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MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
In this Petition for "Certiorari, mandamus and
Prohibition", seeking the dismissal of Civil Case No. C7770 below, we have, as factual background, the
following:
Petitioner, Dr. Eustaquio M. Medalla, Jr., is the Chief of
Clinics of the Caloocan City General Hospital, Caloocan
City. Private respondent,, Dr. Honorato G. Mackay was
the Resident Physician thereat.
When the position of Assistant, hospital Administrator
of the Caloocan City General Hospital became vacant
upon the resignation of the incumbent, former
Caloocan City Mayor Alejandro A. Fider designated and
subsequently
appointed,
as
Assistant
Hospital
Administrator private respondent Dr. Mackay, a
Resident Physician in said hospital. Petitioner, Dr.
Medalla, Jr., protested Dr. Mackay's designation and
subsequent appointment alleging among others that,
as Chief of Clinics, he (Medalla) was next-in-rank. The
then Acting City Mayor Virgilio P. Robles, who
succeeded former Mayor, now Assemblyman Alejandro
A. Fider, in his 4th Indorsement dated September 20,
1978, sustained Mackay's appointment stating:
... as of April 18, 1978 when Dr.
Honorato G. Mackay was promoted to
Assistant Hospital Administrator from
his previous position of Resident
Physician, he was next in rank to the
said higher position by reason of his
having
completed
all
academic
requirements for the Certificate in
Hospital Administration ... contrary to
the claim of Dr. Eustaquio Medalla, Jr. in
his letter of May 2, 1978.
xxx xxx xxx
Dissatisfied, Medalla elevated his case to the Civil
Service Commission on appeal. On December 29,
1978, the Civil Service Merit Systems Board issued
Resolution No. 49 sustaining Medalla's appeal and
revoking Mackay's appointment as Assistant Hospital
Administrator. The pertinent portion of the aforestated
Resolution reads:
A perusal of the records shows that
appellant Medalla is the Chief of Clinics
of the Caloocan City General Hospital;
he is a holder of the Degree of Doctor
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SYLLABUS
Page 4 of 151
1.
ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW;
GOVERNMENT
INSTRUMENTALITY,
DEFINED.
The
1987
Administrative
Code
defines
a
government
instrumentality as follows: Instrumentality refers to any
agency of the National Government, not integrated
within the department framework, vested with special
functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if
not all corporate powers, administering special funds,
and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a
charter. This term includes regulatory agencies,
chartered institutions, and government-owned or
controlled corporations. (Sec. 2 (5) Introductory
Provisions).
2.
ID.;
CHARTERED
INSTITUTION;
DEFINED;
APPLICATION IN CASE AT BAR. The 1987
Administrative Code describes a chartered institution
thus: Chartered institution refers to any agency
organized or operating under a special charter, and
vested by law with functions relating to specific
constitutional policies or objectives. This term includes
the state universities and colleges, and the monetary
authority of the state. (Sec. 2 (12) Introductory
Provisions). It is clear from the above definitions that
ISCOF is a chartered institution and is therefore
covered by P.D. 1818. There are also indications in its
charter that ISCOF is a government instrumentality.
First, it was created in pursuance of the integrated
fisheries development policy of the State, a priority
program of the government to effect the socioeconomic life of the nation. Second, the Treasurer of
the Republic of the Philippines shall also be the exofficio Treasurer of the state college with its accounts
and expenses to be audited by the Commission on
Audit or its duly authorized representative. Third,
heads of bureaus and offices of the National
Government are authorized to loan or transfer to it,
upon request of the president of the state college, such
apparatus, equipment, or supplies and even the
services of such employees as can be spared without
serious detriment to public service. Lastly, an
additional amount of P1.5M had been appropriated out
of the funds of the National Treasury and it was also
decreed in its charter that the funds and maintenance
of the state college would henceforth be included in
the General Appropriations Law. (Presidential Decree
No.
1523)
3. ID.; PROHIBITION OF ANY COURT FROM ISSUING
INJUNCTION IN CASES INVOLVING INFRASTRUCTURE
PROJECTS OF GOVERNMENT (P.D. 1818); POWER OF
THE COURTS TO RESTRAIN APPLICATION. In the case
of Datiles and Co. v. Sucaldito, (186 SCRA 704) this
Court interpreted a similar prohibition contained in P.D.
605, the law after which P.D. 1818 was patterned. It
was there declared that the prohibition pertained to the
issuance of injunctions or restraining orders by courts
against administrative acts in controversies involving
facts or the exercise of discretion in technical cases.
The Court observed that to allow the courts to judge
these matters would disturb the smooth functioning of
the administrative machinery. Justice Teodoro Padilla
made it clear, however, that on issues definitely
outside of this dimension and involving questions of
law, courts could not be prevented by P.D. No. 605
from exercising their power to restrain or prohibit
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DECISION
CRUZ, J.:
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contractors shall be required to file their ARCContractors Confidential Application for Registration &
Classifications & the PRE-C2 Confidential Prequalification Statement for the Project (prior to the
amendment of the rules, this was referred to as PREC1) not later than the deadline set in the published
Invitation to Bid, after which date no PRE-C2 shall be
submitted and received. Invitations to Bid shall be
advertised for at least three times within a reasonable
period but in no case less than two weeks in at least
two newspapers of general circulations.
PBAC advertised the pre-qualification deadline as
December 2, 1988, without stating the hour thereof,
and announced that the opening of bids would be at 3
oclock in the afternoon of December 12, 1988. This
schedule was changed and a notice of such change
was merely posted at the ISCOF bulletin board. The
notice advanced the cut-off time for the submission of
pre-qualification documents to 10 oclock in the
morning of December 2, 1988, and the opening of bids
to 1 oclock in the afternoon of December 12, 1988.
The new schedule caused the pre-disqualification of
the petitioners as recorded in the minutes of the PBAC
meeting held on December 6, 1988. While it may be
true that there were fourteen contractors who were
pre-qualified despite the change in schedule, this fact
did not cure the defect of the irregular notice. Notably,
the petitioners were disqualified because they failed to
meet the new deadline and not because of their
expired licenses. ***
We have held that where the law requires a previous
advertisement before government contracts can be
awarded, non-compliance with the requirement will, as
a general rule, render the same void and of no effect
11 The facts that an invitation for bids has been
communicated to a number of possible bidders is not
necessarily sufficient to establish compliance with the
requirements of the law if it is shown that other public
bidders have not been similarly notified.
Second, PBAC was required to issue to pre-qualified
applicants the plans, specifications and proposal book
forms for the project to be bid thirty days before the
date of bidding if the estimate project cost was
between P1M and P5M. PBAC has not denied that these
forms were issued only on December 2, 1988, or only
ten days before the bidding scheduled for December
12, 1988. At the very latest, PBAC should have issued
them on November 12, 1988, or 30 days before the
scheduled
bidding.
It is apparent that the present controversy did not arise
from the discretionary acts of the administrative body
nor does it involve merely technical matters. What is
involved here is non-compliance with the procedural
rules on bidding which required strict observance. The
purpose of the rules implementing P.D. 1594 is to
secure competitive bidding and to prevent favoritism,
collusion and fraud in the award of these contracts to
the detriment of the public. This purpose was defeated
by the irregularities committed by PBAC red.
It has been held that the three principles in public
bidding are the offer to the public, an opportunity for
competition and a basis for exact comparison of bids. A
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to
the
liabilities
of
the
private
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BELLOSILLO, J.:
The Court views with grave concern the alarming
incidents of illegal recruitment which demonstrate all
too clearly that overseas employment has fast
developed into a major source not only of muchneeded foreign exchanged but also, for the cunning
and the crafty, of easy money.
In response to a newspaper advertisement looking for
a couple to work as driver and tutor cum baby sitter,
petitioners Vicente and Gloria Manalo went to Career
Planners Specialists International, Inc. (CPSI), a
licensed service contracting firm owned by private
respondents, the spouses Victor and Elnora Fernandez.
After the requisite interview and testing, they were
hired to work for a family in Saudi Arabia for a monthly
salary of US$350.00 each. According to petitioners, a
placement fee of P40,000.00 was imposed as a
precondition for the processing of their papers. They
paid only P30,000.00 in cash and executed a
promissory note for the balance. Then they were
allowed by respondent Elnora Fernandez to sign their
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placement
fees
14.00 application
form
300.00 psychological
test
1,400.00 medical
exam
P31,000.00 total
less
3,000.00
processing
fees
at
P1,500.00 per applicant
P28,714.00 amount
to be refunded
It appearing, however, that only
respondent
Career
Planners
Specialist(s) Int'l. Inc., took part in the
collection of the aforesaid amount, the
same should be solely held liable.
We cannot likewise give credence to
the
Final
Quitclaim
signed
by
complainant Vicente Manalo before he
left for the Philippines and presented
by respondent as defense. While its
genuineness may not be in question,
we believe that it has no bearing on
the issue at bar. The aforesaid
Quitclaim deals more with matters
concerning complainants' employment
abroad. However, the subject of the
instant claim is the refund of
complainants' expenses prior to their
deployment to Saudi Arabia.
On the other hand, we hold FILMAN
liable for allowing its document such as
the TEP to be used by other agency.
Respondent's defense that there is
nothing wrong in this because FILMAN
is a sister company of CAREER does
not merit consideration because such
practice is not allowed under the POEA
Rules and Regulations. A check with
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is
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Mining
and
15
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MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This petition seeks the review and reversal of the
Decision of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 12660, 1 which ruled adversely against petitioner
herein.
Petitioner Industrial Enterprises Inc. (IEI) was granted a
coal operating contract by the Government through the
Bureau of Energy Development (BED) for the
exploration of two coal blocks in Eastern Samar.
Subsequently, IEI also applied with the then Ministry of
Energy for another coal operating contract for the
exploration of three additional coal blocks which,
together with the original two blocks, comprised the
so-called "Giporlos Area."
IEI was later on advised that in line with the objective
of rationalizing the country's over-all coal supply-
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S.
Cabarrus
is
the
Page 20 of 151
xxx
xxx
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SO ORDERED.
(b)
PETITIONER IS
SHOPPING; and
GUILTY
OF
FORUM-
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Indeed,
the
underlying
principle
of litis
pendentia is the theory that a party is not allowed to
vex another more than once regarding the same
subject matter and for the same cause of action. This
theory is founded on the public policy that the same
subject matter should not be the subject of controversy
in court more than once in order that possible
conflicting judgments may be avoided, for the sake of
the stability of the rights and status of persons. [31] The
RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 205, recognized this
doctrine when it dismissed SP Civil Action No. 02-237
to avoid the possibility of two contradictory decisions
on the question of the validity of the subject titles.
In any case, should the petitioner disagree with
the ruling of the LMB, it is not precluded from taking
the matter up to with the courts of law.
Fourth. To determine whether a party violated the
rule against forum shopping, the test applied is
whether the elements of litis pendentia are present or
whether a final judgment in one case will amount
to res
judicata in
another.[32] Considering
our
pronouncement
that
the
requisites
of litis
pendentia barred the filing of SP Civil Action No. 02237, the RTC correctly dismissed the same on the
additional ground of forum shopping.
WHEREFORE, considering the foregoing, the
petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Order of the
Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 205,
dismissing SP Civil Action No. 02-237 on the ground
of litis pendentia and forum shopping, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
The Case
Before
us
is
a
petition
for
review
on certiorari seeking the reversal of the Decision [1] of
the Court of Appeals, dated September 27, 1990, in
C.A. G.R. CV No. 09062, affirming the dismissal by the
Page 25 of 151
The Facts
The facts of this case, as narrated in detail by
Respondent Court of Appeals, are as follows:[2]
The evidence, testimonial and documentary, presented
during the trial show that on January 16, 1940, Cirilo
Piencenaves, in a Deed of Absolute Sale (exh. A), sold
to [petitioner], a parcel of agricultural land containing
an area of 50 hectares,[3] more or less, and particularly
described and bounded as follows:
A certain parcel of agricultural land planted to abaca
with visible concrete monuments marking the
boundaries and bounded on the NORTH by Public Land
now Private Deeds on the East by Serafin Villaflor, on
the SOUTH by Public Land; and on the West by land
claimed by H. Patete, containing an area of 60 hectares
more or less, now under Tax Dec. 29451 in the (sic) of
said Vicente Villaflor, the whole parcel of which this
particular parcel is only a part, is assessed
at P22,550.00 under the above said Tax Dec. Number.
This deed states:
That the above described land was sold to the said
VICENTE VILLAFLOR, xxx on June 22, 1937, but no
formal document was then executed, and since then
until the present time, the said Vicente Villaflor has
been in possession and occupation of (the same); (and)
That the above described property was before the sale,
of my exclusive property having inherited from my long
dead parents and my ownership to it and that of my
[sic] lasted for more than fifty (50) years, possessing
and occupying same peacefully, publicly and
continuously without interruption for that length of
time.
Also on January 16, 1940, Claudio Otero, in a Deed of
Absolute Sale (exh. C) sold to Villaflor a parcel of
agricultural land, containing an area of 24 hectares,
more or less, and particularly described and bounded
as follows:
A certain land planted to corn with visible concrete
measurements marking the boundaries and bounded
on the North by Public Land and Tungao Creek; on the
East by Agusan River; on the South by Serafin Villaflor
and Cirilo Piencenaves; and on the West by land of
Fermin Bacobo containing an area of 24 hectares more
or less, under Tax Declaration No. 29451 in the name
already of Vicente Villaflor, the whole parcel of which
this particular land is only a part, is assessed
at P22,550.00 under the above said Tax Declaration No.
29451.
This deed states:
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PARCEL ONE
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during the early years; and that Serafin died three days
after his (Vicentes) arrival, and so no accounting of the
rentals could be made; that on November 27, 1973,
Villaflor wrote a letter to Mr. G.E.C. Mears of Nasipit
Lumber, reminding him of their verbal agreement in
1955 xxx that Mr. Mears in a Reply dated December 3,
1973, appears to have referred the matter to Mr.
Noriega, the corporate general manager, but the new
set of corporate officers refused to recognize (Villaflors)
claim, for Mr. Florencio Tamesis, the general manager
of Nasipit Lumber, in a letter dated February 19, 1974,
denied Villaflors itemized claim dated January 5, 1974
(exh. V) to be without valid and legal basis. In that
5th January, 1974 letter, Villaflor claimed the total
amount of P427,000.00 x x x.
In a formal protest dated January 31, 1974[14] which
Villaflor filed with the Bureau of Lands, he protested
the Sales Application of Nasipit Lumber, claiming that
the company has not paid him P5,000.00 as provided
in the Deed of Relinquishment of Rights dated August
16, 1950.
xxx xxx xxx
x x x (T)hat in a Decision dated August 8, 1977 (exh.
8), the Director of Lands found that the payment of the
amount of P5,000.00 in the Deed xxx and the
consideration in the Agreement to Sell were duly
proven, and ordered the dismissal of Villaflors protest
and gave due course to the Sales Application of Nasipit
Lumber. Pertinent portion of the Decision penned by
Director of Lands, Ramon Casanova, in the Matter of SP
No. V-807 (C-V-407) xxx reads:
xxx xxx xxx
During the proceedings, Villaflor presented another
claim entirely different from his previous claim -- this
time, for recovery of rentals in arrears arising from a
supposed contract of lease by Villaflor as lessor in favor
of Nasipit as lessee, and indemnity for damages
supposedly caused improvements on his other
property xxx in the staggering amount of Seventeen
Million (P17,000,000.00) Pesos. Earlier, he had also
demanded from NASIPIT xxx (P427,000.00) xxx also as
indemnity for damages to improvements supposedly
caused by NASIPIT on his other real property as well as
for reimbursement of realty taxes allegedly paid by him
thereon.
xxx xxx xxx
It would seem that xxx Villaflor has sought to inject so
many collaterals, if not extraneous claims, into this
case. It is the considered opinion of this Office that any
claim not within the sphere or scope of its adjudicatory
authority as an administrative as well as quasi-judicial
body or any issue which seeks to delve into the merits
of incidents clearly outside of the administrative
competence of this Office to decide may not be
entertained.
There is no merit in the contention of Villaflor that
owing to Nasipits failure to pay the amount of xxx
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The Issues
Petitioner, through his heirs, attributes
following errors to the Court of Appeals:
the
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BELLOSILLO, J.:
Are Regional Trial Courts' vested with jurisdiction over
cases for collection of back rentals from leasehold
tenants?
On 21 July 1989 private respondent Celestino Villalon
filed a complaint for collection of back rentals and
damages before the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran
City against petitioners Lope Machete, Nicasio
Jumawid, Santiago Jumawid, John Jumawid, Pedro
Gamaya, Renato Delgado, Fernando Ombahin, Matias
Roleda, Pasiano Baro, Ignacio Baro, Mamerto Plaras
and Justiniano Villalon. The complaint alleged that the
parties entered into a leasehold agreement with
respect to private respondent's landholdings at
Poblacion Norte, Carmen, Bohol, under which
petitioners were to pay private respondent a certain
amount or percentage of their harvests. However,
despite repeated demands and with no valid reason,
petitioners failed to pay their respective rentals. Private
respondent thus prayed that petitioners be ordered to
pay him back rentals and damages.
Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction of the trial court over the
subject matter. They contended that the case arose out
of or was connected with agrarian relations, hence, the
subject matter of the complaint fell squarely within the
jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) in the exercise of its quasi-judicial powers under
Sec. 1, pars. (a) and (b), Rule II of the Revised Rules of
the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB).
On 22 August 1989 the trial court granted the motion
to dismiss, 1 and on 28 September 1989 denied the
motion for reconsideration. 2
Private respondent sought annulment of both orders
before respondent Court of Appeals which on 21 May
1992 rendered judgment reversing the trial court and
directing it to assume jurisdiction over the case 3 on
the basis of its finding that
. . . The CARL (RA 6657) and other
pertinent laws on agrarian reform
cannot be seen to encompass a case of
simple collection of back rentals by
virtue of an agreement, as the one at
bar, where there is no agrarian dispute
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SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 87437
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xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
Page 47 of 151
III
Respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of
discretion when he issued a writ of preliminary
injunction dated May 11, 1988 without hearing
on the merits.
In compliance with Our resolution of 12 April 1989,
herein respondents filed their Comment on 2 May
1989.
As We stated in the introductory portion of this
Decision, in the resolution of 29 May 1989 We gave
due course to the petition and required the parties to
submit their Memoranda, which they complied with.
Page 48 of 151
45
., We held:
Page 49 of 151
xxx
xxx
Page 50 of 151
CORONA, J.:
Page 51 of 151
Before
us
is
a
petition
for
review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the March 29, 2004 decision [1] of the Court of
Appeals, the dispositive portion of which read:
FOR THE FOREGOING DISQUISITIONS, the petition
is GRANTED, the Philippine Health Insurance
Corporation[2] is hereby ordered to give due course to
petitioners, Chinese General Hospital and Medical
Center, claims for the period from 1989 to 1992,
amounting to FOURTEEN MILLION TWO HUNDRED
NINETY ONE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED SIXTY EIGHT
PESOS and 71/100 PESOS (P14,291,568.71).[3]
The facts, as culled by the Court of Appeals,
follow.
On February 14, 1995, Republic Act No. 7875,
otherwise known as An Act Instituting a National Health
Insurance Program for all Filipinos and Establishing the
Philippine Health Insurance Corporation For the
Purpose, was approved and signed into law. As its
guiding principle, it is provided in Section 2 thereof,
thus:
Section 2. Declaration of Principles and Policies.
Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines declares that the state shall
adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to
health development which shall endeavor to make
essential goods, health and other social services
available to all the people at affordable cost. Priority for
the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly,
disabled, women, and children should be recognized.
Likewise, it shall be the policy of the State to provide
free medical care to paupers.
Prior to the enactment of R.A. 7875. CGH[4] had been an
accredited health care provider under the Philippine
Medical Care Commission (PMCC), more popularly
known as Medicare. As defined by R.A. 7875, a health
care provider refers to a health care institution, which
is duly licensed and accredited devoted primarily to the
maintenance and operation of facilities for health
promotion, prevention, diagnosis, treatment and care
of individuals suffering from illness, disease, injury,
disability or deformity, or in need of obstetrical or other
medical and nursing care.[5]
As such, petitioner[6] filed its Medicare claims with the
Social Security System (SSS), which, together with the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS),
administered the Health Insurance Fund of the PMMC.
Thus, petitioner filed its claim from 1989 to 1992 with
the SSS, amounting to EIGHT MILLION ONE HUNDRED
TWO THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHTY-TWO and
10/100 (P8,102,782.10). Its application for the payment
of its claim with the SSS was overtaken by the passage
of R.A. 7875, which in Section 51 and 52, provides:
SECTION 51. Merger. Within sixty (60) days from the
promulgation of the implementing rules and
regulations, all functions and assets of the Philippine
Medical Care Commission shall be merged with those
of the Corporation (PHILHEALTH) without need of
Page 52 of 151
We agree.
was
adopted
in
RA
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No costs.
SO ORDERED.
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HAZEL
ANTOLIN,
MA.
C.
Petitioner,
- versus ABELARDO
T.
DOMONDON,
JOSE A. GANGAN, and
VIOLETA J. JOSEF,
Respondents.
x------------------- - - - - - - -x
HAZEL MA. C. ANTOLIN
Petitioner,
- versus -
ANTONIETA FORTUNAIBE,
Respondent.
Promulgated:
July 5, 2010
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Examinations have a two-fold purpose. First, they are
summative; examinations are intended to assess and record
what and how much the students have learned. Second,
and perhaps more importantly, they are formative;
examinations are intended to be part and parcel of the
learning process. In a perfect system, they are tools for
learning. In view of the pedagogical aspect of national
examinations, the need for all parties to fully ventilate their
respective positions, and the view that government
transactions can only be improved by public scrutiny, we
remand these cases to the trial court for further
proceedings.
Factual Antecedents
Petitioner took the accountancy licensure
examinations (the Certified Public Accountant [CPA] Board
Exams) conducted by the Board of Accountancy (the Board)
in October 1997.[1]The examination results were released
on October 29, 1997; out of 6,481 examinees, only 1,171
passed. Unfortunately, petitioner did not make it. When the
results were released, she received failing grades in four out
of the seven subjects.[2]
Subject
Theory of Accounts
Business Law
Management Services
Auditing Theory
Auditing Problems
Practical Accounting I
Practical Accounting II
Petitioners Grade
65 %
66 %
69 %
82 %
70 %
68 %
77 %
Page 58 of 151
xxxx
3. that have been given in the
examination except if the
test bank for the subject
has on deposit at least
two thousand (2,000)
questions.[7]
After a further exchange of correspondence,[8] the
Board informed petitioner that an investigation was
conducted into her exam and there was no mechanical error
found in the grading of her test papers.[9]
If only to underscore the fact that she was not asking for a
re-checking of her exam, the following prayer for relief was
deleted from the Amended Petition: and, if warranted, to
issue to her a certificate of registration as a CPA.
On June 23, 1998, respondents filed a Manifestation
and Motion to Dismiss Application for Writ of Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction, on the ground that petitioner had
taken and passed the May 1998 CPA Licensure Examination
and had taken her oath as a CPA.[15] Petitioner filed her
Opposition on July 8, 1998.[16] Subsequently, on October 29,
1998, respondents filed their Answer with Counterclaim to
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2. Judgment be issued
a)
b)
c)
Questionnaire in
each of the seven subjects
comprising the Accountancy
Examination of October,
1997;
Petitioners
Answer Sheets; and
Answer keys to
the questionnaires.
SO ORDERED.[23]
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration which was
denied.[24]
Proceedings before
the Court of Appeals
The RTC Decisions led to the filing of three separate
petitions for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA):
(a)
(b)
(c)
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SOUTHERN
CROSS
CEMENT
CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.
CEMENT
MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES, THE SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY,
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
FINANCE and THE COMMISSIONER OF THE
BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, respondents.
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
Cement is hardly an exciting subject for litigation.
Still, the parties in this case have done their best to put
up a spirited advocacy of their respective positions,
throwing in everything including the proverbial kitchen
sink. At present, the burden of passion, if not proof, has
shifted to public respondents Department of Trade and
Industry (DTI) and private respondent Philippine
Cement Manufacturers Corporation (Philcemcor),[1] who
now seek reconsideration of our Decision dated 8 July
2004 (Decision), which granted the petition of
petitioner
Southern Cross
Cement
Corporation
(Southern Cross).
This case, of course, is ultimately not just about
cement. For respondents, it is about love of country
and the future of the domestic industry in the face of
foreign competition. For this Court, it is about
elementary statutory construction, constitutional
limitations on the executive power to impose tariffs
and similar measures, and obedience to the law. Just as
much was asserted in the Decision, and the same holds
true with this present Resolution.
An extensive narration of facts can be found in
the Decision.[2] As can well be recalled, the case
centers on the interpretation of provisions of Republic
Act No. 8800, the Safeguard Measures Act (SMA),
which was one of the laws enacted by Congress soon
after the Philippines ratified the General Agreement on
Tariff and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade
Organization (WTO) Agreement.[3] The SMA provides
the structure and mechanics for the imposition of
emergency measures, including tariffs, to protect
domestic industries and producers from increased
imports which inflict or could inflict serious injury on
them.[4]
A brief summary as to how the present petition
came to be filed by Southern Cross. Philcemcor, an
association of at least eighteen (18) domestic cement
manufacturers filed with the DTI a petition seeking the
imposition of safeguard measures on gray Portland
cement,[5] in accordance with the SMA. After the DTI
issued
a
provisional
safeguard
measure, [6] the
application was referred to the Tariff Commission for a
formal investigation pursuant to Section 9 of the SMA
and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, in order to
determine whether or not to impose a definitive
safeguard measure on imports of gray Portland
cement. The Tariff Commission held public hearings
and conducted its own investigation, then on 13 March
2002, issued its Formal Investigation Report (Report).
The Report determined as follows:
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VI. On Forum-Shopping
We remain convinced that there was no willful and
deliberate forum-shopping in this case by Southern
Cross. The causes of action that animate this present
petition for review and the petition for review with the
CTA are distinct from each other, even though they
relate to similar factual antecedents. Yet it also appears
that contrary to the undertaking signed by the
President of Southern Cross, Hironobu Ryu, to inform
this Court of any similar action or proceeding pending
before any court, tribunal or agency within five (5)
days from knowledge thereof, Southern Cross informed
this Court only on 12 August 2003 of the petition it had
filed with the CTA eleven days earlier. An appropriate
sanction is warranted for such failure, but not the
dismissal of the petition.
for
Page 82 of 151
GLOBE
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Pursuant to its rule-making and regulatory powers,
the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC)
issued on June 16, 2000 Memorandum Circular No. 136-2000, promulgating rules and regulations on the
billing of telecommunications services. Among its
pertinent provisions are the following:
(1) The billing statements shall be received by the
subscriber of the telephone service not later than 30
days from the end of each billing cycle. In case the
statement is received beyond this period, the
subscriber shall have a specified grace period within
which to pay the bill and the public
telecommunications entity (PTEs) shall not be allowed
to disconnect the service within the grace period.
(2) There shall be no charge for calls that are diverted
to a voice mailbox, voice prompt, recorded message or
similar facility excluding the customers own
equipment.
(3) PTEs shall verify the identification and address of
each purchaser of prepaid SIM cards. Prepaid call cards
and SIM cards shall be valid for at least 2 years from
the date of first use. Holders of prepaid SIM cards shall
be given 45 days from the date the prepaid SIM card is
fully consumed but not beyond 2 years and 45 days
from date of first use to replenish the SIM card,
otherwise the SIM card shall be rendered invalid. The
validity of an invalid SIM card, however, shall be
installed upon request of the customer at no additional
charge except the presentation of a valid prepaid call
card.
(4) Subscribers shall be updated of the remaining value
of their cards before the start of every call using the
cards.
(5) The unit of billing for the cellular mobile telephone
service whether postpaid or prepaid shall be reduced
from 1 minute per pulse to 6 seconds per pulse. The
authorized rates per minute shall thus be divided by
10.[1]
The Memorandum Circular provided that it shall
take effect 15 days after its publication in a newspaper
of general circulation and three certified true copies
thereof furnished the UP Law Center. It was published
in the newspaper, The Philippine Star, on June 22,
2000.[2] Meanwhile, the provisions of the Memorandum
Circular pertaining to the sale and use of prepaid cards
and the unit of billing for cellular mobile telephone
service took effect 90 days from the effectivity of the
Memorandum Circular.
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in
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raises
the
Page 87 of 151
First Issue:
Second Issue:
Cause of Action
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of
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1.
2.
3.
SO ORDERED.
4.
5.
CIVIL
SERVICE
COMMISSION,
Petitioner,
- versus -
DEPARTMENT
OF
BUDGET
AND
MANAGEMENT,
Respondent.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
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SO ORDERED.
Page 99 of 151
March 2, 2007
SO ORDERED.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Facts
against [respondent], docketed as Civil Case No. 98811 before public respondent judge.
x x x x x x x x x.
SO ORDERED.
The appeal of [petitioner] was however rejected by
[respondent] in its decision dated July 30, 1998 and the
[the latter] ordered the former to cease and desist from
using the word University. However, prior to said date,
on April 2, 1998, [petitioner] filed a Complaint for
Damages with prayer for Writ of preliminary and
Mandatory Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order
court
SO ORDERED.[3]
On February 23, 1999, respondent filed with the
CA a Petition for certiorari, arguing that the RTC had
committed grave abuse of discretion (a) in denying the
formers Motion to Dismiss, (b) in issuing a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, and (c) in declaring respondent
in default despite its filing an Answer.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
On March 3, 1998, private respondents Pedro
Ignacio, Diomedes Castro, Fe Esperanza Candilla,
Ruben Lamina, Jr., Joel Persiuncula, Alvino Prudente,
Joel Raymundo, Regie Rocero, Linda Rodriguez, John
Seludo, Alberto Reyes and Anacleta Valois filed with the
Department of Labor and Employment, Regional Office
No. IV (DOLE Region IV), separate complaints for
underpayment of wages and non-payment of other
employee benefits.[1] Impleaded as respondent was
their employer, Laguna CATV Network, Inc. (Laguna
CATV).
Private
respondents
filed
their
separate
complaints pursuant to Article 128 of the Labor Code,
as amended by Republic Act No. 7730, [2] which
provides:
Article 128. Visitorial and enforcement powers. - (a)
The Secretary of Labor or his duly authorized
representatives, including labor regulation officers,
shall have access to employers records and premises
at any time of the day or night whenever work is being
undertaken therein, and the right to copy therefrom, to
question any employee and investigate any fact,
condition or matter which may be necessary to
determine violations or which may aid in the
enforcement of this Code and of any labor law, wage
order or rules and regulations issued pursuant thereto.
(b) x x x
An order issued by the duly authorized
representative of the Secretary of Labor and
Employment under this article may
be appealed to the latter. In case said order
involves a monetary award, an appeal by the employer
may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or
surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company
duly accredited by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment in the amount equivalent to the monetary
award in the order appealed from. (emphasis added)
x x x.
On April 1, 1998, DOLE Region IV conducted an
inspection within the premises of Laguna CATV and
found that the latter violated the laws on payment of
wages and other benefits. Thereupon, DOLE Region IV
requested Laguna CATV to correct its violations but the
latter refused, prompting Regional Director Alex E.
Maraan to set the case for summary investigation.
[3]
Thereafter, he issued an Order dated August 19,
1998[4] directing Laguna CATV to pay the concerned
employees the sum of Two Hundred Sixty-One
Thousand, Nine and 19/100 (P261,009.19) Pesos
representing their unpaid claims, within 10 days from
notice, and to submit proof of payment within the same
period. Forthwith, Laguna CATV filed a motion for
reconsideration.[5]
In view of Laguna CATVs failure to comply with the
Order directing it to pay the unpaid claims of its
employees, DOLE Regional Director Maraan issued a
7)
of
be
review
is
instant
petition
for
review
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
July 9, 2002
Islands" located at the southern portion of the ManilaCavite Coastal Road, Paraaque City. The Freedom
Islands have a total land area of One Million Five
Hundred Seventy Eight Thousand Four Hundred and
Forty One (1,578,441) square meters or 157.841
hectares.
On April 25, 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture
Agreement ("JVA" for brevity) with AMARI, a private
corporation, to develop the Freedom Islands. The JVA
also required the reclamation of an additional 250
hectares of submerged areas surrounding these islands
to complete the configuration in the Master
Development Plan of the Southern Reclamation ProjectMCCRRP. PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA through
negotiation without public bidding.4 On April 28, 1995,
the Board of Directors of PEA, in its Resolution No.
1245, confirmed the JVA.5On June 8, 1995, then
President Fidel V. Ramos, through then Executive
Secretary Ruben Torres, approved the JVA.6
On November 29, 1996, then Senate President Ernesto
Maceda delivered a privilege speech in the Senate and
denounced the JVA as the "grandmother of all scams."
As a result, the Senate Committee on Government
Corporations and Public Enterprises, and the
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations, conducted a joint investigation. The
Senate Committees reported the results of their
investigation in Senate Committee Report No. 560
dated September 16, 1997.7 Among the conclusions of
their report are: (1) the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to
transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the public
domain which the government has not classified as
alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate
these lands; (2) the certificates of title covering the
Freedom Islands are thus void, and (3) the JVA itself is
illegal.
On December 5, 1997, then President Fidel V. Ramos
issued Presidential Administrative Order No. 365
creating a Legal Task Force to conduct a study on the
legality of the JVA in view of Senate Committee Report
No. 560. The members of the Legal Task Force were the
Secretary of Justice,8 the Chief Presidential Legal
Counsel,9 and the Government Corporate
Counsel.10 The Legal Task Force upheld the legality of
the JVA, contrary to the conclusions reached by the
Senate Committees.11
On April 4 and 5, 1998, the Philippine Daily
Inquirer and Today published reports that there were
on-going renegotiations between PEA and AMARI under
an order issued by then President Fidel V. Ramos.
According to these reports, PEA Director Nestor Kalaw,
PEA Chairman Arsenio Yulo and retired Navy Officer
Sergio Cruz composed the negotiating panel of PEA.
On April 13, 1998, Antonio M. Zulueta filed before the
Court a Petition for Prohibition with Application for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction docketed as G.R. No. 132994
seeking to nullify the JVA. The Court dismissed the
petition "for unwarranted disregard of judicial
hierarchy, without prejudice to the refiling of the case
before the proper court."12
32
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 6 of Act No. 2874 authorized the GovernorGeneral to "classify lands of the public domain into x x
x alienable or disposable"47 lands. Section 7 of the Act
empowered the Governor-General to "declare what
lands are open to disposition or concession." Section 8
of the Act limited alienable or disposable lands only to
those lands which have been "officially delimited and
classified."
Section 56 of Act No. 2874 stated that lands
"disposable under this title48 shall be classified" as
government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands, as
well as other lands. All these lands, however, must be
suitable for residential, commercial, industrial or other
productive non-agricultural purposes. These
provisions vested upon the Governor-General the
power to classify inalienable lands of the public domain
into disposable lands of the public domain. These
provisions also empowered the Governor-General to
classify further such disposable lands of the public
domain into government reclaimed, foreshore or
marshy lands of the public domain, as well as other
non-agricultural lands.
Section 58 of Act No. 2874 categorically mandated that
disposable lands of the public domain classified as
government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy
lands "shall be disposed of to private parties by
lease only and not otherwise." The GovernorGeneral, before allowing the lease of these lands to
private parties, must formally declare that the lands
were "not necessary for the public service." Act No.
2874 reiterated the State policy to lease and not to sell
government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands of
the public domain, a policy first enunciated in 1907 in
Act No. 1654. Government reclaimed, foreshore and
marshy lands remained sui generis, as the only
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain that
the government could not sell to private parties.
The rationale behind this State policy is obvious.
Government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy public
lands for non-agricultural purposes retain their inherent
potential as areas for public service. This is the reason
the government prohibited the sale, and only allowed
the lease, of these lands to private parties. The State
always reserved these lands for some future public
service.
Act No. 2874 did not authorize the reclassification of
government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands
into other non-agricultural lands under Section 56 (d).
Lands falling under Section 56 (d) were the only lands
for non-agricultural purposes the government could sell
to private parties. Thus, under Act No. 2874, the
government could not sell government reclaimed,
foreshore and marshy lands to private parties, unless
the legislature passed a law allowing their sale.49
xxx
(o) To perform such acts and exercise such
functions as may be necessary for the
attainment of the purposes and objectives
herein specified." (Emphasis supplied)
PD No. 1084 authorizes PEA to reclaim both foreshore
and submerged areas of the public domain. Foreshore
areas are those covered and uncovered by the ebb and
flow of the tide.61 Submerged areas are those
"D. Conclusion
Reclaimed lands are lands of the public
domain. However, by statutory authority, the
rights of ownership and disposition over
reclaimed lands have been transferred to PEA,
by virtue of which PEA, as owner, may validly
convey the same to any qualified person
without violating the Constitution or any
statute.
The constitutional provision prohibiting private
corporations from holding public land, except
by lease (Sec. 3, Art. XVII,70 1987 Constitution),
does not apply to reclaimed lands whose
ownership has passed on to PEA by statutory
grant."
Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution,
the foreshore and submerged areas of Manila Bay are
part of the "lands of the public domain, waters x x x
and other natural resources" and consequently "owned
by the State." As such, foreshore and submerged areas
"shall not be alienated," unless they are classified as
"agricultural lands" of the public domain. The mere
reclamation of these areas by PEA does not convert
these inalienable natural resources of the State into
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain.
There must be a law or presidential proclamation
officially classifying these reclaimed lands as alienable
or disposable and open to disposition or concession.
Moreover, these reclaimed lands cannot be classified
as alienable or disposable if the law has reserved them
for some public or quasi-public use.71
Section 8 of CA No. 141 provides that "only those lands
shall be declared open to disposition or concession
which have been officially delimited and
classified."72 The President has the authority to
classify inalienable lands of the public domain into
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain,
pursuant to Section 6 of CA No. 141. In Laurel vs.
Garcia,73 the Executive Department attempted to sell
the Roppongi property in Tokyo, Japan, which was
acquired by the Philippine Government for use as the
xxx
In case of land reclamation or construction of
industrial estates, the repayment plan may
consist of the grant of a portion or percentage
of the reclaimed land or the industrial estate
constructed."
Although Section 302 of the Local Government Code
does not contain a proviso similar to that of the BOT
Law, the constitutional restrictions on land ownership
automatically apply even though not expressly
mentioned in the Local Government Code.
Thus, under either the BOT Law or the Local
Government Code, the contractor or developer, if a
corporate entity, can only be paid with leaseholds on
portions of the reclaimed land. If the contractor or
developer is an individual, portions of the reclaimed
land, not exceeding 12 hectares96 of non-agricultural
lands, may be conveyed to him in ownership in view of
the legislative authority allowing such conveyance.
This is the only way these provisions of the BOT Law
and the Local Government Code can avoid a direct
collision with Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution.
Registration of lands of the public domain
Finally, PEA theorizes that the "act of conveying the
ownership of the reclaimed lands to public respondent
PEA transformed such lands of the public domain to
private lands." This theory is echoed by AMARI which
maintains that the "issuance of the special patent
leading to the eventual issuance of title takes the
subject land away from the land of public domain and
converts the property into patrimonial or private
property." In short, PEA and AMARI contend that with
the issuance of Special Patent No. 3517 and the
corresponding certificates of titles, the 157.84 hectares
comprising the Freedom Islands have become private
lands of PEA. In support of their theory, PEA and AMARI
cite the following rulings of the Court:
1. Sumail v. Judge of CFI of Cotabato,97 where
the Court held
"Once the patent was granted and the
corresponding certificate of title was issued,
the land ceased to be part of the public domain
and became private property over which the
Director of Lands has neither control nor
jurisdiction."
2. Lee Hong Hok v. David,98 where the Court
declared "After the registration and issuance of the
certificate and duplicate certificate of title
based on a public land patent, the land covered
thereby automatically comes under the
operation of Republic Act 496 subject to all the
safeguards provided therein."3. Heirs of
Gregorio Tengco v. Heirs of Jose
Aliwalas,99 where the Court ruled -
CASTRO, J.:p
Leticia Cipriano served as record clerk in the office of
municipal treasurer Gregorio P. Marcelino of Calabanga,
Camarines Sur, from January 1, 1963 to January 15,
1966, at a monthly salary of eighty pesos (P80). On the
latter date she resigned. Because the respondent
municipal treasurer, upon her severance from the
service, refused to pay her salary corresponding to the
period from September 1, 1965 to January 15, 1966,
inclusive (P349), as well as the commutation
equivalent of her accumulated vacation and sick leaves
(P600), Cipriano filed on May 5, 1966 with the Court of
First Instance of Camarines Sur an action
for mandamus (civil case 6152) to compel the said
municipal treasurer to pay her the total amount of
P949. She also asked for moral and exemplary
damages, attorney's fees and costs of suit.
Marcelino moved to dismiss upon the ground that she
had not "exhausted all administrative remedies before
filing the present action," arguing that exhaustion of all
administrative remedies is a condition precedent
before an aggrieved party may have judicial recourse.
Granting the motion, the court a quo ordered the
dismissal of the case. Cipriano's motion for
reconsideration was denied on May 15, 1967.
BENJAMIN
PAREDES,
LUZ
BUENSUCESO,
AUGUSTO
SEVERINO,
RODRIGO
TABANERA,
STEPHEN
SOLIVEN
and
ROBERTO
SANCHEZ; petitioners,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS, RIZALINO S.
NAVARRO,
as
Secretary
of
Trade
and Industry, and IGNACIO S. SAPAL,
Director of the Bureau of Patents,
Trademarks
and
Technology
Transfer, respondents.
RESOLUTION
KAPUNAN, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court from the Decision dated 27
October 1993 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
30388 which dismissed petitioners Special Civil Action
for Prohibition and said courts Resolution dated 10
January 1994 which denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration of the said decision.
On 9 November 1992, public respondents
promulgated Administrative Order Nos. 1 and 2, Series
of 1992, revising the rules of practice before the
Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer
(BPTTT) in patent and trademark cases, to take effect
on 15 March 1993. Among the provisions of said
administrative orders are Rule 16 of A.O. No. 1 and
Rule 15 of A.O. No. 2, which increased the fees payable
to the BPTTT for registration of patents and trademarks
and Rule 59 of A.O. No. 2 which prohibited the filing of
multi-class applications, that is, one application
covering several classes of goods.[1]
On 11 March 1993, petitioners, who are registered
patent agents, filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition
for Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction to stop public respondents from
enforcing
the
aforementioned
administrative
orders[2] and to declare Rule 16 of A.O. No. 1 and Rules
15 and 59 of A.O. No. 2, series of 1992 of the BPTTT
null and void.
On 27 October 1993, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition for prohibition and on 10 January
1994, denied the motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioners on 18 November 1993.[3]
In the present appeal, petitioners assign the
following errors:
FIRST DIVISION
I
[G.R. No. 113357. February 1, 1996]
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
PETITION ON THE GROUND OF NON-EXHAUSTION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.
II
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING
THAT THE QUESTIONED ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS ARE
NULL AND VOID FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE
[5]
Petitioners,
however,
claim
that
the
aforementioned administrative orders, particularly Rule
16 of A.O. No. I and Rules 15 and 59 of A.O. No. 2,
series of 1992, are null and void for failure of public
respondents to comply with the requirements of
Cabinet approval and publication as specifically
provided in Sections 2 and 5 of B.P. BIg. 325.[6]
We deny the petition.
Prohibition is not the proper remedy. The enabling
law itself, which is B.P. Blg. 325, has specifically tasked
the Cabinet to review and approve any proposed
revisions of rates of fees and charges. Petitioners
should have availed of this easy and accessible remedy
instead of immediately resorting to the judicial process.
Our legislature in delegating to administrative
officers the authority to revise fees and charges
expressly required cabinet approval for the proper
exercise of said power. Petitioners should not have
wasted the opportunity to utilize this built-in remedy.
The grant (or denial) of a writ of prohibition is
ordinarily within the sound discretion of the court to be
exercised with caution and forbearance, according to
the circumstances of the particular case, and only
where the right to seek relief is clear.[7]
Prohibition is granted only in cases where no other
remedy is available which is sufficient to afford
redress. That the petitioners have another and
complete remedy at law either by appeal or otherwise,
is generally a sufficient reason for dismissing the writ. [8]
Hence, in Chua Huat v. CA,[9] we ruled that:
Where the enabling statute indicates a procedure for
administrative review, and provides a system of
administrative appeal, or reconsideration, the courts,
for reasons of law, comity and convenience, will not
entertain a case unless the available administrative
remedies have been resorted to and the
appropriate authorities have been given opportunity to
CONSIDERED,
SO ORDERED.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR. J.:
(b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from
the date of the officials assumption to office or one (1)
year immediately preceding a regular local election.
As to the last ground, petitioners contend that
under Section 74(b) of RA No. 7160, no recall should
take place within one (1) year from the date of the
official's assumption to office or one (1) year
immediately preceding a regular local election. Under
Section 43(c) of the same Code, the term of office of
barangay officials and members of the Sangguniang
Kabataan shall be for three (3) years, which shall begin
after the regular election of barangay officials on the
second Monday of May, 1994. Per Resolution No. 2880
of 27 December 1996, the COMELEC stated that the
next barangay election would be on 12 May 1997
hence, no recall election could be done within one year
immediately preceding 12 May 1997. The recall then in
this case falls within the prohibited period.
On 21 January 1997 we issued a Temporary
Restraining Order ordering the respondent COMELEC to
cease and desist from implementing its questioned
Resolution No. 2879 and directing the respondents to
Comment on the petition within a non-extendible
period of ten (10) days.
In its Comment for public respondent COMELEC,
the Office of the Solicitor General alleges that per
Report of the Election Officer of Basilisa, Surigao del
Norte, the PRA meeting was attended by 109
members, a number sufficient to constitute a quorum
since Basilisa is composed of 27 barangays with eight
officers for each unit. All of the 109 "signed the
minutes of the meeting as they affixed therein their
signatures and thumbmarks signifying their assent to
the assembly; and the COMELEC, (u)pon examination
of the signatures and the minutes of the meeting,"
"affirmed the authenticity of the signatures and
thumbmarks of the members of the PRA." Thereafter,
the Office of the Solicitor General further states, the
COMELECs
Deputy
Executive
Director
for
Operation recommended to the Comelec en banc the
holding of the recall election." Pursuant thereto, the
COMELEC en banc issued on 12 December 1996 the
challenged
Resolution,
whose
reconsideration
petitioner never sought .
The Office of the Solicitor General then urges us to
dismiss the petition because: (a) of prematurity, since
petitioners had not asked the COMELEC to reconsider
Resolution No. 2879; (b) it raises factual issues which
are not proper subjects of a petition for certiorari; and
(c) the barangay election on 12 May 1997 will not bar
the recall election in question in light of our decision
in Paras v. Commission on Elections (G.R. No. 123169,
4 November 1996) where we held that the regular
election referred to in Section 74(b) of the Local
Government Code of 1991 refers to the election where
the office held by the local elective official sought to be
recalled will be contested and be filled by the
electorate, which is not the barangay election on 12
May 1997, but the election for Mayor, Vice Mayor and
members of the SB in May of 1998.
act on the matter, and (6) when the issue for nonexhaustion of administrative remedies has been
rendered moot. (See Severino S. Tabios, Annotation on
Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies As a
Ground for Motion to Dismiss, 165 SCRA 352, 357-362
[1988]).
In the instant case, the only reason advanced by
petitioner was lack of enough opportunity to do so. We
disagree. Petitioner first learned of the promulgation of
the Resolution on 21 December 1996 through the 20
December 1996 issue of the Manila Bulletin and
formally received a copy of the Resolution on 3 January
1997. They had sufficient time to file a motion for its
reconsideration since the recall election was scheduled
on 25 January 1997. Instead of filing this petition on 6
January 1997, petitioners should have first filed a
motion for reconsideration.
Verily, the principal issue in this case is focused on
the factual findings of COMELEC. Petitioners sought to
disprove them by sworn statements which they
attached to the petition at bar.Obviously, these were
not offered before the COMELEC, thus the latter could
not have passed upon their admissibility or probative
value. It cannot then be said that the COMELEC acted
with grave abuse of discretion in ruling on the recall on
the basis of, among other things, the Report of its
Municipal Election Officer assigned in Basilisa, Surigao
del Norte. The latter has in his favor the presumption of
regularity in the performance of his duty (Sec. 3(M),
Rule 131, Rules of Court). Petitioners had the burden to
disprove that presumption, which they miserably failed
to do. They did not even assail the Report nor impute
any improper motive on the Election Officer as to
create doubt as to the integrity of his Report.
Finally, the scheduled barangay election on 12
May 1997 is not the regular election contemplated in
Section 74(b) of the Local Government Code of 1991
whose conduct is the basis for computing the one-year
prohibited period. As we held in Paras v. Commission
on Elections (supra):
It would, therefore, be in keeping with the intent of the
recall provision of the Code to construe regular local
election as one referring to an election where the office
held by the local elective official sought to be recalled
could be contested and be filled by the electorate.
Hence the holding of the recall election in question can
be validly done at any time before the commencement
of the one (1) year period immediately preceding the
next general election for municipal elective officials in
May of 1998.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant
petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the
Temporary Restraining Order issued on 21 January
1997 is LIFTED. The Commission on Elections is
DIRECTED to set anew and hold the RECALL
ELECTION in question not later than 15 April 1997.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.