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[G.R. No. 58876. November 27, 1990.

]
ANICETO RAMOS, Petitioner, v. THE SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Respondents.
Recto T . Racho for Petitioner.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; TRIAL; DISCHARGE OF AN ACCUSED TO BE A STATE WITNESS, EXPRESSLY LEFT TO THE
SOUND DISCRETION OF THE COURT; EFFECT OF ERROR IN THE EXERCISE OF SUCH DISCRETION. The
discharge of an accused in order that he may be utilized as a state witness is expressly left to the sound discretion of the
court. The Court has the exclusive responsibility to see that the conditions prescribed by the rule exist (People v. Ibanez,
etc., Et Al., 92 Phil. 936 [1953]). For the law seeks to regulate the manner of enforcement of the regulations in the sound
discretion of the court. The grant of discretion in cases of this kind under this provision was not a grant of arbitrary
discretion to the trial courts, but such is to be exercised with due regard to the correct administration of justice. (People v.
De Atras, 28 SCRA 389 [1969]). It has, however, been ruled that while it is the duty of the trial judge to exercise a sound
discretion in conformity with the provisions of the statute, if he fails in the performance of his duty, or errs in the exercise of
his discretion in this regard, such error does not relieve from criminal responsibility the guilty participants who are not
discharged to be used as witnesses, any more than a similar error in the weighing of the evidence submitted at the trial
which results in the acquittal of one of several co-accused, who was in truth and in fact a guilty participant in the crime
charged against them, will afford a claim of exemption from criminal liability by the other accused who were properly
convicted (United States v. Abanzado, 37 Phil. 666 [1918]). While the discharge of Benavidez as state witness under the
circumstances, was not in accordance with Section 9(d), Rule 119, nonetheless, in line with settled rulings and
precedents, his testimony has to be admitted. But in accepting the testimony of a co-accused-turned-state witness, this
Court is not unmindful of the principle that in such a case, the testimony of the witness should be received with great
caution and should be carefully scrutinized (People v. Gongora, 8 SCRA 473 [1963]).
2. ID.; EVIDENCE; CONSPIRACY; FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT ON THE EXISTENCE THEREOF, SHOULD NOT
BE DISTURBED IF LOGICAL AND BASED ON THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD; NEED NOT BE PROVED BY DIRECT
EVIDENCE. It has been ruled that the findings of the trial court on the existence of conspiracy should not be disturbed
where such findings are not only logical but also because they are based on evidence appearing in the record (People v.
Arhis, 144 SCRA 691 [1986]). Similarly, jurisprudence supports the contention that it is not necessary that conspiracy be
proved by direct evidence as the same can be inferred from acts of the accused (People v. Pineda, 157 SCRA 73 [1988]).
Thus, conspiracy exists where the evidence on record shows that the questioned documents were prepared and
processed by the government officials involved in connection with the performance of their official functions and duties
and the anomalous transactions could not have been made possible without the connivance of the persons concerned
(Bernabe v. Sandiganbayan, 160 SCRA 683 [1988]). In the case at bar, the testimony of Benavidez is duly corroborated
by physical evidence such as the vouchers, the instructing notes, the postal money orders, as well as the incriminating
letters, all of which persuasively show the criminal conspiracy among the four postal officials.
3. CRIMINAL LAW; LIABILITY; RULE AND EXCEPTION ON THE EXISTENCE THEREOF; ELEMENT OF MALICIOUS
INTENT, SUPPLIED BY THE ELEMENT OF NEGLIGENCE AND IMPRUDENCE. In general, evil intent must unite with
an unlawful act for there to be a crime. Ignorance or mistake as to particular facts, honest and real, will as a general rule,
exempt the doer from criminal responsibility. The exception, however, is neglect in the discharge of duty or indifference to
consequences, which is equivalent to criminal intent. The element of malicious intent is supplied by the element of
negligence and imprudence (People v. Pacana, 47 Phil. 55 [1924]). In the case at bar, the negligence if not criminal intent
of appellant in paying the vouchers in question, is beyond question.
4. ID.; JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES; ACTING IN OBEDIENCE TO A LAWFUL ORDER ISSUED BY A SUPERIOR,
NOT APPLICABLE WHERE THERE IS A CLEAR VIOLATION OF LAW AND THE OFFICER IS NOT AN IMMEDIATE
SUPERVISOR. Neither can petitioner be declared as having merely obeyed a lawful order issued by a superior officer;
there being a clear violation of Circular No. 40, series of 1974 of the Bureau of Posts, while Galinato, on whose order
Ramos supposedly paid the questioned vouchers, was not even his immediate supervisor.
DECISION
BIDIN, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari of the decision dated November 6, 1981, of the Sandiganbayan (First Division) in Criminal
Case No. 918 promulgated on November 11, 1981, finding Aniceto Ramos and his co-accused, Constantino Galinato,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals of the complex crime of Malversation of Public Funds Through Falsification
of Public Documents and sentencing them to an indeterminate penalty ranging from nine (9) years, one (1) month and
eleven (11) days of prision mayor, as minimum, to thirteen (13) years, seven (7) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, to suffer perpetual special disqualification, to pay a fine of P9,720 and to indemnify the
Government of the Philippines (Bureau of Posts) in the amount of P9,720 (Rollo, pp. 90-100).
Accused Aniceto Ramos y Javate was a regular employee of Postal Region I (Exhibits "A", "A-1" and "A-2") and assigned
as Postmaster of Bauang, La Union from 1970 to December, 1976. Accused German Samonte y Jacildo was an
employee in the same Postal Region I (Exhibits "B" and "B-1") and assigned as Postmaster of the Nalinac Post Office,

Bauang, La Union, from May 1975 until August 15, 1976 when he was reassigned in Naguilian, La Union, until his
resignation on September 28, 1977. Accused Constante Galinato y Marinas was likewise employed in the same Postal
Region I as Supervising Postal Service Officer I (Exhibits "D" and "D-1").
Under Circular No. 40 dated September 18, 1974 of the Acting Postmaster General, motorcycle allowance for letter
carriers using motorcycles in the delivery of mails was increased to P60.00 a month effective July 1, 1974. Authority was
given to postmasters to allow the letter carriers concerned to collect their allowance from postal collections at the
increased rate to be charged as budgetary expenses (Exhibit "J"). Implementing the aforesaid Circular No. 40, the Chief of
Finance and Management Division, Bureau of Posts, in a memorandum to the Acting Postal Regional Director, Region I,
San Fernando, La Union, directed that payment of motorcycle allowance of letter carriers be allowed from "the postal
collections of the postmaster concerned where the letter carrier is assigned effective the date when the letter carrier
actually used the motorcycle in the delivery of mails." This memorandum was circularized by the Officer-in-Charge of
Postal Region I per Circular No. 3 dated February 19, 1976. It was there specifically stated that "payment of motorcycle
allowance of letter carriers shall be made by the postmaster under whose office said employees . . . are assigned which
must be certified in the voucher or payroll as the case may be." (Exhibit "J-1")
Pursuant to the memorandum of the Regional Director of Postal Region I dated August 11, 1976 (Exhibit "G"), Regional
Auditing Examiner Rodolfo Ramirez y Rodriguez conducted an audit examination of the accounts of the postmasters in
the Province of La Union, among them the postmaster of Nalinac Beach and Bauang Post Offices. In the course of his
examination, Mr. Ramirez discovered spurious vouchers (Exhibits "E", "E-1" to E-23") in the Bauang Post Office covering
payments of motorcycle gasoline allowance of letter carriers not assigned to that particular post office, and similar
spurious vouchers (Exhibits "F", "F-1" to "F-6") in the Nalinac Beach Post Office. The postmasters assigned in Bauang
and Nalinac who made the payments of the vouchers were accused Aniceto J. Ramos and German J. Samonte,
respectively. Examiner Ramirez submitted a memorandum dated September 14, 1976 to the Regional Director on his
examination of the Nalinac Beach Post Office and other post offices in La Union (Exhibit "H"), and a separate
memorandum dated October 14, 1976 on his examination of the Bauang Post Office (Exhibit "I-1"). In both memoranda,
the discovery of spurious claim vouchers representing payments of motorcycle allowance of letter carriers not assigned to
either Nalinac Beach or Bauang Post Offices was reported. This discovery was reported to the Central Office, Bureau of
Posts, in Manila which forthwith disallowed the forged claim vouchers paid by Postmasters Aniceto Ramos and German
Samonte and recalled the credit advances previously issued to them relating to the said irregular vouchers (Exhibits "K"
and "K-1"). Examiner Ramirez also sent a demand letter to accused Postmaster Aniceto Ramos for the restitution of the
shortage found in his accounts amounting to P13,320.00 (Exhibit "L").
On February 18, 1990, the petitioner-appellant was charged, together with Constante Galinato and Ernesto Benavidez,
with Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public Documents in an information filed by Tanodbayan
Prosecutor Jose G. Ferrer with the Sandiganbayan (Criminal Case No. 918) which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That on or about the period comprised from November 28, 1975 to July 19, 1976, inclusive, in the Municipality of Bauang,
La Union, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,Accused ANICETO RAMOS, then a postmaster of
the Post Office of Bauang, La Union, having been appointed and qualified as such, and therefore, an accountable officer
responsible for public funds collected and received by him in the exercise of his duties and functions, and conniving,
confederating and conspiring with his co-accused CONSTANTE GALINATO, then Supervisor and Acting Chief of the
Operations Division of the Regional Office of the Bureau of Post, San Fernando, La Union, did then and there, wilfully,
feloniously, unlawfully and fraudulently misappropriate, misapply, embezzle and take away the total sum of ELEVEN
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED FORTY PESOS (P11,640.00), Philippine Currency, and converted and appropriated the
same for their personal use and benefit, by making it appear that David Bisoy, Gavino Apilado, Florencio Ramos,
Bienvenido Edralin, Pepito Samson, Dante Biscocho, William Olano, Dionisio Ochinang, Hector Centeno, Celestino
Gasmen, Bienvenido Yaba, Hilario Guzman, Gabriel Alconis, Lucino Bravo, Jose Taclas, Leonardo Frando, Alejandro
Piaoan, Gil Blanco, Nicencio Barlahan, Benito Mangawang, Ernesto Gumawid, German Estoesta, Matias Dumo, Simplicio
Lusan, and Gregorio Villanueva, all letter-carriers and employees of the Bureau of Post, Region I, had filed and claimed
their motorcycle allowances allegedly covered by Vouchers Nos. D-1, D-2,D-3, D-4,D-11,D-12, D-18, D-19, D-21, D-22, D23, D-24, D-25, D-26, D-28, D-40, D-41, D-42, D-70, D-76, D-77, D-86, D-99 and D-100, respectively, when in truth and in
fact they did not, as all their signatures on the aforesaid vouchers are all forged and falsified, and that neither of them
(letter-carriers) received or benefited from the payments of proceeds thereof, Accused CONSTANTE GALINATO caused
the presentation and payment of the falsified vouchers, Accused ERNESTO BENAVIDEZ presented the falsified vouchers
to, and received payment from, his co-accused, ANICETO RAMOS, and that accused ANICETO RAMOS certified to the
correctness of the claim for motorcycle allowances and paid for the same although he doubted the authenticity of the
signatures of the supposed claimants, to the damage and prejudice of the government in the aforesaid amount of
ELEVEN THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED FORTY PESOS (P11,640.00), Philippine Currency, and to the interest of the public
service.
CONTRARY TO LAW." (Original Record, pp. 1-2)
Upon arraignment, Accused Galinato, Ramos and Benavidez pleaded not guilty in Criminal Case No. 918 (Original
Record, pp. 26, 27 and 28). Trial ensued.
At the instance of the prosecution, Accused Ernesto Benavidez, an audit examiner of the Bureau of Posts in Region I, was
discharged from the Information in all the cases and utilized as one of the Peoples witnesses.
In Criminal Case No. 918, out of the twenty-five (25) letter-carriers named in the information, only twenty (20) testified.
They all disowned their supposed signatures in the vouchers ascribed to them, denied having filed any claim for
motorcycle allowance for the periods and received the amounts reflected therein or authorized anybody to file any claim
for them, or rendered service in the Bauang, La Union Post Office.
The principal witness for the prosecution against petitioner Aniceto Ramos, the sole appellant in this case, is the

discharged accused turned state witness, Ernesto Benavidez y Blanco, who testified as follows: From 1970 to 1980, he
was an employee of the Bureau of Posts where he started as Accounting Clerk I, then as Senior Clerk and later as Audit
Examiner from June 16, 1976 to July, 1980. When he was assigned in the Regional Office of the Bureau of Posts at San
Fernando, La Union from 1973 to 1980, his immediate superior was the Chief of the Administrative Division, Bernardo
Tugade. He denied having been under the direct supervision of accused Constante Galinato. He met for the first time
Constante Galinato in 1973 and, thereafter, they had been meeting in the Regional Office almost everyday. It was
sometime in May, 1975 that Galinato and a certain Blandino Gabriel, a buyer in the Regional Office, invited him to a round
of drinks at the Symphony Restaurant, San Fernando, La Union. Because of his need for money, he agreed to deliver fake
motorcycle allowance vouchers. The said vouchers were to be prepared by Blandino Gabriel and Francisco Asporias and
to be delivered by him to either the Nalinac Beach or Bauang Post Office. The proceeds of the vouchers would be divided
in the following manner: 10% to Gabriel; 30% to the Postmaster; 50% to Galinato; and 10% to him (Benavidez). On June
2, 1975, he met Gabriel at Galinatos office and with Galinato proceeded to the Nalinac Beach where he was given fake
vouchers by Galinato in the name of Crispin Fangon, signed by Samonte. Thereafter, postal money order checks payable
to Galinato were issued. He was then introduced as Galinatos trusted man. Another delivery of fake vouchers were made
by Galinato on June 25, 1975 to Samonte which was followed on July l5, 1975. Benavidez was instructed later by
Galinato to deliver gasoline allowance vouchers to either Nalinac Beach or Bauang Post Office. The voucher was in the
name of Santiago Asuncion, signed by Samonte who paid the amount to Benavidez in postal money order. It was
encashed by Benavidez upon the order of Galinato when he returned to the regional office. Two more notes with similar
instructions were given to him on different occasions (Exhibits "N" and "N-1"). The vouchers given to him with the notes
were Exhibits "E", "E-1" to "E-3", "E-5" to "E-14", "E-16" to "E-19", "E-22" and "E-23", and Exhibits "F", "F-1" to "F-6",
which were all signed by Gabriel Asporias and Galinato above the printed phrase "Signature of Creditor." He brought the
vouchers (Exhibits "E", "E-1" to "E-3", "E-5" to "E-14", "E-16" to "E-19", "E-22" and "E-23") to Bauang Postmaster Aniceto
Ramos who signed them and gave him the corresponding amounts of the vouchers, some in cash and some in postal
money orders, less Postmaster Ramos 30% share in each voucher. The rest of the proceeds, amounting to 70% of the
face value of the vouchers was turned over by him (Benavidez) to Galinato who gave him (Benavidez) his 10% share and
10% to Gabriel. As to the other vouchers (Exhibits "F", "F-1" to "F-6"), he delivered them to Postmaster Samonte at the
Nalinac Beach Post Office. Samonte signed the vouchers and paid him their value, some in plain cash and the others in
postal money orders (Exhibits "P", "P-1" to "P-8") less the 30% share of Samonte in each voucher. Some of the postal
money orders (Exhibits "P", "P-1" to "P-3", "P-7" and "P-8") were issued in his name (Benavidez) as payee, while Exhibits
"P-4" to "P-6" in Galinatos name as the payee, all of these postal money orders were signed by Samonte as Issuing
Employee." All the persons whose names appear as "Remitter" were fictitious. On his return to San Fernando, he
delivered the cash and the postal money orders to Galinato who signed those issued in his (Galinatos) name (Exhibits "P4" to "P-6"). He was instructed by Galinato to cash all the postal money order checks. Galinato then gave him his 10%
share. Benavidez further claimed that sometime in May, 1986, Accused Samonte and Ramos went to the Regional Office
looking for Galinato but failed to meet him because Galinato had been designated Acting Postmaster of Baguio City.
Learning this, Ramos and Samonte each prepared a letter (Exhibits "O" and "O-1") and asked him to deliver to Galinato
which he did.
On the other hand, the defense presented petitioner Aniceto Ramos to testify in his behalf. His version is as follows:
Sometime in November, 1975, Benavidez presented to him a voucher of Benito Mangawang for P960.00 and a note from
Ernesto Ochavez, the Special Disbursing Officer of Region I, urging him to pay the voucher. He paid it to Benavidez who
told him that Mangawang was a letter carrier. He met Benavidez again in December, 1975. This time, Benavidez
presented to him some more vouchers for payment, followed by still other vouchers the last of which was either in June or
July, 1976. These vouchers were Exhibits "E" to "E-23." They were already signed by the creditors when presented to him.
Although the payees were not presented, were unknown to him and he knew them to be not assigned in his office, he paid
the vouchers to Benavidez in good faith on the strength of the letter of Ochavez and two (2) letters from Constante
Galinato (one of them is Exhibit "9-Ramos") handed to him by Benavidez which instructed him to pay the vouchers and
enter them in his record of collections. That letter of Ochavez and the other letter of Galinato were taken by District Postal
Inspector Natalio Robles. Further bases of his action were the credit advices (Exhibits "8-A" to "8-H-Ramos") he received
from the Central Office of the Bureau of Posts which did not disallow any of the previous paid vouchers. About 3 or 4
vouchers were paid in money orders which he entered in his record of collections while the rest were paid in cash duly
entered in his record of payments. He did not deduct any amount or receive any share from these vouchers he paid. From
November, 1975 to June or July, 1976, his accounts were periodically audited but not one of those vouchers was
disallowed. But after the August, 1976 audit of his accounts by Auditor Rodolfo Ramirez, the said vouchers were
disallowed. He then sent telegrams to all the creditors/payees in the vouchers asking them to return the payments to him
(Exhibits "4" to "4-N-Ramos"). He disowned Exhibit "O", the letter dated May 6, 1976, ascribed to him by Benavidez as not
his letter, pointing out that the signature therein is not his. He made several signatures before the Court to show that none
matched the signature in aforesaid letter (TSN, February 5, 1981, pp. 43-76).
After trial, the respondent court found accused-appellant together with Constante M. Galinato guilty, the dispositive portion
of which reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, in new of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x

2) In Criminal Case No. 918, finding the accused Aniceto J. Ramos and Constante M. Galinato guilty beyond reasonable
doubt as principals of the complex crime of Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public Document, as
defined and penalized in Article 217, No. 3, and Article 171, No. 2, in relation to Article 48, all of the Revised Penal Code,
without mitigating or aggravating circumstances; and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, sentencing each of them
to an indeterminate penalty ranging from NINE (9) YEARS, ONE (1) MONTH and ELEVEN (11) DAYS of prision mayor, as
minimum, to THIRTEEN (13) YEARS, SEVEN (7) MONTHS and TWENTY (20) DAYS of reclusion temporal, as maximum,
to suffer perpetual special disqualification, to pay a fine of P9,720 and to indemnify the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines (Bureau of Post) in the same amount of P9,720;

x"

(Original Record, p. 399; Decision, p. 31)


Petitioner is the only accused-appellant who elevated this case to this Court and raised the following assignment of
errors:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF ERNESTO BENAVIDEZ, AN
ACCUSED TURNED STATE WITNESS.
II
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE EXISTENCE OF A CONSPIRACY BETWEEN HEREIN
PETITIONER AND THE OTHER ACCUSED.
III
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT HAVING RULED THAT PETITIONER HAS ACTED IN GOOD FAITH AND
WITHOUT ANY CRIMINAL INTENT.
IV
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DECLARE THAT PETITIONER MERELY OBEYED A LAWFUL ORDER
ISSUED BY A SUPERIOR OFFICER.
I.
Petitioner contends that a perusal of the information filed against the accused would readily show that Ernesto Benavidez
played a very major and a substantial role in the aforesaid cases; among which are the following: (a) it was Ernesto
Benavidez himself who personally caused the preparations of the alleged spurious vouchers and (b) it was Ernesto
Benavidez himself who, in all instances personally collected and received from the postmasters concerned all of the
amounts represented by the alleged spurious vouchers. Nonetheless, despite the objection of his co-accused that
Benavidez was the most guilty and would, therefore, not qualify as state witness under Rule 119, Section 9(d), the latter
was discharged as such, on the ground that the prosecution cannot prove the offenses charged without
him.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
The discharge of an accused in order that he may be utilized as a state witness is expressly left to the sound discretion of
the court. Thus, Section 9 of Rule 119, as amended, provides as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 9. Discharge of accused to be state witness. When two or more persons are jointly charged with the commission
of any offense, upon motion of the prosecution before resting its case, the court may direct one or more of the accused to
be discharged with their consent so that they may be witnesses for the state when after requiring the prosecution to
present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge, the
court is satisfied that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested;
(b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony
of said accused;
(c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points;
(d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty;
(e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.
Evidence adduced in support of the discharge shall automatically form part of the trial. If the court denies the motion for
discharge of the accused as state witness, his sworn statement shall be inadmissible in evidence."cralaw virtua1aw library
The Court has the exclusive responsibility to see that the conditions prescribed by the rule exist (People v. Ibanez, etc., Et
Al., 92 Phil. 936 [1953]). For the law seeks to regulate the manner of enforcement of the regulations in the sound
discretion of the court. The grant of discretion in cases of this kind under this provision was not a grant of arbitrary
discretion to the trial courts, but such is to be exercised with due regard to the correct administration of justice. (People v.
De Atras, 28 SCRA 389 [1969])chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
It has, however, been ruled that while it is the duty of the trial judge to exercise a sound discretion in conformity with the

provisions of the statute, if he fails in the performance of his duty, or errs in the exercise of his discretion in this regard,
such error does not relieve from criminal responsibility the guilty participants who are not discharged to be used as
witnesses, any more than a similar error in the weighing of the evidence submitted at the trial which results in the acquittal
of one of several co-accused, who was in truth and in fact a guilty participant in the crime charged against them, will afford
a claim of exemption from criminal liability by the other accused who were properly convicted (United States v. Abanzado,
37 Phil. 666 [1918]).
While the discharge of Benavidez as state witness under the circumstances, was not in accordance with Section 9(d),
Rule 119, nonetheless, in line with settled rulings and precedents, his testimony has to be admitted. But in accepting the
testimony of a co-accused-turned-state witness, this Court is not unmindful of the principle that in such a case, the
testimony of the witness should be received with great caution and should be carefully scrutinized (People v. Gongora, 8
SCRA 473 [1963]).
Petitioner called attention to the fact that the oral testimony of Benavidez is so replete with inconsistencies and with
allegations that are contrary to human nature and experience that they should not have been given credence by the court.
Thus, it was pointed out that Benavidez executed three sworn statements dated December 2, 1976; September 8, 1978;
and October 28, 1980, the latter reiterated almost verbatim in the oral testimony given to the Tanodbayan; all of which are
contradictory with one another; and admitted by the witness himself to be false except the last one given to satisfy the
investigator at the particular time who promised to give him immunity from suit. Likewise, it was noted that Benavidez
produced several typewritten notes purportedly signed by accused Galinato, who ordered him to deliver the vouchers to
Ramos and Samonte, a practice considered absurd and improbable for if indeed there had been a prior arrangement
between Galinato, Benavidez and postmasters Ramos and Samonte, there would not have been a need for the
presentation of said typewritten notes.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
There appears to be no dispute that had the Tanodbayan relied solely on the testimony of Benavidez to establish the guilt
of appellant, it might have failed to prove the latters guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
But it will be noted that the testimony of Benavidez was corroborated by the admissions of appellant Aniceto Ramos
himself, to wit: (a) that he paid the questioned vouchers when presented to him by Benavidez although they were already
signed by the supposed creditors who were not presented to him; (b) that aforesaid creditors were unknown to him and
more importantly; (c) that he knew the supposed payees were not assigned to his office, obviously in violation of Circular
No. 40, series of 1974 of the Bureau of Posts and Implementing Regional Circular No. 3 of Postal Region I providing that
payment of such allowance "shall be made by the Postmaster under whose office said employees . . . are assigned which
must be certified in the voucher or payroll . . . The certification shall include . . . the kind, make and serial number of the
motorcycle." (Exhibit "J-1", Rollo, pp. 93-94). Ramos only excuse is that he paid the vouchers in good faith and on the
strength of the letter of Ochavez and two (2) letters from Constante Galinato handed to him by Benavidez, which
instructed him to pay the vouchers. However, the provision of Regional Circular No. 3 is explicit and unmistakable. His
alleged lack of knowledge thereof is inexcusable, if not improbable considering that the said circular is directly connected
with his duties.
Neither can he avail of the defense that none of his previous paid vouchers were disallowed in audit. Aside from the fact
that the questioned vouchers were spurious and cannot be legalized by the Central Office, the records show that the
credit advices were based on the reports of payment submitted by Ramos without the corresponding vouchers attached,
so that the Central Office would not be in a position to determine whether or not the payees are letter carriers assigned to
the Bauang Post Office of Ramos (Rollo, pp. 97-98).
Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, corroboration of the testimony of Benavidez by the inculpatory
evidence tending to connect and/or implicate Ramos with the offense, is evident. More than that, as found by the
Sandiganbayan, they lend credence to the testimony of Benavidez as to the existence of conspiracy among the accused
(Rollo, p. 95).
II.
It has been ruled that the findings of the trial court on the existence of conspiracy should not be disturbed where such
findings are not only logical but also because they are based on evidence appearing in the record (People v. Arhis, 144
SCRA 691 [1986]).chanrobles law library
Similarly, jurisprudence supports the contention that it is not necessary that conspiracy be proved by direct evidence as
the same can be inferred from acts of the accused (People v. Pineda, 157 SCRA 73 [1988]).
Thus, conspiracy exists where the evidence on record shows that the questioned documents were prepared and
processed by the government officials involved in connection with the performance of their official functions and duties
and the anomalous transactions could not have been made possible without the connivance of the persons concerned
(Bernabe v. Sandiganbayan, 160 SCRA 683 [1988]).
As testified by Benavidez, conspiracy was first established at their first meeting at the Symphony Restaurant where
Galinato convinced Benavidez to join them in the criminal scheme, their subsequent meetings, the preparation of the fake
vouchers and their presentation to the two postmasters Samonte and Ramos, herein petitioner, culminating in the
payment of said fake vouchers.
The involvement of Ramos in this conspiracy, is shown by his payment of the questioned vouchers to payees unknown to
him and not assigned to his post office, in violation of Circular No. 40, series of 1974 and Regional Circular No. 3 of Postal
Region I. The vouchers were presented by Benavidez and honored by Ramos despite their obvious spurious nature,
lending credence to the testimony of Benavidez that they were effected in pursuance of a previous arrangement among

the accused: Galinato, Samonte and Ramos.


Further confirming aforesaid agreement was the letter of Ramos (Exhibit "O") to Galinato urging Galinato to send him
more vouchers. Ramos disowned the signature on the letter and wrote for comparison three (3) specimens, none of which
were similar to the questioned signature. The Sandiganbayan, however, found that the questioned signature is similar to
Ramos signatures on the vouchers he admitted he had signed.
In any event, the testimony of Benavidez is duly corroborated by physical evidence such as the vouchers, the instructing
notes, the postal money orders, as well as the incriminating letters, all of which persuasively show the criminal conspiracy
among the four postal officials.
III.
In general, evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for there to be a crime. Ignorance or mistake as to particular facts,
honest and real, will as a general rule, exempt the doer from criminal responsibility. The exception, however, is neglect in
the discharge of duty or indifference to consequences, which is equivalent to criminal intent. The element of malicious
intent is supplied by the element of negligence and imprudence (People v. Pacana, 47 Phil. 55 [1924]). In the case at bar,
the negligence if not criminal intent of appellant in paying the vouchers in question, is beyond question.
IV.
Neither can petitioner be declared as having merely obeyed a lawful order issued by a superior officer; there being a clear
violation of Circular No. 40, series of 1974 of the Bureau of Posts, while Galinato, on whose order Ramos supposedly paid
the questioned vouchers, was not even his immediate supervisor.chanrobles law library
In view of the foregoing considerations, no cogent reason could be found to reverse the findings and conclusion of the
Sandiganbayan.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is Dismissed and the assailed decision of the Sandiganbayan finding herein petitioner
guilty beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. 918 is Affirmed in toto with costs against the petitioner.

REPORT ON THE JUDICIAL AUDIT CONDUCTED IN THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, BOCAUE, BULACAN
DECISION
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
On account of an anonymous letter[1] dated January 3, 2000 received by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
complaining against Judge Lauro G. Bernardo (respondent), presiding judge of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Bocaue, Bulacan, about his deplorable attitude and inefficiency in the disposition of cases, the Judicial Audit Team of the
OCA conducted on February 8-11, 2000 an audit in the said court.
The report[2] dated March 3, 2000 submitted by the audit team showed that 963 cases (847 criminal and 116
civil/other) were pending in the court as of February 8, 2000, the status of which are shown in the following tabulation:
CASE STATUS/STAGE
OF PROCEEDINGS
With decisions for
promulgation
Submitted for decision
With incidents for
resolution
On trial/Set for hearing
Set for pre-trial
For arraignment of
accused
Set for preliminary
conference
For preliminary

TOTAL
2

CRIMINAL
2

CIVIL
-

126

86

40

504

446

58

39

34

71

71

126

126

investigation
For ex parte reception
of evidence
With orders for
compliance by parties
Subject of inhibition of
Judge Bernardo
Without further action or
setting despite the lapse
of considerable length
of time
With warrants of
arrest/summons
TOTAL

12

52

52

963

847

116

In light of the report, and on recommendation of the OCA, this Court, by Resolution of May 2, 2000, directed:
(a) [respondent] (1) to EXPLAIN within ten (10) days from notice, why no administrative sanction should be imposed
on him for his failure to decide/resolve within the reglementary period reckoned from February 11, 2000
(last day of audit) the following one hundred and three (103) cases submitted for his decision, to wit:
Criminal Cases Nos. 90-333, 92-215, 93-013, 93-208, 93-210, 94-067, 070-94, 94-202, 94-210 to 94-212,
94-218, 94-227, 94-234, 94-282, 94-283, 94-399, 94-403, 94-438, 94-441, 94-461, 94-503, 94-508, 94553, 94-595, 94-602, 94-652, 94-659, 95-001, 95-002, 95-051, 94-052, 95-170 to 95-172, 95-189, 95-218,
95-431, 95-505, 95-749 to 95-752, 96-268, 96-417 to 96-420, 96-431, 96-437 to 96-440, 96-489, 96-761,
97-258, 97-259, and Civil/other Cases Nos. 94-2294, 95-2357, 96-2513, 96-2541, 96-2602 to 96-2613,
96-2615, 96-2616, 96-2619 to 96-2625, 96-2671, 97-2678, 97-2716, 97-2730, 98-2882, 98-2899, 982907, 98-2924, 98-2941, 98-2942, 99-2953, 2960, LRC-P-98-05 and LRC-P-98-06, and the pending
motion in Civil Case No. 95-2466; (2) to DECIDE immediately the aforementioned one hundred and three
(103) cases and the pending motion in Civil Case No. 95-2466, including the following twenty-three (23)
cases submitted for his decision, to wit[:] Criminal Cases Nos. 94-120, 94-174 to 94-179, 95-035, 95-069
to 95-071, 95-092 to 95-096, 95-281, 97-397, 97-640, 97-872, 98-544 and 99-220 and Civil Case No. 962497, and the following seven (7) cases with motions for resolution, to wit: Criminal Cases Nos. 99-360,
99-654, 99-678, MM-039 and MM-075 and Civil Cases Nos. 94-2191 and 99-3073, although these cases
were still within the period to decide/resolve as of audit, otherwise his salaries will be WITHHELD effective
May, 2000, and will be released only upon showing proof that he has rendered his decisions and/or
resolutions in the aforestated cases; (3) to EXPLAIN within ten (10) days from notice, why no court
sessions are scheduled on Tuesdays, in the afternoon of Mondays and Thursdays, and in the morning of
Wednesdays; (4) to immediately TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION on the following twelve (12) cases which
were not further acted on or without further setting, to wit: Criminal Cases Nos. 98-803, 99-693, MM-024,
MM-033 and MM-034, and Civil Cases Nos. 98-2922, 99-2964, 99-3074, 99-3075, 99-3076, 99-3077 and
99-3081, and on the following eleven (11) criminal cases in accordance with Administrative Circular No. 7A-92 dated June 21, 1993, re: Guidelines in the Archiving of Cases, to wit: Criminal Cases Nos. 99-246,
99-339, 99-259, 99-269, 99-336, 99-367, 99-368, 99-369, 99-380, 99-421 and 99-428; (5)
to AVOID unnecessary delay in the issuance of writs of execution of final judgments; (6) to REFRAIN from
conducting lengthy preliminary investigation of cases cognizable by his court; and (7) to SUBMIT within
fifteen (15) days from notice corresponding reports of his compliance with the preceding directives; and
(b) Clerk of Court Ma. Fe O. Dimagiba, same court, (1) to INFORM this Court, through the Office of the Court
Administrator, within five (5) days from notice, whether or not the joint decision in Criminal Cases Nos. 95179 and 95-180 [has] been promulgated as scheduled on February 21, 2000; and (2) to CAUSE the
proper accomplishment of certificates of arraignment of the accused in criminal cases and the attachment
thereof to the corresponding records of cases.[3]
Complying with paragraph (b) of the above directiveresolution of this Court, the MTC of Bocaue Clerk of Court Ma.
Fe O. Dimagiba, by 1st Indorsement[4] dated May 30, 2000, informed that the joint decision in Criminal Case Nos. 95-179
and 95-180, which was scheduled for promulgation on February 21, 2000, was reset to February 28, 2000 in view of the
absence of Public Prosecutor Frederick F. Malapit; was again reset to April 10, 2000 in the absence of proof of service of
the subpoena and notice sent to the accused and her counsel; [5] and was finally ordered entered into the docket of the
court on April 10, 2000 in view of the absence of the accused and her counsel despite due notice. [6]
For his part, respondent filed on August 7, 2000 a motion for extension of time [7] to submit his explanation and
comment on the matters subject of this Courts May 2, 2000 Resolution. To the motion respondent attached a status
report[8] of the cases mentioned in the resolution and his alleged written request for further extension of time to
resolve/decide the pending cases audited as of February 2000 which was included in his Certificate of Service [for
February, March and April 2000] and for which [he] is still awaiting approval. By resolution [9] of July 3, 2000, this Court
granted the motion for extension.

On August 1, 2000, respondent filed a motion for additional extension of time [10] to comply with this Courts May 2,
2000 Resolution. To the motion he attached his Certificate of Service for June 2000 wherein he claimed that a request
was made x x x for extension of time to render decision on the cases therein listed.
By Resolution[11] of August 21, 2000, this Court granted the second motion for extension, with warning that no further
extension would be allowed.
On October 30, 2000, respondent again filed a motion for last and ultimate extension of time [12] to comply with the
May 2, 2000 Resolution which was, by Resolution [13] of November 22, 2000, granted with warning that it would definitely
be the last extension.
Respondent finally filed on February 1, 2001 an undated Manifestation of Compliance[14] to the May 2, 2000
Resolution wherein he stated that the 103 cases enumerated in paragraph (a) (1) thereof have been decided except for
Civil Case Nos. 97-2716, 98-2882, 98-2942 and 98-2953, [15] and that he had already decided the 23 cases submitted for
decision and resolved the 7 cases with motion for resolution mentioned in paragraph (a) (2) of the same resolution. [16] As
to the 23 cases mentioned in paragraph (a) (4) of the resolution, he stated that appropriate action had already been taken
and the therein listed 11 cases had been archived in accordance with Administrative Circular No. 7-A-92 (Guidelines in the
Archiving of Cases).[17]
Complying with paragraph (a) (3) of still the same resolution, respondent explained that no court sessions were held
on Tuesdays, Monday afternoons, Wednesday and Thursday mornings because with respect to criminal cases, no
prosecutor is available on said days and time, [18] and with respect to civil cases, only one day sufficed for hearing them.
[19]
Respondent hastened to add, however, that when the court is not in session, he conducts preliminary examination of
witnesses for purposes of issuing warrants of arrest and preliminary investigation of cases cognizable by the Regional
Trial Court; solemnizes marriages; and resolves pending motions and writes decisions of cases. [20] Further, respondent
informed that in compliance with this Courts Resolution, he has avoided delays in the issuance of writs of execution on
final judgments and refrained from conducting lengthy preliminary investigations/examinations. [21]
By Memorandum[22] of May 4, 2001, the OCA recommended that respondent be:
xxx
(a) DIRECTED to
(a-1) SUBMIT within ten (10) days from notice copies of the decisions promulgated/rendered in
the following cases: Criminal Cases Nos. 95-001, 95-002, 95-051, 95-052, 95-431 and 95-505 and
Civil Cases Nos. 97-2678, 95-092 to 096, 97-640, 97-782 and the resolutions in Criminal Nos. 99360, 99-654, 99-678, MM-039, MM-075 and Civil Cases Nos. 94-219 and 99-3073, and
(b-1) INFORM this Court through the Office of the Court Administrator within ten (10) days from
notice, the actual dates when the decisions in the following cases were promulgated/rendered:
Criminal cases Nos. 94-202, 94-282, 94-283, 94-339, 94-403, 94-461, 94-553, 94-595, 96-431,
96-489, 96-761 and 97-258 to 259; and Civil Cases Nos. 95-2357, 97-2730, 98-2907, 98-2941,
94-120, 95-035, 97-397 and 98-544.
(b) ADVISED that he should file a formal request for extension of time for approval of the Court and not
just indicate in his Certificate of Service said request; and
(2) the 1st Indorsement dated 30 May 2000 of Clerk of Court Ma. Fe Dimagiba be considered satisfactory compliance with
the resolution dated 2 May 2000. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
which this Court approved by Resolution dated July 11, 2001.
On August 27, 2001, respondent submitted another undated Manifestation of Compliance[23] to this Courts July 11,
2001 Resolution to which he attached duplicate original/photocopies of his decisions in the cases mentioned therein
except for Criminal Case Nos. 95-092 to 95-096 which he claimed [24] to be still pending trial but were erroneously included
as having been decided.[25] He also stated that beginning October 2001, a formal request for additional time to
render/promulgate decisions would be filed for approval by this Court. [26]
By Memorandum[27] of April 3, 2002, the OCA recommended that the matter be re-docketed as a regular
administrative matter which recommendation this Court finds well-taken.
Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins a judge to dispose of the courts business promptly and decide
cases within the required periods. The Constitution in fact mandates that lower courts should resolve cases within 3
months, clearly intended to prevent delay in the administration of justice which erodes the faith and confidence of our
people in the judiciary, lowers its standards, and brings it into disrepute. [28]
Respondent did not indicate in his undated Manifestation of Compliance when he decided a total of 115
cases. Unquestionably though, they were decided beyond the reglementary period. Why he did not comply with the
reglementary period of 90 days to render a decision, he did not also explain. [29]
When judges are unable to render a decision within the required period, they are not without remedy. It is not
uncommon for this Court, upon proper application and in meritorious cases, especially when difficult questions of law or
complex issues are involved, to grant judges of lower courts additional time to decide beyond the 90-day period. [30] In
respondents case however, he never requested for additional time to decide the cases submitted for decision. As correctly
observed by the OCA, the only instance that he attempted to seek approval for additional time was when he submitted
certificates of service after the conduct of the audit.[31]

This Court notes that as found by the OCA and reflected in the record on hand, the following reasons aggravated the
delay of respondent in the disposition of cases:
1. Sessions are held only three days a week;
2. Administrative Circular No. 7-A-92 dated June 21, 1993 was not faithfully complied with;
3. Cases cognizable by the court still go through the preliminary investigation process; and
4. Failure to properly observe the following circulars:
a) Administrative Circular No. 1 dated January 28, 1998, reiterated in Administrative Circular 10-94 dated
June 29, 1994 regarding effective docket control; and
b) Circular No. 13 dated July 1, 1987, reiterated in Administrative Circular No. 3-99 dated January 15, 1999
regarding the guidelines to insure the speedy disposition of cases.
Respondents delayed disposition of a big number of cases reflects the cramming done by him in rendering of
decisions, which should not be the manner in which judges should render decisions. For decision-making entails a
thorough study of the evidence presented and the applicable laws for each case.
The administrative complaint against respondent arose in 2000. Hence, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court,
before it was amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, which took effect on October 1, 2001, applies, for the amendment cannot
apply retroactively.[32] Section 10 of said Rule 140 provides for the following:
Section 10. Sanctions.
xxx
B. If the respondent is found culpable of having committed a less serious charge, any of the following sanctions shall be
imposed:
1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for one (1) to two (2) months and twenty-nine
days; or
2. A fine not less than P10,000 but not more than P19,999.
xxx
WHEREFORE, Judge Lauro G. Bernardo is adjudged administratively liable for undue delay in rendering decisions
and is hereby FINED in the amount of P19,000.00, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts
in the future shall be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this decision be filed in the records of Judge Bernardo.
SO ORDERED.

REPORT ON THE JUDICIAL AUDIT CONDUCTED IN THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 5, ILIGAN CITY
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before this Court is the Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5, Iligan City on
May 29, 2002.
The Report states:
Based on the records actually presented to and examined by the audit team, the court has a caseload of two hundred
thirty-three cases as of May 29, 2002 (129 criminal cases and 104 civil/other cases) . . .
...
The . . . cases submitted for decision are still within the reglementary period within which to decide except Civil Case No.
4681 entitled Alferes vs. MCC for Nullity of Certificate of Sale which was submitted for decision August 26, 2001 but
remained unresolved as of audit date . . .
...
Also, there are cases with pending motion or incident which remain unresolved although still within the reglementary
period . . .

...
There are likewise seven (7) cases without any further action and/or no further setting was undertaken by the court for a
considerable length of time, to wit: Criminal Cases Nos. 8231, 8515, 7876 and 8955 and Civil Cases Nos. 5525, SP 5691
and SP 5858.
Further, Civil Cases Nos. 5431 and 5286 may already be archived in accordance with Administrative Circular No. 7-A-92,
dated June 21, 1993, Re: Guidelines in the Archiving of Cases.
On the other hand, in Criminal Case No. 9384 entitled People vs. A. Palomar for Violation of PD 1866, the accused was
arraigned on April 23, 2002. A motion for reinvestigation was filed by the accused on May 4, 2002 and one of his grounds
in his motion for reinvestigation is that he was not yet arraigned. Considering that the prosecution did not object to the
motion of the accused, the court allowed the same when it issued an Order dated May 17, 2002 directing the City
Prosecutor to terminate the supposed reinvestigation within thirty (30) days. Is this not contrary to the rules considering
that a motion for reinvestigation should be taken prior to arraignment of the accused? In this case, the accused was
already arraigned.[1]
Based on said report, the Court, on December 9, 2002, directed Judge Maximino Magno-Libre, Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5 of Iligan City: (1) to explain his failure to decide within the reglementary period Civil
Case No. 4681, entitled Alferes vs. MCC; (2) to inform the Court whether he has decided Criminal Case No. 8309 and
Civil Cases Nos. 3716, 3999, 4371 and 5845 within the ninety-day period and resolved the pending motions or incidents
in Civil Cases Nos. 4751, 5663, 5672, 5726 and 5917 within the reglementary period; (3) to submit to the Court certified
copies of the decisions/resolutions in the cases aforementioned fifteen days from their promulgation; (4) to take immediate
action in Criminal Cases Nos. 8231, 8515, 7876 and 8955 and Civil Cases Nos. 5525, SP 5691 and SP 5858; (5) to take
appropriate action in Civil Cases Nos. 5431 and 5286; and (6) to explain why Criminal Case No. 9384, entitled People vs.
A. Palomar for Violation of P.D. No. 1866 was still allowed to be reinvestigated notwithstanding the fact that the accused
therein was already arraigned.[2]
In a letter dated February 27, 2003, Judge Libre submitted his explanation as follows:
2. That except in Civil Cases No. 3716 and Civil 06-3999 all the other cases mentioned in the said resolution had been
terminated/resolved and issues or incidents had been acted upon by the undersigned, they are to wit:
Case No.

1.

Civil Case No.


4681

Name & Nature of the Case

Alfredo Alferez vs. Mla Cordage Co.


For: Declaration of Nullity of Cert. of
Sale & other related documents &
Damages

Date Resolved/ Action


Taken
Decided based on
Compromise Agreement
last June 7, 2002

Annex

Note: After the parties have submitted their evidences in writing, counsel for the plaintiff informed the court that they are
going to enter into compromise agreement which will be submitted to the court for approval. Parties eventually submitted
their compromise agreement on June 7, 2002 which was approved by the Court on the same date.
2.

3.

Crim. Case
No. 8309

People of the Phils. vs. Rudelino Ablin

Civil Case No.


4371

Development Bank of the Phils. vs. Alejo


T. Uy

For: Violation of R.A. 6425

Dismissed last October 2,


2002

Decided last Nov. 20,


2002

For: Deficiency Claim with Prel.


Attachment
4.

Civil Case No.


5845

Elpedio Kwan vs. Ellen Dumanhug

Decided based on the


merits last November 26,
2002

5.

Civil Case No.


4751

Isabel Racasa vs. Iligan Light & Power


Inc.

Decided on the merits on


Nov. 26, 2002

6.

Civil Case No.


5663

Sultan Baguan M. Mamiscal & Adelaida


L. Mamiscal vs. Gregorio T. Lluch &
Sons, Inc. For: Rescission and Sum of
Money with Damages

Motion filed by plaintiff


seeking with leave to
amend plaintiffs complaint
was resolved in an orders
(sic) issued dated May
30, 2002 and April 11,
2002. This case was also
set for pre-trial on March
31, 2003 as per order of

F
G&
H

the court dated Feb. 20,


2003
7.

Sp. Proc. No.


5672

In the matter of the Intestate Estate of


the Late Ana Tabimina Halibas v. Miguel
Halibas

Dismissed last Sept. 9,


2002

8.

Civil Case No.


5726

Spouses Pimaco L. Dumaug & Virginia


C. Dumaug

The motion seeking


admission for amended
answer has been
resolved in an order
issued on May 30, 2002.
The case is set for
continuance of pre-trial on
April 10, 2003 as per
order of the court dated
Feb. 18, 2002.

For: Specific Performance with Prel.


Injunction & Damages

9.

Civil Case No.


5917

Lian Hong Co., Inc. rep. by Jason Sy vs.


Sps. Constancio & Annette Baliog

J&
K

Decided last Nov. 29,


2002

For: Collection of a Sum of Money


10.

Crim. Case
No. 8231

People of the Phils vs. Armando Monion


alias Apiot, Ronilio Monion, et al.

Dismissed last July 8,


2002

11.

Crim. Case
No. 8515

People of the Phils vs. Bobby Madarieta,


et al.

Archived last Sept. 25,


2002

Pleaded guilty last Sept.


11, 2002

Consolidated to RTC 02
on Sept. 11, 2002

For: Robbery
12.

Crim. Case
No. 7876

People of the Phils vs. Manuel Agbu, Eric


Ello, Danilo Saligumba, et al.
For: Robbery

13.

Crim. Case
No. 8985

People of the Phils vs. Regina Flores

14.

Civil Case No.


5525

Rosie Maus, in her capacity as member


of the Board of Director of Abalos AgroIndustrial Corp. vs. Abalos Agro Industrial
Corp., Lucina A. Ferraren, Herminia
Labarro, et al.

Dismissed last January


23, 2003

15.

Sp. Proc. No.


5691

In the matter of the Petition for allowance


of will of Segundina Vitalis Benitez vs.
Arturo Benitez

Probate of Will Granted


last June 14, 2002

For: ESTAFA thru falsification of Private


Document

For: Probate of Will


16.

Sp. Proc. No.


5858

In Re: Petition for cancellation of entry in


the Birth Certificate of Walter Ala Sy Roa
Simeon Roa, Jr. vs. The Local Civil
Registrar of Iligan City

Probate of Will Granted


last June 4, 2002

17.

Civil Case No.


5431

Paul Joseph B. Deleste & Cristina B.


Deleste vs. Rajah Travel Corp.

Dismissed last July 2,


2002

Dismissed last July 8,


2002

For: Damages
18.

Sp. Civil Action


No. 5286

Employees of the Department &


Environment & Natural Resources
Community Environment & Natural
Resources Office No. XII-A (DENRCENRO XII-1A Iligan City) numbering to
139 rep. by Basher Mangodato, Mana
Datumanong, Cayamura Abdulcarim &
Redobor Pango vs. The Dept. of
Environment & Natural Resources

(DENR) National Office of Diliman


Quezon City
19.

Crim. Case
No. 9384

People of the Phils vs. Palomar

Pleaded guilty last Sept.


16, 2002

In Civil Case No. 3966, entitled Rural Transit of Mindanao, Inc. vs. Lian Hong Company For: Damages and Civil Case No
3716, entitled Rogelio Villaruz vs. Rural Transit of Mindanao Inc. Counsel of the Plaintiff in Civil Case No. 3716 and
counsel for the defendant in Civil Case No. 3966 has filed an ex parte motion for extension of time to file their
memoranda. Court has granted the motion and they are given up to March 4, 2003 within which to file said memoranda,
attached is the order dated Feb. 17, 2003 marked as Annex W. However, whether the counsel will file the memoranda,
undersigned Presiding Judge will decide the case immediately . . . [3]
In the said letter, Judge Libre also asked for the understanding and compassion of this Court. [4]
In a Resolution dated August 6, 2003, the Courts Second Division referred the said letter to the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) for its evaluation, report and recommendation. [5]
In a Memorandum dated September 23, 2003, OCAs Deputy Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock recommended
that Judge Libre be directed to inform this Court whether he has already decided Civil Cases Nos. 3716 and 3999, to
submit copies of the decisions thereof, and to further comply with the Resolution of December 9, 2002 which directed him
to explain why he allowed the reinvestigation of Criminal Case No. 9384 despite the fact that the accused was already
arraigned on April 23, 2002. He likewise requested that his office be allowed to submit its report and recommendation
within thirty days from receipt of the full compliance of Judge Libre with the resolution of December 9, 2002. [6]
Judge Libre thereafter submitted his letter dated December 1, 2003 which states as follows:
Civil Case No. 3716 was already decided last March 31, 2003. Please take note that we dont have a civil case docketed
as No. 3999 raffled to our sala and registered in our docket of civil cases. What we have is Civil Case No. 3966 and this is
also already decided last March 3, 2003. As to Criminal Case No. 9384, this was also already decided last September 16,
2002. In fact, the accused in this case after his conviction, applied for probation and this was given due course last
September 19, 2002.
As a matter of fact, this matter was already reported by our Clerk of Court to the Office of the Court Administrator, as
shown by the monthly reports hereto enclosed as Annexes A and B. For Civil Cases Nos. 3716 and 3966 covered by
Annex A, this was covered by the report of March 2003, while for Criminal Case No. 9384 covered by Annex B, this was
covered by the monthly report of September 2002 [7]
The Court, through its Resolution dated February 4, 2004, noted the above quoted letter of Judge Libre. It also noted
that Judge Libre has not complied with the Resolution dated December 9, 2002, which ordered him to explain why he
allowed the reinvestigation of Criminal Case No. 9384 despite the fact that the accused had been arraigned. [8]
Judge Libre then submitted his letter dated March 23, 2004, stating as follows:
This is in reply to your communication in connection with the resolution of the Supreme Court dated February 4, 2004 that
I explain why I allowed the reinvestigation of Criminal Case No. 9384 when the accused was already arraigned.
This did happen through inadvertence, because of the misrepresentation of the accused when he filed his motion for a
reinvestigation. He alleged in paragraph 1 of his motion that he had not yet been arraigned. In fact, the attending fiscal
confirmed this fact that the accused was not yet arraigned, for when she was sound (sic) off she even signified that she
has no objection to the grant of reinvestigation. This fact is shown by the written motion of accused for reinvestigation,
copy of which is hereto attached . . .
Because of the aforesaid misrepresentation and the added fact that the fiscal did not oppose the motion, but even
acceded to the grant of reinvestigation, I issued the order granting the reinvestigation copy of which is hereto attached . . .
At any rate, the investigating fiscal also informed the undersigned that she overlooked the fact that the accused in this
case was already arraigned . . .
Because of this development, this case was immediately tried and since the accused opted to withdraw his former plea of
not guilty and entered a plea of guilty, judgment was rendered against him, but because the sentence that was
promulgated carries a penalty of prision correctional (sic), he was granted probation.
Be that as it may, the undersigned respectfully submits that when he made the error in this regard, it was in good faith and
this was being done not to cause unnecessary delay in the administration of justice. To be more candid, the inadvertence
that was involved here was due to the fact that the undersigned is so saddled with so many cases, for he had been
assigned to the only Commercial Court and The Special Intellectual Property Court in our multi sala set up.
I therefore respectfully pray that my inadvertence here will be treated with a degree of human consideration and leniency.
[9]

On July 13, 2004, the OCA submitted its report, pertinent portions of which read as follows:
Careful scrutiny of the compliance of Judge Libre shows that he incurred delay in the disposition of the following cases, to
wit: Civil Case Nos. 4681, 4371, 5845, 4751, Criminal Case No. 8309 and Spl. Proc. No. 5672. All other cases
enumerated in the Resolution dated 9 December 2002 had already been acted upon by Judge Libre and had attached
proofs of his compliance with the directives. With regard to Criminal Case No. 9384, we deem it more prudent and
appropriate to remind Judge Libre to be more cautious and circumspect regarding motion seeking reinvestigation or of
similar import in order to avoid any occurrence that may be looked upon as unprocedural if not irregular in the
dispensation of justice.
Judges are mandated to decide cases within the reglementary period.
Failure to decide on time constitutes inefficiency and merits administrative sanctions. Under Sec. 9 (1), in relation to Sec.
11 (B) of the amended Rule 140 of the Rules of Court which took effect on October 1, 2001, the imposable penalty for
undue delay in rendering a decision may either be (a) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less
than one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or (b) a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00. (Report
on the Judicial audit conducted in the MTCC Branches 1, 2 and 3, Mandawe City, A.M. No. 02-8-188 MTCC, July 17,
2003).
Without any doubt, Judge Libre violated his mandate. He failed to decide the above cases submitted for decision within
the required period for resolution. The Honorable Court have been sympathetic to request made by judges for extension
of time for deciding cases and other incidents related thereto. He should have asked for an extension and such request is
generally granted.
It has been noted however, that of the 233 cases pending at the RTC, Branch 5, Iligan City, as of the time of audit, Judge
Libre incurred delay in deciding only six (6) cases which were then found submitted for decision. After having been
appraised of the cases, Judge Libre proved to have acted with dispatch in order to comply with the directive of this
Honorable Court by rendering judgments thereon though with incurred delay. It has also been noted that this is the first
time that Judge Libre was found to have committed an infraction and is to compulsorily retire on October 10, 2004. The
Honorable Court had in several cases considered attending circumstances in applying the corresponding penalty on
erring judges. (Vicente Pichon vs. Judge Lucilo C. Rallos, etc., A.M. No. RTJ-02-1680, January 28, 2003; Re: Judicial
Audit Report conducted in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Kidapawan City). [10]
The OCA then recommended that:
a) the compliance of Judge Maximino M. Libre, RTC, Branch 5, Iligan City be NOTED;
b) the report on the judicial audit in the RTC, Branch 5, Iligan City be redocketed as a regular administrative matter
against Judge Libre and that he be held liable for inefficiency in the disposition of cases and be imposed a FINE
of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) with WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act(s) will be
dealt with more severely;
c) Judge Libre be REMINDED to be more prudent and circumspect in the performance of his mandated duty as a
dispenser of justice.[11]
We agree with the findings and recommendation of the OCA that respondent be fined the amount of P5,000.00 but
not as to his negligence in granting the reinvestigation of Criminal Case No. 9384 after the arraignment of the accused
therein.
Failure of a judge to decide and resolve cases on time is an outright disregard of the Code of Judicial Conduct which
enjoins judges to dispose of their business promptly and decide cases within the required period. [12] They are tasked to
perform all their duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness as
prerequisites to the due performance of judicial office. [13]
When a judge assumes office, duties and restrictions are cast upon him that are peculiar to his position. He should
be punctual in the performance of his duties, exhibit an industry and application commensurate with the duties imposed
on him, and prompt in disposing all matters submitted to him. [14]
As we stated in Cadauan vs. Judge Alivia,[15]
Decision-making, among other duties, is the primordial duty of a member of the bench. The speedy disposition of cases in
our courts is a primary aim of the judiciary so the ends of justice may not be compromised and the judiciary will be true to
its commitment of providing all persons the right to a speedy, impartial and public trial and to a speedy disposition of
cases.[16]
This is because delay in the disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of the people in the judiciary, lowers
its standard and brings it into disrepute.[17] As is often stated, justice delayed is justice denied. Thus, the periods within
which decisions and resolutions should be rendered should not to be treated lightly.[18]
It is not uncommon for this Court, upon proper application and in meritorious cases, especially when difficult
questions of law or complex issues are involved, to grant judges of lower courts additional time to decide beyond the 90day period.[19] All that a judge really needs to do, in cases of great difficulty, is to request for an extension of time over
which the Court has, almost invariably, been sympathetic. [20] Judge Libre, however, did not avail of such remedy, which
only manifests his failure to be on top of the cases assigned to him.

The OCA observed, however, that out of the 233 cases pending before the sala of Judge Libre, only six cases were
decided beyond the reglementary period. And after calling his attention on the matter, Judge Libre acted with dispatch and
immediately resolved the said cases. This is also the first time that Judge Libre has committed any infraction throughout
his career as a judge, which will end with his compulsory retirement on October 10, 2004.
For these reasons we agree with the recommendation of the OCA that the penalty for the delay of Judge Libre to
render his decision should be mitigated accordingly and should be imposed a fine only in the amount of P5,000.00.[21]
Anent Criminal Case No. 9384, Judge Libre explains that the accused in Criminal Case No. 9384 stated in his motion
for reinvestigation dated May 7, 2002 that he has not yet been arraigned. The fiscal also did not object with the motion as
manifested by her signature in the accuseds written motion. [22]
Upon audit however, it was discovered that the accused was already arraigned on April 23, 2002.
Although it is unusual for a trial court to grant a reinvestigation after the accused had been arraigned, the Court has
consistently allowed the trial court to grant reinvestigation, in the exercise of its sound discretion, even after arraignment.
[23]

As succinctly explained by the former Justice Ricardo J. Francisco, [24] to wit:


A motion for reinvestigation should, after the court had acquired jurisdiction over the case, be addressed to the trial judge
and to him alone. Neither the Secretary of Justice, the State Prosecutor, nor the Fiscal may interfere with the Judges
disposition of the case, much less impose upon the court their opinion regarding the guilt or innocence of the accused for
the court is the sole judge of that.
Courts are, however, called upon to exercise great restraint in granting any reinvestigation with the consequent delay
involved, since the weighing and evaluation of such evidence in defense of the accused against the States evidence is
best left to its judgment and its verdict rather than to that of the prosecution. To ferret out the truth, trial is to be preferred
to a reinvestigation.
WHEREFORE, Judge Maximino Magno-Libre is found guilty of delay in the disposition of cases and is hereby
ordered to pay a FINE of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00).
SO ORDERED.

JUDY CAROL L. DANSAL, RAFAEL T. FLORES, HERMINIO C. ELIZON, ARNULFO S. SOLORIA, petitioners, vs.
THE HON. GIL. P. FERNANDEZ, SR., in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of the RTC, Quezon City, Branch 217
and Benigno S. Montera, respondents.
DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to enjoin further proceedings in Criminal Case Nos. Q96-66607-08, and to annul the Order, dated August 27, 1996, of Branch 217 of the Regional Trial Court in Quezon City,
which denied petitioners Motion to Quash the Informations.
Petitioner Judy Carol L. Dansal was the Department Manager of the Enforcement, Investigation, and Prosecution
Department of the National Food Authority ("NFA"), with office address at E. Rodriguez Sr. Avenue, Quezon City.
Petitioner Rafael T. Flores was the Assistant Manager of the said department of NFA. Petitioner Herminio C. Elizon was
the chief of the Security Division of the same department of NFA, while Petitioner Arnulfo S. Soloria was a security officer
of the said department of NFA. Respondent Benigno S. Montera, on the other hand, was employed with the Enforcement,
Investigation, and Prosecution Department of NFA. [1]
On December 16, 1991, respondent Montera filed an "Affidavit of Complaint" with the Office of the Ombudsman, charging
the herein petitioners and one Ronaldo Vallada, a casual security guard of NFA, with the offense of estafa through
falsification of public document.
On January 14, 1992, petitioners were required by the Office of the Ombudsman to submit their respective counteraffidavits and other controverting evidence. Petitioners complied. On April 1, 1992, respondent Montera sent in a replyaffidavit.
On July 10, 1992, petitioner Dansal was directed to submit her verified answer to respondent Monteras additional charge
of violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019.
On September 9, 1992, petitioner Dansal submitted her answer with a counter-charge.
On January 15, 1993, petitioner Dansal filed her rejoinder to respondent Monteras reply-affidavit, after which the cases
were ripe for resolution.[2]

On May 30, 1994, or after one (1) year and four (4) months, the office of the Ombudsman came out with its Resolution,
copy of which petitioners allegedly received on February 5, 1996. [3]Said Resolution ruled:
"Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that respondents Judy Carol Dansal,
Rafael Flores, Herminio Elizon, Arnulfo Soloria, Ronaldo Vallada be prosecuted for one count of estafa
through falsification of public document.
In addition thereto, a separate information for violation of Section 3(e) of R. A. No 3019 be filed against
respondent Judy Carol Dansal alone while the additional charge for violation of Section 3(e) of R. A. No
3019 against the other respondents be dismissed for lack of merit." [4]
On May 13, 1996, after the denial of petitioners motion for reconsideration, the aforesaid cases were referred to the
deputized prosecutor of Quezon City, together with two Informations, dated October 20, 1995 and January 15, 1996,
respectively, accusing Judy Carol L. Dansal of estafa through falsification of public document, and violation of Section 3(e)
of R. A. No. 3019;[5] and the other petitioners of estafa through falsification of public document.
On July 18, 1996, petitioners interposed a Motion to Quash, contending that the delay in terminating the preliminary
investigation violated their constitutional rights to due process and to a speedy disposition of their cases. [6]
On August 27, 1996, the respondent court denied the said motion, ruling thus:
"After careful evaluation of the grounds raised by the accused in their Motion to Quash viz--viz the
Opposition filed by the prosecution, finding no basis in fact and in law to warrant the quashal of the two
informations against the accused, as there appears no unreasonable delay in the conduct of the
preliminary investigation amounting to violation of the accuseds constitutional right to due process and to
a speedy disposition of the cases, the instant Motion is hereby DENIED. Reset the arraignment and pretrial anew on November 25, 1996 at 8:30 oclock in the morning." [7]
Undaunted, petitioners found their way to this Court via the present petition under Rule 65 with a prayer for Preliminary
Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order, theorizing that:
RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DENYING PETITIONERS
MOTION TO QUASH, FINDING NO BASIS IN FACT AND IN LAW TO WARRANT THE QUASHAL OF
THE TWO (2) INFORMATIONS AGAINST THE PETITIONERS.
RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED GRAVE ERRORS OF FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
WHEN HE ERRONEOUSLY HELD THAT THERE APPEARS NO UNREASONABLE DELAY IN THE
CONDUCT OF THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION AMOUNTING TO VIOLATION OF THE
PETITIONERS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND TO A SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF
THE CASES."[8]
On December 18, 1996, without giving due course to the Petition, the Court required the respondents to comment and
denied the prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order.[9]
In his Manifestation and Motion in lieu of Comment, the Solicitor General recommended the granting of the petition. [10]
The accusation against the petitioners is based on the "Affidavit of Complaint" alleging that petitioners falsified the Daily
Time Record (DTR) of one Ronaldo Vallada, by making it appear that the latter reported for work during the month of July
1991 when, in truth and in fact, he did not so report, and that the petitioners collected the amount of P2,244.04 paid on the
basis of the falsified DTR.
In their answer, petitioners countered that the imputation against them is a mere harassment by complainant Benigno S.
Montera, so as to silence, embarrass and destroy their (petitioners) credibility, and that the complainant lodged the
complaint because prior to the filing thereof, petitioner Dansal initiated an investigation of the complainant for alleged
irregularities involving the latters daily time record, which investigation was set by petitioner Dansal after Ronaldo Vallada
admitted having illegally punched in the Bundy Clock the DTRs of several employees and the complainant, who requested
him to do so, and as a result, an administrative case was instituted against the complainant before the Director for Legal
Affairs, docketed as Administrative Case No. 1-05-92 for Dishonesty, Falsification of Public Documents, Grave Misconduct
and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. [11]
Placing reliance on the ruling in the case of Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan,[12] petitioners seek redress for what they theorized
upon as a violation of their right to due process and speedy disposition of their cases by reason of the alleged
unreasonable delay of the preliminary investigation against them.
The petition is barren of merit.

To begin with, the petition is flawed by the failure of petitioners to move for reconsideration of the assailed Order. Settled
is the rule that, except in some recognized exceptions, the filing of a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua
non to the filing of a petition for certiorari.[13] The rationale behind the rule is to give the respondent court an opportunity to
correct its supposed mistake and to rectify its questioned Order.
Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, reads:
"Sec. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasijudicial, or administrative bodies"
Initially embodied in Section 16, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, the aforesaid constitutional provision is one of three
provisions mandating speedier dispensation of justice. [14] It guarantees the right of all persons to "a speedy disposition of
their case"; includes within its contemplation the periods before, during and after trial, and affords broader protection than
Section 14(2),[15] which guarantees just the right to a speedy trial. It is more embracing than the protection under Article
VII, Section 15, which covers only the period after the submission of the case. [16] The present constitutional provision
applies to civil, criminal and administrative cases.[17]
Section 16 was first given flesh and blood in the Tatad case, which also involved a petition seeking to reverse an order of
the trial court denying a motion to quash the Information. Applying Section 16, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, the
Court opined in that case:
"x x x We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan in the
instant case to be violative of the constitutional right of the accused to due process. Substantial
adherence to the requirements of the law governing the conduct of preliminary investigation, including
substantial compliance with the time limitation prescribed by the law for the resolution of the case by the
prosecutor, is part of the procedural due process constitutionally guaranteed by the fundamental law. Not
only under the broad umbrella of the due process clause, but under the constitutional guarantee of
"speedy disposition" of cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Rights (both in the 1973 and the
1987 Constitutions), the inordinate delay is violative of the petitioners constitutional rights." [18]
But the concept of "speedy disposition of cases," like "speedy trial," is a relative term and a flexible concept. It is
consistent with reasonable delay.[19]
In the determination of whether or not the constitutional right invoked by petitioners has been violated, the factors to
consider and balance are the duration of the delay, reason thereof, assertion of the right or failure to assert it and the
prejudice caused by such delay.[20] The desideratum of a speedy disposition of cases should not, if at all possible, result in
the precipitate loss of a partys right to present evidence and either in a plaintiffs being non-suited or the defendants being
pronounced liable under an ex parte judgment.[21]
The Court believes, and so holds, that the aforecited doctrine laid down in Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan is inapplicable in light
of the attendant facts and circumstances in this case. Records disclose that the original complaint against petitioners was
brought before the Office of the Ombudsman on December 16, 1991. The same was deemed submitted for resolution on
January 15, 1993. On May 30, 1994, the investigator issued a Resolution finding a probable cause, which finding was
later approved by the Ombudsman. Petitioners were furnished a copy of the said Resolution on February 5 and 6, 1996.
On June 30, 1996 were filed the Information dated October 20, 1995, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-96-66607, and
the other Information dated January 15, 1996, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-96-66608. [22]
The preliminary investigation in subject cases against the petitioners took more than one year and four months to finish.
But such a happenstance alone, or any like delay, for that matter, should not be cause for an unfettered abdication by the
court of its duty to try cases and to finally make a determination of the controversy after the presentation of evidence. In
Francisco Guerrero vs. Court of Appeals,[23] et al., the Court had this to say:
"While this Court recognizes the right to speedy disposition quite distinctly from the right to a speedy trial,
and although this Court has always zealously espoused protection from oppressive and vexatious delays
not attributable to the party involved, at the same time, we hold that a party's individual rights should not
work against and preclude the people's equally important right to public justice. In the instant case, three
people died as a result of the crash of the airplane that the accused was flying. It appears to us that the
delay in the disposition of the case prejudiced not just the accused but the people as well. Since the
accused has completely failed to assert his right seasonably and inasmuch as the respondent judge was
not in a position to dispose of the case on the merits due to the absence of factual basis, we hold it proper
and equitable to give the parties fair opportunity to obtain (and the court to dispense) substantial justice in
the premises."
The protection under the right to a speedy disposition of cases should not operate as to deprive the government of its
inherent prerogative in prosecuting criminal cases or generally in seeing to it that all who approach the bar of justice be
afforded a fair opportunity to present their side.

Contrary to the stance of the Solicitor General, the delay adverted to in the cases under consideration does not measure
up to the unreasonableness of the delay of disposition in Tatad vs.Sandiganbayan, and other allied cases. It cannot be
said that the petitioners found themselves in a situation oppressive to their rights simply by reason of the delay and
without more.
In Magsaysay et al. vs. Sandiganbayan et al.,[24] this Court ruled that:
"x x x the right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to a speedy trial, is deemed violated only
when the proceedings is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified
postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when, without cause or justifiable motive a long
period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. Equally applicable is the
balancing test used to determine whether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a
speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the
defendant is weighed, and such factors as the length of the delay, the reasons for such delay, the
assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay. The
concept of speedy disposition is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.
A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved, therefore, would not be sufficient. In the application
of the constitutional guarantee of the right to a speedy disposition of cases, particular regard must also be
taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case"
From the facts and circumstances at bar, the Court cannot glean any grave abuse of discretion tainting the denial by the
respondent court of petitioners motion to quash.
The Court is not unmindful of the duty of the Ombudsman under the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770 to act
promptly on Complaints brought before him.[25] But such duty should not be mistaken with a hasty resolution of cases at
the expense of thoroughness and correctness. Judicial notice should be taken of the fact that the nature of the Office of
the Ombudsman encourages individuals who clamor for efficient government service to freely lodge their Complaints
against wrongdoings of government personnel, thus resulting in a steady stream of cases reaching the Office of the
Ombudsman.
As stressed upon by the Solicitor General, the Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman [26] do not specifically prescribe a
period within which a criminal complaint may be investigated and decided. But the same Rules adopt the Rules of Court
on Preliminary Investigation, as modified by the Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman. Under the Rules of Court, [27] the
Investigating Officer has ten (10) days from submission of the case to come out with the resolution.
But it bears stressing that the period fixed by law is merely "directory", although it can not be disregarded or ignored
completely, with absolute impunity.[28] The records of the case do not show any such complete disregard. In like manner,
the circumstances averred in the petition do not suffice to overcome the presumption of regularity in the performance by
the Ombudsman of his functions, especially those involving the review of numerous resolutions and recommendations of
his investigating officers.
In a number of cases, this Court has not hesitated to grant the so-called "radical relief" and to spare the accused from
undergoing the rigors and expense of a full blown trial where it is clear that he has been deprived of due process of law
and/or other constitutionally guaranteed rights.[29] But here, the Court finds none.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the respondent Regional Trial Court is hereby ordered to attend with dispatch
to the trial of Criminal Case No. Q-96-66607, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Judy Carol L. Dansal, Rafael T. Flores,
Herminio T. Elizon and Arnulfo S. Soloria", and Criminal Case No. Q-96-66608, entitled "People of the Philippines vs.
Judy Carol L. Dansal". No pronouncement as to costs.

Spouses KIAT & TERESA REAPORT, petitioners, vs. Judge EFREN S. MARIANO, Municipal Trial Court, Branch 2,
Zamboanga City, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Justice delayed is justice denied. A magistrate who deliberately consents to or abets needless, groundless and
obviously unmeritorious motions for postponement, especially in ejectment cases, is administratively liable.
Statement of the Case

Before this Court is a Petition [1] filed by Spouses Kiat and Teresa Reaport praying for the REMOVAL/DISCHARGE
from office and/or other disciplinary sanctions against Judge Efren S. Mariano of the Municipal Trial Court of Zamboanga
City, Branch 2. The Petition stems from his alleged violation of Section 7 of the New Rules on Summary Procedure and
Rule 1.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
The Facts

The facts in the present case are aptly summarized in the Court Administrators Report [2] dated November 16, 1999,
as follows:
Complainants, x x x allege that:
a. On March 6, 1995, they, together with Spouses Nilo and Lourdes Uro, filed an ejectment case (unlawful
detainer) against Spouses Guillermo B. Natividad, Jr. and Elsie C. Natividad with the MTC, Zamboanga
City. The case was docketed as Special Civil Action No. 4862, and later raffled to Branch 2 of the said court
presided by respondent;
b. On April 25, 1995, summons under the New Rule on Summary Procedure and copies of the complaint were
duly served on defendants;
c. On May 3, 1995, defendants filed their Answer;
d. In an Order dated July 4, 1995, respondent set the subject ejectment case for preliminary conference on July
26, 1995 or exactly eighty-four (84) days after the answer of the defendants was filed;
e. On July 24, 1995, defendants filed a Manifestation with Omnibus Motion praying that the ejectment case be
suspended or held in abeyance on the ground that there [was] a case (Civil Case No. 4406) pending before
the RTC, Branch 12, Zamboanga City involving the same parties;
f. On November 6, 1995, respondent Judge ordered the dismissal of the subject ejectment case for lack of
jurisdiction although the defendants only prayed for the suspension of the proceeding therein and said
dismissal was appealed with the RTC, Zamboanga;
g. In a Resolution dated March 10, 1996, Judge Vicente L. Cabatingan, RTC, Branch 15, Zamboanga City
reversed and set aside the aforesaid Order, holding that:
. . . firmly settled is the rule that the pendency of an action questioning the ownership of property will not abate
ejectment suits or bar the execution of the judgments therein. The rationale for the rule is that an ejectment suit
involves only the issue of material possession or possession de facto. There may be identity of the parties and
subject matter but not of the cause of the action or the relief prayed for. (San Pedro vs. CA, 235 SCRA 145,
146);
h. On April 23, 1996, the MTC, Branch 2, Zamboanga City received the complete records of the subject
ejectment case from the appellate court (RTC, Branch 15, Zamboanga City); and
i. From April 23, 1996, up to the present (March 1997), or for a period of eleven (11) months, respondent Judge
made a mockery of the New Rules on Summary Procedure by setting the subject ejectment case several
times for preliminary conference, only to cancel the same upon motion/s for postponement/resetting filed by
the defendants.
Complainants assert that respondent Judge is guilty of violating the mandate of Sections 7 and 19 (i) of the Revised Rules
on Summary Procedure. According to them, the Order of the respondent Judge setting the preliminary conference only on
July 26, 1999 or exactly eighty-four (84) days after the Answer was filed on May 3, 1995, contravened the provision of
Section 7, supra, which provides thus:
SEC. 7. Preliminary conference; appearance of parties. Not later than thirty (30) days after the last answer is filed, a
preliminary conference shall be held. The rules on pre-trial in ordinary cases shall be applicable to the preliminary
conference unless inconsistent with the provisions of this Rule.
In addition, complainants alleged that for almost two (2) years or from May 3, 1995 up to March 1997, no preliminary
conference took place.
Finally, complainants allege that the act of the respondent of granting several motions for postponement/resetting of the
scheduled preliminary conference on the ground that the defendants counsel, Atty. Rosendo Castillo, Sr., was sick without
any medical certificate attesting to such fact, as required by the Rules of Court, violated the provision of Section 19 (i),
supra, prohibiting dilatory motions for postponement. Complainants further assert that defendants counsel was not Atty.

Rosendo Castillo, Sr. but the law partnership of Castillo and Castillo and that even if in reality Atty. Castillo, Sr. was sick,
the preliminary conference could have taken place with another member of the firm in attendance.
Respondent argued that the material allegations in the complaint [were] false, baseless and malicious. He admitted that
although there was delay in the proceedings, the same was not his fault. In support of his argument he alleged that:
3. The fact and truth of the matter being that petitioners and counsel contributed [i]n great measure to such delay because
(a) petitioners complete address in Metro Manila [had] not [been] given or indicated in the Complaint for ejectment, for the
purpose of notice; (b) their lawyer, Atty. Jesus F. Balicanta, when he left the City of Zamboanga to run [for] his dear life
never left any forwarding address nor that of his clients[,] and lawyers in Zamboanga City could not provide the court with
the desired information; (c) Atty. Abelardo A. Climaco, Jr. entered his appearance for plaintiff Spouses Nilo C. Uro and
Lourdes Uro only and he informed the court that he [did] not have the other plaintiffs, petitioners herein, and he [did] not
have the address of Atty. Balicanta in Manila nor that of the other plaintiffs in Manila. The undersigned does not know the
petitioners and does not remember having seen them in his court.
4. Atty. Rosendo M. Castillo, Sr., attorney-in-fact and counsel for the defendants in the ejectment suit, suffered a stroke
and was hospitalized at the Zamboanga A.E. Colleges Community Hospital, for many days, and up to now, has not fully
recovered from his illness;
5. The court tried to know and get the exact address of petitioners in Manila to send them notices, as well as their lawyer,
but to no avail, as no lawyer here could furnish information on the matter;
7. The subject ejectment case was called several times for pre-trial conference, but had to be postponed due to the
absence of counsels and parties (petitioners and defendants), and on those occasions, only Mr. Nilo C. Uro was present,
but he never informed the court of the exact address of his co-plaintiffs in [M]anila, much less of the fact that he was
designated as their attorney-in-fact. What more, no objection was interposed to the motions for postponement and the
court granted them in the interest of justice. Atty. Climaco also requested x x x postponements;
8. On February 11, 1997, Atty. Climaco registered objection to the motion for postponement filed by Atty. Rosendo U.
Castillo, Jr. after the court asked him if he was not objecting to the motion because the court desire[d] to terminate the
proceedings at the earliest possible time because of the many cases he ha[d] to attend to;
9. Again, it was only on March 25, 1997 [that] for the first time, x x x plaintiff Nilo C. Uro brought out and submitted to his
counsel, Atty. Climaco, in open court, a copy of the Special Power of Attorney executed in his favor by the petitioners on
July 24, 1995. Apparently, there [was] some kind of concealment of material facts done with evil intent to leave the court in
limbo and them blame the Judge for the delay.
Respondent asserts that his integrity, competence and independence of mind were attested to by his record as a lawyer
and as a judge. According to him, thirteen (13) lawyers recommended him to the City Mayor for appointment to the
position of City Legal Officer, resulting in his appointment as such. The IBP, Zamboanga City Chapter, recommended him
for appointment to the Judiciary. The RTC and MTC judges and the City Prosecutor of Zamboanga City certified to his
moral character, competence and independence of mind.
Respondent alleges that the filing of the instant administrative complaint against him was done in order that herein
complainants[] counsel, Atty. Balicanta, could get back at him since he suffered some setbacks in his court.
Finally, respondent avers that the subject ejectment case had already been decided by him on May 27, 1997. [3]
In his Memorandum-Report, then Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo made the following evaluation:
It is evident from the record that respondent does not deny the fact that he had set the preliminary conference, for the first
time, 84 days after the filing of the defendants answer. Neither does he deny the fact that no preliminary conference was
conducted for two years after the issues had been joined with the filing of the answer. This delay, complainants lament,
was principally caused by respondents grant of the many motions for postponement filed by Atty. Rosendo Castillo, Jr., of
the Castillo and Castillo Law Offices. These motions were grounded on the alleged continued illness of Rosendo Castillo,
Sr., of the same law firm, who had originally appeared for said defendants.
Had respondent been more aware of the purposes underlying the adoption of the Summary Procedure in first level courts,
he would not have countenanced such long delay. It certainly was within his powers to order Atty. Castillo, Jr. to appear for
the defendants since the latter were being represented by a law firm to which he belonged. Or he could have validly
required the said defendants to secure the services of a substitute counsel considering that the date of the recovery of
their counsel was not certain.
That respondent violated the provisions of Section 19 of the Rule on Summary Procedure is patent. One of the prohibited
pleadings and motions listed by said rule is [a] dilatory motion for postponement. The repeated grant of the defendants
motions for postponement based on the ground that their counsel was ill, can be clearly characterized as dilatory and as

such were prohibited pleadings under the rule referred to above. This [was] aggravated by the fact that respondent did not
require the presentation of the medical certificate under oath attesting to the counsels inability to attend trial.
The inordinate liberality of respondent in granting the repeated motions for postponement based on the same ground,
which resulted in his failure to terminate the preliminary conference for two years, effectively set at naught the very
purpose of adopting the summary procedure in ejectment cases where the continued occupation of the disputed premises
results in irreparable damages to the person who may be ultimately entitled to its possession. Respondent, by his
inaction, had brought this result about. For this failure, he must be disciplined.[4]
The court administrator then made this recommendation:
x x x [A] FINE in the amount of P5,000.00 [should] be imposed on respondent Judge Efren S. Mariano for his failure to
observe the Rule on Summary Procedure, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future would be
dealt with more severely.[5]
The Courts Ruling

We agree with the findings and recommendations of the court administrator.


Petitioners contend that respondent judge contravened Sections 7 and 19 (i) of the Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure by setting the preliminary conference relative to their complaint for ejectment [6]84 days after the Answer[7] was
filed. Moreover, the holding of the preliminary conference was postponed several times and was finally held only after
almost two years. Section 7, however, requires that such conference should be held not later than 30 days after the last
answer has been filed.
For his part, respondent maintains in his Comment [8] that the delay complained of was not his fault, but was due to
petitioners failure to indicate their full address in their Complaint. Also, their counsel, Atty. Jesus F. Balicanta, had not left
any forwarding address when he left Zamboanga City. Likewise, counsel for the defendants, Atty. Rosendo M. Castillo Sr.,
had asked for several postponements because of illness.
After due consideration of all attendant circumstances, this Court finds respondent guilty of violating Sections 7 and
19 (i) of the Rules on Summary Procedure. We quote Section 7 below:
Sec. 7. Preliminary conference; appearance of parties. - Not later than thirty (30) days after the last answer is filed, a
preliminary conference shall be held. The rules on pre-trial in ordinary cases shall be applicable to the preliminary
conference unless inconsistent with the provisions of this Rule.
The failure of the plaintiff to appear in the preliminary conference shall be a cause for the dismissal of his complaint. The
defendant who appears in the absence of the plaintiff shall be entitled to judgment on his counterclaim in accordance with
Section 6 hereof. All cross-claims shall be dismissed.
If a sole defendant shall fail to appear, the plaintiff shall be entitled to judgment in accordance with Section 6 hereof. This
Rule shall not apply where one of two or more defendants sued under a common cause of action who had pleaded a
common defense shall appear at the preliminary conference.
Section 19 (i) reads as follows:
SEC. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. The following pleadings, motions, or petitions shall not be allowed in the
cases covered by this Rule:
(i) Dilatory motions for postponement; x x x.
Respondent does not deny that after the last Answer had been filed, the preliminary conference was first set only
after 84 days and actually held only after almost two years. He was duty-bound to comply with the summary rules,
considering that their very purpose is the speedy disposition of cases falling under the procedure. Yet, his actions clearly
and directly contravened them.
Consequently, respondent also violated Rule 1.02 of Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which states that
judges should administer justice without delay. Delay in the disposition of cases undermines the peoples faith and
confidence in the judiciary. Hence, judges are enjoined to decide cases with dispatch. Their failure to do so constitutes
gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions on them. [9]
The flimsy explanations of respondent do not detract from his liability, considering the very long delay incurred. More
important, the delay could have been avoided had he exercised more diligence and determination in disposing of the
case.

Although the Rules provide that notice should be served on both counsel and parties, the requirement is deemed to
have been complied with when notice is served on the counsel of record, who in turn is bound to inform the client or else
be liable for administrative sanctions. In the alternative, the absent plaintiffs could have been declared non-suited and the
preliminary conference held with the rest of the plaintiffs in appearance.
Respondent judge should not have accommodated so many Motions for Postponement filed by the then ailing Atty.
Rosendo Castillo Sr. Because a law firm (Castillo & Castillo), to which the latter belonged, was really representing the
defendants, there certainly were other competent lawyers who could have handled the matter. Respondent, however,
continued to entertain and grant several Motions for Postponement based on the same ground. He did not even ascertain
the gravity of counsels illness or require the presentation of a medical certificate.
Respondent judge was instead quite liberal, too liberal, in granting postponements which greatly contributed to the
long delay in the disposition of petitioners ejectment suit. In Arquero v. Mendoza,[10]this Court said that when the motion for
postponement based on illness is not supported by documentary evidence such as a medical certificate, the grant of
postponement is without sufficient basis.
WHEREFORE, Respondent Judge Efren S. Mariano is hereby found GUILTY of gross misconduct and ORDERED to
pay a fine of P5,000 for failure to comply with the Rules on Summary Procedure.He is sternly warned that the commission
of the same or a similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

ANASTACIO E. GAUDENCIO, complainant,


Bulacan, respondent.

vs. Judge

EDWARD

D.

PACIS,

MTC,

Branch

3,

Marilao,

RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Complainant Anastacio E. Gaudencio filed charges against respondent Judge Edward D. Pacis of the Municipal Trial
Court of Marilao, Bulacan, Branch 3, for inefficiency, absenteeism and incompetence.
In a letter-complaint[1] dated June 30, 1999 addressed to the Office of the Chief Justice, complainant states that he
has a case dragging on for years before the sala of respondent. Complainant attributes the delay to respondents constant
resetting of hearings, inefficiency, absenteeism and inexpertise in the field of law.
In his comment[2] dated October 4, 1999, respondent characterizes the complaint to be a mere demolition job against
him. Respondent avers that the alleged complainant is a fictitious person; he is neither a party nor a witness in any of the
cases pending in his sala. Respondent denies having been absent, except when he attended a monthly meeting
conducted by the Executive Judge of Malolos, Bulacan. He disclaims re-setting an arraignment, except when an accused
has no lawyer and asks for one of his own choice. Respondent adds that the only instances when pre-trial and trial of
cases are reset are when witnesses are absent, or when the public prosecutor is absent. In both cases the re-setting is
always with the acquiescence of the parties, respondent states.
On the matter of his caseload, respondent explains that he has inherited 766 cases from his predecessor and that
about 40 to 100 cases are added monthly. He explains that as of October 4, 1999, he had 593 pending cases, which he
avers to be very low compared to [those in] other first class municipalities. [3] As to his schedule, he says he conducts
preliminary investigations daily from Monday to Friday, subject to the availability of witnesses. For civil cases, he holds
hearings on Mondays, Tuesdays and Wednesdays, or any day except Thursday, subject to the availability of the parties
and counsels, or as agreed upon by both parties.
Then Court Administrator, Alfredo Benipayo, referred the complaint and respondents comment to Executive Judge
Danilo Manalastas of the RTC, Malolos, Bulacan, for investigation, report and recommendation. For the investigation,
Judge Manalastas sought the assistance of Mario F. Fumera, Jr., Court Interpreter of the RTC, Branch 7, Bulacan, who
posed as a representative of a litigant. The staff of respondent informed Mr. Fumera that respondent conducts preliminary
investigations every Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday, hears civil and criminal cases every Thursday, while Friday is a
free day. [4]
In a follow-up report dated October 11, 1999, the investigating judge confirmed his initial report that respondent is
usually absent on Friday; he holds hearings of civil and criminal case only every Thursday, conducts preliminary
investigations only in the morning of Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday, and leaves his office afterwards. Further, the
investigating judge found that respondent regularly sets more than thirty cases for the once a week hearing on Thursday
mornings, but only two or three of these cases are actually heard for each sitting due to time constraints. The investigating
judge reported he interviewed law practitioners in Bulacan, they characterized respondent as indifferent in regard to

disposing speedily cases pending before his sala. Finally, Judge Manalastas recommended an audit of cases pending
before the MTC of Marilao, Bulacan, to be conducted by a team from the Office of the Court Administrator to find out the
actual number of the backlog of cases in respondents court. [5]
Deputy Court Administrator Jose Perez seconded Judge Manalastas recommendation for the conduct of judicial
audit. According to DCA Perez, said audit will lay the basis as to whether or not Judge Pacis should be held
administratively liable.[6] He adds that in respondents six years as a judge, this is not respondents first brush with an
administrative complaint. In OCA IPI No. 01-1092-MTJ entitled Abelardo S.M. Rosales vs. Judge Edward D. Pacis, still
pending investigation, the latter was charged with Gross Ignorance of Procedure.
By order of this Court, Court Administrator Alfredo Benipayo organized an audit team to conduct a judicial audit and
physical inventory of cases pending before respondents sala. In his report dated March 10, 2000, the Court Administrator
enumerates the irregularities found in respondents sala:
(a.1) failure to decide Civil Cases Nos. 814 to 816 within the reglementary period to decide;
(a.2) failure to set in the court calendar or take further action after lapse of considerable period of time the
following Civil Cases Nos.: 831, 811, 875, 918, 872, and 914;
(a.3) failure to resolve the following criminal cases after the conclusion of the preliminary investigation, to
wit: 99-520, 99-521, 99-558, 99-388, 99-532, 99-526, 99-529, 99-501, 99-502, 99-547, 99-548, 99482, and 99-465 to 99-475;
(a.4) failure to observe the guidelines set forth under paragraph no[s]. I and IV, Administrative Circular No. 3-99
dated January 15, 1999 specifically on the observance of session hours and adherence to the policy
on avoiding postponements;
(a.5) not holding court session [o]n the following dates: October 1, 8, 14, 15, 22, November 5, 12, 16, 19, 26 and
December 3, 16, 17, 21, 22, 23, 27, 28, 29, all in the year 1999;
xxx
The Court Administrator also reported that respondent failed to:
xxx
(b) Undertake the appropriate action, pursuant to Administrative Circular No. 7-A-92 dated June 21, 1993,
re: Guidelines in the Archiving of Cases, on the following criminal cases with pending warrant of arrest, to
wit: 99-268 to 99-270, 99-091, 99-104, 99-054, 99-082, 99-017 to 99-033, 99-258, 9983, 9534, 9964,
10005 to 10008, 99-050, 99-088, 99-218 and 99-080. [7]
As summarized by the Court Administrator, hereunder is the corresponding explanation of the respondent:
a. Failure to decide Civil Case Nos. 814 and 815 to 816 within the reglementary period - he stated that Civil Case No. 814
was decided on July 24, 1997 and Civil Case Nos. 815 and 816 were decided on 21 July 1997 by the then Acting Judge
Amante Bandayrel.
b. Failure to set in the court calendar or take further action after lapse of considerable period of time Civil Case Nos. 831,
811, 875, 918, 872 and 914 - Judge Pacis gave the following explanations to wit:
(b.1) In Civil Case Nos. 831, 811 and 872 which involves collection cases, the plaintiff corporation was given authority to
serve the corresponding summons to the defendants.
(b.2) Anent Civil Case Nos. 875 and 918 plaintiffs representatives were given authority to cause the service of summons
to the defendants.
In all the above-mentioned cases Judge Pacis reasoned out that during the time of the judicial audit and physical
inventory of cases conducted, no returns have yet been made by the plaintiffs representatives so he could not act on
these cases yet.
(b.3) With regard to Civil Case No. 914 according to Judge Pacis, the same has been decided on 26 June 2000.
c. Failure to resolve the following Criminal Cases after the conclusion of the preliminary investigation to wit: 99-520, 99521, 99-558, 99-388, 99-532, 99-526, 99-529, 99-501, 99-502, 99-547, 99-548, 99-482 and 99-465 to 99-475 - these
cases were still under preliminary investigation during the months of November and December 1999 and the accused on
these cases were given ample time within which to file their respective counter-affidavits and supporting documents,
accordingly, the court has to wait or defer further action on the cases before concluding the preliminary investigation.

d. Failure to observe guidelines set forth under paragraph Nos. I and IV, Administrative Circular No. 3-99 dated 15
January 1999 specifically on the observance of session hours and adherence to the policy on avoiding postponements
and for unduly granting motion for postponements or repeated resetting in court calendar - these alleged infractions
should not be taken against him due to the following:
(d.1) The Assistant Prosecutor assigned in his sala is available only for one-half (1/2) a day a week and only in the
afternoon, and the worst part of it is that most of the time she fails to appear during the scheduled trial/hearing, thus,
reducing the number of sessions in a month from two (2) days to one and one-half (1 1/2) days a month.
(d.2) There are only few practicing lawyers who appear in his court and the public attorney assigned to his court usually
moves for a resetting of the trial.
(d.3) The trial/hearing were also reset by mutual agreement of the parties.
(d.4) A case has to be postponed also because the parties have not received their respective notices on time, most
especially when notices were sent thru the post office.
(d.5) The Police Officers who were tasked to cause the services of the notices, subpoenas/summons are no longer given
the privilege to use the free postage mailing thus the court encounters the difficulty of waiting for the return of service.
(d.6) There are also instances when court processes were served by the Process Server and returned with a notation that
the addresses cannot be found at the given address or unknown within the community.
e. Relative to not holding court sessions on the following dates: October 1, 8, 14, 15, 22, November 5, 12, 16, 19, 26 and
December 3, 16, 17, 21, 22, 23, 27, 28, 29 all in the year 1999, he stated that:
(e.1) October 1, 8 and 22; November 5, 12, 19 and 26 and December 17, 1999, these dates fell on a Friday and were
supposed to be motion day but lawyers still prefer to appear in the Regional Trial Court.Counsels of litigants, particularly in
civil cases prefer Monday to Wednesday and refuse to set any hearing on these dates.
The court accordingly cannot set any hearing/trial or motions on the criminal cases because of the unavailability of an
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, who is available on a Thursday afternoon.
(e.2) On October 14 and 15, he attended the Philippine Trial Judges League Convention held in Bacolod City where he is
the Public Relations Officer and convention coordinator.
(e.3) On November 16, the court held a hearing regarding Civil Case No. 810 entitled Teodorico Rivera vs. Pedro
Manalang.
(e.4) December 3 this was the date set for the Oath Taking of the Officers of the Philippine Trial Judges League where he
is a coordinator and the Public Relations Officer.
(e.5) December 16, was the date set for the Christmas Party of the Municipal Trial Court Judges of the Province of
Bulacan.
(e.6) December 21, 22, 27 and 29, the lawyers refused to set their cases for hearing/trial however according to Judge
Pacis the court set a pre-trial in December 23 but the parties failed to appear. He added that on December 28, a B.P. 22
case was set for clarificatory hearing.
f. Relative to the directive to Judge Pacis to undertake the appropriate action, pursuant to Administrative Circular 7-A-92
dated 21 June, 1993 re: Guidelines in Archiving of Cases with pending warrant of arrest to wit: 99-268 to 99-270, 99-091,
99-104, 99-054, 99-082, 99-017 to 99-033, 99-258, 9983, 9534, 9964, 10005 to 10008, 99-050, 99-088, 99-218 and 99080 he informed the Court of the following action he had taken:
(f.1) Criminal Cases Nos. 99-091, 99-104, 99-054, 99-218, 9983 and 9534 were archived on February 4, 2000;
(f.2) Criminal Cases Nos. 99-082, 99-258, 99-080, 99-050, 9964, 10005 to 10008 were archived on April 4, 2000;
(f.3) Criminal Cases Nos. 99-268 to 99-270 were not archived because after the judicial audit conducted on 6 January,
2000, a motion for issuance of an alias warrant was filed by the Private Prosecutor and the accused was arraigned and
the case is still active;
(f.4) Criminal Case No. 99-017 and 99-033 were not also archived because after judicial audit, accused posted bail bond
on 9 February 2000 and the pre-trial was terminated on 5 October 2000. The case is still active.
(f.5) Criminal Case No. 99-088 was not archived but forwarded to RTC, Malolos, Bulacan on 12 January 2000. [8]

On September 3, 2001, considering the abovecited explanations of Judge Pacis and Ms. Esguerra, the OCA
recommended that the explanations be deemed satisfactory. Judge Edward D. Pacis was, however, advised to: (a)
observe strict adherence to the guidelines set forth under paragraphs I and IV of Administrative Circular 3-99, dated
January 15, 1999, and refrain from frequent granting of motions for postponement; and (b) regularly conduct hearings to
avoid giving the public the impression that the Hon. Judge is remiss in the performance of his judicial functions. [9]
It must be stressed in this regard that guidelines for trial courts have been repeatedly circularized, precisely to
obviate possible public misimpression concerning the prompt conduct of judicial business.
Circular No. 13 issued on July 1, 1987, has set the Guidelines in the Administration of Justice. In particular, Section 1
of the guidelines for trial courts states:
1. Punctuality and strict observance of office hours. - Punctuality in the holding of scheduled hearings is an
imperative. Trial judges should strictly observe the requirement of at least eight hours of service a day, five hours of which
should be devoted to trial, specifically from 8:30 a.m. to 12:00 noon and from 2:00 to 4:30 p.m. as required by par. 5 of
the Interim Rules issued by the Supreme Court on January 11, 1983, pursuant to Sec. 16 of B.P. 129.
Early on, Section 5 of Supervisory Circular No. 14, issued October 22, 1985, similarly provides:
5. Session Hours. - Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts shall hold daily sessions from Monday to Friday, from 8:30 a.m. to 12:00 noon and from 2:00 to 4:30 p.m. assisted
by a skeletal force, also on rotation, primarily to act on petitions for bail and other urgent matters.
Further, Administrative Circular No. 3-99 dated January 15, 1999 mandates the Strict Observance Of Session Hours
Of Trial Courts And Effective Management Of Cases To Ensure Their Speedy Disposition. ThusTo insure speedy disposition of cases, the following guidelines must be faithfully observed:
I. The session hours of all Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall be from 8:30 A.M. to noon and from
2:00 P.M. to 4:30 P.M., from Monday to Friday. The hours in the morning shall be devoted to the
conduct of trial, while the hours in the afternoon shall be utilized for (1) the conduct of pre-trial
conferences; (2) writing of decisions, resolutions or orders; or (3) the continuation of trial on the
merits, whenever rendered necessary, as may be required by the Rules of Court, statutes, or
circulars in specified cases.
II. Judges must be punctual at all times.
IV. There should be strict adherence to the policy on avoiding postponements and needless delay.
VI. All trial judges must strictly comply with Circular No. 38-98, entitled Implementing the Provisions of
Republic Act No. 8493 (An Act to Ensure a Speedy Trial of All Cases Before the Sandiganbayan,
Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court
and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes) issued by
the Honorable Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa on 11 August 1998 and which took effect on 15
September 1998.
These cited circulars are restatements of fundamentals in the Canons of Judicial Ethics which enjoin judges to be
punctual in the performance of their judicial duties, recognizing that the time of litigants, witnesses, and attorneys are of
value, and that if the judge is not punctual in the performance of his functions, he sets a bad example to the bar and tends
to create public dissatisfaction in the administration of justice. [10]
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Edward D. Pacis of Municipal Trial Court of Marilao, Bulacan, Branch 3, is hereby
ADVISED AND ADMONISHED to be more prompt and conscientious in the performance of his duties, with the stern
warning that any repetition of similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 145436. October 10, 2002.]


MICHAEL LONDON for and in behalf of his minor son NICHOLAS FREDERICK LONDON,Petitioner, v. BAGUIO
COUNTRY CLUB CORPORATION, ANTHONY DE LEON and FRANCIS BASTIANO SIMALONG, Respondents.
DECISION

On 14 December 1998, Nicholas Frederick London, then 11 years old, assisted by his father, Michael London, executed
and filed before the Office of the City Prosecutor in Baguio City a complaint-affidavit for "Sexual Harassment and/or Child
Abuse and/or Acts of Lasciviousness and Unjust Vexation" against respondent Francis Bastiano Simalong, a bowling
mechanic at the Baguio Country Club. The complaint contained asseverations about an incident that was said to have
occurred on 29 November 1998 at the Baguio Country Club. Nicholas was playing video games at the recreation center of
the club, when Simalong, then obviously drunk, placed his hand around Nicholas and touched the latters penis.
Frightened, Nicholas immediately informed by telephone his parents about it. Forthwith, his parents fetched him, and the
three proceeded to the police station to report the matter.
On 28 December 1998, the investigating prosecutor, finding probable cause to prosecute Simalong, filed an Information
for unjust vexation before the Municipal Trial Court ("MTC"). On 09 October 1999, the MTC issued an order to the effect
that, Nicholas being a minor, the case should instead be handled by the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Baguio City in
accordance with Circular No. 11-99 of the Supreme Court and Republic Act No. 8369 (the Family Courts Act of 1997). The
criminal case was transferred to the RTC and docketed Criminal Case No. 17107-R. The private complainant reserved his
right to institute an independent civil action.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
On 17 December 1999, Nicholas, represented by his father Michael, filed a complaint for damages before the Baguio City
RTC, against the Baguio Country Club, the clubs General Manager Anthony de Leon, and Francis Simalong. The civil
action, docketed Civil Case No. 4587-R, was predicated on the civil liability of defendants for culpa acquiliana under the
provisions of the Civil Code.
On 04 February 2000, the Baguio Country Club and Anthony de Leon filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the
ground that the "Verification/Certification" against forum shopping attached to the complaint did not disclose the existence
and status of Criminal Case No. 17107-R.
The Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 61 issued, on 18 April 2000, a resolution granting the motion to dismiss. The plaintiff
filed a motion for the reconsideration of the order of dismissal. In the meantime, plaintiff sought the inhibition of Presiding
Judge Antonio Reyes of RTC Branch 61 from trying Civil Case No. 4587-R on the ground that the judge was a close friend
of the clubs president and counsel. Judge Reyes inhibited himself and the case was transferred to Branch 59 of the
Baguio City RTC presided over by Judge Abraham B. Borreta. On 10 October 2000, Judge Borreta issued an order
denying the motion for the reconsideration of the 18th April 2000 order of dismissal of the civil case.chanrob1es virtua1
1aw 1ibrary
On 29 November 2000, the plaintiff filed the instant petition for review assailing the dismissal of his complaint in Civil Case
No. 4587-R.
The petition is meritorious.
Forum shopping is the institution of two (2) or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause upon the
supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. 1 For forum shopping to exist, the actions
must involve the same transaction, including the essential facts and circumstances thereof, and must raise identical
causes of actions, subject matter and issues. The mere filing of two or more cases based on the same incident does not
necessarily constitute forum-shopping. 2 In fine, there should be (a) identity of parties or at least such parties who
represent the same interests in both actions, (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, such relief being founded
on the same circumstances, and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the
other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration, said
requisites being likewise constitutive of the elements of auter action pendent or litis pendencia. 3
While, in this instance, both the criminal action and the civil complaint for quasi-delict have arisen from an act of
lasciviousness claimed to have been committed by Simalong against the person of Nicholas Frederick London, there are,
however, material differences between the two actions. In the criminal case, the real party plaintiff is the "People of the
Philippines" and the defendant is accused Simalong alone. In the civil case, the parties are plaintiff Michael London, for
and in behalf of his minor son Nicholas Frederick London, and the defendants include not only Simalong but also the
Baguio Country Club and its general manager Anthony de Leon. Given the circumstances, a judgment of conviction or
acquittal in the criminal case against Simalong cannot at all be invoked as being one of res judicata in the independent
suit for damages.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
It may not be amiss to reiterate that rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice; thus,
their strict and rigid application that would tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice are well to be avoided. 4
Indeed, the Rules of Civil Procedure on forum shopping are not always applied with inflexibility. 5
WHEREFORE, the challenged resolutions, dated 18 April 2000 and 10 October 2000, of the Regional Trial Court of
Baguio City, Branch 51, are SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 4587-R is hereby ordered REINSTATED. No costs.chanrob1es
virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

DOMINGO NEYPES, LUZ G.R. No. 141524


FAUSTINO, ROGELIO FAUSTINO,
LOLITO VICTORIANO, JACOB
OBANIA AND DOMINGO Present :
CABACUNGAN,
Petitioners, DAVIDE, JR., C.J.
PUNO,
PANGANIBAN,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
- v e r s u s - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO and
GARCIA, JJ.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS
OF BERNARDO DEL MUNDO,
namely: FE, CORAZON, JOSEFA,
SALVADOR and CARMEN, all
surnamed DEL MUNDO, LAND BANK
OF THE PHILIPPINES AND HON.
ANTONIO N. ROSALES, Presiding
Judge, Branch 43, Regional Trial
Court, Roxas, Oriental Mindoro,
Respondents. Promulgated :
September 14, 2005
x-----------------------------------------x
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Petitioners Domingo Neypes, Luz Faustino, Rogelio Faustino, Lolito Victoriano, Jacob Obania and Domingo
Cabacungan filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or reconveyance and/or reversion with
preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, of Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, against the Bureau of
Forest Development, Bureau of Lands, Land Bank of the Philippines and the heirs of Bernardo del Mundo, namely, Fe,
Corazon, Josefa, Salvador and Carmen.
In the course of the proceedings, the parties (both petitioners and respondents) filed various motions with the trial
court. Among these were: (1) the motion filed by petitioners to declare the respondent heirs, the Bureau of Lands and the
Bureau of Forest Development in default and (2) the motions to dismiss filed by the respondent heirs and the Land Bank
of the Philippines, respectively.
In an order dated May 16, 1997, the trial court, presided by public respondent Judge Antonio N. Rosales, resolved
the foregoing motions as follows: (1) the petitioners motion to declare respondents Bureau of Lands and Bureau of Forest
Development in default was granted for their failure to file an answer, but denied as against the respondent heirs of del
Mundo because the substituted service of summons on them was improper; (2) the Land Banks motion to dismiss for lack
of cause of action was denied because there were hypothetical admissions and matters that could be determined only
after trial, and (3) the motion to dismiss filed by respondent heirs of del Mundo, based on prescription, was also denied
because there were factual matters that could be determined only after trial. [1]
The respondent heirs filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denying their motion to dismiss on the ground
that the trial court could very well resolve the issue of prescription from the bare allegations of the complaint itself without
waiting for the trial proper.
In an order[2] dated February 12, 1998, the trial court dismissed petitioners complaint on the ground that the action
had already prescribed. Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal on March 3, 1998 and, on the
15th day thereafter or on March 18, 1998, filed a motion for reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court issued another
order dismissing the motion for reconsideration [3] which petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five days later, on July 27,
1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal[4] and paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998.
On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight days late. [5] This was
received by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this too was denied in an order
dated September 3, 1998.[6]
Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioners
assailed the dismissal of the notice of appeal before the Court of Appeals.

In the appellate court, petitioners claimed that they had seasonably filed their notice of appeal. They argued that
the 15-day reglementary period to appeal started to run only on July 22, 1998 since this was the day they received the
final order of the trial court denying their motion for reconsideration. When they filed their notice of appeal on July 27,
1998, only five days had elapsed and they were well within the reglementary period for appeal. [7]
On September 16, 1999, the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the petition. It ruled that the 15-day period to
appeal should have been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day they received the February 12, 1998 order dismissing
their complaint. According to the appellate court, the order was the final order appealable under the Rules. It held further:
Perforce the petitioners tardy appeal was correctly dismissed for the (P)erfection of an appeal
within the reglementary period and in the manner prescribed by law is jurisdictional and non-compliance
with such legal requirement is fatal and effectively renders the judgment final and executory.[8]
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned decision. This was denied by the Court of Appeals on
January 6, 2000.
In this present petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules, petitioners ascribe the following errors allegedly committed
by the appellate court:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITIONERS PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI AND MANDAMUS AND IN AFFIRMING THE ORDER OF THE HON. JUDGE ANTONIO N.
ROSALES WHICH DISMISSED THE PETITIONERS APPEAL IN CIVIL CASE NO. C-36 OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 43, ROXAS, ORIENTAL MINDORO, EVEN AFTER THE
PETITIONERS HAD PAID THE APPEAL DOCKET FEES.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE ERRED IN RULING AND AFFIRMING THE
DECISION OR ORDER OF THE RESPONDENT HON. ANTONIO M. ROSALES THAT PETITIONERS
APPEAL WAS FILED OUT OF TIME WHEN PETITIONERS RECEIVED THE LAST OR FINAL ORDER
OF THE COURT ON JULY 22, 1998 AND FILED THEIR NOTICE OF APPEAL ON JULY 27, 1998 AND
PAID THE APPEAL DOCKET FEE ON AUGUST 3, 1998.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FURTHER ERRED IN RULING THAT THE WORDS FINAL
ORDER IN SECTION 3, RULE 41, OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE WILL REFER TO THE
[FIRST] ORDER OF RESPONDENT JUDGE HON. ANTONIO M. MORALES DATED FEBRUARY 12,
1998 INSTEAD OF THE LAST AND FINAL ORDER DATED JULY 1, 1998 COPY OF WHICH WAS
RECEIVED BY PETITIONERS THROUGH COUNSEL ON JULY 22, 1998.
IV.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FINALLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE DECISION IN THE
CASE OF DENSO, INC. V. IAC, 148 SCRA 280, IS APPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE THEREBY
IGNORING THE PECULIAR FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE AND THE FACT THAT
THE SAID DECISION WAS RENDERED PRIOR TO THE ENACTMENT OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE.[9]
The foregoing issues essentially revolve around the period within which petitioners should have filed their notice of
appeal.
First and foremost, the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege
and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. Thus, one who seeks to avail of
the right to appeal must comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failure to do so often leads to the loss of the right to
appeal.[10] The period to appeal is fixed by both statute and procedural rules. BP 129, [11] as amended, provides:
Sec. 39. Appeals. The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any
court in all these cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution,
award, judgment, or decision appealed from. Provided, however, that in habeas corpus cases, the period
for appeal shall be (48) forty-eight hours from the notice of judgment appealed from. x x x
Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:
SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from the
notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the
appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from the notice of
judgment or final order.
The period to appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for
extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed. (emphasis supplied)

Based on the foregoing, an appeal should be taken within 15 days from the notice of judgment or final order appealed
from. A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more for the court to do with respect
to it. It is an adjudication on the merits which, considering the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what
the rights and obligations of the parties are; or it may be an order or judgment that dismisses an action. [12]
As already mentioned, petitioners argue that the order of July 1, 1998 denying their motion for reconsideration should be
construed as the final order, not the February 12, 1998 order which dismissed their complaint. Since they received their
copy of the denial of their motion for reconsideration only on July 22, 1998, the 15-day reglementary period to appeal had
not yet lapsed when they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998.
What therefore should be deemed as the final order, receipt of which triggers the start of the 15-day reglementary
period to appeal the February 12, 1998 order dismissing the complaint or the July 1, 1998 order dismissing the MR?
In the recent case of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc.,[13] the trial court declared petitioner Quelnan non-suited and
accordingly dismissed his complaint. Upon receipt of the order of dismissal, he filed an omnibus motion to set it aside.
When the omnibus motion was filed, 12 days of the 15-day period to appeal the order had lapsed. He later on received
another order, this time dismissing his omnibus motion. He then filed his notice of appeal. But this was likewise dismissed
for having been filed out of time.
The court a quo ruled that petitioner should have appealed within 15 days after the dismissal of his complaint
since this was the final order that was appealable under the Rules. We reversed the trial court and declared that it was
the denial of the motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a complaint which constituted the final order as it
was what ended the issues raised there.
This pronouncement was reiterated in the more recent case of Apuyan v. Haldeman et al.[14] where we again considered
the order denying petitioner Apuyans motion for reconsideration as the final order which finally disposed of the issues
involved in the case.
Based on the aforementioned cases, we sustain petitioners view that the order dated July 1, 1998 denying their motion for
reconsideration was thefinal order contemplated in the Rules.
We now come to the next question: if July 1, 1998 was the start of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal, did
petitioners in fact file their notice of appeal on time?
Under Rule 41, Section 3, petitioners had 15 days from notice of judgment or final order to appeal the decision of
the trial court. On the 15 thday of the original appeal period (March 18, 1998), petitioners did not file a notice of appeal but
instead opted to file a motion for reconsideration. According to the trial court, the MR only interrupted the running of the
15-day appeal period.[15] It ruled that petitioners, having filed their MR on the last day of the 15-day reglementary period to
appeal, had only one (1) day left to file the notice of appeal upon receipt of the notice of denial of their MR. Petitioners,
however, argue that they were entitled under the Rules to a fresh period of 15 days from receipt of the final order or the
order dismissing their motion for reconsideration.
In Quelnan and Apuyan, both petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the trial court. We
ruled there that they only had the remaining time of the 15-day appeal period to file the notice of appeal. We consistently
applied this rule in similar cases,[16] premised on the long-settled doctrine that the perfection of an appeal in the manner
and within the period permitted by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional. [17] The rule is also founded on deepseated considerations of public policy and sound practice that, at risk of occasional error, the judgments and awards of
courts must become final at some definite time fixed by law.[18]
Prior to the passage of BP 129, Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court read:
Sec. 3. How appeal is taken. Appeal maybe taken by serving upon the adverse party and
filing with the trial court within thirty (30) days from notice of order or judgment, a notice of
appeal, an appeal bond, and a record on appeal. The time during which a motion to set aside the
judgment or order or for new trial has been pending shall be deducted, unless such motion fails to satisfy
the requirements of Rule 37.
But where such motion has been filed during office hours of the last day of the period herein
provided, the appeal must be perfected within the day following that in which the party appealing received
notice of the denial of said motion.[19] (emphasis supplied)
According to the foregoing provision, the appeal period previously consisted of 30 days. BP 129, however, reduced this
appeal period to 15 days. In the deliberations of the Committee on Judicial Reorganization [20] that drafted BP 129,
the raison d etre behind the amendment was to shorten the period of appeal [21] and enhance the efficiency and
dispensation of justice. We have since required strict observance of this reglementary period of appeal. Seldom have we
condoned late filing of notices of appeal,[22] and only in very exceptional instances to better serve the ends of justice.
In National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority and Authority v. Municipality of Libmanan,[23] however, we
declared that appeal is an essential part of our judicial system and the rules of procedure should not be applied rigidly.
This Court has on occasion advised the lower courts to be cautious about not depriving a party of the right to appeal and
that every party litigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, free
from the constraint of technicalities.
In de la Rosa v. Court of Appeals,[24] we stated that, as a rule, periods which require litigants to do certain acts
must be followed unless, under exceptional circumstances, a delay in the filing of an appeal may be excused on grounds
of substantial justice. There, we condoned the delay incurred by the appealing party due to strong considerations of
fairness and justice.

In setting aside technical infirmities and thereby giving due course to tardy appeals, we have not been oblivious to
or unmindful of the extraordinary situations that merit liberal application of the Rules. In those situations where
technicalities were dispensed with, our decisions were not meant to undermine the force and effectivity of the periods set
by law. But we hasten to add that in those rare cases where procedural rules were not stringently applied, there always
existed a clear need to prevent the commission of a grave injustice. Our judicial system and the courts have always tried
to maintain a healthy balance between the strict enforcement of procedural laws and the guarantee that every litigant be
given the full opportunity for the just and proper disposition of his cause. [25]
The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts. [26] It has the sole prerogative to amend, repeal
or even establish new rules for a more simplified and inexpensive process, and the speedy disposition of cases. In the
rules governing appeals to it and to the Court of Appeals, particularly Rules 42, [27] 43[28] and 45,[29] the Court allows
extensions of time, based on justifiable and compelling reasons, for parties to file their appeals. These extensions may
consist of 15 days or more.
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their
cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the
Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. [30]
Henceforth, this fresh period rule shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to
the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43
on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies [31] to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the
Supreme Court.[32] The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the
order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.
We thus hold that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh period of 15 days, counted
from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their motion for reconsideration). This pronouncement is not
inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules which states that the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of
judgment or final order appealed from. The use of the disjunctive word or signifies disassociation and independence of
one thing from another. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies. [33] Hence, the use of or
in the above provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of judgment or within
15 days from notice of the final order, which we already determined to refer to the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion
for a new trial or reconsideration.
Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39 of BP 129 which shortened the appeal period
from 30 days to 15 days to hasten the disposition of cases. The original period of appeal (in this case March 3-18, 1998)
remains and the requirement for strict compliance still applies. The fresh period of 15 days becomes significant only when
a party opts to file a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In this manner, the trial court which rendered the
assailed decision is given another opportunity to review the case and, in the process, minimize and/or rectify any error of
judgment. While we aim to resolve cases with dispatch and to have judgments of courts become final at some definite
time, we likewise aspire to deliver justice fairly.
In this case, the new period of 15 days eradicates the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be
counted from receipt of notice of judgment (March 3, 1998) or from receipt of notice of final order appealed from (July 22,
1998).
To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the Regional Trial
Courts decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the final order) denying his motion for new trial or motion
for reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the
decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of the original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3.
Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 or five days from receipt of the order denying their
motion for reconsideration on July 22, 1998. Hence, the notice of appeal was well within the fresh appeal period of 15
days, as already discussed.[34]
We deem it unnecessary to discuss the applicability of Denso (Philippines), Inc. v. IAC[35] since the Court of Appeals never
even referred to it in its assailed decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, let the records of this case be remanded to the Court of Appeals for
further proceedings.

LILANY YULO y BILLONES, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
seeking to reverse the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated January 31, 1997 in CA-G.R. CR No. 17513 and its
Resolution[2] dated March 16, 2000.
The facts, as culled from the findings of the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals are:

Sometime in August 1992, Lilany B. Yulo, petitioner, and Josefina Dimalanta went to the house of Myrna Roque,
private complainant, in Caloocan City. Josefina, introduced to Myrna petitioner Yulo as her best friend and a good payer.
Josefina told Myrna that petitioner wanted her checks encashed. In view of Josefinas assurance that petitioner is
trustworthy, Myrna agreed to encash the checks. Petitioner then issued to Myrna three checks: (a) Equitable Bank (EB)
Check No. 237936 in the amount of P40,000.00, postdated September 30, 1992; (b) EB Check No. 237941 in the amount
of P16,200.00; and (c) Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) Check No. 656602 in the amount of P40,000.00, postdated
November 18, 1992.
When Myrna presented the checks for payment to the drawee banks, they were dishonored. The EB checks were
Drawn Against Insufficient Funds, while the BPI check was stamped Account Closed.
As Myrna did not know petitioners address, she immediately informed Josefina about the dishonored checks. The
latter told Myrna not to worry and repeated her assurance that petitioner is her best friend and a good payer. Myrna tried
to get petitioners address from Josefina, but the latter refused and instead made the assurance that she will inform
petitioner that the checks were dishonored.
When no payment was forthcoming, Myrna lodged a complaint against petitioner with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Caloocan City.
On August 23, 1993, three (3) Informations were filed by the Caloocan City Prosecutor with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 130, same city, for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. C-44774, 44775, and
44776.
When arraigned with the assistance of counsel de parte, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charges. The cases were
then consolidated and jointly heard.
Petitioner admitted having issued the checks in question but claimed that she merely lent them to Josefina. In turn,
Josefina delivered the checks to her friend who showed them to a jeweler as show money. It was understood that the
checks were not to be deposited. Petitioner vehemently denied having any transaction with Myrna.
Petitioner also claimed that that when she issued the checks, she knew she had no funds in the banks; and that she
was aware that the checks would be dishonored if presented for payment.
After hearing, the trial court rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused LILANY YULO y BILLONES, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and is hereby sentenced as follows:
(1) In Criminal Case No. C-44774, to an imprisonment of ONE (1) YEAR, and to indemnify the offended party
Myrna Roque in the amount of P16,200.00, representing the face value of Equitable Bank Check No.
227941, and to pay the costs;
(2) In Criminal Case No. C-44775, to an to an imprisonment of ONE (1) YEAR, and to indemnify the offended
party Myrna Roque in the amount of P40,000.00, representing the face value of Bank of the Philippine
Islands Check No. 656602, and to pay the costs;
(3) In Criminal Case No. C-44776, to an imprisonment of ONE (1) YEAR, and to indemnify the offended party
Myrna Roque in the amount of P40,000.00, representing the face value of Equitable Bank Check No.
237936, and to pay the costs.
Pursuant to Rule 114, Section 2(a) of the Rules of Court, as amended, the bail bond of the accused is cancelled and the
accused is hereby committed to the City Jail.
SO ORDERED.[3]
Upon appeal, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 17513, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the Decision of the trial
court.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.
Hence, the instant petition raising the following assignments of error:
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER WAS DEPRIVED OF HER RIGHT TO SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF
CASES;

II. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION FOR
VIOLATION OF BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 22. EVEN IF THE REQUISITES THEREFORE ARE NOT
COMPLETE;
III. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL
COURT ALTHOUGH THE LATTERS DECISION WAS BASED ON THE UNCORROBORATED,
INCREDIBLE, AND UNNATURAL STATEMENTS OF THE COMPLAINANT AND ALTHOUGH THE
TESTIMOMY OF THE ACCUSED WAS SUPPORTED BY CORROBORATING EVIDENCE.[4]
The issues for our resolution are: (1) whether the Court of Appeals violated petitioners right to a speedy trial; and (2)
whether the same court erred in holding that the prosecution has proved petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
On the first issue, petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals resolved her motion for reconsideration only after
three (3) years from its filing. Such inaction violates her right to a speedy disposition of her case.
In his comment, the Solicitor General counters that the Appellate Court has explained satisfactorily why petitioners
motion for reconsideration was not resolved immediately.
Article III, Section 16 of the Constitution provides:
SEC.16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative bodies.
Under the foregoing provision, any party to a case has the right to demand on all officials tasked with the
administration of justice to expedite its disposition. However, the concept of speedy disposition is a relative term and must
necessarily be a flexible concept. [5] A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient. [6] In applying the
Constitutional guarantee, particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances of each case.
The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, [7] is deemed violated only when the
proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays, or when unjustified postponements of the trial
are asked for and secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without
the party having his case tried. [8] To determine whether the right has been violated, the following factors may be
considered: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for such delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by
the accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay.[9]
In the instant case, we agree with the Solicitor General that the delay was sufficiently explained by the Court of
Appeals. The ponente of the decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 17513, Associate Justice Jainal D. Rasul, retired during the
pendency of petitioners motion for reconsideration filed on March 4, 1997. However, the case was assigned to Associate
Justice Mercedes Gozo-Dadole only on February 28, 2000 and brought to her attention on March 2, 2000. We note that it
took Justice Gozo-Dadole only two (2) weeks from notice to resolve the motion. Clearly, she did not incur any delay. We,
therefore, rule that there has been no violation of the petitioners right to a speedy trial.
On the second issue, petitioner submits that the prosecution failed to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Not
all the elements of the offense of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 were adequately established. For one, Myrna
Roque, private complainant, did not send her any notice of dishonor. It was Josefina whom Myrna contacted, not her. For
another, petitioner merely lent the checks to Josefina to be shown by her friend to a jeweler.
Petitioners arguments are simply untenable.
The elements of the offense penalized by Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 are: (1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any
check to apply for account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does
not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and
(3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficient funds or credit or dishonor for the same
reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment. [10]
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the prosecution has proved all the elements of the offense.
Petitioner admitted having issued the three dishonored checks for value. Her purpose was to encash them. She also
admitted that at the time she issued the checks, she was aware that she had only P1,000.00 in her account with the
Equitable Bank and that her BPI account was already closed. Significantly, what Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 penalizes is the
issuance of a bouncing check. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes, but the act of making
and issuing a check that is dishonored upon presentment for payment. [11] The purpose for which the check was issued and
the terms and conditions relating to its issuance are immaterial. What is primordial is that the issued checks were
worthless and the fact of worthlessness was known to the petitioner at the time of their issuance, as in this case. This is
because under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, the mere act of issuing a worthless check is malum prohibitum.[12]

We likewise find no reason to sustain petitioners contention that she was not given any notice of dishonor. Myrna had
no reason to be suspicious of petitioner. It will be recalled that Josefina Dimalanta assured Myrna that petitioner is her
best friend and a good payer. Consequently, when the checks bounced, Myrna would naturally turn to Josefina for help.
We note that Josefina refused to give Myrna petitioners address but promised to inform petitioner about the dishonored
checks.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the trial court. Settled is the rule that factual findings of the trial court
which have been affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals are entitled to great weight and respect by this Court and will not
be disturbed absent any showing that the trial court overlooked certain facts and circumstances which could substantially
affect the outcome of the case. [13] This exception is not present here. That Myrna was the sole witness for the prosecution
is of no moment. There is no law requiring that the testimony of a single witness must be corroborated. The rule in this
jurisdiction is that the testimony of witnesses is weighed, not numbered, and the testimony of a single witness, if found
trustworthy and credible, as in this case, is sufficient to sustain a conviction. [14]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 31, 1997 and its
Resolution dated March 16, 2000, in CA-G.R. CR No. 17513, sustaining the Joint Decision of the trial court in Criminal
Cases Nos. C-44774, C-44775, and C-44776 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

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