoritybindingontheCourtof
Appealthatapersonsellinganarticlewhichhedidnotknowtobedangerouscanbeheldliableto
aperson,withwhomhehasmadenocontract,byreasonofthefactthatreasonableinquiriesmight
haveenabledhimtodiscoverthatthearticlewasinfactdangerous.Whenthedangerisinfact
occasionedbyhisownlackofcare,thenincasesofaproximaterelationshipthepresentcasewill,
Itrust,supplythedeficiency.
ItisalwaysasatisfactiontoanEnglishlawyertobeabletotesthisapplicationoffundamental
principlesofthecommonlawbythedevelopmentofthesamedoctrinesbythelawyersofthe
CourtsoftheUnitedStates.InthatcountryIfindthatthelawappearstobewellestablishedinthe
senseinwhichIhaveindicated.ThemousehademergedfromthegingerbeerbottleintheUnited
StatesbeforeitappearedinScotland,butthereitbroughtaliabilityuponthemanufacturer.Imust
notinthislongjudgmentdomorethanrefertotheilluminatingjudgmentofCardozo,J.,in
MacPhersonv.BuickMotorCo.3intheNewYorkCourtofAppeals,inwhichhestatestheprinciples
ofthelawasIshoulddesiretostatethem,andreviewstheauthoritiesinotherStatesthanhisown.
Whethertheprincipleheaffirmswouldapplytotheparticularfactsofthatcaseinthiscountry
wouldbeaquestionforconsiderationifthecasearose.Itmightbethatthecourseofbusiness,by
givingopportunitiesofexaminationtotheimmediatepurchaserorotherwise,preventedtherelation
betweenthemanufacturerandtheuserofthecarbeingsocloseastocreateaduty.Butthe
Americandecisionwould
1[1906]A.C.428.
2[1932]1K.B.458.
3217N.Y.R.382.

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undoubtedlyleadtoadecisioninfavourofthepursuerinthepresentcase.
IfyourLordshipsaccepttheviewthatthispleadingdisclosesarelevantcauseofaction,youwill
beaffirmingthepropositionthatbyScotsandEnglishlawalikeamanufacturerofproducts,which
hesellsinsuchaformastoshowthatheintendsthemtoreachtheultimateconsumerintheform
inwhichtheylefthim,withnoreasonablepossibilityofintermediateexamination,andwiththe
knowledgethattheabsenceofreasonablecareinthepreparationorputtingupoftheproductswill
resultinaninjurytotheconsumer'slifeorproperty,owesadutytotheconsumertotakethat
reasonablecare.
ItisapropositionwhichIventuretosayononeinScotlandorEnglandwhowasnotalawyer
wouldforonemomentdoubt.Itwillbeanadvantagetomakeitclearthatthelawinthismatter,as
inmostothers,isinaccordancewithsoundcommonsense.Ithinkthatthisappealshouldbe
allowed.
LORDTOMLIN.Ihavehadanopportunityofconsideringtheopinion(whichIhavealreadyread)
preparedbymynobleandlearnedfriendLordBuckmaster.Asthereasoningofthatopinionandthe
conclusionreachedthereinaccordineveryrespectwithmyownviews,Iproposetosayonlyafew
words.
First,Ithinkthat,iftheappellantistosucceed,themustbeuponthepropositionthatevery
manufacturerorrepairerofanyarticleisunderadutytoeveryonewhomaythereafterlegitimately
usethearticletoexerciseduecareinthemanufactureorrepair.Inislogicallyimpossibletostop
shortofthispoint.Therecanbenodistinctionbetweenfoodandanyotherarticle.Moreover,the
factthatanarticleoffoodissentoutinasealedcontainercanhavenorelevancyonthequestion
ofdutyitisonlyafactorwhichmayrenderiteasiertobringnegligencehometothemanufacturer.
Secondly,IdesiretosaythatinmyopinionthedecisioninWinterbottomv.Wright1isdirectlyin
pointagainsttheappellant.Theexaminationofthereportmakesit,Ithink,plain(1)that
negligencewasallegedandwasthebasisoftheclaim,and(2)thatthewidepropositionwhichI

haveindicatedwasthatforwhichtheplaintiffwascontending.Thedeclarationaverred,interalia,
thatthedefendant"soimproperlyandnegligentlyconductedhimself"thattheaccidentcomplained
ofhappened.Theplaintiff'scounselsaid:"Herethedeclarationallegestheaccidenttohave
happenedthroughthedefendant'snegligenceandwantofcare."Thealarmingconsequencesof
acceptingthevalidityofthispropositionwerepointedoutbythedefendantcounsel,whosaid"For
example,everyoneofthesufferersbysuchanaccidentasthatwhichrecentlyhappenedonthe
VersaillesRailwaymighthavehisactionagainstthemanufacturerofthedefectiveaxle."Thatthe
action,whichwasincase,embracedacauseofactionintortis,Ithink,implicitinitsform,and
appearsfromtheconcludingsentenceofLordAbinger's
110M.&W.109.

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judgment(atp.115),whichwastheseterms"Bypermittingthisaction,weshouldbeworkingthis
injustice,thatafterthedefendanthaddoneeverythingtothesatisfactionofhisemployer,andafter
allmattersbetweenthemhadbeenadjustedandallaccountssettledonthefootingoftheir
contract,weshouldsubjectthemtoberippedopenbythisactionoftortbeingbroughtagainst
him."
Iwillonlyaddtowhathasbeenalreadysaidbymynoblesandlearnedfriend,LordBuckmaster,
withregardtothedecisionsanddictarelieduponbytheappellantandtheotherrelevantreported
cases,thatIamunabletoexplainhowthecasesofdangerousarticlescanhavebeentreatedas
"exceptions,"iftheappellant'scontentioniswellfounded.UpontheviewwhichItakeofthematter,
thereportedcasessomedirectly,othersimpliedlynegativetheexistenceaspartofthecommon
lawofEnglandofanyprincipleaffordingsupporttotheappellant'sclaim,andthereforethereis,in
myopinion,nomaterialformwhichitislegitimateforyourLordships'Housetodeducesucha
principle.
LORDTHANKERTON.Inthisactiontheappellantclaimsreparationformtherespondentin
respectofillnessandotherinjuriouseffectsresultingformthepresenceofadecomposedsnailina
bottleofgingerbeer,allegedtohavebeenmanufacturedbytherespondent,whichwaspartly
consumedbyher,ithavingbeenorderedbyafriendonherbehalfinacafinPaisley.
Theactionisbasedonnegligence,andtheonlyquestioninthisappealiswhether,takingthe
appellant'savermentsproveritate,theydiscloseacaserelevantinlawsoastoentitlehertohave
themremittedforproof.TheLordOrdinaryallowedaproof,butonareclaimingnoteforthe
respondenttheSecondDivisionoftheCourtofSessionrecalledtheLordOrdinaryinterlocutorand
dismissedtheaction,followingtheirdecisionintherecentcasesofMullenv.Barr&Co.and
M'Gowanv.Barr&Co.1
Theappellant'scaseisthatthebottlewassealedwithametalcap,andwasmadeofdark
opaqueglass,whichnotonlyexcludedaccesstothecontentsbeforeconsumption,ifthecontents
weretoretaintheiraeratedcondition,butalsoexcludedthepossibilityofvisualexaminationofthe
contentsformoutsideandthatonthesideofthebottletherewaspastedalabelcontainingthe
nameandaddressoftherespondent,whowasthemanufacturer.Shestatesthattheshopkeeper
whosuppliedthegingerbeeropeneditandpouredsomeofitscontentsintoatumbler,which
containedsomeicecream,andthatshedranksomeofthecontentsofthetumblerthatherfriend
thenliftedthebottleandwaspouringtheremainderofthecontentsintothetumblerwhenasnail,
whichhadbeen,unknowntoher,herfriend,ortheshopkeeper,inthebottle,andwasinastateof
decomposition,floatedoutofthebottle.
Thedutieswhichtheappellantaccusestherespondentofhavingneglectedmaybesummarised
asfollows:(a)thatthegingerbeerwasmanufacturedbytherespondentorhisservantstobesold
asanarticle
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ofdrinktomembersofthepublic(includingtheappellant),andthataccordingly,itwashisdutyto
exercisethegreatestcareinorderthatsnailswouldnotgetintothebottles,renderthegingerbeer
dangerousandharmful,andbesoldwiththegingerbeer(b)adutytoprovideasystemofworking
hisbusinesswhichwouldnotallowsnailstogetintothebottles,and,inparticular,wouldnotallow
thebottleswhenwashedtostandinplacestowhichsnailshadaccess(c)adutytoprovideand
efficientsystemofinspectionwhichwouldpreventsnailsfrombeinginthesealedbottlesand(d)a
dutytoprovideclearbottlessoastofacilitatethesaidsystemofinspection.
Therecanbenodoubt,inmyopinion,that,equallyinthelawofScotlandandthelawof
England,itliesuponthepartyclaimingredressinsuchacasetoshowthattherewassomerelation
ofdutybetweenherandthedefenderwhichrequiredthedefendertoexercisedueandreasonable
careforhersafety.Itisnotatallnecessarythatthereshouldbeanydirectcontractbetweenthem,
becausetheactionisbased,notuponcontract,butuponnegligencebutitisnecessaryforthe
pursuerinsuchanactiontoshowthattherewasadutyowedtoherbythedefender,becausea
mancannotbechargedwithnegligenceifbehasnoobligationtoexercisediligenceKemp&

Dougallv.Darnga&CoalCo.,1perLordKinnearseealsoClellandv.Robb,2,perLordPresident
DunedinandLordKinnear.Thequestionineachcaseiswhetherthepursuerhasestablished,or,in
thestageofthepresentappeal,hasrelevantlyaverred,suchfactsasinvolvetheexistenceofsuch
arelationofduty.
Wearenotdealingherewithacaseofwhatiscalledandarticlepersedangerous,oronewhich
wasknownbythedefendertobedangerous,inwhichcasesaspecialdutyofprotectionor
adequatewarningisplaceduponthepersonwhousesordistributesit.Thepresentcaseisthatofa
manufacturerandaconsumer,withwhomhehasnocontractualrelation,ofanarticlewhichthe
manufacturerdidnotknowtobedangerousand,unlesstheconsumercanestablishaspecial
relationshipwiththemanufacturer,itisclear,inmyopinion,thatneitherthelawofScotlandnor
thelawofEnglandwillholdthatthemanufacturerhasanydutytowardstheconsumertoexercise
diligence.Insuchacasetheremedyoftheconsumer,ifany,willlieagainsttheinterveningparty
fromwhomhehasprocuredthearticle.IamawarethattheAmericanCourts,inthedecisions
referredtobymynobleandlearnedfriendLordMacmillan,havetakenaviewmorefavourableto
theconsumer.
Thespecialcircumstancesformwhichtheappellantclaimsthatsucharelationshipofdutyshould
beinferredmay,Ithink,bestatedthus,namely,thattherespondent,inplacinghismanufactured
articleofdrinkuponthemarket,hasintentionallysoexcludedinterferencewith,orexaminationof,
thearticlebyanyintermediatehandlerofthegoodsbetweenhimselfandtheconsumerthathehas,
ofhisownownaccord,broughthimselfintodirectrelationshipwiththeconsumer,withtheresult
thattheconsumerisentitledtorelyupontheexerciseofdiligencebythemanufacturertosecure
thatthearticleshallnotbeharmfulto
11909S.C.1314,atp.1319.
21191S.C.253,atp.256.

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theconsumer.Ifthatcontentionbesound,theconsumer,onhershowingthatthearticlehas
reachedherintact,andthatshehasbeeninjuredbytheharmfulnatureofthearticleowingtothe
failureofthemanufacturertotakereasonablecareinitspreparationpriortoitsenclosureinthe
sealedvessel,willbeentitledtoreparationfromthemanufacturer.
Inmyopinion,theexistenceofalegaldutyundersuchcircumstancesisinconformitywiththe
principlesofboththelawofScotlandandthelawofEngland.TheEnglishcasesdemonstratehow
impossibleitistocataloguefinally,amidtheevervaryingtypesofhumanrelationships,those
relationshipsinwhichadutytoexercisecarearisesapartfromcontract,andeachofthesecases
relatestoitsownsetofcircumstances,outofwhichitwasclaimedthatthedutyhadarisen.In
noneofthesecaseswerethecircumstancesidenticalwiththepresentcaseasregardsthatwhichI
regardastheessentialelementinthiscase,namely,themanufacturer'sownactioninbringing
himselfintodirectrelationshipwiththepartyinjured.Ihavehadtheprivilegeofconsideringthe
discussionoftheseauthoritiesbymynobleandlearnedfriendLordAtkininthejudgmentwhichhe
hasjustdelivered,andIsoentirelyagreewithitthatIcannotusefullyaddanythingtoit.
AninterestingillustrationofsimilarcircumstancesistobefoundinGordonv.M'Hardy,1,inwhich
thepursuersoughttorecoverdamagesfromaretailgroceronaccountofthedeathofhissonby
ptomainepoisoning,causedbyeatingtinnedsalmonpurchasedformthedefender.Thepursuer
averredthatthetin,whensold,wasdented,buthedidnotsuggestthatthegrocerhadcutthrough
themetalandallowedairtogetin,orhadotherwisecausedinjurytothecontents.Theactionwas
heldirrelevant,theLordJusticeClerkremarking(atp.212)"Idonotseehowthedefendercould
haveexaminedthetinofsalmonwhichheisallegedtohavesoldwithoutdestroyingthevery
conditionwhichthemanufacturerhadestablishedinordertopreservethecontents,thetinnot
beingintendedtobeopeneduntilimmediatelybeforeuse."Apparentlyinthatcasethe
manufacturer'slabelwasoffthetinwhensold,andhehadnotbeenidentified.Ishouldbesorryto
thinkthatthemeticulouscareofthemanufacturertoexcludeinterferenceorinspectionbythe
grocerinthatcaseshouldrelievethegrocerofanyresponsibilitytotheconsumerwithoutany
correspondingassumptionofdutybythemanufacturer.
Iamofopinionthatthecontentionoftheappellantissound,andthatshehasrelevantlyaverred
arelationshipofdutyasbetweentherespondentandherself,asalsothatheravermentsofthe
respondent'sneglectofthatdutyarerelevant.
ThecasesofMullenandM'Gowan,2whichthelearnedjudgesoftheSecondDivisionfollowedin
thepresentcase,relatedtofactssimilarineveryrespect,exceptthattheforeignmatterwasa
decomposedmouse.InthesecasesthesameCourt(LordHunterdissenting)heldthatthe
manufacturerowednodutytotheconsumer.Theviewofthemajority
1(1903)6F.210.
21929S.C.461.

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wasthattheEnglishauthoritiesexcludedtheexistenceofsuchdutybutLordOrmidale1would

otherwisehavebeenpreparedtocometoacontraryconclusion.LordHunter'sopinionseemstobe
inconformitywiththeviewIhaveexpressedabove.
Myconclusionrestsuponthefactsaverredinthiscase,andwouldapparentlyalsohaveapplied
inthecasesofMullenandM'Gowan,2inwhich,however,therehadbeenaproofbeforeanswer,and
therewasalsoaquestionwhetherthepursuershadprovedtheiraverments.
Iamthereforeofopinionthattheappealshouldbeallowed,andthatthecaseshouldbe
remittedforproof,asthepursuerdidnotaskforanissue.
LORDMACMILLAN.TheincidentwhichinitslegalbearingsyourLordshipsarecalleduponto
considerinthisappealwasinitselfofatrivialcharacter,althoughtheconsequencestothe
appellant,asshedescribesthem,wereseriousenough.Itappearsfromtheappellant'sallegations
that,onandeveninginAugust1928,sheandafriendvisitedacafinPaisley,whereherfriend
orderedforhersomeicecreamandabottleofgingerbeer.Theseweresuppliedbytheshopkeeper,
whoopenedthegingerbeerbottleandpouredsomeofthecontentsovertheicecream,whichwas
containedinatumbler.Theappellantdrankpartofthemixture,andherfriendthenproceededto
pourtheremainingcontentsofthebottle,intothetumbler.Asshewasdoingsoadecomposedsnail
floatedoutwiththegingerbeer.Inconsequenceofherhavingdrunkpartofthecontaminated
contentsofthebottleisstatedtohavebeenofdarkopaqueglass,sothattheconditionofthe
contentscouldnotbeascertainedbyinspection,andtohavebeenclosedwithametalcapwhile
onthesidewasalabelbearingthenameoftherespondent,whowasthemanufacturerofthe
gingerbeerofwhichtheshopkeeperwasmerelytheretailer.
Theallegationsofnegligenceonwhichtheappellantfoundsheractionagainsttherespondent
maybeshortlysummarised.Shesaysthatthegingerbeerwasmanufacturedbytherespondentfor
saleasanarticleofdrinktomembersofthepublic,includingherselfthatthepresenceofa
decomposingsnailingingerbeerrendersthegingerbeerharmfulanddangeroustothoseconsuming
itandthatitwasthedutyoftherespondenttoexercisehisprocessofmanufacturewithsufficient
caretopreventsnailsgettingintoorremaininginthebottleswhichhefilledwithgingerbeer.The
appellantattackstherespondent'ssystemofconductinghisbusiness,allegingthathefailedto
havehisbottlesproperlyinspectedforthepresenceofforeignmatterbeforehefilledthem.
Therespondentchallengedtherelevancyoftheappellant'savermentsand,takingthempro
veritate,asforthispurposehewasboundtodo,pleadedthattheydisclosednogroundoflegal
liabilityonhisparttotheappellant.
11929S.C.461,atp.471.
21929S.C.461.

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TheLordOrdinaryrepelledtherespondent'spleatotherelevancyandallowedthepartiesaproofof
theiraverments,butonreclaimingnote,theirLordshipsoftheSecondDivision(LordHunter
dissenting,or,perhapsmoreaccurately,protesting)dismissedtheaction,andindoingsofollowed
theirdecisioninthepreviouscasesofMullenv.Barr&Co.1andM'Gowanv.Barr&Co.1Theonly
differenceinfactbetweenthosecasesandthepresentcaseisthatitwasamouseandnotasnail
whichwasfoundinthegingerbeer.Thepresentappealisconsequentlyineffectagainstthe
decisioninthesepreviouscases,whichInowproceedtoexamine.
Thesetwocases,beingtoallintentsandpurposesidentical,wereheardanddecidedtogether.In
Mullenv.Barr&Co.1theSheriffsubstituteallowedaproof,buttheSheriff,onappeal,dismissed
theactionasirrelevant.InM'Gowanv.Barr&Co.1theSheriffsubstituteallowedaproof,andthe
Sheriffalteredhisinterlocutorbyallowingaproofbeforeanswerthatistosay,aproofunder
reservationofallobjectionstotherelevancyoftheaction.OnthecasescomingbeforetheSecond
Division,ontheappealsofthepursuerandthedefendersrespectively,theirLordshipsordereda
proofbeforeanswerineachcase,andtheevidencewastakenbeforeLordHunter.Itwillbe
sufficienttorefertoMullen'scase,1inwhichtheirLordshipsgavetheirreasonsforassoilzieingthe
defendersinbothcases.TheLordJusticeClerkheldthatnegligencehadnotbeenproved,and
thereforedidnotpronounceuponthequestionofrelevancy.LordOrmidaleheldthattherewasno
relevantcaseagainstthedefenders,butwouldhavebeenprepared,ifnecessary,toholdthatin
anycasenegligencehadnotbeenestablishedbytheevidence.LordHunterheldthatthecasewas
relevantandthatnegligencehadbeenproved.LordAndersonheldthatthepursuerhadnocasein
lawagainstthedefenders,butthat,ifthisviewwaserroneous,negligencehadnotbeenproved.
IdesiretodrawspecialattentiontocertainpassagesintheopinionsoftheirLordships.The
learnedLordJusticeClerkstates(atp.470)thatheprefers"tobasehisjudgmentonthe
propositionthatthepursuerhasfailedtoprovefaultonthepartofthedefenders,"andfeels
"absolvedfromexpressingaconcludedopiniononthethornyanddifficultquestionoflaw,whether,
assumingfaulttobeprovedonthepartofthedefenders,thepursuerhadinlawarighttosue
them."InthepresentcasehisLordship,afterpointingoutthathehadformallyreservedhisopinion
onthepointinMullenv.Barr&Co.,1proceeds"IthinkIindicated,notobscurely,theviewwhichI
entertainedonaperusaloftheEnglishcases,"andtothatview,indeferencetotheEnglishcases
whichhisLordshiphasreconsidered,hehasgiveneffectadverselytothepresentappellant.That
theopinionsofthemajorityofthejudgesoftheSecondDivisioninMullen'scase1onthequestion
ofrelevancyarefoundedentirelyontheirreadingoftheseriesofEnglishcasescitedtothemis
makeclearbyLordOrmidale.Afterstatingthequestionsinthecase,thefirstbeing"whether,in

absenceofanycontractualrelation
11929S.C.461.

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betweenthepursuersandthedefenders,the&owedadutytothepursuers,astheconsumersof
thebeer,oftaking&toseethatnothingofapoisonousordeleteriousnaturewasallowedtoenter
andremaininthebottle,"hisLordshipproceeds(atp.471)"Irecognisethedifficultyof
determiningthefirstofthesequestionswitheitherconfidenceorsatisfactionand,wereitnotfor
theunbrokenandconsistentcurrentofdecisionsbeginningwithWinterbottomv.Wright,1towhich
wewerereferred,Ishouldhavebeendisposedtoansweritintheaffirmative.Theevidenceshows
thatthegreatestcareistakenbythemanufacturerstoinsurebytabandlabelthatthegingerbeer
shouldpass,asitwere,fromthehandofthemakertothehandoftheultimateuseruninterfered
withbytheretaildealerwhohaslittleinterestin,andnoopportunityof,examiningthecontentsof
thecontainers.Accordingly,itwouldappeartobereasonableandequitabletoholdthat,inthe
circumstancesandapartaltogetherformcontract,thereexistsarelationshipofdutyasbetweenthe
makerandtheconsumerofthebeer.Suchconsiderations,however,asIreadtheauthorities,have
beenheldtobeirrelevantinanalogouscircumstances."LordOrmidalethusfindshimself
constrainedtoreachaconclusionwhichappearstohimtobecontrarytoreasonandequitybyhis
readingofwhathedescribesasan"unbrokenandconsistentcurrentofdecisionsbeginningwith
Winterbottomv.Wright.1"InviewofthedeferencethuspaidtoEnglishprecedents,itisasingular
factthatthecaseofWinterbottomv.Wright1isoneinwhichnonegligence,inthesenseofbreach
ofadutyowedbythedefendanttotheplaintiff,wasallegedonthepartoftheplaintiff.Thetruth,
asIhopetoshow,isthatthereisintheEnglishreportsnosuch"unbrokenandconsistentcurrentof
decisions"aswouldjustifytheaspersionthatthelawofEnglandhascommitteditselfirrevocablyto
whatisneitherreasonablenorequitable,orrequireaScottishjudgeinfollowingthemtodo
violencetohisconscience."Inmyopinion,"saidLordEsherinEmmensv.Pottle,2"anyproposition
theresultofwhichwouldbetoshowthatthecommonlawofEnglandiswhollyunreasonableand
unjust,cannotbepartofthecommonlawofEngland."
AtyourLordships'barcounselforbothpartiestothepresentappeal,accepting,asIsoalso,the
viewthatthereisnodistinctionbetweenthelawofScotlandandthelawofEnglandinthelegal
principlesapplicabletothecase,confinedtheirargumentstotheEnglishauthorities.Theappellant
endeavouredtoestablishthat,accordingtothelawofEngland,thepleadingsdiscloseagoodcause
ofactiontherespondentendeavouredtoshowthat,ontheEnglishdecisions,theappellanthad
statednoadmissiblecase.Iproposethereforetoaddressmyselfatoncetoanexaminationofthe
relevantEnglishprecedents.
Iobserve,inthefirstplace,thatthereisnodecisionofthisHouseuponthepointatissue,forI
agreewithLordHunterthatsuchcasesasCavalierv.Pope3andCameronv.Young,4whichdecided
that"astrangertoaleasecannotfounduponalandlord'sfailuretofulfilobligations
110M.&W.109.
2(1885)16Q.B.D.354,atpp.357,358.
3[1906]A.C.428.
41908S.C.(H.L.),[1908]A.C.176.

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undertakenbyhimundercontractwithhislessee,"areinadifferentchapterofthelaw.Norcanit
byanymeansbesaidthatthecasespresent"anunbrokenandconsistentcurrent"ofauthority,for
someflowonewayandsometheother.
IthumblyappearstomethatthediversityofviewwhichisexhibitedinsuchcasesasGeorgev.
Skivington1ontheonehandandBlackerv.Lake&Elliot2ontheotherhandtotaketwoextreme
instancesisexplainedbythefactthatinthediscussionofthetopicwhichnowengagesyour
Lordships'attentiontworivalprinciplesofthelawfindameetingplacewhereeachhascontended
forsupremacy,Ontheonehand,thereisthewellestablishedprinciplethatnooneotherthana
partytoacontractcancomplainofabreachofthatcontract.Ontheotherhand,thereisthe
equallywellestablisheddoctrinethatnegligenceapartformcontractgivesarightofactiontothe
partyinjuredbythatnegligenceandhereIusethetermnegligence,ofcourse,initstechnicallegal
sense,implyingadutyowedandneglected.Thefactthatthereisacontractualrelationship
betweentheparties,whichmaygiverisetoanactionforbreachofcontract,doesnotexcludethe
coexistenceofarightofactionfoundedonnegligenceasbetweenthesameparties,independently
ofthecontract,althougharisingoutoftherelationshipinfactbroughtaboutbythecontract.Ofthis
thebestillustrationistherightoftheinjuredrailwaypassengertosuetherailwaycompanyeither
forbreachofthecontractofsafecarriageorfornegligenceincarryinghim,Andthereisnoreason
whythesamesetoffactsshouldnotgiveonepersonarightofactionincontractandanother
personarightofactionintort.Imaybepermittedtoadoptasmyownthelangrageofavery
distinguishedEnglishwriteronthissubject."Itappears,"saysSirFrederickPollock,LawofTorts,
(13thed.)p.570,"thattherehasbeen(thoughtperhapsthereisnolonger)acertaintendencyto
holdthatfactswhichconstituteacontractcannothaveanyotherlegaleffect.Theauthorities
formerlyreliedonforthispropositionreallyprovedsomethingdifferentandmuchmorerational,

namely,thatifAbreakshiscontractwithB(whichmayhappenwithoutanypersonaldefaultinAor
A'sservants),thatisnotofitselfsufficienttomakeAliabletoC,astrangertothecontract,for
consequentialdamage.This,andonlythis,isthesubstanceoftheperfectlycorrectdecisionsofthe
CourtofExchequerinWinterbottomv.Wright3andLongmeidv.Holliday.4Ineachcasethe
defendantdelivered,underacontractofsaleorhiring,achattelwhichwasinfactunsafetouse,
butintheonecaseitwasnotalleged,intheotherwasallegedbutnotproved,tohavebeensoto
hisknowledge.Ineachcaseastrangertothecontract,usingthatchattelacoachintheonecase,
alampintheotherintheordinaryway,cametoharmthroughitsdangerouscondition,andwas
helpnottohaveanycauseofactionagainstthepurveyor.Notincontract,fortherewasno
contractbetweenthesepartiesnotintort,fornobadfaithornegligenceonthedefendant'spart
wasproved."
1L.R.,5Ex.1.
2106L.T.533.
310M.&W.109.
46Ex.761.

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Where,asincaseslikethepresent,somuchdependsupontheavenueofapproachtothe
question,itisveryeasytotakethewrongturning.Ifyoubeginwiththesalebythemanufacturer
totheretaildealer,thentheconsumerwhopurchasesfromtheretailerisatonceseentobea
strangertothecontractbetweentheretailerandthemanufacturerandsodisentitledtosueuponit.
Thereisnocontractualrelationbetweenthemanufacturerandtheconsumerandthustheplaintiff,
ifheistosucceed,isdriventotrytobringhimselfwithinoneorotheroftheexceptionalcases
wherethestrictnessoftherulethatnonebutapartytoacontractcanfoundonabreachofthat
contracthasbeenmitigatedinthepublicinterest,asithasbeeninthecaseofapersonwhoissues
achattelwhichisinherentlydangerousorwhichheknowstobeinadangerouscondition.If,onthe
otherhand,youdisregardthefactthatthecircumstancesofthecaseatonestageincludethe
existenceofacontractofsalebetweenthemanufacturerandtheretailer,andapproachthe
questionbyaskingwhetherthereisevidenceofcarelessnessonthepartofthemanufacturer,and
whetherheowedadutytobecarefulinaquestionwiththepartywhohasbeeninjuredin
consequenceofhiswantofcare,thecircumstancethattheinjuredpartywasnotapartytothe
incidentalcontractofsalebecomesirrelevant,andhistitletosuethemanufacturerisunaffectedby
thatcircumstance.Theappellantinthepresentinstanceasksthathercasebeapproachedasa
caseofdelict,notasacaseofbeachofcontract.Shedoesnotrequiretoinvoketheexceptional
casesinwhichapersonnotapartytoacontracthasbeenheldtobeentitledtocomplainofsome
defectinthesubjectmatterofthecontractwhichhascausedhimharm.Theexceptionalcaseof
thingsdangerousinthemselves,orknowntobeinadangerouscondition,hasbeenregardedas
constitutingapeculiarcategoryoutsidetheordinarylawbothofcontractandoftort.Imayobserve
thatitseemstomeinaccuratetodescribethecaseofdangerousthingsasanexceptiontothe
principlethatnoonebutapartytoacontractcansueonthatcontract.Iratherregardthistypeof
caseasaspecialinstanceofnegligencewherethelawexactsadegreeofdiligencesostringentas
toamoungpracticallytoaguaranteeofsafety.
WiththesepreliminaryobservationsIturntotheseriesofEnglishcaseswhichissaidto
composetheconsistentbodyofauthorityonwhichweareaskedtononsuittheappellant.Itwillbe
foundthatinmostofthemthefactswereverydifferentfromthefactsofthepresentcase,anddid
notgiverisetothespecialrelationship,andconsequentduty,whichinmyopinion,isthedeciding
factorhere.Dixonv.Bell 1isthestartingpoint.Thereamaidservantwassenttofetchagunfroma
neighbour'shouseonthewaybackshepointeditatachild,andthegunwentoffandinjuredthe
child.Theownerofthegunwasheldliablefortheinjurytothechildonthegroundthatheshould
haveseenthatthechargewasdrawnbeforeheentrustedtheguntothemaidservant."Itwas
incumbentonhimwho,bychargingthegun,hadmadeitcapableofdoingmischief,torenderit
safeandinnoxious."Thiscase,inmy
15M.&S.198.

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opinion,merelyillustratesthehighdegreeofcare,amountingineffecttoinsuranceagainstrisk,
whichthelawexactsfromthosewhotaketheresponsibilityofgivingoutsuchdangerousthingsas
loadedfirearms,Thedecision,ifithasanyrelevance,isfavourabletotheappellant,whosubmits
thathumandrinkrenderedpoisonousbycarelesspreparationmaybeasdangeroustolifeasany
loadedfirearm.Langridgev.Levy 1isanothercaseofagun,thistimeofdefectivemakeandknown
tothevendortobedefective.Thepurchaser'ssonwashelpentitledtosuefordamagesin
consequenceofinjuriessustainedbyhimthroughthedefectiveconditionoftheguncausingitto
explode.Thegroundofthedecisionseemstohavebeenthattherewasafalserepresentationby
thevendorthatthegunwassafe,andtherepresentationappearstohavebeenhelptoextendto
thepurchaser'sson.Thecaseistreatedbycommentatorsasturningonitsspecialcircumstances,
andasnotdecidinganyprincipleofgeneralapplication.AsforWinterbottomv.Wright2and
Longmeidv.Holliday,3neitherofthesecasesisreallyinpoint,forthereasonindicatedinthe
passagefromSirFrederickPollock'streatisewhichIhavequotedabove.ThencomesGeorgev.

Skivington,4whichisentirelyinfavouroftheappellant'scontention.Therewasasaleinthatcase
byachemistofsomehairwashtoapurchaserfortheuseofthiswife,whosufferedinjuryfrom
usingitbyreasonofitshavingbeennegligentlycompounded.AsKelly,C.B.,pointsout,theaction
wasnotfoundedonanywarrantyimpliedintheplaintiff,thepurchaser'swife,wasnotseekingto
sueonthecontracttowhichshewasnotaparty.Thequestion,astheChiefBaronstatedit(atp.
3),was"whetherthedefendant,achemist,compoundingthearticlesoldforaparticularpurpose,
andknowingofthepurposeforwhichitwasbought,isliableinanactiononthecasefor
unskilfulnessandnegligenceinthemanufactureofitwherebythepersonwhouseditwasinjured."
AndthisquestiontheCourtunanimouslyansweredintheaffirmative.Imaymentioninpassingthat
LordAtkinsoninthisHouse,speakingofthatcaseandofLangridgev.Levy,1observedthat"In
boththeselattercasethedefendantrepresentedthatthearticlesoldwasfitandproperforthe
purposesforwhichitwascontemplatedthatitshouldbeusedandthepartyinjuredwasignorantof
titsunfitnessforthesepurposes"Cavalierv.Pope.5ItistruethatGeorgev.Skivington4hasbeen
thesubjectofsomecriticismandwassaidbyHamilton,J.,ashethenwas,inBlackerv.Lake&
Elliot,6tohavebeeninlatercasesasnearlydisaffirmedasispossiblewithoutbeingexpressly
overruled.Iamnotsurethatithasbeensoseverelyhandledasthat.Atanyrate,Idonotthink
thatitdeservedtobe,andcertainly,sofarasIamaware,ithasneverbeendisapprovedinthis
House.
Heavenv.Pender7hasprobablybeenmorequotedanddiscussedin
12M.&W.519,4M.&W.337.
210M.&W.109.
36Ex.761.
4.L.R.,5Ex.1.
5[1906]A.C.428,atp.433.
6106L.T.533.
711Q.B.D.503.

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thisbranchofthelawthananyotherauthority,becauseofthedictaofBrett,M.R.,ashethenwas,
onthegeneralprinciplesregulatingliabilitytothirdparties.Inhisopinion(atp.509)"itmay,
therefore,safelybeaffirmedtobeatrueproposition"that,"wheneveronepersonisby
circumstancesplacedinsuchapositionwithregardtoanotherthateveryoneofordinarysensewho
didthinkwouldatoncerecognisethatifhedidnotuseordinarycareandskillinhisownconduct
withregardtothosecircumstancehewouldcausedangerofinjurytothepersonorpropertyofthe
other,adutyarisestouseordinarycareandskilltoavoidsuchdanger."Thepassagespecially
applicabletothepresentcaseisasfollows(atp.510):"Wheneveronepersonsuppliesgoodsfor
thepurposeoftheirbeingusedbyanotherpersonundersuchcircumstancesthateveryoneof
ordinarycareandskillwithregardtotheconditionofthethingsuppliedorthemodeofsupplyingit,
therewillbedangerofinjurytothepersonorpropertyofhimforwhoseusethethingissupplied,
andwhoistouseit,adutyarisestouseordinarycareandskillastotheconditionormannerof
supplyingsuchthing.Andforaneglectofsuchordinarycareorskillwherebyinjuryhappensalegal
liabilityarisestobeenforcedbyanactionfornegligence."Cotton,L.J.,withwhomBowen,L.J.,
agreed,expressedhimself(atp.516)as"unwillingtoconcurwiththeMasteroftheRollsinlaying
downunnecessarilythelargerprinciplewhichheentertains,inasmuchastherearemanycasesin
whichtheprinciplewasimpliedlynegatived,"butthedecisionoftheCourtofAppealwas
unanimouslyintheplaintiff'sfavour.ThepassagesIhavequoted,likeallattemptsofformulate
principlesoflawcompendiouslyandexhaustively,maybeopentosomecriticism,andtheir
universality,mayrequiresomequalification,butasenunciationsofgenerallegaldoctrine.Iam
prepared,likeLordHunter,toacceptthemassoundguides.
InowpasstothethreemoderncasesofEarlv.Lubbock,1Blackerv.Lake&Elliot,2andBatesv.
Batey&Co.3Thefirstofthesecasesrelatedtovanwhichhadrecentlybeenrepairedbythe
defendantundercontractwiththeownerofthevan.Adriverintheemploymentoftheownerwas
injuredinconsequenceofdefectinthevanwhichwassaidtobeduetothecarelessmannerin
whichtherepairerhaddonehiswork.Itwasheldthatthedriverhadnorightofactionagainstthe
repairer.Thecaseturnsupontherulethatastrangertoacontractcannotfoundanactionoftorton
abreachofthatcontract.Itwaspointedoutthattherewasnoevidencethattheplaintiffhadbeen
invitedbythedefendanttousethevan,andthevanownerwasnotcomplainingofthewayin
whichthevanhadbeenrepaired.Thenegligence,ifnegligencetherewas,wastooremote,andthe
practicalconsequencesofaffirmingliabilityinsuchacasewereconsideredtobesuchaswould
renderitdifficulttocarryonatradeatall."Noprudentman,"saysMathew,L.J.(atp.259),"would
contracttomakeorrepairwhatthe
1[1905]1K.B.253.
2106L.T.533.
3[1913]3K.B.351.

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employersintendedtopermitotherstouseinthewayofhistrade."Thespeciesfactiinthatcase

seemstometodifferwidelyfromthecircumstancesofthepresentcase,wherethemanufacturer
hasspecificallyinviewtheuseandconsumptionofhisproductsbytheconsumer,andwherethe
retailerismerelythevehicleoftransmissionoftheproductstotheconsumer,andbythenatureof
theproductsisprecludedfrominspectingorinterferingwiththeminanyway.
ThecaseofBlackerv.Lake&Elliot1isofimportancebecauseofthesurveyofprevious
decisionswhichitcontains.Itrelatedtoabrazinglampwhich,byexplodingowingtoalatent
defect,injuredapersonotherthanthepurchaseofit,andthevendorwasheldnotliabletothe
partyinjured.ThereappearstohavebeensomedifferenceofopinionbetweenHamilton,J.,and
Lush,J.,whoheardthecaseintheDivisionalCourt,astowhetherthelampwasaninherently
dangerousthings.Thecaseseemstohaveturnedlargelyonthequestionwhether,therebeinga
contractofsaleofthelampbetweenthevendorandthepurchaser,thearticlewasofsucha
dangerouscharacterastoimposeuponthevendor,inaquestionwithathirdparty,any
responsibilityforitscondition.Thisquestionwasansweredinthenegative.Sofarasnegligence
wasconcerned,itmaywellhavebeenregardedastooremote,forIfindthatHamilton,J.,used
thesewords(atp.537)"Inthepresentcaseallthatcanbesaidisthatthedefendantsdidnot
knowthattheirlampwasnotperfectlysafe,andhadnoreasontobelievethatitwasnotsointhe
sensethatnoonehaddrawntheirattentiontothefact,butthathadtheybeenwisermenormore
experiencedengineerstheywouldthenhaveknowwhattheplaintiff'sexpertssaythattheyought
tohaveknown."Ishoulddoubt,indeed,ifthatisreallyafindingofnegligenceatall.Thecaseon
itsfactsisveryfarfromthepresentoneandifanyprincipleofgeneralapplicationcanbederived
fromitadversetotheappellant'scontention,Ishouldnotbedisposedtoapproveofsuchprinciple.
ImayaddthattheinWhitev.Steadman2IfindthatLush,J.,whowasapartytothedecisionin
Blackerv.Lake&Elliot,1expressedtheview"thatapersonwhohasthemeansofknowledgeand
onlydoesnotknowthattheanimalorchattelwhichhesuppliesisdangerousbecausehedoesnot
takeordinarycaretoavailhimselfofhisopportunityofknowledgeisinpreciselythesameposition
asthepersonwhoknows."
AsforBatesv.&Co.,2whereagingerbeerbottleburstowingtoadefectinitwhich,though
unknowntothemanufacturerofthegingerbeer,couldhavebeendiscoveredbyhimbytheexercise
ofreasonablecare,Horridge,J.,thereheldthattheplaintiff,whoboughtthebottleofgingerbeer
fromaretailertowhomthemanufacturerhadsoldit,andwhowasinjuredbyitsexplosion,hadno
rightofactionagainstthemanufacturer.Thecasedoesnotadvancematters,foritreallyturnsupon
thefactthatthemanufacturerdidnotknowthatthebottlewasdefective,andthis,intheviewof
viewofHorridge,J.,ashereadstheauthorities,
1106L.T.533.
2[1913]3K.B.340,atp.348.
3[1913]3K.B.351.

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wasenoughtoabsolvethemanufacturer.Iwouldobservethat,inatruecaseifnegligence,
knowledgeoftheexistenceofthedefectcausingdamageisnotanessentialelementatall.
Thissummarysurveysufficienttoshow,whatmoredetailedstudyconfirms,thatthecurrentof
authorityhasbynomeansalwayssetinthesamedirection.InadditiontoGeorgev.Skivington,1
thereistheAmericancaseofThomasv.Winchester,2whichhasmetwithconsiderableacceptance
inthiscountry,andwhichisdistinctlyonthesideoftheappellant.Thereachemistcarelessly
issued,inresponsetoanorderforextractofdandelion,abottlecontainingbelladonna,whichhe
labelledextractofdandelion,withtheconsequencethatathirdpartywhotookadosefromthe
bottlesufferedseverely.Thechemistwasheldresponsible.ThiscaseisquotedbyLordDunedin,in
givingthejudgmentofthePrivyCouncilinDominionNaturalGasCo.v.CollinsandPerkins,3asan
instanceofliabilitytothirdparties,andIthinkitwasasounddecision.
IntheAmericanCourtsthelawhasadvancedconsiderablyinthedevelopmentoftheprinciple
exemplifiedinThomasv.Winchester.4InoneofthelatestcasesintheUnitedStates,MacPherson
v.BuickMotorCo.,4theplaintiff,whohadpurchasedfromaretaileramotorcarmanufacturedby
thedefendantcompany,wasinjuredinconsequenceofadefectintheconstructionofthecar,and
washelpentitledtorecoverdamagesfromthemanufacturer.Cardozo,J.,theveryeminentChief
JudgeoftheNewYorkCourtofAppeals,andnowanAssociateJusticeoftheUnitedStatesSupreme
Court,thusstatedthelaw5:"Thereisnoclaimthatthedefendantknewofthedefectandwilfully
concealeditThechargeisone,notoffraud,butofnegligence.Thequestiontobedeterminedis
whetherthedefendantowedadutyofcareandvigilancetoanyonebuttheimmediatepurchaser.
TheprincipleofThomasv.Winchester2isnotlimitedtopoisons,explosives,andthingsoflike
nature,tothingswhichintheirnormaloperationareimplementsofdestruction.Ifthenatureofa
thingissuchthatitisreasonablycertaintoplacelifeandlimbinperilwhennegligentlymade,itis
thenathingofdanger.Itsnaturegiveswarningoftheconsequencetobeexpected.Iftothe
elementofdangerthereisaddedknowledgethatthethingwillbeusedbypersonsotherthanthe
purchaser,andusedwithoutnewtests,thenirrespectiveofcontract,themanufactureofthisthing
ofdangerisunderadutytomakeitcarefully.Thatisasfaraswearerequiredtogoforthe
decisionofthiscase.Theremustbeknowledgeofadanger,notmerelypossible,butprobable.
Theremustalsobeknowledgethat,intheusualcourseofevents,thedangerwillbesharedby
othersthanthebuyer.Suchknowledgemayoftenbeinferredfromthenatureofthetransaction.
Thedealerwasindeedtheonepersonofwhomitmightbesaidwithsomeapproachtocertainty

thatbyhimcarwouldnotbeused.Yetthe
1L.R.,5Ex.1.
257Amer.Dec.455,6N.Y.R.397.
3[1909]A.C.640.
4Ann.Cas.1916,C.p.440,217N.Y.R.382.
5217N.Y.R.,atp.385.

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defendantwouldhaveussaythathewastheonepersonwhomit[thedefendantcompany]was
underalegaldutytoprotect.Thelawdoesnotleadustosoinconsequentaconclusion."
TheprolongeddiscussionofEnglishandAmericancasesintowhichIhavebeenledmightwell
disposeyourLordshiptothinkthatIhadforgottenthatthepresentisaScottishappealwhichmust
bedecidedaccordingtoScotslaw.Butthisdiscussionhasbeenrenderedinevitablebythecourse
oftheargumentatyourLordships'bar,which,asIhavesaid,proceededonthefootingthatthelaw
applicabletothecasewasthesameinEnglandandinScotland.Havingregardtotheinconclusive
stateoftheauthoritiesintheCourtsbelowandtothefactthattheimportantquestioninvolvedis
nowbeforeyourLordshipsforthefirsttime,Ithinkitdesirabletoconsiderthematterfromthe
pointofviewoftheprinciplesapplicabletothisbranchoflawwhichareadmittedlycommontoboth
EnglishandScottishjurisprudence.
Thelawtakesnocognizanceofcarelessnessintheabstract.Itconcernsitselfwithcarelessness
onlywherethereisadutytotakecareandwherefailureinthatdutyhascauseddamage.Insuch
circumstancescarelessnessassumesthelegalqualityofnegligence,andentailstheconsequences
inlawofnegligence.Whatthenarethecircumstanceswhichgiverisetothisdutytotakecare?In
thedailycontactsofsocialandbusinesslife,humanbeingsarethrowninto,orplacethemselvesin,
aninfinitevarietyofrelationswiththeirfellowsandthelawcanreferonlytothestandardsofthe
reasonablemaninordertodeterminewhetheranyparticularrelationgivesrisetoadutytotake
careasbetweenthosewhostandintherelationtoeachother.Thegroundsofactionmaybe
responsibilitymaydevelopinadaptationtoalteringsocialconditionsandstandards.Thecriterionof
judgmentmustadjustandadaptitselftothechangingcircumstancesoflife.Thecategoriesof
negligenceareneverclosed.Thecardinalprincipleofliabilityisthatthepartycomplainedofshould
owetothepartycomplainingadutytotakecare,andthatthepartycomplainingshouldbeableto
provethathehassuffereddamageinconsequenceofabreachofthatduty.Wherethereisroom
fordiversityofview,itisindeterminingwhatcircumstanceswillestablishsucharelationship
betweenthepartiesastogiverise,ontheoneside,toadutytotakecare,and,ontheotherside,
toarighttohavecaretaken.
Todescendfromthesegeneralitiestothecircumstancesofthepresentcase,Idonotthinkthat
anyreasonableman,oranytwelvereasonablemen,wouldhesitatetoholdthat,iftheappellant
establishesherallegation,therespondenthasexhibitedcarelessnessintheconductofhisbusiness.
Foramanufacturerofaeratedwatertostorehisemptybottlesinaplacewheresnailscanget
accesstothem,andtofillhisbottleswithouttakinganyadequateprecautions,byinspectionor
otherwise,toensurethattheycontainnodeleteriousforeignmatter,mayreasonablybe
characterisedascarelessness,withoutapplyingtooexactingastandard.But,asIhavepointedout,
itisnotenoughtoprovetherespondenttobecarelessinhisprocessofmanufacture.Thequestion
is:Doesheowe
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adutytotakecare,andtowhomdoesheowethatduty?Now,Ihavenohesitationinaffirmingthat
aperson,whoforgainengagesinthebusinessofmanufacturingarticlesoffoodanddrinkintended
forconsumptionbymembersofthepublicintheforminwhichheissuesthem,isunderadutyto
takecareinthemanufacturetothesearticles.Thatduty,inmyopinion,heowestothosewhomhe
intendstoconsumehisproducts.Hemanufactureshiscommoditiesforhumantoconsumptionhe
intendsandcontemplatesthattheyshallbeconsumed.Byreasonofthatveryfact,heplaces
himselfinarelationshipwithallthepotentialconsumersofhiscommodities,andthatrelationship,
whichheassumesanddesiresforhisownends,imposesuponhimadutytotakecaretoavoid
injuringthem.Heowesthemadutynottoconvertbyhisowncarelessnessanarticlewhichhe
issuestothemaswholesomeandinnocentintoanarticlewhichisdangeroustolifeandhealth.Itis
sometimessaidthatliabilitycanonlyarisewhereareasonablemanwouldhaveforeseen,andcould
haveavoided,theconsequencesofhisactoromission.Inthepresentcasetherespondent,when
hemanufacturedhisgingerbeer,haddirectlyincontemplationthatitwouldbeconsumedby
membersofthepublic.Canitbesaidthathecouldnotbeexpectedasareasonablemantoforesee
that,ifheconductedhisprocessofmanufacturecarelessly,hemightinjurethosewhomhe
expectedanddesiredtoconsumehisgingerbeer?Thepossibilityofinjurysoarisingseemstome
inonsomesoremoteastoexcusehimfromforeseeingit.Supposethatabaker,through
carelessness,allowalargequantityofarsenictobemixedwithabatchofhisbead,withtheresult
thatthosewhosubsequentlyeatitarepoisoned,couldhebeheardtosaythatbeowednodutyto
theconsumersofhisbreadtotakecarethatitwasfreefrompoison,andthat,ashedidnotknow
thatanypoisonhadgotintoit,hisonlyliabilitywasforbreachofwarrantyunderhiscontractof

saletothosewhoactuallyboughtthepoisonedbreadfromhim?ObservethatIhavesaid"through
carelessness,"andthusexcludedthecaseofapureaccidentsuchasmayhappenwhereeverycare
istaken.Icannotbelieve,andIdonotbelieve,thatneitherinthelawofEnglandnorinthelawof
Scotlandisthereredressforsuchacase.ThestateoffactsIhavefiguredmightwellgiverisetoa
criminalcharge,andthecivilconsequenceofsuchcarelessnesscanscarcelybelesswidethanits
criminalconsequences.Yettheproductsintendedbyhimforhumanconsumptiondoesnotoweto
theconsumerswhomhehasinviewanydutyofcare,noteventhedutytotakehedoesnotpoison
them.
TherecognitionbycounselthatthelawofScotlandapplicabletothecasewasthesameasthe
lawofEnglandimpliedthattherewasnospecialdoctrineofScotslawwhicheithertheappellantor
therespondentcouldinvoketosupportherorhiscaseandyourLordshipshavethusbeenrelieved
ofthenecessityofaseparateconsiderationofthelawofScotland.Formyself,Iamsatisfiedthat
thereisnospecialtyofScotslawinvolved,andthatthecasemaysafelybedecidedonprinciples
commontobothsystems.Iamhappytothinkthatintheirrelationto
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thepracticalproblemofeverydaylifewhichthisappealpresents,thelegalsystemsofthetwo
countriesarenowayatvariance,andthattheprinciplesofbothalikeatesufficientlyconsonant
withjusticeandcommonsensetoadmitoftheclaimwhichtheappellantseekstoestablish.
Iamanxioustoemphasisethattheprincipleofjudgmentwhichcommendsitselftomedoesnot
giverisetothesortofobjectionstatedbyParke,B.,inLongmeidv.Holliday,1wherehesaid:"But
itwouldbegoingmuchtoofartosay,thatsomuchcareisrequiredintheordinaryintercourseof
lifebetweenoneindividualandanother,that,ifamachinenotinitsnaturedangerousacarriage,
forinstancebutwhichmightbecomesobyalatentdefectentirelyunknown,althoughdiscoverable
bytheexerciseofordinarycare,shouldbelentorgivebyoneperson,evenbythepersonwho
manufacturedit,toanother,theformershouldbeanswerabletothelatterforasubsequentdamage
accruingbytheuseofit."Ireadthispassageratherasanoteofwarningthatthestandardofcare
exactedinhumandealingsmustnotbepitchedtoohigh,thanasgivinganycountenancetothe
viewthatnegligencemaybeexhibitedwithimpunity.Itmustalwaysbeaquestionofcircumstances
whetherthecarelessnessamountstonegligence,andwhethertheinjuryisnottooremotefromthe
carelessness.Icanreadilyconceivethat,whereamanufacturerhaspartedwithhisproductsandit
haspassedintootherhands,itmaywellbeexposedtovicissitudeswhichmayrenderitdefective
ornoxious,forwhichthemanufacturercouldnotinanyviewbetoblame.Itmaybeagoodgeneral
ruletoregardresponsibilityasceasingwhencontrolceases.So,also,wherebetweenthe
manufacturerandtheuserthereisinterposedapartywhohasthemeansandopportunityof
examiningthemanufacturer'sproductbeforehereissuesittotheactualuser.Butwhere,asinthe
presentcase,thearticleofconsumptionissopreparedastobeintendedtoreachtheconsumerin
theconditioninwhichitleavesthemanufacturer,andthemanufacturertakesstepstoensurethis
bysealingorotherwiseclosingthecontainersothatthecontentscannotbetamperedwith,Iregard
hiscontrolasremainingeffectiveuntilthearticlereachestheconsumerandthecontainerisopened
byhim.Theinterventionofanyexterioragencyisintendedtobeexcluded,andwasinfactinthe
presentcaseexcluded.Itisdoubtfulwhetherinsuchacasethereisanyredressagainstthe
retailerGordonv.M'Cardy.2
Theburdenofproofmustalwaysbeupontheinjuredpartytoestablishthatthedefectwhich
causedtheinjurywaspresentinthearticlewhenitleftthehandsofthepartywhomhesuesthat
thedefectwasoccasionedbythecarelessnessofthatpartyandthatthecircumstancesaresuchas
tocastuponthedefenderadutytotakecarenottoinjurethepursuer.Thereisnopresumptionof
negligenceinsuchacaseasthepresent,noristhereanyjustificationforapplyingthemaximres
ipsaloquitur.Negligencemustbebothaverredandproved.Theappellantacceptsthisburdenof
proof,and,inmyopinion,sheisentitledtohaveanopportunityofdischargingitifshecan.Iam
accordinglyofopinion
16Ex.761,atp.768.
2(1903)6F.210.

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thatthisappealshouldbeallowed,thejudgmentoftheSecondDivisionoftheCourtofSession
reversed,andthejudgmentoftheLordOrdinaryrestored.
INTERLOCUTORappealedfromreversedandinterlocutoroftheLordOrdinaryrestoredcauseremitted
backtotheCourtofSessioninScotlandtodothereinasshallbejustandconsistentwiththe
judgmenttherespondenttopaytotheappellantthecostsofthisactionintheInnerHouseand
alsothecostsincurredbyherinrespectoftheappealtothisHouse,muchlastmentionedcoststo
betaxedinthemannerusualwhenthenappellantsuesinformapauperis.
HORNER&HORNERW.G.LEECHMAN&CO.LAWRENCEJONES&CO.MACPHERSON&MACKAY ,W.S.

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