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1) The SANIDAD vs. COMELEC case ruled that Section 19 of Comelec Resolution 2167, which prohibited columnists from expressing opinions during plebiscite periods, had no statutory basis. The Comelec does not have the power to regulate media practitioners' freedom of expression.
2) The BLO UMPAR ADIONG vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS case involved a challenge to the Comelec's prohibition on posting campaign decals and stickers except in authorized areas. The Supreme Court ruled the prohibition was unconstitutional as it unduly infringed on free speech rights.
3) The PILAR vs. COMELEC case concerned a candidate who withdrew his candidacy three
1) The SANIDAD vs. COMELEC case ruled that Section 19 of Comelec Resolution 2167, which prohibited columnists from expressing opinions during plebiscite periods, had no statutory basis. The Comelec does not have the power to regulate media practitioners' freedom of expression.
2) The BLO UMPAR ADIONG vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS case involved a challenge to the Comelec's prohibition on posting campaign decals and stickers except in authorized areas. The Supreme Court ruled the prohibition was unconstitutional as it unduly infringed on free speech rights.
3) The PILAR vs. COMELEC case concerned a candidate who withdrew his candidacy three
1) The SANIDAD vs. COMELEC case ruled that Section 19 of Comelec Resolution 2167, which prohibited columnists from expressing opinions during plebiscite periods, had no statutory basis. The Comelec does not have the power to regulate media practitioners' freedom of expression.
2) The BLO UMPAR ADIONG vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS case involved a challenge to the Comelec's prohibition on posting campaign decals and stickers except in authorized areas. The Supreme Court ruled the prohibition was unconstitutional as it unduly infringed on free speech rights.
3) The PILAR vs. COMELEC case concerned a candidate who withdrew his candidacy three
SANIDAD vs. COMELEC 181 SCRA 529 Facts: On 23 October 1989, RA 6766 (Act providing for an organic act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region) was enacted into law. The plebiscite was scheduled 30 January 1990. The Comelec, by virtue of the power vested by the 1987 Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881), RA 6766 and other pertinent election laws, promulgated Resolution 2167, to govern the conduct of the plebiscite on the said Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region. Pablito V. Sanidad, a newspaper columnist of Overview for the Baguio Midland Courier assailed the constitutionality of Section 19 (Prohibition on columnists, commentators or announcers) of the said resolution, which provides During the plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and on plebiscite day, no mass media columnist, commentator, announcer or personality shall use his column or radio or television time to campaign for or against the plebiscite issues. Issue: Whether columnists are prohibited from expressing their opinions, or should be under Comelec regulation, during plebiscite periods. Held: Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that what was granted to the Comelec was the power to supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises, permits or other grants issued for the operation of transportation or other public utilities, media of communication or information to the end that equal opportunity, time and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates are ensured. Neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11-b, 2nd paragraph of RA 6646 (a columnist, commentator, announcer or personality, who is a candidate for any elective office is required to take a leave of absence from his work during the campaign period) can be construed to mean that the Comelec has also been granted the right to supervise and regulate the exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right to expression during plebiscite periods. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are no candidates involved in a plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19 of Comelec Resolution 2167 has no statutory basis.
G.R. No. 103956 March 31, 1992
BLO UMPAR ADIONG vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS Facts: Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections now assails the COMELEC's Resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in "mobile" places like cars and other moving vehicles. According to him such prohibition is violative of Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 11(a) of Republic Act No. 6646. In addition, the petitioner believes that with the ban on radio, television and print political advertisements, he, being a neophyte in the field of politics stands to suffer grave and irreparable injury with this prohibition. The posting of decals and stickers on cars and other moving vehicles would be his last medium to inform the electorate that he is a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections. Finally, the petitioner states that as of February 22, 1992 (the date of the petition) he has not received any notice from any of the Election Registrars in the entire country as to the location of the supposed "Comelec Poster Areas." Issue: Is the COMELEC Resolution prohibiting the posting of decals and stickers except on COMELEC authorized posting areas, valid and constitutional? Ruling: No. The COMELEC's prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places whether public or private except in designated areas provided for by the COMELEC itself is null and void on constitutional grounds. The prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of free speech enshrined in the Constitution (Sec. 4, Article III). There is no public interest substantial enough to warrant the kind of restriction involved in this case. The questioned prohibition premised on the statute and as couched in the resolution is also void for overbreadth. Section 11 of Rep. Act 6646 is so encompassing and invasive that it prohibits the posting or display of election propaganda in any place, whether public or private, except in the common poster areas sanctioned by COMELEC. Third, the constitutional objective to give a rich
candidate and a poor candidate equal
opportunity to inform the electorate as regards their candidacies, mandated by Article II, Section 26 and Article XIII, section 1 in relation to Article IX (c) Section 4 of the Constitution, is not impaired by posting decals and stickers on cars and other private vehicles. Compared to the paramount interest of the State in guaranteeing freedom of expression, any financial considerations behind the regulation are of marginal significance. In sum, the prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places whether public or private except in the authorized areas designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship which cannot be justified by the Constitution. Election Law: Pilar vs COMELEC G.R. No. 115245 July 11, 1995 JUANITO C. PILAR, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent. G.R. No. 115245 July 11, 1995 Facts: On March 22, 1992, petitioner Juanito C. Pilar filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Isabela. Three days after, the petitioner withdrew his certificate of candidacy. In M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065 dated November 3, 1993 and February 13, 1994 respectively, the COMELEC imposed upon petitioner the fine of Ten Thousand Pesos for failure to file his statement of contributions and expenditures. Petitioner argues that he cannot be held liable for failure to file a statement of contributions and expenditures because he was a "noncandidate," having withdrawn his certificates of candidacy three days after its filing. Petitioner speculates that "it is . . . clear from the law that candidate must have entered the political contest, and should have either won or lost". Issue: Whether or not a candidate is excused in filing his statement of contributions and expenditures after he has withdrawn his certificate of candidacy. Held:
The petition is dismissed. The court ruled that
the filing or withdrawal of certificate of candidacy shall not affect whatever civil, criminal or administrative liabilities which a candidate may have incurred. Petitioners withdrawal of his candidacy did not extinguish his liability for the administrative fine. It is not improbable that a candidate who withdrew his candidacy has accepted contributions and incurred expenditures, even in the short span of his campaign. The evil sought to be prevented by the law is not all too remote. Courts have also ruled that such provisions are mandatory as to the requirement of filing.