A Critical Study of The Iran-Iraq War

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A C R IT IC A L STUDY O F T H E IR A N -IR A Q W AR
W. T H O M W ORKM AN
A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies

in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
Graduate Programme in Political Science

York University
North York, Ontario
November 1991
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IS B N
0 -3 1 5 -7 2 8 3 2 -2
Canada
A CRITICAL STUDY OF THE IRAN-IRAQ
by
W.
WAR
Thom Workman
a dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of

York University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
1992
Permission has been granted to the LIBRARY OF YORK

UNIVERSITY to lend or sell copies of this dissertation, to the
NATIONAL LIBRARY OF CANADA to microfilm this dissertation
and to lend or sell copies of the film, and to UNIVERSITY
MICROFILMS to publish an abstract of this dissertation.
The author reserves other publication rights, and neither the
dissertation nor extensive extracts from it may be printed or
otherwise reproduced without the author's written permission.
>
U N I V I'; R S I T I:
YORK
*
r A C U I 1' 1
U N I V E R S I T Y
\-
R A D L A I 1 S I I P I [. s
I recommend that the dissertation prepared

under my supervision by
W. THOM WORKMAN
entitled
A CRITICAL STUDY OP THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR
be accepted in partial fulfillment of the

requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
January 1992
Supoivisoi
David Dewitt
Recommendation concurred in by the following
Examining Committee
1toward Adeiiian
^y1?11iL
^ 7,
) 'cJ6t/A A 7T
C a rrie ]
David Dewitt
) ,
cl iti
E e n -D o r
y.<r. u iu .
H.T. Wilson
January 1QQ2
ta
Abstract
;
'
:
!
;
!
i
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'
This dissertation contrasts two approaches to the study o f war in international

relations. It identifies a conventional approach, which sets the elimination o f war as its
main goal, adopts a naturalistic understanding of the social sciences, tries to develop a
nomological theory o f war, and then attempts to use this theory to achieve peace. This
approach is contrasted with the critical study o f war which is defined as the contemplation
o f war in terms o f dialectical critiques o f social power. The critical study of w ar accepts as
its main task the explication of the relationship between warfare on the one hand and
social oppression on the other. In other words, it examines war in terms of race, class and
gender. Attention is then given to the Iran-Iraq war. The social origins of the Iran-Iraq
war are uncovered by examining the sweeping changes that have occurred in both societies
over the last century. Particular attention is given to the evolving class structures and
their relationship to state power. The course o f the Iran-Iraq war is also considered in
terms of the process o f revolutionary consolidation in Iran, and Bathist political
consolidation in Iraq. The conclusion is drawn that both regimes essentially won the war
to the extent that their political projects were advanced, and that oppressed social groups
including women, ethnic minorities and lower socio-economic classes suffered a
deterioration in their social position as a result of the war.
?
?
Acknowledgments
I wish to thank the participants of the Donner Workshop on Conflict Management.

Many o f the ideas presented in this dissertation had a long period of germination at those
meetings.
I also wish the thank the York Centre for International and Strategic Studies for its
continued support during my period as a graduate student at York University.
This dissertation was partly researched using the facilities of the Dayan Centre fo r
Middle Eastern and African Studies at Tel Aviv University.
I also wish to graciously acknowledge the financial support of the Canadian
Institute fo r International Peace and Security and the Social Sciences and Humanities
Research Council o f Canada.
Finally, I wish to thank Beverly for making it through the long haul, and Meredith
fo r getting here in time to prove that there is more to life than a silly dissertation 19/02/91 was probably the lesser challenge for all of us.
Table o f Contents
Part I:
Theoretical Considerations
Chapter One:
The Critical Study o f War
Chapter Two:
Analyzing the Social Foundations of War
33
Chapter Three:
Analyzing Societies and States in the ThirdWorld
83
Chapter Four:
Amplifying the Social Dimensions of Security
Part II:
The Iran-Iraq War
introduction:
132
179
Chapter Five:
Conventional Accounts o f the Iran-Iraq War
182
Chapter Six:
Social Transformation and Revolution in Iran
214
Chapter Seven:
State and Society in Iraq:

The Tenuous Social Foundations of the Bath Regime
255
Chapter Eight:
The Developing Security Problematic Between Iran and Iraq
306
Chapter Nine:
The War and Clerical Consolidation in Iran
349
Chapter Ten:
The War and Ba'thist Consolidation in Iraq
390
Conclusion:
427
Bibliography:
442
vi
List o f Tables
Conventional and Critical Study of War

Growth of the Iranian Professional-Bureaucratic Intelligentsia:
1956-1966
Comparative Growth of Iranian Working Class
Urban and Rural Population in Iraq
Crude Oil Revenues in Iraq: 1972-1980
Large and Small Industrial Establishments in Iraq
vii
Chapter One
The Critical Study of War
Introduction:
Why study war? Why concern ourselves with war? What justification could
scholars offer for examining war rather than, say, urban planning or environmental
degradation? This is certainly not a fatuous query. The answer, moreover, is hardly selfevident. Serious reflection upon this elementary question weighs rather heavily upon the
intellect. The cynic might claim, for example, that we study war as part of a colonized
profession. W e are not as deliberate as the question implies. W e make a living at it, and
so we stay with it. This response, however, is unlikely to feel very rewarding or complete.
Along a different line, an essentialist might argue that we arc attracted to the macabre or
th e fantastical. We tend to find solace in the contemplation of things that disturb us.
This riposte, as with the sceptical retort of the cynic, is unlikely to be academically
satisfying, if only because it provides so little in the way o f theoretical o r methodological
guidance.
Many researchers arc likely to offer a third response to our question. One can
study war, they might claim, in order to prevail in war. The most common form o f this
approach has received the appellation strategic studies. "Strategy", clarifies Michael
Howard, "concerns the deployment and use o f armed forces to attain a given political
objective."1 One of the most enduring contributions to the field of strategic studies is
Carl von Clauscwitzs On War, which deals extensively with the question o f how to fight
wars effectively.1 Students of strategic studies tend to locate themselves with the Realist
tradition o f international relations. They sec a virtue in gradual change, and "ate cautious
in their estimate of what can be done, and what ought to be done, to ameliorate
international relationships." They consider rcalpolitik an indelible feature of international
politics, and are sceptical about the possibilities o f achieving a permanent peace.
Although most o f these writers wish to sec warfare avoided, especially in the nuclear age,
they accept its likelihood, and therefore emphasize military preparedness and
effectiveness.
A fourth response to our original query has garnered wider and wider subscription
since World W ar II. In its most succinct formulation we study war in order to eliminate it.
When one considers the sheer number of researchers that have worked within this
framework, and its salience across many academic fields including anthropology, history,
sociology, psychology and political science, we realize that this response has achieved a
sort of predominant status. A more detailed sketch of this prevailing view is necessary
before wc can proceed any further. Accordingly, we will identify the central concerns and
1 Michael Howard, "The Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy," in The Causes of War and other
Essays, (Harvard University Press, 1984), p. 101.
2 For a discussion of the centrality of this question in Chusewit/.s work see Peter Paret,
"Clausewitz," in Makers o f Modem Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, cd., Peter Paret,
(Princeton University Press, 1986).
5 See discussion in John Garnett, "Strategic Studies and its Assumptions," in Contemporary
Strategy I, eds., John Baylis, Ken Booth, John Garnett and Phil Williams, (Holmes & Meier,
1987), pp. 9-12, quote from p. 9.
assumptions of the prevailing answer to our original question. Then, in order to provide
the necessary intellectual and political context for the current study, we will counter this
conventional approach with a response that explicitly draws attention to the need to study
war from the perspective of subordinate classes and groups within society.
The Prevailing Response:
In order to begin our outline, we must recognize that war has forever been imbued
with moral content: "For as long as men and women have talked about war," Michael
Walzcr writes, "they have talked about it in terms o f right and wrong.' This tendency is
no less true in the current era. War tends to be contrasted with peace as surely as evil is
posed against good. The disdain for war in the current era, however, is hardly natural or
inevitable. It appears that widespread scorn for war is directly linked to its prosecution.
As F. H. Hinsley writes: "We cannot say who first devised a plan for perpetual peace: the
aim cannot be much less old than the practice o f war. The interest men have shown in
this aim - the concern they have felt at the absence of peace or for the maintenance of
peace - has fluctuated throughout history. It has been most intense during and
immediately after periods of especially frequent, especially extensive or especially
destructive war."' Indeed, the current view that war is "pathological and abnormal" has
'' Michael Walzcr, Just and Unjust Wars, (Basic Books, 1977), p. 3.
' F.H. Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace: Theory and Practice in the History of Relations
Between States, (Cambridge University Press, 1963), p. 1.
3
been directly traced to the liberal reaction to World War I." While this view had a
reactionary flavour in the early part of the century, its salience is now unquestionable:
"The present trend," observes one commentator on the causes o f war, "seems to be toward
a great popular uprising against war, in which the masses o f the people will issue an
ultimatum to their leaders and rulers against all wars."7 This prevailing viesv has
undoubtedly been impelled by the totalizing wars of the twentieth century, by the vivid
images o f war captured through the media and by the prospect o f nuclear annihilation. As
Hans Morgcnthaus Death in the Nuclear Age and Wilfred Owens The Old Lie elegantly
reveal, the utter horror o f war in the twentieth century has inspired scholarly and poetic
imaginations alike.
This prevailing view of war as "humanitys most pressing problem" stands as the
fundamental point o f departure for almost all contemporary research into its origins and
nature.8 As one commentator stresses: "The problem that most concerns sociologists
working on peace promotion is how to prevent warfare. This concern focuses particularly
on the prevention o f nuclear war between the United Stales and the Soviet Union. At
the same time, widespread persistence o f non-nuclear limited wars has revived social
N,
1
sciences interest in so-called conventional warfare."9 The tenor o f the research
6 Michael Howard, "The Causes of Wars," in The Causes o f Wars, (Harvard University Press,
1984), pp. 9-12.
7 Luther Lee Bernard, War and Its Causes, (Garland Publishing, Inc., 1972), p. 6.
8 Note the title o f Ron Jd J. Glossops, Confronting War: A n Examination of Humanity's Most
Pressing Problem, (McFarland, 1983).
9 Louis Kriesberg, "Peace Promotion," in Handbook of Applied Sociology: Frontiers o f
Contemporary Research, (Praeger, 1971), p. 539.
community is frequently one of urgency in the face o f wars horrifying prospects. Observe
the following twist on the popular professional shibboleth from academia:
Students of war are under a special injunction to "publish or perish. War is

one o f the most intractable human problems. The fear of war, and the threat
o f global cataclysm, is always with us. Perhaps many people would name
some other horseman - hunger or disease - as the most fearsome; each of us
has different private fears. Others would place the quest for human dignity
and equality above that for peace. But the danger of w ar is so great, and so
immediate, that without reliable peace it hardly seems possible to pursue
other goals effectively. Contemporary wars, military preparations, and
continued payment o f the cost of past war amount, in the United States, to
more than all public expenditure for health and education combined. True,
war has been so universally part of the human condition that the prospects for
understanding how to avoid it, especially under the pressures modern
technology puts upon us, do not seem very good. But the need to try is
certainly there.10
According to the prevailing response to our question, we must study war in order to rid
ourselves of its burdens. W ar is widely viewed as the fetter o f human dignity, as
something that can stifle real human development by virtue o f its staggering opportunity
costs.
W ith the goal of the analytical enterprise widely accepted, research employs a
model o f social science adapted from the study o f the natural world. This naturalistic
understanding of the social sciences has been excellently summarized by Richard J.
Bernstein:
A t the core o f the naturalistic understanding of social and political inquiry is
10 Betty Crump Hanson and Bruce M. Russett, "Introduction", in Peace, War, and Numbers,
ed. Bruce M. Russett, (Sage Publications, 1972), p. 9.
5
the demand for empirical explanatory theories of human behaviour. When

this idea of empirical theory is fully articulated, it requires that we discover
basic invariants, structures, or laws that can serve as the foundation for
theoretical explanations - explanations which will take a deductive form, and
from which wc can derive countcrfactural claims about the relations of
independent and dependent variables. It has been projected that the social
sciences, as they mature, will discover well-tested bodies of empirical theory
which w ill eventually coalesce in ever more adequate and comprehensive
theories.11
Research into w ar seeks to provide an account expressed in terms o f basic social laws and
n
regularities. From these accounts wc must distil the crucial variables associated with war.
$
This effort will allow us to get on with the task o f eliminating it. T h e classical axiom si vis
pacem para bellum is replaced by Liddell H a rts dictum "If you wish for peace, understand
war." Expressed most succinctly, war is assigned the status o f dependent variable, the
f$
thing to be explained; war is explicated by identifying those independent variables

responsible for its outbreak and course. This view o f the appropriate scientific model
receives one o f its clearest articulations in Luther Bernards study:
... like all other forms of social behaviour, [war] has its natural causes, some
o f which exist in the social and physical environments and others in the
human nature o f men. These causes o f war are neither mysterious nor
extraordinarily obscure. They are discoverable by means o f patient orderly
research and they are removable by ordinary means of human diligence and
co-operative endeavour. Otherwise, the study of war would not be amenable
to scientific organization and a social science of war could not be produced.
Such a science can be constructed; and when it is established as a pure
science, an applied social science or technology presumably can be developed
as a means to the abolition or prevention of war. It is not possible to abolish
war until its social phenomena have been reduced to a science and its causes
11 Richard J. Bernstein, The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory, (Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich, 1976), p. 227.
have been isolated and rendered susceptible o f intellectual definition.12
"The idea o f turning the cold and brilliant light of mathematics on a subject where
passions obscure reason," confirms Anatol Rapoport in the inaugural edition of the
Journal o f Conflict Resolution, "is in itself the embodiment of the best in scientific ethics."
This scientific approach to war reached its apogee in the Correlates o f War project at the
University o f Michigan.13
The difficulties o f achieving th e necessary rigour required by this model o f science
have frequently been noted. David W ilkinsons appraisal o f Lewis Fry Richardsons
Statistics o f Deadly Quarrels draws attention to the fact that his work contained no
controlled or uncontrolled experimentation, no experimental intervention o r experimental
manipulation, no replication, no examination of random samples from sample populations,
and a minimum o f direct observation.
But in his assessment o f these gaps Wilkinson
tersely writes: "Shortcomings that are inescapable simply have to be recognized and
accepted."" In other words, we must recognize that the method o f science in the natural
sciences is not entirely imitable when wc move to the social sphere. O ther writers have
frequently expressed concern of the scientific possibilities of the enterprise, pointing, fo r
example, to the lack o f agreement about the facts to be selected, the interpretation of
12 Luther Lee Bernard, op.cit., p. 213.

13 For example, sec The Correlates o f War, v. 1 and v. 2, ed. J. David Singer, (The Free Press,
1980).
See the discussion in David Wilkinson, Deadly Quarrels: Lewis F. Richardson and the
Statistical Study o f War, (University of California Press, 1980), especially chapter 11, quote p. 106.
those facts and the tendency to relegate non-quantifiablo aspects o f war to secondary
importance.1' Nonetheless, the naturalistic scientific model still informs and guides
researchers, even if the rigour o f the pure scientific method cannot be matched in the
study of war. In response to the suggestion that a general theory o f war is impossible one
research volume illuminatingly dwelt upon this thrust to the prevailing intellectual project.
According to this viewpoint, the only proper way to study the origins of war is
to analyze individual historical cases of war for their unique elements. This
argument, though seductive, can by easily refuted by examples from the
physical or biological sciences. No two animals arc exactly alike, and certainly
not the flea and the elephant. Hence, one might argue that no valid
generalizations can be stated that embrace both species. Yet the scientific
disciplines of physiology, biochemistry, and genetics have proven diis wrong.
Science does not say that the flea and the elephant are the same thing but
only that they arc similar in certain ways, e.g., both arc produced from the
union o f an egg and a sperm. Concomitantly, two wars, though not exactly
the same, may have enough in common to permit the development o f valid
generalization, e.g., both may have developed out of an arms race precipitated
by one states misperception of anothers intentions."
Although the ideal* model of natural sciences cannot be easily reproduced, it is the model
against which research into war must be sized up. Understandably, therefore, scepticism
about the potential harvests of the science of war does not create a lack o f faith in the
scientific method itself: "Science may not save us, but wc are unlikely to be saved without
15 See, for example: Evan Luard, War in International Society: A Study in International
Sociology, (I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd., 1986), pp. 7-12.
16 See discussion on the nature of the scientific enterprise and the study o f war in. Dean G.
Pruitt and Richard C. Snyder, Theoty and Research on the Causes o f War, (Prcntice-Hall, Inc.),
p. 3.
W c see, therefore, in the prevailing response to our original question, an

unmistakable desire to end war, and an implicit faith that if w e turn the naturalistic
method of science upon warfare it will yield the sought after results. The conventional
response to our original question, when we probe a little deeper, also rests upon a rather
strict separation o f the observer and the observed. The shibboleth o f objectivity forms
the disciplinary injunction for all investigations into war. The researcher must maintain a
healthy distance from the subject matter, continually separating the facts from ones
values. T h e theory of war that is engendered through this cumulative intellectual
project, in other words, is not viewed as being soiled by the values o r political inclinations
of the researcher or his cultural milieu. Theory is held to be immune to cultural
predilections. The theory of w ar describes the world the way it is; not the way it ought to
be. The o ft repeated and seldom challenged goal is that we must "search fo r overarching
explanatory theories based upon the organized and dispassionate collection o f data.m T o
aspire to anything less invites the spectre of ideologically contaminated theories o f war.
This faith in the possibility o f an objective theory of w ar can be easily observed if
we look at the rationalizations presented for the Peace Research project. The original
impetus for this appellation arose from the concern that analysts o f war were not explicit
enough in their critique o f war. Professional dispassion, it was felt, might be extending
too far. Researchers were not adequately moved, according to the dominant
17 Hanson and Russett, op. cit., p. 9.

18 Commentary by M . Nettleship, in War, Its Causes and Correlates, eds. Martin Nettleship,
R. Dalcgivens and A. Nettleship, (Mouton Publishers, 1975), p. 52.
9
rationalization, to explicitly and unflinchingly condemn war. W hile this tendency was
terribly overstated, the debate nonetheless helps to reaffirm th e basic attitude both camps'
have towards a pure science o f war. In response to the challenge o f Peace Research the
editors of War, Its Causes and Correlates posed what could be construed as the most
fundamental question regarding the possibility o f a pure science of war by quoting from
W . H . Audens Unpredictable but providential:
Science, like Art, is fun, a playing with truths, and no game

should even pretend to slay the heavy-lidded riddle
What is the Good Life?
The proposed resolution to the problem, however, was not, as Audens posing o f the
problem strongly suggests, to question the possibility o f a pure and dispassionate science
o f war. Rather, the challenge of Peace Research was resolved by acknowledging the need
for an applied science o f war to be functionally cast astride th e 'basic science o f war:
It is difficult to beg for patience in the face of urgent problems but applied
science is impossible without a basic science and it is false to criticize the
physician who remains in his laboratory to provide the explanations which will
allow his fellow at the bedside to save the patient. Conversely, there are
times, and now is one of them, when the scientist in basic research must invite
the applied scientist to join him in the laboratory so their combined skills,
access to data, and approaches to problems which hold the only hope of
survival for the patient and themselves may be utilized.19
O ther commentators rationalized the challenge o f Peace Research in a similar manner.
19 Sec "Introduction", War, It Causes and Correlates, p. 5.

10
Rapoport writes that the concern with the "purity" o f war science reflected a confusion
between objectivity and neutrality. H e stressed that science has always been motivated by
specific goals: "Individual scientists may have been motivated by nothing but their personal
curiosity, but the scientific enterprise as a whole was driven throughout history by needs
and aspirations both good and evil."20 Rapoports ambition, in a manner consistent with
the broader Peace Research rationale, did not lie in challenging the possibility of an
objective science o f war but rather in calling direct attention to the need to be more
explicit about the goal o f research on war and peace, that is, th e elimination of war:
"There is no need," Rapoport could therefore conclude, "... for the peace researcher to
assume the posture o f political or moral neutrality in the interest of preserving the
credibility accorded to scientific objectivity."21 This basic sentiment receives its clearest
articulation in the preface to a multidisciplinary study of war:
... these writings characteristically show social scientists trying to grapple with
what is commonly recognized as the greatest dilemma of the modern age. For
most of them a detached objectivity is a condition o f their craft, yet here they
emerge as sufficiently involved and committed to focus on a historic issue.
This effort illustrates an inconsistency in social science itself. Although they
gcncnlly view themselves as naturalists in the positivist tradition, these
thinkers arc also morally sensitive men whose interest in war has stemmed
from a desire to improve the lot of humanity. Their self-image as impartial
and detached observers is maintained in spite of the fact that the quality of
their involvement with the subject matter is different from the involvement of,
say, the chemist in his laboratory with the compounds in his test tubes. But
this charming inconsistency is not damaging to their work; rather, their moral
concern has served to channel their scientific energies. They have mustered
the utmost detachment of which they are capable in the service o f their moral
20 Anatol Rapoport, "Approaches to Peace Research," in War, Its Causes and Correlates, eds.
Nettleship et al, (Mouton Publishers, 1975), p. 50.
21 Ibid.
11
commitment."
This debate helps to underscore the widely accepted idea that the scientific method is not
jeopardized by the proclivities o f the research community.
The challenge o f Peace Research draws attention to the general aim o f research
on war. It also assists in identifying the equally fundamental belief concerning the
appropriate relationship between theory and practice. If we are to control this impending
2
phenomenon, so the prevailing view holds, wc must first understand it. This knowledge
VS
m ay then be applied towards our goal of eliminating war. As one significant contribution
to the field stresses at its outset:"... with such understanding [of war| comes the first
meaningful possibility o f controlling it, eliminating it, or finding less reprehensible
substitutes for it."1' The prevailing response fully accords with an instrumentalist account
o f the relationship between theory and practice. According to this view, knowledge claims
form the raw materials out of which we may engineer the social and natural worlds for
specific ends. It is valuable to reflect at length upon Brian Fays summary o f the
instrumentalist view o f theory and practice:
The form of characteristically scientific knowledge in the modern period thus

lends itself to a particular sort o f instrumental use. Scientific theory provides
knowledge of basic causal patterns such that precise determinations of likely
outcomes are made possible, and the variables needed to be manipulated in
" Leon Bramson and George W. Goethals, eds. War: Studies from Psychology, Sociology,
Anthropology, (Basic Books, 1968), p. 5.
u Melvin Small and J. David Singer, Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars, 1816-1)80,
(Sage Publications, 1982), p. 14.
12
order lo produce a desired outcome or prevent an undesired one are

revealed. This use o f scientific knowledge has been most successful in
controlling material processes, with space exploration and medicine probably
offering the most dramatic instances of it. But it is a use of knowledge not
confined to material processes, at least in aspiration. In the use o f economic
theory by governments in their attempt to control the economy, in the
employment o f behaviour modification techniques in psychiatric wars and
prisons, in the application of psychological theories of motivation to questions
of business management - to cite but a few instances - social scientific theory
is conceived as useful in so far as it provides the basis for the engineering of
social life.24
This approach lucidly describes the view o f theory and practice that informs the prevailing
response to our original question. In the study o f war knowledge-claims form the raw
materials out o f which peace can be fashioned. Knowledge o f the independent variables
responsible for war, to be more specific, should allow researchers to intervene in order to
control and eliminate war. The nomological theory o f war will allow the researcher to
attack the real world, and manipulate, suppress, modify, gently coax, countervail or
persuade the independent variables associated w ith war.
T h e net effect o f this intellectual and interventionist enterprise will be peace. We
see, therefore, how the prevailing approach to war rests upon one o f the most
fundamental precepts o f the modern age, that is, that the natural and social worlds can be
subjected to human control through the careful application of scientific knowledge.
Restated in slightly different terms, in the same manner that the natural world can b e
harnessed and controlled through the acquisition o f knowledge, war is viewed as a
phenomenon which lends itself to social manipulation and control. O ne researcher has
24 Brian Fay, Critical Social Science, (Cornell University Press, 1987), p. 88.
13
^stssi'SiSseaK
noted, for example, that the contemporary desire to see war eliminated can, in part, be
traced to the belief that we can engineer and control society: "Perhaps more important is
our greater belief in the prospects o f controlling society. War at one time was regarded as
inevitable. However, so was slavery, which is now an almost defunct institution.
I f war is
not seen to be an inevitable feature o f human life, dislike o f it will make people work to
stop it rather than make the best of a bad job."25
T h e independent variables associated with war are identified with a view to
manipulating them to achieve the desired outcome: peace. N ot surprisingly, the
underlying disdain for war, along with this particular sense of task, has meant that the
study o f w ar has been compared to epidemiology in more than one instance.2'' Analogies
between w ar and human afflictions go to the heart o f current research: "W ar is like a
disease," one recent inquiry begins, "for example, cancer or heart disease."1 The study o f
epidemiology forms the analogical cornerstone for research into war. "An analogy with
medicine," writes Robin Clarke in The Science o f War and Peace:
... is instructive. Until 1848 no one knew what caused cholera. Bui in that
year a Dr. John Snow looked up from his individual patients and sought a
social pattern for the disease. On a map he plotted the addresses of 5(H)
people who had died from cholera in Soho in a period o f 10 days. A ll the
deaths were clustered around a central spot which, investigation proved, was
the site of a water pump. When its handle was removed, the epidemic died
25 Michael Nicholson, Conflict Analysis, (The English Universities Press Ltd., 1970), p. I.
26 Sec, for example: Norman Alcock, The War Disease, (Canadian Peace Research Institute,
1972).
27 Francis A. Beer, Peace Against War: The Ecology o f International Violence, (W .H . Freeman
and Company, 1982), p. 1.
14
out and Dr Snow had proved that cholera was caused by contaminated water.
Why the world had to wait another hundred years before anyone applied the
same principle to the study of war is inexplicable
T h e task of those who study war, as with researchers in the medical sciences, is to identify
the factors which arc responsible for this social disease. Only when w e do this will we be
in a position to develop the appropriate antidote for war. "The cause o f the disease, once
known," wrote Jcan-Jacques Rousseau in the Abstract o f the Abbe de Saint-Pierre's Project
fo r Perpetual Peace, "suffice to indicate the remedy, if indeed there is one to be found."
As Kenneth W altz writes at the outset to his monumental study on the causes of war:
A prescription based on faulty analysis would be unlikely to produce the

desired consequences... A prescription would be unacceptable if it were not
logically related to its analysis. One who suffers from infected tonsils profits
little from a skilfully performed appendectomy. If violence among states is
caused by the cvilncss of man, to aim at the internal reform of states w ill not
do much good. And if violence among states is the product of international
anarchy, to aim at the conversion of individuals can accomplish little. One
mans prognosis confounds the other mans prescription.29
W ith respect to the above mentioned distinction between scientific objectivity and
scientific neutrality Rapoport later reiterated this logic through the epidemiological
analogy:
"The physician docs not pretend to be neutral with regard to the life-and-dcath
struggle between the patient and the disease. He is unequivocally on the side of the
2S Robin Clarke, Tlte Science o f War and Peace, (Jonathan Cape Ltd., 1971), p. 225.
29 Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State and War, (Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 14.
15
patient."10 Ultimately, with the relative importance of each cause meted out. it can be
manipulated, controlled or suppressed so that, in effect, society will be inoculated against
this social plague.
This rounds out the conventional response to our original question. In the
contemporary period war is seldom viewed in any kind o f favourable light, in fact, such
.1
move would violate most professional sensibilities, and immediately spawn the appropriate
menu o f pejorative ascriptions. Research into war is undertaken for the express purpose
of getting rid of it. This research proceeds according to a view that places primtiry stress
upon the importance on discovering the laws of war. When these regularities have been
determined wc can intervene to achieve peace.
The Critical Response:
As reasonably compelling and as morally alluring as the conventional response first

appears, alternative responses to our original question arc possible. Analytical enterprises
into international conflict and war can be motivated by a different set of social concerns
and proceed from a fundamentally different cluster of premises regarding the nature o f
science and the appropriate relationship between theory and practice. The response we
develop here could be appropriately labelled as the critical study o f war, tin intellectual
enterprise crystali/ing within a wider critical theoretical tradition. It is necessary to briefly
speak about the broader intellectual project. We can accomplish this by discussing the
10 Anatol Rapoport, The Origins o f Violence: Approaches to the Study of Conflict, (Paragon
House, 1989), p. xvii.
16
social concerns generally privileged by critical theory. The ontological suppositions

underlining the critical theoretical enterprise specify canted distributions o f social power
within society. These skewed configurations of social power do not necessarily have
definitive nodal points o r centres of gravity, but can be suffused throughout society within
its hegemonic ideological and cultural practices.31 These super/subordinate
concentrations of power arc intimately bound up with societys oppressive conditions.
Oppression refers to the condition that obtains when human potential is frustated by
constrictive circumstances.33 It is a condition frequently faced by lower socio-economic
classes, women and many racial groups. Members o f these social groups tend to find many
life-paths definitively closed off, and rudimentary life-skills often remain underdeveloped.
T h e ir lives tend to be difficult, i f not burdensome. Members o f subordinate social groups
often face day to day hardship, uncertainty and fear. Society, in other words, is thoroughly
coercive, although the complex web o f naturalized understandings and daily practices
helps to mask these coercions. This mystifying tendency can persist despite the fact that
these oppressive social conditions are frequently accompanied by outright repressive
practices by the dominant social groups.
Furthermore, social oppression is viewed as a historically fabricated condition.
One o f the clearest efforts to conceive of social power in these terms within the Marxist
tradition can be found in Gramsci. Gramscis notion o f a war o f position, for example, is entirely
contingent upon his theoretical conceptualization of the distribution of power within civil society.
W ithin the field of conflict studies the idea o f oppression has been labelled as structural
violence. As Johan Galtung writes:"... let us say that violence is present when human beings are
being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential
realizations." Later Galtung adds: "The violence is built into the structure and shows up as
unequal power and consequently as unequal life chances." See "Violence, Peace, and Peace
Research," Journal o f Peace Research, 6 (1969), p. 168 and p. 171.
17
Hum an beings create and continually re-create these oppressive conditions through their
self-understandings. A socially oppressive world is not a divinely driven phenomenon. In
this regard Cynthia Enloe writes that a feminist bumper slicker would read: "Nothing is
natural - w ell, almost nothing".' T h e critical theoretical enterprise is motivated by the
b elief that as surely as humans brought about the world, they can unmake it. A socially
oppressive society is not insuperable. T h e subordination o f women, or o f the working
classes or o f innumerable ethnic groups is not an insoluble condition. This crucial belief
defines the practico-normativc baseline o f critical social science. T h e task of th e student
working w ithin this tradition is understood in terms o f the possibility and need for
fundamental social transformation.
Notwithstanding the uniquely Marxist or class-specific lineages o f the critical
theoretical enterprise, philosophical discussions have frequently sought to identify general
clusters o f intellectual premises that transcend the specific Marxist concern with class
oppression.14 In a complementary direction the specific modes o f social oppression that
33 She continues:
As one learns to look at this world through feminist eyes, one learns to ask
whether any thing that passes for inevitable, inherent, traditional o r biological
has in fact been made. One begins to ask how all sorts of things have been made
- a treeless landscape, a rifle-wielding police force, the Irishman joke, an all
women typing pool. Asking how something has been made implies that it has
been made by someone. Suddenly there are clues to trace; there is also blame,
credit and responsibility to apportion, not just at the start but at each point along
the way.
Bananas, Beaches and Bases, (Pandora Press, 1989), p. 3.
34 For example, see: Douglas Kellner, Critical Theory, Marxism and Modernity, (John I lopkins
University Press, 1989); Brian Fay, Critical Social Science, op. cit..
18
must necessarily be included in the critical theoretical enterprise have explicitly widened.35
Arguably, a parallel trend has occurred within the field o f international relations. O n the
one hand there have been attempts to abstract from the specific Marxist tradition to arrive
at general criteria for the critical intellectual project within the field.36 O n the other
hand, as the critical enterprise gathers momentum within international relations, explicit
calls are being made to address all oppressive elements o f the social canvas as well as their
interpositions.37
A necessary step in the development o f the critical theoretical project within
international relations surrounds the establishment o f theoretical and conceptual
compasses that can guide us through specific subject domains or areas o f study. T h e need
to do this is especially true in the case o f international relations most travelled subject
matter: war. W e might begin to fill in this gap by noting that the critical study o f w a r can
be broadly summarized as the contemplation o f war in terms o f dialectical critiques o f
social power.'8 W ar is not pondered as a thing to be manipulated o r controlled but
35 F o r example, see: Nancy Fraser, "Whats Critical About Critical Theory? The Case o f
Habermas and Gender" in Feminism and Critique, eds. Seyla Benhabib et al, (University o f
Minnesota Press, 1987).
^ O n e of the first attempts at this may be found in M ark Hoffman, "Critical Theory and the
Inter-Paradigmatic Debate," Millennium: Journal o f International Studies 16:2 (Summer, 1987).
For a more recent example see: M ark Neufeld, Towards the Restructuring o f International
Relations Theory, Ph.D. Dissertation, Carleton University, 1990 (Unpublished).
Sandra Whitworth, "Gender in the Inter-Paradigm Debate,"
International Studies 18:2 (1989).
Millennium: Journal o f
w It is appropriate here to briefly speak of the term 'critical. It is important to recognize

from the outset that the suggestion is not being made that the critical study o f war is imbued with
greater incisiveness when compared with conventional approaches to war. This would be an
arrogating claim to say the least. Although there is a considerable terminological lineage,
including the way the term was employed in M arxs Contribution to the Critique o f Political
19
rather as part o f a complex socio-political dynamic.'1 T h e critical study o f war must

stubbornly refuse to reify war by cutting it adrift from contending social forces a t the
moment o f theoretical inception.
T h e critical study o f w ar is further impelled by the preliminary observation that
war is never prosecuted for politically innocent reasons. W ar is seldom undertaken on
behalf o f "the people" or "the nation" as if society were some lumpcn-group. W a r is
organically linked with rudimentary social and political struggles within society.
Observations o f this sort have certainly been made before. As Thomas Paine wrote more
than two centuries ago:
W ar is the common harvest o f all those who participate in the division and
expenditure of public money, in all countries. I t is the art of conquering a t
home: the object of it is an increase of revenue; and as revenue cannot be
increased without taxes, a pretence must be made for expenditures. In
reviewing the history o f the English Government, its wars and its taxes, a
bystander, not blinded by prejudice, not warped by interest, would declare ,
that taxes were not raised to carry on wars, but that wars were raised to carry
on taxes.40
International conflict and w ar enters into rudimentary social struggles, confirms and
reflects them, and at the same time reshapes them. A t one and the same moment war is
Economy, it is beneficial to quote from a footnote in Horkhcim ers programmatic essay entitled
Traditional and Critical Theory'. "The term [critical] is used here less in the sense it has in the
idealist critique o f pure reason than in the sense it has in the dialectical critique of political
economy. It points to an essential aspect o f the dialectical theory of society."
39 E.P. Thompson has written: "Class itself is not a thing, it is a happening." The Making o f
the English Working Class, (Penguin, 1968), p. 939.
40 Thomas Paine, Rights o f Man, (Pelican Books, 1969), p.99.
20
conditioned by and thrusts back upon the fundamental configuration o f social forces
within society. "Docs not the threat of an atomic catastrophe which could wipe out the
human race," queries Marcuse in an exemplary manner, "also serve to protect the very
forces which perpetuate this danger?41 From the perspective o f our alternative response
war is a thoroughly contaminated affair. The potential scenarios are almost limitless: the
naked drama o f war can cement otherwise fractured societies; similarly, the symbols and
rhetoric o f w arfare can blur oppressive social relations and weaken resistant practices;
alternatively, the prosecution of war can be used to strengthen social repression; the
imperatives o f th e war project can lead to the rapid reshaping o f conventional
understandings and practices - Rosie the Riveter - o r reinforce conventional
understandings and practices - as in the exhortation that wom en should birth for the war
effort, the prosecution o f war can disproportionately benefit narrow class o r group
projects by securing their specific needs; the development o f armed forces and other
instruments o f w a r can further class hegemony and so on.
W e should begirt, therefore, to measure the spoils o f war in terms o f the gains and
losses o f these oppressed classes and groups within society. The common tendency has
been to measure the costs o f war with macroeconomic indicators. W e tend to see a focus
upon declining production, especially falling GNPs o r sectoral outputs, and upon
infrastructural damage. At other times we see war discussed and assessed in terms o f
m ilitary equipm ent losses and soldier counts. Again, we also see attention drawn to
physical damage as in the destruction o f towns and cities. A n d to a lesser extent we see
41 Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, (Beacon Press, 1964), ix.
21
attention drawn to civilian losses and human tragedies such as refugee Hows. The near
exclusive concern with these measurements, however, assists in occluding the social costs
associated with war. W arfare frequently tips the balance of social forces within society
against oppressed and marginalized classes and groups. The first casualties o f war are
frequently those disadvantaged or marginalized groups within society. W arfare more often
than not reinforces existing power asymmetries to the disadvantage o f oppressed classes
and groups. W h ile these effects o f war arc certainly less palpable, they are none the less
real. T o overlook this effect o f war, whether unconsciously o r by choice, has towering
political ramifications, especially to the extent that such oversight exacerbates the
oppressed condition o f these peripheral classes and groups. Societies seldom lose wars,
oppressed social classes and groups frequently lose through war.
According to our alternative response, war must be studied in order to draw
attention to its links to different modes o f socially oppressive relations in society. The
orientation and stress o f our alternative response can be considered from another angle.
In keeping with the idea that war is not a thing but rather part o f a dynamic social
process, our primary concern, in contrast to most research into war, does not lie with the
prosecution of w ar itself. Stated baldly, the critical study of war is not motivated by the
oft cited desire to see violent conflict end. This is not to trivialize the concern with the
utter brutality o f war, especially as technological developments have yielded rather
stunning capacities for destruction and annihilation. W e must forever surrender ourselves
22
to the spirit o f Wilfred O w ens rcmonstrative poem:
If in some smothering dreams you too could pace

Behind the wagon that we flung him in,
And watch the white eyes writhing in his face,
His hanging face, like a devils sick of sin;
If you could hear, at eveiy jolt, the blood
come gargling from the froth-corrupted lungs,
Obscene as cancer, bitter as the cud
O f vile, incurable sores on innocent tongues, My friend, you would not tell with such high zest
To children ardent for some desperate glory,
The old Lie: Dulce ct decorum cst
Pro patria mori.
But our expressed concern over the undeniable horrors o f warfare and the deontological
claim that w ar is simply wrong arc, of course, two entirely different matters. The emphasis
and ultimate set of concerns under the critical study o f war flush out this difference.
Before judging the use o f violence a prior question must be asked: H o w does violent
conflict affect the oppressed and disadvantaged groups in society? Our abandonment of
th e Kantian ceiling where war is concerned, however, does not mean that we fall
helplessly towards the Hobbesian floor. We have simply retired to consequentialist
quarters. T h e particular social effect o f war is a matter o f direct investigation, and ethical
assessments o f war arc therefore contingent. The possibility that violent conflict could be
beneficial, moreover, is entirely precluded by contemporary etiquette. The possibility of a
revolutionary Nicaragua, for example, distributing arms or fighting on behalf o f oppressed
peasant classes in El Salvador, Honduras or Guatemala tends to be ruled out. W hile such
scenarios are certainly uncommon, the emphasis nonetheless leaves the possibility o f a
just w ar wide open. Although most wars tend to work in the other direction, that is, to
23
the disadvantage o f oppressed groups within society, the example assists us in seeing the
emphasis o f the alternative response to our original question. In the prevailing view, the
concern tends to b e with war itself; war is seldom considered from the perspective of
oppressive social relations. I f a war is being fought, the shooting and killing must end first
- period.
It is the social implications o f war that lie at the heart o f our alternative response.
V iolent conflict is contemplated in terms o f its relationship to the dynamic struggle
between the oppressed and th e oppressors. As such, our alternative response is
unapologetically politically explicit in its critique o f the oppressive nature of existing social
orders and in the desire to sec these social orders thoroughly and radically transformed.
T h e practical concerns o f our alternative response work to define those elements
considered worthy of attention. T h e belief that social oppression exists in society, that
social power tends to be skewed in favour o f some classes and groups over others, and
that this is an unacceptable condition, leads us to identify and interpret the facts of war
differently. We recognize that there is seldom a politically innocent fact in the social
sciences. T h e selection and interpretation o f the facts identified are intimately bound up
with the values and biases o f the researcher, whether or not the researcher is fully
cognizant o f this. The science of w ar and peace, to employ a more common expression, is
value-laden. Our analysis of war is inescapably coloured. W e must not take this as a
licence for rampant and undisciplined interrogation o f the social world.
Reason and logic
are not to be jettisoned in the service of naked political aspirations. Rather, we see this
as an injunction to be up front and explicit about the tendentious elements and political
reflexes that inevitably guide research into war.
24
This same injunction forces us to be vigilant with respect to the political effect of
war theory. The complacent appropriation and adoption o f certain analytical categories,
paradigms and disciplinary imperatives may have profoundly negative political
consequences.'12 Notwithstanding the overwhelming weight o f the disciplinary writs o f
international relations, the healthy suspicion underlying the critical study o f war is that the
prevailing response to our original question has had unacceptable political ramifications,
unacceptable in the sense that it has contributed to the maintenance o f the oppressive
relations within societies at or on the verge of war. Critics o f peace research have
certainly raised these questions in the past. Johan Galtung argued strenuously that the
focus on the reduction o f violence in peace research results is a sort o f "negative peace"
wherein the preoccupation is with "... the conditions o f maintaining power, o f freezing the
status quo, o f manipulating the underdog so that he does not take up arms against the
topdog. This concept o f peace will obviously be in the interest o f the status-quo powers
at the national or international levels, and may easily become a conservative force in
politics." In a germinal article written in the late 1960s Herm an Schmidt argues that the
ideological emphasis upon order constitutes the essence o f conflict management thinking,
and has led to "an identification with the interests of the existing international system, that
is, the interests o f those who have power in the international system." As a result,
Schmidt argued, "peace research becomes a factor supporting the status quo o f the
international power structure, providing the decision-makers o f the system with knowledge
41 For example, sec: Lars Dencik, "Peace Research: Pacification or Revolution?",

Contemporary Peace Research, Ghanshym Pardesi ed. (Harvester Press, 1982).
25
for control, manipulation and integration of the system."4'

W e can extend our discussion o f our alternative response by stressing that it is also
informed by a different view of the appropriate relationship between theory and practice.
In the critical study o f war the educative function of social theory is stressed. In contrast
to the instrumentalist conception, the educative view secs social theory "as a means by
which people can achieve a much clearer picture of who they are, and o f what the real
meaning o f their social practices is, as a first step in becoming different sorts o f people
with different sorts o f social arrangements."4 The stress is placed upon social learning
and social empowerment w ith a view to radically transforming the existing social order.
T h e educative view o f social theory proceeds on the assumption that there is a dialectical
relationship between peoples view o f the world and more basic structural conditions, and
that by moulding and pressuring peoples world view their social condition can be
fundamentally transformed:
The educative conception is rooted in the belief that peoples ignorance of

themselves is responsible for the situation in which, in a certain sense (i.e.
unconsciously), they permit certain conditions to make them feel and act in
ways that are self-destructive, and yet, in another sense (i.e. consciously), they
are victims o f these conditions and their causal force just because they do not
know how to relieve themselves of their suffering. In other words, certain
external conditions that produce suffering in people can have the causal force
they do because these people are unaware that it is in part their conceptions
o f themselves which give these conditions their causal powers.45
43 Herman Schmidt, "Peace Research and Politics," Journal o f Conflict Resolution 13, (1968).
44 Brian Fay, Critical Social Science, p. 89.
45 Ibid., p. 95.
26
M oreover, it is clear that this view rests upon a dyadic conception of social power "in the
sense that all of its many forms invoke the self-understandings of the powerless as well as
th e powerful." The process of social enlightenment, therefore, will enhance the social
power o f disadvantaged o r oppressed groups within society and thereby contribute to its
rcstrueturalion.
O ur alternative response, then, is guided by the educative view of the relationship
between social theory and political practice. That is, the critical study of war proceeds
upon the assumption that insofar as social theory is useful, it must assist oppressed
groups in transforming their oppressive social condition; it must enlighten and educate
them. T h e study o f war must help people to more incisively comprehend themselves and
society, specifically the relationship between warfare and their social oppression.
Consequently, we can see that the goal o f this study stands in blunt contrast with the
conventional concern of exploring the causes and course o f international conflict and war
primarily for the sake of eliminating it. We are impelled, rather, to explore international
conflict and war for the sake o f empowering oppressed social groups within society and
thereby contributing to fundamental social transformation. The explicit value of this
intellectual project, in other words, is understood in terms o f its ability to assist
disadvantaged or oppressed groups in transforming their social condition. The net effect
o f the critical study of war aimed at explicating the relationship between the prosecution
o f war on the one hand and the extension or diminution o f oppressive social relations on
the other hand will be exceptionally difficult to assess and certainly indirect. A t best,
social theory will be one of a number o f factors in the extended and complex process of
social transformation, and its importance will likely vary over time. Although this research
27
approach harbours no illusions about its overall impact, the process o f social learning will
have at least two initial elements: first, there w ill be the legitimizing o f those intellectual
and political communities already engaged in an extensive social critique, and secondly,
existing social critique will be intensified and reinforced.
E!y drawing attention to the links between war and oppressive social relations the
critical theory o f society will be refined and extended. The contemplation o f war from
the perspective of the structural relations of power within society has little precedence
within international relations.4* In other words, to dwell upon war in terms o f its
relationship to class, race or gender has received little treatment in past research on war.
W hile second image explanations arc somewhat common, that is, explanations that could
be widely construed to focus upon society, the particular conception o f society employed
generally fails to emphasize, and usually entirely overlooks, the role o r impact of
oppressive social relations. Three fundamental general questions arise in the critical study
o f war: First, to what extent are social relations of class, gender and race responsible for
heightened tension and conflict between two states? Secondly, to what degree can the
move to war be linked to the oppressive social relations of class, race and gender? Third,
how is the course o f war linked to the oppressive social relations of class, race and
gender? The three questions draw explicit attention to the relationship between
rudimentary societal dynamics understood as the unfolding o f the oppressive social
relations o f class, race and gender. A ll three questions can be loosely reformulated in
46 One refreshing exception to this rule may be found in Arno J. Mayer, "Internal Gtuses and
Purposes of W ar in Europe, 1870 - 1956: A Research Assignment," Journal o f Modem History 41
(September 1969).
28
terms more amenable to the contemporary international relations lexicon. T h e first

question can be restated: What arc the social foundations of international conflict? The
second question becomes: What are the social origins o f war? The third question may be
expressed as: What are the social foundations o f conflict resolution?
Why study war? The prevailing response to our original question, as summarized
in the table below, is concerned with war first and foremost, sees it as something to be
avoided and eliminated, enters into research in order to achieve this goal. A t the same
time the research project is guided by the faith that science can be objective and valuefree, that it will produce a nomological theory o f war, and that such a theory may then be
employed in order to achieve the original goal o f peace. In stark contrast, the critical
response to war developed here is most immediately concerned with social oppression in
society and with removing these
29
Conventional and Critical Study of W ar

Criteria
Conventional
Approach to War
Critical
Study o f W ar
M ost Basic Concern
W ar and violence
Oppressive social relations
V ie w of W ar
T o be avoided
War should not be a priori

judged in ethical terms
G o al of Research
Ending war
Mitigating and removing

modes o f social oppression
G o al of Science
Nomological theory of war
Explication o f relationship
between war and modes of
social oppression
Nature o f Science
objective, descriptive, valuefree
value-laden
Theory and Practice
Instrumental
Educative
t.
relations o f oppression. It is less inclined to assess war until it has addressed it in terms
t
4
of these rudimentary social relations. At the same time, it rests upon the belief that social
science cannot be objective in the sense that it is uncontaminated by complex cultural
processes, that the goal of the scientific endeavour should be to explicate the relationship
between w ar and social oppression, and that social theory is useful to the extent that it is
a
educative and contributes, ultimately, to the mitigation and transformation o f society.
Conclusion:
"In peace, sons bury their fathers," Herodotus writes at the outset o f The Histories,
"but in war, fathers bury their sons." Twenty-five centuries later the sentiments that
informed this remark are entirely intact. The bluntness of this observation goes a long
30
way towards summarizing the current convictions with respect to war in the modern era.
W hile it is certainly painful to distance ourselves from the honest and heartfelt sympathies
that inform this view, it appears that they have generated a tendency to view war in an
exclusive manner, as a problem unto its own, and as a human phenomenon that must be
avoided at all costs. Thus, attention is drawn away from the relationship between war and
social oppression. W e arrive at a situation, in other words, where warfare is fctishized and
not understood, ultimately, as an intensely social reality.
The critical study o f war cannot participate in the reification of war. W ar reflects
and reworks rudimentary social struggles and relations of power within society. We have
suggested here that the neglected casualties o f war are often those social classes and
groups that arc marginalized and peripheralized within society. W ar is often directly
responsible for the intensification o f forms of social oppression. How often has the war
project blunted alternative political projects within society? W ith these simple
observations we are led to formulate an entirely different response to our original
question. Why study war? W e study war to call attention to the relationship between war
and the oppiossive relations of class, gender and race. We must explicate and assess the
complex dynamics at work between social power and warfare. W e do so, ultimately, with
the hope that we will guide social struggles in a direction that will dissolve these
oppressive social relations.
In the chapters that follow we develop an analytical framework commensurate with
the requirements of the critical study of war. Our overarching theoretical goal is to
outline a theory of society that specifies skewed distributions of social power. In chapter
2, we survey some o f the literature on war and conflict for the purpose o f addressing its
31
limited conceptualization of the state and society. In chapter 3, we draw upon the rich
theoretical debates on the state and society for the purposes o f explicitly laying down our
alternative analytical framework. In chapter 4, w e discuss the development o f the
literature on security w ith a view to linking discussions o f security to our particular view of
society. T h e remaining chapters then apply our theoretical framework to the Iran-Iraq
war.
32
Chapter Two
Analyzing the Social Foundations o f W ar
Introduction:
This chapter locates the current account o f war in terms o f past research within
international relations. Initial attention is given to the specific type o f explanation
developed in this study. This is followed by a clarification o f the object o f investigation.
B rie f attention is then given to the various accounts o f war that have appeared in past
research. In particular, we focus upon conventional discussions o f the second image and
third image in order to sharpen our understanding o f the explanation developed in this
study. W e then follow this w ith a brief assessment o f the conflict management/resolution
literature.
W e note that, as w ith the traditional causes of w ar research, th e conflict
management/resolution literature generally fails to contemplate the evolution and course

o f interstate conflict and war from the perspective o f basic societal dynamics. T h e most
apparent oversight in this respect concerns class relations within society. In the end, this
chapter underscores the need for analyses o f interstate conflict and war th at seriously
reflects upon the influence of societal dynamics.
The Nature o f the Explanation:
W e must briefly consider the kind o f explanation offered here. As Quincy W right
pointed o u t in his monumental overview to th e study o f war, the very meaning of th e word
cause is not a settled item:
T o some a cause o f war is an event, condition, act, or personality involved

only in a particular war; to others it is a general proposition applicable to
many wars. T o some it is a class of human motives, ideals, or values; to
others it is a class o f impersonal forces, conditions, processes, patterns o r
relations. To some it is th e entrance o r injection of a disturbing factor into a
stable situation; to others it is the lack of essential conditions o f stability in
the situation itself o r the human failure to realize potentialities. These
differences o f opinion reflect different meanings of the word "cause". Social
scientists, historians, and politicians often ascribe different meanings to
causation, and so they have different views about the causes o f war.1
A t a minimum, this observation requires that wc explicitly address the nature o f the
explanation offered in this study.
In addition to this, wc must be careful not to overburden any particular
explanation of war. The proliferation o f a language o f causation, including condition
(necessary and sufficient) verses cause, direct and indirect causes, primary and secondary
causes and so on, certainly cautions us against the belief that we can identify singular
agents o r forces responsible for war.1 D espite these cautions, however, there is something
very basic and fundamental to the account o f war brought forth here. Societal dynamics
always figure prominently, wc contend, in the outbreak and prosecution o f war. This
relationship can be elaborated using three different metaphors. First, employing simple
1 Quincy Wright, A Study of War, (University of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 104.

2 For a survey o f necessary and sufficient conditions see George H . Quester, "War and
Peace: Necessary and Sufficient Conditions," in International Conflict and Conflict Management.
Readings in World Politics, cds. Robert O . Matthews et al (Prentice-Hall Canada Inc., 1984).
34
themes of physical sir icturcs, there is an attempt to identify the foundations of war, that
is, to identify the social scaffolding that upholds and sustains war. Secondly, using ideas o f
the lifc-cycle, the concern here lies in identifying those features which "bring forth" or
"engender" and "nurture" the outbreak and prosecution o f war. Finally, employing
thcspian metaphors, this dissertation is concerned w ith the social setting o f war, that is,
to those social processes that arc not readily apparent or immediately up fro n t and
obvious to the viewer, but which, like the relationship between the artist and the
performer, greatly condition o r constrain social actors.
These metaphorical accounts o f the explanation, however, are unfortunately vague.
Wc must refine our explanation of the causal accounts developed here. This study
provides what can be considered quasi-causal explanations of war. T h e basic assumption
is that humans forever intervene to chart the course of events, even if they are
constrained by what arc frequently understood as the structural features - intersubjective
or otherwise - of society. This study recognizes that any basic structural characteristics o f
the social canvas w ill not cause international conflict or war merely by their presence.
Rather, social actors intervene to read and interpret social dynamics. T h a t is, the
particular effect o f society always remains contingent. Hence, this study purports to offer
quasi-causal explanations of international conflict and war rather than causal accounts.
This distinction has been elaborated elsewhere:
... (we say] quasi-causal rather than causal because, in these sorts of
conditionship relations, consciousness functions as a mediator between the
determining antecedent factors and the subsequent action; in other words,
men act in terms o f their interpretations of, and intentions towards, their
external conditions, rather lhan being governed directly by them, and
35
therefore these conditions must be understood not as causes but as warranting

conditions which make a particular action or belief more reasonable,
justified, o r appropriate, given the desires, beliefs, and expectations o f the
actors.3
T h e underlying social dynamics addressed in this study, in addition to exhibiting many

d ifferen t configurations and forms, are associated w ith war in a manner that sees them
forever mediated by human decisions. W e cannot say, for example, that the presence of a
particular form of class conflict within a specific type of society will inevitably lead to war.
Individuals continually intervene, make decisions and sometimes respond in unpredictable
o r idiosyncratic ways. To assert that the social-structural realm conditions actors is far
diminishing th e importance o f social actors. Dram atic social events such as war cannot be
understood as the result o f simple structural imperatives that can be meted out in the
form o f independent variables. A similar line o f reasoning has appeared in other studies
on the causes o f w a r :"... the stream o f causation is not direct, but mediated and
transformed through the personalities who make the decision or will the war... In war,
therefore, the causation is not only personal and mental instead o f physical, but it is by
means o f the mechanism o f association or conditioning rather than by force.'"
Two im portant factors follow from this brief discussion. First, in a very significant
manner, the explanation for war offered in this study will not logically override other
accounts of w ar that have been offered in the past, especially those that draw attention to
decisionmaking processes and leadership characteristics such as Bruce Bueno de M esqitas
3 Brian Fay, Social Theory and Political Practice, (George Allen and Unwin, 1975), pp. 84-85.
4 Luther Lee Bernard, War and Its Causes, (Garland Publishing Inc., 1972), pp. 208-9.
36
The War Trap or O le Holstis Crisis, Escalation, War.s Similarly, those explanations that
call attention to organizational structures and processes within states, such as Graham
Allisons Essence o f Decision, will not be necessarily incompatible with the current
account.6 As such, there is considerable room for complementary analyses o f war.
Nonetheless, the implicit assumption of this study is that these factors will generally have
less overall importance in the development, outbreak and prosecution of war. Moreover,
as discussed in section one, the focus upon these social dimensions o f class, ethnic and
gender struggles is undertaken for explicitly stated practical purposes; that is, the desire
to sec class, ethnic and gender oppression reduced. Secondly, in offering quasi-causal
accounts o f war we accept that the etiological programme o f society and war is
subjcctivized and therefore contingent and somewhat unpredictable. The outbreak and
course o f war is never inevitable, never beyond the scope o f individual intervention and
manipulation. The emphasis, however, remains upon these basic social structural features
and the social struggles and broader political dynamics that are erected around them.
Refinement o f the Object of Investigation:
It recently has been asserted that concerns with w ar and peace constitute the most
5 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, The War Trap, (Yale University Press, 1981); Ole R . Holsti,
Crisis, Escalation, War, (McGil 1-Queens University Press, 1972).
6 Graham Allison, The Essence o f Decision. Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, (Little, Brown
and Co., 1973).
37
enduring and long standing problematic ol' international relations scholarship.7 Analysts,
however, seldom have maintained a rigorous conceptual distinction between conflict and
war in international relations. In view o f this preoccupation with the study o f war in
international relations, therefore, it is surprising that there has been relatively little effort
to refine the concept itself. Most analysis in the field o f international relations, for
example, has tended "to overlook the critical distinction between international conflict and
international w a r ..." T h e distinction between international conflict and war is at least as
old as Clausewitz when he noted that war is "a clash between major interests that is
resolved by bloodshed - that is the only way in which it differs from other conflicts."
Despite these intellectual precedents, however, this distinction has not been developed or
refined. The tendency to collapse international conilict and war remains. It would appear
that the net result o f this conceptual negligence has been that "lew students of
international relations have developed theories o f conilict worth mentioning.'"'
Explicit cails for a more rigorous conceptual differentiation between international
conflict and w ar are beginning to appear. "While contlicts can arise out o f an impressive
range o f social incompatibilities," David Singer writes, "the processes that lead to so
frequent an event as conflict are not necessarily those that lead to so infrequent an event
7 This contention forms an important theme in Kal Holstis The Dividing Discipline:
Hegemony and Diversity in International Theory, (Allen and Unwin, 1985), see pp. 75-77, and
chapter 7.
8 Kenneth Waltz, "Conflict in World Politics," in Conflict in World Politics, eds. Steven L.
Spiegel and Kenneth N. W altz (W inthrop Publishers, 1971), p. 454.
38
as war."1* Building upon the idea that international conilict and international war are
separate phenomena to be explained, Geoffrey Blainey argues that "most o f the popular
theories o f war - and the explanations by many historians o f individual wars - blame
capitalists, dictators, monarchs o r other individuals or pressure groups. These theories,
however, explain rivalry and tension rather than war: rivalry and tension between countries
can exist for generations without producing war."10 For Blainey, the concept of w a r is
narrowed considerably to mean simply the employment o f force: "To attempt to explain
war is to attempt to explain why forceful means w ere selected." The clear stress here is
that international conflict and w ar constitute separate objects o f analysis or investigation.
T he conceptual distinction between international conflict and war summoned by
writers such as Blainey and Singer is adopted in this study. T he basic distinction called for
here reflects the ever widening meaning o f the word conflict. Originally, with its
etymological roots in the Latin confligere, to clash or to strike together, the idea o f conflict
appears to have denoted or signified an armed and potentially violent encounter. The
word has continually widened in meaning, however, and can now be associated w ith basic
incompatibilities or collisions of tendencies.11 It is this wider view o f conflict adopted
here. There have been a handful of excellent inquiries into the ideas surrounding social
, J. David Singer, "Accounting for International War: The State o f the Discipline," Journal
o f Peace Research 18:1 (1981), p. 3.
10 Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War, (The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1973), p. 291.
11 Sec discussion in Kurt Singer, "The Meaning of Conflict," The Australasian Journal of
Philosophy 27:3 (December 1949), pp. 145-146.
39
conflict.12 T h e specific idea of conflict employed here builds upon the analysis o f Max
W e b er in The Methodology of the Social Sciences. I t is valuable to quote the most
relevant passage in W eber at length:
Conflict cannot be excluded from social life. One can change its means, its
object, even its fundamental direction and its bearers, but it cannot be
eliminated. There can be, instead of an external struggle o f antagonistic
persons for external objects, an inner struggle o f mutually loving persons for
subjective values and therewith, instead of external compulsion, an inner
control... O r it can take the form of a subjective conflict in the individual's
own mind. It is always present and its influence is often greatest when it is
least noticed, i.e., the more its course takes the form of indifferent or
complacent passivity or self-deception, o r when it operates as "selection".
"Peace" is nothing more than a change in the fonn o f the conflict or in the
antagonists or in the objects of the conflict...1''
Aside from the idea that conflict is pervasive in any social system, W eber makes it clear
th at each individual conflict has a number of identifiable elements including one o r more
bearers, some type o f goal to be secured or object to be achieved, and different methods to
achieve these goals which give conflict an almost unlimited number o(form s. T h e specific
concerns o f this study can be reformulated to lay stress on the fact that the antagonists
under consideration here are states. W e are concerned specifically, that is, with interstate
conflict and war. A conflict changes form when a different set o f methods are employed
12 See R .W . Mack and R.C Snyder, "The Analysis of Social Conflict: Towards an Overview
and Synthesis," Journal o f Conflict Resolution 1:2 (1957); C.F. Fink, "Some Conceptual Difficulties
in the Theory o f Social Conflict," Journal of Conflict Resolution 12:4 (1968); Kurt Singer, "The
Meaning o f Conflict," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 27 (December, 1949).
15 Max Weber, The Methodology of the Social Sciences, (The Free Press, 1949), pp. 26-27, my
40
to achieve some end o r object. As we will see, war is narrowed to mean a very specific
form o f interstate conflict.
Importantly, the concept o f conflict can be so broad as to be intellectually
unwieldy. T h e very notion o f interstate conflict, that is, runs the risks o f becoming so
comprehensive that it ends up being conceptually vacuous o r meaningless, a mere
substitute for the terms international politics or world politics or international relations. In
order to avoid this problem, it is analytically useful to narrow the scope o f the concept.
To this end, we may add two important refinements. First, w e note that conflict must
have some political relevance. It is fruitful to quote K urt Singers reflections on the
concept:
... a Stale is not in danger o f disorganisation if two ordinary citizens

occasionally come to blows; it is different if such collisions become chronic or
happen to concern two heads o f powerful factions. It seems advisable to
speak in the first case o f collision ... and to reserve the term conflict for cases
in which the collision threatens the stability and viability or the integrating
unit. This would relieve us from the necessity o f speaking o f conflict if one
restaurant guest is disappointed by another guests not passing him the salt.14
W hile the specific criteria that conflict must be systemically disruptive is not necessary, the
suggestion that conflict refers to disputes o f considerable political importance is certainly
helpful. A n d although such a threshold of political significance is exceptionally difficult to
establish, this qualification has the likely effect o f ruling out disputes and disagreement
around the proliferating number o f technical issues that can envelop states in the modern
14 Sec discussion in Kurt Singer, op. cit., p. 169.

41
era. A second refinement also helps us narrow the concept o f conflict. The sociologist
Lewis Coscr argued that we must distinguish between a condition of tension and a
condition o f conflict. According to Coscr, the mere awareness or perception o f
I
j
*
*
incompatibility constitutes a condition o f tension. Actors cross an important threshold
I
j
minimizing or removing the negative effects of their antagonists.1' W ith this refinement
we are led to speak o f conflict when one social actor attempts to countenail another
because o f the perception o f incompatibility among their respective goals. Taken
)
'
together, both refinements allow us to narrow the meaning of conflict within the wider
into conflict, however, when they resolve to enhance their position or predicament by
i
i
range o f interstate relations.

T h e concept o f war, however, is narrowed greatly. W ar relates directly to forms of
interstate conflict involving the employment of armed force. This conceptualization of war
is echoed in other research quarters:
W e do not mean anything so general as conflict or fighting or competition.

W e mean the deliberate use of organised physical force by groups of men
against other groups. Other kinds of conflict might, and no doubt would
persist in the absence of war; and to pul an end to war would not be the same
thing as to put an end to competitive effort. That is clear from the history of
states. For within an ordered state there is peace, but none the less there is
conflict.16
15 Lewis A. Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict, (New York: The Free Press, 1956), p.
3.
16 Goldsworthy L. Dickinson, Causes o f International War, (Garland Publishing Inc., 1972),
p. 7.
42
This narrower conception o f war is entirely compatible with the definition o f war set out
by Clausewitz at the outset o f his investigation into the subject matter: "War ... is an act o f
violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our will... Physical force ... is therefore
the means; the compulsory submission o f the enemy to our will is the ultimate objective."
It docs not, however, correspond to still narrower operational definitions o f w ar which set
quantifiable thresholds of death or physical destruction.17
Both o f these refinements have the effect o f removing from the sphere of
international conflict those issues, such as the allocation o f radio frequencies, agreements
on copyright infringements o r international postal regulations, which tend to be primarily
technical or logistical in nature. Nonetheless, conflict still applies to a wide variety o f
scenarios. For the purposes of this study, it is valuable to draw upon Thomas Hobbes
widely cited observations concerning the scope of war: "For as the nature o f Foule
weather, lyeth not in a showre or two o f rain; but in an inclination thereto o f many dayes
together: So the nature of W ar, consisteth not in actuall Fighting; but in the known
disposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. A ll other
time is P E A C E ."1* T h e disposition or inclination to fight, merely fo r purpose o f
conceptual consistency within this study, lies in the realm o f international conflict rather
than war. Nonetheless, Hobbes remarks allow us to conceive of two broad classes o f
interstate conflicts, that is, those that may possibly lead to interstate war, and those that
are extremely unlikely to lead to war. As the literature on complex interdependence
p For example, see Lewis F. Richardson, Statistics o f Deadly Quarrels, eds. Quincy Wright
ct al (Boxwood Press, 1960).
18 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, (Penguin Books, 1968), p. 186.
43
reminds us, fo r example, there are many conflicts which have little likelihood of being
resolved by military force.19
The analytical approach informing this study will provide valuable insights into the
full spectrum o f interstate conflict. O u r immediate concern, however, lies with those
interstate conflicts where the exercise o f the military option forms a very real or likely
possibility. Restated in terms o f the distinctions elaborated here, the immediate focus is
upon those interstate conflicts that have some likelihood o f shifting in form to become
wars. T h e belief is that an examination of underlying social and political dyanamics will
yield valuable insights into these types of conflicts. It will help us understand the basic
issues at stake, will help us to understand why the salience of certain conflicts change over
time, and will demonstrate why certain states are involved in specific conflicts while others
remain on the periphery. Similarly, the approach will help us to understand why the
military option appeared viable and why it was chosen. Again, the approach developed
here will shed considerable light upon the manner in which wars are prosecuted and why
they are drawn to a close at certain points in time, as opposed to others.
Situating the Societal-Centred Account o f International Conflict and War:
The explanation for interstate conflict and war employed in this study calls
19 See Robert O . Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in
Transition, (Little, Brown and Company, 1977).
44
attention to the importance of class and communal struggles within society.20 The nature
o f this explanation differs rather fundamentally from most accounts o f interstate conflict
and war offered to date. The role of societal dynamics has conventionally been afforded
very little attention. In order to clarify the distinctiveness o f the explanation developed
here it is necessary to locate the account in terms of previous research on international
conflict and war. Accordingly, one can identify two bodies o f literature which address
international conflict and war: first, the large and diverse literature on the causes o f war;
and secondly, the equally large and diffuse literature on conflict management and conflict
resolution. This locational exercise will help to demonstrate that past research into
international conflict and war generally has failed to consider the effects of social
structures, especially class dynamics.
The Causes o f War Literature:
Explanations for international conflict and war can be classed in a variety o f ways.
One classification identifies different spheres o f human activity - such as economic,
political, legal and technological - and then theorizes about the relationship o f these
20 In this study, class refers to social relations established primarily within production. The
term communal refers to non-class cleavages within society, such as race or gender divisions, that
embody skewed configurations o f social power (super/subordinate), and create or fuel social
conflict. Class and communal relations are forever evolving. Communal dynamics, we hold,
should not be separated from the analysis of class, but, as will be argued in Chapter Three,
should not be collapsed in class either.
45
spheres to war.21 A second approach to explaining international conflict and war focuses
upon different modes o f social conflict - interpersonal, familial, organizational, societal
etcetera - and then grafts its insights from these levels onto the realm o f international
relations.22 A third body of research exits the human realm altogether and draws links
between w ar and the animal kingdom.23 One of the most helpful classifications o f the
causes of war, however, was developed by Kenneth W altz in the late 1950s. In Man, the
State and War, W altz posited a threefold classificatory scheme which focused upon human
nature or the first image, the state or second image and the system o f states or third
image. By far the largest body o f research into the causes o f war sits flush with W altzs
taxonomy.21 For the purposes o f situating the account o f war developed in this study a
brief recapitulation o f Waltzs study is beneficial.
Explanations for war which adopt the first image focus upon human nature.
According to these explanations, wars stem from "selfishness" or "misdirected aggressive
impulses" o r "stupidity". "Political ills", this line of argumentation contends, are derived
21 For example, see Karl W . Deutschs discussion in Quincy Wrights, A Study o f War,
(University o f Chicago Press, 1964), especially pp. xiii-xv. Also see Raymond Arons discussion
o f the levels of conceptualization about war in Peace and War: Towards a Theory of International
Relations, (Doubleday, 1969); F o r another example of the spheres of analysis approach see Na/.li
Choucri and Robert C. North, Nations in Conflict: National Growth and International Violence,
(San Francisco: Freeman, 1975).
22 For example, see J.S. Himes, Conflict and Conflict Management, (University o f Georgia
Press, 1982); Lawrence Kriesberg, Social Conflicts, (Prentice-Hall, 1982).
23 See the exchange between Ralph L. Holloway, Jr., "Human Aggression: The Need for a
Species-Specific Framework," and C.R. Carpenter, "The Contribution o f Primate Studies to the
Understanding of War," in War: The Anthropology of Armed Conflict and Aggression, (The Natural
History Press, 1968).
21 Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis, (Columbia University
Press, 1959).
46
from "human defects". T h e first image, according to W altz, carries with it an implicit
prescription for ending wars that focuses upon human reform. "The prescriptions vary,"
W altz writes, "but common to them all is the thought that in order to achieve a more
peaceful world men must be changed, whether in their moral-intellectual outlook or in
their psychic-social behaviour."25 As W altz contends, however, the fundamental flaw with
first image accounts of w ar lies in their inability to explain situations o f peace as well as
war: "W hile human nature no doubt plays a role in bringing about war, it cannot by itself
explain both war and peace, except by the simple statement that mans nature is such that
sometimes he fights and sometimes he does not."26 Undue focus upon the first image,
according to W altz, will lead "one away from a realistic analysis o f world politics". Finally,
he admonishes that even those pessimistic first image theorists who believe that human
nature is relatively fixed should automatically lead to an examination o f social and political
institutions "because human nature, by the terms of the assumption, cannot be changed,
whereas social-political institutions can be."
Th e second image focuses upon the "internal structure o f states." T h e essence o f
this view is that the internal nature o f the state is the moving force behind war. "Peace
and war are the product," according to this view, "of good and bad states."27 It carries
with it the logical prescription that internal reform of states will lead to perpetual peace.
As W altz argues, this view characterizes a diverse group o f writers frc
v nrl M arx to
25 ibid., p. 18.
26 Ibid., p. 29.
27 ibid., p. 114.
47
W oodrow Wilson to Immanuel Kant. Waltz recounts the different strains o f this line o f
argumentation: "A world full o f democracies would be a world forever at peace, but
autocratic governments are warlike.... Monarchies are peaceful; democracies are
irresponsible and impulsive, and consequently foment war.... N ot political but economic
organization is the key: capitalist democracies actively promote war, socialist democracies
are peaceful. Each of these formulations has claimed numerous adherents, and each
adherent has in turn been called to task by critics and by history."* One form o f this
argument, the form that W altz analyzes in considerable detail, stresses the importance of
internal democratic structures.
As an example o f this line of thought, W altz discusses one
group o f the second image theorists whose thinking is fully rationalized by the 19lh
century Liberal view o f a harmonious society. "Though the interest of the people is in
peace," W altz summarizes, "their governments make war."* According to this view, if
people were given a direct voice in government policy, especially since it is they who stand
to suffer the most from war, they would invariably choose peace.
W altzs critique o f second image argumentation provides entry into his account of
the third image.
H e contends that any peace project which bases its reforms upon the first
or second image will fail in its effort.
As W altz writes: "And i f conflict arises not only
from defects in the subjects but also from the quality o f the relations among them, it may
be that no amount o f improvement in the individual subjects would be sufficient to
produce harmony in anarchy."
Waltzs critique o f this position is based upon his belief
28 Ibid., pp. 120-121.

29 Ibid., p. 101. See general discussion in chapter 4, especially pp. 1(H)-103.
48
that the relations between states, that is, the third image, greatly conditions state
behaviour:
I f every war is preceded by acts that we can identify (o r at least try to identify)
as cause, then why can we not eliminate wars by modifying individual or state
behaviour? This is the line of thinking followed by those who say: To end
war, improve men; or: To end war, improve states. But in such prescriptions
the role of the international environment is easily distorted. How can some
o f the acting units improve while others continue to follow their old and often
predatory ways?30
Any call for peace which ignores the effect o f the international environment runs th e risk
o f increasing the likelihood o f war. The third image argumentation contends that state
behaviour is profoundly conditioned by the relations between states. I t was succinctly
summarized by Waltz: "Because each state is the final judge of its own cause, any state
may at any lime use force to implement its policies. Because any state may at any time
use force, all states must constantly be ready either to counter force w ith force or to pay
the cost o f weakness. The requirements o f slate action arc, in this view, imposed by the
circumstances in which all states exist."31
These three images constitute the basic conceptual framework fo r Kenneth Waltz.
A considerable body o f research on the causes of war is commensurate with W altzs
scheme. W ith respect to the first image, many theories have focused upon the behavioural
manifestations o f underlying human instincts, contcxtualized instincts such as the
30 Ibid., p. 233.
31 Ibid., p. 160.
49
frustration-aggrcssion hypotheses, personality traits among national leaders and social

learning theory.32 W ith respect to the second image, research has drawn the links
between war proneness and national attributes o f states including wealth, si/e and internal
political arrangements, the degree and scope o f domestic conflict, nationalist sentiments
and other cultural factors.3' Accounts of war clustering around the third image include
especially those studies that call direct attention to configurations o f power within the
international system and the outbreak of war/31
32 One o f the better examples o f instinct theories may be found in Konrad L oren/s On
Aggression, (Harcourt, Brace and World, 1966). For the classic statement of the frustration
aggression view sec John Dollard and Leonard W. Doob et al, Frustration and Aggression, (Yale
University Press, 1939). Also see Elton B. McNeil, "Psychology and Aggression," Journal of
Conflict Resolution, 3 (1959). For an example of the analysis o f personality characteristics see
Margaret G. Hermann, "Leader Personality and Foreign Policy Behaviour," in Comparing Foreign
Policies: Theories, Findings, and Methods, ed. James N. Rosenau (Wiley, 1974). For an example
o f social learning theory see Albert Bandura, Aggression: A Social Learning Analysis, (Prentice
Hall, 1973). Some informative overviews o f first image theories may be found in Michael P.
Sullivan, International Relations: Theories and Evidence, (Prentice-Hall, 1976), chapter 2, James
E . Dougherty and Robert L. Pfalt/graff, Jr., Contending Theories of International Relations. A
Comprehensive Survey, (Harper and Row, 1981), chapter 7 entitled "Microcosmic Theories of
V iolent Conflict".
" With respect to national attributes see Richard J. Rummell, "Some Empirical Findings on
Nations and Their Behaviour," World Politics 21 (1969). With respect to internal levels of conflict
sec L. M . Terrell, "Societal Stress, Political Instability and Levels of M ilitary Effort," Journal of
Conflict Resolution 15 (1971). For an excellent, although slightly dated, review o f speculations
and research along the theme o f cultural variables sec Patrick J. McGowan and Howard B.
Shapiro, The Comparative Study of Foreign Policy: A Survey o f Scientific Findings, (Sage, 1973),
primarily Chapter X on cultural variables.
33 The classic restatement o f Third Image theory is given by Walt/, himself in his Theory o f
International Relations, (Addison-Wesley, 1979). Another example that draws attention to shifting
configurations of power within the international system and war proneness is A.F.K. Organski
and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger, (T h e University o f Chicago Press, 1980).
50
C onsideration o f Second Image Argum entation:
The account of war employed in this dissertation is prim a facie compatible with
W a ltzs second image. T o the extent that W altzs analysis focuses upon the internal
political structure o f states, in a manner reminiscent o f Immanuel K an ts emphasis upon
republican states in Eternal Peace, there is little compatibility between th e focus of the
current study and W altzs second image. It should be pointed out, however, that elements
o f W altzs discussion draw direct attention to considerations o f society such as its
potentially fractured nature, and we can conclude that the second image is potentially very
wide in its analytical scope. A t one point, W altz, for example, considers th e thesis that
states may go to war in order to cement a deeply fractured society. W altz, however, does
not offer any comprehensive analysis o f all the possible arguments that could be
formulated and classified as second image arguments. I t must be stressed that the
particular emphasis in this study is upon the social relations o f class, and that this is far
different from examining the internal political structure o f states. T h e emphasis o f this
study can be Hushed out by briefly considering other explanations fo r war which have
focused upon elements o f society other than internal political structure, in a manner
potentially corresponding to a wider view o f the second image.
One very systematic study was prepared by Midlarsky and Thomas. T heir basic
concern was with the relationship between societal development and war.
"Are societies
which are more developed socially and politically more or less prone to engage in
51
international warfare?"3' Midlarsky and Thomas compared the effect o f primitive

political systems, patrimonial empires, nomad or conquest empires, city-states, feudal
systems, centralized historical bureaucratic empires and modern pre-industrial societies
upon the incidence and duration o f war. They discovered that there was no relationship
between societal development and war. They stressed that this directly undermined the
assumption o f the modernization school that societal development would eventually lend
to peace.3* "Those who would hope for eventual peace through the development of
nations," Midlarsky and Thomas write, "appear to have little evidence to support their
position... They did rather suggestively find, however, that some social institutions, such
as the military or the bureaucracy, might have a stake in the prolongation o f war.
From the perspective o f this study, Midlarsky and Thomass conceptualization o f
society could be strongly questioned. Although their comparative analysis was based on
criteria that involved a consideration o f social structure understood in terms o f economic
sectors and social groups, they did not attempt to consider the dynamics or interactions
among these groups. M erely drawing attention to what might be termed as a social class
is far different from attempting to assess the specific dynamics among social classes and
groups. In the end, their conceptualization of society is static and stationary. It can be
clearly contrasted with this study which ponders the dynamic relationship o f social classes
and groups on the one hand and the relationship of these dynamics to interstate conflict
35 Manus 1. Midlarsky and Stafford T . Thomas, "Domestic Social Structure and International
Warfare," in War, Its Causes and Correlates, eds. Marlin A. Nettleship, R. Dalegivens and
Anderson Nettleship (Moulon Publsihers, 1975), p. 531.
36 James N. Rosenau, International Aspects of Civil Strife, (Princeton University Press, 1964).
52
and war on the society on the other. In this study, society is viewed as constantly shifting
and undulating, and as being propelled along by its fluid social forces.
The treatment o f society in this dissertation can be further assessed by considering
R obert Gilpin's War and Change in World Politics.*1 Gilpins work provides an excellent
example o f Kenneth W altzs contention that the study o f war often emphasizes certain
images but does not assign exclusivity to it. Gilpins work in particular, looks at the
combined effects of the second image (in Gilpins words the economic [rational-actor]
approach to explaining behaviour) and third image (that is, the sociological [systemic or
environmental]) approach. Gilpin is fundamentally concerned with the forces behind
change in the international system.
His basic argumentative line is straightforward. An
international system is in a state o f equilibrium or stability if n o state calculates that it is

profitable to change it. Differential growth rates among states, however, will cause some
states to become disenchanted with the arrangement o f the international system. In other
words, the new configurations of power will not be reflected in the social, political, and
economic arrangements designed to advance the interest of states. Newly empowered
states will attempt to change the international system when they calculate that the
expected benefits are greater than the expected costs. W ar is held out as the "principal
mechanism o f change throughout history."1* These efforts at change will take the form o f
territorial, political, and economic expansion until the marginal costs of further change are
17 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in International Politics, (Cambridge University Press,
1981).
w Ibid., p. 15.
53
equal to or greater than the marginal benefits.-'9

W hen G ilpin embellishes his account of the second image (state) we are afforded
valuable points o f contrast with the current study. While the move towards war is clearly
contingent upon changes within states, these changes are not conceived o f or explained in
terms o f basic social divisions, cleavages or conflicts within society. The meaningfulness of
the changes, in fact, only make sense in terms of other actors in the system, especially
relative changes in power and security. A t the same time, he notes that powerful groups
within society often can control the direction of state policy, and thereby falls back upon
relatively crude instrumentalist accounts o f state theory. And in a suggestive way he also
notes that the primary function of the state is "to define and protect the property rights o f
individuals and groups." Nonetheless, while we learn that changes within the slate are
pivotal, we have little indication of the factors or dynamics that may underwrite these
changes. The actual move towards a hegemonic war, moreover, is based upon rational
calculations o f costs and benefits. Growth in the power o f one state and the
corresponding disjuncture or incongruity between the new configuration o f power and
the lagging or inappropriate political, social and economic arrangements creates the
disposition to war. G ilpins state appears as a unitary, rational actor. In contrast to the
central focus o f this study, however, we are not afforded any analysis of the fundamental
cleavages and dynamics within society and how these might be related to changing
configurations of power o r war.
A third prominent study that has considered the effects o f societal dynamics upon
Ibid., pp. 10-11.

54
the outbreak of war is Choucri and N orths Nations in Conflict. In their examination o f
the outbreak of World W ar I, Choucri and North address society in terms o f its growing
population and advances in technology.40 In a growing population they note that there
will be increased demand for basic resources, resources that w ill become increasingly
scarce. Similarly, societies which achieve greater levels o f technological advancement will
experience greater resource requirements. Choucri and N orth also consider that tech
nological advances have a greater impact upon society, affecting, for example, its
demographic characteristics and its perception o f needs. The net effect o f these
technological advances and population growths include rising demands and social
expectations and increasingly insufficient supplies of resources. They note that if new
capabilities are no t developed to meet these needs nations begin to search abroad in order
to fulfil them. Choucri and North use the term lateral pressure to describe the need o f
states to secure resource supplies beyond their domestic environs. These external
activities come to characterize the national interest, and "the feeling may develop among
the leaders o f such a state or the citizenry or both, that these national interests ought to
be protected." This process o f protection may spawn war. Hence, as Choucri and North
conclude, domestic changes, including technological development and population growth
arc closely linked to international conflict and the possibility o f war.
Although Choucri and North qualify their investigation by calling it a "prototheory", it does represent an excellent example o f theorization of war in terms o f societal
factors in a manner compatible with W altzs second image. Also, it should be noted that
40 Nazli Choucri and Robert C. North, Nations in Conflict: National Growth and International
Violence, (W .H . Freeman and Company, 1975).
55
Choucri and North did not in any way attempt to exclude other factors, such as the
international environment, from their analysis. Clearly, however, their focus is upon the
relationship between society and war. T h eir conception of society, however, must be
called into question. Although they drew valuable attention to levels of population and
technological development, and while they certainly view society as a dynamic entity, they
tend to wholly ignore basic cleavages within society, cleavages which could dramatically
affect the tendency of a nation to develop and secure external interests. They view
society, in other words, as a holistic or monolithic entity. In an important manner, by
failing to consider the fundamental class and communal struggles within society, their
entire analysis can be called into question. Basic inter-class and intra-class struggles, for
example, can have a dramatic effect upon the long-term course of a countrys foreign
policy regardless o f growth levels and availability o f resources, as Fred Blocks The Origins
of International Economic Disorder persuasively contends.4' In contrast to the emphasis
of Choucri and North, the analysis o f society in this study draws explicit attention to the
fundamental class and communal dynamics within society, and then explores the manner in
which these basic dynamics reverberate throughout society to engender interstate conflict
and war.
Raymond A rons study into the relationship between industrial society and war
provides a final point o f comparison to the current study. T h e very notion o f industrial
society hints at some of the fundamental features of modern society, especially the
41 Fred L. Block, The Origins o f International Economic Disorder: A Study o f United States
International Monetary Policy from World W ar II to the Present, (University o f California Press,
1977).
56
importance o f class divisions in capitalist industrial societies. Aron was moved to consider
the thesis that industrial society was either more bellicose or peaceful than pre-industrial
society.42 His point o f departure was Auguste Comtes claim that industrial society would
be more peaceful primarily because of the industrial spirit that industrialism engendered.
Aron concluded, however, that industrial society fosters contradictory tendencies. On the
one hand, for example, he noted that industrial society had bred two fundamentally
contending ideologies poised on the brink o f warfare. On the other hand, however, he
observed that industrial society had not created any technical stagnation but had rather
brought about the possibility of total destruction and therewith a likely reduction in the
risk o f war. A rons analysis richly illustrates many o f the underlying contentions o f the
international relations field, as in his leitmotif that "no economic system by itself excludes
the risk o f war, because none ends the state o f nature which reigns among rival sovereign
states."43
In terms o f comparison with the focus o f this study, however, what is of concern is
A ro n s conceptualization o f industrial society. Industrial society for A ro n denotes the
growth of factories and wider employment o f machinery, urban concentrated production,
increasing use of science and technology and an ever-increasing productive capacity. What
Aron docs not explicitly consider, however, are the different modes o f social organization
that can accompany industrial society, especially capitalist industrial society. In other
words, Aron does not consider industrial society in terms o f its socio-economic cleavages
4i Raymond Aron, War and Industrial Society, (Oxford University Press, 1958).
43 Ibid., p. 28.
57
and the political struggles that these divisions engender. While he recognizes that there
are two types of industrial societies - the Marxists and the West - he is inclined to
downplay their differences, especially with respect to war." This becomes most evident
in A ro n s discussion of industrial societies as holistic entities or nations.1' The explicit
concern o f this study, however, draws attention to the political struggles in society
expressed in terms o f rudimentary class and communal divisions. While the nature of the
productive activity - industrial, agrarian and so on - is certainly important, it is the social
divisions directly related to production that should be of o f crucial consideration.
This brief survey allows us to see two tendencies in the analysis of society that
recur in the study o f interstate conflict and war. First, there is a tendency to adopt a
static conception o f society, as in the idea o f modern versus feudal or industrial verses
agrarian, and thereby to fail to consider important internal class and communal dynamics
w ithin society. Secondly, when a dynamic view o f society is adopted, as in the w ork of
Choucri and North, the tendency to view society in a holistic or monolithic manner
remains. Society all too often appears as a lumpen-mass that simply runs out of space or
resources. In both cases, the dynamic relations within society, such as those centred
around class or race or gender, remain analytically undeveloped. The emphasis in this
study is precisely upon these dynamic social relations, especially class struggles, that are
characteristically overlooked in second image argumentation.
44 Ibid., pp. 46-7.

45 Ibid., for example see pp. 37, 56.
58
Consideration o f Third Image Argumentation:
T h e emphasis o f this study can be further clarified by briefly considering an

example o f third image argumentation. A n excellent example o f this type o f reasoning
may be found in Stephen Krasners recent contribution to the field entitled Structural
Conflict.
Krasner contcnds that the distribution of capabilities among actors in the
international system is directly responsible for the attempts by Third W orld states to
transform liberal international economic regimes into more authoritative economic
regimes: "The countries o f the South are not purveyors o f some new and superior
morality, nor arc their policies any less reasonable than those o f the industrialized world.
They are behaving the way states have always behaved; they are trying to maximize their
power - their ability to control their own destinies."46 T h e particular strategy adopted by
states in the Third W orld to enhance their power, according to Krasner, also w ill be
affected by the structural distributions o f power in the international system as well as by
different domestic attributes including ideology. Nonetheless, states are motivated by their
place in the overall configurations o f power at the global level. Third W orld states want
to move away from liberal economic regimes because o f their lower power rank in the
world. Krasner directly attacks second image accounts o f state behaviour, moreover, as
reductionist.
This study embodies all that is contrary to Krasners thesis, and indirectly all third
4< Stephen D. Krasner, Stmctural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism,
(University of O ilifornia Press, 1985), p. 12.
59
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
image explanations of interstate conflict and war. The argument employed in this study
contends that the heightened class and communal conflicts within Third W orld states have
engendered the struggle over the nature o f international economic regimes. The
distribution o f power at best conditions the outcome of this struggle. Expressed
differently, states that are not riddled with extreme internal class and communal struggles,
conflicts which make them extremely vulnerable to market fluctuations in the world
economy, could just as easily live with liberal international economic regimes. There is no
primitive effort being made to enhance their power; these states simply want greater
degrees of control in order to insulate themselves from internal vulnerability.
Considerations o f power cannot be viewed as motivating factors in the calculus o f Third
W orld states. In fact, there is something circular and self-reinforcing in third image
argumentation to the extent that it means that forms of behaviour have their natural,
ready made explanation in the form of power considerations. Conflict and war, we must
believe, simply stems from attempts to enhance state power, an imperative itself impelled
by the self-help international system. Eventually, all state actions are interpreted in terms
amenable to Morgcnthaus aphorism "interest defined as power". Other potential
explanations of behaviour automatically play an ancillary role at best, that is, they merely
enhance power.
The thesis o f this study stands in blunt contrast to any assignation o f causal
primacy in international conflict and war to the relations between states. In fact, wc
contend that any study which assigns undue importance to the third image loses the
original insight of W altzs pathbreaking study. W altzs concern was to chastise those
prescriptions for peace which failed to consider the effects of the international
60
environment. W altz makes an explicit distinction between what he calls the "efficient"
causes of war (especially those associated with the second image) and the "permissive"
cause (third image) o f war. For Waltz, relations between states only really allow war to
unfold; the third image does not impel states to war: "The third image describes the
framework of world politics, but without the first and second images there can be no
knowledge of th e forces that determine policy.*17 It is important to understand that
W altzs critique was aimed at partial or incomplete analysis:
... the structure of the state system does not directly cause state A to attack
state B. Whether or not that attack occurs will depend on a number of
special circumstances - location, size, power, interest, type of government, past
history and tradition - each o f which will influence the actions of both states.
If they fight against each other it will be for reasons especially defined for the
occasion by each of them. These special reasons become the immediate, or
efficient, causes of war. These immediate causes o f war are contained in the
first and second images."48
His aim was to avoid dangerous prescriptions for peace which failed to consider the third
image dynamic. The relationship between states was not an imperative o f war, it was not
an independent deterministic force in any sense. Rather, W altz viewed the third image as
the permissive causes o f war, as a sort of catalyzing condition o r situation. The
explanatory power of the third image by itself is nominal. Rather, we must direct attention
to those forces which develop within states, not between them.
W altzs pathbreaking study must be viewed as a work that demanded that the
17 Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State and IVar, p. 238.

4S Ibid., p. 232.
61
nature of states and societies be thoroughly addressed in accounting foi war. This insight
I
represents a crucial point o f departure for the current study. O f course, the particular
K?
conception of society that one employs is entirely open. T h e conceptualisation of society
I'
in this study calls attention to basic class struggles and communal struggles. These
t
e
l
ft
rudimentary elements o f society, we hold, profoundly contour interstate conflict and war.
The Conflict Management/Resolution Literature:
The conflict management/resolution literature cannot be cast cleanly astride the

causes of war of literature. Much of the work, could be viewed as dealing with the causes
o f w ar in the sense that it addresses the move to violence and military combat. Broadly
speaking, this li.erature seeks to channel violent conflict along more acceptable paths. It
is valuable to quote Chris M itchells clarification of the basic problematic o f this diffuse
and wide-ranging body of literature:
Many scholars would argue that one tried and tested way o f preventing
conflict is through the deterrent threat, or demonstrative use, of military
force, so that all of the vast literature on deterrence theory ... is relevant to
conflict management. Similarly, a case could be made that much of (he work
on arms control or disarmament should, of right, form a part of any review o f
conflict management techniques. However, in the one case, deterrence
strategy is merely a way o f suppressing a conflict while disarmament attempts
to remove the most dangerous tools for prosecuting an existing dispute. In
both cases, the conflict is still there in the form of mutually incompatible goals
and (probably) hostile and fearful emotion. M erc suppression o r modification
of conflict behaviour can hardly be counted as true management... On the
other hand, it docs seem legitimate to consider that efforts to create
structures, rules and processes to avoid or channel conllict into acceptable (or
less damaging) ways of arriving at a solution do form part o f the general field
62
of conflict management.49
As M itchell writes, this body o f work is united by the fact that it seeks to avoid having
conflict evolve violently. As another commentator reaffirms: "W hether a conflict relation
ship is expressed through acts o f violence and hostility, or whether it produces a more
fruitful form of interaction depends, inter alia, on the way it is managed.59
A brief identification o f the various streams o f this wide-ranging body of literature
is helpful. One large pool of research periodizes conflict into a number of different time
frames or stages. There is, for example, a vast literature on crisis management which is
broadly concerned with preventing crises from occurring or with finessing national actors
peacefully through extremely difficult periods o f tension or hostility.51 In the words of
one prominent researcher, a shared assumption o f crisis research is that it can "facilitate
the avoidance o f crises o r their effective management so as to minimize the adverse effect
on world order".5' There is also the problem of preventing and controlling conflicts from
w C. R. Mitchell, "Conflict, War and Conflict Management," International Relations: A

Handbook o f Current Theory, cds. Margot Light and A.J.R. Groom (Frances Pinter, 1985), p. 128129.
50 Jacob Bercovitch, "Third Parties in Conflict Management: The Structure and Conditions
of Effective Mediation in International Relations," International Journal 40 (Autumn 1985), 736.
51 On the former theme of crisis prevention see Alexander L. George, Managing U.S.-Soviet
Rivalry: Problems o f Crisis Prevention, (Westview Press, 1983).
On the theory o f crisis
management see Michael Brecher, "International Crises and Protracted Conflicts," International
Interactions 11:3 (1984); Daniel Frei, ed. Managing International Crises, (Sage Publications, 1982);
Ole R. Holsti, "Historians, Social Scientists and Crisis Management: An Alternative View,"
Journal o f Conflict Resolution 24:4 (December 1980).
5*' Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkcnfcld, "Crises in World Politics," World Politics (1983),
p. 382.
63
escalating into violent or more violent phases.53

A nother body o f the conflict management/ resolution literature is concerned with
developing specific conflict management technologies to help foster peaceful conflict
processes. First, there is a large body o f literature which examines those processes especially bargaining and negotiation - aimed at terminating or resolving conflict.5' As
w ith the wider body of literature on conflict management, the bargaining and negotiating
literature is concerned with channelling conflict along more productive paths o f
communication and trust-building in order to avoid violent conflict. Secondly, an
interesting twist on the negotiation and bargaining literature, one that is cast as being
diametrically opposed to traditional bargaining procedures, is the problem solving
workshop. An additional body of literature has been erected around the vast array o f
social, political and military instruments available to manage and resolve conflicts,
especially at the sites where violent exchange is most likely to occur. These are
informational, coordinativc, consultative, mcdiative, or circumscriptive arrangements
between two or more slates in the socioeconomic, political or military spheres. One
|
1
55 For the still classic treatment of this problem see Richard Smoke, War: Controlling
Escalation, (Harvard University Press, 1977).
|
t
g
54 The literature on bargaining and negotiation is endless. For a few samples of this
literature sec Samuel B. Bacharach and Edward J., Lawler, Bargaining. Power, Tactics and
Outcomes, (San Francisco: Josscy-Bass, 1981); S.D. Bailey, How Wars End, 2 volumes, (Oxford
University Press, 1982); Jacob Bcrcovitch, "An Analysis of Negotiation as a Successful Approach
to International Conflict Management. Egyptian-Isracli Negotiations at G im p David, Crossroads
17 (1985), 83-106; J.S. Murray, "Understanding Competing Theories of Negotiation," Negotiation
Journal 2:2 (1986); Paul R. Pillar, Negotiating Peace. War Tennination as a Bargaining Process,
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983), Howard Raiffa, The Art and Science o f
Negotiation, (New York: Academic Press, 1982); Thomas C. Schelling, "An Essay on Bargaining,"
The American Economic Review 46:3 (June 1956).
\
?
|
*
^
\
64
prominent instrument in this respect concerns peacekeeping f o r c e s Another

considerable body of literature has been erected around confidence and security building
measures.SA Considerable attention also has been given to the activities and roles o f
conflict managers including international organizations and other third parties, regional
powers, middlc-powers and superpowers.
Importantly, the conflict management/resolution literature generally has failed to
contemplate interstate conflict and war from the perspective of societal dynamics
emphasized in this study. This tendency can be highlighted by focusing upon the precise
sense of intellectual and practical tasks associated with the conflict management/resolution
research. As with the study of war in general, the conflict management/resolution
55 Charles C. Moskos Jr., Peace Soldiers: The Sociology o f United Nations Military Force,
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976); Indar Jit Rikhyc, The Theory and Practice o f
Peacekeeping, (London: C. Hurst and Company, 1984); Asbjorn Eide, "Peace-Keeping and
Enforcement by Regional Organizations," Journal o f Peace Research 3 (1966).
For an exhaustive list o f the various aspect of conflict management instruments see Walter
lsard and Christine Smith, Conflict Analysis and Practical Conflict Management Procedures,
(Ballinger, 1983). For a survey of confidence building measures see Karl N. Lewis and Mark
Lorell, "Confidence-Building Measures and Crisis Resolution: Historical Perspectives," Orbis 28:2
(Summer 1984). For some interesting discussions of confidence-building measures see Josef
Binter, "Approaches to Security and Confidence-Building: Concepts of Peace Research," Peace
and the Sciences 1 (1987), 42-49; Peter Stania, "Some Points of Departure for ConfidenceBuilding," Peace and the Sciences 2 (1987), 30-35.
This body of literature is very wide-ranging. For example, see: Oran Young, The
Intermediaries. Third Parties in International Crises, (Princeton University Press, 1967); Ernest B.
Haas, Conflict Management by International Organizations, (General Learning Press, 1972); Chris
Mitchell, Peacemaking and the Consultants Role, (Farnborough, Hants and Gower, 1981); Raimo
Vayryncn, "Is There a Role for the United Nations in Conflict Resolution?", Journal o f Peace
Research 22:3 (1985); Michael Harbottlc, "The Strategy of Third Party Intervention in Conflict
Resolution," International Journal 35:1 (Winter 1979-80); Jacob Bercovitch, Social Conflict and
Third Parties: Strategies of Conflict Resolution, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984); Robert
Lyle Butterworth, "Do Conflict Managers Matter? An Empirical Assessment o f Interstate Security
Disputes and Resolution Efforts, 1945-1974," International Studies Quarterly 22:2 (June 1978).
65
research shares a disdain for violent conflict. The avoidance o f violence bias lies at the
heart o f the literature. A typical view of violent conflict is evident in one o f the earlier
works on conflict management:
... violence persists as a chronic disease of society; the procedures that might
resolve the conflicts are too weak to prevent violence taking over, and
violence in itself prevents the conflicts from being resolved and indeed
perpetuates them... Violence in itself, because it cannot perform the
reconciling and compromising function, leads to the suppression rather than
the resolution of conflict: it drives conflict underground but does little to
eliminate it.58
Kenneth Bouldings remonstrations summarize the research on conflict management well.

The task, as M itchells above cited quote reveals, lies in channeling conflict through less
destructive or damaging paths. This characteristic sense of task rests upon a particular
view o f conflict, one that has established a dominant position in the conflict
management/resolution research throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Initially, the view o f
conflict appeared to emphasize its natural tendency to evolve into violent, unwieldy and
destructive forms. This view o f conflict was clearly articulated by Johan Galtungs in his
Institutionalized Conflict Management. In this work, the challenge was for international
affairs to replicate the move from duels to litigation at the interpersonal level, that is, to
find a susbstitute for war. Conflict has a natural tendency to evolve violently:
Two of the most celebrated propositions about conflict can now be made use
58 Kenneth Boulding, Conflict and Defense: A General Theory, (New York. I larper and Row,
1963), pp. 323-324.
66
of: conflict behaviour tends to become destructive behaviour ... and

destructive behaviour tends to be self-reinforcing. There are several
mechanisms at work here: destructive beha.jnur may induce destructive
behaviour in others, which in turn reinforces destructive behaviour in oneself;
or it may induce servility, complacency, conformity in others, this in turn
serving as a reinforcement. The consequence of this is trite, but should
nevertheless be spelled out: conflict is dangerous because it may in its
consequences lead to a Hobbcsian state of affairs where everybody uses all
possible means o f destruction against everybody else... Conflicts have a
tendency to snowball both in space and time: they bring in more people and
they broaden in scope as time goes on, which means that much energy is
poured into the conflict over time until the point where the resources of the
system become gradually exhausted.59
Given this, Galtung expressed clear preference for those processes which could lead
toward "some kind o f resolution."
By the 1970s, however, a more benign view of conflict came to prevail. Perhaps
the clearest articulation of this view o f conflict may be found in John Burtons frequently
quoted observations regarding human conflict:
"Conflict... is an essential creative element
in human relationships. It is the means to change, the means by which our social values
of welfare, security, justice and opportunities for personal development can be achieved.
If suppresscd...society becomes static...[Conflict is] neither to be deprecated nor feared."
Conflict is viewed as a natural part o f social life, inescapable and unavoidable, but not
necessarily damaging o r destructive. Hence, there is not a rejection o f conflict p e r se but
rather a strong feeling that conflict must be kept in line, prevented from taking its
potentially violent turn.
59 Johan Galtung, "Institutionalized Conflict Resolution: A Theoretical Paradigm," Journal

of Peace Research 2:4 (1965), 348-%.
" J. W . Burton, IVorld Society, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), pp. 137-138,
my emphasis.
67
This view that conflict can follow violent and non-violent paths receives its most
poignant confirmation in the writings Morton Deutsche. Deutsche explicitly constructs an
intimate relationship between violent conflict, additional negative elements o f conflict such
as rigidity and closure, and a destructive process of conflict management:
$,
Destructive conflict is characterized by a tendency to expand and escalate...

Expansion occurs along the various dimensions of conflict: the size and
number of the immediate issues involved; the number o f motives and
participants implicated on each side o f the issue; the size and number of the
principles and precedents that arc perceived to be at stake; the costs that the
participants arc willing to bear in relation to the conflict; the number of
norms o f moral conduct from which behaviour toward the other side is
exempted, and the intensity of negative attitudes toward the other side.
A n d with still clearer links to violence he adds:
Paralleling the expansion of the scope of conflict, there is an increasing

reliance upon a strategy of power and upon the tactics o f threat, coercion, and
deception. Correspondingly, there is a shift away from a strategy of
persuasion and from the tactics of conciliation, minimization o f differences,
and enhancement o f mutual understanding and goodwill.'1
A t the heart o f destructive conflict is the competitive conflict resolution process, a process
which engenders impoverished communication between the parties, stimulates the view
that a solution can be imposed, and enhances suspicion and hostility. Through
Deutsches work we are told that violent conflict also will be impoverished conflict, just as
sure as it will be coercive, deceptive, threatening and altogether purged o f any meaningful
61 Morton Deutsche, The Resolution o f Conflict. Conslmclive and Dcstmcthe Processes, (Yale
University Press, 1973), pp. 351-352.
68
moral content.
Deutsche mirrors destructive conflict with constructive conflict, which he basically
equates with "creative thinking". A t the heart o f constructive conflict lies a cooperative
conflict resolution process which fosters:
... open and honest communication of relevant information between the

participants. The freedom to share information enables the parties to go
beneath the manifest to the underlying issues involved in the conflict and,
thereby, to facilitate the meaningful and accurate definition o f the problems
they are confronting together.... It encourages the recognition of the
legitimacy of the others interests and of the necessity to search for a solution
that is responsive to the needs of each side.... It leads to a trusting, friendly
attitude, which increases sensitivity to similarities and common interests, while
minimizing the salience of differences.62
W ith these ideal conflict types thus defined it becomes clear that "the point is not how to
eliminate or prevent conflict but rather how to make it productive".63 "In a cooperative
context," Deutsche emphasizes, "a conflict can be viewed as a common problem in which
the conflict parties have the joint interest in reaching a mutually satisfactory solution."
It is this intellectual conceptualization and problematization of conflict that
informs the conflict management research agenda. Tw o clear potential conflict paths exist,
or, as in the ease of Deutsche and others, two ideal constructions o f conflict have been
erected. Conflict will follow one o f two possible trajectories. Conflict w ill be either
62 Ibid., p. 363.
63 Ibid., p. 17. Deutsche also inquires into those factors which seem likely to induce or
promote cooperative conflict resolution processes over competitive ones. See "Conflict
Resolution: Theory and Practice," Political Psychology 4:3 (1983).
destructive and violent or comparatively constructive and peaceful.M Understandably, the

sense o f task engendered by this problematization o f conflict is essentially manipulative in
nature. T h e challenge becomes one o f fashioning social dissonance along less harmful, or
even creative, channels. Conflict management research does not try to purge humanity of
a natural phenomenon. The task o f the conflict management literature is one o f
producing conflict management technologies, whether in the form o f a problem solving
workshop, a peacekeeping force, a prior-notification procedure and so forth, for the
purposes o f manipulating and finessing the conflict along more productive channels or
avenues. T h e locus o f the manipulative exercise tends to be actor specific; that is, it tends
to concern itself with the creation o f conflict management technologies that will enhance
communication and reinforce peaceful communicative channels, increase information,
revise actoral beliefs and values, clarify and affirm issues at stake, increase actoral
confidence and raise levels o f security and so on, all with a view to avoiding the eruption
of violence.
It is in this way, perhaps, more than any other, that the literature on conflict
management can be consistently distinguished from the more traditional causes o f war
64 This conceptualization o f conflict consistently appears in the literature. Note, for example,
the tenor o f the following remark by Jacob Bcrcovitch:
This broad and as yet vaguely perceived trend [that is, the perception that the
Arab-Israeli conflict will not be resolved by the use of force] can be given further
impetus if all those concerned are both able and willing to translate their beliefs
into concrete actions and adopt an new approach to their conflict, an approach
that emphasized confidence, trust, and negotiation rather than hostility, distrust
and violence.
See, "Negotiation in International Conflict Management," Crossroads 17 (1985), p. 84.
70
literature. Moreover, this increasingly prevailing view o f conflict and the sense o f task
that it engenders is undoubtably partially responsible for the confusion, if not outright
conceptual interchangeability, o f conflict management and conflict resolution. For our
purposes, however, we note that the conceptualization o f conflict tends to be actor
specific; that is, as a relationship between actors that can either follow destructive and
violent or constructive and non-violent paths. The prevailing conceptualization and
problematization o f conflict does not invite its contemplation in terms of rudimentary
social dynamics, especially the social relations of class. Conflict is not, for example,
conceptualized in terms o f contending social forces. W hen broader features of the social
canvas are considered, as in the case o f an ethnic cleavage, the conflict parties are
abstracted from this backdrop, cut loose from any constraining or conditioning elements,
and the locus upon actoral beliefs and behaviours is barely interrupted. T h e effort lies
solely in manipulating the conflict parties by manipulating their values, perceptions and
behaviours. In the end, the manner in which conflict is conceptualized and problematized
means that the conflict management literature generally has failed to consider the course
and prosecution o f interstate conflict and war in terms o f basic societal relations and
dynamics.
Developing a Society-Centred Approach to International Conflict and War:
This exercise has served two important purposes. First, in situational or locational
terms, it allows us to begin to clarify what is and what is not entailed by the approach to
international conflict and war informing this study. Secondly, it helps to demonstrate that
71
an approach to international conflict and war that calls attention to the importance o f
class and communal dynamics within society is dearly lacking within the international
relations scholarship. In past research there have been some hints at the importance o f
societal dynamics and the outbreak o f war, but these were not accompanied by sustained
theoretical refinement.
Karl Polanyis argument concerning haute finance and W orld
W a r I focused implicitly upon class fractions and the development o f war.*'' Polanyis
basic thesis is reminiscent of K an ts observations that "the spirit of commerce cannot
coexist with war, and which sooner or later takes hold o f every nation.'* In his efforts to
explain the 19th centurys hundred years o f peace (1815-1914) Polanyi draws attention to
the emergence o f "an acute peace interest". He identifies the bearers o f the new peace
interest as "those who chietly benefit by it" and stresses that haute finance became the new
social instrumentality which would ensure peace. "They \fwute finance] w ere anything but
pacifists; they had made their fortune in the tlnancing o f wars, they were impervious to
m oral considerations; they had no objection to any number o f minor, short, or localized
wars. But their business would be impaired if a general war between the Great Powers
should interfere with th e monetary foundations o f the system."'7 In tin even clearer
manner Polanyi notes that:
65 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: the Political and Economic Origins o f Our Time,
(Beacon, 1957).
66 Immanuel Kant, "Eternal Peace," in The Philosophy of Kant: Immanuel Kant \s Mora! and
Political Writings, ed. G ir l J. Friedrich (The Modern Library, 1977), p. 455.
67 Ibid., p. 10-11.
72
We have become too much accustomed to think of the spread o f capitalism as

a process which is anything but peaceful, and of finance capital as the chief
instigator o f innumerable colonial crimes and expansionist aggressions. Its
intimate affiliation with heavy industries made Lenin assert that finance capital
was responsible for imperialism, notably for the struggle for spheres of
influence, concessions, extraterritorial rights, and the innumerable form in
which the Western Powers got a stranglehold on backward regions, in order to
invest in railways, public utilities, ports, and other permanent establishments
on which their heavy industries made profits. Actually, business and finance
were responsible for many colonial wars, but also for the fact that a general
conflagration was avoided... Every war, almost, was organized by financiers;
but peace also was organized by them.*8
Polanyis analysis is complex, especially in his account of the relationship between balance
o f power politics and economic interests. F o r our purposes, however, his analysis is
extremely suggestive to the extent that it suggests some class fractions among the capitalist
class may have a fa r greater interest in averting some wars and promoting others. While
the analysis in this respect is underdeveloped, especially to the extent that it lacks a clear
class dialectic, it represents a refreshing departure from most accounts of interstate
conflict and war.
The relationship between capitalist classes and war is given systematic treatment in
the Marxist literature on imperialism.*9 This debate receives its clearest articulation in
the contending views of Lenin and Kautsky.70 For Lenin, the necessity of exporting
capital due to the "ovcr-ripeness" of capitalism unfolds in the context o f national states.
Each capitalist class is tied to the local state. Thus, conflicts among the capitalist class
68 Ibid, pp. 15-16.

m For an excellent survey see Anthony Brewer, Marxist Theories o f Imperialism, (Routledge
and Kcgan Paul, 1980), especially chapter 5.
70 Ibid, see pp. 122-126.
73
could manifest itself in interstate conflict and war. Lenin placed particular stress on the
generation o f inter-capitalist rivalry, a rivalry which drew attention to his popular
conclusion that inter-capitalist struggle in the era o f imperialism has a tendency to lead to
war. Kautskys thesis, o n the other hand, secs increasing pacifism among the advance
industrialized countries in the era of imperialism. This tendency would be generated by
the increasing cohesiveness o f the capitalist classes in the face of opposition from the
oppressed peoples of the colonial world and the working classes back home. Both works
draw attention to the relationship between class struggles on the one hand and
international conflict and war on the other, and represent a significant contribution to
society-centred theories o f international conflict and war.
An excellent example o f a w ork which reflects upon the social origins o f war may
by found in Perry Andersons Lineages of the Absolutist State.
In this work Anderson
explores the social basis of the relationship between the mercantilist outlook o f the early
modern era and its war prone character.71 Anderson draws attentions to the permanency
o f w ar during the Absolutist period.
In this period we see international relations
analogically reflecting Hobbes state o f nature. The incidence of war was directly related
to prevailing views of mercantilism which were in turn linked to the world view of the
feudal ruling class:
The classical bourgeois doctrines of laissez-faire, with their rigorous formal

separation of the political and economic systems, were to be its [mercantilism]
antipode. Mercantilism was precisely a theory of the coherent intervention of
11 Perry Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State, (Verso, 1979), chapter 1, especially pp.
31-37.
74
the political Stale into the working of the economy, in the joint interests of
the prosperity o f the one and the power of the other. Logically, whereas
laissez-faire was consistently pacifist, urging the benefits o f peace among
nations to increase mutually profitable international trade, mercantilist theory
... was heavily bellicist, emphasizing the necessity and profitability of
warfare.72
Anderson draws attention to the "predatory mercantilism" of the age, with the treatment
of land as "a physical object to be taken and enjoyed by military force as the natural mode
o f appropriation, and possessed permanently thereafter."72 The morphology o f the
Absolutist states, moreover, contained atavisms of the feudal structures that were entirely
geared to war. In the feudal age, he argues that war presented itself as a rational and
rapid method to expand surplus extraction for any given ruling class under feudalism. War
was not the choice of sport o f princes but rather their fa te :"... beyond the finite diversity
o f individual inclinations and characters, it beckoned them inexorably as a social necessity
o f their estate." Importantly, Anderson draws attention to the relationship between
prevailing conceptions o f the world, the class struggles underlying them and state
behaviour. His work hints at the possibility o f a "Marxist theory o f the variant social
functions o f war in different modes of production."
In the work o f Arno Mayer we find explicit calls for a revamped analytical
framework for war. T h e starting point for Mayers analysis is the rejection o f those
approaches to war which focus solely on the individual (W altzs first image) or the
international system (W altzs third image). In developing an alternative approach Mayer
72 Ibid., p. 36.
72 Ibid., p. 37.
argues for an approach which situates decision makers immediately in the context of
society:
T o be sure, even or particularly under tumultuous political conditions decision

makers and their advisers - including civil and military experts - feign to stand
above o r beyond partisanship. They mean to sanctify this nonpartisan posture
with spurious incantations about their selfless devotion to an objective
national interest which instantly demand the subordination o f domestic politics
to foreign policy. In reality, .,owcver, these decision makers and their advisers
continue to be political actors with very tangible social, economic, political,
and ideological attachments, if not interests. With rare exceptions theses
attachments are not dissolved or deactivated by the alleged requirements of
the primacy o f foreign policy.7'
M ayer importunes researchers on war to "take account o f the full range o f interrelated
political, social, economic, and ideological factors and conflict that condition the making,
conduct, and implementation of foreign policy.'' In the end, M ayers most fundamental
point of departure is the observation that war is clearly a continuation o f domestic politics,
especially during periods o f internal and external instability.7' M ayers w ork constitutes
the clearest call for research on international conflict and war from the perspective o f the
array of political, economic and social dynamics within society.
71 Ibid., p. 293.
75 Ibid., p. 298.
76 Ibid., p. 303.
Conclusion:
Despite these exceptions the study o f interstate conflict and war has received little
systematic analysis from the perspective of rudimentary societal dynamics. There arc at
least two main reasons for this theoretical lethargy within the international relations field.
Perhaps the main reason is that international relations analysis has been dominated by the
American tradition which has assigned a very specific meaning to the state, a meaning
which has for the most part precluded any inquiry into societal dynamics.77 Calls within
the discipline are increasingly being made to reconceptualizc the state.78 T h e assertion
that we must examine those elements within states, however, means going considerably
beyond those analyses o f state institutions in the manner suggested by Graham Allisons
classic study. One pivotal theme in these writings concerns explicitly the need to address
the complex issue o f civil society. A t least one prominent theoretician in this regard has
raised the possibility o f considering the "state/society complex as the basic unit o f
international relations" in order to amplify its social dimensions.77 A second reason, and
one which is partly related to the first, lies in the fact that the field o f international
77 As Robert Cox argues, this is a general feature of international relations theory. See
Robert W. Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations
Theory," in Neo-Realism and its Critics, ed. Robert O. Kcohane (Columbia University Press,
1986).
78 Sec R.B.J. Walker, "The Territorial State and the Theme o f G u lliv e r International Journal
39 (Summer 1984); Fred Halliday, "State and Society in International Relations: A Second
Agenda," Millenium 16:2 (Summer 1987).
7g See Robert W . Cox, "Social Forces, Stales and World Orders: Beyond International
Relations Theory," op.cit., p. 205.
77
relations has not engaged historical materialist methodology in any sustained manner.*
W hile the recent paradigmatic debates within the field are suggestive, the manner in which
historical materialist methodology is being appropriated is still far from clear.s' Those
studies falling under the rubric o f a Marxist international political economy,
11101 cover,
tend not to be directly concerned with international conflict and war as distinct points of
inquiry.82
Recently, there has been some growing awareness o f the need to examine
international conflict and war from the perspective of state and society. The two
suggestive contributions in this respect are The Sociology of War and Peace along with
War, Slate and Society.*' Although this research, along with the debates that it engages,
draws attention to broader considerations of society that have been ignored or downplayed
in most research upon war, it exhibits a tendency to autonomi/.e warfare, especially to the
extent that it borrows heavily upon third image and geopolitical considerations.41 Michael
M an n s warfare and capitalism explicitly derives militarism from the "geopolitical aspects
80 See discussion in Vendulka Kubalkova and Albert Cruickshank, Marxism and International
Relations, (Oxford University Press, 1989), especially the introduction.
81 See, for example Michael Banks, "The Inter-Paradigm Debate," in International Relations.
A Handbook o f Current Theory, cds. Margot Light and A.J.R. Groom (Frances Pinter, 1985).
82 See, for example Robert W . Cox, Production, Power, and World Older: Social Forces in the
Making o f History, (Columbia University Press, 1987).
83 See Martin Shaw, ed. War, State and Society, (Macmillan Press, 1984); Colin Creighton
and M artin Shaw, eds. The Sociology o f War and Peace, (British Sociological Association, 1987).
84 A t one point Raymond Arons third imagistic view is approvingly reclaimed. See John
Hall, "Raymond Arons Sociology of States, or the Non-Relative Autonomy of Inter-state
Behaviour," in War, State and Society, op. cit..
78
of our social structure which are fa r older than capitalism."*' Similarly, M ary Kaldor has
written that "capitalism needs the state, needs non-cconomic forms of coercion, and, as
long as states are divided by geography, needs warfare."*' In other words, the logic o f
statehood creates the imperatives o f war in a manner eommensurate with W altzs third
image. Even E.P. Thompsons celebrated Notes on Extemiinism attacks the deterministic
logic of orthodox Marxist imperialist arguments and replaces it with an analysis drawing
attention to independent militarization logics and reciprocal effects upon society: "If the
hand-mill gives you society w ith the feudal lord; the steam-mill, society with the industrial
capitalist, what are we given by those Satanic mills which are now at work, grinding out
the means of human extermination?"87
Demonstrating that there is a strong need to explore the relationship between
societal dynamics and international conflict and war has the effect o f backing us up into a
serious corner o f scholarly contention, namely, the appropriate conceptualization of
society. Tn elaborating its analytical framework this study primarily draws on the fecund
debate on the state and society of I he last two decades. Society is primarily
conceptualized in terms of its dynamic class and communal struggles. In terms o f the
standard divide between Marxist and Liberal conceptions of society it falls down much
more upon the historical materialist view.
It accepts, moreover, that the fundamental
85 Michael Mann, "War and Social Theory: Into Battle with Classes, Nations and States," in
The Sociology of War an d Peace, op. cit..
^ Mary Kaldor, "Warfare and Capitalism", in Extemiinism and Cold War, ed. E. P. Thompson,
(Verso, 1982), p. 282.
s7 E. P. Thompson, "Notes on Exterminism, the Last Stage o f Civilization," in ibid..
79
problematic regarding the state concerns its relationship to basic structures within society,
especially class structures, and that this problematic yields a debute which centres around
the degrees o f autonomy of the state. Consequently, an approach that focuses upon
society necessarily examines the state. The state, however, is understood in terms of its
relationship to the configurations o f social forces within society. State institutions are
embedded in an array o f contradictory social forces, state power is seldom aloof from the
disposing and conditioning features o f the social canvas. These analytical premises will be
elaborated in chapter three.
The analysis of stale and society will be complemented by direct discussion o f the
m anner in which social dynamics condition the security concerns' o f the ruling regimes.
This study draws upon recent theoretical debates in the field o f security studies. These
debates have opened the door for an analysis o f security that draws attention to
conceptions o f security among social actors and within society on the one hand and
fundamental features o f society on the other hand. Although they have tended to r.iise
more issues than they resolve, this body of recent scholarly work constitutes a fundamental
break from past security studies, and provides an informative and helpful baseline for
determining the relationship between societal dynamics and international conflict and war.
This analysis o f security problems w ill assist us in understanding how basic and
fundamental struggles within society register within the immediate outlook and perceptions
o f the ruling regimes, and thereby ramify within international relations in the form o f
international conflict and war. This analytical framework will be addressed in chapter
four.
Taken together these fields o f analysis allow us to develop an analytical framework
80
aimed <it fostering a society-centred approach to international conflict and war. By

contemplating interstate conflict and war from the perspective o f the contending and
prevailing social forces within society our comprehension of the origins and course of
interstate conflict and war will be greatly enhanced. This approach involves exploring the
lull implications o f Clausewitzs remark that: "War belongs not to the province o f Arts and
Science hut to the province o f social life".
War is addressed here as a social reality, as a
phenomenon greatly impelled, conditioned and constrained by rudimentary dynamics

within society. T h e issues, the so-called enemy and the apparent options open to social
actors are all matters which rest upon this social scaffolding. A ny approach to interstate
conflict and war which docs not take account of these fundamental dynamics unnecessarily
reifies international conflict and war, making it into an independent thing as if it were
Iree from the influence o f these elementary social dynamics.
This is not to deny that interstate conflict and war can have a certain logic of their
own, especially logics affected and contoured by technological development. It is simply to
suggest that a complete account of war, and one that has been terribly lacking within
international relations, must be careful not to overdraw the autonomous nature o f war by
failing to address its social foundations. In the end we arrive at our basic archimedean
thesis: interstate conflict and war is a political mat. '.feslation o f extended social snuggles
endemic to a ll societies. Through this society-centred approach, moreover, we will be in a
much stronger position to assess the relationship between international conflict and war
on the one hand and oppressive social relations within society on the other. In explicitly
drawing attention to the relationship between social struggles and war our efforts are
commensurate with the expressed purpose of our undertaking: the study o f international
81
conflict and war for the sake of mitigating oppressive relations within society.
82
Chapter Three
Analyzing Societies and States in the T h ird W orld
Introduction:
T h e first challenge o f this study is to establish a conceptual framework for

analyzing societies in the Third World. The goal o f this chapter is to establish a clear set
o f analytical premises that will assist us in developing a society-centred account of
interstate conflict and war. The need to be explicit about this enterprise stems in part
from the increasing criticisms that have been levelled at the concept o f the state. As the
discussions of R.B. J. W alker, Fred Halliday and others remind us, the spatial or totality
view of th e state has tended to predominate international relations scholarship.' W hen
more refined conceptualizations of the state appear, they underscore the disagreement
that exists with respect to the analysis o f society.2
This chapter reaffirms the importance o f a conception o f society that draws
attention to its inherently conflictual nature, that is, it views society as a constellation of
oppressive conditions that foster contending social forces, especially as society is subjected
to the engulfing or totalizing or systemic tendencies o f capitalism. This
1 R.B.J. Walker, "The Territorial Stf.te and the Theme o f Gulliver," International Journal 39
(Summer 1984); Fred Halliday, "State a* * Society in International Relations: A Second Agenda,"
Millenium: Journal of International Studies 16:2 (Summer 1987).
2 See discussion in Yale H. Ferguson and Richard W. Mansbaeh, The State, Conceptual
Chaos, and the Future of International Relations Theory, (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989),
primarily chapter 4 entitled "The Many Meanings of the State."
conceptualization o f society, therefore, draws attention to the skewed configurations of

social power within society, especially those configurations imbued with class, race and
gender. Social power, as the Gramscian conception of society reminds us, has no
identifiable centre of gravity, but rather is suffused throughout society in its hegemonic
ideological and cultural practices.' Society, in other words, is inherently coercive,
although the complex web o f daily practices forever masks these coercions. Although we
acknowledge that society has plural characteristics, historical materialist premises ate
strongly reaffirmed to the extent that the recognition of these pluralisms "does not deny
the systematic unity of capitalism, which can tell the difference between the constitutive
relations of capitalism and other inequalities and oppressions with different relations to
capitalism, a different place in the systemic logic of capitalism...'"
Paradoxically, our analysis of society brings us to consider directly those accounts
o f the state termed society-centred, that is, accounts that see the state as derived from
and constrained power elements in society. "A theory o f the state," according to this
J Gramscis conception of a war o f position is entirely contingent upon his pai titular
conception of civil society. The following summary from Ellen Meiksins Wood in "The Uses and
Abuses o f Civil Society"," The Socialist Register: 1990, (Merlin Press, 1990), is illuminating:
The object o f this new formulation [Gramsei on civil society] was to acknowledge
both the complexity of political power in the parliamentary or constitutional
slates o f the West, in contrast to more openly coercive autocracies, and the
difficulty of supplanting a system of class domination in which class power has
no clearly visible point of concentration in the state but is diffused throughout
society and its cultural practices. Gramsei thus appropriated the concept o f civil
society to mark out the terrain o f a new kind o f struggle which would take the
battle against capitalism not only to its economic foundations but to its culturtil
and ideological roots in everyday life. (pp. 62-63)
4 1 take this to be the essential conclusion of Ellen Meiksins Woods "The Uses and Abuses
of Civil Society," op. cit., p. 79-80.
84
view, "is also a theory o f society and of the distribution of power in that society."' T h e
two dominant theories o f the state in the post-war period - Marxist and Pluralist correspond to distinctive and largely incompatible theories o f society. It is entirely
appropriate, as a result, to begin with a consideration o f these two views. W e will then
chart two distinct debates concerning the specificity o f the political which ..avc arisen
within Marxist social theory. Brief attention will then be given to the particular nature of
societies and states in the Third World, focusing upon those features that have arisen
largely as a result o f the rapid extension o f capitalist relations o f production throughout
the twentieth century.
The Pluralist Theory o f Slate and Society:
Pluralism corresponds to the view o f society and the state typically held among
citizens in Western liberal democracies. "The state is seen," M artin Carnoy writes:
... as a neutral arena of debate. Elected representatives and appointed

bureaucrats lead but simultaneously reflect public wishes, at least for that
public which is interested in the issues at hand. And although the State
bureaucracy may develop a life of its own, the general public assumes that,
through elections, it has ultimate power over government decisions."6
Pluralist views o f the state rest upon the idea that society generates a number o f interest
5 Ralph Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society, (Basic Books, 1969), p. 2.

6 M artin Carnoy, The State and Political Theory, (Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 10.
85
groups which voice their political demands. The social content of these interest groups
may be defined in terms of fundamental cleavages in society, such as social class or
ethnicity, o r they may also be composed along single issue lines relatively detached from
wider social cleavages. The understanding o f society in terms o f a number o f competing
interest groups vying for political influence helps to define the states role as balancing
these interest group demands.7 The state surfaces as a dispassionate edifice that neutrally
arbitrates among competing pressure group demands:
"Pluralism can be defined as a system of interest representation in which the

constituent units are organized into an unspecified number of multiple,
voluntary, competitive, nonhierarchically ordered and self-determined (as to
type or scope of interest) categories which are not specifically licensed,
recognized, subsidized, created or otherwise controlled in leadership selection
or interest articulation by the state and which do not exercise a monopoly of
representative activity within their respective categories.8
Implicit in the notion that no interest group commands the undivided attention o f the
state is the granting of some degree o f autonomy to the state.
This classical view o f Pluralism has been called to task. The assertion about slate
neutrality and a proportionate diffusion o f power within society have been the focus o f
several revisionist pluralist commentators. Charles Lindbloms Politics and Markets
provides an excellent example of this line o f query. In the face of overwhelming influence
7 See summary in Gregor McLennan, "Capitalist state or democratic polity? Recent

Developments in Marxist and Pluralist Theory," in The Idea o f the Modem State, (Open University
Press, 1984), pp. 82-83.
8 Phillippe Schmitter "Still the Century of Corporatism?" cited in Martin Carnoy, op. cit., p.
37.
86
of business Lindblom asks two important questions: Is polyarchy not very democratic at
all? Arc the polyarchies controlled by business and property?19 Lindblom answers both o f
these questions affirmatively, and identifies his task as explaining the "fundamental
mechanism" through which business acquires this disproportionate influence. Lindblom
basically addresses this issue by redefining business as a parallel sphere of political
officialdom. He speaks of the "duality o f leadership", o f the "second set o f major leaders"
and o f the "intimacy o f connection between businessmen, civil service, and legislators..."
Lindblom essentially removes business from the simple interest group realm. Th e special
status of business is necessary if any market-oriented system is to work properly:
Any government official who understand the requirements of his position and
the responsibilities that market-oriented systems throw on businessmen will
therefore grant them a privileged position. H e does not have to be bribed,
duped, or pressured to do so. Nor does he have to be an uncritical admirer
of businessmen to do so. H e simply understands, as is plain to see, that
public affairs in market-oriented systems are in the hands of two groups of
leaders, government and business, who much collaborate and that to make the
system work government leadership much often defer to business leadership.
Collaboration and deference between the two arc at the heart of politics in
such systems. Businessmen cannot be left knocking at the doors of the
political systems, they must be invited in .10
In speaking o f their unique consultations with government officials Lindblom writes: "In
these consultations, however, corporate executives occupy a privileged position, since they
Charles E. Lindblom, Politics and Markets: The World's Political-Economic Systems, (Basic
Books, 1977), p. 170.
10
Ibid., p. 175.
87
and not the intercst-group leaders are there mainly in their capacity as public officials."
Ultimately, in the tradition which has been called "critical pluralism", Lindblom assesses
the disproportionate power and influence o f business in terms of the requirements o f
democracy:
Enormously large, rich in resources, the big corporations, we have seen,

command more resources than do most government units. They can also,
over a broad range, insist that government meet their demands, even if these
demands run counter to those o f citizens expressed through their polyarchal
controls. Moreover, they do not disqualify themselves from playing the
partisan role of a citizen - for the corporation is legally a person. And they
exercise unusual veto powers. They are on all these counts disproportionately
powerful ... the large private corporation fits oddly into democratic theory and
vision. Indeed, it does not fit.12
W hile Lindbloms analysis suggests certain affinities with Marxist assessments o f stales and
societies, he is motivated to reform the political system while attempting to retain the
basic economic system, a move which requires that he maintains a certain analytical
separation o f the political sphere from the economic sphere. Some writers have suggested
that Lindblom has moved beyond pluralism, especially in the extent to which he contends
that "conventional theory is embarrassingly defective. It greatiy needs to call more heavily
on radical thought."1' This maintenance o f some degree o f separation o f the political
from the economic sphere, however, is precisely why other writers choose to leave
11 Ibid., p. 179.
12 Ibid., p. 356.
13 Charles E. Lindblom, "Another State of Mi nd" American Political Science Review 76 (1982),
p. 20, cited in Murray Knuttila, State Theories: From Liberalism to the Challenge o f Feminism,
(Garamond Press, 1987), p. 80.
88
Lindblom and others who criticize the skewed influence of business firmly within the
pluralist camp. This line has been succinctly summarized by M cLennan:"... this affinity
[with Marxism] falls short ol an identity, since these writers reaffirm the standard pluialist
view that economic cleavages and political processes remain to an important degree
separate from one another, and that through vigilant democratic pressure in the electoral
sphere, the power of business can be stalled without overturning the free enterprise
system as such."
Marxist Challenges to Pluralism:
M arxs writing on the state tended to remain undeveloped and for a large part
implicitly relied upon an instrumentalist view that the state was wholly commanded by the
capitalist class. One of the oft quoted remarks from the Communist Manifesto tends to
confirm this view: "The executive of the modern stale is but a committee for managing the
common affairs o f the whole bourgeoisie." Even this remark, however, is sufficiently
ambiguous as to conceal the exact manner in which the state actually carries out its
functions with respect to the capitalist class.
There has been a resurgence of Marxist theories o f the state in the last two
decades. The profound difference between Marxist and pluralist analyses can be drawn
out by considering Ralph Milibands groundbreaking contribution entitled The Slate in
Capitalist Society. Miliband explicitly contrasts the pluralist and Marxist treatments o f
social power. A crucial clement underpinning the pluralist emphasis upon social diversity
is the assumption of a diffusion of power structures in society that are ultimately relevant
89
lo the political sphere. As Miliband writes:"... most Western students o f politics tend to
start, judging from their work, with the assumption that power, in Western societies, is
competitive, fragmented and diffused: everybody, directly or through organised groups, has
some power and nobody has or can have too much o f it."14 That is, pluralism adopts a
mullicausal view of power relations in society and affirms that politics will reflect this
multiple structuration o f social power. It is this diffusion of power which gives the state
real autonomy and allows it to neutrally arbitrate among competing claims in society. The
logical implication of this view of social power, Miliband stresses, precludes the possibility
o f a fundamentally Marxist view o f the state:
Its first result is to exclude, by definition, the notion that the state might be a
rather special institution, whose main purpose is to defend the predominance
in society of a particular class. There are, in Western societies, no such
predominant classes, interests or groups. There are only competing blocs of
interests, whose competition, which is sanctioned and guaranteed by the state
itself, ensures that power is diffused and balanced, and that no particular
interest is able to weigh too heavily upon the state.15
Th e Marxist view outlined in Milibands work, in stark contrast to pluralism, contends the
social power deriving ultimately from the economic realm fundamentally signatures the
entire political sphere, especially the state. H e adopts the basic Marxist position that
political life is primarily determined by the relationship between the capitalist class and the
14 Ralph Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society, (Basic Books, 1969), p. 2.

15 Ibid., p. 3.
90
working class.16 T h e state remains, first and foremost, a class state. Other spheres of
social power remain uniquely threaded by the class power arising from the mode of
production. Consequently, above and beyond a reaffirmation o f the rudimentary' links
between state and society, Milibands discussion assists us in seeing that the Marxist
analytical approach rests upon a very specific treatment o f society.
W ith this distinction in mind Miliband set out to directly attack upon the pluralist
conception o f the state and "over-simple" Marxist instrumentalism.
Miliband argues that
there is a plurality of elites in advanced capitalist countries, but stresses that this does not
"prevent the separate elites in capitalist society from constituting a dominant economic
class, possessed o f a high degree of cohesion and solidarity, with common interests and
common purposes which far transcend their specific differences and disagreements."17 As
to whether or not this group constitutes a ruling class Miliband turns to examine the state
elites, on the assumption that any links between the state elite and the economically
dominant class will bias the general outlook, ideological dispositions and political leanings
of the state. Miliband concludes that although the subordinate classes do come to
occasionally staff the state, the dominant classes are disproportionately represented:
What the evidence conclusively suggests is that in terms of social origin,

education and class situation, the men who have manner all command
positions in the state system have largely, and in many case overwhelmingly,
been drawn from the world of business and property, or from the profession
middle classes. Here as in every other field, men and women born into the
subordinate classes ... have fared very poorly... In an epoch when so much is
16 Ibid., p. 16.
17 Ibid., pp. 47-48.
91
made o f democracy, equality, social mobility, classlessness and the rest, it has
remained a basic fact of life in advanced capitalist countries that the vast
majority of men and women in the these countries have been governed,
represented, administered, judged, and commanded in war by people drawn
from other, economically and socially superior and relatively distant classes.18
Thus, Milibands findings tend to confirm Karl Kautskys observation that "the capitalist
class rules but does not govern". In assessing the relationship between the state and
society, that is, Miliband concludes that slate staffing ensures that the interests of the
capitalist class will form the basis of state policy.
Other writers within the Marxist tradition have developed Milibands basic ideas by
demonstrating the various mechanisms through which the capitalist class controls the
state.19 Milibands thinking, moreover, was considerably clarified in his later work
entitled Marxism and Politics.20 Nonetheless, Milibands views came under direct attack
from Nicos Poulantzas almost immediately, and the Miliband/Poulantzas dialogue helps to
provide an intellectual setting for ensuing state/society debates within Marxism. A t the
outset o f this debate, Poulantzas held that the form and function of the state was
engendered by the structure of class relations, a structure that is in turn rooted in the
capitalist mode of production. Poulantzas emphasis upon class structure over class
struggle is evident in the following passage from Political Power and Social Classes:
18 Ibid., pp. 66-67.

19 Sec, for example Albert Szymanski, The Capitalist State and the Politics o f Class, (Winthrop
Publishers Inc., 1978), chapters 10 and 11.
w Ralph Miliband, Marxism and Politics, (Oxford University Press, 1977), especially pp. 74116.
92
This guarantee given by the capitalist state to the economic interests of

certain dominated classes cannot be seen per se as a restraint on the political
power of the dominant classes. It is true that the political and economic
stmggles of the dominated classes impose this on the capitalist state. However,
this simply shows that the state is not a class instrument, but rather the stale
of a society divided into classes. The class struggle in capitalist formations
entails that this guarantee of the economic interests of certain dominated
classes is inscribed as a possibility, within the vi.ry limits imposed by the slate
on the struggle for hegemonic class leadership.21
The structuralist position advocated by Poulantzas set the stage for his attack upon
Miliband. Most basically, he contends that Miliband adopts a sort o f "subjectivist
problematic", that is, a problematic o f "social actors" or o f "individuals as the origin of
social action" against the structuralist approach: "According to this problematic, the agents
o f a social formation, men, are not considered as the bearers of objective instances...
but as the genetic principle of the levels of the social whole." Consequently, when
Miliband considers the composition o f state personnel, he confuses basic causal notions
and thus wrongly overestimates their importance by accepting, in the end, that their
position and class background is responsible for state policy:
... the direct participation of members of the capitalist class in the State
apparatus and in the government, even where it exists, is not the important
side o f the matter. The relations between the bourgeois class and the Stale is
an objective relation. This means that if the function of the State in a
determinate social formation and the interests of the dominant class in this
formation coincide, it is by reason of the system itself: the direct participation
of members o f the ruling class in the Stale apparatus is not the cause but the
effect, and moreover a chance and contingent one, of this objective
________________________
21 Nicos Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Classes, (New Left Books, 1973), p. 191,
emphasis in original.
93
coincidence.22
Milibands response to this line of critique from Poulantzas focused upon the issue of the
hitters "one-sided" approach, which Miliband labelled as "structural super-determinism.
This move, according to Miliband, contains an inherent political danger as well: "For if the
state elite is as totally imprisoned in objective structures as is suggested, it follows that
there is really no difference between a state rule, say, by bourgeois constitutionalists,
whether conservative or social-democratic, and one ruled by, say, Fascists."
With the structural cut of Poulantzas, there is an explicit rejection o f
instrumentalist state theory, especially in his analysis of relative autonomy, wherein the
state acquires the necessary political space to maintain the long-term interests of capitalist
society, a process which may mean the granting of privileges and concessions to the
subordinate classes along with stale measures which often stand in direct opposition to
fractions of the capitalist class. Undoubtably, in view of Poulantzass structuralist
approach, the Miliband-Poulantzas debate has frequently been characterized as a debate
between instrumentalism and structuralism respectively. This account of the debate,
however, is somewhat misleading. Although Poulantzas was certainly advocating a
structuralist position, Milibands explicit concern was to avoid an instrumentalist analysis,
and Poulantzas explicitly acknowledge that Miliband did not fall "into this trap". This
characterization masks some of the more important issues in the debate. Aside from the
important methodological issues which have not been addressed here, the debate tended
22 Ibid., p. 245, emphasis in original.

94
more to focus upon the role o f the individual as a source of historical influence and
change against the individual as determined by social structure.1' With respect to the
state, therefore, Poulantzas contends that its form and function is conditioned by the class
structure inherent in the mode of production (a move which greatly diminishes the role of
the individual), whereas Miliband is clearly develops a class-pressurc view o f stale
behaviour through his examination of state personnel. It is the class-pressure view of
Miliband as opposed to class-instrumental view which is under fire by writers such as
Poulantzas.24
The class-theoretical view of state determination that informed the MilibandPoulantzas debate was directly challenged by the capital-logic school or dcrivationists. At
the heart o f the capital-logic or derivationist response (that is, the view which sees the
state as derived or from the laws o f capital) lies the idea that distinctively political
categories o f Miliband and Poulantzas - most notably the "political category of class" - and
the more general attempts to construct a specific theory of the political are both
mistakenly sundered from the "materialist categories" developed by Marx. In a sense, the
derivationist critique emphasizes that Marxs writing was primarily a material critique of
political economy. In their specific critique of Poulantzas, for example, they contend his
"false point of departure" lies in the "severing his study of the political from the analysis of
the contradictions of accumulation..." There is a failure to consider the "anatomy of civil
society", that is, the laws of motion o f capital and the tendency for the rate of profit to fall
23 See discussion in Martin Girnoy, op. cit., p. 106.

24 See, for example, the discussion in Fred Block, "The Ruling Class Does Not Rule: Notes
on the Marxist Theory of the State," Socialist Review 33 (May-June, 1977).
95
arc taken for granted in the Miliband-Poulantzas debate. Consequently, Poulantzas

cannot analyze, so the derivationist challenge runs, any constraints upon political action
and state behaviour: "Because there is no systematic analysis of the relations between the
capitalist state and its basis, capitalist exploitation of the working class in the process of
accumulation, so too there is no analysis of the constraints and limitations which the
nature o f capitalist accumulation imposes upon state action."35
In this vein, Holloway and Picciotto contend that reductionist or cconomistic
approaches have merit at least to the extent that they attempt to "provide an answer,
however crude, to a real problem, the problem of how we come to a materialistic
understanding of political development, of how we relate political development to the
contradictions o f capitalist production: it is no improvement at all simply to sidestep the
problem." While the derivationist critique does not necessarily mean that analysis must be
wholly cconomistic, that is, that we should not view the state as a "finished phenomenon",
it has drawn criticism by its tendency to isolate the laws of capital.36 Some writers have
stressed that the logic of capital should not be viewed as self-driven. The derivationists, in
other words, have been criticized for their failure to consider adequately the effects o f the
class struggle upon the logic of capital. This critique is clearly articulated by Bob Jcssop:
The capital relations cannot be considered in isolation from class struggle.
35 Ibid., p. 7, my emphasis.
3* On the issue of cconornism in this debate see Bernhard Blanke, Ulrich Jurgens, Hans
Kastcndick, "On the Current Marxist Discussion on the Analysis of Form and Function of the
Bourgeois State," in State and Capital: A Marxist Debate, eds. John Holloway and So! Picciotto
(Edward Arnold, 1978).
|
'
5
I
j
\
*
For accumulation is conditional on the continued ability of capital itself to

secure through struggle the many different conditions necessary for the
creation and appropriation of surplus-value on an ever-expanding scale. This
means that its laws o f motion are not natural and inevitable but depend for
their realisation on the balance of forces in the conflict between capital and
labour. Thus one should not artificially separate the logic of capital from its
historical conditioning through class struggle ...:7
<
Jessops response to the capital-logic school reaffirms the importance o f class struggle
specifically and the political sphere more generally in considering the broader relationship
between the state and society. The forms and functions of the state, according to this
critique, cannot be simply derived from the logic of capital simply because that logic itself
remains conditioned by political considerations, especially those o f class struggle.
The capital-logic response draws attention to the crucial issue o f analyzing the
political sphere as distinct from the mode of production or the logic of capital. In both
Miliband and Poulantzas, there is explicit theorization at the 71
, '''c a l level. In responding
to the Miliband-Poulantzas debate, for example, Ernesto Laclau lauded the attention the
debate brought to the sphere of politics in the context of slate-sociely analysis: "Sketchy
observations attempting to establish the ultimate coherence between socio-economic
changes and the transformations o f the political system, or not so sketchy observations
attempting to establish mechanical relations o f causality between the two have dominated
the area of analysis to such a point that we can only welcome a work which tries to
27 Bob Jessop, The Capitalist State: Marxist Theories and Methods, (New York University
Press, 1982), p. 134.
97
establish on the theoretical level the specificity of the political..."28 The specificity o f the
political contains at least two crucial lines of argumentation that can be flushed out and
briefly charted in order to round out our discussion of Marxist theory of state and society:
first, the "specificity o f the stale" debate or the degree to which the state acquires real
autonomy as opposed to relative autonomy from class struggle; secondly, autonomization
o f politics or the extent to which the realm of ideology and social consciousness can be
separated from class conditioning. Both of these streams have settled upon post-Marxist
analyses of politics and the state, and have recently been strongly challenged by a
reaffirmation o f the Marxist line o f argumentation.
The Specificity o f the Political: The Autonomy o f the State
An apparent challenge to Marxism may be found in the "statist" conceptions o f the

relationship between state and society. The specificity o f the political in Marxist theory
has spawned some intellectual efforts to assign the state real or absolute autonomy from
society. One o f the clearest examples o f this may be found in Fred Blocks efforts to
move beyond the "relative autonomy" formulation of neo-Marxist theory.29 Block assigns
the state full specificity. Block is explicit about the limits that are imposed upon the
exercise of state by the "class context". However, the dependency that the bourgeoisie has
28 Ernesto Laclau, Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory: Capitalism, Fascism, Populism,
(Verso, 1977), p. 51.
29 Fred Block, "Beyond Relative Autonomy: State Managers as Historical Subjects," in
Revising State Theory: Essays in Politics and Postindustrialism, (Temple University Press, 1987).
98
upon the state, according to him, forces this class to "seek a modus vivendi with the state
managers. W ith this explicit recognition o f the necessity of the state in capitalist society,
Block goes on to argue that state managers acquire significantly more freedom of action in
exceptional periods such as war or depression. In such periods the stale may he able to
achieve "full autonomy", especially if such a crisis erodes the consensus and political
capacity of the capitalist class. In the end, "state managers might pursue their self interest
in ways that violate both the existing political rules and the normal constraints of class
relations."'0
There arc writers that assign the state decidedly more autonomy than Block.
Attempts centre around the idea that the state is a much more active ereature than neo
Marxist formulations allow; that is, the state develops its own distinct and separate
interests that arc not reducible to class or groups interest.'1 A valuable example o f it
theoretical effort that fully subjectivities the state historically can be found in Eric
Nordlingers On the Autonomy of the Democratic Stale. Nordlinger lakes direct issue with
the emphasis that has been placed on societal constraints upon the state that is
"pervasively accepted and uncritically applied" in state-society writing.
Public officials tire
scldomly assigned any "substantial measure of independence" in the lace o f the forces anil
pressures emanating from society:
JO
ibid., p. 84.
11 For a clear example of this tendency within the international relations corpus see Stephen
D. Krasner, Defending the National Interest. Raw Materials Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy,
(Princeton University Press, 1978), especially pp. 26-27.
99
... public policy is understood primarily as a response to the expectations,

demands, and pressures of those who control the largest proportion of
especially effective resources. The state, that is, public officials taken all
together, is commonly seen as a permeable, vulnerable, and malleable entity,
not necessarily in the hands of most individuals and groups, but in those of
the most powerful ones. When state and societal preferences diverge, this
society-centred model denies, ignores, or downplays the possibility of public
officials acting on their preferences after engineering a shift in societal
preferences or in the relative distribution of resources behind them, and
strenuously denies the possibility of the state translating its preferences into
authoritative actions when opposed by societal actors who control the
weightiest political resources.32
In response to this tendency, Nordlinger emphasizes that the state can develop its own
distinctive and "self-generated" interests, that it can employ a number of autonomyenhancing mechanisms and thereby act on these preference regardless of society. The
nature of public policy, therefore, can reflect the desires of public personnel far more than
societally based groups.13 As for the autonomy enhancing mechanisms, Nordlinger
discusses the states ability to persuade, pressure and coopt different social interests and
the manner in which the slate can affect the availability and distribution o f resources
among social groups and actors.13 Curiously, Nordlinger then proceeds to reflect upon a
standard Marxist diet o f state commentators including Miliband, Offc and O Connor, and
he concludes that the liberal capitalist state acts autonomously "far more often than
acknowledged or implied in Marxist writings".11 It is important to stress that he does not
12 Erie Nordlinger, On the Autonomy o f the Democratic State, (Harvard University Press,
1981), p. 3.
33 Ibid., chapter one in passim, especially pp. 5-7.
31 For example, sec ibid., pp. 111-112, pp. 130-132.
31 Ibid., p. 180.
100
present anything essentially inconsistent with Marxist relative-autonomy theory, but has
rather explicated the numerous mechanisms through which such autonomy unfolds in
political practice.
Perhaps the most developed theoretical tract which fully subjectivises the stale is
the collection o f articles in Bringing the Suite Back In.y' Theda SkocpoTs introductory
chapter to this collection o f studies eloquently elaborates the neo-statist thesis. Skocpol is
most concerned with those tendencies, especially within the Marxist tradition, to expunge
any historically subjective qualities from the stale. Speaking of Marxism in particular,
Skocpol notes that even critically minded neo-Marxists have failed "it) grant true autonomy
to states." Skocpol characterizes Marxism as a society-centred theory at heart, and as a
framework which is therefore incapable of discussing the state outside o f the constraining
features o f society:
Neo-Marxists have, above all, debated alternative understandings o f the

socioeconomic functions performed by the capitalist state. Some see it as an
instrument of class rule, others as an objective guarantor of production
relations or economic accumulation, and still others as an arena for political
class struggles... Yet at the theoretical level, virtually all neo-Marxist writers
on the state have retained deeply embedded society-centred assumptions, not
allowing themselves to doubt that, at base, states arc inherently shaped by
classes or class struggles and function to preserve and expand modes of
production. Many possible forms of autonomous state action are thus ruled
out by definitional fiat. Furthermore, neo-Marxist theorists have too often
sought to generalize - often in extremely abstract way - about features or
functions shared by all states within a mode of production, a phase of
capitalist accumulation, or a position in the world capitalist system. This
makes it difficult to assign causal weight to variations in state structures and
activities across nations and short time periods, thereby undercutting the
v Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Ruescheineyer and Theda Skocpol, eds. Bringing the State Buck
In, (Gimbridge University Press, 1985).
101
usefulness of some neo-Marxist schemes for comparative research.
In response to this society-centred tendency Skocpol announces that states "may formulate
and pursue goals that are not simply reflective o f the demands or interests o f social
groups, classes, or society."
Skocpol presents some important points for neo-Marxist assessments and
discussions o f the state, especially to the extent that her work would help guard against
sclerotic views of class instrumentalism o r hopeless abstractionism or even, as the above
quote suggests, the neglect of concrete analysis o f particular historical conjunctures.
There arc, nonetheless, some serious limitations and oversights in her analysis. A t times
Skocpol tends toward a caricature of Marxist scholarship. In her discussion o f class
formation and the politicization o f classes, for example, she suggests that:
Marxists may be right to argue that classes and class tensions are always
present in industrial societies, but the political expression of class interests
and conflicts is never automatic or economically determined. It depends on
the capacities classes have for achieving consciousness, organization, and
representation. Direct!, or indirectly, the structures and activities of state
profoundly condition such class capacities. Thus, the classical wisdom o f
Marxian political sociology must be turned, if not on its head, then certainly
on its side.*8
It is exceptionally difficult to understand how Skocpol can make this assertion in the face
Ibid., p. 5.
* Ibid., p. 27.
102
o f the wealth of Marxist commentary which draws specific attention to class formation,
class consciousness and especially, as in the work of Poulantzas and others, to the role of
th e state in the politicization o f cohesion o f subordinate classes. H e r view here rests upon
the erroneous equation of Marxist analysis with some kind o f sterile orthodoxy.
Perhaps the most serious concern regarding Skocpols statist research agenda, and
problem arising out o f the tendency to caricature Marxism and neo-Marxism, lies in her
claims that she has presented a clear and distinct alternative to society-centred modes of
inquiry. In particular, the claim th at her approach is distanced considerably from neoMarxism is overdrawn. At a methodological level she stresses that the society-centred
model should not be simply turned on its head by starting and ending with an analysis of
th e state: "Studies o f slates alone a re not to be substituted for concerns with classes or
groups; nor are purely state-detcrminist arguments to be fashioned in the place o f societycentred explanations." In other words, Skocpols argues that "the need to analyze stales in
relation to socio-economic and socio-cultural contexts is convincingly demonstrated in the
best current research on state capacities."39 Neo-Marxist analysis itself, however, is
expressly concerned with attempts to understand how the behaviour of the state is
impelled, conditioned, constrained or directed by the socioeconomic and socio-cultural
contexts. Even M arxs discussions o f Bonapartism, for example, drew attention to the
full-blown autonomy of the state at times when the balance among contending social
classes cancelled each other out. I t must be stressed, in the end, that this position
suggests differences o f emphasis o r differences of degree. Indeed, other commentators
Ibid., p. 20.
103
have seriously questioned the extent to which Skocpols research programme is

fundamentally antithetical to neo-Marxism in anything other than appellation.40
The Specificity o f the Political: Autonomization o f Ideology and Social Consciousness
A t the risk of ovcr-simplification, a distinct element o f the specificity of the

political includes an examination of social consciousness and ideology on th e one hand and
class relations on the other. In other words, for the purposes of discussion, we can
examine the relationship between the stu ff of politics and class dy.iamics. In The
German Ideology we get one o f the clearest statements with respect to the asserted
relationship between ruling classes and the construction of social consciousness and
ideology:
"The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class
which is the ruling material force o f society, is at the same tim e its ruling
intellectual force. The class which has the means o f material production at its
disposal, consequently also controls the means of mental production, so that
the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are on the whole
subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression o f
the dominant material relations, the dominant material relations grasped as
ideas; hence of the relations which make the one class the ruling one,
therefore, the ideas of its dominance... Insofar, therefore, as they rule as a
class and determine the extent and compass of the historical epoch, it is selfevident that they do this in its whole range, hence among other thing rule also
as thinkers, as producers of ideas, and regulate the production and
distribution of the ideas of their age; thus their ideas are the ruling ideas o f
40 As Paul Cammack has argued, many elements of Skocpols work merely demonstrate a
structuralist-Marxist analysis. Sec "Statism, New Institutionalism, and Marxism," in The Socialist
Register: 1990, (M erlin Press, 1990), p. 157.
104
th e epoch:"
As this quote suggests, the ruling ideas o f the epoch help to solidify class dominance, in
fact, are synonymous with this dominance, and essentially reflect the dominant prevailing
material relations o f the epoch. O ne important development within Marxist writing,
however, has been th e continual assignation of greater political and historical significance
to content and construction of ideology and social consciousness. Georg Lukacs drew
attention to the need to directly deal with the historical constitution o f a genuine working
class consciousness, and in his discussion drew attention to the dangers of reifying this
analysis by analyzing it apart from the social relations o f class.12 Again, the collection of
Marxist scholars commonly referred to as the Frankfurt School undertook a systematic
analysis o f social consciousness and ideology in contemporary capitalist class society.'1
T h e exploration of ideology and social consciousness within Marxism can be
flushed o u t by briefly considering the work o f four Marxist scholars. In the writings o f
Antonio Gramsci ideology and politics arc assigned considerable role in the maintenance
and transformation o f society. O n the one hand, the dominant ideology (expressed
through the concept o f hegemony) is still clearly class-based, but it expresses more than
41 K arl Marx, The German Ideology, (Progress Publishers, 1976), p. 67, emphasis in original
text.
42 Georg Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics, (M erlin Press,
1971), especially pp. 83-110.
43 A beneficial summary of the analytical tasks of the Frankfurt school by a member of this
scholarly group may b e found in Jiirgcn Habermass, "The Tasks of a Critical Theory of Society,"
in On Society and Politics: A Reader, ed. Steven Seidman (Beacon Press, 1989), pp. 77-103.
105
narrow material interests as it comes to permeate the social consciousness. The dominant
ideology, after prevailing during a period of "purely political" struggle, comes to "propagate
itself throughout society - bringing about not only a unison o f economic and political aims,
but also intellectual and moral unity, posing all the questions around which the struggle
rages not on a corporate but on a universal plane, and thus creating the hegemony o f a
fundamental social group over a series o f subordinate groups." Through this constitution
the interests of the dominant group is universalized and naturalized, although subordinate
groups can extract concessions through the system as long as the economic interest of the
dominant groups will remain unchallenged:
... the development and expansion of the particular group are conceived of,
and presented, as being the motor force of a universal expansion, of a
development of all the "national energies." In other words, the dominant
group is coordinated concretely with the general interests of the subordinate
groups, and the life o f the State is conceived of as a continuous process of
formation and superseding o f unstable equilibria (on the juridical plane)
between the interests of the fundamental group and those of the subordinate
groups - equilibria in which the interests o f the dominant group prevail, but
only up to a certain point, i.e. stopping short o f narrowly corporate economic
interests.'
Gramsci widens the concept of the state to include the hegemony o f the leading fraction
or group ("State = political society + civil society, in other words hegemony protected by
the armour coercion"). The state is no longer merely an instrument o f coercion in the
hands o f the ruling group. The ruling group relies on a combination o f "force" and
"consent"; it "leads" in addition to being "dominant". The narrow notion of civil society in
44 Ibid., p. 182.
106
M arx (relations o f production) is expanded in Gramsci to include the hegemonic elements.

Consequently, ideology and social consciousness become, in GramscL thought, critical
sites of struggle, as evident in his notion of a war o f position, and driving forces in
political and social change.
Again, for example, in the work o f E. P. Thompson we see the historical
importance of ideology and social consciousness strongly reaffirmed in his critique o f Louis
Althussers structuralist philosophy. Thompson stresses that social consciousness cannot
be reduced to a one-way determinism from one class location. In other words, there is a
dialectic between class experiences and the wider social ontology on the one hand and the
manner in which society has mentally constructed the world on the other:
What Althusser overlooks is the dialogue between social being and social
consciousness. Obviously, this dialogue goes in both directions. I f social
being is not an inert table which cannot refute a philosopher with its legs,
then neither is social consciousness a passive recipient of "reflections" of that
table. Obviously, consciousness, whether as unselfconseious culture, or as
myth, o r as science, o r law, or articulated ideology, thrusts back into being in
its turn: as being is though so though also is lived - people may, within limits,
live the social o r sexual expectations which are imposed upon them by
dominant conceptual categories.'45
T h e centrality o f social consciousness in historical change means, for Thompson, that the
"subject" cannot be so easily expunged from histoiy as structuralism contends.
O ther writers have also drawn explicit attention to ideology and social
consciousness in the broader context o f class experience and location. W ith respect to
45 E. P. Thompson, "The Poverty of Theory or An Orrery of Errors," in The Poverty o f Theory

and Other Essays, (Monthly Review Press, 1978), p. 9.
107
class formation, for example, Adam Przeworski has explicitly rejected the idea that there
must be some necessary or inevitable movement from class in itself to class fo r itself; that
is, from the widespread but somewhat isolated experiences o f direct producers to the full
scale recognition o f their similar experiences in the form o f a rounded class consciousness.
As Przeworski writes:
In place o f this formulation we must think along the lines, also suggested by
Marx, in which economic, political, and ideological conditions jointly structure
the realm of struggles that have as their effect the organization,
disorganization, or reorganization of classes. Classes must thus be viewed as
effects of struggles structured by objective conditions that are simultaneously
economic, political, and ideological. Class analysis is a form of analysis that
links social development to struggles among concrete historical actors. Such
actors, collectivities-in-struggle at a particular moment of history, are not
determined uniquely by objective conditions, not even by the totality of
economic, political, and ideological conditions. Precisely because class
formation is a effect of struggles, outcomes of this process are at each
moment o f history to some extent indeterminate.46
Przeworksi draws explicit attention to the fact that ideological and political factors
intervene to condition struggles between concrete historical collectivities, and that the
nature o f these struggles is pivotal in the process o f class formation and dissolution.
W hile Przcworksis analysis is provocative in that it raises the prospects of class analysis
beyond those groups directly involved in production, it is an excellent demonstration of
the idea that different cultural and ideational elements can intervene to profoundly affect
the manner in which people come to think about and respond to their experiences within
46 See the valuable work of Adam Przeworski, Capitalism and Social Democracy, (Cambridge
University Press, 1985), chapter 2 especially, quote from p. 47.
108
production.
Finally, other writers have observed the specificity o f non-class elements of social
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consciousness and culture, without rejecting the historical materialist premises regarding
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the links between production on the one hand and consciousness and human agency on
the other.
complete independent weight has been given to additional facets o f social consciousness
and political life. Perhaps the most open and incisive example of this trend in Ronald
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Muncks Marxism and Nationalism: The Difficult Dialogue. Munck pillories those Marxist
works which tend to collapse elements o f culture into class imperatives or
instrumentalities:
In other words, historical materialist premises have been retained although
W e must, in short, reject all Marxist theories of nationalism which see it as

reducible to some underlying cause, or a simple cpiphenomenon o f economic
processes, or indeed, which reduce it to any mono-causal explanation.
Nationalism is a complex political phenomenon which is irreducible and must
be understood in its own terms.47
Elsewhere, and with even clearer links to social consciousness, he writes:
Whereas the Russian Revolution did go some way towards recognizing the
crucial importance o f the national question in political practice, it did not lead
to the necessary theoretical breakthrough. An example of Marxisms failure
in this respect was its economic/rational view of capitalism which, rather, is
permeated by its racist and patriarchal features. Consciousness is moulded by
all these elements and not simply by the economic exploitation o f wagelabour, so that revolutions are inevitably shaped by their particular national
context... It is no longer acceptable to view the national question as derivative
47 Ronaldo Munck, The Difficult Dialogue: Marxism and Nationalism, (Zed Books: 1986), p
165.
109
of some deeper underlying and determinative historical process.48
Importantly, the recognition of the irreducible specificity o f nationalism does not in any
way preclude the need to examine the manner in which class and nationalism interact.
Munck extols the research o f O tto Bauer in that it addressed class issues and national
issues as separate but profoundly related factors. Equally importantly, Munck valuably
draws attention towards other elements of the social world - such as notions o f race and
socially constructed conceptions o f gender and strongly contends that they, in addition to
the issue o f nationalism, should not be collapsed into the class question.
The essential defining feature o f this historical materialist method is the retention
o f the determinative importance of class experiences and class struggles in the analysis of
political life. Politics and production should not be separated. Nonetheless, as in the case
of Przeworski and Munck, considerable potential historical effect is assigned to non-class
elements o f the social consciousness.
Political life, in other words, is still largely, but
certainly not entirely, conditioned by class experience and class struggle. This tendency to
accept the necessary effect of class experience and class struggle with social consciousness
and political life has drawn sustained criticism. Perhaps the clearest example of this
criticism may be found in Ernesto Laclau and Chantal M ouffes Hegemony and Socialist
Strategy.w Laclau and Mouffe are explicit in their determination to move beyond the
"last redoubt" o f class rcductionism and economism. They take direct issue with Marxisms
48 Ibid., p. 170.
14 Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical
Democratic Politics, (Verso, 1985).
110
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cconomistic tendencies in that it demands that there is rational substratum of history. In

order for this to be true, Laclau and Mouffe argue that the economic realm would have to
have entirely endogenous laws o f motion, that the unity of social agents constituted at the
economic level would be directly spawned by these laws of motion, and that these agents
would be endowed with historical interests. They reject the validity o f all three
conditions: "It is not the case that the field o f the economy is a self-regulated space
subject to endogenous laws; nor does there exist a constitutive principle for social agents
which can be fixed in an ultimate class core; nor arc class positions the necessary location
of historical interests."
Laclau and M ouffe explicitly reject the notion that society has some essential core
or ontology in favour o f a "dc-totalized" view emphasizing the "irreducible plurality o f the
social." They state: "If, however, we renounce the hypothesis of a final closure o f the
social, it is necessary to start from a plurality of political and social spaces which do not
refer to any ultimate unitarian basis. Plurality is not the phenomenon to be explained, but
the starting point o f the analysis.'0 They employ a discourse-theoretical approach and
arrive at the idea, ultimately, that society, including the economic level, is constituted
through discursive practices. The unity of society is not informed by an external, fixed
point beyond the discursive realm. Social consciousness is entirely freed from the
"sutured" society; ideology cannot be anchored in some independently effective economic
realm.
Consequently, in the work o f Laclau and Mouffe, the problem o f the relationship
so
Ibid., p. 140.
Ill
between the economic and the political is resolved by dissolving the former. The very
notion o f a disposing or constraining or conditioning social realm apart from
consciousness is liquidated. We see a position developed which rejects the economic
.structure/subject dichotomy central to contemporary Marxism. T h e explicit rejection of
the notion o f a unifying social core entirely supplants the so-called Marxist primacy o f the
economic with the primacy of the political. The specificity of th e political, in other
words, is developed to the point where is becomes the motor of history. The socialist
struggle, consequently, is played out on the field o f political struggle, or, more to the
point, on the plane o f social consciousness and ideology. The very notion that their move
constitutes the full autonomization of the political is explicitly rejected by them,
moreover, in that such a characterization presupposes the sutured society.
Laclau and M ouffes position has been subject to question and criticism
throughout the 1980s. O ne of th e most trenchant assaults upon Laclau and M o u ffes
thinking appears in Ellen Miekscns Woods Retreat from Class: The New True Socialism.
Wood begins by observing that Laclau and Mouffe have fully detached ideology from
social determinations beyond consciousness: "Above all, autonomous ideology - or, more
precisely, discourse - has now swallowed up the whole social world."51 The criticism falls
along two different lines. First, there is the exegetical aspects w ith respect to Marxism.
Secondly, a political critique aimed at contextualizing the movement. W ith respect to
historical materialist tenets Wood argues that Laclau and M ouffe have made a
technologically deterministic reading. It is not the case that Marxism holds that the
51 Ellen Mciksins Wood, The Retreat From Class: a New Tnte Socialism, (Verso, 1986), p. 53.
112
economic realm constitutes some self-propelled world which in turn impels history. She
directly takes up Laclau and M ouffes charge that Marxism suppresses the effect o f soci.il
life and consciousness upon the economic realm:
... it is precisely because the economic sphere is permeated by the relations

o f class exploitation and the antagonism of class interest, indeed because the
economic sphere is constituted by those class relations - and not simply by
some neutral technological imperative - that there is an organic relation
between economy and other social spheres. ... it is precisely because
material production is organized in class-distorted ways that economic
relations are also relations of power, conflict and struggle which play
themselves out not only in the economic sphere but also in other social
domains and in the arena of politics. ( In fact, is it not the first premise of
historical materialism that material production is a social phenomenon?) It is,
therefore, incomprehensible why the proposition that the organization of
production cannot be separated from overall social relations should be
regarded as a fatal challenge to Marxism, instead of its ultimate
justification/2
W ood also rejects Laclau and M ouffes position that any political intervention in the
process of constituting the working class (that is, if the working class does not spring
automatically from the productive realm) makes the working class lose its privileged
position as a revolutionary agent. This amounts to a denial o f any objective or fixed
interest arising within production. As Wood argues, "the understandable observation that
material interests are not spontaneously translated into political objectives is twisted to
mean that there is no such thing as a material interest unless translated into political
objectives. W oods counter to this claim includes the emphasis upon the full implications
o f denying that their can b e fixed interests o r identities, implications which essentially
52 Ibid., p. 59.
113
embrace a Humean-like denial of causality: "What it effectively means is that, where there
is not simple, absolute, mechanical, unilinear, and non-contradictory determination, there
is no detcrminacy, no relationship, no causality at all. There arc only arbitrary
juxtapositions, conjunctures, and contingencies. If anything holds the discrete and isolated
fragments o f reality together, it is only the logic of discourse."
In terms of her political critique, Wood continues that th e post-structuralist
dissolution o f reality into discourse is tantamount to a new pluralism. The political
implications o f such a position are clear:
In place of the csscntialist working class, Laclau and Mouffe offer us an

indeterminate plural subject, a popular force, constituted by people with
either multiple social identities o r no such identities at all ... The modern
world, wc arc told, no longer consists o f clearly opposed social interests. We
live in an increasingly pluralistic society characterized by constant flux and
mobility, where people partake o f multiple and changing social identities.53
T h e descent into pluralism, moreover, carries with it some concrete political implications:
"The supreme irony is that, while many on the left have been busy announcing the death
o f class politics and denying the privileged position of the working class in the struggle
fo r socialism, the Conservative [British] government has been conducting a policy whose
first - and last - premise is that an organized working class represents the greatest threat
to capitalism."54
The final word on Laclau and M ouffes critique is impossible. The Socialist
w Ibid., p. 63.
54 Ibid., p. 182.
114
intellectual and political project, however, is ill-served by the facile categorization o f

Laclau and M ouffe as extolling a revised pluralist thesis. Laclau and M ouffe explicitly
discuss this in their rejection o f the foundational aspects of p o w e r:"... it is equally wrong
to propose as an alternative, cither pluralism or the total diffusion o f power within the
social, as this would blind the analysis to the presence o f nodal points and to the partial
concentrations o f power existing in every concrete social formation." Laclau and
M o u ffe s post-structuralist position, however, valuably calls attention to some important
elements in any analysis o f society. Their work is part o f a growing body o f intellectual
efforts wherein historical materialism has been:
... interrogated and jettisoned by those championing the discursive, cenlreless

nature of a pervasive power which is bounded not so much by class relations
and struggles, or the structures of historically determined political economy,
but by discourse, representation, and a social construction weighted heavily
toward the ideological. This is, simply put, the postslructuralism premise, the
ideological/ intellectual freight accompanying the postmodernist condition/''
In the post-structuralist historiography the fiercely dialectical relationship between

(economic) structure and human consciousness has tilted unrelentingly towards the latter.
Perry Anderson has advanced the argument that the post-structuralist position is a natural
response to the structuralist view which tended to downplay subjective or human
dimensions o f history, and laments that neither structuralism o r post-structuralism has
55 Laclau and Mouffe, op. c/7., p. 142.

56 Bryan D. Palmer, "The Eclipse o f Materialism: Marxism and The Writing o f Social History
in the 1980s," Socialist Register: 1990, (M erlin Press, 1990), p. 112.
115
done a lot to advance a relational theory o f economic structure/subject.57 "This

relationship of being and consciousness was always central to the materialist texts of social
history and cultural studies..." Bryan Palmer writes, "but that dialogue between structure
and agency has recently been silenced in a one-sided act of borrowing and suppression, in
which the economically material realms capacity to erect boundaries and set limits has
receded from analytic view."
It is the two-sidedness o f social life that must be restored in the analysis of society
and the state. W c can respond to Laclau and Mouffe (at least for now) by recalling Ted
Bentons notion of social structure: "Any more or less enduring pattern o f relationships
between agents (which may be individual persons, parties, associations, and so o n ) or
between agents and objects may be thought of as constituting a structure."58 Conceived
in this manner, the denial that economic life, that is, the practical conditions in which
people frequently find themselves day after day in their work, and the reproduction o f
similar experiences spatially and temporally across society, necessarily conditions social and
political life is overstated. W hile it is true that there are different ways to conceive o f an
economic structure, and that it may be riddled with all o f the pitfalls of analogical
thinking, and that the language o f structural effect (conditioning, facilitating, disciplining,
impelling, moulding and so forth) is extremely vague, to deny the necessary effect o f the
practical and experiential economic stratum in favour o f gossamered treatment o f social
consciousness seems severe. In other words, the "enduring patterns of relationships" in
57 Perry Anderson, In the Tracks of Historical Materialism, (Verso, 1983).

58 Ted Benton. The Rise and Fall o f Structural Marxism: Althusser and His Influence, (St.
Martins Press, 1984), p. 214.
116
the context of production will necessarily discipline and mould social consciousness,
Everyday practice conditions social consciousness. O f course, m en and women arc not the
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passive recipients of an upwardly thrusting sphere of everyday practice. Social
s
consciousness w ill thrust back upon productive life in a never ending cycle o f recalibration.
1
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Granted that this is hardly a tidy picture o f social and political lile , but these complexities
I
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do not constitute a sufficient reason for a wholesale ascendency into language and
discourse as if the determinations of historical change began and ended in this particular
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domain. The solipsistic nature of the post-structuralist premise denies the necessity ol
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these links. As Bryan Palmer has observed: "What has been killed along the way is any
appreciation of the complex interaction o f economic structure and historical agency, ol
imposed necessity and cultivated desire."59
This cadastral sojourn through some of the themes entailed within the notion o f
the specificity o f the political allows us to begin to construct o u r analytical framework.
The bottomlinc contention here is that the statist and post-structuralist arguments are
not convincing to the extent that they call for a rejection of historical materialist
methodology. Perhaps most importantly, any theoretical claims in this regard only call
forth with greater urgency the need for concrete empirical analysis. In fact, this is
frequently acknowledged by those advocating a statist o r post-structuralist view. Laclau
and M ouffc, in speaking o f the implications o f their break from the esscntialist
materialist paradigm, admit that a concrete consideration of the impact of the economic
realm is indispensable: "To assert that what occurs at all levels o f society in a given
59 Biyan Palmer, op. cit., p. 126.

117
conjuncture is absolutely determined by what happens at the level of the economy, is not strictly speaking - logically incompatible with an anti-economistic response to our first
question [the endogenous laws o f motion in the economic stratum]".60 As this quote also
suggests, the philosophical or theoretical musings about historical determinations (as
opposed to conjunctural determinations) should not be construed as overriding the
historical materialist methodology within the conjuncture. And the obverse is also true: It
is quite conceivable that class and non-class elements within society might not account for
particular conjunctural events or processes o r outcomes. Similar cautions have been
erected by those advocating statist theories. In speaking of the possibility o f state
autonomy, for example, Theda Skocpol notes that: "Studies of states alone are not to be
substituted for concerns with classes or groups; nor are purely state-detcrminist arguments
to be fashioned in the place of society-centred explanations."61 These qualifications tend
to reinforce E.P Thompsons valuable caution that the question of economic structure
verses ideological determination "is in any case a question more usefully resolved by
historical and cultural analysis than by theoretical pronouncements."62
In view of this brief survey o f some o f the main lines o f inquiry regarding society
and the state, we can begin to construct an analytical framework aimed at developing a
society-centred account o f international conflict and war. In its most succinct form we
arrive at three basic research premises from which a series of pivotal questions and
* Laclau and Mouffc, op. cit., p. 77, emphasis in original.

61 Skocpol, op. cit., p. 20.
62 E. P. Thompson, op. cit., p. 9, my emphasis.
118
problems can be derived:
Premise One:
T h e productive realm is necessarily influential in the construction of

political life.
T h e need to avoid economistic analyses o f the world is crucial. Nonetheless, then' is

equally the need to chart the effects of production as it reverberates throughout society.
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As to the claim that is still a form of reduction w e can only offer the following
observation:
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The issue, the danger of reduclionism has been serious and a necessary theme
in the history of Marxist thought. But it is now a very tired theme, wheeled
out over and over again, without deliberation or discrimination as to when or
where it might be apt. There is scarcely ever pause to reflect on what is the
difference between explanation that is reductionist and explanation, period. It
is not a sufficient basis for the complaint o f reductionism that a given thinker
explains certain features of one phenomena by reference to certain features of
another. He or she does not have to suppose that there are no other
contributing or conditioning factor at work, or that there are no other
dimensions of the phenomenon to be understood.63
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Premise one draws attention to the need to assess nature and formation o f social classes,
to class fractions, relationship between various classes.61
These classes are primarily
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63 Norman Geras, "Seven Types of Obloquy: Travesties o f Marxism," The Retreat o f the
Intellectuals: Socialist Register, (M erlin Press, 1990), p.ll.
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61 The identification of classes has been the subject of some controversy within Marxist
analysis. See, for example Erik Olin Wright, "Class Boundaries andContradictory
Class
Locations," in Classes, Power, and Conflict: Classical and ContemporaryDebates, cds.Anthony
Giddens and David Held, (University of California Press, 1982).
119
defined by their relationship to the productive realm.65 The problem o f class formation
and class consciousness is exceedingly difficult and contentious.66 In fundamental contrast
to pluralist premises, the power of social classes is not symmetrical, and the relationship
can be characterized in terms o f varying degree of social oppression for subordinate
classes.
Premise Two: Other elements of the social consciousness - such as gender or ethnicity play a pivotal role in social and political life.
The second premise is established in the spirit of Ronaldo M uncks analysis. This
commands that w e consider the nature of other non-class elements o f culture. W e view
these as socially constructed elements of life which undulated and modulate incessantly.
W hile they can certainly be affected by elements o f the productive realm, it would be a
terrible mistake to reduce them to this realm.
Nationalism is more than a simple ruse for
class struggle. Gender is more than simply a mechanism to insure that the requisites o f
capitalist production arc met. We must, in short, acknowledge the irreducible nature o f
nationalism, gender, race and so on. These intersubjective elements reside in peoples
minds and reveal themselves through their practices. They can give rise to distinct
65 Although this appears straightforward, the importance o f this observation is crucial when
contrasted with approaches which define classes, for example, solely in terms of income
stratification.
66 One of the first, and still most wide-ranging attempts to directly analyze class consciousness
may be found in Georg Lukacs, "Class Consciousness," and "Reification and the Consciousness
of the Proletariat", in History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics, (Merlin Press,
1971).
120
political forms and expressions. Most importantly, these elements of the social canvas
embody asymmetrical power relationships and forms of social oppression. The specificity
o f the non-class elements o f social consciousness and ideology leaves us. nonetheless, with
the important and unavoidable task of determining how they unite to condition social life
and political struggle.
Premise Three:
The state is not above these class and non-class elements of the
social canvas.
T h e third premise directly responds to the challenge o f the neo-statist literature. W e
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reiterate that there is a dialectical relationship between state and society, that is, that both
most salient institution: the state. In an important sense societies and states are mutually
elements interact to condition each other. Any analysis of society implies an analysis of its
driven. As one collective commentary upon the state and society observed: "The problem
is that the state is enmeshed in society; in a sense, it is constituted by society, and society
in turn is shaped by the state."67 The competing poles of the autonomy/non*autonomy
spectrum informs Stuart H alls remarks about the fundamental relationship between
societies and states:
The state, then, is not autonomous of society. That does not mean that is
wholly determined in form and function by society. There arc complex inter
relationships and inter-dependencies between the form of the state and the
type of society... It [the state] cannot be wholly reducible to society.
67 David Held et al, States end Societies, eds. David Held ct al, (The Open University, 1983),
ix.
121
Something is added, when power in society is organized into a separate and

distinct instance of rule. From this perspective it seems clear that the state
constitutes society as well as being constituted by it. States, then, are not
autonomous o f society. They are only "relatively autonomous."68
By rooting the nature and role of the state firmly within social and political struggles o f
society w e also draw attention towards the historical nature of the state. In addressing the
complex relationship between state and society we must begin by observing that the state
is not a natural condition or creation. "The state is a historical phenomenon," writes
Stuart Hall, "it is a product o f human association - o f men and women living together in
an organized way; not of Nature."
Moreover, the state will not remain fixed in form or
content. The gradual democratization of the nineteenth century liberal capitalist state, the
growth o f the welfare state in the twentieth century and the current pressures for a neo
liberal state demonstrate its constantly changing nature.
In our particular analysis o f slates, moreover, we must directly consider those
groups o r classes which tend to control or disproportionately influence the exercise of
state power. W e must also consider, from the other side, the manner in which the
exercise o f state power interposes with social struggles. W e contend that state power as a
"complex social relation that reflects the changing balance o f social forces in a determinate
conjuncture."6<) Importantly, we must see the state more than a force o f class domination,
as, for example, the feminist literature on the state and womens oppression convincingly
68 Stuart Hall, "The State in Question", in The Idea o f the Modem State, eds. Gregor
McLennan, David Held and Stuart Hall, (The Open University Press, 1984).
M Bob Jessop, "Capitalism and Democracy: The Best Possible Political Shell," in States and
Societies, eds. David Held ct al, (Open University, 1983), especially pp. 272-5.
122
argues.70
The State and Society in the Third World:
We now turn to consider briefly societies and states in the Third World, a process
that w ill help us embellish and expand upon our three analytical premises. One of the
most salient tendencies in the analysis of state and society in the Third World was the
tendency to view it as a derived phenomenon. Influenced by Gundcr Franks dependency
analysis and Immanuel Walltersteins world systems analysis, research on Third World
states and society tended to understate the importance o f local social forces. These
traditions tend to set up very basic analytical dichotomies, such as centre/periphery,
developed/developing, advanced/backward, rich/poor, strong states/weak states and so on.
T h e net effect of this intellectual move is to draw attention away from any immediate
consideration of the local social dynamics within Third World state/society complexes.
This analytical tendency has been subject to sustained criticism by a number o f scholars
including Colin Leys and Robert Brenner.71 One theme continually reiterated among
these writers is that a full accounting o f the Third World state/society complex must
examine local configurations o f class forces.
70 For a socialist feminist view see Mary McIntosh, "The State and the Oppression of
Women," in Annette Kuhn and Anne Marie Wolpe eds., Feminism and Materialism: Women and
Modes of Production, (Routledge, 1978). For a radical or critical feminist view see Varda Burstyn,
"Masculine Domination and the State," in Women, Class, Family and the State, (Garamond, 1985)
71 Colin Leys "Underdevelopment and Dependency: Critical Notes," Journal o f Contemporary
Asia 7:1 (1977); Robert Brenner, "The Origins of Capitalist Development: A Critique of NeoSmithian Marxism," New Left Review 104 (July-August, 1977);
123
One of the clearest examples o f a modified dependency approach to explaining

Third World societies and states appears in the work of Cardoso and Falettos Dependency
and Development in Latin America.
Cardoso and Feletto explicitly reject any approach to
Third World societies that "derive mechanically significant phases o f dependent societies
only from the logic o f capitalist accumulation. We do not see dependency and imperialism
as external and internal sides o f a single coin, with the internal aspects reduced to the
condition o f epiphenomenal."11 Cardoso and Feletto argue that we must avoid replacing
the "concrete analyses of specific characteristics of dependent societies" with discussions o f
the "general characteristics of capitalism":
Mercantilism, free enterprise and free competition, monopoly capitalism

arc, in general, molds from which historical landmarks of peripheral countries
are drawn. ObviousN .itin American societies have been built as a
consequence of the expansion o f European and American capitalism.
Although less obvious, there also are features of capitalism common to
developed and dependent countries. However, by excluding from the
explanatory model social struggles and the particular relations (economic,
social, and political) that give momentum to specific dominated societies,
these kinds of interpretation oversimplify history and lead to error: they do
not offer accurate characterization of social structures, nor do they grasp the
dynamic aspect of history actualized by social struggles in dependent
societies.7-'
In their analysis Cardoso and Faletto determine the social formation (or the internal
dimension) forms a part o f the larger social formation (or external dimension) or global
77 Fernando Hcnrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, Dependency and Development in Latin
America, (University of Gtlifornia Press, 1979), p. xv, emphasis in original text.
7-' Ibid., pp. xiv - xv.
124
dimension. "W c conceive the relationship between external and internal forces," they
write, "as forming a complex whole whose structural links are not based on mere external
forms o f exploitation and coercion, but arc rooted in the coincidences o f interests between
local and dominant classes and international ones, and, on the other side, are challenged
by local dominated groups and classes."74
Cardoso and Falettos analysis provide an indispensable theme in the analysis of
Third World state/society complexes, namely, that we must consider the interaction
between local and global political and social forces. A number of very rich analytical
pieces have examined both sides of this picture, including the development o f production
on a global scale and specific socio-political dynamics within Third World social formations
Third World.7' Expressed more specifically, wc analyze the manner in which local social
forces have been unlcased through the insertion of Third World pre-capitalist economies
into th e global economy. In most cases, social transformation engendered through this
insertion has been rapid and extremely socially disruptive. When we contemplate Third
W orld societies from the perspective o f their absorption into the global economy at least
three different themes emerge that may assist in guiding us through the analysis o f Third
W orld social formations. In other words, the transformation from pre-capitalist
74 Ibid., p. xvi.
75 On the development of the global economy see especially Robert W. Cox, Production,
Power and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History, (Columbia University Press, 19K7);
For two works which stand out among the efforts to conceptualize local state/society complexes
within the context of production and social classes see; Hamza Alavi, "The State in Post-Colonial
Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh," New Left Review 74 (July/August 1972); John S. Saul, "The
State in Post-colonial Societies: Tanzania," in Politics and State in the Third World, ed. Harry
Goulbourne (The Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1983).
125
economics to capitalist economics has radically modified Third W orld societies along three
pivotal lines:
The Changing Class Slmclure:
First, the extension o f capitalism has fostered the rise of new social classes and the
transformation of established social classes. First, attention can be drawn to the
development o f a working class, especially concentrated in the urban areas.76 Again, we
see the development of an exporting bourgeoisie based in agricultural - usually in the form
o f a rural landowning class - o r resource extraction. A t the same time, in some cases
there has been the development of relatively small industrial and financial bourgeoisie in
urban centres. Wc also see the development of a middle strata o f professionals and
intellectuals, especially salaried workers linked directly to state apparatus.77 A
generalized but valuable overview of the typical class situation in the Third World,
expressed somewhat misleadingly in terms o f winners and losers, may be seen in Paul
Harrisons observations:
70 Sec, for example Robin Cohen, "Workers in Developing Societies," in Introduction to the
Sociology o f Developing Societies, eds. Hamza Alavi and Teodor Shanin (Monthly Review Press,
1982).
77 Much of this documentation tends to focus upon specific debates, such as the strength of
the local bourgeoisie against forces in the centre in the dependency literature, and in the
analysis of specific states or regions. One overview may be found in: James Petras et al eds.,
Class, State, and Power in the Third World, (Zed Press, 1981). Taking the case o f class formation
and its political ramifications in Central America see: Jan L. Flora and Edelberto Torres-Rivas,
"Sociology of Developing Societies: Historical Bases of Insurgency in Central America," in The
Sociology o f Developing Societies: Centra! America, cd. Flora and Torres-Rivas (Monthly Review
Press, 1989).
126
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T h e winners a re nil those with a foot in the door of the modern, westernized
sector, state o r private. Government employees, down to all but the humblest
level, with their excessive salaries, their unshakcable security, their perks.
T h e owners, manager and the salaried employees of modcrn-style enterprises,
national or multinational. The fat city cats: owners of urban property cashing
in on the goldmine produced by rural exodus, businessmen, export and import
merchants. O n the land, there arc the big landowners and, at a lower level,
those with enough land to produce a sizable surplus for sale. Both groups
have benefited disporportionatcly from state infrastructure, new roads, credit,
extension work. Then there is a new class of rural privileged - some of them
previously underprivileged - that is, the beneficiaries o f limited development
projects and o f token land reform schemes. These people, like the big
farmers, attract far more than their fair share of government and international
resources.78
There are important regional variations in class structure throughout the Third W orld, and
no generalization overrides the important of specific, concrete historical analyses of the
development o f social classes during the extension of capitalist relations in all Third World
societies.
Social Dislocation:
A second cluster of themes focuses upon the extreme social dislocation that has
accompanied the extension o f capitalist relations of production in Third W orld societies.
W e must initially call attention to the extreme misery and poverty that has increasingly
blanketed much of th e Third World population.79 This is perhaps most aptly
78
Paul Harrison, Inside the Third World, (Penguin Books, 1981), pp. 413-414.
79 See Susan George, How the Other H a lf Dies: The Real Reasons f o r World Hunger, (Penquin,
1976). George directly attacks Neo-Malthusian argumentation and emphasises the importance
of export production in the development o f Third World poverty.
127
demonstrated by noting the massive migration o f rural populations to the urban centres,
spawned especially by the transformation of agricultural production for export purposes.
Rural dwellers have increasingly fled from the poverty of the countryside in search o f a
belter life within the cities. Urban centres have accordingly swelled well beyond their
capacities to provide even minimal requirement to the newly urbanized population. A
sense o f the scope of this migration is evident in the following lines:
As rural migrants left their exhausted soil, dwindling landholdings, and

decreasing employment, the Third Worlds cities swallowed them until they
were bursting at the seams. The urban population grew from 185 millions in
1940 to 792 millions in 1975, expanding at double the rate o f the total
population. By the early seventies some 12 million people joined the exodus
from land to cities every year, or 33,000 every single day. They were driven
by poverty, but drawn, too, by the cities promise of wealth, as average urban
incomes are two or three times higher than in rural areas.
And the results o f the urbanization pressures could be easily forecast:
Every Third world city is a dual city - an island of wealth surrounded by a

black belt of misery. Outside the bright, shining modern city of skyscrapers,
flyovers and desirable residences, the poor are camped in squalor, disease and
neglect, in shacks and hutments of plywood, cardboard, mud or straw, usually
without clean water, sewers, health centres, schools, paved roads or paying
jobs. M ore than two fifths of city dwellers in developing countries live in
squatter or slum areas, and these are growing at twice the rate o f the official,
modern cities they surround.80
It is, unfortunately, one o f the least risky generalizations to note that these accounts
80 Paul Harrison, The Third World Tomorrow: A Report on the Battlefront in the W ar Against
Poverty, (Penguin Books, 1983), pp. 108-109.
128
extend to all major metropolitan centres in the Third World.

The extension o f capitalist relations and the associated migration patterns are
additionally related to the erosion of centuries-old customs and practices and the
weakening o f traditional social affiliations. The rapid transformation o f Th ird World
societies has put extreme pressure upon traditional tribal affiliations, especially nomadic
populations.81 The frequent suffusion o f European values and traditions and the
emaciation of indigenous culture is the natural concomitant to the extension of capitalist
relations throughout the Third World societies.82 Imported Western ideas, combined
with the dramatic social pressures created by the extension o f capitalist relations of
production, has resulted in a proliferation o f social philosophies and movements, including
especially nationalist philosophies and struggles, which tend to be easily affixed to
populations struggling to cultivate new forms o f social identity and, above a ll, achieve
relief from heightened immiseration and poverty.8' In these combined conditions the
revolutionary potential o f traditional elements o f Third World culture has been fully
exploited.81
81 For a discussion of this in the specific case o f Saudia Arabia see Donald P. Cole, "Pastoral
Nomads in a Rapidly Changing Economy: The Case o f Saudi Arabia," in Social and Economic
Development in the Arab Gulf, ed. Tim Niblock (St. M arlins Press, New York, 1980).
82 For a provocative account of the manner in which European Culture was inserted into
Latin America under the ideological rubric of progress see E. Bradford Burns, Tlw Poverty of
Progress, (University of California Press, 1980).
83 For an excellent survey of theories of nationalist philosophy in the Third W orld see
Ronaldo Munck, The Difficult Dialogue: Nationalism and Marxism, (Zed Books, 1986), chapter
6. For a provocative assessment of the links between Arab nationalism and the insertion of the
M iddle East into the world economy sec Samir Amin, The Arab Nation, (Zed Press, 1978).
^ For an example of the relationship between traditional culture and other social struggles
see T .L . Hodgkin, "The Revolutionary Tradition is Islam," Race and Class 21 (1980).
129
Protracted Social Conflict:
The final salient theme addresses prolonged social conflict and struggles, primarily
between specific constituencies on the one hand and the state on the other.85 Third
World countries have been the scene of intense social struggles that often manifest
themselves in a multitude of social protests and movements, insurgencies, extreme forms
o f political violence, insurrections, frequent coups detats and full-blown civil wars. M any
Third World societies oversee a constant and fierce struggle for control over the state
apparatus. There have been more than 200 revolutions and coups in the Third W orld in
the post-war period.** Insurgency and its political corollary of counter-insurgency and
increased state oppression are recurrent features of Third W orld societies.
Conclusion:
In the analysis o f society and the state, this chapter has raised three crucial
analytical themes. First, it argues that we must examine the relationship between politics
and production, that is, the manner in which the realm o f production sets in motion and
sustains struggles among specific social classes, especially in the capitalist era. Secondly,
we must also examine the manner in which additional elements of social consciousness, such
85 The clearest attempt to theorize about this conflict may be found in Edward Azar,
"Protracted Social Conflict: Ten Propositions," International Interactions (1984).
** Figures compiled from Patrick Brogan, The Fighting Never Stopped: Comprehensive Guide
to World Conflict Since 1945, (Vintage Books, 1990), appendix II.
130
as nationalism or gender, affect and condition social and political struggle, and particularly
the manner in which these elements interact with the social and political dynamics of class
relations. Thirdly, wc must analyze state in the context o f these social relations. Should
the state have a moment of full autonomy, it will only be detected through empirical
analysis. When w e examine the broad relationship between production and politics in the
Third W orld we additionally note the formation o f new social classes and the eclipse o f
established social classes, profound social dislocation in the form of urban migration, the
decline in traditional social affiliations, immiscration o f the population, and the rise of
prolonged social conflict.
131
Chapter Four
Amplifying the Social Dimensions of Security
Introduction:
The concepts o f security and insecurity always have been associated with
international relations and warfare. Thucydides wrote th at "real reason" for the
Peloponnesian W ar was linked to rising insecurity among the Spartans: "What made war
inevitable was the growth of A thenian power and the fe a r which this caused in Sparta".1
M ore than two millennia later a similar idea is echoed: "The feeling o f insecurity, and the
fears which it engenders, arc undoubtedly the strongest potential causes o f war in the
world today."2 Quincy Wright, in his pathsetting inquiry into war, noted that high tension
levels and the associated prospects for violence are directly related to varying levels of
security and insecurity.1 The language of security and insecurity, moreover, has forever
influenced scholarly conceptualization within international relations. In his attempt to
embellish the strategic vocabulary, fo r example, Michael Howard proffers the concept o f
reassurance and adds that by this he means "the kind of reassurance a child needs from its
parents or an invalid from his doctors against the dangers which, however remote, cannot
' Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, (Penguin, 1954), p. 49.

2 Quote attributed to Wickham Steed in Clyde Eagleton, Analysis of the Problem of War,
(Garland Publishing, 1972), p. 55.
' Quincy Wright, A Study o f War, (University o f Chicago Press, 1964).
be entirely discounted."4
Nonetheless, discussions o f the exact relationship between security and insecurity
on the one hand and interstate conflict and war on the other have remained hugely
implicit and underdeveloped/ T h e view that considerations o f security and insecurity are
integral to the analysis o f interstate conflict and war is maintained here. The working
premise, however, is that they are not related in a manner that can be encapsulated by
straightforward hypotheses such as rising insecurity leads to war. Security and insecurity
are not treated as variables, in other words, in the equation o f international conflict and
war. Rather, the focus in this study is upon security problems as they arc derived from
broader socio-political struggles. Expressed as succinctly as possible, the discourses o f
security reflect social and political struggles within society. O ther states arc assessed
according to the manner in which they are perceived to factor into internal social
equations. T h e construction of states as threatening, moreover, is closely related to the
perception o f rivalry, hostility and conflict. T he analysis of security discourses, therefore,
will help to reveal the links between societal dynamics and interstate rivalry, conflict and
war.
T h e treatment o f security in this study picks up on the Alternative group of security
researchers that draw attention to the need to understand the concept o f security within a
broader political and cultural matrix. The Alternative body o f research represents the third
4 Michael Howard, "Reassurance and Deterrence: Western Defence in the 1980s," in The
Causes o f War, (Harvard University Press, 1984), p. 248.
5 There are some minor exceptions to this tendency. Rummels discussions have drawn
explicit attention to the idea of threat as one key variable in the movement towards conflict.
See R.J. Rummcl, Understanding Conflict and War, v.3 (Sage Publications, 1977).
133
o f three post-war phases in the conceptual development o f security. T h e first period was
largely one o f conceptual neglect with some minor exceptions. The second phase began in
the late 1970s and focuses upon the need to redefine the concept of security. The nascent
Alternative security research began to develop in the late 1980s, partly in response to the
writings of the definitional school as well as other trends in social philosophy. It
represents a fundamental break with past studies. In order to understand the manner in
which discussions o f security are treated in this study, it is necessary to briefly discuss the
post-war treatment of the concept of security.
Development o f the Concept of Security:
Perhaps the most striking thing about the concept o f security within the field of
international relations in the post-war period was its undertreatment. Although always
implicitly central to any analytical framework within the field of international relations, the
need to develop the concept appears to have been overridden by the attention given to
the more central organizing concept of power. It is instructive to observe that the main
text book in international relations failed to explore the concept of security directly.6
Barry Buzan has identified five reasons for the conceptual underdevelopment of security.
First, the idea of security is too complex and has therefore been bypassed in favour of
more manageable ideas. Secondly, he notes the overlap between the concept of security
and that of power. "In the Realist orthodoxy," Buzan writes, "power dominated both as
6 Hans Morgcnthau, Politics and Power: The Stmggle for Power and Peace, 5th edition (Alfred
A . Knopf, 1973).
134
end and as means. Security necessarily shrank conceptually to being a way of saying either
how well any particular state o r allied group of states was doing in the struggle for power,
or how stable the balance of power overall appeared to be."7 As a third point, Buzan
notes that the assortment of revolts against the Realist tradition within international
relations have tended to shy away from the concept o f security. W ith respect to the
literature on interdependence, for example, he notes that the "inclination was to push the
traditional, military power-oriented Realist model into the background, seeing its
competitive, fragmented, force-based approach as increasingly irrelevant to the interwoven
network world o f international political economy." T he nature of Strategic Studies as a
sub-field lies behind the fourth reason for the conceptual underdevelopment surrounding
security. Buzan notes that Strategic Studies has conventionally offered a shorter-term
policy oriented perspective, has been directly linked to Anglo-American defense needs,
and has a primary concern with military matters. As Buzan notes: "Security is about much
m ore than military capability and relations, and th is ... has made Strategic Studies an
infertile seedbed for the further growth o f the concept." Finally, and perhaps most
provocatively, Buzan claims that any dcfinitivencss around the idea o f security would
undermine the utility derived from its symbolic ambiguity:
An undefined notion o f national security offers scope for power-maximising

strategies to political and military elites, because of the considerable leverage
7 Barry Buzan, People, Stales and Fear: The National Security Problem in International
Relations, (Wheatsheaf B oob, 1983), p. 7. Buzan offers four additional reasons for the lack o f
attention given to the concept including its essentially contested nature, the lack o f receptivity
of the "revolts" against Realist orthodoxy to the concept, the short-term policy orientation o f
strategic studies, and the political dividends o f maintaining the concepts ambiguity. Sec pp. 6-9.
135
over domestic affairs which can be obtained by invoking it. While such
leverage may sometimes be justified, as in the case of Britains mobilisation
during the Second World W ar, the natural ambiguity o f foreign threats during
peacetime makes it easy to disguise more sinister intentions in the cloak of
national security... Cultivation of hostile images abroad can justify intensified
political surveillance, shifts o f resources to the military, and other such
policies with deep implications for the conduct o f domestic political life. At
an extreme, the need for national security can even be evoked as a reason for
not discussing it.8
Consequently, for most o f the post-war period, the field of international relations
paradoxically employed the concept o f security but failed to subject it to any critical
scrutiny.
Two notable exceptions to this trend appeared during the 1950s. T h e first was
John H erzs discussion o f the security dilemma.9 In his response to the various forms of
"Idealist Internationalism" H erz posited an account of international relations which placed
the concept o f security at the centre of analysis. His first move was to observe that
whenever we find a constellation o f groups or social units that are not organized into a
"higher unity" there arises the condition known as the security dilemma:
Groups or individuals living in such a constellation must be, and usually are,
concerned about their security from being attacked, subjected, dominated, or
annihilated by other groups or individual. Striving to attain security from such
an attack, they are driven to acquire more and more power in order to escape
the impact of the power of others. This, in turn, renders the others more
insecure and compels them to prepare for the worst. Since none can ever
feel entirely secure in such a world of competing units, power competition
8 Ibid., p. 9.
9 John H. H e r/, "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma," World Politics 2 (1950),
157-180.
136
ensues, and the vicious circle of security and power accumulation is on.1"
One mechanism o f the power struggle for Herz is the unending consolidation o f lower
groups into intermediate and better organized groups. This process culminates in the
"extreme manifestation" o f the security dilemma in international relations:
This homo homini lupus situation does not preclude social cooperation as
another fundamental fact of social life. But even cooperation and solidarity
tend to become elements in the conflict situation, part of their function being
the consolidation and the strengthening of particular groups in their
competition with other groups. T he struggle fo r security, then, is merely
raised from the individual or lower-group level to a higher-group level. Thus,
families and tribes may overcome the power game in their internal relations in
order to face other families or tribes; larger groups may overcome it to face
other classes unitedly; entire nations may compose their internal conflicts in
order to face other nations.11
The security dilemma, according to Herz, constitutes an intractable feature o f human life
in the condition o f anarchy, especially within the field of international relations. In
international politics there have been two traditional responses: "Either l.ie approach has
been expressive o f a utopian and often chiliastic Political Idealism, or - when
disillusionment with the idealists ability to mould the realist fact frustrates expectations it has taken refuge in an equally extreme, power-political and power-glorifying Political
Realism."12
10 Ibid., p. 73.
11 Ibid., p. 73.
12 Ibid., p. 74.
137
Hcrzs formulation contains the common observation that rising spirals o f power
are associated with falling spirals of insecurity. On the other hand, however, it contains
the novel observation that the engine o f this dynamic is the struggle fo r security itself.
Power is reduced to the status o f an instrumentality. H erzs formulation of the security
dilemma challenges the conventional power-centred model of international relations, but it
was a challenge that was not taken up analytically. This has the effect of confirming, at
least to some degree, the ambiguity surrounding the concept o f security, as well, at least in
the sense that the challenge does not appear to have been recognized, that the concepts
o f security and power have been collapsed into each other, and treated, to a large extent,
synonymously: "Reduced to little more than a synonym for power," Buzan reminds us,
"security could have little independent relevance in wider systemic terms, and therefore
the security dilemma approach could function at best as a minor adjunct to the power
model o f international relations."13
The second exception appeared in Arnold Wolfers discussion of the increasingly
widespread appeals to national security in the immediate post-war period.14 For
Wolfers, this appeal is "understandable" in view of the cold war and th e threat o f external
aggression, especially when compared with earlier periods when the focus o f national
attention would have been tilted towards the depression and the need for social reform.
T h e problem, however, is that th e idea of national security is sufficiently ambiguous to
13 Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International
Relations, p. 3.
14 Arnold Wolfers, "National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol," Discord and Collaboration,
(Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), chapter 10.
138
A
t
h
warrant serious concern. H e notes that this ambiguity "may be permitting everyone to
label whatever policy he favours with an attractive and possibly deceptive name."1'
Wolfers claims that "it would be an exaggeration to claim that the symbol o f national
security is nothing but a stimulus to semantic confusion", that wc "know roughly" what is
meant by it, but that it still "leaves room for more confusion than sound political counsel
or scientific usage can afford."16 H e is motivated by the concern that the "teini security
covers a range of goals so wide that highly divergent policies can be interpreted as policies
o f security."17 In an attempt to clarify the idea of national security, Wolfers identifies
three distinct phases through which decision makers must pass. First, he speaks o f security
in terms of the protection o f national values previously acquired, and refers to W alter
Lippmanns idea that "a nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger o f
having to sacrifice core values." While these values arc not a given for Wolfers, that is,
that decision makers must define them, it is clear this difficulty should not be overdrawn.
H e matter o f factly stresses that "national independence" must rank high "not merely for
its own sake but for the guarantee it may offer to values like liberty, justice, and peace.""1
Secondly, the appropriate "level" o f security must be targeted by decision makers in
recognition o f the fact that "efforts for security arc bound to be experienced as a
15 Ibid., p. 147.
16 Ibid., p. 149.
17 Ibid., p. 150.
18 Ibid., pp. 163-164.
139
burden...'"''
Wolfers writes that a number of different factors including the salience of
external threats, national character and convention will influence the degree o f security
that a nation targets. Finally, decision makers must find the "means" to obtain the
targeted level of security: "It may be good advice in one instance to appeal for greater
effort and more armaments; it may be no less expedient and morally advisable in another
instance to call for moderation and for greater reliance on means other than coercive
power."20. Consequently, Wolfers drew attention to the political nature o f appeals to
national security, and attempted to minimize this ambiguity by identifying the process
through which national security could be established.
Redefining the N ational Security Problem:
Although Wolfers and Herz threw down the conceptual gauntlet, the concept o f
security remained in an emaciated state for most o f the post-war period. Beginning in the
late 1970s and continuing throughout the 1980s, however, there has been a flurry of
intellectual activity around the concept o f security. This intellectual effort received
stimulus from two high profile reports that chiselled at the edges o f conventional views o f
security. T h e first was the Bruntland report by the World Commission on the
Environment and Development entitled Our Common Future. The second was the Palme
R eport by the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues entitled
w Ibid., p. 153.
20 Ibid., p. 165.
140
Common Security: A Blueprint fo r Survival.'1 These studies contained a number o f pivotal

themes, especially the need to demilitarize the concept o f security, that were
simultaneously scrutinized in the scholarly literature. This revitalized inquiry into security
contains two basic directions. T h e first concerns the attempt to afford the concept its due.
so to speak, by expanding its relevance in international relations theory. The second, and
by far most energized efforts, are focused upon the need to expand the definition o f the
concept o f security beyond its more conventional militaristic connotations.
T h e first theme develops the status of the concept o f security in international
relations. The first attempt at this may be found in Barry Buzans Peace, Power, and
Security: Contending Concepts in the Study of International Relations.22 Buzan begins by
noting that the basic concepts o f power and peace have dominated the field o f
international relations: "The concept o i power emphasises the parts o f the international
system at the expense of the whole, and the dynamic of conflict at the expense of
harmony. It docs, however, identify a factor which is universal both as a motive for
behaviour and as a description o f the relative status of actors. The concept o f peace
emphasises both the international system as a whole, and individuals as its ultimate
building bloc, at the expense o f states, and emphasises the dynamic o f harmony at the
expense o f that of conflict. Its principal focus is on a possible universal condition." This
fundamental conceptual dichotomy, Buzan notes, has yielded a broad dissatisfaction. The
21 O ur Common Future: World Commission on Environment and Development, [Chairman Gro

Harlem Brundtland, Norway] (Oxford University Press, 1987); Common Security: A Blueprint fo r
Survival, [Palme Report], (Simon and Schuster, 1982).
21 Barry Buzan, "Peace, Power, and Security: Contending Concepts in the Study o f
International Relations," Journal o f Peace Research 21:2 (1984).
141
basic opposition between the power perspective of international relations and the peace
perspective has engendered contradictory results. U p to a point it provides valuable

criticism and "creates incentives to sharpen and deepen thinking". But we have now
arrived at a point, according to Buzan, whereby the conceptual polarization has inhibited
intellectual development: "Opposition become institutionalised and politicised, and creative
i
i
thinking is either overridden by the rituals of intellectual entrenchment, or stifled by the
lack o f creative room within the tight contradictory confines of the peace/power dilemma."
.2
In view of this conceptual ossification, Buzan offers us the concept o f security "as a
synthesis" between the two contending poles. He begins by observing that the struggle for
i
security is a basic condition o f international relations: "The basic problem which underlies
almost all interest in international relations is insecurity." H e stresses that the power
j
s
perspective and the peace perspective are valuable to the extent that they have offered
insight on this basic problem. But their ability to address the struggle for security is
insufficient. The power and peace perspectives have at best offered "a partial view o f the
security problem". Buzan stresses the need to view the struggle for state security as an
impetus by itself: " If security is recognised as an important motive for behaviour in the
international system, then it provides a view o f international relations which is quite
distinct from that which secs security merely as a possible outcome o f power relations."
Through the aperture o f security as a "broader behavioural motive" for states, then, Buzan
blends the Power (Realist) and Peace (Idealist) perspectives in order to create a "realistidealism". T h e power and peace perspective, he reiterates, have offered an increasingly
sclerotic view of both the international anarchy and the arms race. In their place, he
offers the reader the security perspective, which takes as its starting point the struggle
against insecurity among states. Regardless of the aptness o f his characterisation o f the
two contending views o f international relations, and regardless o f the tenable nature o f his
blend solution, it is important that Buzan has explicitly treated the concept o f security as
much more than mere outcome in the struggle for power. The struggle lor security is a
distinct behavioural motive in its own right. In an important manner, the original views of
H erz have been resurrected and used as a springboard to construct a third perspective in
international relations.
Mohammed Ayoobs work on the Third World also offers us tin opportunity to see
the concept of security assigned a weightier role in the behavioural calculus o f states.
Ayoob posits the concept of security as the matrix o f state behaviour. Ayoob contends
that the seemingly contradictory behaviour o f Third World stales as an intrusive
collectivity bent on reordering the international order on the one hand and as individual
states trying to maintain some semblance of political and economic stability on the other
are manifestations are "two sides o f the same security coin for these new members of the
system of states. " 23 M o re specifically, the struggle to reorder the rules more favourably to
Third W orld states reflects the struggle for international status. "The perceived security if
not the survival o f these states," he writes, "hinges upon the terms on which they interact
with the dominant powers o f the global north". A t the same time, the salience of
internal security threats predisposes individual Third World states to protect the world
order as far as possible.
Ayoob concludes that the contradictory behaviour is more
apparent than real, reflecting basic considerations o f security in both eases. In a manner
23 Mohammed Ayoob, "Statebuilding and Security in the Third World," International Studies
Quarterly 33 (1989), p. 78.
143
reminiscent of Hcrz's original formulations on the subject, Ayoob also suggests that
security concerns arc the ultima ratio of state behaviour, and that considerations o f
power and status take on an cpiphenomenal hue. In the end, M orgenthaus axiom o f
"interest defined as power" is dramatically reworded as "interest defined as security".
The second, an equally important trend within the definitional school of security
studies has been the struggle to broaden the meaning o f security. T h e central theme in
this respect has been the expansion o f the idea of security beyond the military realm. The
need to view security in terms which move beyond the narrowness o f military solutions was
made poignantly clear in the Palme Report:
... the perceived requirements of national security dictate that nations

maintain military forces adequate to the dangers posed to their security dangers from within and from without. But the realities are such that military
strength alone cannot provide real security. By every index o f military strength
it is evident that most nations have become more powerful over the years.
Yet, judged by the increasingly strident tone o f international and domestic
debates about these issues, it is also clear that greater national military might
has not led to a greater sense of national security... if the world is to approach
even the possibility of achieving true security - ending the danger of nuclear
war, reducing the frequency and destructiveness of conventional conflicts,
casing the social and economic burdens of armaments - important changes are
necessary in the way that nations look at questions of armaments and security. 24
This thrust has its parallel within the scholarly literature on security: "The concern for the
security of a nation is undoubtedly as old as the nation state itself, but since World W ar I I
the concept of national security has acquired an overwhelmingly military character ." * 5
24
Palme Report, pp. 4-6, my emphasis.
25
Lester R. Brown, Redefining National Security, (Worldwatch Paper 14, 1977), p. 5.

144
Another writer notes that "much writing and most political debate about national security
policy seem obsessed these days with the inputs to military defense (weapons systems,
manpower, logistics, and research and development on military technology) and the
planning, strategy, and tactics of organized violence."2" In his assessment o f the concept
of security Richard Ullman argues that American national security has been defined in
"excessively narrow and excessively military terms.'07 Ullman argues that militaristic
notions o f security guide American political leaders, and may cause them to miss
potentially even more harmful dangers while leading to the excessive militarization o f
international affairs. In order to avoid this path Ullman explicitly calls for "a more
comprehensive definition of security."
As part o f this expanded notion o f security these writers focus upon an expanded
notion o f threat. The logic behind this move is rather straightforward. I f threats are no
longer o f a military nature, then a military response is simply inappropriate. In the
context o f oil supplies Lester Brown demonstrates this logic:
The overwhelmingly military approach to national security is based on the

assumption that the principal threat to security comes from other nations.
But the threat to security may now arise less from the relationship o f nation
to nation and more from the relationship of man to nature. Dwindling
reserves o f oil ... now threaten the security of nations everywhere. National
security cannot be maintained unless national economies can be sustained,
but, unfortunately, the health of many economics cannot be sustained much
longer with major adjustments. All advanced industrial economies arc fuelled
primarily by oil, a resources that is being depleted. W hile military strategists
have worried about the access of industrial economies to Middle Eastern oil,
26
Abdul-Monem M . Al-Mashat, National Security in the Third World, (Westview Press, 1985),
p. 34.
27
RichardH. Ullman, "Redefining Security," International Security 8 :1 (Summer 1983), p. 129.

145
another more serious threat, the eventual exhaustion o f the worlds oil
supplies, has been moving to the fore .28
The notion that military solutions can be inappropriate for some security problems was
most succinctly expressed in th e Palme Report: "There are, o f course, no military solutions
to environmental insecurity." 29
Richard Ullman proceeds to expand the concept of security by similarly expanding
the notion o f threats. Ullm an notes that not all threats to the state are immediately
obvious, external and military in nature. Rather, Ullman seeks to draw attention to the
less apparent, internal, non-military threats to the state including environmental
degradation, resource depiction, terrorism, natural catastrophes and the chronic instability
of major Third W orld states. In the process the concept of national security is expanded
to accommodate a wide variety of threats beyond the military sphere. A nother example
of an expanded notion o f threat may be found in A 2 ar and M oons Third World N ational
Security: Toward a New Conceptual Framework. Working w ith an expanded concept o f
security which includes military, economic, ecological and ethnic considerations, Azar and
M o o n argue that w e must examine th e complexity which can surround the nature of
threats. Each dimension of security, they argue, has an array o f corresponding threat
types requiring different policies. A military threat may be overt and external, fo r
28
Brown, op. cit., p.
29
Palme Report, op. cit., p. 301
Edward Azar and Chung-ln Moon, "Third World National Security: Toward and New
Conceptual Framework," International Interactions 11:2 (1984).
50
146
example, whereas economic threats can be subtle and internal in nature. In order to
understand the security dilemma as it faces most Third W orld states we must, according to
A zar and M oon, take these subtle and complex threats into account.
Beginning in the late 1970s and continuing throughout the 1980s, then, the
definitional school attempted to revive and rework the concept of security. T h e task was
largely related to finding the appropriate definition of national security. This approach
sought to provide an expanded view o f throats to states, and thereby stressed that the
security response of states must move beyond the narrow military realm. The problem of
national security was uncritically accepted as the central animating concern. T h e highly
political, but seldom recognized, assumption that the problem of security for the state,
operationalized and addressed in terms o f the national security problematic, should form
the legitimate point o f scholarly departure was never called into question. W ithin the
context o f this uncritical posing o f the fundamental issue we see writers drawing attention
to politically suspect definitions o f national security:
In the absence of a consensus on fundamental issues and in the absence o f

open political debate and contest, many o f these (Third World) states arc
ruled by regimes with narrow support bases - both politically and socially which usually come to power by means of a coup detat and which hang on so
tenaciously to office that they have to be, more often than not, physically
liquidated to pave the way for any form o f political transition. Since it is
these regimes, and their bureaucratic and intellectual hangers-on, who define
the threats to the security of their respective states, it is no wonder that they
define it primarily in terms of regime security rather than the security of the
society as a whole. Security ... has been traditionally defined as the protection
and preservation of core values. However, in the case of many Third World
states, the core values of the regime - with self-preservation at the very core
o f this core - are often at extreme variance with the core values cherished by
large segments of the populations over whom they rule. Once again, given
these discrepancies in the definition of core values and, indeed, o f security
147
itself, it is no wonder that major threats to the security o f these regimes

emanate from within their own societies.31
As this quote demonstrates, the definitional school could suggestively draw attention to the
political nature o f security problems, and acknowledge that other subjects o f security
must be considered. Nonetheless, there was no meaningful movement away from the view
that the national security problem is basic and fundamental. Th e above quote, as an
example, is not a repudiation o f the basic orientation o f the intellectual project but rather
a heartfelt acknowledgement that some definitions of national security can be seriously
called into question.
The Alternative School o f Security Studies:
Beginning in the late 1980s a group of scholars began laying the foundations for
radically different approach to the analysis o f security in international relations. According
to this emerging view, any analysis of security in international relations that begins and
ends with the national security problem is far too narrow in its concern.32 International
M Mohammed Ayoob, "Regional Security and the Third World," in Regional Security in the
Third World, (Wcstview Press, 1986), p. 11.
32
For example, see R.B.J. Walker, The Concept o f Security and International Relations,
Working Paper no. 3, Institute on global Conflict and Cooperation, Univeristy o f California; Paul
A. Chilton, The Container concept of Security: A Cognitive Linguistic Approach, (Unpublished); D.
Campbell, Global Inscription: Space, Time and the U.S. National Security Policy, (Unpublished
paper, August 1988); Simon Dalby, Geopolitics and Security Discourse, (Unpublished paper, 1988);
G.M. Dillon, Security and Modernity, (Unpublished); Brad Klein, "Alter Strategy: The Search for
a Post-Modernist Analysis of Peace," Alternatives (July 1988).
148
relations analysts, they argue, can no longer be content to search for the appropriate
meaning or definition of national security. The concept of security, rather, must be
decoupled, delinked, disengaged or disentangled from the national security problem."
"By displacing the state as the sole focus of analytic attention," Simon Dalby has written,
"critical research allows consideration o f the broader aspects of politics, seen properly as a
broad concept o f how society is organized." Ultimately, these writers analyze the concept
o f security in terms o f a broader social and cultural matrix. The explicit call is for a
socially and culturally centred analysis which thoroughly supplants the state focused
national security problem.
Perhaps the title o f Rob Walkers programmatic The Concept o f Security and
International Relations succinctly and unambiguously commences the narrative of the
Alternative group, suggesting as it does that the concept o f security has a social usages and
intellectual meanings beyond the narrow appropriation o f international relations. ' 1
W alker expresses concern at the paradoxical and "deeply disturbing" silence surrounding
the concept of security: T h e concept o f security remains on the margin of contemporary
political discourse in a way that is at odds with the importance o f security policies in
contemporary political life". Walker directly confronts the intellectual silence which cloaks
the concept. H e argues that the prevailing categorical schemes o r conceptual structures of
the international relations discipline - Realism/Idealism, community/anarchy, friend/enemy
33 As R.B.J. Walker writes "The concept of national security isa consequence of the theory
of the state as the Sovereign locus of political identity." The Concept of Security and International
Relations, op. cit., p. 23.
31
Ibid..
149
permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
- rest upon a very strict exclusion between life inside the state and life outside the state.
W alker draws upon post-structuralisms thorough critique of the philosophy of identity, a
conceptual constellation that has been central to Western thought. H e contends that the
basic categories and conceptual schemes of international relations thought reflects the
tendency to fetishize the moment of unity - community or life inside the state - and to
subordinate the moment o f difference - anarchy or life outside the state - to it. Perhaps
the most striking conceptual casualty o f these discursive practices within the international
relations discipline has been treatment of the concept o f the state. Although central to
the discipline o f international relations, it is understood primarily in spatial terms and as
the sole locus o f political identity, and has escaped any serious and sustained examination.
It is against this backdrop that the concept of security has been introduced into
the dominant discourse o f international relations. This peculiar appropriation within the
field o f international relations, according to Walker, has been informed by the view which
secs "the state as the primary locus o f political life." A s Walker writes: "The concept o f
national security is a consequence of the theory of the state as the Sovereign locus of
political identity." Security is a problem of the outside o f the state: "The most important
characteristic o f the concept o f security is neither that it is essentially contested nor that it
is silent but that it is derivative from and dependent upon an historically specific
conception o f political community." The focus upon the national security problem is the
product of the view of the state as the exclusive basis o f political community. Indeed, his
most basic conclusion is that only by breaking the equation o f security with identity, o f
security with community or life inside the state will a critical approach to security develop.
It is valuable to observe W alker at length:
150
The fact that international relations theory has depended on only the
sketchiest outlines o f a theory of the state has mattered surprisingly little to a
discipline that has been so self-conscious about the primacy of the state. It
has only been necessary to be sure that the distinction between inside and
outside, between politics and relation, between community and anarchy, could
be maintained as an absolute exclusion. However appropriate this
formulation may have been in the past - it has, arguably, always been
misleading - it is difficult to sustain in a world in which states arc both
growing "stronger" in some sense but are also increasingly embedded in
complex global structure whose contours do not conform to the expectation of
a global Leviathan.
W alker draws his line of argumentation to conclusion:
The issue is not whether the state is obstinate or obsolete; or whether

"realism" expresses a recognition of tragic necessity and idealism is merely a
dangerous naivety; or whether drawing on the "domestic analogy" is a sign of
professional incompetence; or any other version of the false choice between
the community of identity within and the difference - the barbarian, the other,
the anarchy without. In this sense, the problem with the claims o f realism on
which the concept of national security depends is its simultaneous rejection
yet deeper acceptance of idealism, of the priority of the moment o f identity
against which the tragedy of the "security dilemma" can be measured. This
priority produces the problem o f national security. Concepts of peace that
build upon this same priority cannot provide a way out. T h e silence of
prevailing concepts of security - and peace - can only be broken by refusing
the equation of security with identity, and thus with the obliteration of
difference: a refusal that necessarily constitutes a struggle for new forms for
political community.
T h e analysis of security in international relations, in other words, has heretofore been

incarcerated by the naturalization of an historically specific conception o f political
community. The state cannot be continued to be viewed as the natural or even
obligatory sight o f political community. W e must move beyond these Procrustean
barriers to contemplate security in terms of a wider social and cultural matrix that
151
necessarily embraces alternative questions of political practice and political community.

From another quarter we see Mick Dillons embellishments upon the rather
abstract ideas on the subject of security. Dillon reproaches those modern discussions o f
security which assume that the subject o f security - individuals or states - are
unproblematically constituted outside o f language. He argues that the common
referential view o f language, whereby words refer to things or esser"cs, has been
extended to the idea o f identity o f the subject. That is, the subject (of security) is
conceived o f "as an essence; something autonomous, standing outside language and
beyond our way o f representing it, but which our modes o f representation should seek as
accurately as possible to reflect."35 Dillon calls attention to the constitutive view of
language, a view that sees language as not merely referring to the presence o f an external
world but rather as actively constituting it: "We have language, but how often do we
discover, and not only through the pre-eminently playful language games o f humour, that
wc arc had by it." It follows from this view that we must revise our conception of the
subject (o f security), and especially, of the manner in which its identity comes to be
formed. Conventional conceptions of identity tend to attribute order and unity to the
inside, he notes, and privilege and value these qualities over the disorder on the outside.
The notion of boundary was understandably regarded as the barrier which preserved
internal order (o f the individual, group or state) from the disorder o f the external world.
According to Dillon, however, a constitutive view of language forces us to reconsider the
very notion of boundary:
35 G .M . Dillon, "Modernity, Discourse and Deterrence," Current Research on Peace and

Violence 2 (1989), p. 100.
152
... it is the boundary that "differentiates between inside and outside", and
hence the boundary should be elevated in our attention because it is the
structure which produces mutually-defining perspectives. Though the
boundary is commonly thought to belong to the system (individual, groups or
state), giving it shape and form, it necessarily also shapes the environment.
Hence the system is just as much inside the environment (actively shaping it),
as the environment is inside the system (actively shaping that too). Thus the
boundary has to be conceived not as an inert thing belonging cither to the
system or its environment, but as an active process o f differentiation which
serve system and environment equally. Neither the inside (order, community,
identity or system), nor the outside (disorder, anarchy, plurality or
environment), can be regarded as the source o f identity. They should,
therefore, not constitute the central problematic of social or psychological
science. It is the process o f differentiation that counts.*1
In a somewhat simpler form, the boundary is conceived as an active process which

continually constructs and constitutes difference which in turn constructs and constitutes
identity: "No longer an inert barrier, it emerges as a dynamic liminal domain where the
constant interplay o f difference continually constitutes meaning, knowledge and identity in short, forms of life (individual, group or state)." W ithout difference, D illon emphasizes,
there is no identity.
W e learn through D illons post-modern disquisition that "the subject (o f security)
is both the subject and object o f security policies." That is, as surely as the subject
inaugurates and promotes and develops security policies, it is had by them in the sense
that these policies contribute to the process o f differentiation which lies at the root of
identity. Despite the difficult and somewhat prohibitive style, we learn that the dominant
discursive practices o f security manage difference' "into otherness, a negative, undeserving
and threatening difference requiring destruction or deterrence." H e creatively restates the
16 Ibid., p. 100, my emphasis.

153
contemporary understanding o f the security dilemma a la John Herz in terms o f this

typical process of differentiation:
... the urge to translate difference into otherness is a common one, confined
neither to West nor East. If I am tolerant of different identities, there is no
guarantee that they will be equally tolerant of me. An identity that differs
from mine may well constitute me as other, and I may have to try to fend it
off. To establish or renew myself, my identity might also require that I, in
turn, construe some difference as otherness. From this perspective the study
o f security is concerned with the construction of identity through the interplay
o f difference and the imposition o f otherness.37
It is this common move, a move that has brought us to the brink of nuclear war, that
D illon admonishes us to escape. The post-structuralist "revitalization of politics", he
strongly contends, offers us a chance to reinstate the ambiguity and indeterminateness o f
identity and accept (rather than caricature) the necessity of difference.
Another example of the movement towards a sociological approach can be found
in the writings of Paul Chilton. Chilton is concerned with analyzing security "in a culture
in general, and in various modes of discourse within the culture."
T o this end he
addresses the concept o f security in terms of linguistic analysis. W hile his goal is to meld
linguistics and international relations, he argues that the approach is not as quixotic as it
may appear at first glance, and that it is congruent with the influence of the "cognitive
revolution" upon I R
37
Ibid., pp.
.'8
Chilton argues that there are two broad linguistic themes that can
1 0 1 -1 0 2 .
18
Chilton directly refers to Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International
Relations, (Princeton University Press, 1976) and Deborah Larson, Origins o f Containment: A
Psychological Explanation, (Princeton University Press, 1985).
154
assist us in the analysis o f international relations: the first are theories o f communication
and the second concerns theories of underlying conceptual structures. It is the latter
theme that Chilton uses as his point o f analytical departure. Chilton begins his analysis
with the straightforward observation that the words security and secure are polysemic, that
is, that the words occur in numerous social contexts and tend to "pervade our lives", and
!|
that at a result we can safely conclude that security is "very much a cultural concept.""
Chilton notes that cognitive semantics assumes that the meanings ol words are constructed
upon "preconccptual structures" deriving to a large extent from bodily experience.
"Concepts from this source domain", Chilton writes, "can be mapped into less directly
experience, less well-comprehended domains." 40 That is, words are rendered sensical
I
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through a process o f metaphorical mapping from simple experiences onto more abstract
I
1
levels. "The point here is that metaphor," Chilton writes, "is a lundamcntal and
I
s
a
unconscious principle in the production of meaning."
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I
5
\
\
Chilton identifies three relevant groups o f metaphors based upon bodily

experience. T h e first is the C O N T A IN E R schema, with three crucial elements including
interior, boundary, and surface.
The accessing of the C O N T A IN E R schema is extremely
j
I
i
common. "All day long humans go in and go out, especially so in urban environments; they
are in and out of states o f mind; in and out of clothes; they take in air and let it air; they
ingest food and excrete it; they are insiders and outsiders with respect to social groups."
T he second preconccptual structure is that o f the P A TH schema. This source domain
30 Paul A . Chilton, "The Container Concept of Security: A Cognitive Linguistic Approach,"

(Unpublished), p. 17.
40
Ibid., p. 17.
155
"involves structural elements such as a starting point (origin), destination (endpoint), path,
and directedness toward the endpoint." In terms o f the metaphors that may be mapped
from this domain Chilton draws out attention to the concept o f purpose, and especially
national purpose. "We can talk o f going a long way toward our purposes, meeting
obstacles on the way, getting there in th e end, and so on." The third important source
domain focuses upon F O R C E D Y N A M IC S . It is valuable in this respect to quote directly
from Chilton: "This image schema derives from the physical experience o f pressure and
resistances, both exerted and received - ie. from pushing and striking and from being
struck and pushed. The most important cases are probably the experience o f lateral push
and pull, gravitational force and the experience of balance .41
W ith respect to the higher level concept of security Chilton argues that these
source domains o f C O N T A IN E R , P A T H and F O R C E D Y N A M IC S are accessed as part
of the construction of meaning. With respect to the concept o f security he identifies two
common melaphorizations. First, security comes to mean something that is fixed or firmly
held in p lace:"... one o f the conceptual elements in our understanding of security is
connected to the absence o f motion, to stasis, and more precisely to the physical restraint
of undesircd motion." As a consequence we are prone to speak, he contends, in terms o f
"tight security" or "loose security" or to collocate security with stability. T h e second image
schema that is frequently accessed is the C O N T A IN E R . In this sense, if something is
secure then it cannot be entered or exited, and, since containers have an inside and an
outside, then to be secure is to prevent movement in and out. Common expressions o f
41
Chilton, What Do W e M ean by Security?, p.
156
this nature include the idea o f being "secure in ones beliefs", a "penetration o f security",
or "security leaks", or o f "holes or breaches in security".
Chilton argues that these conceptualizations help to make certain
conceptualizations of security plausible, and can profoundly influence dominant discourses
j|
around security.
With respect to the United States, for example, Chilton notes that the
C O N T A IN E R schema has been particularly influential in post-war security doctrines,

especially the doctrine of Containment. Chilton argues that the U S is now in a "critical
'i1
discourse moment", particularly in the sense that the C O N T A IN E R metaphors seem less
$.
and less viable: "New thinking is required in the west as in the Soviet Union. The United
Si
States is seeking to formulate a policy concept beyond containment; the Soviet Union has
introduced openness concepts into international political discourse with the notion o f
Glasnost - the reverse of the C O N T A IN E R schemas." The implicit tenor of Chiltons
work is that the construction of meaning through metaphor contributes to the resiliency of
particular conceptions of security.
Linguistic plausibility is not in itself a sufficient
explanation for security policy. Rather, Chilton is concerned with providing an

explanation of th e perseverance o r "historical memory" of conceptions o f security in the
si
minds o f both analysts and policy makers.'12 It would follow from this, that this resiliency
would partly explain why alternative meanings o f security within society might remain
^
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42 See his discussion of Steven Kulls Minds at War. Chilton notes that Kull observes that
certain mindsets persevere within defense policy-makers, and responds to it in the following
manner: "Though his study is based on rich verbal m aterial... the clues that language can give
us as to the full details of cognitive structures in this filed still remain to be explored. In
particular, Kulls account rests crucially on the concept of pcrsevcrencc. But this notion is not
in itself capable o f any explanatory hint as to why some forms o f thought persevere and why they
have a powerful influence on other minds to the extent that they guide action."
157
peripheral.
Simon Dalbys Geopolitics and Security Discourse provides an excellent example of
the relationship between prevailing conceptions of security on the one hand and the post
structuralist themes of identity and difference on the other. Dalby begins by observing
that the hegemonic conception of security in the post-war period in the United States is
inherently geopolitical, especially o f the manner in which geopolitics refers to the
relationship between power and the control o f territory. He identifies the common
process constructing "exotic Others and disciplining domestic selves", and of then defining
"their [the Others] place as different from ours". Dalby notes that the common theme
underlying these moves is the conception of security as "the spatial exclusion o f Others."
Although the terms geopolitics often gets left out o f the discussion, the dominant debates
on US security arc:
... structured within understanding of political power in spatial terms, within an

implicit division of political space into territorially demarcated states. These
states in turn are strategically important because of their location in terms of
geopolitics. The presence of geopolitics here is clear, the geographical
occupation o f the Machindcrian heartland and the potential Soviet domination
of the Eurasian landmass are persistent themes o f American security
discourse, even if the term geopolitics is rarely mentioned. Operational
foreign policy was structured in terms o f an implicit geopolitical understanding
of global events in which the motive force is the bilateral competition o f the
USSR and the "free world" led by the U.S. This competition, and with it
deterrence as the key to Western survival, necessitates a global militarisation
to contain the expansion of the totalitarian sphere led by the USSR. A ll the
principal aspects of the political discourse of post-war U.S. politics are present
here. In combination they acted to limit the fields of discourse, asking
ultimately "but what about the Russians?" to close off potentially
counterhcgemonic formulations.4-'
4} Ibid., p.
.
158
It underlines strategic thinking and sovietology, he contends, and gives meaningful shape
to the doctrine of containment: "All the arguments for containment, drawn from various
disciplines and political discourses understood security as a matter of spatial limitation of
other powers". For Dalby, the construction of otherness is intimately linked to underlying
|
spatial currents. In speaking especially of the U.S., he notes that projects such as the
Strategic Defense Initiative arc founded upon the specification of a spatially excluded
otherness:
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Others are spatially excluded, to be feared, ostracised, and ultimately reduced

to extensions of an imposed identity. Security is identified as identity, unity
and an imposed order. Difference is a threat. Otherness has to be spatially
contained, ultimately reduced to an extension of sameness, implies a reduction
of difference, making their space like ours. Inherent in all this are
conceptions of absolute space, and the metaphysical construction of a
universalist epistemological position where true knowledge triumphs, gradually
extending through absolute space."
Dalby admonishes the reader that we should not underestimate the degree to which this
prevailing formulation o f security concerns has shaped U.S. policy, especially the
underlying U.S. foreign policy themes of Atlanticism (Euro-American political economy of
liberal capitalism with its political, cultural and economic arrangements) and the
Containment doctrine.
The socially constructed nature of the language of security is most clearly
Ibid., p. 16.
159
presented in Rob Walkers Canadian Security Policy and the Language of W ar at Peace.4*
Walker begins his study with a very blunt question: "Is it possible for Canadians to speak
coherently and effectively about peace and security?" In sketching out an answer to this
question he asserts that a complex "discourse" or "rhetoric" or "culture" of military affairs
can be identified in Canada: "They invoke authority and expertise. They give meanings to
certain terms and exclude those who do not speak properly from the conversation. In
short, they engage in a politics o f language." Walker then focuses upon the question o f
what is meant by the infinitive "to speak". In his response he draws attention to the
political nature of language, to the mechanisms that shape or amplify or distort or silence
some types o f communication, and to more fundamental questions about th e relationship
between language and power, a relationship that determines who gets to speak, about
which type o f speech is permissible, about tacit understandings surrounding speech, and
about the process through which some images ascend in terms o f cultural importance.
W alker assumes the constitutive nature of language in general, that is, that language does
not merely refer to an outside world but rather makes and remakes it. H e observes that
people themselves are constituted by language, and, in contrast to the cynics assumption,
attempt to tell the truth. The recognition, he writes, of the intimate relationship between
language and security has been lost upon those within the security field:
To flirt with language, or rhetoric, or discourse, or the cultural production of

militarization is, by definition - the self-definition o f the professional analysts
and policy advisors - to admit professional incompetence. Machiavclli may
15
R.B.J. Walker, "Canadian Security Policy and the Language of W ar and Peace,"
(September 1988), unpublished.
160
have offered sage advice about the need to appear virtuous, and Clauscwit/.
may have offered timely warnings about the intemperate passions of
democratic society, but in the end, security, it is said, is about hard realities
and immediate necessities. Some thing arc important, some are not, and,
according to the conventional wisdom, the politics o f language hardly merit a
passing footnote. Peace and security call for pragmatism and action, for
logistics and technological expertise, for hardware and bullets. The rest is all
t a lk *
W alker stresses that the security dialogue is fundamentally about the politics of language
despite the protestations of the security community. It is valuable to quote him at length:
The trouble is that it is not only the rest that is all talk. Missiles may well stand
silent in their silos, but they arc only part of enormously complex systems of
communication and control. They fit into "strategics," "scenarios," and
"postures" and are directed at an "enemy," all of which are constructed on the
basis of certain articulations o f the way the world is or might be. Conjectures
and imagination, secrecy and disinformation, theory, hypothesis and historical
memory are all as much a part of the "reality" of security as the hardware,
fire-powcr or finger on the button. Military experience is just as subject to
codification and romanticizalion with a sub-culture as any other area of
human experience. Thinking about peace and security draws upon all kinds of
cultural influences which find their way into the everyday discourses of
strategic planners and front-line military personnel alike. Those concerned
with matters of peace and security may pay little attention to the politics of
language, but this does not mean that they are not engaged in them. 17
jt;
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Srj
The very process o f naming and defining permits analysts and practitioners to forget the
historical struggle behind security concerns. The language of security elucidates and
obscures simultaneously. "Where part of the politics o f language depends on the fluidity
o f meanings, another part depends on the practices of reification, on the crystali/ation o f
* Ibid., p. 14o f unpublished copy, my emphasis.
17
I
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Ibid., p. 15,
my emphasis.
161
llux into a claim o f permanence." Elsewhere he writes: "Language slips and translates. It
fixes and reifies. Living within language it is difficult to be aware o f its effects, impossible
to know exactly how one is located within its grammars and locutions." Most importantly,
W alker emphasizes that no one can escape this fact o f life: "To speak is always to be
caught within the cultural codes, rhetorical motifs, philosophical assumptions and
institutionalized patterns o f conversation that make speech possible." In the end, W alker
has placed security concerns and security debates firmly within the discursive nature o f
social life, thereby amplifying its distinctive political character.
How, we might ask, docs W alkers emphasis upon the social and political nature of
security concerns and problems differ from that identified by Arnold W o lfers over thirty
years ago? We would have to answer this question by stressing that security policy and
security proclamations arc, for Walker, essentially about controlling and policing the
boundaries of security discussions, that is, about what can and cannot be said:"... we are
led to questions about the way the limits of discussion are set, about the boundaries
between what can and what cannot be said, about what is taken seriously and what can be
dismissed as trivial. " 18 It follows from this, as he points out, that what is not said about
security concerns arc equally important. In the Canadian case W alker notes that
discussions of security are intimately linked to discussions o f national sovereignty, a move
which facilitates the policing of the boundaries of security debates within Canada:
It is ... instructive to consider how the very focus on sovereignty as an

immediate policy makes it difficult for Canadians to pursue the most
48
Ibid., pp. 43-44 especially.

162
fundamental questions posed by contemporary forms o f insecurity. What docs

it mean to be secure? Whose security are we talking about? Who gets to
decide on what conception of security is most appropriate? The great
attraction of the concept of statc-sovcrcignty, of course, is that it provides a
clear answer to such questions. Indeed, as an answer, it was once so
persuasive that the questions came to be regarded as trivial. It gave voice to a
broad understanding of political community bounded by clearly demarcated
borders and organized by the autonomous authorities within .49
W alker emphasizes that recent political trends, such as the rising concerns surrounding
environmental degradation, arc strongly suggesting that "the meaning o f insecurity has
' *
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begun to be radically rewritten". Consequently, recent state pronouncements concerning
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the nature of Canadian security concerns, such as that found in the 1987 White Paper,
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tend to follow an older, and increasingly antiquated, script.
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W ith this we can begin to clearly sec how Wollers politics of security and
W alkers politics ot security diller fundamentally. For the lorm cr writer, the politics ol
security proceeds according to a basic agreement or consensus around fundamental
security concerns. Clearly, lor Wollers, the dilficultics ol establishing the core values at
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issue should not be overstated, and the protection of territorial independence would
necessarily rank high among these. Political debates would tend to focus upon
instrumentalities of achieving security, o f having decision makers set the appropriate level
and choose the appropriate means. Wollers acknowledgement that we know "roughly"
w hat is meant when we appeal to national security underscores the intra-discursive nature
o f his discussion; the political is housed within the same security discourse. For Walker,
in stark contrast, the political aspects of security refers the clear possibility of alternative
49
Ibid., p. 51.
163
or fundamentally antagonistic security rhetorics and meanings. The pale o f the political is
much broader that the realm o f policy. Here, the political nature o f security is about the
manner in which dominant security concerns are established and reproduced, and about
the possibility of alternative security discourses fundamentally challenging the dominant
characterization. It is about security concerns in the wider context o f a somewhat
fractionated and "expansive" political culture, not the holistic and inclusive context
embodied in Wollers reference to "the nation". T o collapse politics into narrower policy
debates is to succumb, as Walker puts it, to the "lure o f the Prince".
Elements o f a New Approach to Security and International Relations
The stale centred approach and the attendant notion o f national security has
traditionally dominated the field: "A subject that is only remotely related to central
political problems o f threat perception and management among sovereign states," Nye and
Lynn-Jones affirm, "would be regarded as peripheral."50 The Alternative group of security
researchers, however, are collectively swathing a new approach to the problem of security
in international relations. They arc no longer content to search for new definitions of
national security. The definitional exercise is firmly supplanted by an approach which
seeks to extol the intensely social and political nature o f the concept of security."5'
50 Joseph S. Nye and Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "International Security Studies: A Report of a

conference on the State of the Field," International Security 12:4 (Spring 1988).
51
Fred Halliday, "State and Society in International Relations: A Second Agenda,"
Millennium 16:2 (1987), 219.
164
The contours of th h Alternative approach to security and international relations

must still be set out. The writings of the Alternative school carry serious limitations,
limitations which reflect the fact that the writings arc largely informed from the post
modernist vantage point. A t the risk o f oversimplification, while these writings are
particularly strong with respect to the analysis of security in the context of language and
culture, they still fail to adequately assess the cultural dimensions o f security in terms of
relatively basic structural relations of power within society. In other words, the concept o f
security is not explicitly contemplated from the perspective of dominant and subordinate
classes and groups within society. A few examples with respect to class power will suffice
to illustrate this point. R.B.J. Walker, for example, lucidly and persuasively contends that
some conceptions o f security are policed at the margins. But we do not learn which
classes or groups might be benefiting by the patrol. Basic questions and considerations arc
unfortunately overlooked. What is the relationship between the capitalist class in Canada
and the policed conception of security? W ere the interests o f the capitalist class the
formalional forces behind the prevailing view of security in Canada? Is there a class
\\
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alliance behind the prevailing view? How might this prevailing conception o f security tie
into other prevailing political discourses, such as neo-liberalism, which have cleaier class
|
links within Canada? Equally importantly, what class dynamics lie behind attempts to
I
transform dominant conceptions of security in Canada?
Similarly, although Simon Dalby writes that prevailing conceptions o f security can
better reflect the interests of some groups over the interests o f others, there is little or no
attempt to identify any classes in this respect. Again, we should inquire about the class
dynamics and struggles that might lie behind this tendency to universalize conceptions o f
security across society. In what manner, for example, does the prevailing view contribute
to the blurring or mystification of class relations? In what manner does the prevailing
conception of security damper or mute class antagonisms or, alternatively, how does it
fetter subordinate class projects? T o what extent does the universalized conception o f
security incorporate the struggles or aspirations of the subordinate classes? None of these
questions are ever posed. Again, while Paul Chilton suggests that some understandings of
security have greater resiliency partly by virtue o f the metaphors that they draw upon, he
is completely silent the class projects which may lie behind this resiliency. We are never
afforded any analysis o f fundamental class divisions within society that may underline,
inform, exploit or actively promote the original conceptualizations. And finally, while
M ick Dillon contends that the contorted construction of Otherness in the post-war
period has brought us to the brink of nuclear annihilation, we are not afforded any
analysis, or even a hint for that matter, o f the relationship that this construction might
have to the struggles o f international capitalist classes in the post-war period. In what
manner docs this construction, we might also ask, conveniently enter into and soften the
class struggle back home?
In short, security is not analyzed in terms of the basic class fissures embedded in
the social canvas. Nor is the need to do this acknowledged. Paradoxically, while these
writings refreshingly celebrate the political nature o f security in one sense, the failure to
adequately extend the analysis to basic configurations of social power within society,
especially class power and class struggle, tends to give these writings an apolitical hue.
One task o f this study is to reassert, in the strongest possible terms, that a complete
analysis o f security must include considerations o f class and other social relations of power.
166
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W ith this affirmation in mind, we note that a complete analysis o f the social and political
dimensions o f security will include two pivotal themes: First, an examination o f security in
terms o f the rudimentary relations of power within society. Secondly, an examination o f
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security within the broad context of culture, a process well underway in the Alternative
group o f security analysts. Although these two themes are treated separately, there is no
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intention here of committing an isolationist fallacy by arguing that culture and relations ol
power in society somehow represent separate and distinct spheres ol social litc.
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separation is for analytical identification only.
Theme One: Security and Social Relations o f Power
W e must examine the way in which conceptions of security are bound up with the
1
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historically contingent but conjuncturally specific relations o f power embedded in the
social canvas. Included here are the social relations o f production (class defined primarily
in terms o f the mode of production) and other social relations including gender and race.
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;
M ore directly, we must explore the manner in which conceptions ol security are
conditioned by the class dialectic along with the specificities o f gender and race. This
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theme is premised upon the belief that prevalent ideas about society will be profoundly
!
related to its dominant power relations, a premise drawing on the orientation o f historical
materialist critiques. In considering security from the perspective of the dialectic among
social classes and groups within society we are making the claim that conceptions of
security will reflect, in other words, the basic socio-political struggles within society. No
conception o f security will be politically innocent in that it transcends these social
167
struggles.
T h e recognition that prevailing conceptions o f security can be linked to specific
interests within society underscores the distinct possibility that subordinate class and
groups, such as the working class or women, may have fundamentally different conceptions
o f security. Those factors deemed to be most threatening to subordinate social classes
may be largely marginalized by the dominant security discourse. The clear likelihood exists
that any discourse o f threat among women, for example, may be fundamentally at odds
with the prevailing notions of threat. These marginalized discourses on security will
largely reflect basic struggles between dominant and subordinate groups within society.
T h e fact that their can be multiple discourses around security raises an additional set o f
analytical problems including inter alia the relationship between these various conceptions
and wider elements o f social consciousness, especially ideology. Multiple discourses
around security and insecurity, for example, may be bound up with the inability for ruling
classes and groups to establish ideological hegemony. We might also explore the manner
in which competing views o f security arc aired within the state apparatus, particularly if we
suspect that the prevailing security discourse might only be firmly lodged within the
military.
Theme Two: Security and Culture
Th e concept o f security must be approached "less in terms o f any coherent

technical definition o f national security," Rob W alker writes, "than o f the way the concept
of security enters into all kinds o f other codes, symbols, rhetorics, propagandas, ideologies,
168
discourses, and other terms usually subsumed under the generic concept ol' culture." The
I
need to examine the relationship between security and culture arises from at least two
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basic observations. First, there is the idea of culture as context. As the work o f Paul
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Chilton helps us see, language permeates the social consciousness and maintains a certain
4?
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resiliency; it can affect politics by conditioning people quite independently o f any
ii
immediately apparent configuration of social power. Moreover, the concept ol security
links to other dimensions o f contemporary culture. Security cliches such as Hawk and
Dove "connect the world o f national security with the art gallery, sports stadium,
kindergarten and drive-in movie. " 52 Secondly, there is the idea of culture as a political
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front.
W e must recognize that any effort to transform relations of domination and
subordination and recast social practices must consider the relationship between ideas
and social change, and address the manner in which new ideas can create resistant social
practices.
W hen the two aspects o f this alternative approach are melded together an almost
t
infinite number o f research themes are possible. This Alternative approach will also help
us to avoid some common errors that have been made in past approaches to security. A
brief discussion o f these errors, many o f which have been identified in the alternative
writings w ill be very valuable:
52
R.B.J. Walker, Security in Canada, p. 79.

169
The Problem o f Universalization:
W c must avoid the mistake o f universalizing conceptions of security by privileging

widely held or dominant views on the matter. "The possibilities that there may be other
interests within the nation state whose security might be better served in other ways,"
writes Simon Dalby, "is usually neatly excluded by the simple ideological operation of
'
universalising the particular interests of a narrow segment o f the population within the
'
ambit o f the concept o f national security." While this move might be more recognizable in
government policy statements and documentation, analytical approaches which begin and
end with the national security problem also privilege, in varying degrees, conceptions o f
5
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security favoured by ruling classes and dominant groups within the nation state. This is
especially true to the extent that these approaches emphasize certain core values such as
;
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the integrity of the state apparatus, or they speak of a hierarchy of vital interests
established by the nation, or that they discuss internal threats to the state. This is not to
suggest that analysts of security are the mere mouthpieces o f ruling groups or institutions
within society, although this dynamic is undoubtably played out: "The road from academia
to the foot of the prince," W alker reminds us, "is lined with comfortable institutes,
specialized funding organizations, aggressive consulting firms and large quantities of cash."
W hite analysis can and do participate in ideological production of this type, the links are
likely less infusionist and more contextual in nature. The definitional exercise, for
example, that is, the struggle to find the appropriate parameters and boundaries of
national security, accepts this as the correct way to characterize security problems. In
discussions about the appropriate definition of national security, moreover, specific170
conceptual categories and academic discourses are frequently employed as givens. The
uncritical appropriation o f concepts such as territorial integrity, political integrity, core
values, core interests, vital interests, internal threats, nation, state and national values
unwittingly reproduces and legitimizes a wider political discourse which assists in
maintaining specific and often highly repressive configurations o f social power within
society. As long as we proceed as though these analytical categories arc divinely inspired
the m irth of the Gods w ill be on our account. To speak o f a insurgent group as a threat
to the state, for example, is a politically loaded move, and one which buys into the
dominant characterization of social problems. Security issues o f the top-dogs (Galtungs
phrase) are unwittingly privileged and extended across society.
The Reification of Analytical Categories:
The second common error that the alternative approach to security will avoid is
the reification of analytical categories. The most flagrant error
his regard surrounds
the idea of th e security dilemma. In the writings o f John Herz, the security dilemma was
deduced o r distilled from third imagistic assumptions. The multi-state system simply
creates insuperable dynamics wherein the struggle for greater security leads to spirals o f
power struggles which rendered international relations inherently unstable. As long as
there are states, so the H erzian view must run, there will be security dilemmas similar to
the C old W a r era. The security dilemma reflects the essence o f international relations,
not th e contamination o f social and political struggles in the post-war period. It has, so to
speak, a life o f its own, at least in the sense that its only contingency is the presence o f
171
the state system or some facsimile thereof. W hile the approach was first employed to
describe conditions commonly perceived at the time o f the cold war, recent writings regard
the security dilemma to be a basic condition or feature of international relations .53
Leaving aside the question as to whether this was an appropriate characterization o f the
immediate post-war period, the permanent assignation o f the security dilemma to
international relations effectively cuts it o ff from all social relations. Something akin to
one historical era is presumed to be a kindred condition of all historical periods. The
security dilemma is cut loose from any aspect o f society and held to be relatively immune
to it.
In contrast to this move, the alternative study o f security would emphasize that all
security problems are contingent upon the push and pull of social forces in society.
Security dilemmas, to the extent that this idea is useful, would be anchored firmly in
society. Threats and seemingly intractable conditions for social actors (including parts o f a
stale) are made by concrete social and political struggles, not by the mere presence o f the
state system. Security dilemmas reflect upward determinations from the social floor rather
than the downward determinations o f the systemic ceiling. In other words, the
development and evolution o f the security problematic for states is fundamentally
historical and intimately tied to the evolution o f social relations within and between
societies.
Another error o f reification concerns the identification of certain "core" security
concerns. Understood usually as the protection o f political and territorial integrity, these
See, for example Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," World Politics
(1978).
172
"core" concerns arc then assumed to operate for all states at all times. "Put more
strongly," Azar and Moon argue, "this way of conceiving national security is almost
universal across time and space as long as there exists an entity called the nation-state."
T h e caveat "almost" docs not lesson the fact that these "core concerns can be identified
apart from the historical evolution o f societies, and they are elevated to the status of
general truths. T h at is, the "core" concerns are not understood in terms o f any social
contingency. Rather, they are understood to operate notwithstanding the imperatives o f
any particular societal dynamics. In contrast to this, the alternative approach outlined
would begin with the assumption that there is a social contingency where security issues
are involved. One can even find numerous exceptions, for example, to the apparently
incontrovertible truth of territorial integrity, violations that are clearly the product of
social dynamics within and between societies.
The Problem o f Hypostatization:
A third error concerns the tendency towards hypostatization. That is, analysts
must avoid premising their discussions of security on the idea that there is some real or
objective or independent confluence of social conditions to which the word security
corresponds. Simply stated, analysts must avoid assuming that the abstract concept of
security has any real existence. In his discussion o f Barry Buzans contribution to the
security literature Chilton argues that he "assumes that the meaning o f a word (such as
security) is its correlation with some entity or process out there in the real world." As
Chilton notes, Buzan speaks o f the meaning of security in the general sense, of
173
transferring this meaning of security to "specific entities like states" and of discovering the
"referent object of security". A s Chilton argues, "the presence o f the word (in this case
security) docs not mean that a corresponding entity exists in the real world".
Other writers are equally prone to Buzans move. Numerous discussions of
national security proceed on the assumption that there some actual configuration of events
o r circumstances characteristic o f a "secure society". That is, the correct meaning of
national security is the linguistic conformation of some real state of secure affairs for the
nation. Indeed, the writings aimed at redefining the meaning o f national security intend
to use the definition to contour domestic and foreign policy with the goal o f achieving this
real or total security. The cut of the exercise, in other words, is thoroughly correlative.
T h e alternative approach to security studies offered here would help guard against
hypostatization in that it explicitly draws attention towards the relationship between the
employment o f the concept of security by actors within society on the one hand and the
broader cultural and social relational context on the other. Politics and perceptions are our
plot. W e must seek to understand the various conceptions o f security and security issues
as social constructions rather than as reflections o f or references to some external
reality.
The Denial o f Politics:
Finally, the cumulative effect o f the alternative approach to security is to explicitly

draw attention to the political nature o f all security problematizations. In speaking of
scholarly discussions of security Rob Walker notes: "Contemporary discourse about
174
security draws attention to the intensely political character of concepts that have been
naturalized and rendered relatively apolitical within the discipline." Our discussion
underscores a view which secs security problematizations and discussions as fiercely
political in at least two ways. First, characterizations of security are contaminated by basic
social relations and the wider cultural milieu. There is no natural' security problem or
scenario defined into our midst. Secondly, scholarly inquiries into security, as with all
scholarly inquiries within international relations and beyond, are stained by the wider
social and cultural setting. The only relief from this condition is by pretension. W e must
guard against losing sight of the political nature and effect of the analytical categories.
S ''^ '% ,v;
suspicion."4' W e do this, ultimately, in recognition of the fact that international relations
''I*'*
theory stands as a form of power/knowledge: "To speak of security on terms other than
to *
"The very terms themselves," stresses Ian Forbes, "must be treated with the utmost
those o f Realism and Idealism ... is to confront a brick wall, the palpable limits of
permitted discourse." 55
Alternative Security Analysis' and Interstate conflict and War:
As with all social discourse, the security discourse exercises a disciplining function
with respect to cognition and experience, and will be sustained and reproduced partly
54 See Ian Forbes discussion of the implications, for example, of a reconceptualizcd state
within international relations in "The International Relations Discourse and I lallidays Second
Agenda," Millennium 17:1 (1988), quote from p. 62.
55
R.B.J. Walker, The Concept of Security and International Relations, p. 22.

175
through touchable institutions and secablc practices that have crystallised within the
wider cultural milieu. We hold that this colonization of cognition and experience with
respect to security discourses will have three focal points: first, it will identify that which is
valued and protected by society; secondly, it will establish threats (obstacles or
resistance points or dangers) towards those valorized elements; thirdly, it will tend to
suggest avenues for relief from these threats. In the end, the security discourse will
generate "clear ways" of speaking about the values and threats of society. Any claims of
universality of the security discourse, however, will tend to be illusionary or mystifying.
T h e assumption here is that the security discourse will disproportionately reflect the
specific political project of a given constituency within society, projects that will be directly
conditioned by broader socio-political struggles. O f course, in the social process of
constructing values and threats, a wider array of ideological motifs and cultural fields
will be enlisted as part of the struggle for meaning across society. We arrive at a view,
then, whereby security problems are understood largely in terms of relatively rudimentary
soeial and political dynamics.
A discussion about the social construction o f threat allows us to see the links to
interstate conflict and war. The security discourse will draw explicit attention to obstacles
or resistances or threats to society. During the formative or transformative periods o f the
security discourse (critical discourse moments as they have sometimes been called),
moreover, these threats or resistance points or obstacles w ill be distinguished according
to their perceived relationship to specific political projects. Concern, that is, will tend to
focus upon the obstivctionist nature o f any social actor, scenario, trend and so forth. Any
social actor, for example, not directly or immediately related to the social and political
176
dynamics within society, will be assessed in terms of the manner in which it is perceived
to factor into specific political projects. Relatively simple questions will sometimes gel
asked: Docs this or that group help our cause or stand to frustrate our ambitions?
Consequently, an external state, for example, will be constructed as a threat primarily
according in the manner in which it is perceived to either block or hinder specific political
projects.
It is assumed that this socially fabricated threat will be fundamentally related to
the perception o f conflict. Once certain social actors, that is, have been labelled as
threatening or dangerous, the perception of conflict will be close at hand. In practical
terms, these threatening groups or states will be perceived circumspectly.
Generally,threatening social actors will be seen as standing in the way o f or obstructing
or interfering with certain core goals. Their actions are monitored closely, and will be
frequently received with outright hostility. Specific procedures for dealing with these
threatening social actors will be established, and, of course, one o f these avenues may
include violence.
A concrete example that draws more explicit links to interstate conflict is
appropriate here. We may speak of the security discourse of the ruling classes o f a
particular state, and we can assume that this discourse is firmly lodged within the
apparatus o f the state, especially the military. This slate security discourse may or may
not have acquired hegemony within society. This security discourse, nonetheless,
embodies an assessment o f what constitutes a threat to society and prescriptions for relief
from this threat. Once certain states are identified in these terms, that is, as threatening
or dangerous, it is likely that the perception of conflict will be close by. Their behaviour
177
will he scrupulously monitored and assessed, and, quite often, interpreted as intrusive and
aggressive. Frequently, the belief will take hold that the activities o f this aggressive state
are largely or fundamentally incompatible with our core values. O f course, once a state
has been construed in this manner the possibility of war acquires a certain immediacy.
W hat is crucial here is that the socially grounded construction of other states as
threatening, and the assumed likelihood that interstate rivalry, conflict and war will
accompany this construction, gives the examination of security discourses its immediate
value in this study.
I t is this relationship between the construction of threats within the states
security discourse and the increased likelihood o f interstate conflict and war which makes
the examination of security discourses worthwhile. The security discourse of the state is,
in this regard, a double-edged sword, reflecting socio-political dynamics within society and
at the same time identifying those states that will likely be perceived to be in a conflictual
relationship. Hence, the examination of the security discourse o f ruling classes assists in
helping us obseive the relationship between sodol and political struggles within society on the
one hand and interstate conflict and war on (he other.
178
Part II
Introduction
In the preceding chapters we mapped out an alternative response to our initial

question: "Why study war?" Stress was placed on the relationship between warfare on the
one hand and the dynamics o f social power on the other. T o this intellectual enterprise
we assigned the appellation critical study o f war. We now turn our attention to the Iran
Iraq war fought between the fall o f 1980 and the summer of 1988. Our immediate
challenge lies in identifying the manner in the theoretical groundwork o f the previous
chapters informs our empirical analysis o f the war.
As implied in our definition, the critical study o f war rests upon a specific view of
society, one that calls attention to canted distributions o f social power between socio
economic classes, racial groups and the sexes. In Chapter Two, attention was drawn to the
fact that most research into war has failed to conceptualize society in these terms. Society
was usually conceptualized as a monolithic and/or non dynamic entity. Indeed, in Chapter
Five we find that most analysis of the Iran-Iraq war fails to address dynamic configurations
of social power within either country.
In order to overcome these limitations and render our analysis commensurate with
the requirements o f the critical study of war, we draw upon the framework for analyzing
states and societies established in C h a p te r T h ree.
In that chapter, we concluded that the
productive realm was necessarily influential in political life, but that other elements o f the
social canvass - especially racial and gender dynamics - were also politically integral. The
.stale is enmeshed in society, although it frequently achieves moments of significant

autonomy. Moreover, we noted that states in the Third World have been heavily
influenced by the trajectory of the global economy, but that analysis must fully appraise
social dynamics inside the state in order to adequately understand its social and political
character. Crucial features o f states and societies in the Third W orld include radically
transformed class structures, extensive social dislocation, especially urban migration, and
protracted social conflict. W e then apply this framework to Iranian and Iraqi society. In
Chapter Six, we address the sweeping transformations of Iranian society in the century
prior to the war, and ask how these changes affected both the Islamic revolution of 1979
and the subsequent move to war in 1980. In Chapter Seven, we examine the evolution of
Iraqi society in the century prior to war, and specifically explore the evolving relationship
between Iraqi society and the Bath regime during the 1970s.
The move to war in 1980 is addressed in terms of the theoretical considerations
raised in Chapter Four. W e noted that scholars must avoid mistaking the security
discourses of political leaders as representative of the entire population, that security
problems must be addressed in terms o f the socio-political struggles within and across
societies, that security discourses simultaneously enter into and draw upon the wider
cultural milieu, and that security discourses arc inherently political. In Chapter Eight, we
address the security discourses of the Iraqi Bath and the Iranian theocrats. W e ponder
the growing insecurity between the two regimes in terms o f socio-economic and socio
political trends well in evidence in the decades prior to war.
In assessing the link between the evolving social fields in both countries on the
one hand and the outbreak of war on the othei, we uncover the social origins o f the Iran180
Iraq war. As wc argued in Chapter One, however, warfare not only reflects social
struggles, it also contributes to their evolution and reshaping.
In other words, war will
modify society, a process that could have a profound effect upon resolution efforts. With
this in mind, we round out our analysis o f the Iran-Iraq war by considering its relationship
to social struggles in both countries. In Chapter Nine, we examine the relationship
between the prosecution o f war and the process o f revolutionary consolidation in Iran.
W c then address this effect in terms o f the emancipatory struggles o f women, the working
classes and racial minorities in Iran. In Chapter Ten, we examine the relationship between
the war and the political consolidation o f the Bath regime in Iraq. We then assess the
impact o f this effect upon the emancipatory struggles o f lower socio-economic classes, the
Kurdish minority and women.
181
Chapter Five
Conventional Accounts of the Iran-Iraq W ar
Introduction:
The Iran-Iraq war has been described as the Third W orlds first "Great W ar . " 1
W hen one considers its economic costs, its physical destruction and its human toll there
appears to be merit in this claim. Indeed, the Iran-Iraq war was the longest conventional
war o f the twentieth century. 2 Estimates suggest that 1.2 million lives were lost, with a
further 2.2 million wounded. Almost 40 per cent of the adult male population in the two
countries took part in the war. Material damage from the w ar has been estimated at
upwards o f 350 billion dollars, while the overall costs o f the w ar have been estimated at
1,190 billion dollars. Up to 1.5 million people were uprooted through the course o f the
fighting. A t least 157 Iranian towns with populations o f more than 5,000 were damaged or
wholly destroyed, and some 1,800 border villages were virtually wiped off the map.3 The
Iranian and Iraqi economies suffered greatly from the strains o f the war, including lost oil
1 See discussion, for example, in Samir al-Khalil, Republic o f Fear: The Politics o f Modem
Iraq, (University of California Press, 1989), p. 261.
2 This claim is pressed by Dilip Hiro, The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Militaty Conflict,
(Paladin, 1990), p. xxii and p. 1.
3 Statistics on human and village loses extracted from Amir Taheri, The Cauldron: The Middle
East Behind the Headlines, (Hutchinson, 1988), pp. 198-199. O n refugees see Martha Wenger
and Dick Anderson, The G ulf W ar, M ERIP Middle East Report, 17:5 (September-Octobcr 1987),
p. 25. Estimates on the overall cost o f the w ar appear in Hiro, op. cit., p. 1 .
revenues and steep declines in economic productivity. 4 During the course o f the war the
belligerents flirted w ith the nadir of humanity through their use o f chemical weaponry, the
employment o f teenaged boys to clear mine fields and their indiscriminate bombing o f
towns and cities.
Conventional assessments of the costs of the war tend to locus upon lost oil
revenues, declining GNPs, mateiial destruction and human tragedies such as refugee ciises
and body counts. This concern, however, with macro-economic indicators such as
1
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declining oil revenues or GNPs, o r the focus on quantifiable measures o f the wars
destruction such as physical damage or death tolls, serves to occlude the dramatic social
costs associated with the war. T h e Iran-Iraq war profoundly affected the balance of social
forces in both countries by further eroding the social power of oppressed groups and
classes and working to the near exclusive advantage o f the ruling regimes and their
&
relatively narrow social bases. These social costs are perhaps the greatest legacy of the
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Iran-Iraq war and w ill undoubtedly be fell for many years to come.
In accordance with the critical study o f war - the contemplation of war in terms o f
dialectical critiques o f social power wc address the social costs o f the war by exploring
its social foundations. Analysis must unravel the complex class, communal and state
dynamics underlying the outbreak and course o f the war. O ne broad theme is taken up in
this study. In its most straightforward formulation, the Iran-Iraq war may he understood as
a dramatic political manifestation o f extended social sin g les endemic to both societies.
4 For example, see Bijan Mossavar-Rahmani, "Economic Implications for Iran and Iraq," in
The Iran-Iraq War: New Weapons, Old Conflicts," cds. Shirin Tahir-Kheli and Shahccn Ayubi
(Praeger, 1983); also see Kamran Mofid, Economic Consequences o f the G u lf War, (Routledge,
1990).
183
This theme entails two separate analytical thrusts. The first concerns the social origins of
the war.
The Iran-Iraq war was essentially engendered through the play o f indigenous
social forces. External actors had little direct role in its outbreak. These indigenous social
and political struggles were profoundly contoured by the extensive social transformation of
these societies during their gradual insertion into the world economy.
Secondly, the course o f the war also bore the imprint of these social and political
struggles. The war was not guided exclusively by the logic o f military strategy and
stalemate, by the personal inclinations o f political leaders, by the indifference o f the
international community or by the complexity o f the issues between the two countries.
Rather, the course o f the war was fundamentally coloured by the socio-political struggles
common to both societies. Moreover, as well as reflecting these social struggles, the war
reconstituted social relationships in Iran and Iraq. Through the war the social power o f
the working classes, women, and ethnic minorities generally slipped vis a vis those more
powerlul constituencies in both societies. Expressed in another way, the emancipatory
struggles o f the working classes, of women or o f ethnic groups suffered a setback as a
result of the war. In Iran, much of this effect is premised upon the fact that the war
tended to reinforce certain political constellations within the state, which then
reverberated throughout society. For example, the extent to which the war strengthened
the position of the radical clerical control in Iran, particularly during its earlier stage, the
social position o f women slipped appreciably by virtue of the concomitant desecularization
of Iranian society. In Iraq, this effect of the war is predicated on the fact that it
consolidated the Ba'th regime and extended its political project, a project that forbids
autonomous or authentic political activity by the less powerful social constituencies in the
184
country.
It is the coarse contention o f this study that the Iran-Iraq war essentially had two
winners: the Ba'th regime in Iraq and the theocrats in Iran. The corollary o f this view is
that subordinate social groups within Iran and Iraq - the working classes, women and the
ethnic minorities - generally lost the war.
Course o f the War:
O n September 17, 1980 Saddam Hussein unilaterally abrogated the 1975 Algiers
Accord with Iran and claimed fully sovereignty over the entire Shall al-Aiab waterway
along the southern border between the two countries. The rapid slide to war w.is under
way. Tensions between the two countries had grown steadily over the prior year. The
political battle included the closure o f the Iraqi consulate in Khorramshahr by linn and
the mutual expulsion o f diplomats in April o f 1980. T h e attempted assassination o f Taiiq
Aziz, Iraqs deputy prime minister o n April 1, 1980 contributed to the gathering storm
when Iraq directly implicated Iran.
Border clashes between the two countries became
increasingly frequent. The vitriolic war of words reached a feverous pitch throughout the
spring and summer. Tensions culminated on September 22, 1980, when the Iraqi army
crossed over into Iranian territory in a three pronged attack . 5
5 This brief outline primarily relics upon the following sources Middle East Contemporary
Survey, v. 5-12; Middle East Journal, chronologies on Iraq, Iran and the Iran-Iraq war between
1980 and 1988; Efraim Karsh, The Iran-Iraq War: A Military Analysis, International Institute for
Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper 220 (Spring 1987); Ralph King, The Iran Iraq War. The Political
Implications, International Institute fo r Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper 219 (Spring 1987).
185
A few months into the war Iraq occupied some 14,000 square kilometres o f Iranian
territory, primarily in the province of Khuzistan. After its initial phase the fighting greatly
lapsed. As D ilip Hiro summarizes: "For all practical purposes a continuous, full-scale wat
between Iran and Iraq lasted about two months: from 22 September to 29 November
1980. A fter that the conflict was sustained with constrained, episodic action interspersed
with bouts of feverish fighting."6 On January 5, 1981, an unsuccessful counteroffensive
was launched by Iran close to Susangerd. As the second year of the war approached the
stalemate continued. Iranian efforts to dislodged the occupying Iraqi forces proved futile.
One commentator aptly described the deadlock as a "balance of weakness."7
The deadlock began to break with a scries o f Iranian counteroffensives in the fall
o f 1981. With great human costs, partially incurred by the use o f human wave assaults,
Iran began to dislodge Iraq from the occupied territories. The Iranians ended the siege o f
Abadan and recaptured Susangerd. In May o f 1982 Iran successfully recaptured
Khorramshahr (renamed the "City of Blood"). By June of 1982, Iraq was forced to
announce the withdrawal o f most of its most forces from Iranian territory. Iran
immediately went on the offensive and took the war into Iraq. It repeatedly tried and
failed to capture Basra. A deadlock that continued for years quickly set in. Iranian
offensives would frequently yield nominal gains under heavy losses. In almost every case
the Iraqi army was able to repulse the attacking Iranian army. This pattern lasted until
Dilip Hiro, The Longest War, p. 47.
7 Avi Plascov, "Strategic Developments in the Persian Gulf," Middle East Contemporary Survey
5 (1980-1981).
186
1986 when Iran successfully seized the Fao peninsula in the south o f Iraq . 8 Iran also
started to make some breakthroughs in the area o f Salaimauiyya. From a military
standpoint, however, Iran was unable to turn these nominal successes into any meaningful
strategic or political advantage.
Iraqi offensives, on the other hand, were limited throughout most o f the war.
Manoeuvres during the spring o f 1988, however, showed signs of permanently changing
the stalemated character o f the war. This activity began on April 17 with the quick
liberation of the Fao peninsula. Iraq followed this up by dislodging the Iranians from
their positions east o f Basra. In June o f 1988 the Iraqis liberated the Iranian held area in
the Httwr al-Huwayza marshes in the south of the country. Around Sulaimaniyya the
Iraqis also push the Iranians back across the border. Consequently, during the first half of
1988 Iraq managed to liberate its lands and reoccupying small tracts o f Iranian territory.
The war included additional operational chapters. Iraq used its air superiority to
strike at Iranian economic targets and infrastructural facilities, especially its oil export
facilities. Iranian air activity was much more limited. The Iraqi aim was to weaken
Iranian oil export capacities in order to force the Islamic regime to accept a ceasefire.
Iraqi air raids were concentrated upon the Kharg Island terminal. Occasional air raids
were also made upon export facilities on Larak Island, Sirri Island and Lavan Island closer
to the Straits o f Hormuz. Iraqi attacks upon oil installations continued throughout the
war, and although they occasionally succeeded in diminishing Iranian oil exports, the
8 An extremely interesting account of Iranian activities in the Fao peninsula may be found
in John Simpson, Behind Iranian Lincy Travels Through Revolutionary Iran and the Persian Past,
(Fontana, 1988), pp. 305-315.
187
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attacks never permanently incapacitated Irans oil exporting capacities.
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tanker war was initiated by Iraq primarily to draw in the international community and
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The "tanker war" constituted the third operational chapter of the campaign. The
thereby put pressure on Iran to end the war. In August of 1982 Iraq declared a maritime
exclusion zone around the large Kharg Island oil terminal, after the sinking o f non-Iranian
commercial vessels during the summer. In the spring of 1984 Iraq seriously escalated the
tanker war, and for the first time Iran responded by hitting ships servicing Saudi Arabian
I
and Kuwaiti ports. During 1986 tanker attacks escalated dramatically. In 1987 Iraq finally
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succeeded in drawing the international community into the war when the American naval
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presence in the G ulf was increased in response to Iranian attacks upon Gulf shipping.
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Tankers were reflagged and the United States began conducting naval escorts of shipping
convoys. In October of 1987, for example, the U.S. navy destroyed two Iranian oil-shore
1
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oil platforms in retaliation for an attack on a reflagged vessel. Other countries joined in
mine-sweeping operations. Heightened tensions throughout the Gulf continued until the
end of the war. By its conclusion the warring parties had scored more than 5(X) direct hits
upon G ulf shipping.

The last operational chapter was widely dubbed as "the war of the cities." This
dimension of the war fully materialized in February of 1984. From this point on both
sides continued to exchange missile assaults upon urban centres. Although Iraqs superior
weaponry tended to give it an upper edge in this aspect of the war, in 1986 Iran
responded with Scud-B missile attacks upon Baghdad for the first time. Early in 1987 Iraq
attacked the holy city of Qom (Khomeinis city of residence) which had previously been
unmolested. Iran answered with further Scud-B missile attacks upon Baghdad. Between
188
February and April of 1988 Ihc "war of the cities" entered a new and qualitatively different
round with intensive exchanges of missile attacks upon the Tehran and Baghdad. The
sustained Iraqi assault produced greater relative alarm in Iran, especially Tehran, and
undoubtedly contributed to the conclusion of the war.
Efforts to end the war continued for its duration. A familiar pattern o f qualified
or Iraqi encouragement and acceptance of peace efforts and Iranian indifference emerged
rather quickly. Five days after the initial invasion representatives of the Islamic
Conference Organization, including President Z ia ul-Haq o f Pakistan, attempted to
mediate the dispute. In early November a newly formed committee o f the Non-aligned
Movement met to discuss mediation efforts. On November 11, 1980, O lof Palme was
appointed as the Special Representative of the United Nations. The mediation efforts of
Palme, the Non-aligned Movement and the Islamic Conference formed the central
diplomatic efforts to resolve the war in the following months and years. Unilateral
initiatives were also pursued by Syria, Cuba, Algeria and the PLO. A ll efforts to achieve a
ceasefire between the belligerents met with failure. In 1985 one commentator
appropriately summed up the efforts of the international community as "routine and in the
main futile " .9
During the war the United Nations passed a series o f resolutions to resolve the
dispute. Six days after the war began the Security Council unanimously adopted
Resolution 479 which broadly urged an end to hostilities and the acceptance of
international mediation. Other resolutions of the Security Council were sometimes
Uriel Dann, "The Iraqi-lranian War," Middle East Contemporary Survey 8 (1983-1984), p.
186.
189
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targeted at more specific issues. Resolution 552 in June o f 1984, for example, condemned
attacks o n shipping in the Gulf and called upon states to respect the principle of free
navigation in international waters. On July 20, 1987 the Security Council adopted
Resolution 598. Over the following months Resolution 598 came to form the working basis
for a ceasefire and permanent peace between the two countries. The resolution
demanded an immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of all forces to internationally
recognized boundaries, urged that prisoners of war be released and immediately
repatriated and called upon both countries to work with the Secretary General o f the
United Nations to achieve a comprehensive settlement.
O n July 18, 1988, amidst mounting international pressure and shifting Iraqi
fortunes, Iran declared that it was ready to unconditionally accept Resolution 598. One
month later th e United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (U N IIM O G ) went into
operation along much of the 1,170 kilometre common border between the two countries.
A decade after the initial Iraqi invasion numerous outstanding issues plagued the pursuit
o f a permanent peace between the two countries. Iraq continued to occupy about 1,600
square kilometres o f Iranian territory. The apparently insoluble disagreement with respect
to the Shalt al-Arab waterway remained, with Iran calling for a return to the terms of the
1975 Algiers Accord and Iraq continuing to favour full sovereignty over the channel.
Important differences also continued with respect to the nearly 100,000 prisoners o f war
held between the tw o countries. Four rounds o f official negotiations culminated in face to
faee meetings between the foreign ministers of Iran and Iraq in the summer of 1990.
These exchanges were thought to have laid the foundations for a summit between
Hashemi Rafsanjani of Iran and Saddam Hussein of Iraq. Among other things, such a
190
summit would have provided the opportunity to negotiate a permanent peace between the
two countries. This gradualism was quickly changed after Iraqs invasion of Kuwait on
August 2, 1990. The rapidly mounting international pressure upon Iraq accelerated the
move towards a permanent peace between the two countries. An accord in
August 1990 included a restoration of the pre-war international boundaries and the
repatriation of prisoners of war. The Bath regimes second capitulation on the Shatt alArab boundary issue in less than a generation officially drew the war to a close.
Conventional Accounts of the War:
A t least five different explanations for the Iran-Iraq war have appeared in
academic and journalistic commentary. One common argument is that the war was rooted
in the ancient animosities between two vastly different societies. The war was thus the
latest episode between two societies destined to collide. A second argument addresses the
manner in which the Iranian revolution aggravated Iraqs Shi'i struggle against the Bath
regime. Iraq simply moved against Iran in order to neutralize this source of external
agitation. A third argument draws attention to the border dispute along the Shatt al-Arab
waterway. According to Iraq, the boundary should be drawn along the eastern shoreline,
which would give it full sovereignty over the waterway. Iran, in contrast, preferred to see
the boundary drawn according to the thalweg or mid-channel principle, as embodied in the
1975 Algiers Accord between the two countries. From this perspective the war was a
manifestation o f the intractable territorial conflict. A fourth account of the war focuses
upon the megalomaniacal nature o f Saddam Hussein, and finds some confirmation in the
191
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fact that Iraq named the war after him. Husseins arrogating sense ol stature and
exaggerated notions of historical destiny simply led him to invade Iran at first opportunity.
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A final account o f the war draws attention to the regional aspirations o f Iraq in the face
o f the post-revolutionary turmoil in Iran. Irans troubles, so this argument runs, damaged
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a long-standing balance of power between the two countries. Iraq simply sought to fill this
regional vacuum. It is rare that the casus belli that commentators lend to settle under are
held out in any exclusive manner. In other words, there is a widespread recognition that a
plurality o f forces were at work when war broke out in 1980. An expanded outline of
each of these argumentative tendencies is beneficial.
Ancient Enmities:
The first account o f the Iran-Iraq war draws attention to the deeply rooted cultural
enmities between Iran and Iraq. Explanations o f this sort are premised upon a sense of
incompatible and immanently hostile societies characterized in racial (Aryan and Semite),
confessional (Shii and Sunni), ethnic (Arab and Persian) or ideological (Iranian Pan-Islam
against Iraqi Pan-Arab Nationalism) terms. 10 Iraq is thus viewed as the Semitic, Sunniruled Pan-Arab government while Iran is held out as the Persian, Shii-ruled Pan-Islamic
state. This account of the conflict tends to emphasize past conflicts and stresses the idea
that the current conflict is a manifestation of "ancient enmities" between two long time
10 For an example of this argumentation sec Kamel S. Abu Jaber, "The Iran-Iraq War:
Regime Security and International Security," in Regional Security and the Third World, Mohammed
Ayoob, ed. (Croom Helm, 1986).
192
foes." This latent conflict between Iran and Iraq simply manifested itself in the form o f
war in 1980. An example of the broad collision between two culturally distinct societies
may be found in the following account offered by Grummon:
Underlying the political tension and rivalry [between Iran and Iraq] is a clash
of what might be termed cultural nationalism. Very broadly speaking, the
Persian heartland is dominated by descendants of Indo-European tribes who
speak Farsi (Persian), an Indo-European language. Iraq on the other hand is
composed primarily (although by no means exclusively) of Semitic peoples
who speak Arabic, a Semitic language. 12
Grummon continues by calling attention to sectarian differences between the two

countries:
Islam itself has also had a tendency to divide the two countries rather than
acting as a unifying force. For approximately four and a half centuries, Iran
has been the bastion of the Shiite branch of Islam, while Iraqs political elites
have oriented that country toward Sunni Islam... These social and cultural
differences have provided the backdrop against which repeated political
dashes have occurred. 13
The relationship between the Shi'i /Sunni split and the outbreak o f war receives one o f its
clearest expressions in Majid Khadduris study:
11 For example, see Mansour Farhang, "The Iran-Iraq War: The Feud, The Tragedy, The
Spoils," IVorld Policy Journal, 11 (Fall 1985), 663-664; J.M. Abdulghani, Iraq and Iran: The Years
of Crisis, (Croom Helm, 1984).
12 Stephen R. Grummon, The Iran-Iraq War: Islam Embattled, The Washington Papers 92
(Pracgcr Publishers, 1982), pp. 1-2.
13
Ibid., p. 2.
193
The root cause of the conflict ... was and remains the Sunni-Shi'i confessional
controversy, which divided the house of Islam into two major religious
communities. Before the rise of Persia as a Shii slate at the beginning of the
sixteenth century, the schism in Islam was communal, or horizontal, not
accompanied by territorial segregation; but after the secession of Persia from
Islamic unity and its adoption of Shi'ism as the official state religion, the
schism became territorial, or vertical, and set in motion a decentralization that
had been in progress for centuries and that led to the fragmentation and
eventual breakup of the house of Islam into several states.
These broad cultural cleavages between Iran and Iraq have sometimes been discussed by
other writers in terms of their reinforcing nature. In speaking of the rise of the
Shii/Sunni antagonism, for example, Hunseler writes: "A new dimension had therefore
been added to the original contradiction between Arab and Persian nationalism...'"'
The emphasis upon the historical animosities between Iran and Iraq thus set the
stage for the contemporary political struggles such as the Shatt til-Arab dispute. This
thinking is particularly evident in Christine Moss Helms Iraq: Eastern Flank o f the Arab
World, where she draws attention to the boundary dispute in terms of the deeper social
hostilities between the two countries."' On other occasions the border dispute is entirely
subordinated to more fundamental rivalries; "The Shatt al-Arab is less a real subject o f
dispute than a fixation left over from the Otloman-Pcrsian rivalry," Ghassan Salameh
M Majid Khadduri, The C alf War: The Origins and Implications of the Iraq-Iran Conflict,
(Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 159.
15 Peter Hunseler, "The Historical Antecedents of the Shatt al-Arab Dispute," in The Iran
Iraq War: An Historical, Economic and Political Analysis, (Croom Helm, 1984), p. 9.
16 For example sec Christine Moss Helms, Iraq: Eastern Flank of the Arab World, (The
Brookings Institution, 1984), pp. 142-144. A similar contextuali/alion of the boundary dispute
may be found in other discussions o f the war. See Mustafa al-Najjar and Najdat Fathi Safwat,
"Arab Sovereignty over the Shatt al-Arab during the Ka'bide Period," in The Iran-Iraq War. An
Historical, Economic and Political Analysis, ed. M.S. El Azhary (Croom Helm, 1984).
194
reiterates, "which had taken on a religious colouring in the early sixteenth century when
Iran adopted Twelver Shiism." 17
The Sh'Ti Threat to the Ba'th Regime:
A second account of the war draws attention to the impact o f the Iranian
Revolution upon Iraqi society and the Ba'th regime. The most common form of this
argument stresses Irans efforts to incite a Shi'i rebellion in Iraq. Shii political activity in
the late 1970s, especially after the Iranian revolution, seriously alarmed Iraqs political
leaders. The challenge posed by the revolutionary government in Iran was viewed as no
less than a threat to the existence of the Ba'th regime. As Ralph King writes:
In 1980 ... the mood of the Shi'ile community was a more troublesome
question. Although their social conditions began to improve in the late 1970s,
the Shi'ites had not generally fared well at the hands of central government.
The danger therefore existed that this hitherto placid and disorganized group
might respond to Khomeinis blandishments. There was evidence to show
that Iran was lending not only moral, but also material support to Shi'ite
opposition movements like al-Dawa. It appears that Saddam Hussein felt
that the outrage liable to be provoked by the execution o f the prominent
Shi'ile divine, Ayatollah Baqir al-Sadr, in April 1980, was a lesser evil than the
potential appeal of an Iraqi Khomeini. Uncertain Shi'ite localities and
Iranian propaganda were not two distinct threats: as far as Iraq was
concerned, Khomeinis hostility and fears of a possible Shi'ite rebellion were
closely related. It is no coincidence that, in 1980, Saddam Husscir. publicly
aired his fears that Iraq might disintegrate. . . 18
17
Ghassan Salamch, "Checkmate in the Gulf War," MERIP Reports, v. 14, 6/7 (JulySeptember, 1984), p. 16.
18 Ralph King. The Iran-Iraq War: The Political Implications, Adelphi Papers 219 (Spring,
1987), p. 9.
195
A similar emphasis upon Irans relationship to the Shii struggle in Iraq may be found in
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Albert Houranis wide ranging study of Arab history:
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There were certain frontier questions at issue between them [Iran and Iraqi,
and these had been resolved in favour of Iran in 1975, when the Shah was at
the height of his power in the world. The Iranian revolution, and the period
o f confusion and apparent weakness which followed it, gave Iraq an
opportunity to redress the balance. Something more important than this was at
stake, however. The new Iranian regime appealed to Muslims everywhere to
restore the authority of Islam in society, and might seem to have a special
attraction to the Shii majority in Iraq; the Iraqi regime faced a double
challenge, as a secular nationalist government and as one dominated by Sunni
Muslims. 10
In summary, the aggressive posture of the theocratic regime in Iran played upon
rudimentary cleavages within Iraqi society and exacerbated the vulnerabilities o f the Buth
regime. Iraqs aggression, according to this perspective, was essentially remedial in nature.
In its most succinct formulation, the Bath regime simply responded to this external source
t
o f agitation by attacking Iran in 1980.
The Shatt al-Arab Boundary Dispute:
A third account of the war focuses upon territorial disputes between the two
states, especially those arising over the Shatt al-Arab waterway. The Shatt al-Arab
waterway starts at the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers and is later joined on
10 Albert Houram,/1 History of the Arab Peoples, (Harvard University Press, 1991), p. 432,
my emphasis.
196
its 190 kilometre course by the Karun river. The dispute between Iran and Iraq surrounds
the manner in which the boundary between the two countries is drawn along the
waterway. 20 Iraq prefers to see the boundary drawn along the eastern shoreline o f the
Shall al-Arab. This would give it full jurisdiction over the entire waterway. Iran prefers to
see the boundary drawn according to the thalweg or mid-channel principle, which would
give the countries joint jurisdiction. The development o f port facilities along the Shall alArab throughout the post-war period invigorated their respective claims.
The historical record with respect to the location of the international boundary
along the Shall al-Arab is ambiguous. Treaties between the Ottoman; and the Safavid
government o f Iran at Zohab in 1639, and the subsequent Treaty of Peace at Kherdcn in
1746 and the First Treaty of Erzurum in 1823 were all vague with respect to the
delineation the international boundary. The Second Treaty o f Erzurum in 1847 departed
from the previous treaties in at least one significant manner. The second article o f the
treaty stated that "The Ottoman Government formally recognizes the unrestricted
sovereignty of the Persian Government over the city and port of Muhammara, the island
of Khizr, the Abadan anchorage, and the lands on the eastern bank ...." By implication,
Ottoman authority over the waterway was clearly established through the 1847 treaty. In
20 For discussions upon the Shatt al-Arab waterway sec Peter Hunseler, "The Historical
Antecedents of the Shatt al-Arab Dispute, in The Iran-Iraq War: An Historical, Economic and
Political Analysis, (Croom Helm, 1984), Albertine Jwaidch, "The Historical Origins o f the IraqIran Border Dispute," in Iran, Iraq and the Gulf War, (Centre for International Studies, University
of Toronto, 1982); Eli Lautcrpacht, "River Boundaries: Legal Aspects of the Shatt-al-Arab
Frontier," International and Comparative Law Quarterly 9:2 (April 1960); A. Melamid, "The Shatt
al-Arab Boundary Dispute," Middle East Journal 23:3 (1968); Ramesh Sanghvi, Shatt al-Arab: The
Facts Behind the Dispute, (Transorient Books, 1969); Bruce Hardcastlc, "The Shatt-al-Arab Saga,"
The New Republic 183:15 (October 11,1980); Sayed Hasan Amin, "The Iran-Iraq Conflict: Legal
Implication," International and Comparative Law Quarterly 31:3 (January 1982).
197
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1913 the Constantinople Protocol established a more specific solution to the Shatt al-Arab
problem by leaving the river under Ottoman sovereignty but by giving Iran some control
over the waterway around Khorramshahr.
Throughout the twentieth century Iranian dissatisfaction with the 1913 delineation
grew steadily. Pahlavi foreign policy with respect to the waterway promoted a maximalist
reading of all previous agreements. 11 Submissions to the League o f Nations in the 1930s
had the effect of reinforcing the growing contention between the two countries.
Subsequent negotiations led to the signing of the Iraqi-Iranian Boundary Treaty in 1937.
This agreement basically confirmed the protocol of 1913 with one exception, namely, that
for almost
kilometres around Abadan the international boundary would follow the
thalweg or mid-channcl principle. Iran had thus formally expanded its sovereignty over
the waterway. Throughout the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s confrontations between Iran and
Iraq continued. In 1961, for example, the Iraqi obstructions caused the port o f Abadan to
close for more than two months. This act prompted Iran to construct new export facilities
o ff the river at Kharg Island. In 1969 Iraq claimed sovereignty over the entire Shall alArab. The Shah responded by abrogating the 1937 treaty and then laid claim to half the
Shatt al-Arab in accordance with the thalweg or mid-channcl principle. Iran renamed the
waterway Arvand-Rud. T h e interminable border problem moved a giant step towards
resolution under the terms of the Algiers Accord in 1975. According to this agreement,
the boundary of the Shatt al-Arab would be drawn in accordance with the thalweg
principle. The treaty represented a major concession on the part of Iraq. It was extracted
21 See discussion in Albertine Jwaidch, "The Historical Origins of the Iraq-Iran Border
Dispute," op. cit., pp. 13-15.
198
in the face o f Iranian support for the Kurdish struggle in Iraqi Kurdistan. In return for
the Iraqi concession on the Shalt al-Arab, Iran agreed to suspend its assistance to the
Kurds, and the Kurdish struggle subsequently collapsed. 22
The cosy relations between Iraq and Iran in the years following the Algiers accord
evaporated quickly with the accession o f the clerics in Iran. The terms of the Algiers
accord were central to the rising tensions between Iran and Iraq in 1979 and into 1980.
O n October 30, 1979 Iraq insisted that the terms o f the Algiers accord be revised.
Five
days before the full-scale invasion on September 22,1980 Iraq unilaterally abrogated the
agreement under the pretext that Iran had refused to abide by its principles. Iran
responded by claiming that it still respected the provisions o f the Algiers Accord, and that
it still considered Iraq bound by them.
The dispute over the Sliatt al-Arab has long been viewed as important enough to
take the two countries to war. A correspondent for the Tehran Journal who travelled
down the Shatt al-Arab in an Iranian patrol boat in 1969 later wrote: "At least no w ar was
going to start over our little excursion, tl.ough the trip left little doubt one could start any
time."1' In view o f the propinquity o f events during 1979 and 1980, and the rhetoric
surrounding the Shatt al-Arab issue, most commentators hold that the Shatt al-Arab
dispute played a significant role in the outbreak o f war in 1980.21 Indeed one writer has
22 An account of the Algiers accord may be found in Robert Romasek, "The Resolution o f
Major Controversies Between Iran and Iraq," World Affairs 139:3 (W inter 1976-1977).
u Ramcsh Sanghvi, Shatt al-Arab: The Facts Behind the Issue, op. cit., p. 1.
u This recognition frequently amounts to recognizing that there are a plurality of causes but
that the Shatt al-Arab dispute is central. For example, see Josette Gennaoui, "Irak en guerre au
Moyen-Orient," Projet 151 (January, 1981). Other writers, however, have explicitly argued that
199
cogently argued that the boundary dispute was the principal factor in the outbreak of war
in September 1980. In "A Border Adrift" Pipes is unequivocal in his rejection of other
accounts o f the war. H e argues that the ancient enmities thesis, for example, overlooks
the remarkable similarities between the two countries:
Indeed, many differences do separate Iraq and Iran, but their important
similarities must also be kept in mind. Both countries arc heirs to a shared
legacy going back five millennia; both regions had vital roles in the ancient
culture of the Middle East; both fell to Alexander the Great while escaping
Roman rule; and both succumbed to Arabian conquerors around A.D. 630.
Their populations converted so massively to Islam that today less than 10
percent remain non-Muslim. They also chose a distinct form of Islam,
Twelver Shiism, making these two countries virtually alone in having a
majority of Twelvers. Kurdish and Turkic minorities arc numerous and
powerful. Iraq and Iran both had disproportionately large roles in shaping
Muslim civilization, contributing some o f its greatest figures, its most splendid
cities, and its key institutions.25
Pipes also challenges accounts o f the war that stress Ba'thist concern with a possible Shi'i
uprising: "If the Iraqis feared Shia uprisings," he queries, "would they attack the only state
governed by Shia religious authorities?" With respect to a prospective Shi i uprising he
concludes: "A state so fearful o f restlessness among its own people would not embark on a
war against their foreign supporters. Fear o f Shia rebellion docs not account for the war
boundary disputes were largely inconsequential. See Rouhollah Rama/ani, "The Arab-Iranian
Conflict: The Ideological Dimensions," in International Security in Southwest Asia, Hafcc/. Malik,
ed., (Praeger, 1984).
25
Daniel Pipes, "A Border Adrift: Origins of the Conflict," in The Iran-Iraq War: New
Weapons, Old Conflicts, eds. Shirin Tahir-khcli and Shaheen Ayub, (Praeger, 1983), p. 4.
200
with Iran."2*
With these refutations of the "ancient enmities" and the "Shi'i threat" theses, Pipes
then offers his account for the war. After providing an overview of the history o f the
Shatt al-Arab dispute he writes:
The great meaning of all these centuries of to and fro over the Shatt lies not
so much in the details ... but in the long record o f concentrating on the Shatt
al-Arab as a vital area. This river is unique in the Middle East; no other
border has a record so long and so emotional. Virtually all other boundaries
were drawn by colonial administrators in the twentieth century. W hile it has
become a matter of national pride to maintain those borders, they are not
invested with long histories. In contrast, the border between Iraq and Iran
had two centuries of dispute even before the European powers became
involved.21
Pipes concludes that the boundary dispute was a sufficient cause of the war: "Even if Iraq
and Iran were homogeneous, even if Iraq had no Shia problem, the Shatt al-Arab issue
would have sufficed to cause war to break out in 1980."28
The Personality o f Saddam Hussein:
W hile commentators have frequently drawn attention to the personalities and

inclinations o f the Iranian and Iraqi leadership, at least one prominent w riter has
persuasively argued that the war can still be understood almost entirely in terms of
Ibid., p.
12.
27
Ibid., p.
21
25
Ibid., p.
21
201
Saddam Husseins psyche. In his provocative study o f contemporary Iraq entitled Republic
o f Fear Samir al-Khalil addresses many o f the factors conventionally attributed to the
outbreak of war, including the ancient enmities thesis, the Shii threat to the Bath regime,
and the dispute over the Shatt al-Arab waterway.1 In the end, however, he contends
that these arc "invented rationalizations" which overlook the degree to which Saddam
Hussein acted as "the only genuinely free man in Iraq". al-Khalil prefaces his account of
the war with a discussion of Bathi logic in Iraq. On the one hand the Balh in Iraq were
drunk w ith optimism:
T he regime was brimming over with self-confidence and a sense of its own
achievement; it was armed to the teeth and capable of those great things that
were given to it by history and everything that the pan-Arabism o f the Ba'th
stood for. The time was ripe for the Bath to take externally the kind of
decisive action they had already taken internally, to signify to the outside the
rising preeminence of Iraqi Bathism in regional and Arab affairs. ' 0
O n the other hand, the regime had honed its repressive apparatus in a manner that made
an attack upon neighbouring stales natural. "War, any war," writes al-Khalil, "it does not
matter against whom, is a not unlikely outcome of the unbridled growth of the means of
violence, particularly when it is so structured as to compromise literally masses of people
in its terror ." 31 The tendency of the regime writ large, he argues, meshed with the
29 Samir al-Khalil, Republic of Fear: The Politics o f Modern Iraq, (University of California
Press, 1989), pp. 262-270.
30
Ibid., p. 270.
31
Ibid., p. 271.
202
personality o f Saddam Hussein. In the context o f domestic political developments during

the late 1970s Saddam Hussein "had become an institution unto himself, one virtually
without checks." 12 This rendered his decisions "unusually important" to the war: "I think
the whole question o f how this war began," al-Khalil concludes, "resolves itself into what
was passing through Saddam Husseins mind."33 The "well-founded self-confidence" of
Saddam Hussein was translated into megalomania. That Saddam Hussein could take the
decision to attack Iran was rooted in the gradual autonomization o f his political authority
(al-Khalil refers to this as the "form" of the decision, and he summarizes this as
"gratuitous"). The actual decision to attack Iran, as opposed to Syria or perhaps Kuwait,
was the product o f Saddams mind alone (al-Khalil calls this the "content" of the decision
to go to war). For al-Khalil, the most elegant testimony to this view of the war may be
found in its Iraqi christening: Qadisiyyat Saddam.
Iraq .v Quest fo r Regional Hegemony:
A final account of the war focuses upon the declining Iranian hegemony in the
G u lf region after the revolution. This regional power vacuum afforded the Bath regime a
unique opportunity to extend its regional influence and enhance its Arab stature.
Chubins discussion finely illustrates this argumentative tendency:
32
Ibid., p. 271.
Ibid., p. 272.
203
What made war likely - even inevitable - was not simply Irans provocation but
also its neglect of, and disdain for, the traditional military balance obtaining
between the two countries. It had been the balance - in Irans favour - that
had secured the 1975 Algiers agreement and sustained the new relationship of
respect and reciprocity that had followed. Irans rhetorical excesses and
claims and inattention to the military balance were matched on the Iraqi side
by a compound o f fear and ambition; fear about Irans goals if the revolution
were to become entrenched, and ambition to achieve a position of regional
suprcmaey while Iran was preoccupied and Iraq was in a relative position of
unmatched military/economic strength. From Iraqs perspective the time to
strike, preventativcly perhaps, was unlikely to be better than in 1980, before
the revolution put down its roots, while its forces were in disarray, and while
its relationship with both superpowers and most regional states were at best
strained.34
Iraq and Iran were traditional rivals in the Gulf. The tumultuous state o f affairs in the
revolutionary aftermath created the opportunity for Iraq to gain the upper hand in
regional affairs. Iraq, according to this account, simply seized the unique opportunity
presented by the apparently chaotic situation in Iran.
The Long War:
The course o f the Iran-Iraq war has also received attention in academic and
journalistic commentary. T h e stunning material and human costs o f the war created a
conundrum o f sorts for many writers. The underlying tenor of much o f the commentary
34 Shahram Chubin, "Iran and the War: From Stalemate to Ceasefire," in The G u lf War:
Regional and International Dimensions, eds. Hanns W. Maull and Otto Pick, (Pinter Publishers,
1989), p. 6 .
35
Explanations o f the length of the war, however, have received less commentary than
theories about the causes of the war.
204
was that the interminable length of the Iran-Iraq war was somewhat odd or peculiar.-'6
How could such a costly war continue for eight years? Why did the war drag on despite
its incredible human toll and its astounding economic losses? One response to this puzzle
holds that the personal animosity between Saddam Hussein and Ayatollah Khomeini
fuelled the war for much of its eight years. "For all the rational fears, the claims and
counter-claims that stood between Iraq and Iran," one commentator laments, "the student
o f history is hard put to find another war in modern times in which two peoples have been
so extensively made victim o f their rulers hatred of each other ." 38
The following
observation echoes similar sentiments:
In June o f 1982 came the mistake of Khomeinis life. In Baghdad the

Revolutionary Command Council, the ruling body o f the Ba'ath party, met
without Saddam Hussein and offered peace. Khomeini, if he had not been
obsessed by hatred for the man who had been his most reluctant host during his
years o f exile ... could at that moment have gained peace for his people ... This
was one of the classic blunders which changed the course o f events for
mankind. It led on to more carnage (and) to years o f hardship for the
Iranians . . . 39
A corollary of this thesis was that the war was unlikely to come to a close until the death
v For example, the Middle East Research and Information Project entitled its special coverage
of the war in 1984 (14:6/7, July-Scptember 1984) as "The Strange W ar in the G ulf'.
37
Mansour Farhang develops this thesis to its fullest extent.
Between Two Despots" The Nation 243:8 (September 20,1986).
78
See "An Unending War
Uriel Dann, "The Iraqi-Iranian War," Middle East Contemporary Survey 9 (1984-1985), p.
168.
w John Bullock and Harvey Morris, The G u lf War: Its Origins, History and Consequences,
(Methuen, 1989), p. xvi, my emphasis.
205
o f Ayatollah Khomeini or the forced removal o f Saddam Hussein.

A second theme focuses upon the perfunctory efforts o f the international
community to find a solution to the war. The international community was generally seen
as opposing an Iranian victory, and was only more slightly supportive o f the socialist Iraqi
regime. Consequently, the international community was for the most part content to see
the two countries bleed each other as long as neither emerged victorious. T h e two
superpowers were deemed to be especially culpable in this respect. 10 The conspicuous
absence of the superpowers from the mediation efforts tends to support this line of
argumentation. As long as the war could be contained, that is, as long as the war did not
extend militarily to the neighbouring G u lf states and thereby jeopardize the supply of
crude o il, it could be tolerated by the international community. This view finds some
substantiation in the fact that as the involvement o f the international community
heightened in 1987 and 1988 a solution to the war was forthcoming.
A final theme surrounds the lack of commitment on the part o f Iran and Iraq.
Both countries were seen as lacking the necessary will to resolve the war. Upon returning
to Stockholm following his mediation efforts early in the war a frustntlcd O la f Palme
remarked that a solution to the war was improbable "as long as the political will to make
peace is missing." Mediation efforts were doomed to failure given the lack o f enthusiasm
by the protagonists/
M any of the causes o f the war, such as deeply rooted cultural
For example, see A li E. Hillal Dcssouki, "The Iraq-lran War: An Overview," in The IraqIran War: Issues o f Conflict and Prospects for Settlement," ed. Elie. Hillal Dessouki, Centre for
International Studies, Princeton University, 1981, p. 4.
40
41 Sec Glen Balfour-Paul, "The Prospects for Peace", in The Iran-Iraq War: An Historical,
Economic and Political Analysis, ed. M.S. El Azhary (Croom Helm, 1984), p. 137.
206
animosities or the intractability o f the territorial disputes, were widely viewed as blocking
th e development of good intentions and trust between the two regimes. Another view saw
a rapid end to the w ar unlikely given its character as a "counterrevolutionary war " .42
Concern was registered over the need to avoid assigning blame for the war .43 Another
line of inquiry implicitly accounted for the lack of will by drawing attention to some o f the
problems and challenges facing the Iraqi and Iranian political systems, especially internal
conflicts and nationalist struggles.4'
Analyzing the Social Foundations of the Iran-Iraq War:
Although each of these accounts contains a kernel of truth, as a collection o f

explanations they remain woefully inadequate in that they fail to socially contextualize the
Iran-Iraq war . 44 They afford little attention to the complex socio-political dynamics at
42 Richard W. Bullict, "Time, Perceptions, and Conflict Resolution, in The Iran-Iraq War:
New Weapons, Old Conflicts, op. cit..
43 See the discussion in Richard Falk, "International Law and the Peaceful Settlement of the
Conflict," in The Iran-Iraq War: Issues o f Conflict and Prospects fo r Settlement, ed. Ali E. Hillal
Dcssourki, Centre for International Studies, Princeton University, 1981.
41 Eric Davis, "Domestic Factors and the Peaceful Settlement o f the Conflict," in The IraqIran War: Issues of Conflict and Prospects for Settlement, ed. Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, Centre for
International Studies, Princeton University, 1981), pp. 66-78.
4< Their arc some exceptions to this rule but they are rare. W ith respect to the outbreak of
war see Isam al-Khafaji, "The Parasitic Base of the Bathist Regime," in Saddams Iraq:
Revolution or Reaction, ed., Committee Against Repression and for Democratic Rights in Iraq,
(Z ed Books, 1986). With respect to the course of the war see Eric Rouleau, "The W ar and the
Struggle for the State", M E R IP Reports 98 (July-August 1981), 3-11. David Mcnasheris
discussions in Middle East Contemporary Survey also provide some analysis of the war and
revolutionary consolidation in Iran.
207
work within either country. Accounts that draw attention to the "ancient animosities"
between Iran and Iraq, for example, entirely overlook the complex array o f social forces in
either country. Each society is conceptualized in holistic or monolithic terms. The war is
simply a result of the repetitive collisions between two thoroughly different societies.
There is a general failure to address the Iraqi and Iranian societies as dynamic and diverse
entities. Similarly, when attention is given to social divisions within society, little
additional effort is made to relate these cleavages to other social dynamics. This is most
obvious in those explanations o f the Shi'i struggle in Iraq. The Shi'i threat to the Bath
regime is not linked to other developments in Iraqi society, especially enduring class
developments that profoundly affected urban migration and the secularizing trends of
twentieth century Iraq. Again, explanations which call attention to the Shatt al-Arab
dispute, or to Iraqs regional aspirations in the Gulf, generally overlook the relationship of
these factors to dynamic state, class and communal developments within either society.
This is their primary failing. Most accounts o f the Iran-Iraq war tend to separate
its cause or course from the broader social canvases o f either country. In other words,
as real as the war may be, it is not understood as a thoroughly social reality. The struggle
among contending social groups is omitted from most commentary. The war, in short, is
carelessly reified. T h e war is treated as a self-contained event suspended above society
rather than intimately bound up with it. Understandably, there is a general failure to
sense o r appreciate the social costs o f the war, especially in terms o f the extension of
oppressive relations within Iran and Iraq. These accounts of the war are, at best, partial
and incomplete. A t worst, the interventionist parturitions of discussions which fail to
appreciate the social realities underlining war may be politically disastrous for many o f the
208
oppressed constituencies in society.

Analysts have been misguided in their attempts to provide a scalar model o f the
war. We should not be seeking to establish the degree of relative importance o f factor A
over factor B, o f persuasively uncovering the weightier force behind the war. Th e real
issue of the war, at least according to the critical study of war, concerns its relationship to
underlying struggles among contending social forces. In its abstract formulation, factor A
(lo r example, the Shi'i struggle in Iraq) and factor B (for example, Iraqs struggle for
regional hegemony) arc equally important by virtue of their links to class and communal
struggles within society. The pallid quest for degree must be supplanted by the discovery
of relationship. W e analytically embed the war in society, regardless o f how tenuous such
linkages might appear at first glance.
What would a non-reifted account of the Iran-Iraq war look like? In the broadest
possible terms we begin to unearth the social origins and social foundations of the IranIraq war by understanding the interaction between forces from the international
environment and specific local processes and structures with their own specific logic
throughout the
20
th century. 46 Only a thumb-nail sketch of these developments may be
adumbrated here, while keeping in mind the fact that the particular evolutionary path in
both countries has varied somewhat.4 Both Iran and Iraq were gradually drawn into the
European economic fold over the last century. T o the extent that the opening o f the
46 Sec introductory discussion in Talal Asad and Roger Owen, cds., Sociology o f Developing
Societies: The Middle East, (Monthly Review Press, 1983), pp. 7-8.
47 For an interesting collection of articles that begin to take up these themes see Tim
Niblock, ed. Social and Economic Development in the Arab Gulf, (St Martins Press, 1980).
209
Suez canal accelerated this economic integration we could claim that the slide to war
began in 1869. This initial process o f integration centred around locally produced craft
and agricultural commodities. The economic sector catalysing these transformations over
the last few decades has been hydrocarbon extraction and processing. As part o f this
process capitalist relations of production have been continually extended throughout both
countries. The Iraqi and Iranian states were instrumental in facilitating the processes of
economic transformation, and have played increasing roles throughout the economy in the
post-war period.
Iran and Iraq have consequently undergone radical social transformations over the
last century. Agrarian reforms in both countries resulted in deteriorating living conditions
in th e countryside and spawned increased migration into the urban centres. Large pools
of urban poor have arisen in both countries. In terms o f class structure there was the
growth o f urban working classes, new intermediate classes including salaried professionals,
intellectuals and teachers and a small indigenous bourgeoisie. At the same time the
political and social influence o f the clerics and the traditional petty bourgeoisie declined
under the pressures of economic modernization and secularization. The strength o f the
landed classes, particularly in Iraq, have weakened considerably.w Tribal affiliations have
continually eroded in the face o f these pressures. The processes o f modernization and
48 The most exhaustive study of class formation in Iran is Ervand Abrahamian, Iran Between
Two Revolutions, (Princeton University Press, 1982). The most thorough study of class tormation
in Iraq remains Hanna Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movement in Iraq,
(Princeton University Press, 1978). For a provocative review of Abrahamians work see Eric
Hooglund in M E R IP Reports, 13:3 (March-April 1983); and for Batatus work see articles by Tom
Nieuwcnhuis, Marion Farouk-Sluglctt, Peter Sluglctt and Joe Stork in MERJP Reports, no. 97
(June 1981).
210
secularization also resulted in more liberalized views of women, thereby encouraging

modest improvements in their social condition. In view o f these processes the once
nomadic, rural and tribally centred ways of life have been largely given over to an
urbanized, secularized and distinctly modern society.
It is commonplace to observe that the favourable effects of the particular path of
socio-economic development in Iran and Iraq were highly skewed in favour o f thin
segments at the top of society. Increasing privation and social marginalization continued
to plague the majority. O n the whole, the urban population fairs better than the rural
population. W ithin the urban centres, the ruling classes and the growing middle classes
tended to fair better than the working groups. The urban underemployed and unskilled
often reside in squalid slums and shantytowns all too characteristic o f the Third World.
The slums o f Baghdad and Tehran became infamous for their miserable living conditions.
Political development in Iran and Iraq was rarely commensurate with the farreaching socio-economic change. In both countries, through a combination o f shear oil
wealth and well-honed repressive apparatuses, the ruling regimes were able to acquire
considerable degrees of conjunctural autonomy from any particular social class.
Conventional political parties and alternative political organizations were systematically
attacked and rendered politically ineffective. Increased exposure to Western ideas helped
generate nationalist, class and feminist political discourses that were denied the
opportunity to be freely voiced.
In short, as the socio-economic transformation of 20th
century Iran and Iraq created new social expectations and demands among classes and
groups in both societies, the political avenues to address these demands were progressively
closed off. Political opposition increasingly manifested itself in the form o f direct attacks
211
against the regime and in protracted struggles in the countryside. The disjunctive
between the political sphere and the socio-economic sphere in both Iran and Iraq has
produced extremely volatile political conditions for the ruling regimes. In the case o f Iran,
the incongruity between the political and socio-economic worlds fostered the sustained
struggles throughout the latter half of the 1970s that culminated in the Islamic revolution.
W hile the Ba'th managed to retain control o f the state apparatus in Iraq, it has been
blackened by prolonged and bloody confrontations with its political opponents, especially
the Kurds in the north of the country.
It is within this transformed social canvas that we must begin to search for the
social foundations of the Iran-Iraq war. The socio-economic transformations o f the 20th
century set in motion distinct struggles that culminated in the three crucial political
dynamics most closely associated with the outbreak o f the war: the inflamed Islamic
rhetoric emanating from Iran in the aftermath of the revolution; the alarmed Bathi
response in the face o f a perceived Shii uprising in Iraq; and the Iraqi B alh attempts to
secure and stabilize oil export revenues. Expressed differently, the political aspirations
and vulnerabilities that impelled both regimes to war for almost eight years are stained by
the structural disjunctures between the political and socio-economic spheres in Iraqi and
Iranian society, disjunctures that in turn are fundamentally signatured by the class and
communal struggles engendered by the broad socio-economic transformation o f these
societies over the last century. The war grew out o f the social stress and political strain
that characterizes both countries.
O u r task, therefore, is to explore the social foundations o f the Iran-Iraq war. In
Chapter 6 we explore the social transformations o f contemporary Iran that culminated in
212
the Islamic Revolution in February of 1979. In Chapter 7, we address the social changes
in Iraq, and draw attention to the alienation o f the Ba'th regime from the evolving Iraqi
society. In Chapter 8, wc conclude our discussion o f the social origins of the war by
addressing the political struggles associated with the war in terms o f the specific changes
outlined in chapters
and 7. Wc contend that the security problems facing Iran and Iraq,
problems that spawned war in 1980, are directly rooted in the broad socio-economic
transformations o f the last ccntuiy. In Chapter 9 we address the continuation of the war
in terms o f the turbulent process o f revolutionary consolidation in Iran. In Chapter 10 we
address the war in terms of Ba'thist political consolidation in Iraq.
213
Chapter Six
Social Transformation and Revolution In Iran
Introduction:
The Islamic Revolution o f 1979 was the major political dynamic immediately
related to the outbreak o f the Iran-Iraq war. A complete account o f the social origins o f
the Iran-Iraq war must therefore consider the social transformations that engendered the
events of the late 1970s in Iran. The contemporary history o f Iran has been guided by an
uneasy balance o f internal and external forces. Tsarist Russias support of the Q ajar
dynasty in the early decades o f this century, British support o f Rcza Shah and American
support of the Shah attest to the importance of outside players. A t the same time Irans
gradual insertion into the world economy has been accompanied by profound changes in
Iranian society. In a matter of decades Iran was transformed from a largely disconnected
collection o f villages and nomadic tribes into a highly centralized, urban-centred capitalist
society replete with the attendant social contradictions o f modernity. The changes in the
contemporary structure o f Iranian society began to fall into place during the reign of R e /a
Shah from 1926 to 1941. U nder the reign o f the Shah from 1953 to 1979 the modern
form o f Iranian society fully congealed. These sweeping changes in Iranian society
provided the raw material for the series of political crises of 20th century Iran including
the Constitutional Revolution o f 1905, the overthrow of the Qajar dynasty, the ousting o f
Reza Shah in 1941, the Mossadeq crisis in 1953 and, ultimately, the Islamic Revolution o f
1979.
W c entertain two broad themes in our discussion of the transformation of Iranian
society. First, the centralization and modernization o f the Iranian economy that resulted
in a significantly transformed class structure. This class framework included the creation
of a politically vibrant working class, a modern middle class o f salaried professionals and
the erosion o f the traditional middle class of merchants and clerics. Secondly, the
evolution of modern Iran can be characterized as a growing contradiction between social
modernization and political stagnation, between the proliferation o f social forces under
capitalist development and the progressive deterioration of meaningful channels o f
political expression. These developments paved the way for social and political struggles
that came to bear on the events o f the late 1970s. Conjunctural conditions in the latter
half of the 1970s cradled the burgeoning opposition and ultimately led to the collapse of
the Pahlavi dynasty.
I9th Century Iran and the Constitutional Revolution
For most of its history Iran was a loosely connected region . 1 The shear vastness
1 Except where specifically indicated for clarity and due recognition this analysis is extracted
from the following general histories o f twentieth century Iran: Ervand Abrahamian, Iran Between
Two Revolutions, (Princeton University Press, 1982); H . Bashiriyeh, The State and Revolution in
Iran: 1962-1982, (St. Martins Press, 1984); Fred Halliday, Iran: Dictatorship and Development,
(Penguin, 1989); Mehran Kamrava, Revolution in Iran: The Roots of Turmoil, (Routledge, 1990);
Katouzian, H., The Political Economy of Modem Iran: Despotism and Pseudo-Modernism: 19261979, (New York University Press, 1981); Nikki R. Keddie, Roots o f Revolution: An Interpretive
History o f Modem Iran, (Yale University Press, 1981); Misagh Parsa, Social Origins o f the Iranian
Revolution, (Rutgers, 1989).
215
o f Iran, its mountainous terrain and massive central dessert, and its lack of a central
waterway analogous to the Nile or the Tigris-Euphrates river system effectively stalled the
political centralization o f the region. Irans geography insured that its ruling cities were
necessarily peripheral and fluid. The political centre was uniquely dispersed among nine
different cities over the last few centuries. 2 These factors combined to nurse economic
self-sufficiency in Irans numerous towns. This political diffusion was reinforced by
extensive ethnic and religious differences. Together, these features o f Iran supported the
nomadism and tribalism that historically characterized the Iranian peoples.
A t the outset of the nineteenth century there were four distinct elements in the
class structure o f Iran. T h e upper class o f the Qajar dynasty included those directly
associated with the monarchy, provincial aristocrats and tribal leaders. The intermediate
strata was composed of merchants, shopkeepers and small work-shop owners. These
groups were organically linked with the ulama o r Islamic clerics. T h e third class was
made up o f wage earners including apprentices, hired artisans and construction workers.
A t the lower echelon o f Iranian society were the rural masses including the tribal members
and the peasantry. 5 These classes did not behave as politically conscious entities due to
the strong presence of local non-class tics:
"... communal tics - especially those based on tribal lineages, religious sects,
regional organization, and paternalistic sentiments - cut through the horizontal
2 For full account o f the political effects of Iranian geography see Charles Issawi,
"Geographical and Historical Background," in The Economic History of Iran: 1800-1914,
(University of Chicago Press, 1971), pp. 1-13.
3
Ervand Abrahamian, Iran: Between Two Revolutions, pp. 33-34.

216
classes, strengthened the vertical communal bond, and thereby prevented latent
economic interests from developing into manifest political forces. In so far as
numerous individuals in early nineteenth-century Iran shared similar ways o f life,
similar positions in the mode of production, and similar relations to the means of
adminstration, they constituted socioeconomic classes. But in so far as these
individuals were bound by communal tics, failed to overcome local barriers, and
articulated no state-wide interests, they did not constitute socio-political classes."4
T h e vertical cleavages of Iranian society thus retarded the development o f a class

consciousness. In other words, the political significance o f the class structure of Iranian
society should not be accorded undue weight.
This political characteristic of Iran changed as the Iranian economy was opened up
to external influence. The penetration of the Iranian economy by European merchants
and their products underscored these changes. Nursed by the Gulistan Treaty of 1813 and
the Turkmanchai Treaty of 1828, both with Russia, and the Anglo-Persian Commercial
Treaty ot 1841, Irans trade rose dramatically. Between the turn o f the century and the
1850s Iranian trade rose threefold. In the following decades until the outbreak of World
W ar I Irans trade quadrupled .5 O n e salient effect o f these changes included the
development o f a politically conscious intermediate class, especially that fraction o f the
traditional middle classes that were adversely affected by Ira n s new economic trajectory.
Two separate trends laid at the heart o f this effect. First, the growing disaffection o f the
traditional middle classes in the face o f the new economic relations with Europe
contributed to their heightened sense o f solidarity and task. The gradual extension of
European market relations throughout the Iranian economy resulted in the erosion of
Ibid., p. 36.
Issawi, op. cit., editors summary, Chapter Three, p. 132.

217
local artisan production and merchant activity. The following observations recorded by the
son of an Isfahanian cashier, for example, demonstrate the reverberating effects o f the
influx o f European textiles upon the weavers guilds:
It was for the sake of elegant appearance and easy handling that they employed
European yarn in weaving qadaks. Their work became ugly and, as a result of
mixing European and Iranian materials, it became progressively defective and tore
and went to pieces while worn; it also lost its stiffness, fluff, and durability.
Spinners lost their jobs and gradually perished. Russia stopped buying. Iranians
turned away from their own products, and the weavers guild suffered a
tremendous loss. Consequently, other guilds began to face deficits and loss. A t
least one-tenth of the guilds in this city were weavers, of whom not even one-fifth
has survived. About one-twentieth of the needy widows of Isfahan raised their
children by spinning thread for the weavers; they all have perished. Likewise
other large guilds, such as dyers, carders, and labourers in the bleaching house,
which were related to this guild, have mostly disappeared.'
p.
|
t
|:.
I',
W
W-
This developing consciousness was facilitated by the significant growth in communications

throughout the region. The politically latent middle classes gradually developed the
necessary cohesion to effect political change in Iran.
%
T h e second crucial trend centred around the spread o f Western ideas among the
Iranian population. T h e nucleus of a modern middle class intelligentsia was slowly being
formed and tended to articulate a political critique of the Q ajar dynasty. Attention was
drawn to the interference of European powers in Iranian affairs and to the tyrannical
c,
tendencies of some Muslim rulers. 7 The Qajar dynasty was increasingly viewed as weak
I
M irza Husain, "Crafts in Isfahan," selection 3, Chapter 6 in Tlw Economic Hi.stoiy o f Iran:
1800-1914, ed. Charles Issawi, op. cit., p. 281.
6
7 See discussion in Malcolm E. Yapp, "1900-1921: The Last Years o f the Qajar Dynasty," in
Twentieth Century Iran, ed. Hossein Amirsadeghi (Heinemann, 1977), p.7.
218
and corrupt. A n embryonic nationalist political discourse increasingly permeated the

Iranian political atmosphere. The agitated clergy, an integral element o f the traditional
middle class, insured that this Western influenced political dialogue would have a
distinctive Islamic hue. Through the minbar they insured that the general public would
remain sufficiently aroused. 8 The combiation o f the traditional merchant/clerical class and
the Western-influenced modern middle class resulted in a social force that strongly
believed that the "religio-nalional community" was in danger. 9 The ensuing confrontation
with the Qajars manifested itself in the sustained struggle to cloak the dynasty with
constitutional rule. The prolonged civil war lasted from 1905 to 1911. The main sites of
the struggle were centred in Tehran and Tabriz . 10 In the end, the Qajar dynasty was
forced to supplement its rule with constitutional restrictions, particularly through the
presence o f an elected assembly (Majlis). These constitutional restrictions, strongly
opposed the monarchy and Tsarist Russia, were gradually undone as the dynasty regained
de facto political power over the next decade. "In the final analysis," summarizes Fred
Halliday, "no revolution occurred, and the state was not fundamentally altered by these
events. " ' 1 The traditional middle class/ modern middle class alliance, however, established
8
An interesting assessment o f this role may be found in Asghar Fathi, "Preachers as
Substitutes for Mass Media: The Case of Iran 1905-1909," in Towards a Modern Iran: Studies in
Thought, Politics and Society, eds. Elie Kedourie and Sylvia G. Haim (Frank Cass, 1980).
0 See discussion in Hamid Algar, Religion and State in Iran 1785 - 1906: The Role of the
Ulama in the Qajar Period, (University o f California Press, 1969), chapter 14.
10 The most detailed account o f the Constitutional Revolution in Iran may be found in E. G.
Browne, The Persian Revolution: 1905-1909, (Frank Cass and Co. Ltd., 1966).
11
Halliday, op. cit., p. 22.

219
a powerful historical precedent that would leave a far more enduring mark towards the
end o f the twentieth century.
Reza Shah and the Phulavi Monarchy
W hile the Qajar dynasty managed to wrestle back most of its lost power in the
|.
aftermath o f the constitutional revolution, its control over the country extended little
&
beyond Tehran and a few other major cities. Travel between towns was hazardous. Iran
$
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was increasingly beset by centrifugal forces that threw to its multi-communal character into
1'
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full relief:
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In every corner of the land local chiefs and tribal khans were taking the law into
their own hands - Turcomans in the northeast, Kurds in the northwest, Bakhtiaris
and Qashqais in the south, Baluchis in Kerman and Bulchistan, Lurs in the
mountain ranges of the west. In Khuzistan, the Arab Shaykh Khazal reigned as
an independent ruler, confident in the support of his British allies. In Gilan,
Marza Kuchek Khan established an independent, republican regime from his
Jangali "forest" headquarters, and collaborated with other rebels and Bolshevik
troops along the whole coast of the Caspian Sea. 12
I
W ith the country hopelessly disintegrating, new fuel was added to the nationalist struggle
with the signing o f the Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919. T h e accord essentially turned
Iran into a British protectorate. The agreement was loathed by nationalists throughout
the country: "Once again a comprehensive agreement had run foul of nascent Persian
nationalism and after another half-century of development, a revolution and a war, that
12 L. P. Elwell-Sutton, "Reza Shah the Great: Founder of the Pahlavi Dynasty," in Iran Under
the Pahlavis, ed. George Lenczowski (Stanford University: Hoover Institution Press, 1978), p. 9.
220
nationalism had a new cause." 13 The crescendo o f opposition culminated in a British

encouraged coup d etat on February 20, 1919. The coup was organized by Sayyid Zia and
Riza Khan. In the ensuing year Reza Khan (later Reza Shah) emerged as the
unchallenged locus of power in the Country. In April 1926 the Majlis ended the Qajar
dynasty by formally founding the Phalavi monarchy.
The process of political consolidation in Iran began in earnest. The gradual
ferment of Western ideas came to fruition under Reza Shah. Reza Shahs embrace o f
Western ideas, particularly those of nationalism and statehood, centred more around the
practical solution they offered for Irans social and political ills. Western ideas embodied a
coherent response to external interference and the internal forces and disintegration that
had plagued Iran. As Banani has written: "Reza Shah was imbued with this spirit; it had
come to him not from abstract contemplation o f Western ideologies but from distress and
anger at the helplessness of backward Iran in the face of foreign intervention . " 14 Reza
Shahs rule received support from the growing modern middle class that widely accepted
Western notions o f nationalism, development and progress. T h e task o f building a
distinctly modern state began during Reza Shahs initial tenure as Minister o f War in the
early 1920s. The state o f the armed forces during the final years of the Qajar dynasty
reflected the political fragmentation of the country. The Persian Cossack Brigade, the
gendarmerie, and the South Persia Rifles were tied to different power bases within the
13 William J. Olson, "The Genesis of the Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919," in Towards a

Modem Iran: Studies in Thought, Politics and Society, eds. Elie Kedourie and Sylvia G . Haim,
(Frank Cass, 1980), p. 211.
14
Amin Banani, The Modernization o f Iran: 1921-1941, (Stanford University Press, 1961), p.
46.
221
country. Reza Shah immediately dissolved all independent military units and created the
first unified standing army in Iran. The tradition o f forcign-ot'fieercd armed forces was
ended. On June
, 1925 the Majlis passed a law o f compulsory conscription for every
male upon reaching 21. On February 15, 1936 the armed forces were further
professionalised through the establishment of new ranks with Persian names, a regulated
basis o f promotion, retirement pay and other pensions. By 1941 Reza Shah could
mobilize an army of 400,000 men. The centralized army allowed Reza Shah to pacify the
country, and by the end o f 1923 his task was completed in all but the southwestern corner
of Iran in the province o f Khuzcstan. By the 1930s one could travel throughout the
country with relative safety.
W ithin a decade Reza Shah had taken a fragmented army and turned it into a
centralized, professional military force that he employed to conquer all autonomous forces
in Iran. "H e instinctively understood the lesson o f European history - the emergence o f a
unified national state coincides with the development o f a standing national army . ' " 5
Additional political and economic reforms complemented Reza Shahs reorganization o f
Irans armed forces. The nepotism of the poorly organized and corrupt Qajar bureaucracy
was replaced by a Westernized, meritocratic and vastly expanded civil adminstration. As
testimony to the nature and extent of these administrative forms, the nwdakhel system of
official bribery was replaced by a strict system o f penalties for corrupt practices. In the
area o f public health laws were passed regarding the quality o f food supplies, the licensing
of physicians and the prevention and combating o f infectious diseases. A scientific
15
Banani, op. cit., p. 54.

222
research institute and a medical school were established in Tehran. The construction of
hospitals was energetically pursued. Extensive reforms in the areas o f education included
the creation of the High Council o f Education in 1921 and the establishment o f the
University o f Tehran in 1934. Additional educational changes included the bypassing of
the clerical controlled maktab (elementary schools) and madrasah (seminaries in Qom and
Isfahan) through the establishment of an elementary and secondary school system with a
standard secular curricula.
The most extensive changes during the reign o f Reza Shah were in the
economy. 16 Under the Qajar dynasty Iranian economic development was hindered by a
number o f factors, especially the weakness o f the central government. W ith the political
consolidation under Reza Shah the Iranian state became the central economic force.
Enhanced internal security meant better communication and safer travel. Educational,
administrative and health reforms were largely designed to complement economic growth
and development. Irans infrastructure was continually developed and expanded. Between
1927 and 1938, for example, approximately 14,000 miles of roads were constructed.
Simultaneously, the number of vehicles in the country jumped from one lone car in 1910
to 8,000 cars and 6,000 trucks by 1929.17 By 1938 the Trans-Iranian Railway connecting
Tehran in the north and Ahwas in the south was completed. By 1941 the east-west link
between Mashhad, Teran and Tabriz was 50 per cent completed. The Iranian state also
became directly involved in the economy. A number o f state monopolies were established
16 Following discussion on economic changes primarily draws upon Julian Bharier, Economic
Development in Iran: 1900-1970, (Oxford University Press, 1971).
17
Ibid., pp. 194-197.

223
to import and export certain necessities such as sugar, tobacco, tea, cotton, ju te, rice and
carpets. By 1931 the state had established 27 monopolies in crucial commodity sectors.
T h e state encouraged private industrialization through import and tax exemptions,
by supplying credit through the Agricultural and Industrial Bank established in 1933, and
through other protective measures including tariffs, quotas, and exchange controls."* The
combined effect o f the states direct and indirect encouragement to industrial development
was substantial. Between 1929 and 1941 ninety large manufacturing plants were
established, and between 1934 and 1938 alone at least fifty-eight industries began
operation. This compares with the establishment o f two new operations in 1926, none in
I
|
1927 and none in 1928. O il exports continued to increase throughout the reign ol Reza
Shah. Iran continually increased its oil exports from 3.8 million metric tons in 1925 to a
j
>
:
\
peak o f approximately 9.6 million metric tons in 1938.

Irans irreversible path towards political and economic modernization was
inaugurated during Reza Shahs rule. Social changes included the continuing rise o f
professionals including lawyers, judges, doctors and teachers. Industrialization led to the
rise of a working class. A t the same time, the traditional middle classes of clerics and
bazaar merchants continued to decline in terms of their social standing and their political
influence. Tribal strength and affiliation eroded in the face of economic modernization
and political centralization. In the countryside, the growth of a landed class and a massive
18
See discussion in Charles Issawi, "The Iranian Economy 1925-L975: Fifty Years of
Economic Development," in Iran Under the Pahlavis, ed. George Lenczowski (Hoover Institution
Press, 1978), p. 131. Also see Bharicr, op. cit., chapter 5 entitled "The State and Development,"
pp. 84-88.
224
Iranian peasant class characterized rural relations of production . 19
The
developing social forces under Reza Shahs extremely exclusive political system were
generally denied access to any meaningful avenues of political expression. The monarchy
had managed to engineer almost absolute control over the political system. The state,
paradoxically, was stable and resilient on the one hand and vulnerable on the other. W ith
regards to the former, the political structure under the two decades o f Reza Shahs rule,
especially the strong military organization, rendered Iran much more politically centralized
than any other time in Iranian history. In the latter sense, however, the regime lacked any
strong social foundations. "Reza Shahs state hovered somewhat precariously,"
Abrahamian comments, "without class foundations, over Irans society." 20 Reza Shah had
managed to divide and conquer members of the upper-class, alienate the traditional middle
class, garner mixed support from the modern middle classes, and maintain a tight reign
over the burgeoning working classes. Trade unions, for example, were banned in 1926 and
a law prohibiting the propagation o f all "collectivist ideologies" was promulgated in 1931.
Class and ethnic conflict was increasingly controlled through state repression.
In 1941, Iran was occupied by the forces of the Soviet Union, Turkey and Great
Britain. Reza Shah, lacking any strong social base and suspected by the Allied forces o f
being sympathetic to Germany, was easily deposed and replaced by his son. Mohammed
R eza was then just 22 years o f age. In the aftermath o f the occupation Iran began a
w A n excellent account o f these social changes may be found in Farideh Farhi, "Class
Struggles, the State, and Revolution in Iran," Power and Stability in the Middle East, ed. Berch
Berbcroglu (Zed Books, 1989), p. 92.
20
Ervand Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p. 149.

225
** "Boaaeacwstew
.-xsuiwa- HAttusr-Guenm. '-^SSSS^SM iS^f^lâ'm &S
XOS&S
process of political liberalisation.
The social forces that had developed during the reign
of Reza Shah were allowed to organize and operate with relative freedom. The result was
a lively and fluid political struggle among the contending political expressions of the
traditional middle classes, the modern middle classes, the working classes and various
fractions of the ruling elite. 21 The most salient political struggle o f the period was
between the young Shah and the politically rich Majlis. T h e struggle could be
characterized as the call for an open, liberal democracy (the forces represented in the
Majlis) and the return to a closed, monarchic system. Turning points in this struggle
include the banning o f the Tudeh party in 1949 and the oil nationalization crisis o f 1951-3.
Towards the end of the 1940s the drift back to a closed political system could be delected
as the Shah slowly prevailed. The turbulence of the twelve year interregnum was brought
to an abrupt close w ith the ousting of Mossedcqs government through a CIA-sponsored
coup in 1953. Although the power of the court had been steadily accumulating, the coup
signalled the return o f autocratic rule in Iran. In short, "the potentially viable alternative
to royal authoritarianism" was closed o ff for decades.22
Developments under the Shuh
The undisputed accession of the Shah to power in 1953 ushered in the second
21 The most comprehensive account of the political struggles of this period my be found in
Fakhreddin Azimi, Iran: The Crisis of Democracy, 1941-1953, (I.B. Tauris and Company Ltd.,
1989).
22
Ibid., p. 339.
226
period o f concentrated economic growth and social change in Iran. The centrepiece of
the Shahs development programme was the package o f economic and social reforms
known as the W hite Revolution o f 1963. The six-point programme included 1) land
reform provisions 2) sale o f government-owned factories 3) a revised election law granting
womens suffrage 4) nationalization of Irans forests 5) a literacy corps and
) a plan to
give workers a share o f industrial profits. Iranian economic growth under the Shah
achieved spectacular rates. Between 1959/1960 and 1970/1971 the G N P in Iran rose by
143 per cent, or at an average rate of approximately 8.5 per cent each year. Annual
growth rates in the first half o f the 1970s were approximately 30 per cent each year, a
jum p largely due to the sharp rise the world oil prices after 1973.23 The rapid growth
throughout the 1960s and the 1970s reinfored shifting trends in the relative contributions
o f the different sectors o f the Iranian economy. The agricultural sector, which accounted
for more than 80 per cent of the Iranian G D P at the turned o f the century, continued to
decline. By 1959 it had fallen to 33 per cent and by the close o f the 1960s it had fallen to
23 per cent. In contrast, the manufacturing and mining sectors o f the Iranian economy,
which made negligible contributions to the Iranian economy at the turn of the century,
accounted for one third o f the G N P by 1969. The service sector o f the Iranian economy,
including banking and insurance, communications and power supplies, grew to over forty
per cent o f the Iranian economy by the end o f the 1960s.24
Iranian economic development under the Shah is subject to qualification.
14 Charles Issawi, "The Iranian Economy 1925-1975: Fifty Years o f Economic Development,"
in Iran Under the Pahlavis, p. 141.
24
Bharier, Economic Development in Iran: 1900-1970, pp. 59-61.

227
Successful growth in manufacturing and mining was accompanied by the growing

inefficiency o f the agricultural sector. Iranian agricultural production was incapable of
meeting domestic needs and the regime had to import foodstuffs. 15 Those that remained
in the countryside often endured extreme privation and hardship. The industrial sector
had few backward or forward linkages, which limited the opportunity for autonomous
economic growth. The growth of the economy became increasingly dependent upon the
steady supply o f oil revenues. Large-scale urban migration put great strain upon Irans
cities. Shanty towns with deplorable living conditions arose in the major urban centres,
especially Tehran. The economic boom after 1973 was accompanied by high inflation that
exacerbated the living condition of much o f Irans population.
In short, although some
social constituencies prospered, particularly those groups directly linked to the couit, the
business classes, many large landowners and the upper segments of the modern middle
classes, the majority of Iranians became worse off.
The Shahs economic success were overshadowed by political stagnation. Although
the Majlis continued to sit, it provided little more than official approbation o f royal
decrees. The Shahs political control manifested itself most clearly in the two
parliamentary parties, the National Party and the Peoples Party, which were known
colloquially as the "yes" and "yes sir" parties. The Shah complemented his political control
through a well developed internal policing apparatus, especially S A V A K .
In 1975 the
Shah dissolved the two-party system and replaced it with the Resurgence Party. Denied
meaningful political avenues to register their grievances, Irans latent opposition viewed
See Keith McLachlan, "The Iranian Economy: 1960-1976," in Twentieth Century Iran, ed.
Hossein Amirsadeghi (Heinemann, 1977).
25
228
the formation of the one-party system as a brazen move towards absolute political closure
by the monarchy.
Social discontent with the Shahs monarchy had registered as early as 1963.
During the mourning month of Muharram thousands of Iranians poured into the street to
protest against the regime. The protests lasted three days and left hundreds dead. A
state-enforced calm lasted for little more than a decade. The economic downturns o f the
mid-1970s inspired the dormant opposition and rallied the population behind them. The
monarchy began to unfold in 1977 with the proliferation of widely circulated letters
criticizing government policies and demanding greater political freedoms. These protests
were accompanied by growing students rallies and events. T h e sporadic nature o f the
protests was soon transformed into sustained opposition against the regime. Clashes
between police and students in early January of 1978 resulted in several student deaths.
On January 9 , 1978, the Tehran bazaar closed down for the first time since 1963 in
protest. The cycle of opposition mounted throughout the first months o f 1978, and were
especially centred around the 40 day mourning periods of Islam. By the summer o f 1978
confrontations between the mounting opposition movement and the regime were
unbroken. A ny religious date or anniversary occassioned large-scale mobilization and
protest. The second half o f 1978 saw a series of crippling strikes and protests involving
hundreds of thousands of Iranians. By the end of 1978 the Phalavi monarchy stood on the
verge o f collapse.
A broad coalition o f social forces banded together and ultimately brought down
the Pahlavi monarchy. Each element o f the revolutionary opposition - the working class,
the modern professional class and the traditional middle class - was rudimentarily affected
229
b y the transformations of contemporary Iran. The Pahlavi state was again awkwardly
poised above Iranian society. Its social base was scant and undeveloped. Political
patronage and brute force could no longer stem the oppositional tide.
Tw o distinctive factors worthy o f detailed attention stand out w ith respect to the
Iranian revolution. The first concerns the wide coalition o f social forces that ultimately
brought the Shahs regime down. The political character o f each social force was
essentially a product o f the Pahlavi monarchy. Only by banding together could the
political momentum capable of toppling the monarchy be achieved. Secondly, a
combination o f unique circumstances combined to give the revolution its Islamic colours.
B oth o f these factors must be examined in order to adequately comprehend th e social
foundations o f the 1979 revolution.
M odem Middle Class Opposition
The Iranian revolution received its initial impetus from the modern middle classes.
I n his pathbreaking study James Bill defined the Iranian modern middle class as:
"... a new class composed o f individuals who rest their power position upon
employment utilizing those skills and talents which they possess thanks to modern
education. This is a nonbourgeois middle class many o f whose members relate
themselves to the other classes and the system through function, performance, and
service rather than through material wealth, family ties, or property. The
members of this class arc engaged in professional, technical, cultural, intellectual,
and administrative occupations and arc by and large a salaried middle class. " 26
M James Alban Bill, The Politics of Iran: Groups, Classes and Modernization, (Bell & Howell
Company, 1972), p. 54.
230
T h e modern middle class was a direct creation o f the socio-economic trajectory o f

contemporary Iran, especially under the Phalavi monarchy. T h e modern middle class
displayed a refusal to accept the power relationships that characterized traditional Iranian
society. They had considerable exposure to Western ideas and they tended to be less
inclined to religious dogmatism (as manifested in their embrace o f the Bahai religion ) . 27
As Table One demonstrates this class grew approximately sixty per cent between 1956 and
1966. By 1966 one in every twelve
TABLE 1
G row th of the Iranian Profession-Bureaucratic Intelligentsia, 1956-1966
1956
1966
332,000
513,400
93,200
54,800
22,800
12,400
2 1 2 ,2 0 0
Administrative, Managerial, and Clerical Total

Government Employees
Self-Employed
Private Employees
175,900
146,500
17,000
12,400
197,900
134,900
10,700
52,300
Commerce and R etail Total

Private Employees
62,900
103,300
2,700
100,600
Professional-Bureaucratic Intelligentsia Total

Professional, Technical, and Cultural Total
Self-Employed
Private Employees
27
2 ,1 0 0
60,800
See discussion in James Bill, op. cit., pp. 57-62.

231
143,200
18,500
50,500
Iranians belonged to the burgeoning middle class. In terms o f employed population this
class grew from 6.2 per cent to
8 .6
per cent o f the total . 28 The growth o f the "new
technocrats" of Iranian society was partly bound up with the expansion o f the state
apparatus. Between 1956 and 1963, for example, Ira n s Ministry o f Economy tripled in
size and the Ministry of Education doubled in size. 29
As with all constituencies o f Iranian society, the modern middle class was denied
the opportunity to organize politically. This condition began to change in the late 1970s.
The Shahs promises of political liberalization and the human rights pronouncements by
US president Jimmy Carter in January o f 1977 sparked increasing activity among the
modern middle class. These openings invited the rebirth o f dormant organizations and the
formation o f entirely new ones. T h e Writers' Association, for example, was reactivated in
the spring o f 1977. The Iranian Committee fo r the Defense o f Freedom and Human Rights,
the Association o f Iranian Lawyers, and the National Organization o f University Teachers
were formed in the autumn o f 1977. During 1977 the National Front was revived by
Karim Sanjabi while M ehdi Bazargan revitalized the Freedom Movement o f Iran."' In
June o f 1977 the N ational Front sent a letter directly to the Shah asking for observance of
the national Constitution by the regime. Its authors wrote:
28 Ibid., figures for table extracted from pp. 66-67.

29 See discussion in Roger M. Savory, "Social Development in Iran during the Pahlavi Era,"
in Iran Under the Pahlavis, ed. George Lanc/.owski (Hoover Institution, 1978), pp. 124-125.
For a discussion of the politics of this class under the Shah and in the revolutionary
aftermath see Said Am ir Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran,
(Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 198-114.
30
232
The only way... to restore individual freedoms, reestablish national co-operation

and solve the problems that threaten Irans future is to desist from authoritarian
rule, to submit absolutely to the principle of constitutionality, revive the peoples
rights, respect the Constitution and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
abandon the single-party system, permit freedom of the press and freedom of
association, free all political prisoners, allow exiles to return and establish a
government based on a majority that has been popularly elected and which
considers itself answerable to the Constitution.
The letter began with an extremely candid assessment of where the blame for Irans
malaise lay:
No one in parliament, the Judiciary or the Administration is capable of listening

to this statement since they possess no authority or responsibility, but merely
observe the Royal Will. All the Nations affairs are discharged through Imperial
Writs.3'
The activities o f the various political wings of the modern middle class provide a
barometrc of the growing disenchantment and discontent among o f the Iranian
population.
T h e Writers' Association is exemplary in its activity against the regime after 1977.
The Writers' Association was originally formed in 1967, quickly dissolved by the
government, and revived in 1977. At its peak the Writers Association numbered some 200
members adhering to a wide spectrum o f political ideologies. T h e main venue for the
W riters Association during the initial stages o f unrest were sixteen poetry nights. The
readings were instrumental in the initial stages of mobilization against the regime in 1977.
The following account of one poetry night, when the well-known Iranian Marxist poet and
M See discussion in Jcrrold D. Green, Revolution in Iran: The Politics o f Countemxobilization,

(Praeger Special Studies, 1982), pp. 64-67, letter quoted on p. 65.
233
playwright Saeed Soltanpour was scheduled to speak, reveals the political character o f this
forum:
The organizers had sent out two thousand invitations, but ten thousand people
showed up to hear the talk. The police prevented the rest from entering the
university. There was a confrontation between thousands of these people and the
police outside the doors. Fifty students who had been denied permission to enter
the amphitheatre were arrested. To protest this act of government repression,
Soltanpour refused to give his scheduled speech on art and its influence on
society and instead read one of his most revolutionary poems, written while he
was incarcerated in a Savak jail. His reading generated great excitement. A
massive overnight sit-in was spontaneously organized inside the amphitheatre and
just outside the door to protest the students arrests. The building that held the
amphitheatre was surrounded all night and into the morning by police, who
threatened more arrests if the demonstrators refused to disperse. Throughout the
night, those inside sang revolutionary songs... In the morning a message of
solidarity was sent by workers from south Tehran and read to the audience. The
protesters then left the amphitheatre for a street demonstration during which
several students were slain or injured in clashes with the police. Three days later
students called for a national day of mourning. Tehran merchants quickly
responded by closing down the entire bazaar. That day more demonstrations took
place and additional people were killed and injured. ' 2
T h e activities o f the Writers' Association epitomized growing opposition to the regime.

Collectively, th e various political expressions o f the modern middle class can be credited
w ith inspiring the revolution and initiating the mobilization against the regime.
Elements of the modern middle class also provided considerable revolution
momentum during 1978. Strikes by bank clerks, civil servants and customs officials
crippled the economy. "The wheels o f government," Ghods summarizes in view of their
action, "ground to a halt."33 The revolution was also dealt a final blow by the numerous
32 Misagh Parsa, Social Origins of the Iranian Revolution, pp. 178-179.

33 M . Reza Ghods, Iran in the Twentieth Century: A Political History, (Lynne Reinner
Publishers, 1989), p. 218.
234
insurgent groups that drew almost exclusively upon members of the modern middle
class.14 By the late 1970s at least five major groupings o f insurgent organizations could
be identified. These groupings included the Marxist Fedayi (Sazman-i Cherik-ha-yi Feda-i
Khalq-i), the Islamic Mujahadin ( Sasman-i Mujahidin-i Khalq-i Ira n ), Paykar o r Marxist
Mujahidin (Sazman-i Paykar dar Rah-i Azad-i Tabaqeh-i Kargar), smaller Islamic
organizations frequently limited to one town, and smaller Marxist organizations. Almost
all the members of these organizations came from the ranks o f the young intelligentsia,
and took up arms out of moral and political indignation rather than material privation.
During the last days o f the Shahs regime the major insurgent organizations mounted
assaults on the Shahs army. During the insurrection the guerrillas successfully opposed
the elite Imperial Guards, and gained control of the prisons, police stations, the armouries,
and five military bases in Teheran. Similar siezures took place in Tabriz, Abadan,
Hamadan, Mermanshah, Yazd, Isfahan, Mashad, Mahabad and Babol.
The Traditional Middle Class:
Although the modern middle class provided the revolution with its initial push, it
was the traditional middle class that sustained it by mobilizing the Iranian population on a
massive scale. The main components o f the traditional middle class, the clerics and the
bazaar-centred merchants (bazaaris), were thoroughly alienated by the rapid socio
economic changes under the Phalavi monarchy. The social power of both classes waned
14 Discussion extracted from Ervand Abrahamian, "The Guerrilla Movement in Iran, 19631977," M E R IP Reports no. 8 6 (March/April 1980).
235
as a direct result o f the monarchys modernization and secularization drives. Sweeping

socio-economic changes, in other words, created extreme disaffection among the bazaaris
and the clerics. This disaffection evolved into direct antagonism towards the regime as the
Shah directly attacked them. The traditional middle class was active in the uprisings of
1963. As small openings developed in the late 1970s the latent political potential o f the
traditional middle class manifested itself once again. Each element of the traditional
middle class warrants separate attention.
The Bazaaris:
The bazaaris constitute one of the two main elements o f the traditional middle
class. The transformation o f the Iranian economy under the Phalavi monarchy placed
severe economic strain upon the bazaaris. The process o f deterioration began in earnest
with the accession of Reza Shah. Adverse trends for the bazaaris during the 1930s
prompted one contemporary observer o f the time to remark that "the merchant class in
Persia is practically ruined, and the activity o f former great trading centres like Tabriz,
Isfahan, and Sultanabad paralysed." Bazaaris fathers no longer wanted their sons to be
merchants. 36 The erosion o f the traditional socio-economic character o f Iran under the
rubric o f modernization threw the bazaaris on the defensive. Specific economic trends
35 Violet Conolly, "The Industrialization of Persia,'Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society,
(July 1935), p. 462, cited in M . Reza Ghods, Iran in the Twentieth Century: A Political History,
(Lynne Ricnner Publishers, 1989), p. 112.
36
See discussion in Michael Fischer, "Persian Society: Transformation and Strain," in
Twentieth-Century Iran, ed. Hossein Amirsadeghi (William Heniemann Ltd., 1977), pp. 180-183.
236
such as the rise of government owned industrial enterprises, the increasing involvement o f
the state in the export-import businesses, and the expansion of the banking system that
supplanted the credit capacities o f the bazaaris all contributed to the general decline of
their social and economic standing. "Modernization in Iran," G reen writes, "was geared
to bypassing the bazaar while rendering it politically and economically obsolete ." 38
T h e bazaaris were also subjected to direct attacks by the Shahs regime, especially
after 1975. His contempt for the traditional merchant class is evident in his personal
reflections of Iranian events during the late 1970s:
Bazaars arc a major social and commercial institution throughout the Mideast.
But it remains my conviction that their time is past. The bazaar consists of a
cluster of small shops. There is usually little sunshine or ventilation so they are
basically unhealthy environs. The bazaaris are a frantic lot, highly resistant to
change because their locations afford a lucratic monopoly. I could not stop
building supermarkets. I wanted a modern country. Moving against the bazaars
was typical of the political and social risks I had to take in my drive for
modernization.39
T h e Shah s, for example, proposed construction of an eight-lane superhighway through the

Tehran bazaar. O ne of the most visibk assaults on the bazaaris was the anti-profiteering
campaign. In August of 1975, the price control and anti-profiteering policy directed at the
37
See the discussion in Sepehr Zabih, Iran's Revolutioitaty Upheaval, (Alchemy Books, 1979),
49 Arjoniand, p. 86.
237
"parasitic middle-men" o f Iranian society was launched. 40 The state recruited some 10,(XK)
people from all walks o f life - students, teachers and housewives - in order to enforce the
anti-profiteering legislation. These enforcers o f the new legislation reserved the right to
"hand out fines and recommend stiff penalties which ranged from prison to deportation
and closure of the place of business. " 11 In the first few days o f the policy more than
7,000 shopkeepers had been arrested by the regime. In a little more than two years at
least half the shopkeepers in Tehran had been investigated for price-control violations.
By the end of 1977 some 20,000 shopkeepers had been jailed for violating the new law.
Convicted shopkeepers were humiliated through the closure o f their shops and the
hanging o f a banner across their doorways proclaiming that the owner had been convicted
o f profiteering .42 Throughout 1978 the bazaars were increasingly subjected to theft and
destruction through violent attacks by SAVAK-hircd hooligans. ' 3
The 'Ulema:
T h e clerical component of the traditional middle class fared even worse than the
bazaaris. Socio-economic reforms relentlessly cut into their traditional roles and functions
40 Michael Fischer, "Persian Society: Transformation and Strain," in Twentieth-Century Iran,

ed. Hossein Amirsadeghi (William Heniemann Ltd., 1977), pp. 180-183.
41
Sepehr Zabih, Iran s Revolutionary Upheaval, p. 31
42 Figures and account extracted from Misagh Parsa, Social Origins o f the Iranian Revolution,
pp. 102-104.
43
Ibid., pp. 115-119.

238
within Iranian society, and their social prestige and power within the Iranian social
tapestry greatly declined. Attempts to regain their lost social stature seemed forever futile
in view o f the overwhelming forces of modernization and secularization at work under
the Phalavi monarchy.
Although the decline of the clergy could be detected prior to the rise o f Reza
Shah, the period between 1926 and 1941 marked the first rapid and sustained
deterioration o f their societal standing. The growing body o f intellectuals that nursed the
socio-economic programme o f Reza Shah "recognized in the power o f the clergy the
strongest obstacle to progress."44 The revisions to the universal military training law of
1938 made all clergy subject to two years of compulsory military duty. Educational
?
reforms under Reza Shah, especially the development o f new institutions and curricula,
undercut the traditional role of the clergy in Iranian education. Legal functions such as
the registration of private property, traditionally monopolized by the shari'ah courts, and
an important source o f prestige and income for the clergy, became the prerogative o f
secular courts.
Further legal reforms, especially the Civil and Penal Codes o f 1939 and
1940, continually departed from the shariah to the point where traditional Islamic
jurisprudence was left no room at all. Further reforms in 1932 forced many members of
the clergy to "abandon the robe and seek secular employment" .45 Clerical resistance,
especially towards such reforms as the unveiling of women, was sustained throughout Reza
Shahs reign.
44
Banani, p. 50.
45
Banani, p. 73.
239
The decline o f the traditional middle class was further aggravated under the Shah.
Initially the Shah attempted to woo the traditional classes and appeared extremely
sensitive to the potential power o f the ulama. Prominent religious leaders, for example,
enjoyed easy access to the court. Similarly, the Shah, in his denunciations of the Tudeh
Party, referred to them as the "enemy o f private property and Islam".'16 Nonetheless, the
Shah did nothing to reverse the setbacks suffered by the clerics under his fathers
modernization drive. Moreover, by following similar development policies the Shah
contributed to the further deterioration o f their condition. 17 The growth o f the modern
middle class under the Shah, for example, constituted a direct challenge to the clergy. As
James Bill summarizes:
That which was sacred to the traditional middle classes is either ignored or
attacked by the new class which is little impressed by either history or prophets.
It is perhaps natural that the secularization of the education process would result
in a different view o f Shii Islam. The result has been a sharp move away from
this most basic of value systems which organized all phases of a Muslims life.
Thus, a mujtahid state in 1967 that whenever he spoke and worked with university
students, he left his ammamah (turban) at home and wore only a plain suit. The
students of today, he pointed out, had little respect for the cleric. Within the
intelligentsia in general, there is a deep sense that Islam represents and alien
incursion force upon Iranians by foreign invaders. It is often state that the social
problems of Iran stem from the Islamic intrusion.1*
Events in the 1960s and 1970s aroused further opposition from the clergy. The majority
46
See discussion in Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, pp. 421-422.
47
Discussion extracted from Parsa, pp. 195-196.
48 James Alban Bill, The Politics o f Iran: Groups, Classes, and Modernization, (Charles E.
M errill Publishing Company, 1972), p. 61.
240
o f the clerics were opposed to elements o f the Shahs W hite Revolution, for example,
including the proposed land reform and the enfranchisement o f women. The Shah also
undertook a number of direct measures designed to weaken the clergy. The stipends
given to clerical students (tullab) were abolished and the new programme resulted in
considerably less money for the aspiring students of Islam. Religious leaders, such as
Ayatollah Talcqani, were persecuted by the regime. The Shah directly affronted the
clergy by destroying most of the theological seminaries in the holy city o f Mashhad in 1975
under the pretext of creating green areas around the eighth Imams shrine.49 The regime
also attacked established Islamic symbols, including the Islamic calendar. The Shah also
created a Religious Corps in 1971 that was viewed as directly undermining the clergy: "The
Shahs opponents charged that he was creating his own brand o f Islam and clergy, and that
the corps was designed to "nationalize religion" and undermine the traditional spiritual
leaders." 50 The Shah tended to see the clergy as a potential obstruction to his
modernization policies, as revealed in his personal reflections:
... it must be acknowledged that, had my father not curtailed political efforts of
certain clerics, the task which he had undertaken would have been far more
difficult. It would have been a long time before Iran became a modern state ...
The moral primacy of the spiritual over the temporal being indisputable and
undisputed, it was a matter of bringing Iran into the twentieth century, whereas
todays efforts arc towards turning the clock back. Reza Shah asserted that in the
twentieth century it was impossible for a nation to survive in obscurantism. True
spirituality should exist over and above politics and economics.51
49
Arjomand, p.
50
Parsa, op. cit., p. 196.
51
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Answer to History, (Stein and Day, 1980), p. 55.
86
241
Finally, under the land reform programme, many religious lands (awqaf) were
redistributed. The ulema became a declasse stratum of Iranian society, "disengaged" from
the political power structure o f Phalavi Iran and "discmbeddcd" from the Iranian social
canvas. 52
The mounting frustration of the clerics was cemented by their cohcsiveness as a
social group. This collective animosity towards the regime articulated well with the
alienation o f the bazaaris fraction o f the traditional middle class.
An organic link
between these two elements o f the traditional middle class created a powerful social force.
The bazaaris formed the traditional financial base for the ulema, providing up to eighty
|
per cent of the clergys operating expenses. 53 The bazaaris also operated different
religious centres including the Hosseinieyeli, used for incidental religious gatherings to
mourn the dead, the Mahdiyeh, used for religious instruction or the recital of the Quran,
and the Takyeh, used for 40 days beginning with the first of Mohatram, the holy month of
martyrdom o f Imam Hossein. 51 The bazaaris and the clergy generally shared physical
linkages. N ikki Keddies discussion o f the Shahs attacks upon the traditional middle class
in Mashhad, particularly with respect to the creation o f a green belt around the shrine of
Imam Rcza, sheds light on the extent of this physical link:
... the Shahs scheme to redevelop the area around the holy shrine of the Imam
52 Sec discussion in Said Amir Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution
in Iran, (Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 83-84.
53
Figure from John D. Stempel, Inside the Iranian Revolution, p. 45.
54
Sepchr Zabih, Iran s Revolutionary Upheaval, p. 29.

242
Reza at Mashhad, which, like many shrines, was surrounded by a dense bazaar
area that helped unify the bazaaris and the ulama. The plan was carried through
and razed all buildings around the shrine, creating instead a green space and a
broad traffic circle. It was so unpopular that bulldozers and construction
equipment were often bombed or sabotaged, but it created something more
attractive to "modern" taste. It dispersed Mashhads bazaaris and further kindled
their resentments. A related scheme for the Tehran bazaar, to cut through it with
broad boulevards, which would, as in Mashhad, have dispersed potentially
dangerous bazaaris, aroused so much opposition that it was not carried
through.55
These linkages were complemented by strong ideological bonds between the ulema and
the bazaaris. The ulema provided the bazaaris with moral, intellectual and political
guidance. The guidance was undoubtedly nurtured by the fact that Shia Islam has never
called the sanctity o f private property and ownership into question .55 T h e bazaaris, in
turn, tended to exert a moderating economic influence on the clergy. 57 These organic
links between both fractions of the traditional middle class helped to insure that they
would unify as an active social force against the monarchy as soon as circumstances
permitted.
Although elements of the modern middle classes began the revolutionary process,
it was the traditional middle class that seized the openings and carried the revolution.
Throughout 1978 and into 1979 the clerics mobilized the Iranian population on a scale
unmatched in modern history. In the end, however, they were joined by the third integral
element o f the revolution, namely, the working class.
55
Kcddic, Roots of Revolution, p. 241.
^ For a detailed account of the relationship between the bazaaris and the clerics see Ahmad
Ashraf, "Bazaar and Mosque in Irans Revolution," M ER IP Reports 13:3 (March-April 1983).
57
Sec discussion in Faridch Farhi, op. cit., p. 103.

243
Working Class Opposition:
T h e last social force to be considered here is the Iranian working class. This
group was the product o f Pahlavi industrialization policy. There is sonic dispute
concerning the overall significance of the working class in the revolutionary struggle, but
most assessments believe that this participation was integral and substantial. ' 8 "If the two
middle classes were the main bulwarks o f the revolution," Ervand Abrahamian concludes,
I ,
"the urban working class was its chief battering ram ." '9 As an independently organized
social force the working class in Iran has oscillated between periods o f growing
organization and development and periods o f repression under the autocratic political
forces of Reza Shah and the Shah. * 1 The development of a nascent working class arose
during the gradual transformations over the turn o f the century.6' As an independent
political force, the labour movement developed strongly during the period after the
constitutional revolution and up to the rise o f Reza Shah. Any meaningful gains,
however, were forfeited in the face of Reza Shahs direct repression. In particular, the
Regulations for Factories and Industrial Organizations law o f 1936 prohibited employees
from "faction formation, connivance, and other activities leading to disturbance o f the
ft?
58 For a dissenting view see Said Amir Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown, (Oxford
University Press, 1988), note 14, p. 236.
59
I
j
Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p. 535
60
The following summary primarily relies upon Habib Ladjcvardi, Labour Unions and
Autocracy in Iran, (Syracuse University Press, 1985).
6' See the discussion of Z . Z. Abdullaev, "Bourgeoisie and Working Class, 19(X)s," in Issawi,
The Economic History o f Iran: 1800-1914, especially pp. 48-52.
244
smooth running o f factory affairs and progress in production." 62 Reza Shah tried to
supplant the need for independent trade unions by issuing labour regulations, but these
palliative gestures tended to leave the condition of the working class unchanged during his
rule.
The working class went through a period o f renewal in the aftermath of the Allied
occupation o f 1941. In the more relaxed political atmosphere o f the early 1940s worker
militancy increased substantially. The Tudeh party was founded in 1941. The
intensification of trade union organization culminated in the formation o f the Central
United Council o f the Trade Union of Workers and Toilers of Iran. The growth o f the
labour movement in Iran alter 1941 contributed to the development of new labour
legislation enacted in 1946 under the Qavam government. This law contained a number
o f provisions including limitations on the number o f hours of factory work, restrictions on
child labour, maternity provisions for women, minimum wage laws and the legalization o f
trade unions and the setting up o f factory councils. The gathering strength and
importance o f the working class during the interregnum was accompanied by several
important strikes including the well documented oil workers strike in the Anglo-Iranian
fields in 1951.6-'
Despite these modest gains, repression against the labour movement began in
earnest with the gradual accession of the Shah.6' In the aftermath o f the coup d etat that
62
Ladjevardi, p. 61.
6' See discussion in Nikki R. Kcddie, Roots of Revolution. A n Interpretive History of Modem
Iran, (Yale University Press, 1981), pp. 121-129.
61
Sec especially Ladjevardi, chapter 4.

245
overthrew the government of Mohammad Mossadegh, the relationship between labour and
the state went full circle and reacquired the characteristics of the period under Reza Shah.
"In that year a long night fell over the Iranian working class," Halliday writes, "a darkness
from which it only began to emerge after the passage of twenty years."' Labour was
directly attacked through a process that was colloquially summarized as "putting them
[workers] in their place. " 66 The opportunity for independent worker action in the face o f
the repressive monarchy attenuated rapidly. The labour law o f 1959 established that
unions could only be established if recognized by the Ministry o f Labour. Labour
organizations were increasingly penetrated and organized by S A V A K .
As a result of these
policies the number of major industrial strikes fell from 79 in 1953 to 7 in 1954, and
between 1955-1957 to 3 in total. 67
The repressive atmosphere o f the Shahs rule sat awkwardly against the significant
growth of labour as a direct result o f the Shahs rapid industrialization policy. As 'Table 2
indicates, the. working class grew far more rapidly than any other segment o f the Iranian
workforce. Total growth between 1956 and 1977 o f the working class (O il, M ining and
Manufacturing, and Construction) approached 2.5 million while the remaining sectors
totalled 1,959 millions.
Manufacturing, mining and construction led all other economic
sectors in
65
Fred Halliday, Iran: Dictatorship and Development, p. 202.
66 Ladjevardi, p. 198.
67
Abrahamian, p. 420.
246
TABLE TWO
Comparative Growth of Iranian W orking Class
Annual Totals
Sector
Increases
1956
1966
1972
1977
1956-
Agriculture
3,326
O il
25
Mining and
816
Manufacturing
(includes handi
crafts)
Construction
336
Utilities
12
Commerce
355
Transport and
208
communications
Government Services
248
Banking
582
3,774
26
1,324
3,800
40
1,820
3,800
55
2,500
474
30
1,684
520
53
513
224
710
60
650
255
980
65
725
280
644
53
370
72
474
650
640
900
780
1,040
532
458
1977
Adapted from: Halliday, Iran: Dictatorship or Democracy, p. 176.
total employment growth, and in 1977 only the agricultural sector employed more Iranians.
A realm of unobserved oppression increasingly plagued Iranian workers including
industrial accidents such as amputations, loss o f sight, chemical hazards, noise pollution,
foul odours and poor lighting.68 Attempts to raise worker productivity and to placate
labour in critical economic sectors resulted in the implementation o f a profit-sharing
6,8
Assef Bayat, Workers and Revolution in Iran, (Zed Books, 1987), pp. 65-74.
247
scheme o f 1963 (p art of the W hite Revolution) and the workers' share scheme of 1975.
N either programme was particularly effective, especially with respect to raising worker
productivity . 69 M any wage gains by workers were eroded by the high inflation that
accompanied the economic boom after 1973.
In the repressive political atmosphere of the Shah workers could only periodically
resort to wildcat strikes. However, mounting inflation, labour shortages (which enhances
job prospects in the event that a worker is fired for agitation) and oil revenue increases
(which could allow the state to occasionally grant concessions) all contributed to the
growth o f strike activity during the mid-1970s. Strikes rose from a mere handful between
1971 and 1973 to a t least 20 in 1974-1975 and 20 in 1977 alone. In the first three months
o f 1978 m ore than ten strikes were called .70 Despite this growth in strike activity during
the 1970s, workers did not join the gathering revolutionary movement until the second
half o f 1978:
During the upheavals of early 1978, the urban wage earners had been conspicuous
by their absence. With the notable exception of Tabriz, where workers from small
private factories had joined the uprising, most demonstrations had taken place
around the universities, bazaars, and seminaries, and their participants had been
drawn predominantly from the traditional and the modern middle classes. The
situation changed drastically after June, however, when the urban poor, especially
construction labourers and factory workers, started to join the street
demonstrations. Their participation not only swelled the demonstrations from
tens of thousands of marchers to hundreds of thousands and even millions, but
also changed the class composition of the opposition and transformed the middleclass protest into a joint protest of the middle and working classes. Indeed, the
entry of the working class made possible the eventual triumph of the Islamic
69
See discussion in Halliday, pp. 193-197.
70
Figures and analysis extracted from Parsa, op. cit., pp. 140-144.
248
Revolution.71
W orkers strikes paralyzed the Shahs regime. In September o f 1978 oil workers went on
strike at the Tehran oil refinery and later at the refineries of Abadan, Shiraz, Isfahan anu
Tabriz . 72 The crippling strike by the oil workers was heavily permeated with political
demands, as evident in the list of demands of Ahwaz staff workers from October 29, 1979:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6 .
7.
8 .
9.
10.
11.
End martial law

Full solidarity and co-operation with the striking teachers;
Unconditional release o f all political prisoners;
Iranianization of the oil industry;
A ll communications to be in the Persian language;
A ll foreign employees to leave the country;
A n end to discrimination against women staff employees and workers;
T h e implementation of a law recently passed by both houses o f parliament
dealing with the housing o f oil workers and staff employees;
Support for the demands of the production workers, including the
dissolution of SA VA K ;
Punishment o f corrupt high government officials and ministers;
Reduced manning schedules for offshore drilling crews. 73
T h e effect of the oil workers strike reverberated throughout the Iranian economy.
W ithout access to oil revenues the regime was severely weakened . 74 W ith the growing
71
Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p. 537.
72
A detailed first-hand account of the oil-workers strike may be found in "How W e
Organized Strike that Paralysed the Shahs Regime," in Oil and Class Struggle, eds. Petter Nore
and Tcrisa Turner (Zed Press, 1980).
14 Terisa Turner, "Iranian Oilworkers in the 1978-1979 Revolution," in Oil and Class Struggle,
eds. Petter Nore and Terisa Turner (Zed Press, 1980), p. 282.
74 Discussion extracted from Misagh Parsa, op. cit., pp. 157-167, especially p. 160, quote from
p. 166.
249
domestic oil shortage buses and cars ceased to run which lead to the closing of many
government ministries. Many factories were forced to close because of the lack o f fuel.
The strike by the oil workers inspired other economic sectors to act against the regime.
Eventually, the combined effect of the strike by industrial workers succeeded in grinding
the Iranian economy a virtual halt and left the monarchy on the verge o f collapse.
The Islamic Revolution:
Fifteen years after the Muharram uprisings of 1963 the Phalavi monarchy was
seriously faltering. Once again, during the mourning month of Muharram, and particularly
on Ashurah, its most solemn day, hundreds of thousands of Iranians took to the streets
calling for the overthrow of the monarchy. Strikes had crippled the economy. The Shahs
army appeared incapable of restoring any semblance o f calm or order. From his exile in
France Khomeini urged all Iranians to steadfastly oppose the monarchy and repeatedly
called for the Shahs removal. By the end of 1978 major Iranian cities such as Mashhad
and Isfahan were under control of the revolutionary opposition. Revolutionary
institutions, including the Revolutionary Guards and the Revolutionary Courts were
operating in areas controlled by opposition forces.
In response to the growing crisis the Shah appointed his third government in six
months. Shahpur Bakhtiar agreed to accept the task o f seeking a political solution to the
deepening crisis. His two immediate predecessors, Sherif-Amami and Gholam Reza
Azhari, nad entirely failed in their bid to restore calm. Bakhtyar committed his
government to a number of liberalization policies, including the disbanding of S A V A K and
250
the lifting o f press censorship. Despite these moves, his government was met with
sustained opposition, especially from the National Front. Bakhtyars efforts were radically
undermined by the departure of the Shah on January 16,1979. This was followed by the
return of Khomeini to Iran on February 1, 1979. On February 5 ,1979 Khomeini
appointed Mehdi Barargan to head the Provisional Revolutionary Government. Over the
next two weeks the decay o f the old regime accelerated. On February
11,
1979 the army
declared its neutrality and Bakhtyar resigned.75 The Pahlavi monarchy had collapsed.
The monarchy fell victim to a broad coalition o f revolutionary forces including the
urban middle class, the traditional middle class and the working class. The regime
authored its own fate in two senses. First, its development and modernization policies had
profoundly conditioned the social forces that rose up to challenge it. Each component of
the revolutionary opposition, that is, bore a profound relationship to the socio-economic
transformations o f Pahlavi Iran. Secondly, the regime contributed to its own destruction
by depriving Iranians of the opportunity to air their social and political grievances. By
systematically closing off alternative avenues for political expression the opposition
congealed and was forced to adopt a revolutionary posture:"... the failure o f the Pahlavi
regime to make political modifications appropriate to the changes taking place in the
economy and society inevitably strained the links between the social structure and the
political structure, blocked the channelling o f social grievances into the political system,
widened the gap between new social forces and the ruling circles, and most serious o f all,
cut down the few bridges that had in the past connected traditional social forces, especially
75
For a more detailed account of the military during this period see Sepehr Zabih, The
Iranian Military in Revolution and War, (Routlcdge, 1988).
251
the bazaars, with the political establishment."7'

Despite its diverse oppositional cast, the Iranian revolution acquired a distinct
Islamic hue. In an important way the Iranian revolution was commandeered by a
reactionary traditional middle class that sought to reverse the trends o f twentieth century
Iran. A number o f factors explain their ability to do this. First, the absence o f alternative
avenues and opportunities for political expression provided an incentive to structure
political frustration in religious terms. Religion essentially became a political front. The
narratives of Shia Islam, moreover, tend to emphasize the struggle of the downtrodden
and the oppressed. Both factors insured that religious rituals and events would take on
political meaning. The following passage from Homa Katouzians study captures the
potential political content o f funeral services, religious sermons, annual religious festivals
and mourning periods:
In the month of Muharram - in which Imam Husain, his family and his followers
had been heroically martyred by an army of Yazid, the second Ummayid caliph even the lampposts in the more traditional city districts were wrapped in black
material. When in a mosque, or a private house, the audience roared approval of
the ceremonial damnation of Yazid and his men by the officiating preacher, few
people, including SAVAK agents, missed the allusions to the Shah and his
henchmen, which were on everybodys mind. On the birthday of the twelfth Shi
ite Imam - Hujjat ibn al-Hasan al-Askari; the Redeemer who is always present,
but remains invisible until the moment of his advent - the huge banners put out
in the streets carried thinly disguised political slogans: Oh Redeemer of all
humanity, hasten in your advent, for the world is now full of injustice; With the
advent o f the lord of the Time; may god Almighty hasten his deliverance; injustice
will be completely uprooted in this world and so on.77
76 Ervand Abrahamian, "Structural Causes of the Iranian Revolution," M E R IP Reports no. 87

(May 1980), p. 21.
77 Homa Katouzian, The Political Economy o f Modem Iran: Despotism and Pseudo-Modernism,
1926-1979, (Macmillan Press, Ltd, 1981), p. 339.
252
The ability o f Shii Islam to structure political grievances merged with the popular appeal
of the writings o f A li Shariati. In Shari'atis widely read works, Islam is viewed as an
ideology for a social revolution. It aspires to establish a free and classless society. 78
In the repressive political atmosphere the mosque network also became a
strategically important source of political mobilization and communication. This
strategically well-placed and relatively insulated network complemented the use of
religious services, festivals and mourning periods as political venues. Moreover, Ayatollah
Khomeini stood at the pinnacle o f the gathering social opposition during the late 1970s.
T h e influence exercised by Khomeini, especially from Paris during the autumn o f 1978,
was unequalled by any other opposition figure. O ther elements o f the gathering
opposition, especially among the liberal middle class opposition, would not dare to
contradict Khomeinis instructions from Paris. Khomeinis charisma and uncompromising
stand against the monarchy insured his widespread popular support. As Abrahmian
concludes in his study of twentieth century Iran: "Khomeini is to the Islamic Revolution
what Lenin was to the Bolshevik, M ao to the Chinese, and Castro to the Cubans. " 79
Conclusion:
These factors combined to give the Iranian revolution its Islamic hue. The
For a discussion of Shariatis works see Mangol Bayat-Philipp, "Shi'ism in Contemporary

Iranian Politics: The Case o f Ali Shari'ati," in Towards a Modem Iran: Studies in Thought, Politics
and Society, eds. Elie Kedouric and Sylvia G. Haim (Frank Cass, 1980).
18
79
Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p. 531.

253
revolution was impelled by a collection o f social forces that were profoundly tailored by
the contemporary socio-economic trajectory of Iran. The unity achieved by the
revolutionary opposition in the face o f a common adversary was fragile. Clerical
prevalence throughout 1978 and into 1979 would not go unchallenged by other elements
of the revolutionary coalition. The broad collection o f social forces behind the revolution
would engage the clergy in a struggle to control the direction o f the revolution.
An
intense and frequently violent process o f revolutionary consolidation set in. It is in the
process o f revolutionary consolidation that the seeds o f the aggressive campaign against
Iraq may be detected, a campaign that included direct calls to overthrow th e Iraqi regime
by Ira n s political leaders. Iran s aggressive posture evoked extreme concern among th e
Bathist leadership in Iraq. A t the same time, the post-revolutionary turmoil of Iran
presented Iraqi leaders with a cherished opportunity to even recent diplomatic history.
In order to understand Iraqs response to the Iranian revolution we now turn to analyze
Iraq s contemporary socio-economic history.
254
Chapter Seven
State and Society in Iraq:

The Tenuous Social Foundations of the Bath Regime
Introduction:
T h e Islamic revolution in Iran had a far reaching impact on Iraq. Ultimately, it led
to war between the two countries in 1980. In order to adequately understand this impact
it is necessary to address the social development o f Iraqi society. Th e gradual insertion of
Iraq into the global eeonomy lies at the heart o f these developments. In the century that
began in the mid-1800s Iraq was transformed from a mainly rural, nomadic, tribally-based
society into a largely urbanized, sedentary and extensively proletarianized society. These
transformations have generated turbulent social and political struggles throughout the
contemporary period. Notable episodes include the 1914 British occupation, the creation
o f the monarchy in 1921, the scries o f military coups between 1936 and 1941, the alWathbah popular uprising against the Portsmouth Treaty in 1948, the July 1958 coup that
overthrew the monarchy, the second accession of the Arab Bath Socialist Party to power
in 1968 and the 1975 Algiers Accord between Iraq and Iran.
For most of the last century', however, Iraqs political development was out o f
synchronization with its social development. This disparity has been magnified in the post1968 period. In the repressive atmosphere o f the Bath regime Iraqs evolving social
constituencies were denied the opportunity to air their grievances. Kurdish groups, the
working classes, women and the Shii poor were forced to play by politically restrictive
Bathist rules. The social foundations of the Bath regime became increasingly slender.
Our discussion gradually closes in on the fact that by the conclusion of the 1970s the
Bathi regime was tenuously poised above a deeply fractured and politically explosive
society. A volatile contradiction had emerged between the political and social spheres o f
Iraq. Iraqi society wrestled beneath an obtrusive and repressive state.
In addressing these social changes and the related disjunclure between the political
and social realms, this chapter provides the necessary subtext to Iraqs reception o f the
Islamic revolution of 1979. T h e impact o f events in Iran must be addressed in terms of
this volatility. Irans post-revolutionary turmoil and its determination to 'export the
revolution, that is, must be contemplated in terms of Ira q s sweeping social changes and
its fundamental disjunclure between the social and political spheres.
The Decline o f Ottoman Rule:
W e commence our analysis o f Iraqi society by drawing attention to the changes

that began during the last h alf of the 19th century. Beginning in the mid- 18(X)s gradual
changes began to take place within the Ottoman vilayets of Baghdad, Basra and Mosul.'
These changes can be understood in terms of the gradual insertion o l'lraq into the
European economy, a process that profoundly interrupted traditional life throughout the
country .2 This traditional life was essentially tribal. The tribes practised subsistence
A vilayet is an Ottoman administrative region.
For a brief and comprehensive survey of these developments see Fran 1 la/.ellon, "Iraq to
1963," in Saddam's Iraq: Revolution or Reaction?, ed. by C A R D R I (Zed Books, 1985).
2
256
agriculture; along with camel, sheep or goat herding. Tribal life tended to oscillate
between periods o f relative calm and periods of turmoil among the frequently feuding
elans. Three particular trends and events stimulated the deterioration of Iraqs tribal life:
the development o f commercialized river transport along the Tigris between Basra and
Baghdad during the 1850s, the Ottoman Land Code o f 1858 and the opening o f the Suez
Canal in 1869. It is helpful to address each of these stimuli to changes separately.
Prior to the mid-1800s Iraqi exports were primarily destined for the Arabian
Peninsula and India. Basras exports at mid-century included horses, dates, and to a lesser
extent wool, rice and grain. Imports included coffee from Yemen and indigo, sugar and
textiles from India. T h e relatively weak access to external markets provided little
incentive to overcome the considerable obstacles to increased trade. As Roger Owen
writes:
T h e major obstacles to any increase in trade remained more or less the

same. Goods traffic along both the Tigris and the Euphrates remained
difficult, slow and subject to heavy duties imposed by both the government
and the tribes which controlled strategic points along the river banks. The
cargoes o f the small boats engaged in this traffic were still held to ransom
or plundered at regular intervals. Sea-going ships face other problems,
notably the monsoons which made it hard for a sailing vessel to make more
than one trip to India a year. With access to external markets so difficult
there was little incentive to increase production and the captains o f the few
British ships which reached Basra with goods from England generally
complained o f being unable to find a return cargo. 3
The development of commercialized river transport along the Tigris and the Euphrates
' Roger Owen, The Middle East in the World Economy: 1800-1914, (Methuen, 1981), pp. ISO-
257
during the 19th century provided the first incentive to alter Iraqs trading relations and
broader economic orientation. Initial surveys o f the Mesopotamian rivers were
undertaken in the earlv 1830s met with limited success. The major impetus came from the
decision o f the British House of Commons in favour of the Mesopotamian rivers as an
alternative route to India. This decision spawned more intensive surveying of the Tigris
and the Euphrates and led to the foundation o f the Lynch Firm s operation of two
steamers in 1841. By the 1860s travel time and transportation costs had been significantly
reduced. Upstream travel time between Baghdad and Basra was reduced, for example, to
five to eight days from an initial journey of 40 to 60 days.'
The second element that changed Iraqs economic orientation came under Midh.n
Pashas tenure as governor of Baghdad. While previous reforms were inaugurated under
D a ud during the Mamluk era, including the establishment of a printing press, the clearing
o f canals and the setting up of small scale industries, it was M idhats administrative,
educational and rural reforms that ushered in the era o f modernisation in Iraq.
Administrative reforms strengthened the position of the towns, particularly Baghdad, anil
educational reforms laid the foundations for the secularization o f Iraqi education by
establishing schools outside the ambit o f the maktab (elementary educational facilities ran
by the clergy) and the madrasah (advanced educational institutions ran by the clergy).'
Midhats implementation of the Ottoman Land Code o f 1858, however, had the
See discussion in Charles Issawi, The Economic History o f the Middle-East, 1800 - 1)1-1.
A Book o f Readings, (University of Chicago Press, 1966), chapter 3, "Steam Navigation on the
Tigris and Euphrates, 1961-1931," especially pp. 146-147.
4
' See discussion in Phebe Marr, The Modern History o f Iraq, (Westview Press, 1985), pp.
22-24.
258
most enduring effect upon Iraqs economic development and, ultimately, its social
structure. Prior to 1858 land-Code most of the cultivated areas o f Iraq were held
communally among all members o f the tribe. Although much of" the product of the
cultivated land of the (lira (area claimed by the tribe) eventually found its way to the tribal
shaikh, the revenues, in theory, should have gone to support the tribe writ large by
supporting, for example, the upkeep o f the tribal militia. The remainder to the tribal
lands was held by tribal sub-chiefs (sirkal) on conditions similar to the tribal shaikh. The
unit o f cultivated land, known as thequil'a was subdivided into plots (faddan) that were
worked by groups o f cultivators (juaq ) . 6 Midhats rural reforms were aimed at
strengthening the influence and financial position o f the Ottoman state. T h e 1858 Code
established a legal land tenure system by granting title-deeds known as tapu sands in place
of m iri (state or unalienated) land. The simple goal was to have the security of stateauthorized tenure give prospective taxpayers a much greater incentive to pay their taxes. 7
The absence of any effective machinery to enforce tax laws, however, resulted in the
failure o f the policy from the Ottoman standpoint, and tapu grants were banned after
1881. A strong precedent had been set with M idhats reforms, partieularly with respect to
the private ownership of land, although most o f Iraqs lands remained in m iri or
unalicnated status.
The process of detribalization and pacification of the countryside received its third,
See Issawi, The Economic History of the Middle East: 1800 - 1914, pp. 163-164.
Diseussion extracted from Marion Farouk-Sluglctt and Peter Sluglett, "The
Transformation o f Land Tenure and Rural Social Structure in Central and Southern Iraq, c.
1870-1958." in International Journal o f Middle East Studies 15 (1983), pp. 493-495.
7
259
and perhaps most significant boost with the opening o f the Suez canal in 1869. With the
opening of the Suez canal the incentive to export Iraqi goods changed dramatically. The
arrival o f the first British steamer via the Suez canal in June 1870 symbolically
underscored the removal of traditional barriers to trade in Iraq. The combined effect of
the growth of tapu lands, the development of commercialized river transport along the
Mesopotamian rivers, and especially the opening of the Suez canal insured Iraqs
movement away from a subsistence economy to a sea-borne export oriented economy
primarily based on agricultural and pastoral exports. In the first decade after the opening
o f the Suez canal Iraqi exports jumped dramatically. Between 1870 and 1880 total exports
jumped from 206,000 to 1,275,000 while imports jumped from 314,000 it) 722,000
over the same period.
Between 1880 and 1913 the total value of Iraqs exports of dales,
wool, wheat and barley rose from 940,(XX) to 2.7 m illion/ This stimulus to agricultur.il
production was accompanied by the relative decline o f Middle Eastern markets and the
dramatic rise o f Indian and British markets for Iraqi exports.
The net effect o f these changes during the 19th and early 20th centuries was the
unmistakable process o f detribalization and pacification of the Iraq countryside and the
modernization of Iraqi urban society. T h e evolution o f the latter part o f the 19th
century broke the pattern of undulating power balances between the towns and the tribes
that had guided the evolution of Iraqi society for centuries. The strengthening o f the
Figures compiled in Roger Owen, The Middle East in the World Economy: 1800-1VI4,
p. 182, 275; for a detailed discussion of the changes in the quantity and quality o f Iraqs trade
behaviour see Mohammed Salman Hasan, "The Role of Foreign Trade in the Economic
Development o f Iraq, 1864-1964: A Study in the Growth o f a Dependent Economy," in
Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East from the Rise o f Islam to the Present Day,
cd., M . A. Cook, (Oxford University Press, 1970).
8
260
towns now implied the satcllization of rural lifc.g The tribal peasant, moreover, was
transformed from a warrior to a landworker in a few short decades: "Nomads who were
no longer in a position to rely on the camel or plunder for their livelihood, but were still
subject to the discipline o f tribal organization regarding the relations between the
followers and their leaders," writes Hassan, "had no alternative but the follow their
shaykhs into settlement on the land. " 10 The incipient insertion o f Iraq into the world
economy in the latter half of the nineteenth century resulted in the co-presence o f a
distinctively modern and a distinctively traditional social formation:
under the Ottomans, Iraq consisted ... o f the inter-penetration O F a social

form, oriented towards moneymaking and the expansion o f private property
and shaped essentially by Iraqs relatively recent ties to a world market
resting on big industry, W IT H older social forms attaching to noble lineage,
or knowledge of religion, or possession of sanctity or fighting prowess in
tribal raids, and dominated largely by local bonds and local outlooks, by
small-scale handicraft or subsistence agricultural production and, outside o f
the towns, by state or communal tribal forms o f property."
The transformation of the countryside and the erosion of tribal life is also reflected in the
shifting demographic patterns of the period. The growth o f the agricultural export
economy largely contributed to the settlement o f the population. In 1867 the nomadic
g Hanna Balatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements o f Iraq: A Study
o f Ira q s O ld Landed and Commercial Classes and o f its Communists, Ba'thists, and Free
Officers, (Princeton University Press, 1978), p. 24.
10 Mohammad Salman Hasan, "The Role of Foreign Trade in the Economic Development
of Iraq. 1864-1964: A Study in the Growth of a Dependent Economy," op. cit., p. 350.
" Hanna Batatu, "Class Analysis and Iraqi Society," cited in Hazelton, op. cit., p. 1 .
261
population of Iraq stood at 35 per cent of the total population. By 1890 this figure hud
declined to 25 per cent, and to 17 per cent by 1905 and to a mere 7 p e r cent by 1930.
T h e spectacular growth of the agricultural economy resulted in the considerable growth in
the rural population o f Iraq. In 1867 the rural population as a percentage o f the total
Iraqi population stood at 41 per cent. By 1930 the rural population had climbed to
68
pei
cent o f the total population . 12

Th e first World W ar was accompanied by the rapid decline of Ottoman influence
and the corresponding rise o f British control. British interest in the vilayets o f Basra.
Baghdad and Mosul surrounded the struggle to secure control o f the regions oil wealth.
In November o f 1914 British troops landed at the head o f the Persian Gulf in order to
protect its oil interests at Abadan. By the end of the war Great Britain has secured
control o f Iraq. In 1920 the League of Nations awarded Great Britain mandatoiy powei
over Iraq under the terms o f the San Remo Agreement. Britain then proceeded to set up
a monarchy and installed Faisal upon the Iraqi thrown in August, 1921.
British Influence and the Iraqi Monarchy
The transformation of the Iraqi social canvas was accelerated under the monarchy.
A brief outline of class developments under the monarchy is beneficial. At the apex of
Iraqi society stood the landed shaikhs that had directly benefited from the transformations
12
Statistics from Mohammad Salman Hasan, "The Growth and Structure o f Iraqs
Population, 1867-1947," Bulletin o f the Oxford University Institute o f Economics and Statistics
(1958).
262
of rural productive relations throughout the latter part of the 19th and early 20th
centuries. The landowning class was bolstered by favourable agricultural policies under
the monarchy. The early years o f the monarchy accelerated the rise of the urban primarily mercantile - bourgeoisie. This growing class was encouraged by the
opportunities attending the first and second world wars (such as the presence o f troops to
increase markets or rapidly fluctuating prices to promote profiteering), the considerable
growth in cultivated lands, improved infrastructural facilities (especially in transport and
travel), and weak tax structures. Some elements o f the mercantile bourgeoisie also
branched out into the manufacturing of textiles, beverages, soap, vegetable oil, cigarettes
and building materials. In the latter period o f the monarchy the rising demand for
consumer goods and amenities, and the dramatic influx of oil revenues after 1951,
significantly enhanced the tiscent o f the mercantile bourgeoisie.
T he middle classes were also falling into place. The sadah or traditional clerical
class maintained some influence in the government, although their political influence and
social position, especially during the latter years o f the monarchy, began to decline
appreciably: "The building up of the state apparatus, the growth o f the army ... the spread
of modern learning, the rise o f the oil industry, the rapid increase in the countrys
revenue, the widening links o f Iraq with the outside world, had created new forces, new
opinions, a new psychological climate. The old activities o f many o f the sadah families,
their function as ulama, or keepers of shrines, or leaders o f mystic orders, had declined in
*' Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements, pp. 86-114,119-132.
11
Ibid., discussion based upon pp. 224-318.

263
social value."'' A t the same time the gradual growth of the modern middle class could be
detected. The growth of the state apparatus under the British mandate in the 1920s was
accompanied by a gradual rise o f a new modern urban middle class. The symbiotic growth
of modern education facilities and new occupational opportunities helped
10
g i\e this class
a relatively cohesive view o f the world. The new middle class tended to be employed in
the civil service, as professionals, including elementary and university teachers, doctors,
lawyers, army officers, retailers and the operators o f small business and industrial
establishments. By the collapse o f the monarchy in 1958 this class constituted slightly
more than
10
per cent of the workforce."'
T h e vast majority o f Iraqis stood at the bottom o f the social spectrum.
The use
o f mechanical irrigation pumps encouraged through a special tax law in 1926 resulted in a
live-fold increase in cultivated lands between 1913 and 1943. The evolving agricultural
system bore down heavily upon the Iraqi peasantry. Agricultural production revolved
around a system o f share-cropping through which the peasant or lallah was paid in kind.
I f the fallah was unable to supply seed or tools for cultivation he would be forced to
borrow money, frequently at exhorbitant interest rates, which would result in the perennial
indebtedness o f the peasant. The condition o f the fallahin was aggravated by the Rights
and Duties of the Cultivator Act o f 1933. Elie Kedouries masterful essay on the Iraqi
monarchy reveals the social effect of the Christian legacy:
15
Ibid., pp. 209-210.
16
See discussion in M arr, pp. 137-141.

264
... the notorious Rights and Duties of Cultivator A c t ... deprived the fellah
o f all rights, and made him into a serf. Under this law, the landowner
could evict the fellah for any activities deemed 'harmful to agriculture. On
the other hand, the agricultural worker was virtually tied to the land; so
long as he was in debt to the landowner, it was laid down in the law, he
could not be employed by another landowner; and should he be dismissed
or evicted, his debts were recoverable from his personal property. This law
thus transformed a large - perhaps the largest - number o f Iraqis from free
persons into mere adscripti glehae.'1
T h e wretched condition of the Iraqi peasantry was unenviable in the extreme . 18 One
record describing the typical Iraqi cultivator reveals the extent o f their misery: "The health
condition o f the fallah was so appalling that Professor Critchley described him as a living
pathological specimen. His life expectancy did not improve much throughout the regime
o f the monarchy... it stood at 35-39 years. " 19
T h e prevailing relations o f agricultural production and the perilous condition o f
the fallahin contributed to the growing tendency to leave the land in search o f better lives.
Between 1930 and 1947 the rural population dropped from
68
per cent of the total to 57
per cent o f the total. During the same period, the urban population, after hovering
around 25 per cent o f the total population between 1867 and 1930, rose to 38 per cent of
p See discussion in Elie Kcdouric, "The Kingdom o f Iraq: a Retrospect," in The Chatham
House Version and other Middle-Eastern Studies, (University Press of New England, 1984),
quote from p. 269.
18 O n the specific nature of the sharecropping arrangements see Saleh Haider, Land
Problems o f Iraq, (unpublished dissertation, London University, 1941) cited in Charles Issawi,
The Economic History o f the Middle East: 1800-1914, pp. 177-178.
Sluglett and Sluglett, "The Transformation o f Land Tenure and Rural Social Structure
in Central and Southern Iraq: 1870 - 1958," op. cit., p. 505.
19
265
the total by 1947.2" The growing migration to the urban areas put considerable pressure
upon the urban centres. In Baghdad in particular, the migrants crowded into open spaces
in th e city and lived in saritah huts (mud dwellings with reed mats on the roof). O ne such
settlement in 1956, al-Washshash, had 12,000 people living in 1,555 houses. These
residents tended to work in menial capacities as porters and servants.1' In 1956, it was
estimated that there were 16,400 sarifas in the area of Baghdad. Unsanitary conditions
and disease were common in the squalor of the new shanty-towns.
The Iraqi working class was growing throughout the monarchy, although the pace
of this growth was retarded by the slow pace of industrial development until the 1950s.
The working class was concentrated almost exclusively in the urban areas, and drew upon
recent rural migrants. In 1954 less than 1(K).(KK) workers were employed in industrial
activity and approximately 15,000 workers were employed in the oil industry. Large scale
manufacturing enterprises were relatively uncommon, and as a result only approximately
30,000 worked in manufacturing units employing more than
10
workers.*'
Although the transformed social structure of contemporary Iraq was falling into
20 Sec discussion and statistics in Hasan, "The Growth and Structure o f Iraqs population.
1867 - 1947," op. cit., pp. 344-5.
21
Sec discussion in M arr, p. 142.
22
Doris G. Phillips, "Rural Migration in Iraq," Economic Development and Cultural
Change 7 (1959), p. 409.
22 See discussion in Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, "Labour and National
Liberation: th eT rad c Union Movement in Iraq, 1920-1958,'"Arab Studies Quarterly 5:2 (1981).
See discussion in Marion Farouk-Sluglett, "Contemporary Iraq: Some Recent Writings

Reconsidered", Review o f Middle East Studies 3 (1978), pp. 91-92.
22
266
place during the monarchy, the political apparatus was captive o f a relatively narrow
power axis comprised of Great Britain, the Court, and the large landowners. The latter
group was the truly privileged class under the monarchy. Policies such as the
Consumption tax of 1931 (which set favourable tax schemes for the landlords), the
settlements Law of 1932 (which turned landholdings into private property) and the Rights
and Duties o f Cultivator Law o f 1933 (a law greatly restricting the rights and mobility of
the peasants) attest to the degree to which the monarchy would accommodate the
landowning class.1' T h e political base o f the monarchy, in other words, did not reside the
social forces that were emerging under the monarchy. The subordinate classes were
denied access to Iraqs authority structures. As a result, these classes became increasingly
disaffected with the prevailing political arrangements. One manifestation o f their
discontent was the growth of the nationalist political discourse as early as the 1920s. This
alienation o f the middle classes from the monarchic power structure may be seen in the
series o f coups between 1936 and 1941 by military officers. Batatu provides the clearest
discussion o f the relationship between these successive coups and the growth o f the
malcontentcd middle classes:
... the coups represented a successful, even if shortlived, break by the

armed segment of the middle class into the narrow circle o f the ruling
order: power had been before 1936 pretty much the preserve of the
English, the king, principal ex-Sharifian officers [upper-level
administrators], and the upper stratum of the properties classes. From this
it should not be inferred that the coups were, narrowly speaking, class
actions, or that in the instance o f each and every officer who was involved
in the coups there was a direct or conscious connection between his social
1( See discussion in Hazelton, op. cit., p.
267
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origin and his political behaviour. O f course, the coups were carried out
on the initiative of a small number of individuals, and could partly be
explained by the personal motives of the leading officers, or the intrigues
of ambitious politicians, or the lure, for example, o f the neighbouring
militarist regimes - those o f Iran and Turkey - but the coups succeeded, if
briefly, because they appealed to sentiments or manifested tendencies reformism, or pan-Arabism, or neutralism, or intense opposition to English
influence, or sheer discontent at the exclusion o f all but a few from any
effective role in the political life o f the country - sentiments and tendencies
that were shared by substantial portions o f the officer corps and o f the
middle class from which the corps largely stemmed.2t>
In other instances the educated classes increasingly articulated demands aimed at

thoroughly transforming the existing social and political order. The tendency towards a
more radical social critique may be scon in the growing strength o f the Iraqi Communist
Party, particularly in th e 1940s and 1950s. The IC P rested upon an "alliance o f elements
of the workers, soldiers, and the middle and lower middle-class intelligentsia." A number
of separate elements blended together to increase the attractiveness of the ICP during the
latter years of the monarchy. Perhaps foremost among these was the rapidly decreasing
legitimacy o f the monarchy in the eyes o f many Iraqis. Political parties and labour unions
were not generally permitted to function openly or freely. British influence was widely
understood and even more widely held in contempt. A t the same time, the social critique
of th e IC P appealed to the sentiments o f the subordinate Iraqi classes, especially with the
waning influence of Islam in the face o f modernisation and secularisation. It was a world
view that meshed with the experiences o f many Iraqis and helped them to make some
sense of their world. T o this may be added the geographical and occupational
26 Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements, pp. 28-29.
268
concentration of the spectrum of Iraqi society - especially the students, unskilled labourers,
the shanty-town dwellers and the civil servants - that formed the nucleus o f communist
party support. 27
The IC P was instrumental in organizing and coordinating numerous protests
against the monarchy. In January 1948 a massive urban-centred uprising known as the alWathbah (the Leap) unfolded. The ICP was the primary organizational force behind the
uprising. T h e al-lVathbah was precipitated by the signing o f the Portsmouth Treaty on
January 15, 1948. "It provided for the removal of British troops from Iraqi soil and gave
Iraq sovereignly over the bases," M arr writes, "but it was hardly a treaty of equals, as the
regime claimed."" Between January 5 and January
students staged protests and strikes
against the regime. These initial stirrings did not infect the remainder of the population.
The day alter the treaty was formally signed students embarked upon further strikes and
demonstrations against the regime. This lime the student protests fired up other segments
o f the population. On January 20 an ICP initialed march was joined by the urban poor,
workers and students. Over the next few days the streets regularly filled with enormous
crowds armed with canes and engaging the police. A t atmosphere of revolution clearly
gripped Baghdad. On January 27 the al-Wathbah came to an end with the killing o f
hundreds of protestors by the regime.
The al-Wathbah was unique only by dint of its size. Social protests were extremely
common under the monarchy. In 1931. for example, a 14-day general strike that quickly
The social foundations of the ICP forms one o f the central concerns in Batatus, The
Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements o f Iraq, quote from p. 644.
Marr. p. 102.
269
spread to other parts o f the country began in Baghdad. Tribal upiisings in the Iraqi south
and Kurdish rebellions in the north were common. Further urban centred iiuifmltihs look
place in 1952 and 1956. The typical response of the regime to political opposition and
social unrest was extremely repressive. The ICP was repeatedly attacked throughout the
1940 and 1950s. Article 79 o f the Criminal Procedure Act Appendix pei milled the arrest
of any person "who for some reason, it is believed, may disturb the peace." Political
parties were rarely allowed to operate openly, the press was heavily censored, political
incarcerations were typical. 20
The monarchy, lacking any sound links to Iraqi society, was destined to collapse.
The growing social opposition during the 1950s was mutch by the formation of the
national unity front composed of the National Democratic Party (th e party of the Iraqi
bourgeoisie), the ICP and the Ba'th Party (founded in Iraq in the early 1950s).
On July
14, 1958 a coup by the Free Officers closed the monarchic chapter of Iraqi history. The
Free Officers, led by abd al-Karim Qasem, ushered in Iraqs Republican period. The
overthrow of the monarchy was greeted with widespread demonstrations o f support by the
Iraqi people, and political support from the diversified opposition that had united against
the monarchy. The coup reflected the underlying alienation o f the regime from the
subordinate classes in Iraq. The toppling o f the monarchy brought to the political fore the
urban-centred middle classes that had been growing steadily throughout the monarchy.
Intense struggles among different sections of the heterogenous middle class would
dominate Iraqi life for the next decade until the second accession o f the Ba'th in 1968.
29
See discussion in Fran Hazelton, op. ch., pp. 20-22.

270
Republican Iraq and the Emergence o f the Ba'th Regime
The early years of the nascent Iraqi Republic was marked by an evolving
polarization around the issue o f whether Iraq should join the political union ( wahda) of
Syria and Egypt.'" Qascm increasingly relied upon the tacit support o f the left, and
especially the increasingly popular ICP. T h e other end o f the political spectrum, which
included the pan-Arabist Arab Ba'th Socialist Party, grew increasingly suspicious o f
Oasems relationship with the ICP. In October 1959, a Ba'thist assassination attempt
upon Qasem (the group included Saddam Hussein) was unsuccessful. In spite of Qascms
measures which directly attacked the communists, Ba'thist suspicion continued to grow.
On February 4, 1963 they staged a successful coup against Qasem . ' 1 The coup was
greeted with popular protests in favour of the still widely popular Qascm.
In the months following the Ba'thist coup Iraq suffered from "the most terrible
scenes of violence hitherto experienced in the post-war M iddle East." 31 The ICP was the
primary target during the wave of repression. On the evening o f February
, 1963,
Baghdad radio issued Order Number 13 that specifically called for the killing of
communists:
The most thorough account o f this period may be found in U riel Dann, Ira q Under
Qassem: A Political History, 1958-1963, (Pracger, 1969).
M On the period between 1958 and 1968 sec Majid Khadduri, Republican Iraq: A Study
in Iraq i Politics Since the Revolution o f 1958, (Oxford University Press, 1969).
'' Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship, (I.B. Tauris and
Co. Ltd., 1990), p. 85.
271
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As a consequence of the attempt of Communist agents, supporter o f God's

enemy Abd al-Karim Qasitn, to disturb the ranks o f the citizens and
disobey order and instructions, we hereby confer authority on the
commanders of military units, Police and National Guards to annihilate
anyone who disturbs the peace. Faithful sons of the people are called
upon to co-operate with the authorities by informing on these criminals
and annihilate them . 33
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f
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The Sunday Times reported that the Ba'th announcement sounded "like an open
incitement to a massacre which would make St. Bartholomew's Day look like a Sunday
School picnic." 31 The torture chambers o f Qasr al-Nihayal (Palace o f the End) in
Baghdad became notorious as a place of detention and torture.
Growing tensions between the Ba'th and the military led to ti second coup in
November o f 1963. This coup was led by Abd al-Salatn A rif, a peer o f Qasem in the
events of 1958 that brought down the monarchy. The November 1963 coup was a
bloodless affair. A rif successfully drew upon his accumulated political experience since
1958, a period that had included imprisonment. "His ability to govern in a more open
manner and to communicate with the populace," M arr writes, "were to stand him in good
stead in consolidating his power and giving the nation some relaxation from the tensions
and clashes of the previous years. " 33 The brief interlude o f political stability provided by
A r if was brought to an abrupt close by his death in a helicopter crttsh in April o f 1966.
A rifs widespread popularity insured that any potential heirs to Iraq s political mantle
33
U. Zaher, "Political Developments in Iraq: 1963-1980," p. 32.
34
Sunday Times, February 10, 1963, quoted in ibid., p. 31.
35
M arr, The Modern History o f Iraq, p. 191.

272
would follow similiir policies. The ensuring political struggle among contending nodes of
power within the military, and to a lesser extent between the military and civilian political
wings within Iraq, was resolved in favour of A rifs brother Abd al-Rahman A rif. In the
next two years there was growing disenchantment among different factions o f the military.
This was accompanied by growing working class unrest, as manifested in a scries of strikes
in economic sectors such as construction and textiles. T o this could be added the
heightened activity of the General Union of Students in the Iraqi Republic that
aggressively campaigned for welfare rights.1* The disenchantment within the military, and
the protests among different elements o f the subordinate classes, combined to weaken the
regime. In these tenuous circumstances the Ba'thists were able to gain the support of
pockets of disaffection within the military. O n July 17, 1968 the A rif regime was
overthrown. The Ba'th quickly neutralized the military and secured full political control.
Ba'thist control of the Iraqi state has been unbroken since.
In the period between 1958 and 1968 the regime went through four leadership
changes. Despite the political volatility, however, there was continuity in terms of the
class composition of the republican regimes. The political turmoil of the 1958-1968 period
can be broadly understood as the efforts of different fractions o f the middle classes to
consolidate political control and extend their class hegemony. This characterization is
appropriate due to the confluence of a number o f different factors. First, the middle or
intermediate classes have supplied most of the post-1958 political leadership and stocked
the upper and middle ranges of the Iraqi bureaucracy. Secondly, the increasing autonomy
** See discussion in Zahcr, "Political Developments in Iraq: 1963-1980," pp. 40-41.

273
of the state created by its access to oil revenues has rendered control over private
property less important as a determinant o f state policy: "Under these circumstances |of
remarkably high oil revenues) control over the state, that is. the composition of the social
and political forces in charge o f the state apparatus, came to he of paramount impotlance
for the development o f the country and for the determination of the direction of fuluie
capitalist penetration . " ' 7 Moreover, by dint o f their experience, their educational
background and their social condition, the groups that have come to control the stale
apparatus in the post-1958 tended "to look out into life from similar standpoints and
tackle many problems in a similar manner. " ' 8 This was reflected most clearly in the
nature of the economic and social agenda that the post-1958 regimes recurrently
introduced:
The old regime had been attacked by its opposition for the pttcc and
direction o f its development program and for the absence o f social change.
In particular, the regimes reliance on foreign oil companies for its revenue;
its neglect of industry and emphasis on agriculture, which benefited m.inly
the landed classes; its disregard o f the countrys human resources, and the
severe maldistribution o f wealth that had resulted from the malfunctioning
of the free enterprise system were all singled out for criticism.... T h e new
regimes ... set forth contrasting development aims. Regardless of the
regime in power, all rebelled against foreign domination and control of the
economy and th e maldistribution o f wealth, especially in land. They
demanded an accelerated pace of development and a change o f direction,
particularly toward industrial development and social welfare.3''
37
Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship, p. 217.
38
Batatu provides the most thorough discussion on the middle class nature of the regime,
The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq, quote from p. 1133.
30
M arr, The Modem History o f Iraq, p. 247.

274
Finally, the middle classes have also been the primary beneficiaries o f a particular
direction o f state policy throughout under Qasem, the A rif brothers, and the Bath. The
benefits of expanded slate activity in health and education, for example, accrued most
visibly to members of the middle class. ' 0
O ne of the most salient redistributive policies in the post-1958 period was the land
reform policy initiated under Qascm. The policy successfully broke the powerful rural
landed classes o f the monarchy. The introduction of land reform clearly reflected the
shifting balance o f social forces in favour of the urban-centred middlc-classes: "Sympathy
with the wretched conditions o f peasants was not the only reason which prompted the new
regime to promulgate an agrarian reform act; it wished also to eradicate the principal
pillar on which the Old Regime had rested."" Writing in the mid-1950s Doreen Warriner
provided a cogent analysis of the need to recast the political structure in order to recast
the social structure:
The real obstacle to reform in Iraq is not a shortage of experts, or money, or

administrative inefficiency. Nor is it, in reality, the feudal landowners. The town
middle class represents the public opinion of the country in that it is conscious of
the need for change; it provides the official class, criticizes development policy,
and it is growing very fast. It cannot, however, link up with the fellahin and
provide the political force which would recast the social structure of the country.
There is no social or political force which can challenge the power of the sheikhs.
The educated townspeople do not, at present, constitute this force, though their
number, their intelligence, and their importance in administration should quality
Sec discussion in Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements in
Iraq, pp. 1127-1129.
10
41
Khadduri, Republican Iraq: A Study in Iraqi Politics Since the Revolution of 1958, p.
151.
275
them to become it.
T h e necessary political power quickly came with the overthrow o f the monarchy in 1958.
O n September 30, 1958, just a few weeks after the successful overthrow of the monarchy,
the Agrarian Reform Law was promulgated. The main features o f this progtamme
included upper limits on the sue of landholdings and proposals for the extensive allocation
o f land to the falluhin. In 1970 the Ba'th enacted law 117 which further reduced land
ceilings.
In 1975 land reform was extended to the Kurdish Autonomous Region. By the
mid-1970s over half o f Iraqs cultivable land had been affected by the land reform
measures.' T h e success o f the land reform measures was limited. While the 01
, " ,
clearly broke the power o f the large landed families, the predominance of ptivale propeity
in the countryside remains, and a relatively new class o f small private landownets has
arisen.
Many o f the l'allahin remained landless, and the continuation o f poor conditions in
the countryside pushed them into the urban centres."

A second feature o f the post-1958 regimes surrounds the greater domestic control
acquired over Iraq s oil resources. This political thrust reflects the widespread resentment
that was felt within Iraq at the foreign control over oil. Between 1958 and 1972 the
republican regimes wrestled for control o f oil resources with the Iraqi Petroleum Company
0 D oreen Warrincr, Land Refonn and Development in (he Middle East: A Study o f Egypt,
Syria, a n d Iraq, (Greenwood Press, 1957), p. 172.
43 Statistic quoted in Robert Springborg, "Iraqs Agrarian Infitah," M E R IP Middle East

Report 17:2 (M areh-April, 1987), p. 16.
Discussion extracted Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to
Dictatorship, pp. 226-227.
44
276
(IP C ). The 1952 agreement between Iraq and the IPC resulted in a 50/50 profit sharing
scheme. This did little to placate opposition to the monarchy. The increased revenues for
the remainder o f the monarchy, that is, tended to benefit the large landowners. A t the
same time, the IPC, through its control of the oil market, was able to insure that oil
revenues accruing to the monarchy would be kept to a minimum .45 After 1958, greater
oil revenues in the hands of the state were viewed as essential to modernizing the Iraqi
economy and improving the living conditions of the Iraqi masses. A wealthy state, so the
argument ran, would be a benign state. To this end the regime negotiated with the IPC.
By October of 1961, however, talks had collapsed. The regime subsequently enacted Law
80 that dramatically reduced the concession areas o f the IPC and its two subsidiaries to
0.5% of their original size. Law 80 still left the issues o f profit sharing, the use o f natural
gas and Iraqs claim to a 20 per cent share o f the capital of the ICP and its subsidiaries
outstanding. The next major move came in 1964 when the government formed the Iraq
National O il Company (IN O C ). The IN O C was put it in charge o f all phases of the oil
industry from exploration through to the distribution of petrochemical products. On June
1,
1972 the continual conflict between the ICP and the republican regimes led to the
nationalization o f the IC P by the Ba'th. Thereafter, the Ba'th regime had full control o f
the oil resource in Iraq.
Growing o . revenues through the post-1958 period gave the regimes a greater role
in the economic development of Iraq. State-led development was a common clement o f
45 See the discussion in Celine Whittleton, "Oil and the Iraqi Economy," in Saddams
Iraq: Revolution or Reaction?, cd. C A R D R I (Zed Books, 1986), pp. 55-56. Following outline
primarily h-vscd upon pp. 61-64.
277
th e post-1958 regimes. The regimes have generally labelled this type of state-led
economic development as socialist, especially under the Bath. During the l%()s an
average of 23 per cent o f the development budgets were allocated for industrial
development. 4'1 Under the Ba'th regime industrial allocations climbed as high as one
third o f the total development budget. 11 Significant allocations were also made to
infrastructural development, including transportation and communication, throughout the
post-revolutionary period.
These policies reinforced class developments of preceding decades. The
development strategies o f the post-1958 regimes created opportunities lor capital
accumulation and the growth o f an indigenous capitalist class.w The greatest expansion,
however, has been in the growth of the middle and lower classes in Iraq. By 1977 the
middle classes, including professionals, civil servants, service and business workers, owneis
o f small industrial, retail and wholesale establishments, skilled worker in large industiial
establishments and technicians totalled 56.5 per cent of the urban population. T h e middle
class amounted to more than one third of the total Iraqi population. The urban working
class also grew rapidly in the post-1958 period. By 1977 there was more than 1 million
workers including over 1/4 million construction workers. Expatriate labour remained far
46
See discussion in Edith Penrose, "Industrial Policy and Performance in Iraq," in The
Integration o f Modem Iraq, ed. Abbas Kelidar (Croom Helm, 1979).
47
M a rr, The Modern History o f Iraq, pp. 249-250.
48
See Isam al-Khafaji, "The Parasitic Base o f the Bathist Regime," inSaddam's Iraq:
Revolution o r Reaction, ed. C A R D R 1 (Zed Books, 1986); Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq Since
1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship, chapter 7; Joe Stork, "State Power and Economic
Structure: Class Determ ination and State Formation in Contemporary Iraq, in Iraq: The
Coniemporaiy State, ed. Tim Niblock (Croom Helm, 1982).
278
below the levels it would achieve during the war with Iran. In 1976 an estimated 19,000
foreign workers were employed in nonagricultural sectors. 19
Notwithstanding the almost unlimited funds available to the Bath regime in the
aftermath of the nationalization of the IPC, the Ba'th regime faced serious political
threats. In 1973 the Ba'th attempted to enhance its legitimacy by forming the Progressive
and Patriotic National Front (PPNF), a programme deviating little from standard Ba'thist
social and economic policies. The Ba'th managed to secure the cooperation of the Iraqi
Communist Party in the PPNF. The PPNF amounted to little more than an extensive
cooptive strategy to minimize political opposition and maximize societal compliance. By
the late 1970s the powerful Iraqi Communist Party had been driven underground.
Ba'thization o f all organs of Iraqi society were continued unabated throughout the 1970s:
Already in 1977, Saddam Husain had declared that every Iraqi citizen is a Ba'thist
even if he had not joined the Ba'th Party. The regime now proceeded with the
Ba'thization of the State organ, the social organization, the educational system
and the cultural life of the whole country. Non-Ba'thists were banned from
employment in the Ministries of Defence, Interior, Foreign Affairs, Education,
Culture and Information. Trade Unions, peasant co-operative societies, womens
organizations, student and youth organizations and vocational associations were
monopolized and transformed into tools for the implementation of Ba'th policies.
And for those who did not voluntarily join the Ba'th Party:
Laws were enacted banning the formation of parallel organizations and

punishing with life imprisonment anyone who dared to exercise this right. A
campaign of terror was launched to force people, especially civil servants, into
affiliation to the ruling parly and the organization attached to it. Workers were
49
Statistics extracted from Marr, The Modem History o f Iraq, pp. 273-281.
279
deprived of their right to strike and thousands fell victim to Government

persecution and ill-treatment. Non-Bathist were denied scholarships to study
abroad, and a penalty of 15 years imprisonment with hard labour was imposed on
offenders. They were also denied admission to military colleges, teachers training
colleges and the Institute of Fine Arts. Thousands of qualified students were
denied university or school higher education or were expelled from both.
Thousands of teachers were also dismissed, causing a sharp decline in the
standard of education and the emigration large numbers of teachers and specialist
in various fields.50
"Everything that was authentically popular or even remotely critical," Sluglett and Sluglett
confirm, "came under suspicion and was ruthlessly suppressed. " ' 1 Societal level
Ba'thization was complemented by the essential merger o f the Regional Command of the
Ba'th and the Revolutionary Command Council in 1977. At this point the Ba'th Party and
the Iraqi state virtually became synonymous. W ithin the ruling elite of Iraq power
devolved onto Saddam Hussein. This process was completed with the retirem ent of
President al-Bakr in July of 1979.52
Despite the Ba'thization of the Iraqi population, the regime faced substantial
degrees of opposition from various social constituencies. A virtual civil w ar was fought
with the Kurds throughout most o f the 1970s. The regime also faced opposition from
women and the gathering Shi'i movement. A full appreciation o f the regimes
vulnerability requires that we examine each of these pockets o f opposition in turn.
50
Quotes from U. Zahcr, "Political Development in Iraq: 1963-1980," pp. 48-49.
51
52 For some o f the reasons benind al-Bakrs gradual withdrawal from the ruling apex see
M arr, The Modern History o f Iraq, pp. 228-229.
280
The Kurdish Struggle Against the Ba'th:
Iraq is composed o f two primary ethnic groups: Arabs and Kurds. The latter
ethnic group has been without political control of its destiny for most of the twentieth
century. Under the Ba'th regime, moreover, the Kurds have been increasingly subjected
to Arabization or Ba'thization policies aimed at extirpating their cultural distinctiveness
and political identity. These policies have been sustained despite the fact that the Kurdish
people constitute approximately 28 per cent of the Iraqi population.
The Kurdish people have struggled for political autonomy throughout their
homeland (an area extending over Turkey, Iraq and Iran with smaller parcels in Syria and
the Soviet Union) for most of the twentieth century. Between 1961 and 1975 the centre
of the Kurdish struggle was in Iraq. A lull in the civil war occurred in 1970 when the
Ba'th and the Kurds, represented by Mustafa Barzani, reached a tentative accord. The
agreement gave the Kurds extensive political recognition and established the procedures
for setting up an autonomous Kurdish region in Iraq. Among the more important aspects
of the agreement, the Kurdish people were recognized as one of the two main nations
that make up Iraq (Article 10). In cultural areas the Kurdish language was recognized as
one of the official languages in areas where the Kurds formed a majority, and that Kurdish
would also be the language of schooling in these regions (Article
1 ).
The Kurdish people
could set up distinct organizations for youths, students, women and educational workers
(Article 5). Provisions were included to insure that Kurds would staff senior government
" Sec calculations in Ismct Sheriff Vanly, Kurdistan in Iran," in People Without a Country:
The Kurds and Kurdistan, ed. Gerard Chaliand (Zed Books, 1980), pp. 154-158.
281
posts including police and security chiefs. Kurdish workers that participated in the war
would be reinstated to their jobs unconditionally (Article
). Lastly, the Kurds vveie
afforded equal status with Arabs in running Iraq, including nominations for public, political
and military offices (Article 2). The si/.c o f the autonomous region was to be determined
by a special census. T h e Ba'th regime immediately undertook measures to insure that the
census would work to lessen the prospective size of the autonomous region. Kurdish
families were resettled in large numbers in order to alter the ethnic balance o f the specific
areas, especially the contested oil-rich region of Kirkuk. An attempt was also made on
the life o f the K D P leader Barzani. Despite the stipulations o f the March 11, 1970
agreement, the Ba'th issued its own law on Kurdish autonomy without consulting the
Kurdish leaders. The size o f the autonomous area was considerably smaller than the total
area o f Kurdistan, and bypassed the procedures concerning the special census.
From
the perspective o f the Kurds, the declaration by the Bath regime was wanting in several
respects, and thoroughly violated the spirit of the 1970 accord: "In reality it [the Ba'th
declaration] gave only limited self-rule in a region that excluded Kirkuk." Not
surprisingly, the unilateral declaration by the Ba'th regime ushered in another phase o f
fighting between Baghdad and the Kurds.
The last phase o f the 1961-1975 war between the Kurds and the central authorities
54 See discussion in Peter Sluglett, "The Kurds," in Saddam .v Iraq. Revolution or Reaction,
ed. C A R D R I (Z e d Books, 1986), pp. 195-196.
55 See discussion in Vanly, "Kurdistan in Iraq", pp. 176-178.

56
Christine Moss Helms, Iraq: Eastern Flank o f the Arab World, (T h e Brookings
Institution, 1984), p. 30.

282
in Baghdad proved to be particularly costly to both sides. The Kurds fielded an army of
about 50,000 peshmergas.''1 Baghdad committed the major proportion of its military
capacity to the fight including eight army divisions, almost all of its 900 tanks, the entire
airforce and 20 battalions of mobile artillery. The civilian population of Kurdistan proved
to be one of the main targets of the regime. An economic blockade was imposed on the
region. The war created serious hardships for the local population and caused severe
social dislocation. Inside the war zone, a number of makeshift camps with inadequate
facilities housed Kurdish families fleeing from Ba'thist bombing raids on the villages.
Disease, poor supplies and inadequate medical attention characterized the temporary
settlements. The war sent over a quarter million refugees across the border into
neighbouring Iran. In the summer of 1974 the Iraqi army attempted to deliver the final
blow to the peshmergas but the offensive fell far short o f its goal. The war continued
throughout the winter and exacerbated the difficult living conditions o f much o f the
population.
The stalemate was broken in favour of the Ba'th regime by virtue o f the Algiers
Accord between Iraq and Iran. The March 1975 Algiers agreement was reached about
one year after the last phase of the 1961-1975 war had erupted. Under the terms o f the
Algiers Treaty the Shah agreed to close the Iranian border between Iran and the Kurdish
region of Iran. In return for ending its support to the Kurdish forces, Iraq capitulated and
accepted the thalweg or mid-channel principle with respect to the border along the Shalt
57 These figured are from Vanly, "Kurdistan in Iraq," pp. 181-182. O ther figures are
comparable to these numbers. Sluglett and Sluglett add that some 50,(KK) irregular fighters
can be included in estimates of the Kurdish strength, in Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to
Dictatorship, pp. 168-169.

283
al-Arab waterway. The Iraqi reversal on the Shalt al-Arab attests to the drain that the
civil war had on Baghdad. The rapidity with which the Kurdish struggle collapsed in the
aftermath of the Algiers accord could not be overstated. The Kurdish movement had
become extremely dependent upon Iranian assistance, although the Shah (along with the
United Stales) had no intention of letting the Kurds prevail in their civil war.58
Within
weeks o f the agreement the fourteen year old civil war had come to an end.
Between the collapse o f the civil war in 1975 and the outbreak o f the Iran-Iraq
war in 1980, the condition of the Kurdish people continued to deteriorate. Bathist policy
against the Kurds is essentially gcnocidal. 59 Large numbers of Kurds have been resettled
in Vielnam-stylc strategic hamlets in central and southern Iraq. Relocated Kurdish groups
tend to fall into three separate categories including those that surrendered to Iraqi
authorities after the collapse o f fighting in 1975, the inhabitants of ethnically mixed areas
as the regime tired to de-Kurd strategically important areas, especially Kirkuk, and the
entire population of border villages along the Turkish and Iranian frontiers as the regime
The rcalpolitik that characterized both Iranian and American support for the Kurdish
movement was made clear in the Pike Report to the United States House o f Representatives
on the Central Intelligence Agency activities. In speaking o f American assistance to the
Kurds the report states that: "It is clear that the project was originally conceived as a favour
to our ally (the Shah) who had co-operated with the United States secret services and felt
threatened by his neighbours... The Shahs own aid could not but make ours seem
insignificant by comparison. O ur contribution must thus be considered as largely symbolic...
Neither the foreign Head of [the Iranian] State nor the President and D r. Kissinger desired
victory for our [Kurdish] clients. They merely hoped to ensure that the insurgents would be
capable o f sustaining a level of hostility just high enough to sap the resources o f the
neighbouring [Iraqi] state."
58
59 For a general discussion of human rights abuses in the face o f the collapse o f the
Kurdish insurgency see Human Rights in Iraq, compiled by Middle East Watch, (Yale
University Press, 1990), pp. 73-74.
284
created cordon sanitaires to inhibit further insurgency."' With respect to dispersal of

Kurds from the oil-rich regions of Kirkuk and Khanaqin the International League for
Human Rights wrote: "The apparent goal of the Iraqi Government is to gain complete
control o f the petroleum resource in Kurdistan and the deny the Kurds any rights to the
economic riches of their area." 61 Kurds were prohibited from purchasing land in Kirkuk
and other important regions. Development strategics in Iraqi Kurdistan must be
understood in the context of the Kurdish struggle. The regime strategy to develop the
region with urban-centred light industries, for example, had the underlying political goal of
eroding Kurdish nationalism.62 Boasts by the Ba'th regime about developing the Kurdish
area during the 1970s must be considered in light of the fact that much o f the money went
r
towards constructing strategic roads and new villages to house Kurdish families resettled
from the border regions. 63
%
%
The Ba'thization and Arabization of the region also was
intensified in the post-1975 period. There were reports that the language of education
was Arabic rather than Kurdish.6' Kurdish schools were given names from Arab
60
61 The International League for Human Rights, Statement to (he Members o f the United
Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, January 14, 1977.
62
The contributors to Middle East Contemporary Swvey offer one account o f this
relationship:"... industrialization speeds urbanization, which in turn dissolves tribal affinities
which have always been the backbone of Kurdish cthnocentricity - if not necessarily or
organized nationalism." v. 1 (1976-1977), p. 410.

63
Ofra Bengio and Uriel Dann, Middle East Contemporary Sur\>ey 2 (1977-1978), p. 521.
61
See discussion in Middle East Contemporary Survey 3 (1978-1979), pp. 569.

285
history.65 The new Kurdish villages normally included Ba'th party headquarters .66
Kurdish papers were closed by Ba'th officials. Kurdish faculty at Salaimaniya University
were replaced by Arab teachers. The Faculty of Kurdish Studies at Baghdad University
*
was abolished. The equivalent of $1,500 US dollars was offered to any Arab that took a
Kurdish spouse. 67 During 1979 Saddam Hussein argued that the Kurds were linked to
the Arab by virtue of their common historical ties dating back to the Assyrians and the
Babylonians. Consequently, in spite of the Aryan ethnic roots of the Kurds and the IndoEuropean lineages of their language, Hussein declared that "there was no contradiction
between the Kurdishness of the Kurd and his being a part o f the Arab nation ." 68
W ith the collapse of the civil war the Kurdish opposition split into two antagonistic
camps. Mustafa Barzanis sons, Mas'ud and Idris, formed the KDP-provisional command.
This group tended to find more support among the Karmanji speaking areas of Iraqi
Kurdistan. The Patriotic Union o f Kurdistan (PUK), headed by Jalal Talabani, was
65
Vanly, "Kurdistan in Iraq," p. 195.
66 Ibid., p. 197. Ismct Sheriff Vanly, who was invited by the Ba'th to inspect the Kurdish
region after the collapse of the Kurdish struggle, and who was subsequently the victim o f an
attempted assassination by the Ba'th, writes: "The first thing which struck us in Arbil, the
capital o f autonomous Kurdistan, was a banner stretched right across the town hall,
proclaiming, first in Arabic, then in Kurdish, that The Baath way is our way... In all the
Regions larger settlements, as in other parts o f Kurdistan, the Arab Baath had prosperous
looking local branch offices." Sec also Middle East Contemporary Survey 3 (1978-1979), p.
569.
67 Submission to U N by International League for Human Rights, January 14, 1977. This
information corroborates submissions by Kurdish leaders. See letter to Kurt Waldheim,
Secretary General o f the United Nations, M ay 18, 1978 by Mustafa Barzani, Chairman,
Kurdistan Democratic Party, including appendices A through K.
68
Middle East Contemporary S u m y 3 (1978-1979), p. 569.

286
formed from three different groups, the Komala (Marxist-Leninist), the Socialist
Movement of Kurdistan and the General Line (followers of Talabani). In 1977, the PUK
moved its headquarters from Damascus to Iraqi Kurdistan. The P U K tended to find more
support among the Sorani speaking areas o f Kurdistan. Following intense fighting
between the K D P and the PU K a third group known as the Socialist Parly o f Iraqi
Kurdistan also emerged.69
The Kurdish military struggle was gradually revived during the late 1970s. In the
summer o f 1978, for example, fighting between the Ba'th regime and Kurdish insurgents
&
%
%
grew in intensity. The Ba'th regime responded by razing and evaeuating more Kurdish
villages. 70 The Ba'th also attempted to shut out external support for the Kurdish
&
insurgency. In Nuvember of 1978, the Ba'th extracted a promise from Syria to halt aid to
!
the PU K . A similar agreement was reached with Turkey in April o f 1979. Significantly,
the new theocratic regime proved "either unwilling or unable to respect the 1975
I
I
I
I
agreement" that effectively closed the Iranian border. As a result, both the KDPprovisional command and the P U K were developing operations through Iranian bases.7'
By the close of the 1970s two separate trends can be summarized. First, the
Kurdish insurgency and the Kurdish people had suffered greatly after the collapse of
operations in 1975. Political opposition among the Kurds was openly split while its
operational latitude and effectiveness was greatly diminished. The Kurdish people
69 Discussion extracted from Martin van Bruinessen, "The Kurds Between Iran and Iraq,"
M E R IP 16:4 (July-August 1986).
70
Middle East Contemporary Survey 2 (1977-1978), p. 521.
71
See Middle East Contemporary Sur\>ey 3, (1978-1979), pp. 570-571.

287
continued to be subjected to genocidal policies. The Kurdish population was visibly

suffering at the hands o f the Ba'th regime. A little more than one year after the collapse
of the Kurdish insurgency, for example, American columnist W illiam Safire lamented the
Kurdish plight: "Here is a culture being systematically demolished, a people being
destroyed... W hat do the Kurds want? Not independence, not a new nation out o f three
existing nations. They want to be let alone, as an autonomous region of Iraq, loyal to
Baghdad hut living their own lives." 72 Secondly, although the Kurdish struggle had
suffered a severe blow and was wrought with factionalism, it was showing clear signs o f
resurging: "Although the Algiers Agreement had dealt a fearful blow to the Kurdish
Movement, the brutal and repressive policies pursued by the regime in the area ensured
that the spirit o f the resistance was not completely crushed." 11 The latent Kurdish threat,
especially in view of events in Iran in the late 1970s, remained a concern to the regime.
Predictably, the Ba'th continued to deploy at least one-third o f its army in the north o f the
country. 71
Women in Iraq:
The condition o f Iraqi women provides some of the starkest examples of
72
William Safire, "O f Kurds and Conscience," New York Times, December 13, 1976.
71
71
Middle East Contemporary Sur\>ey 3 (1978-1979), pp. 570.

288
oppressive conceptions of gender in the Middle East.1' Along with the growth o f the
Western-exposed intelligentsia in Iraq, however, came the articulation of a clear feminist
consciousness. Throughout the twentieth century there has been a growing resistance to
the condition of women in Iraqi society. It was through the articulation o f a feminist
consciousness that Marxism was first introduced in Iraq. Historical materialist precepts
were employed to help account for the "ancient fetters" that enslaved Iraqi women.
According to these arguments, the harem and veil, for example, bore the mark of
fei
fcfc
feudalism and would disappear with the evolution of society.7'' To the extent that the
Bath regime was seen as exacerbating the social position of women and blocking their
struggle for equality, its legitimacy was further eroded.
The emancipation of Iraqi women had a long way to travel. One o f the starkest
examples o f womens subjugation could be seen in the phenomenon oifasl that was
practised well into the twentieth century. In fasl women were essentially reduced to
chattel. Women could be exchanged to settle disputes that potentially involved the
shedding o f blood. Batatus account of fast reveals its thoroughly oppressive nature:
Those earmarked for later delivery to the aggrieved party were young girls that
had not yet attained majority. They and the other women given in fasl or, to use
the name by which they were known, the fasliyyat, led a particularly harsh life,
their husbands normally oppressing them and holding them in contempt.
Disposal by fasl was not the only system to which the peasant women were
exposed. Sometimes, with a view to winning favour, her father offered her as a
gift to one or other of the notables of the village. This went under the
designation of zawaj-ul-hibah or "gift marriage". Moreover, often, when still a
15
See Nawal El Saadawi, The Hidden Face o f Eve: Women in the Arab World, (Zed Press,
1980).
76
Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements o f Iraq, pp. 395-396.
289
child, .she was pledged to a personage or relative in waqf (literally, mortmain)

marriage - zawaj-ul-waqf.v
By the late 1950s it was apparent that the resilient views of men and women in Iraqi
society were showing some strain in the face of the changes of Iraqi society, particularly in
the larger towns and in the cities. Nonetheless, many practices that more clearly revealed
the subordinate position of women in Iraqi society, such as polygamy or purdah
(segregation) were still present.
During the 1920s womens organizations commenced an attack on the more visible
and not so visible forms of exploitation and oppression. Calls to educate Iraqi women and
to drop the veil were echoed within feminist literature and other political circles such as
the ICP. Feminist activists, however, faced constant repression under the monarchy. In
1952 the League for the Defense o f Womens Rights was formed, although this
organization did not obtain official sanction until the monarchy was toppled in 1958. The
president o f the League, Naziha Dulaimi, was appointed Minister for Municipalities in
1959, the first such time that any woman was assigned a cabinet portfolio in the Middle
East. Perhaps the most notable achievement of the League was its contribution to new
legislation on marriage and the family. The law enacted under Qasem was based upon a
draft submitted by the League. It was designed to protect help protect women from many
77 Ibid., p. 146.
78 One revealing narrative on the condition of women in Iraqi society, especially with
respect to conventional rituals and practices and the differences between town and country,
may be found in Elizabeth Warnock Fcrnca, Guests of the Sheik. An Ethnography o f an Iraqi
Village, (Anchor Books, 1969).
290
of the oppressive elements of conventional practices, especially arranged marriages at an

early age. The feminist struggle in Iraq was brought to an abrupt halt following the first
Ba'thist coup in 1963. The offices o f the League were closed and many of its members
were arrested and tortured.71*
Following the second accession to power of the Ba'th in 1968, the regime
continued to repress any grass-roots or autonomous womens groups. The Ba'th proclaims
itself as the only body capable of correctly and meaningfully guiding the emancipation o f
women: "The liberation of women cannot be done through womens societies alone. It
can be done through the complete political and economic liberation of society. The Arab
Bath Socialist Party has a leading role to play in the liberation of women since it leads the
process of social and cultural change.*'1 The programme of the Bath is extremely
modest in its emancipatory ambitions. It identifies the strengthening of the family unit .is
a primary goal of the revolution, and stresses that the General Federation of Iraqi B'omen
must play a critical role in this process.8' A t other limes the Ba'th programme is even
more restrictive in outlook: "Whilst women are incapable of performing permanent service
on a wide scale in the armed forces, especially in the combat unit, men are likewise
incapable o f looking after children as women do in general. Therefore, if men are better
19 This brief summary is based primarily upon Deborah Cobbct, "Women in Iraq," in
Saddams Iraq: Revolution or Reaction?", ed. C A R D R I, (Zed Books, 1986).
80 Report o f the Eighth Regional Congress of the Arab Bath Socialist Party, 8-12
January, 1974, (Baghdad, 1974), p. 185.
81 Ibid., p. 35.
291
su'ted than women in the army, women arc better suited than men in childcare. 2
In spite o f the absence of any open grass-roots womens movement in Iraq, by the
late 1970s there were changes in the condition of Iraqi women. These developments must
be seen in the context of Iraqs evolving economy under the Bath regime. The Ba'th
itself lends to rationalize the need to address the condition o f women in terms o f the
economic direction o f the July 17-30 Revolution. The Party Report from 1974 declares
that it must be ind fatigable in its efforts to achieve "legal equality and the provision o f
equal opportunities o f work" for women. It goes on to attack antiquated views o f women
as "alien and harmful" and as inconsistent with the "needs o f modern times." In short, the
regimes concern for Iraqi women appears to be premised on the imperatives o f economic
modernization. To these ends, legal reforms have granted women the right to own their
own land and to be full members o f agricultural cooperatives. Other reforms have sought
to grant women equal pay, equal allowances, equal leave, equal opportunities for
promotion, maternity leave and nursing breaks. In 1978 the regime introduced
amendments to the Personal Status Law which allowed women the right of divorce in
cases of persistent dispute, adultery, incurable disease or prolonged spousal absence. The
amended law also forces men to register their marriages in court, a requirement designed
to lessen the opportunities for illegal polygamy.82
These changes have been complemented by modest growths in educational
82
Ibid., pp. 46-47.
M Outline of legal changes extracted from Amal al-Sharqi, "The Emancipation of Iraqi
Women," in Iraq: The Contemporary State," ed. Tim Niblock (St. M artins Press, 1982), pp.
83-84.
292
opportunities for women. A greater percentage o f women could be detected at ail levels
o f education by the close of the 1970s. During the 1970s, for example, the percentage of
females in elementary school rose from 29 to 45 per cent. Increases for secondary
education remained considerably lower, that is, at 29 and 31 per cent for the same period.
The percentage of women in professional programmes such as medicine and engineering
also increased over the 1970s. In medicine, for example, female enrolment rose from 7
per cent to
22
per cent of the total, while in management and economics enrolment rose
from 17 per cent to 38 per cent. These changes in the educational opportunities for
women underlined the growing participation of women in the Iraqi workforce. By the end
o f the 1970s women could be found toiling as gas station attendants, bus conductors or
traffic guides.*' Women formed 19 per cent of the Iraqi workforce by the turn o f the
decade, and had also managed to break into more prestigious occupations such as
accounting, medicine, engineering and high level government posts."
In an attempt to co-opt any genuine struggle and to placate the international
community, the regime has sponsored its own womens organization, the General
Federation of Iraqi Women. This body is undoubtedly hindered by the limited aspirations
o f the Bath regime regarding women. The G F IW is widely viewed as a body designed
w Educational and Employment statistics extracted from General Federation of Iraqi

Women, The Working Program of the Iraqi Republic to Improve the Woman's Statin,, The
national papers presented to the international congress for the United Nation Womens
contract, Copenhagen, 14-30 July, 1980, pp. 21-45.
85 Sec discussion in Marr, The Modern History o f Iraq, pp. 272-273. M arrs assessment
o f the changes is cautiously optimistic:"... women in 1980 still had a long way to go to achieve
equal status with men, but the trends were clear, and the progress, especially in the 1970s,
impressive." p. 273.
293
primarily to enter to the needs of the regime, especially to the extent that it serves as the
regimes mouthpiece on issues concerning women. The G F IW has cooperated with the
security forces o f the Bath regime, behaviour that "makes a mockery o f their propaganda
about womens liberation .'* 6 Despite tiic political restrictions that govern all social
constituencies in Iraq, at least four organisations aimed at the genuine emancipation of
Iraqi women have been active including the Union of Iraqi Women, the Union of Women
of the Iraqi Rcpublic-Mujahidin, and the International Committee for the Release o f
Detained and Disappeared Women in Iraq and the Iraqi Womens League. The activities
and social critique of these groups has contributed to the deligitimation o f the Bath
regime throughout the 1970s, especially among segments of the Iraqi intelligentsia. While
the authentic womens struggle did not manifest itself in an active armed confrontation
against the regime, its importance cannot be discounted. A t a minimum, these groups
further narrowed the social base of the Bath, and could have combined with other
constituencies to significantly decrease the legitimacy o f the regime.
Shii Opposition:
The gravest threat to the Bath regime in the late 1970s appeared to be arising
from the Shii population of Iraq. This manifested itself in increasing protests directed at
the regime.
It contributed to the overall image o f an illegitimate regime, especially when
considered alongside the activities of the ICP, the Kurds and womens groups. From one
C o b b e tl. p . 129.
294
perspective, the historical Iraqi trend that political writs extended little beyond Baghdad
appeared to be borne out again. The Bath regime, that is, confronted a growing Shii
opposition in the south of the country and even stiffer Kurdish opposition in the north of
the country. The real change was that Shii discontent and Kurdish nationalism had
replaced the traditional role of tribal opposition to urban rule. This simplification,
however, obscures the fact that Shii opposition was engaged in a wholesale attack upon
the secular ideology of the Bath. This simplification also runs the risk of understating the
degree of control exercised by Baghdad. Although Shii demonstrations against the regime
were increasingly popular during the late 1970s, the Shii threat was more latent than
manifest, especially when compared with the events in neighbouring Iran.
During the latter half of the 1970s there was discernable evidence that the Shi i
opposition to the regime was growing. In particular, there was the rise of sporadic
protests and riots, especially in the ath-Thawra township of Baghdad and the holy cities of
N ajaf and Karbala. The most visible protests took place in February o f 1977, on the
occasion o f !A shura', when thousands o f Shiis, including some who were well armed,
called for the overthrow of the Bath regime. 87 When the police attempted to intervene
on a procession from Najaf to Karbala, the angry crowed shouted: "Saddam, remove your
hand! The people of Iraq do not want you!" 88 In June o f 1977 Saddam Hussein warned
against the linking of religion and politics.^ The occasion also precipitated a crisis within
87
See discussion in Bengio, Middle East Contemporary Sumey 1 (1976-1977), pp. 405-408.
88
Hanna Batatu, "Iraqs Underground Shii Movements," M E R IP Reports 12:1 (January
1982), p. 6 .
89
Bengio, Middle East Contemporary Sur\>cy 2 (1977-78), p. 522.

295
the ruling coterie o f the Bath and led to the inclusion o f Shi'is within the revamped
Revolutionary Command Council later that year.90 In 1979 further Shi'i demonstrations
transpired in the aftermath o f the overthrow o f the Shah. There was also the clearer
emergence of an Shii political leadership, with at least two and perhaps as many as five
groups appearing on the periphery of the Iraqi political stage.91 The Shi'i groups,
especially with the decline o f the ICP in certain areas o f Iraq, were uniquely positioned to
mobilize large segments o f the Iraqi populace . 92
T h e regime moved to contain any Shi'i uprising through conciliatory gestures and
outright repression: "In practice, Saddam Husayn pursued two tactics: tarhib and targhib, as
Iraqis would say. H e terrorized with one hand and offered rewards with the other ." 93 In
public appearances members of the regime did all they could to accommodate Ba'thi
ideology to the tenets of Islam. T h e regime promised to disburse funds for the
maintenance and construction of holy sites and mosques. 91 In the aftermath o f the
90
Sec discussion in O fra Bengio, "Shi'is and Politics in Ba'thi Iraq," Middle Eastern
Studies 21:1 (January 1985), pp. 3-8.

91 Bengio, ibid., identifies five groups in her 1985 article, one that was not formed until
1982. These include The Organization for Islamic Action, The Iraqi Mujahidin, The
M ovem ent of the Mujahidin Ulam a in Iraq (founded in Iran in 1980), A l-D a wa, and, in 1982,
T h e Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution. Batatu, writing three years earlier in "Iraq's
Underground Shii Movements," identifies two main political groups, A l-D a'w a, formed in
1969, and the M ujahidin formed in Iraq after the Islamic Revolution in Iran.
93 See discussion in Marion farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, "Some Reflections on the
Present State o f Sunni-Shii Relations in Iraq," Bulletin o f the British Society fo r Middle
Eastern Studies 5 (1978), pp. 79-87.

93
91
Batatu, "Iraqs Underground Shi'i Movements," p. 7.

See discussion in Bengio, Middle East Conlemporaty Surxey 3 (1978-1979), pp. 570-571.
296
Iranian revolution the Ba'th regime was seriously alarmed by the prospect o f a Shi'i
uprising, and tended to regard the Shi'i struggle and the wider Islamic movement "as a
challenge to its very existence."* The manner in which the revolutionary regime in Iran
was seen to be fuelling the sentiments among the Shi'i population in Iraq added to the
concern o f the Ba'th regime.
The Primary P illar of the Ba th Regime:
T h e emergence of fundamental political opposition to the Ba'th regime is

revealing.
It reflects th e sweeping changes in the texture o f the social canvas as Iraq was
drawn into the world economic orbit. N ew constituencies including modern middle classes
and working classes emerged in th e urban centres, especially Baghdad. O th e r social
classes, particularly th e large landed classes, declined with the growing strength o f the
urban-centred classes.
In other cases, established social groups emerged anew and
rcinvigorated. I n the 1960s and 1970s the Kurds show much greater signs o f overcoming
the localism of tribal identity and acted as a coherent and highly politicised nationalist
group. T h e influx of western ideas also contributed to a heightened political
consciousness w ith respect to the condition o f women in Iraq. A t the same time, in the
face o f th e pressures o f modernization and secularization, the traditional clerical class
consolidated its opposition to the regime and articulated an Islamic ideology that stood
diametrically opposed to the Pan-Arab world view o f the Ba'th.
95
Bengio, Middle East Contemporary Survey 4 (1979-1980), p. 513.

297
Political opposition to the regime was undoubtedly impelled and simultaneously

nurtured by the stunning degree of poverty that plagued much o f Iraq. Migration from
the countryside placed enormous stress upon the urban centres. 96 As Table 1 reveals, the
percentages o f rural and urban populations flipped in the thirty years from 1947. In 1947,
the rural population constituted almost two-thirds of the total Iraqi population, while the
urban population was just above one-third. By 1977 the respective weights had reversed,
with the urban population totalling almost two-thirds and the rural population declining to
a little more than one-third o f the population.
For a discussion o f some of the concrete problems that forced migration, particularly
after the heralded land reforms of the post-revolutionary period, see A theel Al-Jomard,
"Internal M igration in Iraq, in The Integration o f Modem Iraq, ed. Abbas Kelidar (Croom
Helm , 1979).
96
298
Table 1
Urban and Rural Population in Iraq
Total
Year
Population
1947
1957
1965
1977
4,816,185
6,298,978
8,047,415
12,171,28
Source:
Urban %
1,733,827
2,455,459
4,112,291
7,728,763
36.0
48.8
51.1
63.5
Rural
3,082,358
3,853,519
3,935,124
4,442,517
64.0
61.2
48.9
36.5
T a b le compiled in Joseph Stork, "Class, State and Politics in Iraq," in Power

a n d Stability in the Middle East, ed. Berch Berbcroglu, (Z e d Books, 1989),
p. 34.
As a result o f this pressure upon the urban areas, particularly Baghdad, which came to
contain more than one quarter of Ira q s total population, living conditions moved from
bad to worse. T h e district of M adinat ath-Thawra in Baghdad, for example, inflated to a
population o f at least 1.5 million in the late 1970s, although it was originally designed to
house only 300,000. Ira q s Annual Abstract o f Statistics from 1978 records that h a lf a
million people w e re still living in reed huts (sarilas), 4 million in mud houses and 1/4
million in tents.97 Thus, out o f a population o f some 15 million, government statistics
suggest that almost one third o f the Iraqi population was inadequately housed during th e
97
See discussion in Isam al-Khafaji, "The Parasitic Base o f the Balhist Regim e," in
Saddam s Ira q : Revolution or Reaction, eds. C A R D R I (Z e d Books, 1986). Figures on housing
and population fro m p. 82.
299
1970s. One assessment suggests that at least 1.5 million Iraqis live in absolute poverty . 98
A study of income distribution in Iraq from the 1970s reveals wide inequalities. Am ong
urban households, the bottom 40 per cent received just 17.7 per cent o f the income while
the top 30 p er cent received 57.1 per cent o f the income. T h e top decile alone received
almost 30 p e r cent of the income. Among rural households, the bottom forty per cent
received 19.4 per cent while the two top deciles received 42.2 per cent." Beyond
households, statistics reveal that the lowest 20 per cent o f the Iraqi population receives a
mere
2 .1
per cent o f total income, while the top
2 0
per cent receives more than 6 0 per
cent o f the total . 100

The poor quality o f life for many Iraqis created potential pools of support for the
well developed poles o f political opposition to the Ba'th regime. A t this point, poverty
meshed with socio-political conditions to render the Ba'th regime unstable.
It may be
summarized that by the last half o f the 1970s the social forces that had been moulded and
refigured in the context o f a rapidly changing Iraqi society were denied the opportunity to
voice social o r political grievances. Their political manifestations w ere forced onto the
margins of th e system through the denial o f meaningful channels o f expression. Dissent
simply was no t permitted by the regime. T h e Ba'th regime was unwilling to grant the
98
Alan Richards and John Waterbuiy, A Political Economy o f the Middle East: State,
Class, and Economic Development, eds. Alan Richards and John Waterbury (W estview Press,
1990), pp. 282-283. The term absolute poverty refers to the number o f people falling below
a previously determined line.
99 Statistics extracted from Shakir M . Issa, "The Distribution o f Income in Iraq, 1971," in
The Integration o f Modern Iraq, ed. Abbas Kelidar (Croom Helm , 1979), pp. 132-133.
100
Sec discussion in Isam al-Khafaji, op. cit., pp. 82-82.

300
necessary freedom to allow their political demands to be genuinely aired and played out.
T h e posture o f those groups opposing the B ath was often survivalist and generally radical.
Should the opportunity arise, these groups were prepared to mobilize Iraqs population
against the Ba'th regime.
T h e regime hovered somewhat awkwardly over "the Iraqi people". Its social
foundations, in other words, were tenuous in the extreme.
By the late 1970s the regime
came to rest on one essential pillar: state repression. The policing apparatus o f the Iraqi
regime was consolidated during the mid-1970s.
Party difficulties with the first C hief o f
Internal State Security, Nadhim Kzar, which involved a bungled coup attempt and an
embarrassing series o f bizarre hatchet murders in Baghdad led by fictional character
named A bu al-T u b ar and ex-members o f K zars police service, led to the revamping o f the
security apparatus. 101 T h e response to the Kzar affair and th c A b u al-Tubar crimes
transformed a potentially inconsequential episode in contemporary Iraqi history into a
pivotal political juncture o f the Ba'th Revolution. Internal crime became inextricably
linked to counter-revolutionary imperialist plots by subversive forces. The affair was
transformed into a ledgerdomainic rationale for the police state. "All that we hear and
read about, including those crimes which have taken place recently," Saddam Hussein
claimed in a speech in September o f 1973, "are new devices to confront the Revolution
and exhaust it psychologically. These are not sadistic crimes as some imagine, they are
crimes committed by traitorous agents."10* T h e crimes were not addressed in criminal
F o r a full discussion o f these events see Samir al-Khalil, The Republic o f Fear: The
Politics o f Modem Iraq, (University o f California Press, 1989), pp. 6-12.
101
102
Ibid., p.
.
301
terms but rather on treasonous grounds. The transgressions were conceptualized as

attacks against "the people" in the service o f counterrevolutionary forces. As Samir alKhalil writes o f Saddams Husseins September 1973 speech:
His speech was designed to make treason grow more vague and abstract; now it
could be found in peoples thoughts, not only in their deeds. At the same time its
monstrousncss was made palpable and concrete through Abu al-Tubars sadism...
Above all, his particular achievement was the placement of an inordinate
emphasis on a revised conception of political crime, one that made it ever more
loose and all-inclusive. Treason in his hands was a much larger offense, direct at
the whole people, and a much less specific one. Once treason was ensconced in
this fashion, police work logically became the substitute for all politics.103
The security apparatus was revamped and brought under more immediate control o f the
party. T h e Bath Partys Political report of 1974 makes the following sobering observation:
The security force was inoculated on all levels by Party elements and other
patriotic and qualified men. This force, however, was difficult to reform and
rebuild because of its longstanding rotten structure. During the past few years,
this force has reflected badly on the Party in many aspects. We must confess that
me leadership was wrong in not tightening control further over this very
important apparatus. The leadership had full confidence in the Party members in
this force which caused some of them to abuse it and conspire against the Party as
was shown in the June 30th criminal conspiracy. This conspiracy, however,
sounded the alarm, and the leadership made extensive changes. 101
Three separate institutions comprised the new security institutions: thcA m n or State
Internal Security, the Estikhbaral or Military Intelligence, and the Mukhabarat or Party
103
Ibid., pp. 9-10.
101 Revolutionary Iraq: 1968 -1973, The Political Report Adopted by the Eighth Regional
Congress of the Arab Bath Socialist Party - Iraq, January 1974, pp. 172.
302
Intelligence. A ll three agencies were independently responsible to the Revolutionary

Command Council. O f the three wings the Mukhabarat is the most feared . 105 The
development o f the policing apparatus in Iraq was reflected in the proportion o f public
sector workers employed in the Ministry of Interior, the main department responsible for
internal security. According to the Annual Abstract o f Statistics from 1978, the number
employed by the Ministry o f the Interior was 22.8 per cent o f all government employees.
This was more than the Ministry o f Health, Ministry o f Finance, Ministry o f Justice,
Ministry o f Education, Ministry o f Labour and Social Affairs, Ministry o f Housing and
Reconstruction, and the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research combined.
No other ministry even approximated the employment figures for the M inistry o f Interior.
\
By the latter part o f the 1970s the net effect o f this intense surveillance o f the
Iraqi population was widely felt. The state o f the Iraqi political culture has been elegantly
summarized by al-Khalil:
Fear is the cement that holds together this strange body politic in Iraq. All forms
of organization not directly controlled by the party have been wiped out. The
public is atomized and broken up, which is why it can be made to believe
anything. A society that used to revel in politics is not only subdued and silent,
but profoundly apolitical. Fear is the agency of that transformation; the kind of
fear that comes not only from what the neighbours might say, but that makes
people careful of what they say in front of their children. This fear has become a
part of the psychological constitution of citizenship. Fashioned out of Iraqi raw
material, this fear is ironically the mainstay of the countrys national self
assertiveness in the modern era. The violence that remained buried as a potential
in the subconscious culture of societys groups surfaced as this new kind of fear
drove through all private space that once existed on the peripheries of families,
boundaries of communities, or by virtue of status or class origin. The result was a
true regime of terror whose deepest roots lay in the growing fear that people now
105 T h e most detailed discussion o f the Bathist security apparatus may be found in a I
Khalil, op. cit., chapter one entitled "The Institutions of Violence".
303
had of each other."16
The extirpation o f non-Ba'thi forms of political organization and the net effect o f the
surveillance stale fostered an artificial silence among the Iraqi population. It was a
silence that could always be broken. The Bath regime was well aware of this possibility.
Conclusion: The Ba'th and Revolutionary Iran
By the end o f the 1970s a fundamental disjuncture or rift had developed between
the political and social worlds in Iraq. Changes within society had created new social
forces with political agendas that diverged from the Bathist world view. The main lines of
opposition came from women, the Kurds, the Shi'i groups and a profoundly weakened
ICP. Political channels capable o f tabling and addressing their social demands were
choked off. It was a political offense punishable by death to leave the Ba'th and join an
alternative parly, or to coax others to do the same. The regime had systematically insured
that political opposition would be driven underground or exiled. Either one was with the
Ba'th regime or potentially traitorous and forever suspect.
It is this vulnerability of the Ba th regime towards the end o f the 1970s that gives
events in Iran their heightened importance. The well-honed repressive apparatus of the
regime would never be enough to inoculate it from the latent opposition that was
prepared to rise under propitious circumstances. T he Islamic Revolution in Iran provided
uv> Saniir al-Khalil, op. cit., pp. 275-276.

304
a stark reminder o f this possibility. The Ba'th political order was displaying some signs of
unravelling. The Shi'i struggle was o f special concern to the regime. The theocratic
regime in Iran appeared to be doing all it could to foment Shi'i unrest. Consequently,
tensions between the two regimes escalated quickly.
A t the same time, the turmoil of post-revolutionary Iran meant that Iraqs
traditional rival in the Persian G u lf was substantially weakened. Only five years earlier
Iraq was forced the acquiesce to Iranian strength and accept the capitulatory terms o f the
Algiers Accord. T h e Ba'th were suddenly handed the opportunity to emerge as the
dominant power in the G u lf with enhanced prestige among the Arab world. Greater
regional leverage and influence would accrue for the Ba'th regime. This outcome would
go a long way towards stabilizing oil revenues, revenues that w ere increasingly crucial for
the maintenance o f the repressive regime. The temptation proved to be too much for the
Ba'th.
These political imperatives, we must remind ourselves, bore the stains o f the rapid
social transformation that accompanied Iraqs insertion into the world economy. Neither
the internal opposition against the Ba'th nor the regimes quest for stable oil revenues can
be adequately addressed outside of this evolving social tapestry. In other words, the
political conflicts that impelled the Iraqi regime to attack Iran were signatured by Iraqs
rudimentary socio-political struggles. With the socio-political evolution o f Iraq and Iran
now outlined, we may now complete our analysis o f the social origins of the war by
devoting closer attention to the socially-grounded political conflicts that enveloped both
regimes in the aftermath o f the Islamic revolution.
305
Chapter Eight
The Developing Security Problematic Between Iran and Iraq
Introduction:
In chapter four we drew attention to the nature of the intellectual gauntlet thrown down
by the Alternative stream o f security analysis. In its most pithy formulation, the challenge involves
problematizing security in terms of its wider social and political matrices. According to the
Alternative stream at least four theoretical limitations associated with conventional security analysis
must be assiduously avoided. First, scholars must guard against universalizing security discourses
articulated by political leaders or ruling social groups.' We stressed that this move assumes a
certain homogeneity within society that is rarely present. The extension o f conceptions o f security
across society will lead analysts to overlook or dismiss dissenting characterizations of security
problems emanating from subordinate or marginal social constituencies. Secondly, research needs
to avoid the reification of security discourses and certain analytical categories. In other words,
security issues and problems must be viewed as the product o f socio-political struggles within
society. Analysts must therefore avoid deducing them from certain givens such as the state
system or naturalizing them as core or essential security concerns of the state. Third, we
should not assume that security discourses, as well as the proffered solutions to security problems,
correspond to some real or objective condition in the world out there. W e stressed that security
problems and characterizations should not be analyzed in correlative terms but rather as a
' In this chapter the term security discourse is occasionally replaced with security problem, security
characterization, security conceptions, discourse around security and insecurity etcetera for stylistic
reasons. For the intended meaning of security discourse see Chapter Four, pp. 175-176.
terminological universe that social actors (and analysts) employ within a wider sotio cultural
milieu. Finally, we must acknowledge that security discourses are necessarily imbued with political
content, particularly as they will relate to configurations o f social power within society. There is
no apolitical or uncontaminated security characterisation shouldered by groups within society.
Political projects and agendas, in other words, inhere in all social and academic discourses around
security and insecurity.
Th e Alternative stream of security analysis is particularly instructive when analysing the
developing security problems between Iraq and Iran prior to the outbreak of war in 1980. The
security discourses o f the theocrats in Tehran and the Ba'th regime in Baghdad, we contend, were
firmly rooted in the social terrain o f both countries. More specifically, when we probe into the
mounting security problems between the two regimes we see that it was enervated by three
distinguishable political dynamics: Irans efforts to foment a Shii rebellion in Iraq, the alarm that
this provocation created within the Bath regime, and the struggle by the Iraqi Bath to secure and
stabilize oil revenues. Each of these dynamics, in turn, was signatured by the socio-political
struggles that characterized each country. In other words, each political dynamic had distinct
social foundations. The evolving security discourses of both regimes, therefore, bore an intimate
relationship to the socio-political fields in both Iran and Iraq. They reflected the uplifting
determinations o f the social floor, we might say, rather than the downward determinations o f the
systemic o r essentialist ceiling.
Th e following elaboration o f the social foundations o f the developing security problem
between Iran and Iraq accords with the theoretical requirements o f the Alternate e stream of
security analysis. W e avoid extending the security discourses beyond the regimes that controlled
the state apparatus in 1980. We see the developing issues o f security as a thoroughly political
manifestation between two regimes struggling to maintain control o f the state apparatus within
307
their respective social formations. We refuse to reify our analysis by grounding it firmly in the
socio-political struggles of the two countries. We do not approach the discussion o f the security
problems between Iran and Iraq in correlative terms, that is, as a natural or insuperable problem
rooted in the objective conditions of the Iraqi state or the Iranian state. Finally, we fully
acknowledge the political project underlying our discussion, particularly as it is motivated to draw
attention to the struggle o f subordinate social constituencies in both countries.
The Socio-Political Matrices of Security:
In 1980, the primary elements o f the security discourses o f the Bath regime in Baghdad
and the theocratic regime in Tehran were falling into place.2 For the Ba'th regime, the most
fundamental element to be safeguarded or protected was the integrity o f the July 17-30
Revolution. In practice, this tended to mean the perpetuation o f Ba'thist rule, since the Ba'th
were invariably portrayed as the guardians o f the Revolution. Public speeches in Iraq w ere
replete with references to, and justifications in terms of, the principles o f the July 17-30
Revolution. For the theocrats in Tehran, the most fundamental element to be protected was the
Islamic revolution o f 1979. In practice, this tended to mean the preservation of the Islamic
principles o f the revolution and the consolidation o f clerical rule. To be sure, both regimes would
characterise their security concerns in politically inclusive terms, and references, fo r example, to
the integrity of the Arab nation or the Islamic nation were thus very common. It was not the
more narrowly based regimes that were threatened, in other words, but rather the lofty principles
and aspirations o f entire nations.
T h e primary threats to these valorised elements also clearly emerged. Between the
For an outline of the three analytical elements of security discourses see Chapter Four, p. 176.
308
signing of th e Algiers Accord in 1975 and the fall of the Shah in 1979 Iraqi-Iranian relations were
at their warmest. A fter the insurrection Iraq quickly expressed the desire to continue cordial
relations.' Despite these initial gestures friendly relations between the two countries quickly
evaporated. By the fall of 1979 Ira n s foreign minister Ebrahim Yazdi appropriately summarised
Iranian-Iraqi relations as "very cool.'" Over the next year Iran and Iraq became each others
primary security concern/ Official government statements, interviews with political leaders,
newspaper commentaries and radio broadcasts increasingly addressed the growing tensions
between the two countries. Interviews with political leaders and official policy organs frequently
provided lengthy and elaborate expositions on the reasons for the growing hostility between the
two countries. In the fall o f 1979, for example, the Iranian foreign minister, in an effort to
account for the deteriorating relations between the two countries, detailed the logical Haws o f
Bathist ideology, drew attention to the undemocratic nature o f the Bath regime, and expresseil
concern over the stark repression that characterised the current leadership. T h e blunt contrast
between th e misguided, undemocratic, repressive Bath regime in Iraq and the flowering Islamic
revolution in Iran, the listener was led to conclude, lay at the root o f the growing tensions.
Expositions o f a similar nature often appeared on the Iraqi side. T h e Bath party organ alh
Thawrah, fo r example, recounted recent Iraqi-Iranian relations under the Shah and the
revolutionary government in a series of articles during the Spring o f 1979. The final piece in the
* For a detailed account o f the message conveyed by Iraq to the provisional government in Iran
Iraqi News Agency, February 13, 1979, FBIS: Daily Reports, February 14, 1979.
sec
4 Beirut, An-Nahar, October 1, 1979, FBIS: Daily Reports, October 4, 1979.

s Iraq, for example, figured front and centre in a discussion of Irans security problems by Iranian
president Abolhasan Bani-Sadr in May 1980, Tehran Domestic Radio Service, May 5, 1980, FBIS. Daily
Reports, M ay 6,1980.
6
Tehran Domestic Radio Service, October 15, 1979, FBIS: Daily Reports, October 16, 1979.
309
series expressed a desire for friendly relations but maintained that Iraq had a natural concern for
the Arab population in Arabistan (Khuzcstan). T h e series concluded with the accusation that the
Iranian regime was inventing "illusory" enemies in order to justify the expansion o f the Iranian
army . 7
This rising attentivencss and mutual concern was closely bound up with a growing sense o f
conflict between Iran and Iraq." This conflict manifested itself through a calumnious rhetoric that
extended far beyond the bounds of normal diplomatic dislike o r disapproval. Iraq was nothing
short o f contemptuous o f the revolutionary leadership in Iran. Khomeini was refeired to as a
"Pahlavi", as that "mummy Khomeini", as a "shah wearing a turban" and as being "too petty" to
carry out the revolution. The political leadership o f Iran was characterized as K hom einis "gang",
as a cluster o f "sick politicians", as "lunatics", as "frenzied charlatans and imposters", as the "racist
Persian clique", as a "criminal gang" and and as "murderers" displaying "animosity, despicable
racism and empty vanity." T h e following commentary from Baghdad in response to border clashes
with Iran was typical:
The charlatans and tricksters of Iran will pay a heavy price for their reckless line. The
reckless and misguided Khomeyni group knows more than anyone else - because it
experiences this daily - the type o f answer it gets from the Iraqis across the border. It is a
price which this deviate group will continue to pay.9
Iran was equally to the rhetorical task. The Ba'th regime was described as the "Takriti gang", as
the "gangster regime," as a "regime o f tyrants", as "Satans", as "traitorous" to the G u lf region, as
Ath-Thawrah, June 12-14, 1979, FBIS: Daily Reports, June 14, 15 1979.
On the relationship between security discourses and conflict see Chapter Four, pp. 175-178.
9 Baghdad Voice o f the Masses, September 4, 1980, FBIS: Daily Reports, September 5, 1980, my
emphasis.
310
"subservient" to Am erican imperialism, "inhumane and as "fascist butchers". Saddam Hussein was
characterized as "mentally ill" and as the "puppet o f Satan". In its response to clashes with Iraqi
supported Kurdish groups in August o f 1980, Ira n s Interior Ministry offered the following
diatribe that revealed nothing out o f the ordinary:
As the dear compatriots may well know, mercenary elements of bloodthirsty Saddam
Husayn - this obedient senm t of the United Stales - have not yet renounced their
antihuman and bestial conduct. Saddam Husayn - this autocratic and legitimized dictator without learning a lesson from the malevolent and black past of his erstwhile, deposed,
executed collaborator, the traitorous Mohammad Re/.a, is resorting to crimes and treachery
similar to that of his friend ... Little docs he know that the ramshackle and shaky bases of
the oppressive regime which relies on gunpowder and the bayonet o f the Iraqi balh will
soon be destroyed thanks to the wakefulness and positive efforts o f the dedicated and
revolutionary Iraqi Muslims, and that the roots of oppression and cruelty will soon dry up
and will consign nefarious Saddam to the trash heap of History}0
Ayotallah Khom eini himself drew on a colourful repertoire o f adjectives when speaking o f the
Ba'th regime including "despicable", "criminal", "nefarious" and "murderous".
As tensions escalated and the conflict mounted there was a resurrection o f the
interm inable land issue by Iraq, particularly with respect to the Shatt al-Arab waterway and the
three Persian G u lf Islands o f G reater Tunbs, Lesser Tunbs and Abu Musa. O n October 30, 1979,
Iraq demanded that the 1975 border treaty be revised. From the Iraqi perspective the agreement
had been extracted under special circumstances. That is, in the face o f the "mercenary mutiny" o f
the Kurds, Iraq had no choice but to accept the unfair terms o f the treaty. For the Ba'th, the
1975 treaty was politically expedient and nothing more. Saddam Hussein now demanded that the
terms o f the accord be revised.
In the spring o f 1980, moreover, the territorial ante was upped
when Iraq demanded the return of the Persian G u lf Islands o f G reater Tunbs, Lesser Tunbs and
10
Tehran Domestic Service, August 26, 1980, FBIS. Daily Reports, August 27, 1980, my emphasis.
311
Abu Musa sieved by Iran in 1971. Both countries continued their w ar o f words over the disputed
lands and became increasingly intransigent with respect to their mutually incompatible positions.
T h e territorial issue reached its peak on September 17, 1980 when Saddam Hussein unilaterally
abrogated th e Algiers accord. In a speech delivered to Ira q s National Assembly, Hussein
declared Iranian non-commitment to the provisions o f 1975 agreement now forced Iraq, despite
its best efforts, to abrogate the agreement: "This Shatt shall again be, as it has been throughout
history," Hussein triumphantly declared, "Iraqi and Arab in name and reality, with all rights o f full
sovereignty over it . " 11
T h e heightened insecurity and growing conflict between Iran and Iraq was capped by a
series o f military clashes along their common border. T h e clashes generally involved exchanges of
lire, border-post raids, a ir incursions and limited military operations. Each country repeatedly
claimed to be the victim o f gratuitous aggression by the other.
Border provocations, moreover,
provided both countries with an opportunity to fire more rhetorical salvos. Iraq described border
dashes in late May, for example, "aggression (that) comes as part o f the criminal provocative acts
committed by the agent Persian regime against Iraq and its struggling people . " 12 In a similar
vein, during the escalation of border incidents in February of 1980, Iran summarized the clashes
as "yet another confirmation o f the Iraqi Ba'th Partys hostile stand against the Islamic revolution
and the sons o f the border villages."1' The border collisions, which began in earnest in February
o f 1980, continued relatively unabated until the outbreak o f w ar in September.
Iran and Iraq became each others primary concern over the year prior to war. W h ile
other international political issues were of concern to both regimes, such as the accord between
11
Speech to National Assembly, September 17, 1980, FBIS: Daily Reports, September 18, 1980.
12
Iraqi News Agency, FBIS: Daily Reports, May 28, 1980.
11
Tehran International Sen'ice, February 26, 1980, FBIS: Daily Reports, February 26, 1980.
312
)?
:"
Egypt ad Israel, and the possible American response to the hostage crisis, both countries became
seriously alarmed over the others posture and activities. The rhetorical excesses o f both regimes
strongly suggest that the preferred avenue o f relief was nothing short o f the removal o f the
neighbouring foe.
W hen we probe beyond the mounting security problems between the two countries,
however, w e observe that is was threaded by three distinguishable political dynamics: the attempts
by Ira n to fom ent a Shi'i uprising in Iraq, the alarm that the potential Shi'i uprising created for
the Ba'th regime, and the struggle by the Ba'th regime in Iraq to secure oil revenues. Each
political dynamic warrants special attention, particularly in terms of the manner in which it is
linked to th e broader social fields in each country.
Through this we can uncover the fundamental
social foundations of the developing security problems between the two countries and, ultimately,
reveal the social origins o f the Iran-Iraq war.
The Genesis o f Ir a n s Aggressive Foreign Policy Against Iraq:
In C h ap ter
we drew attention to the broadly based coalition of social forces that
temporarily united to bring down the Phalavi monarchy. Attention was given to the fact that each
element o f the revolutionary opposition was profoundly conditioned by the socio-economic
transformations o f contemporary Iran. Both components of the Iranian middle class figured
prominently in th e revolution. The modern middle class, composed o f urban-educated salaried
professionals, independently employed professionals and intellectuals, set the revolutionary
process in m otion by demanding that the Shah end state repression and democratize the political
system. In the latter stages o f the revolutionary process political elements o f the modern middle
classes refused to contradict the word o f Khomeini and thus contributed to the strong sense o f
313
solidarity among the opposition. M o re importantly, the traditional middle classes, the bazaaris
and th e clerics, provided the inspiration and mobilization to overcome the regime. By the end o f
1978 the monarchy was seriously faltering. The departure o f the Shah early in the new year and
the arrival o f Khomeini shortly thereafter marked the final episodes in destruction of the
monarchy. O n February 11, the army declared its neutrality. The Provisional Revolutionary
Governm ent (P R G ), headed by M chdi Bazargan, proceeded to pave the w ay towards the Islamic
Republic o f Iran.
One strength o f the Iranian revolution lay in the solidarity achieved by the diverse
opposition. T h e Shah o f Iran provided the necessary focus that allowed th e opposition to put
aside its differences and bring down the monarchy. Profound ideological cleavages among the
revolutionary opposition were thus successfully concealed in the face of the common adversary.
Upon achieving their initial goal of removing the Shah the unity o f the opposition quickly
unravelled. "Once the revolutionary forces had expelled the Shah and neutralised the military,"
summarizes one commentator, "their unity began to crack . " 14 In the aftermath o f the insurrection
the inherently different political agendas o f each social force rapidly emerged. Each elem ent o f
the anti-Shah coalition carried a different view o f the political and economic nature o f the
revolution, and a different social and political agenda regarding post-Pahlavi Iran. T h e struggle
for post-revolutionary class hegemony in the months following the insurrection was intense.
Although the clerics clearly had the upper edge going into the struggle, in view o f the many
factors that gave the revolution its Islamic hue, their political position was far from unassailable.
A t least three different ideological threads could be detected after the fall of the Shah.is
u Dilip H iro, Iran under die Ayatollahs, (Routledge, 1985), p. 103.

Some writers have identified as many as five ideological currents including the nationalist and
monarchist' trends. See Eric Hooglund, "Iran in the 1980s," in The Iranian Revolution and die Islamic
Republic, eds. N ikki R. Keddie and E ric Hooglund (Syracuse University Press, 1986), pp. 17-20.
314
*4'
5*
Each ideological stream was represented by a number o f political parties and had a distinct social
base. T h e first ideological pocket consisted of the Liberal-bourgeois parties o f the modern middle
class. They tended to view the revolution as a change from authoritarianism to a liberal
fcV'
democracy. In other words, they emphasized the political dimension o f the revolution. O ne o f
Ip,
m
ijf',
their primary concerns was to protect private enterprise and property. Their base o f support was
concentrated in the judiciary, the bureaucracy and the moneyed classes. The liberal groups lacked
%
^
any mass social base and their political or economic agenda was likely to generate one. There
were literally dozens o f political groups within the liberal cast. Among the more prominent were
the Teachers Association, the Movement Group, the Democratic Union o f the Iranian People, the
&
Republican Party, the Radical Party, the Association fo r the Protection o f the Constitution, the
Society o f Free Muslims, the Iranian Association o f Jurists, and the Writers Association. The most
I
i
&
prominent liberal groups were the National Front and the Freedom Movement. The National
Front was led by Karim Sanjabi o f the Iran Party.
ideological coinerstones o f the National Front.
Iranian nationalism formed one of the
The National Front, lo r example, had tended to
characterize the revolutionary opposition as nationalist rather than religious. T he Freedom

Movement was headed by M ehdi Bazargan. It voiced strong support for a parliamentary
democracy and embraced the idea o f a healthy economy driven by private ownership o f property.
T h e second ideological strain in post-revolutionary Iran was represented by the numerous
parties on the left o f the political spectrum.1S The driving force behind the radical left parties
came from Iranian intellectuals (and especially the students). The radical left in Iran was
characterized by intense factionalism. The left parties included the Fedaiyen-e Khalq, the Paykar
Organisation, the Tufan Organisation (Maoist), the Organization fo r Communist Unity, the
16 For a detailed survey o f the Iranian left forces at the outset o f the post-revolutionary period sec
M E R IP Reports 8 6 (M arch-April 1980).
315
Communist Party o f Iranian Workers and Peasants, the Party o f Socialist Workers (Trotskyist), the
*
Organization o f the M ilitant Workers, the Communers Organisation, the Marxist-Leninist Committee
and the Organisation of Revolutionary Youth. T h e Tudeh Party was the main left-wing party in
Iran . T h e Tudeh also spawned two splinter parties over the years, the Revolutionary Organisation
and the Democratic Union. A collection o f radical Islamic parties rounded out this end o f the
political spectrum in the immediate post-revolutionary period. The radical Islamic parties,
particularly the Mojahedin-e Khalq, were also centred in the modern intelligentsia. Despite the
diverse collection o f parties, these groups can be summarized as advocating radical transformation
o f Ira n s socio-economic structure, including the nationalization o f key economic sectors and the
removal o f all imperialist ties. The 1979 revolution was a necessary step in this direction, but
considerable w ork still had to be done. Although rooted in the intermediate strata, these groups
lacked a broad social base. On the whole, the left stood little chance o f commandeering the
5,
Iranian revolution. In view of this reality the Tudeh Party, for example, supported the radical
clergy and strove to guide revolutionary policy in a direction commensurate with th eir social and
economic agenda.
T h e third ideological faction contending for power in post-revolutionaiy Ira n were the
|
fundamentalist clerics. T h e fundamentalist parties tended to be drawn from the low er strata o f
:
the clergy. Im portant differences among the clergy certainly existed. Am ong the three most
prom inent figures, for example, Ayatollah Taleqani and Ayatollah Shariaat M adari emphasized
the importance o f establishing a democratic political system, a position which gave them greater
compatibility w ith the liberals and some regional movements. In contrast, Ayatollah Khomeini
emphasized the importance o f establishing an Islamic political system with the m arja'e taqlid or
most learned religious figure at its apex: "Our nation gave its blood to create an Islamic republic,"
316
asserted Khomeini in a speech at Qom cemctary on March 9, 1979, "not a democratic republic.' "
The followers o f Khomeini, including Ayatollah Beheshti, Ayatollah Mosavi Ardbili and Ayatollah
Mahdavi K ani along w ith Hojjatolislams Khamenei, Bahonar and Hashemi Ral'sanjani, founded
the Islamic Republican Party during the month of the insurrection. The Islamic parties, and
particularly the IR P , came to figure most prominently in the policy directions o f post
revolutionary Iran.
T h e political struggle in the post-revolutionary period evolved into a contention between
the liberals and the fundamentalists or radical clergy. 8 In very broad class terms, this struggle
could be summarized as a conflict between the new and old segments o f the middle class. The
P R G under Bazargan was stalked with representatives from the liberal wings o f the political
spectrum. Although the radical clergy did not exercise formal power within the old state
apparatus, they tended to exercise de facto power by virtue of their strong links to the
revolutionary institutions that spontaneously arose during the period o f struggle. The three main
revolutionary institutions were the Council o f the Revolution, the revolutionary Komitehs in the
towns and districts, and the Revolutionary Guards. Together they undermined the authority of
the P R G and essentially became the primary locus of political power within the country.
Bazargan metaphorically described the tenuous authority of the PR G as "a knife without a blade".
I
$
T h e P R G was further undermined by its inability to address the demands for far reaching social
1
17
Ij
^
1
From FBIS: Daily Reports, March 12, 1979.
One o f the clearest discussions of this period of revolutionary Iran may be found in Shaul Bakhash,
The Reign o f the Ayatollahs; Iran and the Islamic Revolution, (Basic Books, 1984), pp. 52-91. Detailed
accounts o f this period may also be found in Middle East Contemporary Survey v. 3 (1978-1979), pp. 514
527, and v. 4, (1979-1980), pp. 438-456.
18
317
change.1'' Bazargan resigned one day after students siezed the American embassy in the fall o f
1979.
M ajor political events in the early post .evolutionary period, including the referendum to
decide the general political form of revolutionary Iran, the process o f drafting the constitution
including the election of the Council o f Experts, and the elections to the Majlis in 1980 revealed
the growing political power of the radical clerics and the waning influence o f the liberals.
One key factor in the ability o f the radical clergy to consolidate its power was rooted in its
ability to politically mobilize the population on a massive scale. This mobilization was nurtured
through a form o f theocratic-populism wherein Islam provided the nourishment and cohesion for
:
a political discourse that concerned itself with the interests o f the "oppressed Iranian nation",
especially its "downtrodden" masses. This linguistic atmosphere was heavily permeated with
xenophobic motifs that helped keep the population on guard against foreign "predators" . 20 T h e
;
S'
:
symbolic world o f theocratic-populism, in other words, kept the population sufficiently aroused in
the aftermath o f the revolution. By sustaining this r> cautionary fervour, especially the
1
2
momentum required to maintain support fo r the revolutionary institutions, political power was
f
I
concentrated in the hands of the clerics. Theocratic-populism, in short, was instrumental in the
accumulation o f clerical power in post-revolutionary Iran. It is within the parametres o f this
political discourse, moreover, that we can detect the germination o f the aggressive campaign
against Iraq. Consequently, a closer examination of the relevant tenets o f theocratic-populism is
beneficial for our understanding of the developing security problems between Iran and Iraq.
The "oppressed Iranian masses" were to be the primary beneficiaries of the Islamic
ig Hossein Bashiriyehs discussion on the inability of the PRG to address the social question
provides an interesting analysis o f the declining influence of the liberals in the immediate aftermath of
the revolution. See The State and Revolution in Iran: 1962-1982, (St M artins Press, 1984), pp. 139-149.
20 For a discussion on theocratic populism in Iran see Kambiz Afrachteh, "The Predominance and
Dilemmas o f Theocratic Populism in Contemporary Iran," Iranian Studies 14:3-4 (Summer-Autumn 1981).
318
1
revolution. Khomeinis address to the Iranian people from Qom in the immediate aftermath of
the insurrection, for example, clearly reveals this revolutionary thrust:
Apart from wanting to make your material life affluent, we want to see your moral life
affluent as well. You need spiritual values. They have taken away our spiritual values.
Do not be satisfied that we arc only houses. We are going to make power and water free
for the poor classes. Wc shall make buses free for the poor classes. Do not be satisfied
with just this. Wc shall impart greatness to moral and spiritual values... Wc Shall develop
both your world and your hereafter. 21
Despite an apparent affinity with the impoverished masses o f Iranian society, however, theocratic
populism tended to deny the political meaningful ness of social stratification and division. Islamic
society, in other words, overcame social division and cleavage. Islam performed a type o f levelling
function. The primary social constituency became the devout "nation". In an address to the
Iranian people less than two months after the revolution, for example, Khomeini propounded this
theme:
I tell all the sections of society that in Islam there are no privileges recognized for one
group as distinct from another, Sunni or Shi'a, Arabs or Persians, Turks or non-Turks.
Islam recognized social distinction only for the just, for piety. Only those with piety enjoy
social distinction. Those with the spirit of humanity enjoy social distinction. Social
distinction is not governed by wealth and material possessions. All such privileges must
be eliminated, and everybody made equal. 22
In response to the heavy fighting between Kurdish insurgents and Tehran in August of 1979, this
notion was succinctly reiterated: "I proclaim to the honourable people o f Kordestan that we
consider you to be our brothers and equals and that you will enjoy equal rights with your other
21
Tehran Domestic Service, March 1, 1979, FBIS: Daily Reports, March 5, 1979.
22
Tehran Domestic Service, April 1, 1979, FBIS: Daily Reports, April 2, 1979.
319
1
I
Iranian brothers wherever you may be and that in the Islamic Republic there is absolutely no
difference between Azarbayjanis, Kurds, Lors, Arabs, Persian or Baluchis ." 25 According to the
logic o f the theocratic-populist discourse, the most meaningful social entity in post-revolutionary
Iran was the pious nation. T h e individual or the group was inseparable from the "nation", and
their interests had to be subordinated to it: "W e regard the whole nation as part o f us and
ourselves as part o f the nation," claimed Khomeini to a group o f students and educational
professionals from Sanandaj (in the Kurdish region), "and we all are servants o f the nation " . 21
Social conflict and political discord, therefore, was incommensurate with Islamic society.
Political opposition merely undermined the intrinsic unity o f the Islamic nation. "The aim o f the
opposition," Khomeini typically claimed in response to criticism o f the revolutionary Komitehs, "is
to discredit anybody who wants to serve the people . " 25 There was, o f course, an obvious disparity
between the professed unity o f the pious nation and the rampant political opposition within the
country. In order to explain and challenge this political opposition, therefore, the theocraticpopulist discourse tended to enlist xenophobic themes and narratives. The spiritual unity and
political coherence o f Islamic society, that is, could only be punctured by the machinations o f
foreigners. The alleged link between internal discord and foreign elements is readily visible in
Khomeinis address to the Iranian people shortly before his departure for Qom:
Wc all know that the secret behind the great victory that the nation has scored lied in the
unity of expression of all strata, from the capital to the remotest parts of the country, and
that its sole objective was to overthrow the satanic rule and to get rid of colonial
associates and international colonialists, and set up an Islamic republic. We arc not in
great need of maintaining this unity of expression and unity o f objective. The great nation
25
Tehran
Domestic
Service, August 22, 1979, FBIS: Daily Reports, August
23, 1979.
24
Tehran
Domestic
Scivice, April 28, 1979, FBIS: Daily Reports,April 30,
1979.
25
Tehran
Domestic
Service, April 19, 1979, FBIS: Daily Reports,April 20,
1979.
320
should beware of certain divisive elements that, by means of deceitful slogans, want to
pave the way for the return of foreigners to our Islamic country and to restore the same
old repression and looting in another form. By isolating them and refraining from
participating in their gatherings, and by means of Islamic logic, the great national will
neutralize their harmful propaganda.2*
T h e aim o f the revolution was to "cut o ff the hand o f foreigners." Social unrest and political
discord was necessarily residual, that is, it lingered by virtue o f imperialist design. Iranians were
repeatedly cautioned to be on guard against foreign intruders. This logic is clearly visible in the
following statement by Khomeini: "Islam produces human beings, and this is what the foreigners,
the superpowers, are afraid of. They are afraid o f humans, so they attack Islam, for it is a religion
which breeds humans." 27 According to the theocratic-populist discourse, colonialism had "done
its homework" and knew where to foment unrest and sow disenchantment. Strikes, marches,
protests and sit-ins w ere thus dismissed as the work o f foreign forces. T h e increasingly pejorative
connotation that surrounded the terms "liberal" and "intellectual" was partly created by linking
them to foreign groups: "Let these moribund brains drain away," Khomeini announced in response
to the criticism from the liberal strands Iranian political spectrum, "these brains have worked for
the aliens". T h e central foreign element in the populist calculus was the United States. Internal
opposition was brandished as "lackeys" o f American imperialism. Iran was nothing more than the
"prey" o f the United States. 28 T h e second storming o f the United Stales embassy and the taking
o f American hostages was the equivalent to capturing the "den o f corruption" or the "nest o f
imperialism".
It is within the prevailing political language o f post-revolutionary Iran that the germination
26
TehranDomestic Service, February 28, 1979, FBIS: Daily Reports, March 1, 1979.
27
TehranDomestic Service, March 1, 1979, FBIS: Daily Reports, March 5, 1979.
28
TehranDomestic Service, May 19, 1979, FBIS: Daily Reports, May 21, 1979.
321
o f the aggressive campaign against Iraq may be detected. Tw o separate dynamics embodied
within the theocratic-populist discourse were at work. The first surrounded the natural bonds
that this rhetorical pale created with other downtrodden nations. As the theocratic-populist
project drew attention to the "oppressed Iranian nation" it expressed a natural affinity with other
Muslim and oppressed peoples all over the world: "As a Muslim nation," Iranian foreign minister
Ebrahim Yazdi remarked in an interview in the spring of 1979, "we feel duty-bound to help all
oppressed peoples.""' "Muslims and oppressed people o f the world, hold each others hands and
turn your face toward the great G od, encouraged Khomeini in an address to Muslims around the
world, "take refuge in Islam and arise against the oppressors and those who usurp the rights o f
the nations." 4 Iran essentially found itself exporting revolution in order to consolidate the
revolution at home. The means through which Iran would export this revolution did not
necessarily demand direct assistance or confrontation:"... the revolutions guidelines and courses
will go to other places, whether wc wish it or not. Basically, if we are able to build a model
Islamic society," claimed newly elected president Bani-Sadr, "it will automatically go beyond our
frontiers, for others would wish to copy it . " 1 As a neighbouring Muslim country, especially one
with a history o f conflict with Iran and indeed the only other Shii dominated country in the
world, Iraq was a natural target for Tehrans purple blasts.
The second dynamic was directly linked to the creation of external enemies and
aggressors. Within its nucleus the theocratic-populist discourse generated a litany o f potential
counter-revolutionary threats to Islamic Iran. In this sense, the aggression against Iraq was a
natural offshoot of the xenophobic leitmotif of post-revolutionary Iran s godly ideological cloak.
Tehran Domestic Service, May 10, 1979, FBIS: Daily Reports, May 14, 1979.
w Tehran Domestic Service, October 30, 1979, FBIS: Daily Reports, November 1, 1979.
I Tehran Domestic Scn'ice, June 13, 1980, FBIS: Daily Reports, June 16,1980.
322
T h e immediate linkages between this aggressive posture against Iraq and the theocratic populist
dialogue in Ira n was unmistakable:
The Iraqi people must get rid of the claws of this gang (Ba'th regime]. Like the Iranian
Army which, after realizing that the deposed shah was fighting Islam, joined the people
and contributed to making their Islamic revolution, the Iraqi Army must rise up... The war
that the Iraqi Ba'th wants to ignite is a war against Islam." 33
Events in Iraq provided Ira n with further opportunities to specifically draw the Ba'th regime into
its rhetorical orbit. The execution of the eminent Iraqi Shi'i figure Baqir as-Sadr in April o f 1980,
for example, prompted Iran to declare a three day period o f mourning and a public holiday:
"Baqir as-Sadr ...," Khom eini proclaimed, "gained the exalted rank of martyrdom in a heartrendering manner by the hands o f the despicable Iraqi Ba'th regime. " 33 Iraqs expulsion o f
citizens o f Iranian origin provided additional fodder for the thcocrals: "... the inhumane Iraqi
Ba'thist regim e has forced thousands o f Muslim brothers and sisters to leave that country in the
most disgraceful manner o n charges o f being Shi'ite Muslims and opposing the bloodsucking
regime o f Saddam Husayn . " 34 T h e campaign against Iraq was reinforced by linking it with
American imperialism. Ira q was seen as the "U.S. agent in the region . " 35 Thinly veiled
references to American "appendages and stooges" frequently appeared in political commentary.
T h e aggression against Iraq was directly linked to the rhetorical world that sustained
revolutionary zeal and consolidated clerical power. Through direct broadcasts and support for
33 Address by Khomeini to national mobilization representatives, Tehran International Senite, A pril

17, 1980, FBIS: Daily Reports, April 18, 1980.
33
31
Tehran Domestic Service, April 6 , 1980, FBIS: Daily Reports, April 7, 1980.
55
Tehran International Service, March 10, 1980, FBIS: Daily Reports, March 11, 1980.
323
Shii groups in Iraq, Iran encouraged the overthrow of the Iraqi regime. Radio Tehran regularly
broadcasted messages by different Islamic groups including the Islamic Revolution Struggle o f Iraq,
the Islamic Movement o f Iraq and the Islamic Revolutionary A rm y fo r the Liberation o f Iraq.
Although the groups probably existed in name only, they routinely issued calls fo r the Shii
population i . ii.q to rise up and overthrow the Ba'th regime. * 4 These wishes extended to Ira n s
lop political Icu-ors. In the spring o f 1980, for example, Khomeini expressed the hope that the
Ba'thist regime would be "despatched to the refuse bin o f history".
To recapitulate, the presence o f the radical clerics within the post-revolutionary terrain o f
Iran generated and reinforced the aggressive campaign against Iraq. A small part of this process
would have been sustained by what might be called pure or unadulterated ideology. Am ong the
religious ideologues, for example, the Islamic narratives o f overthrowing impious states (futah)
were undoubtably operative . 17 T h e driving factor, however, was the theocratic-populist discourse
that helped maintain revolutionary fervour and insure clerical ascendency. This rhetorical
universe served as a constant reminder that the 'ulema were th e pivotal force behind the
revolution, and strongly suggested that they were the key to its continued success. The
functioning o f the revolutionary institutions, moreover, was greatly assisted by this symbolic cloak.
Revolutionary fulfilment and the preservation o f clerical leadership w ere virtually inseparable for
Khomeini and the radical clerics. Theocratic-populism went a long way to help them achieve
their hegemonic aspirations. Aggression against Iraq was the flip-side of sustaining revolutionary
* Middle East Contemporary Survey 4 (1979-80), pp. 514-515.

17
As Bernard Lewis writes: These [futuh] were not seen as conquests in the vulgar sense of
territorial acquisitions, but as the overthrow of impious regimes and illegitimate hierarchies, and the
opening o f their people to the new revelation and dispensation. The notion o f a superseded old order
is vividly expressed in the invocation of an ultimatum said to have been sent by one o f the Muslim Arab
commanders to the princes of Persian: "Praise be to God who has dissolved your order, frustrated your
evil designs and sundered your unity." from The Political Language o f Islam , (University of Chicago Press,
1988), p. 93.
324
fervour. In short, there was no cultural imperative unfolding in the G u lf region in th e early
1980s. T h e theocrats were motivated by the somewhat more temporal concern of consolidating
their grip on the post-revolutionary state. T h e aggressive campaign against Iraq, however, evoked
grave concern among the B ath regime.
The Ba'th and the Shi'i Population:
In the century prior to the outbreak o f war in 1980, as discussed in chapter seven, Iraqi
society was rapidly evolving and changing. W ith the gradual insertion o f Iraq into th e world
economy, first as a supplier of agricultural goods and later as a supplier of crude oil, the class
structure o f Iraq was radically altered. By the 1970s this transformed social canvas included a
growing, indigenous capitalist class, a modern middle class, an urban centred working class and
rural agricultural workers. The large and powerful landed class o f the monarchy was eclipsed by
the land reform policies o f the revolutionary regimes. The evolving class structure o f Iraq was
accompanied by extensive demographic shifts. In addition to continually growing in sue, the Iraqi
population was becoming increasingly urbanized. On the eve o f the Iran -Iraq war, two out o f
every three Iraqis lived in the cities. The most palpable manifestation o f these shifting
demographics was the growth of dense pockets of urban poor, especially in Baghdad.
A tten tio n was also drawn to the incongruity that had emerged between the social and
political spheres o f Iraq. In political terms the Ba'th regime had developed into an island unto its
own. Nourished by an unending, and for all intents and purposes unlimited, supply o f oil
revenues, the Ba'thi controlled state had systematically closed o ff any independent avenues o f
political expression. Authentic and autonomous political activity was aggressively discouraged. In
social terms, however, the evolving Iraqi tapestry created new constituencies that demanded a
325
m ore open political system. In the closed world o f the Ba'th the opportunity fo r these
constituencies to air their grievances and advance their interests w ere greatly limited. Political life
was increasingly incommensurate with the imperatives o f society. A disjuncture between the
political and social worlds o f Iraq, not unlike the contradiction that toppled the Phalavi monarchy
in neighbouring Iran, had clearly developed by the late 1970s.
W ith in this volatile political setting the reinvigorated Shi'i opposition showed signs o f
em erging as a serious challenge to the Ba'th regime. U n like the nationally tinged Kurdish
struggle o r the Marxist inspired activity o f the IC P , this movement sought to mask o r house their
activities within Islam and the mosque. Protests occurred in the Shi'i holy cities o f Najaf,
Kazimiyyah and Karbala and in the Shi'i dominated M adin at ath-Thawrah district o f Baghdad.
Despite the Sunni-dominated state apparatus in a predominantly Shi'i society, the developing Shi'i
struggle should not be characterized as a religious struggle. I t was not, in other words, a sectarian
conflict . 18 Nor can the Shi'i opposition be adequately understood as a struggle o f the poorer
Iraqis (w ho were predominantly Shi'i) rising up against the w ealthier groups and those fragments
o f the middle classes that had fared well in post-revolutionaty Iraq. The Shi'i movement cannot,
that is, b e reduced to a struggle for material betterment. Rather, w e stress that the emerging
Shi'i opposition was closely bound up with the sweeping changes o f twentieth century Iraq. That
is, the social transformation o f contemporaty Iraq created two distinct and highly disaffected social
groups th at combined to fuel the Shi'i struggle: the declining clerical class and the impoverished
S hi'i masses. Both groups must be considered separately in order to fully comprehend the rise o f
the Shi'i challenge to the Ba'th regime.
O v e r the century prior to the outbreak o f war the social position and political influence o f
w T h e characterization o f the Shi'i opposition as a religious conflict between the Sunni and the Shi'i
has been critically assessed in P. Sluglett and M . Farouk-Sluglett, "Some Reflections on the Sunni/Shi'i
Question in Iraq," Bulletin o f the British Society fo r Middle Eastern Studies 5 (1978), pp. 79-81.
326
the Shi'i clergy was in continual decline. The forces of modernization and secularization
associated w ith Iraq s satellization with the world economy lay at the heart o f these changing
f
&
i
ft-
fortunes. A series of specific pressures came to bear upon the clerics. Pivotal among them was
the waning attraction o f the religious profession for many Iraqis. In 1918 there were more than
6,000 students attending the theological seminaries in Najaf. By the twilight of the monarchy the
number o f students enroled in the seminaries had fallen to 1,954. T h e growing tendency towards
secular education, along with new opportunities for employment in the modernizing economy and
the expanding civil service, contributed to this declining enrolment. The progressive thinning o f
the ranks o f the ulema went hand in hand with their declining prestige and authority. This net
effect was exacerbated by the falling income due to the loss o f special tithes, taxes or fees. The
clerics were thus inspired to form political associations to protect their soei.il standing."... they
were moved by a growing sense that the old faith was receding, that scepticism and even disdain
for traditional rites were rife among the educated Shi'is, that the belief o f even the urban Shi'a
masses was not as firm, and their conformism to ancient usages not as punctual or as reverent as
in past time, and that the 'ulema were losing ground and declining in prestige and material
influence . " 40
T h e Shi'i men o f religion, moreover, were moved to act in response to the growing
attraction o f the Iraqi Communist Party among the urban Shi'i population. During the 1940s and
50s communist influence even managed to penetrate Ira q s holy bastion o f Najaf. Clerical alarm
at the IC P ran particularly high in the aftermath o f the 1958 revolution as their profile grew
The following discussion primarily draws upon two excellent discussions o f the Shi'i population and
struggle in Iraq; Marion-Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to
Dictatorship, (I.B . Tauris and Co. Ltd., 1990), especially pp. 190-200; Hanna Batatu, "Iraqs Underground
Shi'a Movements; Characteristics, Causes and Prospects," Middle East Journal 35 (1981), statistics drawn
from Batatu.
40
Batatu, "Iraqs Underground Shi'a Movements; Characteristics, Causes and Prospects," p. 586.
327
under Qasem. In the fall o f 1958 leading clerics in N ajaf founded a political organization called
the Association o f N a ja f u l a m a T h e organization aimed to raise the religious consciousness o f
Iraqis and combat atheism. In view o f the nominal influence of Ba'thism or Nasserism at the
time, the goal o f combatting atheism was essentially synonymous w ith combatting communist
influence throughout the country. In 1960 a decree was issued by a prominent cleric, for
example, forbidding membership in the IC P. As further testimony to the concerns o f the ulama a
younger cleric, Muham m ad Baqir al-Sadr (who was executed by the Ba'th regime just prior to the
Iran-Iraq w ar) wrote an extensive and widely read critique o f European philosophy entitled
Iqtisaduna.
I t is significant that almost one third o f this text was devoted to refuting Marxism and
historical materialism.
The general decline o f the clerics in the face o f the secular path o f contemporary Iraq
contributed to their political cohesion. Ira q s secular tendencies became even more visible with
the accession to power o f the Ba'th regime in 1968. The Ba'th, which has traditionally been
dominated by Sunnis, adopted an avowedly non-religious platform. This posture, along with the
Ba'thi contempt for autonomous political expressions, "helped to alienate the conservative
religious groups o f both Sunni and Shi'i."'" It was the Shi'i religious establishment in particular,
however, that was aggressively targeted by the Ba'th:
... the brunt of secularization or the breaking of the power of religion was direct in the
main against the Shi'is. Thus, in the summer of 1969, the Bath unleashed a campaign of
repression against Shi'i men of religion and institutions which included: the closure of
Islamic institutions including a theological college in Najaf; the imposition of strict
censorship on religious publications; the authorization of the sale of alcohol in the Shi'i
holy places reportedly for the first time in Iraqi history; and persecution of Shi'i Ulama in
" Sluglett and Sluglett, "Some reflections on the Sunni/Shi'i Question in Iraq," p. 87.
328
general.42
T h e accession and consolidation o f the Bath in the late 1960s encouraged the nucleus o f the
Association o f N a ja f u lam a to form the Da'wa al-Islamiyyah (the Islamic Call). Predictably, the
Da'wa stood opposed, first and foremost, to the secular tendencies o f modern Iraq: "It is
important to recognize," writes Michael Hudson, "that the Islamic opposition to the Ba'thist
regime led by Saddam Husayn eschews defining the conflict in sectarian terms; thus the Da'wa
Party and other groups do not see themselves as Shi'is fighting the oppression o f a Sunni
government, but as spokesmen for all the Muslims o f Iraq - Shii and Sunni, Arab and Kurd,
against an evil secular government." 43 As the 1970s progressed the Da'wa became the most
prominent and most active religious group resisting the Ba'th regime.
T h e potential strength o f the Shi'i clerics did not lie in their relative political cohesiveness
or in their resolve to oppose the Ba'th. Rather, this small but politically vibrant fraction of the
traditional middle class was in a unique position to mobilize the Shi'i masses o f Iraq. This
mobilizational potential o f the Shi'i masses, however, must also be contextualized in terms of the
social transformation o f modern Iraq. In fact, there are a number o f reasons to doubt that the
Shi'i masses would be favourably disposed to the efforts o f the clerics. Throughout the southern
Shi'i populated region o f Iraq, for example, religion tended to be loosely organized. Religious
institutions were uncommon owing to extreme poverty, the nomadism of much o f the population,
the marshlands o f the region and the susceptibility of much o f the area to seasonal Hooding. In
1947, for example, there were only 39 religious institutions in the Shi'i areas which translates into
42 See discussion in Ofra Bengio, "Shi'is and Politics in Ba'thi Iraq, Middle Eastern Studies 21:1
(January 1985), quote from p. 2.
43 Michael C. Hudson, "The Islamic Factor in Syrian and Iraqi Politics," in Islam and the Political
Process, ed. James Piscatori (Cambridge, 1983), p. 87.
329
institution for evety 37,000 persons.
Moreover, many o f the rural Shi'i w ere o f bedouin origin.
Since Islam has traditionally "sat lightly on the bedouins" one could reasonably expect that they
would not eagerly embrace the Islamic movement. 44 Finally, many Shi'is were of relatively recent
conversion and still tended to be governed as much by ancient tribal customs as by Islamic law.
Nonetheless, there were forces at w ork that reinforced the religiosity o f the Shi'i and
favourably disposed them towards the activities o f the D a'w a and other Shi'i groups. In particular,
the shifting land tenure structures associated with the initial phases o f Iraqs insertion into th e
world economy as a supplier o f agricultural commodities turned the Shi'i tribesmen into peasants.
The condition o f the rural Shi'i in the context o f shifting land tenure arrangements became
deplorable.
In these wretched circumstances the southern population found Shi'i narratives
particularly appropriate to their lives. As Batatu w rites:"... Shi'isms anti-governmental m otif, its
pre-occupation with oppression, its grief-laden tales, and its miracle play representing Husayns
passion accorded w ith the instincts and sufferings o f tribesmen-turned-peasants and must have
eased the tasks o f the travelling Shi'a m u mins ." 45 The miserable conditions o f the countryside,
moreover, encouraged massive migration to the urban centres. As a result, the shifting landtenure structures had indirectly created large pools o f S h ii poor in Ira q s urban centres:
... as the Shi'i inhabitants of the southern provinces began to migrate to Baghdad in
increasing numbers, they also came to constitute the majority of the urban poor in the
slums that grew up around Baghdad and other cities after the Second World War.
Naturally, the Shi'i poor, both those still living in villages and those who had migrated to
the cities in search of work, were poor not because they were Shi'is but because, in the
comparatively recent past, the great tribal diras (estates) of the South on which they lives
had been appropriated by powerful tribal leaders, and the tribesmen had been left either
44 See the discussion in Hanna Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements o f
Iraq, pp. 41-42.
14
Batatu, "Iraqs Underground Shi'a Movements: Characteristics. Causes and Prospects," p. 585.
330
entirely without land or with insufficient land for their subsistence/*
>.
In keeping with their modest religiosity the Shi'ism of the new city dwellers was centred less
I
^
around the rituals o f prayer and fasting and more with the Shi'i festivals and processions, venues
I|
that more readily lent themselves to political exploitation.
h
J
It was the Iraqi communists who first succeeded in mobilising the poorer city dwellers.
T h e efforts of the IC P to cultivate support among the urban poor was undoubtedly abetted by the
I
^
la
v
ii
&
I.
Ist
narratives and promises o f the Marxist discourse. In particular, their aspirations for a better life,
and their sense o f a politically corrupt regime meshed well with the eqalitarian motifs and
concrete political critiques disseminated by the ICP: "O f course, it would be wrong to suggest that
the rural migrants had any profound understanding of the theories of Marxist/Leninism: the
appeal o f the Communist Party lay in its uncompromising calls for the overthrow ol a regime that
If
was self-evidently controlled by foreign strategic and economic interests, and for an end to the
exploitation and poverty o f which this particular constituency was only too well aware . " 17 The
i,
I
IC P achieved considerable support
Baghdad.
from the urban areas well into the 1970s, especially in
\
,
As discussed above, the growing popularity of communism with the urban poor and
i
members o f the lower middle classes, including the holy city o f Najaf, aroused the concern of the
\
I
!
Shi'i clerics and prompted them to respond by the late 1950s. Clerical attempts to offset the
growing influence o f the communists was cased by two important developments. First, the
condition o f the urban Shi'i continued to deteriorate, despite the distributive policies o f the post
revolutionary regimes. Put simply, conditions continued to get worse for the urban poor.
46
Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship, pp. 190-191.
47
Ibid., p. 193.
331
Secondly, the ICP has fared poorly in the repressive atmosphere that has characterized much o f
the post-revolutionary period. In the wave o f violence after the first Ba'thist coup in 1963, for
example, many communist cadres brutally extirpated. By the late 1970s, after a brief and
conditional flourishing under the Progressive Patriotic National Front, the IC P was decimated and
forced to take up arms in the north o f the country alongside the Kurdish insurgency. By virture
o f this process considerable ideological space was freed up among the urban poor. This space was
unlikely to be filled by the pan-Arab ideologies of Nasserism and Ba'thism. Both movements, that
is, generated the concern among the Shi'is that they might be consumed by Sunnism in the event
o f Arab unity. W ith this progressive narrowing of political discourse in Iraq to the pale o f the
Ba'thi world view and in view of the limited attraction of pan-Arab ideologies, therefore, Shi'ism
could help the urban poor make sense o f their world .48 Shi'i narratives provided an important
way to structure their social and political grievances. Shi'isms preoccupation with suffering and
the central importance o f its passion motif suit it well to the "have-nots" o f society. As Batatu
writes: "Shi'ism ... has here for long been by and large the ideology o f the underdogs, just as
Sunnism that o f the socially dominant classes." 49 In the political and ideological vacuum created
under the Ba'thi reign o f terror, especially when the marked decline o f the IC P by the late 1970s
is considered, these qualities o f Shi'ism take on an added significance. Ultimately, Shi'ism helped
the urban poor address their social condition. These social and political conditions, more than
any intrinsically animating qualities that Shi'ism may possess, favourably disposed the Shi'i urban
poor to the efforts o f the disenchanted clerics.
48 Samir al-Khalil has described the narrowing of political discourse in Iraq rather aptly as the "end
of politics". See Republic o f Fear: The Politics o f Modem Iraq, (University of California Press, 1989), pp.
235-236.
49 Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements o f Iraq, p. 983, also see discussion
on p. 45.
332
T h e Baghdad district o f M adinat ath-Thawrah epitomized the political latency of the Shi'i
movement. M adinat ath-Thawrah was one o f the urban centrepieces o f Qasems development
policies. Qasems goal was to address Baghdads growing slum problem. To this end the clearing
o f slums and the construction o f brick housing proceeded together. T h e newly created area was
renamed M a d in at ath-Thawrah (City of the Revolution ) . ' 0 T h e district o f Madinat ath-Thawrali,
understandably, was one of the main centres o f resistcncc to the first Ba'thist coup in 1963.'1
T h e constant pressures of urban migration, however, continually taxed the capacities of Madinat
ath-Thawrah. W hile the district was originally designed to house a population of about 300,(XX)
by the late 1970s the "City o f the Revolution" had swelled to upwards o f a quarter o f Baghdads
population. Minimal living and housing standards were not met and the differences in life styles
throughout the capital was increasingly obvious. ' 2 W ithin M adinat ath-Thawrah one may find
some of Baghdads most deplorable slums. The area provides a large proportion o f Baghdads
labour force. Inflation, the influx o f foreign labour and generally poor labour representation
further eroded the living standards o f the inhabitants o f Madinat ath-Thawrah during the 1970s.
Although this district was once a solid centre o f support for the Iraqi Communists, in the post
revolutionary period it evolved into a strong base of Shii support. M adi: at ath-Thawrah has
been identified as "the stronghold o f heroes" in militant Shi'i literature.
This confluence of circumstances created a latent but powerful social force that
occasionally manifested itself throughout the 1970s. Shi'i processionals in 1974 and again in 1977
turned into political marches against the Ba'th regime. The potential momentum o f a divinely
50
See the discussion in Phebe Marr, The Modem History of Iraq, ( Westview Press, 1985), pp. 169-170.
51 See discussion in Samir al-Khalil, Republic of Fear. The Politics o f Modem Iraq, (University of
California Press, 1989), pp. 58-59.
52
See figures in ibid., pp. 283-284.

333
inspired political movement seriously alarmed the Ba'th regime. From the perspective of the
Ba'th regime, events in Iran had fostered an alarming historical precedent. Indeed, in the
aftermath o f the Islamic revolution further stirrings among the Shi'i community could be detected.
Iran was doing all it could to stir the unsettled Shi'i population. The Bath regime appeared to
sense that growing numbers of Shi'i were attracted to the Islamic cause. In the spring o f 1980, for
example, Iraqs Interior Minister admitted that "the number of misguided supporters and religious
sympathizers is considerable" .55 The clearest testimony to the regimes alarm was evident in its
execution o f Iraqs most learned Shii Figure, Baqir as-Sadr, in the spring of 1980. The Ba'th
regime, as suggested above, characterized the Shi'i threat in politically inclusive terms. It was not
the regime that was under attack but rather the Arab nation. The Ba'th presented themselves as
defenders o f the Arab homeland against the "racist Persians". The main Shi'i organization adDa'wa was linked to "official and unofficial Iranian circles".54 Internal agitation was the result of
Iranian nationals. Khomeini was accused o f inciting "Iranians living in Iraq."55 The regime exiled
thousands o f Iraqi citizens o f Iranian origin who were also accused o f having connections to adDa'wa, even though many o f these citizens had been living in Iraq for generations.
In inspirational terms alone events in Iran would have been disconcerting to the Ba'th
leadership. But the direct efforts by Iran to foment a Shi'i uprising were horrifying to the regime.
It is difficult to assess the degree to which the potential Shi'i uprising was responsible for the
decision to invade Iran in September of 1980. Most commentators have accorded it considerable
weight. Joseph Storks observations are exemplary: "The difficulty o f insulating Iraqis from the
**
FBIS: DailyReports, May 16, 1980.
54
FBIS: DailyRepons, April 10, 1980.
55
FBIS: DailyReports, April 21, 1980, my emphasis.

334
contagion o f revolution and mass politics persuaded Baghdad to eliminate the threat at its
'A&sss
^3gaassr-& s& tîS 5S - ^sv^^& ':'asfH'
source." S6 T h e relative sufficiency of the Shii threat to the Bath regime notwithstanding, the
developing tensions between Iran and Iraq were undergirded by a third political dynamic.
The Bathist Struggle to Secure O il Revenues:
It would be an oversimplification to contend that oil interests in Iraq caused the war.
Such a claim invariably invokes the image o f the oil classes or a venal political elite pushing for
-fe-sseait- jcsas&a
war in order to advance their narrowly defined interests. Nonetheless, the struggle o f the Bath
regime to secure oil revenues forms the third political dynamic underlining the mounting security
problems between Iran and Iraq and thus figures prominently in the outbreak of war.
-taMa
Throughout the 1970s the oil wealth became critically important to the survival o f the Ba th
regime. T h e regime felt increasingly vulnerable to any long term drop in oil revenues. This
situation was compounded by Iraqs limited oil export capacities. In the late 1970s Iraq had three
ways to get the o il out. T h e first was the less profitable terminals o ff the Iraqi coastline in the
Gulf. The second and third were pipelines through Syria and Turkey. This rendered the Bath
regime vulnerable to international political conditions. Indeed, the How o f Iraqi oil via the Syrian
pipeline was subject to numerous interruptions prior to the war. Iraq, therefore, had many of the
vulnerabilities o f a landlocked country. This growing reliance upon oil revenues, along with its
situational vulnerability, manifested itself in a regional policy designed to reduce the likelihood of
haardous shifts in oil policy and pricing. Iraq struggled to acquire as much influence as possible
over regional oil production and pricing policies. The post-revolutionary turmoil in Iran, Iraqs
,6 Joseph Stork, "Class, State and Politics in Iraq," in Power and Stability in the Middle East, cd. Berth
Berberoglu (Zed Books, 1989), p. 51.
335
long time rival in the G u lf region, infected the Bath regime with the sense o f opportunity. By
further weakening its traditional G u lf rival Iraq could enhance its regional stature. Regional
paramountcy and enhanced stature in the Arab world would go a long way towards giving the
Bath the necessary influence to guide regional oil policy in predictable and safe directions.
Tw o frequently identified aspects o f the war - Husseins quest for regional hegemony and
the dispute over the Shatt al-Arab water way - are related to the struggle to secure and stabilize
oil revenues. As outlined in Chapter Five, both o f these factors have figured prominently in
journalistic and academic accounts o f the war. Most analysis, however, fails to address these
dimensions in terms of any unifying policy aims. The quest for regional paramountcy and the
territorial disputes, wc contend, must be considered in terms o f Iraqs growing vulnerability to
downwards trends in its oil income. The claim here is not that the struggle for regional hegemony
or the dispute over the Shatt al-Arab can be entirely reduced to the Ba'thi struggle to secure and
stabilize oil revenues. Simple territorial grabs undoubtedly animate policymakers and political
leaders from time to time. Nonetheless, there is a sense in which the struggle for regional
hegemony and the territorial disputes arc instrumentally related to the efforts to secure and
maximize oil revenues. Success in both areas could strengthen Iraqs international stature and
control in O P E C decisionmaking bodies.
Th e oil imperative that operated upon the Ba'th regime, however, rests upon two related
socio-political dynamics in Iraq. First, the oil wealth allowed the regime to contain subordinate
social forces. Oil money simply enhanced the prospects for political control. Secondly, the
infusion of oil wealth affected the development o f Iraqs capitalist class, a process that allowed the
regime to carve out a small social base. By addressing the Ba'thi struggle to secure oil revenues
in terms of each o f these socio-political dynamics we can round out our examination of th e social
foundations o f the developing security problems between Iran and Iraq.
336
W ith the nationalization of the Iraqi Petroleum Company and its subsidiaries in 1972 the
Ba'th regime was provided w ith an almost unlimited supply of oil revenues. For the Ba'th the
nationalization o f the ICP could not have come at a more propitious time. The huge rise in oil
prices following the Arab-Israeli war in 1973 resulted in an equally huge rise in Iraqs oil
revenues. A s Table 8.1 illustrates, between 1972 until the outbreak o f the war with Iran in 1980
T A B L E 8.1
Crude Oil Revenues in Iraq: 1972 - 1980
Year
Crude O il Production
in million metric tonnes
O il Revenue
(Estimates in
million US $ )
\
I
I
\
I
|
I
I
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
72.1
99.0
96.7
6 ,0 0 0
1 1 1 .0
8 ,0 0 0
118.8
115.2
125.7
170.6
130.2
8,500
9,500
11,600
575
1,900
2 1 ,2 0 0
26,500
the rise in Ira q s oil revenues far outstripped increases in production. Over the eight years
production less than doubled in volume while oil revenues increased by more than 4,000 per cent.
By 1980, oil revenues had reached a staggering 26.5 billion dollars as compared with 575 million
dollars in 1972.
The almost unlimited supply o f oil revenues after 1973 created a wide array o f options for
the regime when dealing w ith subordinate social classes and potentially explosive issues. A few
,7 Celine Whittleton, "Oil and the Iraqi Economy," in Saddam's Iraq. Revolution or Reaction?, ed.
C A R D R I (Z ed B o o b , 1985).
337
examples will adequately illustrate this idea. The regime could grant periodic wage increases that
allowed it to avoid direct confrontations with the state workers or the labouring classes. This was
invaluable in an atmosphere where labour was not allowed to organize freely. The campaign of
mosque constructions and generous grants to the Shi'i clerics in the late 1970s was similarly
designed to ward off dangerous confrontations. Again, the absorption o f surplus labour into the
inefficient public service sector o f the Iraqi state was partly designed to avoid explosive social
confrontations by minimizing urban pockets o f bitterness and frustration. The state also acted as
the employer of last resort for university graduates in Iraq. By the end o f the 1970s the Iraqi
state (excluding the armed forces) was by far the largest individual employer in the economy. 58
Once more, the distribution of lens of thousands of television sets and cash donations to forcibly
resettled Kurdish families provides another example o f the important political function o f oil
revenues/1 These cooptivc strategics were utterly dependent upon oil money. The use o f oil
money to thwart social unrest and coopt political opposition operated in lieu o f genuine
democratic exchange and political dialogue. The oil money allowed the regime to contain
subordinate classes and groups, at least to some extent, by selectively responding to their
demands. T h e Ba'th regime, in a sense, floated on the price of a barrel of oil.
I f these cooptive strategies failed, the Ba'th could fall back upon the repressive apparatus
of the state. Oil money facilitated the expansion of the policing apparatus. By 1980 the number
of people employed in the repressive apparatus included 175,000 in tne party militia, 242,000 in
the army, and 260,000 in the police. The total of 677,000 people amounted to one-fifth o f the
economically active labour force in Iraq. This extraordinary peace-time size o f the security
58 See discussion in Joseph Stork, "State Power and Economic Structure: Class Determination and
State Formation in Contemporary Iraq," in Iraq. The Contemporary State, ed. Tim Niblock (Croom Helm,
1982), p. 38.
59 See discussion in Middle East Contemporary Survey 3 (1978-1979), p. 569.

338
apparatus was utterly reliant upon the oil rent. The political function served by the large policing
apparatus was invaluable to the regime. Samir al-Khalil, whose Republic of Fear is devoted to
assessing the effects o f the policing apparatus, offers the following sobering assessment of the
Iraqi police state:
Authority used to be the butt of popular jokes, anecdotes, and satirical poems, cultural
safety valves that provided relief from the traditional oppressiveness o f the state. But all
that is gone now. No one dare ridicule authority any longer in Iraq because everyone is
afraid. The tone of political culture has become Kafkacsque: saturated with a sense of the
impersonality of sinister and impenetrable forces, operating on helpless individuals, who
nonetheless intutit that they are being buffeted about by a bi/arre, almost transcendental
kind of rationality.60
By the eve o f war the regime had managed to atomize much its population through fear.
Political
life beyond the state was limited to the underground movements that generally aimed to destroy
the regime. From the perspective of political autonomy the Ba'th regime was a facsimile o f the
Bonapartist state. Ba'thi autonomy, however, was not created through the offsetting effects of
countervailing social forces as it was in post-revolutionary France. Rather, the extreme wealth
available to the Ba'th, especially after 1974, gave the regime powerful leverages over dissenting
social forces. Society was captive of the Ba'th and its aspirations. The political function o f the oil
rent understandably provided the regime with a strong impulse to secure and expand this source
o f income.
A second motive behind the determination to secure oil revenues was at work. T h e Ba'th
regime, by contributing to the growth o f an indigenous capitalist class, was rapidly carving out a
genuine social base o f its own.
In order to understand this imperative we must briefly trace the
nature o f Ba'thist socialism in the context of post-revolutionary development policies. Ba'thi
* Ibid., p. 45.
339
economic policy revealed a continuity with Ira q s post-revolutionary regimes in terms of its
favourable effects upon the expansion o f an indigenous bourgeoisie. Between 1958 and 1968
Ira q s private sector continued to expand. In the manufacturing sector, fo r example, private
capital made considerable headway in both smaller (less than
10
workers) and larger enterprises.
T h e redistributive policies characteristic o f the post-1958 regimes tended to create lucrative

opportunities for private capital. The widely heralded nationalization o f Ira q s foreign trade
under A r if in 1964 was designed to give the regime greater control over the volume and nature
o f imports and exports than to squeeze out private capital. In short, although the Iraqi state was
involved in the economy to a much greater degree in the post-1958 period, this involvement did
not undermine the private accumulation o f capital.*'
In 1968 the Ba'th ascended to power for the second time in five years. The regime
trumpeted what it called a "revolutionary" economic and social programme. It repeatedly boasted
to be vigilantly anti-imperialist and stridently socialist. Section Two of the Political Report o f the
A rab Ba'th Socialst Party in 1974, for example, was entitled "Transformations on the Road to
Socialism". American sense o f the socialist character o f Iraq during the early 1970s, especially in
the face o f Ira q s cozy relationship with the Soviet Union, had figured prominently in U.S.
decisions to destabilize the regime by supporting the Kurds. The socialist rhetoric o f the regime
and the growing involvement o f the state in the Iraqi economy managed to convince some
scholars o f the regimes socialist thrust:
Following the Revolution of 1968, when the country was spared changes of regimes and
rulers, grandiose schemes of development were initiated which marked a significant
6' It is in view of these processes that Hanna Batatus claim in The Old Social Classes that the social
power o f private property was uprooted by the revolutionary regimes must be heavily qualified. See
discussion in Hanna Batatu, "State and Capitalism in Iraq," MER1P Middle East Report 16:2 (SeptemberOctobcr 1986).
340
departure from the social and economic policies of previous regimes. Not only did the
new rulers seek to transform the economic system from free enterprise to collectivism, but
also to achieve the countrys economic independence without which political independence
cannot be long sustained... Only after 1968, when the political system became fairly
stabilized, did the government lay down a consistent policy correlating political, economic
and social affairs and take steps to carry them out. The immediate objective of this policy
was to increase production and raise the standard of living, but the ultimate objective was
to establish a socialist society in which all injustices would be wiped out and all citizens
enjoy the benefits of progress and prosperity.62
Other commentators subscribe to similar characterizations o f the Ba'th: "Increasingly," Phebe

M arr writes o f all post-revolutionary regimes, "they favoured socialism over laissez-faire economics
and emphasized greater benefits to the lower classes."6-'
There is strong evidence to suggest that the socialist boasts o f the regime are entirely
contradicted by its practice: "In spite o f any appearances to the contrary, the Ba'th, like its
predecessors, was not committed to building socialism' o r to the radical transformation o f existing
relations o f production, but to maintaining and sustaining the existing capitalist economic
order."6' These observations have been echoed by other writers: "The Ba'th ideology and
slogans," writes Isam al-Khafaji, "arc an extreme expression of a political movements efforts to
give leftist from to a fundamentally rightist content."6' T h e post-1968 period has been
accompanied by the continual expansion of Iraqs capitalist class. This has been acknowledged by
62 Majid Khadduri, Socialist Iraq: A Study in Iraqi Politics Since 1968, (The Middle East Institute,
1978), pp. 111-112.
45
Phebe Marr, op. cit., p. 247.
64 This is the main contention of the conceptual chapter of Sluglett and Sluglett Iraq Since 1958.
From Revolution to Dictatorship. They stress that the growth of the public sector o f Iraqs economy has
been easily matched by the growth of the private sector and the clear development o f a moneyed class
in Iraq. Quote from p. 228.
The following discussion, including statistics on growth and nature of the parasitic bourgeoisie, is
indebted to Isam al-Khafaji, "The Parasitic Base o f the Ba'thist Regime," in Saddam's Iraq. Revolution
or Reaction, ed. C A R D R I (Zed Books, 1986), quote from p. 85.
65
341
Ihc Ba'th leadership. In 1983, for example, as he encouraged members of the contracting
bourgeoisie to donate more money to the war effort, Saddam Hussein used the story o f how the
revolution had made millionaires out o f barefoot men:
... you know that there was only a handful of contractors before the revolution... Now, this
contractor own not thousands [of Iraqi dinars] but millions... I was informed that he had
donated only a pittance. He did not ask himself: "Where did I get this fortune? Isnt it
thanks to these new circumstances?"**
Even a much looser notion o f socialism, as in the sense that the regime tended to side with
workers and wage-earners, is inappropriate for the Iraqi Bath. The regime offers workers no
opportunity to organise independently, and strikes are strictly forbidden. Low productivity in
Iraqs manufacturing and service sectors in the mid-1970s, for example, was accompanied by
efforts to increase productivity by increasing worker surveillance and discipline, and by directly
tying wage increases to increases in productivity. 67
In stark contrast to its professions the Ba'th regime has cradled capitalist development
since its accession to power in 1968. Through its infrastructural and mega-development projects
the state became the main generator o f private wealth in the country. Although the Ba'thi state
played an increasingly important role in the domestic economy, it was never at the expense o f
private capital. These trends accelerated after the massive influx o f oil revenues towards th e mid1970s. This relationship between the Ba'thi state and the expansion of private capital was most
visible with respect to the growth o f the contracting bourgeoisie. The soaring investment
* Quoted in Isam al-Khafaji, "Slate Incubation of Iraqi Capitalism," M ER IP Middle East Report 16:5
(Scptcmbcr-Octobcr 1986), p. 4.
61 See the discussion in Joseph Stork, "State Power and Economic Structure: Class Determination
and State Formation in Contemporary Iraq," op. cit., p. 43.
342
expenditures by the state throughout the 1970s was paid out mainly to private contractors. By
1975, for example, there were 2,788 contractors officially registered with the state. This compared
with only 829 contractors in 1970-1971. Between 1975 and 1981 the annual growth rate for the
construction sector was 2 9 percent. By 1981, the construction sector accounted for 17 percent o f
the G D P as compared w ith 4 per cent in 1975. Some of the large contractors have amassed huge
fortunes. Elements of this class branched out into the industrial sector of the economy. Strong
personal connections to the regime played an important role in the growing success o f many o f
the contractors. The fact that many members of the contracting class originated from relatively
humble backgrounds testifies to the scale of capital accumulation in Iraq. This fraction of the
bourgeoisie was thoroughly dependent upon the state, fully relying upon the state sponsored
development projects to advance its interests, and frequently receiving generous concessions from
the state by being allowed to bypass lax and labour laws.
The industrial fraction o f the capitalist class also fared very well under the Ba'th during
the 1970s. As demonstrated in Table 8.2, the private industrial sector continued to thrive
T A B L E 8.2
Large and Small Industrial Establishments in Iraq
Large Establishments
Small Establishments
(employing more than 10 worker*)
Year
Public
Private
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
185
198
204
225
266
1090
1043
1145
1254
1282
Source:
26,377
26,332
39.275
37,669
41,719
A nnual Abstract o f Statistics, Ministry o f Planning, Republic o f Iraq, 1978.
343
along with the public sector. While large industrial establishments owned by the state increased
by 81 enterprises between 1973 and 1977, private industrial establishments increased by 192
enterprises. A large increase in small industrial establishments took place after the oil boom,
jumping by almost 13,000 firms between 1974 and 1975. Between 1970 and 1975 the Industrial
Banks credits and loans totalled a little over 10 million ID . In the next two years alone the
Industrial Banks credit and loans totalled more than 22 million ID . In some cases the
contributions of the regime obviated the need for the private sector to front any capital o f its
own: "The Industrial bank was committed to granting loans o f up to 80% o f the total cost of
construction projects, while loans fo r other projects were given up to 40% of cost in the three
central provinces and o f up to 50-60% of cost in the other provinces. In other words, the
industrialist had only to inflate the cost o f his project (a device regularly resorted to) in order to
obtain a loan which would cover the total cost." 68
Despite the rhetorical posture of the Ba th regime, therefore, it is clear that the capitalist
class in Iraq was nourishing alongside the state. In this sense the Ba'th regime goes far beyond
the point o f merely creating the conditions for the expansion o f Iraqi capitalism by establishing,
for example, an industrial infrastructure. The B athi state became the lifeline for the parasitic
fraction o f the Iraq i bourgeoisie which includes contractors, brokers, upper-level bureaucrats and
speculators. The degree to which th e parasitic bourgeoisie relied upon the state is evident is the
following excerpt from a memo sent by a member of the Planning Council to the Iraq President
in 1977:
What docs the contractor need? He needs the capital, which he obtains from the state;
the machinery, which he also obtains from the state; the raw materials, which are supplied
by the state at subsidized prices; and technical expertise, which is available by depleting
Ni Isam al-Khafaji, "The Parasitic Base of the Ba'th Regime," op. cil., p. 78.
344
the state sector of its technicians. When all these facilities arc made available to him, he
has nothing left but to open an elegant office; and even this may not be necessary.'"
State sponsored development, especially during the post-1973 period, created important new
fractions among the capitalist class within Iraq during the 1970s. Their interests demanded that
state coffers be constantly replenished by oil revenues so that they could be depleted for
development purposes. The capitalist class was understandably "developing a vested interest in
the maintenance of the system" . 70 This parasitic bourgeoisie, that is, was forming an important
social base for the regime. The Ba'th regime, sensitive as any political constellation would be to
potential social bases o f support, was therefore provided with an additional motive to pursue its
economic policies.
Ba'thist interests in nursing the nascent capitalist class combined with the political benefits
o f raw oil money created a powerful incentive to secure and stabilize oil revenues. A regime
determined to enhance its international influence for political gain was destined to sense the
opportunity created by Ira n s post-revolutionary turmoil, especially the widely reported disarray
within the regular military. The Ba'th party organ alh-Thawrah spoke disparagingly o f the
"ragged" Iranian military.7' Social unrest and uprisings among Irans ethnic minorities added to
the sense o f revolutionary decay. The regime, in effect, tasted blood. Attacking the pariah
Islamic state was an extremely safe and extremely rewarding move in international political terms.
Iraq, in short, was presented with a golden opportunity to decapitate the revolution for extensive
political gain. Iraqs net gain has been straightforwardly summarized by Khafaji: "If the Iraqi
69
Isam al-Khafaji, "State Incubation of Iraqi Capitalism," op. cit., p.
70
Sluglett and Sluglett, p. 250.
71
FBIS: Daily Reports, April 14, 1980.
345
regime could exert a dominant role in the region it would then be able to insure its control over
all decisions of O P E C .. ." 72
It is in this sense that the developing security problems between Iran and Iraq were
threaded inter alia by the Ba'th struggle to stabilize oil revenues. The Iranian revolution created
an opportunity for Iraq to secure and maximize its oil revenues. It was certainly not natural or
inevitable that Iraq would capitalize upon the momentary weakness o f Iran. T h e Bath regime
was certainly not divinely inspired to fill the regional power vacuum that had developed in the
Gulf. Had the oil imperative been absent in Iraq, the turbulence o f post-revolutionary Iran might
have gone unnoticed, or at least it would not have evoked any meaningful response. But the oil
imperative, combined with Iranian efforts to foment a Shii revolution in Iraq, proved to be too
tempting for the Bath regime. By the spring o f 1980 the slide to war appeared irreversible. On
September 22, amidst mounting tensions, Iraqi forces launched a full-scale invasion o f Iran.
Conclusion:
T h e growing security problem between Iran and Iraq was underlined by three
distinguishable political dynamics: the efforts by Iran to incite a Shi'i uprising in Iraq; the alarm
created by the potential Shi'i rebellion for the Bath regime; and the Ba'thist struggle to secure
and stabilize oil revenues. W e stressed that each of these political dynamics was intimately
related to the transformed social fields of both countries. Irans aggressive policy was linked to
the struggle among contending social forces in the aftermath of the February insurrection.
Theocratic-populism entered into this struggle and played an important role in the ascendency of
the clerics. Theocratie-populism, moreover, cradled an aggressive campaign to incite the Shi'i
72
al-Khafaji, "The Parasitic Base of the Ba'thist Regime," op. cit., p.
86
346
population in Iraq. The Bath regime was seriously alarmed by this prospect. The potential Shi'i
uprising in Iraq, however, was itself linked to the social evolution o f Iraqs clerical class and the
Shii masses in the context of the repressive political atmosphere of the Bath regime.
Simultaneously, Iraqs struggle to secure oil revenues led it to take advantage of Irans post*
revolutionary turmoil. Iraqs oil imperative, we argued, was rooted in the alienation of the Bath
regime from most authentic social forces and in the need for the regime to cultivate and nurture
its growing capitalist base.
These dynamics combined to fuel the mounting security problems between the two
regimes. Both regimes came to view each other in conflictual terms. Manifestations o f the
conflict included vitriolic rhetoric, the resurrection of territorial disputes, border dashes, internal
interference and inflamed radio broadcasts, acts o f sabotage and the frequent threat o f war.
Ultimately, the Bath regime was sufficiently motivated to attack Iran. In examining the social
foundations o f the developing security problems between Iran and Iraq, and by demonstrating that
these foundations were the result o f the evolutionary socio-economic trajectories o f both
countries, we have helped uncover the social origins of the iran-Iraq war. These origins o f the
war caused it in the sense that they laid the foundations for war, that they engendered and
brought it forth, that they provided the stage and script for war. M ore specifically, we have
addressed what others have termed quasi-cnusal factors. The emerging conflict between the two
regimes still had to be mediated and transformed through the personalities who made the war.
The etiological programme o f war, w e accept, is necessarily subjectivi/.cd and contingent. The
personalities within the decision-making coteries o f Iran and Iraq, especially those of Saddam
Hussein and Ayatollah Khomeini, were certainly immediately relevant to the outbreak o f war.
The war was never inevitable, just highly likely.
According to all indications Saddam Hussein expected the war to be short. As it dragged
347
on throughout the 1980s it was clear that he had grossly miscalculated. I t would take almost eight
years before the belligerents would accept a ceasefire. Despite the immense costs o f the war,
however, the theocrats in Tehran and the Ba'th regime in Baghdad tended to come out on top.
Both regimes, that is, consolidated their political power against rival contenders and subordinate
social forces. The emancipatory struggles of subordinate social groups, o f primary concern in the
critical study o f war and peace, relapsed over the course o f the war. These social and political
dynamics help to account for its seemingly senseless length. W e now turn to discuss these
dynamics as they pertain to each country.
348
Chapter Nine
The War and Clerical Consolidation in Iran
Introduction:
In chapter eight we drew attention to the contradictory social base of the Iranian
revolution o f 1979. It was argued that the cohesivcness of the revolutionary opposition quickly
dissolved once the Shah was ousted from power. The continuing struggle among contending
social forces in Iran, a struggle in which the traditional middle class had the upper hand, lay at
the heart o f the aggressive campaign against Iraq. The struggle among these social forces also
partly accounted for the internal disarray o f post-revolutionary Iran. Both factors compelled
Iraq to attack Iran in the fall o f 1980. These dynamics allow us to speak o f the social origins
of th e Iran-Iraq war. O n the Iranian side, that is, its aggressive posture and internal turmoil
were immediately related to political struggles among contending social forces. The character
of these social forces was significantly determined by the socio-economic trajectory o f Iran in
the century prior to 1980.
There is, however, another side to the war. As surely as its outbreak partially bore the
imprint of the evolving social field in Iran, the war also contributed to the remaking or
reworking o f social relationships. T h e Iran-Iraq war, in other words, entered into the struggles
among contending social forces and participated in their refiguration. In this chapter we Hush
out this effect. W e note that the war contributed to the consolidation o f the radical clerics in
the post-revolutionary period. This meant the ousting o f "liberal" forces linked to the modern
middle classes, and the marginalization o f the radical political forces struggling on behalf o f the
peasants and the working classes. Clerical consolidation also meant that the political project of
the radical clerics could be implemented with minimal opposition, a process that had far
reaching implications for subordinate social groups, especially the working classes, th e Kurdish
minorities and women.
The "Blessings" o f War:
The process o f revolutionary consolidation by the clerics encountered determined

resistance from the "centre" of Ira n s political spectrum, that is, from the liberal quarters
including the National Front and the Freedom Movement, and from the left o f Irans political
spectrum, especially the Mujahedin Khalq . 1 Each element o f the revolutionary opposition
held a different assessment of the revolution, and a ditferent agenda concerning Ira n s future
political path. The liberal wing o f the revolutionary opposition tended to view the revolution
as a political change, especially in terms o f the replacement of the repressive monarchy with an
open, democratic system. The liberals tended to emphasize the nationalistic character of the
revolutionary opposition rather than its religious nature. The secular and religious le ft parties
tended to view the revolution as a necessary, or at least unavoidable, step in the creation o f a
truly egalitarian, classless society. To the extent that the radical clerics adopted stridently antiimperialist stances, and given the belief that a strong revolutionary front had to be maintained
in the lace of counterrevolutionary forces, some elements o f the left, especially the Tudeh
party, cautiously supported the radical clerics. Both the centre and left views contrasted rather
1
Ervand Abrahamians "The Opposition Forces," written in February of 1979, provides an
illuminating outline o f the different tendencies that inevitably surfaced in the post-revolutionary
period. These were categorized as 1) religious conservatives (including Shariatmadari), 2 ) religious
radicals (especially the Mujahedin) 3) religious reactionaries 4) secular reformers (the "liberals") and
5) the secular radicals (including the Fedayi and the Tudeh Party). See MERIPReports 9:2/3 (MarchApril, 1979).
350
sharply with the clerical view of the revolution, which tended to emphasize its organic religious
nature, aspired to fully Islamicize the political system, and aimed at the thorough
desecularization o f Iranian society.'
T h e clerics recognized the difficulty o f sustaining popular support in the face of
mounting criticism from antagonist elements o f the increasingly fractured post-revolutionary
political alignment. The growing conflict between the liberals and the radical clones
manifested itself in Bazargans Provisional Revolutionary Government, the referendum on the
nature o f the new Iranian republic, the constitutional debate and the w ork of the Council of
Experts. In each of these struggles the radical clerics prevailed.
The resignation o f Bazargan
in the aftermath o f the hostage affair signalled an important victory for the radical clerics over
liberal forces. Through their close contact with the revolutionary institutions, the continuing
importance of the extensive mosque network, and the untainted figure o f Khomeini, the clerics
had the upper hand in the post-revolutionary struggle against rival forces. Their ascendancy,
however, was further nurtured through the adroit manipulation o f Islamic symbols and
xenophobic motifs that could broadly be summarized as a theocratic-populist political
discourse. This rhetorical world allowed the mullahs to sustain revolutionary fervour and keep
In this chapter the terms clerics and radical clerics are used interchangeably. This employment
does not overlook the fact that there were considerable differences in political views. Most notably,
among the Grand Ayatollahs or Ayatollah 'Uzma widely diverging political views could be detected.
During the initial post-revolutionary period the views o f Shariat Madari and Taleqani (who was also
known as the "Red Mullah") departed sharply from those of Khomeini. Some of these figures clearly
sided with the "liberals" during the initial phase o f the post-revolutionary struggle. The radical clerics,
who commandeered the revolution as time went on, tended to follow Khomeinis line, and were drawn
primarily from the middle ranks of the clergy. Their most prominent political figure during the initial
period was Beheshti and their main political organ was the hlum k Rcpublicun Party. It is these clergy
that can appropriately be labelled as "fundamentalist" as opposed to "traditional" or "progressive". See
discussions by David Menasheri in Middle East Contemporary Suney v. 3, pp. 506-510, v. 4, pp. 455460, v. 5, pp. 525-526. For a discussion o f different streams o f Islamic political thinking see Cheryl
Benard and Zalmay Khalilzad, The Government o f God. Iran's Islamic Republic, (Columbia University
Press, 1984), pp. 30-34.
2
351
the population mobilized against "counterrevolutionary" elements.

W ith the fall o f the Shah the clerics were acutely aware o f the potential loss o f this
mobilizational potential. In this regard, the prolonged American hostage crisis created obvious
mobiluational potential. 1 During the escalation o f the conflict with Iraq it was evident that
some clerics viewed a potential war in similar terms/ 1 Many preferred to see the hostilities
intensified/ Their rudimentary calculus was presciently summarized by Ervand Abrahamian
well before the Iraqi invasion:"... the clergy are unlikely to find another public enemy as
unpopular as the shah against whom they can rally the whole population - unless, o f course, a
foreign enemy invades the country and threatens the existence of the entire nation . " 6 Enter
Iraq! Saddam Hussein appeared to underestimate this possibility. There arc a number of
reasons to suppose that the war might have been debilitating for the theocrats. Internal
conflict appeared to have created havoc within the military, and the prowess o f the
1 According to an interview conducted with Bani-Sadr after he fled to Paris, it was exclusively this
potential that appealed to Khomeini even in the face o f economic threats from the United States.
Bani-Sadrs recollection of a discussion with Khomeini is revealing:
... once we were talking about the economic effects of the hostage crisis and I asked
him, "What is the point in holding the Americans hostage?" H e [Khomeini] replied,
"Our regime is consolidating itself. Our enemies are trying to make the Islamic
constitution fail. We can use the hostages to get the constitution passed, then to get
a president and a legislative assembly elected. Once w e have done all that, we can
think again. O u r internal enemies will have been unable to move because to do so
would expose them to the charge of being traitors.
Interview with Abol-Hassan Bani-Sadr by Fred Halliday, August, 1981, M E R IP Reports 12:3 (MarchApril, 1982), p. 6 .
4 Kambi/. Afrachtoh goes as far as suggesting that the hostage crisis could not be settled until it
was superseded with an episode o f similar, if not greater, mobilizing potential, namely, the Gulf War.
See "The Piedominance and Dilemmas of Theocratic Populism in Contemporary Iran," Iranian
Studies; Journal fo r the Society o f Iranian Studies 14:3-4 (Summer-Autumn, 1981), pp. 194-5.
Eric Rouleau, Le Monde, April
, 1980.
Ervand Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, (Princeton University Press, 1982), p. 537.
352
revolutionary bodies was unknown. The war might also have meant that the condition of the
masses would further deteriorate, thereby possibly undercutting a critical base o f suppoit for
the radical clerics. A t a minimum, one might at least have banked upon the passive support of
the A rab population o f Khuzistan, and strongly have expected the war to rekindle strong
opposition from other ethnic minorities in Iran, especially among the Kurds.
T h e possibility that an Iraqi invasion could work in favour o f the theocrats, a possibility
recognized by some clerics and scholarly commentators, did not appear to have influenced
Saddam Husseins thinking: "Ignorant o f history of revolutions, Saddam and his allies failed to
understand that external aggression has often contributed to the consolidation o f revolutions .is
it did in the Russian and French revolutions." 7 In keeping with historical precedent, the
radical clergy proved adept at exploiting the war in order to extend their class hegemony. The
Bath invasion provided the clerics with the axiomatic common enemy. Xenophobic themes
were fully enlisted to arouse popular sentiments. The war was presented as nothing less that a
war against the "Great Satan incarnate. The regime extolled Iraq as the embodiment of all
that was antithetical to the Islam. The defense of Islam, by political implication, became the
defense o f the theocratic regime. Over time, with its mobilizational potential fully tapped, the
war was widely recognized as a "blessing" for the theocrats. This recognition manifested itself
in the determination to prosecute the war for a seemingly indefinite length of time.
"War, war
until victory" became the determined cry o f the clergy.
7 Mohscn M . Milani, The Making o f Iran 's Islamic Revolution. From Monarchy to Islamic Republic,
(Westview Press, 1988), pp. 285-286.
353
The War a n d B an i-S a d rs Decline:
T h e relationship between the war and the process o f clerical consolidation was
multifaceted. In the initial months o f the war the war intensified the conflict between the
liberal wing and radical clerical wings of th e post-revolutionary power configuration. Although
the continuing decline of the "liberals" was the political corollary o f clerical ascendency in Iran,
the war offered a chance for the liberals to bid fo r greater control. A t the time o f the Iraqi
invasion th e political struggle between the radical clergy and the liberals had manifested itself
primarily in a struggle between newly-elected Iranian President Abolhasson Bani-Sadr and the
radical clerics strategically located throughout the various organs o f government.
Bani-Sadr
received Ayatollah Khomeinis endorsement in his bid for Irans first presidency.
His first
appearance with the revolutionary opposition was as Khomeinis advisor in Paris. Although
Bani-Sadr was an extremely religious man (his father was an Ayatollah and close associate of
Khomeini), his political views contrasted sharply with those o f the radical clerics.
Bani-Sadr
emphasized the democratic nature o f the new state and privilege personal freedom, views that
gave him more affinity with the liberal camp. In January o f 1980, he secured a resounding
victory in th e presidential elections, garnering more that seventy-five percent of th e votes cast.
It was clear that Bani-Sadr attached considerable importance to the presidential office
in Iran, although he lacked an independent power base o f his own. Real political control still
lay with the radical clerics, especially through their command of the revolutionary institutions.
Subsequent elections to the Majlis gave the Islamic Republican Party political control within
the official state apparatus, which thus recreated the broadei ideological conflict between BaniSadr and th e radical clerics within th e institutions of the new Iranian Republic. T h e conflict
belw'oen Bani-Sadr and the radical clerics, led by Beheshti and the IR P , reflected the
354
rudimentary conflict between the liberal-technocratic approach to governance and the Islamic
fundamentalist or maktabi orientation. In accordance with his view of the democratic nature
of th e new republic, Bani-Sadr sought to significantly reduce the influence o f the clergy and
subordinate the revolutionary institutions to the executive,legislative apparatus." This conflict
immediately manifested itself in the struggle between the IR P and Bani-Sadr for the right to
nominate the Prime Minister. Bani-Sadrs first three nominations were rejected by the IR P .
Bani-Sadr was forced to capitulate with the choice of Rajai, and publicly voiced reservations
about his administrative competency. Subsequent struggles over the composition o f the
cabinet (where the president exercised veto power) continued to reveal the growing strains
between the Bani-Sadr and the IR P . A frustrated Bani-Sadr ventured to attack the IR P
publicly by declaring that they were trying to monopolize the revolution and exercise "despotic"
control over the government.
Iraq s invasion o f Iran initially boosted Bani-Sadrs struggle against the IR P . The
conflicts between both camps momentarily resided in the face of th e Iraqi invasion. The
presidents visibility was greatly enhanced through his role as Commander in Chief o f Irans
forces. As Shaul Bakhash summarizes:
The front provided an escape from the frictions and frustrations, from "that
poisoned atmosphere and those barren conflicts," o f the capital. It allowed BaniSadr to give priority to the war effort ... It also made for excellent public relations.
Newspapers photographs often depicted the president in army fatigues, peering
down gunsights, sharing a humble tray of rice with the troops, or touring the battle
zone from the rumble scat of a motorcycle, his arms wrapped tightly around the
waist of the driver and, except for a bristling black mustache, his face lost beneath
8 One o f the most thorough accounts of the struggle between Bani-Sadr and the clerics may be
found in Shaul Bakhash, The Reign o f the Ayatollahs. Iran and the Islamic Resolution, (Basic Books,
1984), chapters 5 and 6 . Detailed accounts may also be found in Middle East Contemporary Survey
v. 4., pp. 461-464, v. 5, pp. 523-536.
355
a ficrcc-looking pith helmet.
"For Bani-Sadr," as Robin Wright summarizes, "the war was almost a blessing." 10 These initial
benefits, however, could not be turned into permanent gains for the president. O n the whole,
the war intensified the conflicts between both sides of the struggle, and ultimately accelerated
the removal o f Bani-Sadr. To begin with, the war created the issue o f who should have
control over war policy. Members of the Majlis and the President engaged in a separate battle
for authority over war policy, and the dispute was a t least partially responsible for the fact that
Iran failed to present its case in the U N deliberations on the war while Bani-Sadr was still in
power. In his capacity as supreme commander over the armed forces, Bani-Sadr began
spending most of his time at the front. Bani-Sadr believed from the outset that the bulk o f the
war should be prosecuted by the military (rather than the Revolutionaiy Guards) and that
appropriate military training should be the primaiy consideration. As Bani-Sadr spent
increasing amounts o f lime with the military (even moving to Khuzestan) suspicion grew
among the clerics that he was cultivating an independent base o f support for his broader
political cause. From the perspective o f the clerics, the military was still unproven and
remained a potential counterrevolutionary force. This threat was thus compounded as their
main political rival forged stronger ties with the military. These clerical suspicions were well-
Bakhash, pp. 130-131.
10 Robin Wright, In the Name o f God. The Khomeini Decade, (Simon and Schuster, 1989), p. 93,
my emphasis.
" It has been argued that Bani-Sadr could have used the war to his advantage but failed to do so.
Sec Sharif Arani, "The Toppling o f Bani-Sadr," The Nation 233:1 (July 4, 1981), pp. 9-12.
See discussion in Waheed-u/ Zaman, Iranian Revolution: A Profile, (Islamabad: Institute of
Policy Studies, 1985), pp. 258-260.
356
summarized by Eric Rouleau during Bani Sadrs ousting: "Some IR P leaders are wondering
why Bani-Sadr is assiduously courting the military, why he is spending most o f his tim e at the
armed forces headquarters, why he is making constant tours o f the various fronts and the
officers mess, and why he has nothing but extravagant praise for the army. The head of state,
they concede, is commander-in-chief o f the armed forces, but does he have nothing else to
d o ? " 13 The clerics actively sought to preclude this possibility by directing military operations
whenever possible and obstructing Bani-Sadrs ability to direct military operations. These
conflicts became clear with the publication o f Bani-Sadrs letter to Khomeini in which he
accused the cabinet o f "running the army" and of "putting obstacles in the path o f the
Com m ander-in-Chief, in the middle of a raging war". Ultimately, Bani-Sadr claimed that the
cabinet was "more disastrous than the war" and urged for their dismissal."
Predictably, the clerics positively used tê w ar to further their cause and marginalize
Bani-Sadr. State radio and television, controlled by IRP supporters, tended to focus upon the
achievements o f the Revolutionary Guards at the expense of the military and Bani-Sadr. IR P
leaders repeatedly voiced strong criticism of Bani-Sadrs handling of the war. Bani-Sadr
undoubtedly felt pressured to launch a counter-offensive against Iraq, and when it failed early
in 1981, new fodder was added to the clerical assault. The presidents absence from Tehran,
moreover, provided the clerics w ith unique opportunities to drive wedges between Khomeini
and Bani-Sadr." Bani-Sadr attempted to fight back against the clerical onslaught. O ne o f his
most frequently employed tools was his regular newspaper column entitled "The Presidents
13 Eric Rouleau, "The W ar and the Struggle for the State," M E R IP Reports no. 98 (July-August,
1981), p. 5.
14 See David Mcnasheris discussion o f Bani-Sadrs letter in Middle East Contemporary Survey v.
5, p. 524.
" Sec discussion in Scpehr Zabih, Iran Since the Revolution, (Croom Helm, 1982), p. 128.
357
Diary". In the column Bani-Sadr addressed topics from Erich Fromm to his war plans. 16
Bani-Sadr also frequently resorted to attacking the clerics in public speeches. The growing
confrontation between Bani-Sadr and the radical clerics prompted Khomeini to urge both
parties to bury their differences in the overall interests o f the revolution.
The beginning o f the end for Bani-Sadr could be traced to his public address on March
5, 1981. The occasion turned into a clash between supporters o f the president and supporters
of the IR P . Bani-Sadrs attack upon the radical clergy was greeted with an equally vitriolic
response by the clergy. The different opposition parties, still stinging from the election process
to the first Majlis, threw their support behind Bani-Sadr. Increasingly, the conflict resembled a
struggle between most elements of the revolutionary opposition w rit large and the radical
clergy. As the struggle intensified, a three-man committee was formed to find a way of
resolving the dispute. In its report issued on June 1, 1981, the committee found that BaniSadr had unnecessarily inflamed the political dispute. As the battle intensified, Bani-Sadr went
underground. On the 21st of June the Majlis declared that the president was incapable o f
fulfilling his duties.
W ith the removal of Bani-Sadr from the political block, power was fully concentrated
in the hands o f the radical clerics. His removal merely confirmed a trend in evidence since the
formation o f the Provisional Revolutionary Government (P R G ) in 1979. During the course of
the first two years of the revolution, that is, liberal political elements wielded nominal authority
by virtue o f their presence within executive and legislative organs o f the state. T heir presence
created an illusion of political pluralism, one undoubtedly useful to Khomeini and the clerics.
De facto political power, however, was increasingly accumulating in the hands o f the 'ulema.
W ith the ousting of Bani-Sadr apparent and real power merged in the hands o f the radical
16
See discussion in Bakhash, Reign of the Ayatollahs, pp. 131-133.

358
clerics. Subsequent presidential elections put the clerics firmly in control of the executive,
legislative and judicial branches o f government. Combined with their control over
revolutionary institutions, the clerics had gone a long way towards commandeering the
revolution.
T h e war with Iraq greatly assisted the clerics in their bid for total control o f the
revolution. The war intensified the conflict between Bani-Sadr and the clerics, and hastened
its resolution in favour o f the latter. Beyond this element, however, at least three related
dynamics were unfolding that linked the war and clerical consolidation. First, the war lent
itself perfectly to the populist strategy o f the clerics. Second, it provided a blanket like pretext
for the elimination o f any remaining opposition. Third, the war created an opportunity for the
growth and extension o f revolutionary organisations. Each dynamic greatly contributed to the
consolidation o f clerical power throughout the 1980s. Ultimately, the war was so valuable to
the radical clerics that they refused to seriously entertain efforts to end it. A closer
examination of each o f these dynamics is helpful.
The War as an Islamic Cause:
Th e manner in which the clerics characterised the Iran-Iraq war assisted them in
consolidating power. The war entered into the broader theocratic-populist discourse. The
clerics shrewdly presented the war in terms of the broader struggle of Islam. The war thus
served to sustain revolutionary fervour and political mobilisation as the clerics cemented their
hold on the revolution. Shortly after the war broke out Imam Khomeini characterised the
battle as a war between "the glorious Koran and the pagans" . ' 1 In the words o f Iranian
17
Tehran Domestic Service, September 24, 1980, FBIS. Daily Reports, September 25, 1980.
359
President Khamenii the battle with Iraq was "a tug of war between Islam and blasphemy." 18
T h e Ba'th regime was described as "enemies of Islam and the Koran ." 19 The atheistic
character o f Saddam Hussein was beyond question: "The infidel Saddam commits these
monstrous acts to prove that he does not believe in Islam and humanity ." 20 The Iranian
nation was continuing the centuries old struggle o f Islam:
The difference between us and them is that our motivation is Islam. Those who
from the early days of Islam have served Islam and have fought and have shown
self-sacrifice arc recorded in history. The holy prophet faced many more hardships
than we have. For many months, for many years, he was imprisoned and
confined... Nevertheless, he resisted and had to resist; and the Iranian nation will
resist and has to resist. 21
T h e choice was simply between Islam and glory or abysmal defeat and failure: "O you great
Islamic nation, you arc now at a two-way junction: The road to eternal happiness and honour
under the most honourable shadow o f jihad for God and the defense o f the Islamic nation or
the road to abjeclness and eternal shame should you, God forbid, show laxness and coolness in
this jihad."22 On other occasions the character o f the war as a jih a d was elaborated:"... war
means aggression against other countries to obtain their resources and wealth... jihad, in its
Islamic context means defending ones freedom, border, honour, Islam and the Koran, and
18
Tehran IR N A , January
19
Tehran Domestic Service, October 16, 1980, FBIS: Daily Reports, October 20, 1980.
, 1985, FBIS: Daily Reports, January 9, 1985.
Prime Minister Raja'i, Tehran International Service, April 2, 1981, FBIS: Daily Reports, April
2, 1981.
20
21 Ayatollah Khomeini Address to Iranian Nation, Tehran Domestic Service, September 30,1980,
FBIS: Daily Reports, October 1, 1980.
22 Ayatollah Khomeini, Tehran Domestic Service, October 19,1980, FBIS: Daily Reports, October
20. 1980.
360
helping the oppressed and crushing the oppressors."1' T h e drive into Iraqi territory was
explained and justified in similar terms: "From the outset, our war began in a defensive
manner; it is still a defensive one so far. The reason being that even our crossing into Iraqi
soil was an extension of our holy defense." 11
T h e ulema, moreover, were presented as integral to the Islamic struggle: "The mosque
is Islams trench and the mosque altar is the place for war."1' Iranian success in the face o f
overwhelming odds, according to the regime, was directly due to the nations struggle for Islam
and the leadership o f the clerics:"... were it not for divine assistance and for His special
blessings, we would have never possessed the strength to withstand a satanic regime armed to
the teeth... In this unequal war, despite all the weapons and unlimited assistance of the East,
W est and the region to Iraq, it succeeded in achieving so many amazing successes for Islam
and Iran . " 26
T h e characterisation of the war in terms o f Islam and defense o f the revolution was
often held out as one of the primary reasons that Iran could not accept the Iraqi offers loi a
ceasefire:
Saddam docs not believe in even a single tenet of Islam and we want to defend it.
Saddam is carrying out atrocities against his own nation, a Muslim nation that is
asking us for help. We want to defend them. We did not attack, we are on the
defensive now too. Are you expecting us to shake hands in friendship with a
23 Tehran Domestic Service, February 5, 1985, FBIS: Daily Reports, February
, 1985.
President Khamcnci, Tehran Domestic Service, September 22, 1986, FBIS: Daily Reports,
September 22, 1986.
24
Ayatollah Khomeini, Tehran Domestic Service, November 18, 1980, FBIS: Daily Reports,
November 19, 1980.
25
26 Khomeini address to nation, Tehran Domestic Service, February 11, 1983, FBIS: Daily Reports,
February 15, 1983.
361
person who would crush Islam under his feet and would destroy it if he had the
power? You want us to sit with him and wish him health and peace? What sort
of logic is this? Is this the logic of Islam? Do you ... believe that this is the logic
of Islam? May God correct you, God willing .27
Earlier in the war the same rationale was clear: "How can we reconcile? And with whom?
This is most ridiculous. It is like someone telling the prophet to reconcile with Abu Jahl
(Quraishi infidel is early Islamic writing)."2* Similarly: "There is no way we can compromise
with these people, because we have one aim and that is Islam. O ur entire nation wants Islam.
Saddams aim is an anti-Islamic one. It is impossible for Islam to compromise with its
opponents . " 29
T h e Islamic portrayal o f the war was reinforced by the theme of martyrdom. The
theme of martyrdom appeared at the outset of the war: "No doubt, all of the resistance, arising
from pure hearts committed to Islam, stem from the mentality o f martyrdom which continues
growing in the Muslim nation." The Islamic victory would be a victory "of blood over the
sword and "faith over arms" .'0 As Khomeini stressed during the third week of the w a r:"... if
war is imposed upon us, everyone in our nation becomes a fighter and we encounter with
everything in our power even if all the superpowers are behind it [Iraq]. This is so because we
regard martyrdom as a great blessing, and our nation also welcomes martyrdom with open
27
Tehran Domestic Service, April 19, 1985, FBIS: Daily Repons, April 20, 1985.
2K Tehran International Service, 28 October. 1980, FBIS: Daily Reports, October 28, 1980.
29 Ayatollah Khomeinis Id Ghadir Address, Tehran Domestic Service, October 28,1980, FBIS:
Daily Reports, October 29, 1980.
10 Office of the Prime Minister, Tehran Domestic Service, October 4, 1980, FBIS: Daily Reports,
October 6 , 1980.
362
arms.'*1 Death in Iran s struggle against Iraq acquired etherial qualities:
Think about the fact that the best o f the people at his own time. His Holiness the
Lord of the Martyrs [Imam Husayn], peace be upon him, and the best youths of
Bani-Hashim [the tribe o f the Prophet and Imam Husayn], and his best followers
were martyred, leaving this world through martyrdom. Yet when the family of
Imam Husayn was taken to the evil presence of Yazid [the Ummayid ruler in
whose time Imam Husayn was killed], Her Holiness Zcynab [Imam Husayns
sister] peace be upon her, swore saying: "What we experienced was nothing but
beautiful. The departure of a perfect person, the martyrdom o f a perfect person is
beautiful in the eyes o f the saints o f God - not because they have fought and been
killed, but because their war has been for the sake of god, because their uprising
has been for the sake o f God." Regarding martyrdom as a great blessing is not
because they are killed. People on the other side also get killed. Their blessing is
due to the fact that their motivation is Islam. 32
Martyrdom was held out to the population as a blessed sacrifice. Commenting on fallen
soldiers at the outset o f the war Khomeini elaimed that "they have been sacrificed for Islam,
and they have achieved eternal martyrdom and permanent honour thanks to His boundless
blessings."33
The war was presented in a manner that created a strong sense of continuity with the
past, and in a way that pitched the current battle as part of a centuries old campaign to defend
Islam. The war was clearly linked to past Islamic struggles: "You should not fear war. Th e
most blessed prophet has waged war for the sake o f Islam. His holiness amir [Imam A li, the
first imam o f the Shiites) has waged war for the sake o f Islam. There were several wars in the
31
32 Khomeinis address on eighth anniversary o f revolution, Tehran Domestic Service, February

10, 1987, FBIS: Daily Reports, February 11, 1987.
33
363
course o f a few years during the early days o f Islam."3' Martyrdom was predictably traced
back to the beginning o f Islam:
This anniversary coincides with the anniversary of the martyrdom of the most
noble martyr Husayn ibn Ali, Gods peace be upon him. H e taught us to be
neither subservient nor obsequious to those who perpetrate injustice. He recorded
in his pure blood, and in the blood of his scion and companions in Karbala, the
lessons of resistance, steadfastness, and sacrifice. These lessons map out, for the
generations to come, the road o f dignity, freedom, and pride. Our defensive
resistance to the unjust war which is being imposed on us receives its profundity
from the blood o f martyrs for Islam, foremost of whom is the most noble martyr,
Husayn ibn Ali, Gods peace be upon him .33
Khomeinis address to the families of killed Iranian soldiers clearly reveals a similar tendency:
"You people in the west and south ... have stood against the oppressors and those who are
attacking Islam and have offered martyrs like the martyrs in the early days o f Islam . " 34
The war easily played into the wider theocratic-populist discourse. It followed, for
example, that since the clerics saw the Iranian revolution as an Islamic revolution, the war also
had a clear counterrevolutionary quality to it.
In the words of Ayatollah Beheshti: "... we are
preparing ourselves for a protracted struggle against ... the Islamic revolution ." 37 Similar
depictions emanated from the Foreign Ministry: "The war imposed on Iran was not planned by
the Saddam regime. H e is only a tool for implementing it. Behind his stand the enemies o f
the Islamic Revolution o f Iran, who w ant to destroy our popular regime and our revolutionary
11
Ayatollah Khomeini, Tehran Domestic Service, November 3, 1980, FBIS: Daily Reports,
November 4, L980.
M President Khamcniis Friday Sermon at Tehran University, Tehran International Service,

September 27, 1985, FBIS: Daily Reports, September 27, 1985.
34
37
Tehran International Service, October 2, 1980, FBIS: Daily Reports, October 2, 1980.
364
model."38
Similarly, the war provided crude confirmation o f the xenophobic motifs o f the
theocratic-populist discourse. According to Bchcshti:"... the Ba'thist government servos as
representative and agent for this superpower [the United States] in the area ." ' 0
On other
occasions the themes of world conspiracy and the struggle for Islam merged: "When the
nation and the leadership arc confronting... the satanic and puppet regime, all the promises o f
the Koran avow to the victory of that nation . " 10 Ayatollah Khomeini pithily described Saddam
Hussein as "this wretched servant" o f the United States." Saddam had fallen into the trap o f
"deceit practised by its instigators. " 2 Iran had stood fast in the face of "world-devourers and
their dependent lackeys. . . " 3
T h e clerical presentation o f the war undoubtedly contributed to the mobilization effort
o f the regime in two manners. First, it created a large pool o f volunteers lor the front. In
1985 Heshemi-Rafsanjani held out the appeal o f martyrdom as the primary reason for Irans
wartime success: "The fact that there are still so many volunteers so long after the war has
started shows that not only are the people not tired but that fighting the enemy and
38 Foreign Ministry Statement, Tehran International Service, December 11, 1980, FBIS. Daily
Reports, December 12, 1980.
39
Tehran International Service, October 2, 1980, FBIS: Daily Reports, October 2, 1980.
Heshemi-Rafsanjani, Tehran Domestic Service, October 28, 1980, FBIS. Daily Reports, October
29, 1980.
40
41
Ayatollah Khomeini, Tehran Domestic Service, November 3, 1980, FBIS. Daily Reports,
November 4, 1980.
42
Ayatollah Khomeini, Tehran Domestic Service, April 1, 1981, FBIS: Daily Reports, April 2,
1981.
43
365
martyrdom had become sweeter form them.'"-' On another occasion Islam writ large was
presented as the simple force successful mobilization at the front: "A great many countries
claim that they can mobilize the people, but wc have not witnessed such a situation in the
world whereby the movement and mobilization for participating in the front can be carried out
as a religious canonical duty. Indeed, such a method of dispatching forces to the fronts is
unprecedented in history. ' " 5
In a second sense, the presentation o f the war had sustained revolutionary fervour. It
kept the population politically mobilized against counterrevolutionary forces. It reinforced the
Islamic nature of the revolution, and reaffirmed clerical leadership. It created unity and a
sense o f focus that eased the way for clerical concretization of power. Clerical glee at the
effect o f the war sometimes could not be contained: "Even when a war begins, our nation
begins to be awakened, becomes more mobilized, and you should know that as a result o f this
imposed war on Iran, the war which has been launched by the people who betrayed Islam, the
archopponents of our Islam, Iran has been united. What other event could unite our people
to such an extent? This war has mobilized o u r people." 46
The War and the Elimination of Internal Opposition:
The clerics were also able to enlist the war in their efforts to remove all internal
opposition. Speaking in 1985, Iranian President Khamanic claimed that the war was the first
" Tehran Domestic Service, January 9,1985, FBIS: Daily Reports, January 9,1985.
" President Khameni'i, Tehran Domestic Service, February 17, 1984, FBIS: Daily Reports,
February 17, 1984.
4* Khomeini's address to the clergy on the eve o f the month of Muharram, Tehran Domestic
Service, November 5, 1980, FBIS: Daily Reports, November 6 , 1980.
366
strike in the conspiratorial activities of the "liberals and enemies o f the Islamic revolution.
The opposition, according to Khamanci. had tried to used the war to throw the revolution into
a "position o f defeat . " ' 7 Predictably, the exigencies of the war were used as a blanket like
pretext to marginalize all internal opposition. "The war with Iraq." writes Tahmooies Sarr.tf.
"had from its initial stages created a condition of emergency for the regime which was used to
full advantage to justify aggressive moves against all opponents."* In a rhetorical universe
where all internal opposition was considered mercenary and automatically linked to foreign
elements, the war made these alleged linkages appear all the more tangible: "W ith a war raging
along 300 miles o f its border with Iraq, the government convincingly labelled those creating
disorder at home as unpatriotic agents o f Iraq.'"' "On the pretext o f a war emergency,"
Mohsen M ilani baldly confirms, "the government increased its repression o f dissidents."'"
W ith the elimination of Bani-Sadr the liberal opposition suffered a final blow. Cleiieal
entrenchment was extensive. The clerics controlled the main branches o f government. W ithin
the legislative apparatus clerical control was assured by institutional changes such as the
establishment o f a clerical body known as the Sintra (Council of Guardians ) . ' 1 The clerics
also controlled the revolutionary organizations, such as the Komilehs, that functioned astride
the official state apparatus. The clerics were also the only body capable of mobilizing the
population on a massive scale. T h e war, moreover, had helped to created a sense o f solidarity
47
Tehran IR N A , January 5, 1985, FBIS: Daily Reports, January 7, 1985.
48
Tahmoorcs Sarraf, Cry o f a Nation. The Saga o f the Iranian Revolution, (P. Lang, 1990), p. 180.
49
D ilip Hiro, Iran Under the Ayatollahs, p. 220.
so Mohsen M . M ilani, The Making of Iran's Islamic Revolution. From Monarchy to Islamic Republic,
p. 287.
M See discussion o f this body in the context of economic policy divisions within the regime in Fred
Halliday, "Year IV o f the Islamic Republic," M E R IP Reports (1983), p. 4.
367
among the clergy, a factor that further strengthened their position vis it vis opposition forces.
The opposition was shunted to the periphery o f the social and political system, and the war
figured prominently in this trend. In the spring of 1981, for example, five non-clerical
newspapers were closed down under the pretext that they had been "printing provocative
materials during the time o f war ." 52
As the repression o f the regime accelerated, opposition forces operated less and less in
the open. Their activities, in view of this fact, increasingly manifested themselves in terms o f
sporadic, hit-and-run attacks against members o f the clerical regime or its institutions. The
most dramatic attack was against members o f the IR P as they gathered for a meeting on the
evening o f June 28, 1981, just days after the fall of Bani-Sadr. A powerful blast ripped
through IR P headquarters, killing more than seventy party members including Beheshti.
Bombings and attacks continued over the summer. O n August 30, 1981, newly elected
President Rajai and newly appointed Prime Minister Javad Bahonar were killed in the bombing
o f the Prime M inisters office. Throughout the remainder o f the war attacks by groups
operating at the margins o f the political system continued, although none achieved the profile
o f the initial Hurry.
The theocrats attributed many o f the attacks to the Mujahedin (th e Islamic Mujahedin
as opposed to their secular counterparts, the Marxist Mujahedin, which later became Paykar).
The Mujahedin were heavily influenced by the writings of Shariali and had generated a wide
following among Ira n s youth. Their leader, Mas'ud Rajavi, escaped to France on the same
covert night as Bani-Sadr. As the radical clergy consolidated their grip on power, the
52
Waheed-U/.-Zaman, Iranian Revolution: A Profile, p. 284.

368
Mujahedin stepped up its opposition/' Once the Mujahedin had been implicated in the
initial round o f attacks, the clerics retaliated with ferocity. Over the year following the blast at
IR P headquarters, thousands of Mujahdin supports were killed and imprisoned. As 1982 drew
to a close the operational capacity of the Mujahidin had been severely weakened. The bulk o f
its leading figures inside Iran had either been incarcerated or killed, and disillusionment had
set in within the rank and file. Many o f its members had appeared on television to repudiate
the M ujahedin and denounce its leader. Many of its members lived in exile. The Mujahedin
had essentially been driven underground/' The war had clearly exacerbated the fate of the
Mujahedin:
During the height o f the Mujahedin uprising, Iraq still occupied approximately
one-third o f Khuzistan province, including the important city o f Khorramshar, the
city Abadan was besieged and in danger of being captured; and the cities of Ahvas
and Dizful were in range o f Iraqi artillery guns. Thus, the Mujahedins assault
upon the government coincided with a grim phase of the war. This made it easy
for the IRP to portray the Mujahedin as traitors and agents o f foreign enemies at
a time when popular anger against Iraq was high/ 5
The demise o f the Mujahedin, especially public toleration of the ferocious clerical onslaught
against it, can be thus partially attributed to the war.
55 For an outline of the Mujahedin outlook see "We are an Islamic Movement separate from the
ruling oligarchy," in M E R IP Reports 10.3 (March-April, 1980), interview conducted by Fred Halliday.
51 See the discussion by David Menasheri in Middle East Contemporary Survey, v.5, pp. 537-8, v,
, p. 556, v. 7, pp. 535-536. Also see the chapter devoted to the Mujahedin in Tahmoores Sarraf, Cry
o f a Nation: The Saga o f the Iranian Revolution, pp. 178-196. For a critical assessment of the
Mujahedin see Afsaneh Najmabadi, "Mystifications of the Past and Illusions of the Future," in The
Iranian Revolution and the Islamic Republic, cds. Nikki R. Keddie and Eric Hooglund (Syracuse
University Press, 1986), pp. 154-156, and sec discussants remarks and general discussion, pp. 162 170.
6
55
Eric Hooglund, 'T h e G ulf War and the Islamic Republic," M E R IP Reports 14:6/7 (JulySeptember, 1984), p. 34.
369
1
Ax the ability of the Mujahedin to operate against the regime waned, the theocrats
turned their attention to the last remaining stream o f potential opposition to the regime: the
Tudeh Party. From the outset o f the revolution the Tudeh had offered its support to the
regime. Its main motive stemmed from the regimes staunch anti-imperialist posture and the
need to maintain a united front against counterrevolutionary elements. 56 W ith the ousting of
the liberals, the need to tolerate the secular left was gone. On July 18, 1982, the Tudeh
partys paper, Mardum, was banned because o f its "opposition" to Islamic principles. Towards
the end o f 1982 the Tudeh became the subject of harsh criticism by the Iranian media. T h e
Tudeh was conveniently painted as a political front for the Soviet Union at a time when antiSoviet sentiments were high because o f Soviet arms sales to Iraq. The theocrats also
apparently obtained a detailed list of Tudeh members, courtesy o f the British cabinet, following
the defection o f a KG B official from the Soviet Union. Beginning in February o f 1983 and
continuing into the spring, extensive operations were carried out against the upper echelons of
the Tudeh. Over the next year high ranking members o f the Tudeh were forced to appear on
television to confess to crimes committed by the party, and to extol the virtues o f Khomeini
and the clerical regime. On January 21, 1984, eighty-seven Tudeh party members were given
prison terms ranging from one year to life . 58 With the bulk of the Tudehs leadership
incarcerated the Tudeh was driven underground, and its effectiveness considerably
56 See Tudeh Party report entitled The Revolution, the Counterrevolution, and how we safegitard
the People's Gain, issued by the Central Committee of the Tudeh Party in Tehran, July 1979, reprinted
in As-Snfir, Beirut, July 13, 1979, reported in FB1S: Daily Reports, July 18, 1979.
57 See discussion in John Simpson, Behind Iranian Lines. Travels Through Revolutionary Ira n and
i,.; Persian Past, (Fontana, 1989), pp. 105-106.
58
Middle East Economic Digest, January 27, 1984.

370
emasculated. 59
M uch of the original opposition to the Shah quickly found itself in exile. The
extremely diverse exiled opposition included the royalists, who favoured a type o f constitutional
monarchy, and Marxist groups such as the Fedayi (minority faction). The largest exiled group
was lumped together under an umbrella organisation called the Council o f National
Resistance. T h e C N R was established a few months after the flight o f Bani-Sadr. It included
the M ujahedin, the National Front, Bani-Sadr and the Kurdish Democratic Party. In exile,
however, the opposition was beset by factionalism, personality clashes and lundamentally
different world views that significantly obstructed their ability to present a coherent and
sustained critique o f the regime."0 By 1984, fo. example, the C N R had fallen apart. Support
for these groups, moreover, continually weakened during the course o f the war, and the clerics
never lost th e opportunity to brand them as counterrevolutionaries in the service o f Iraq and
the United States.
In short, the political corollary of clerical consolidation o f power in Iran was the
progressive enfeeblement o f the opposition. Seven years tiller the grand coalition hud toppled
the monarchy the clerics stood alone at the apex o f the post-revolutionary totem. The
opposition was "divided and sterile" and "a growing helplessness became noticeable in their
ranks." 61 T h e war had played a prominent role in their demise. W riting in 1987, Eric
Hooglund lucidly summarized its effect upon the opposition as follows: "The war with Iraq is
the main Achilles heel o f the opposition. Attacks against the Islamic Republic permit the
w See discussions by David Menasheri in Middle East Contemporary Smvey v.

7, pp. 532-534, v. 8 , pp. 442-444, v. 9, pp. 440-441.
, pp. 555 556. v.
60
See breakdown o f expatriate opposition in Fred Halliday, "Year Three of the Iranian
Revolution," M E R IP Reports 12:3 (March-April, 1982), pp. 4-5.
61
David Menasheri, Middle East Contemporary Survey 10 (1986), p. 344.

371
government to paint the opposition fairly easily with the brush o f treason ." 62
The War and the Extension o f Clerical Control:
T h e war tended to strengthen those revolutionary organizations under clerical control.

The war also helped to extend clerical control over the traditional apparatus o f the Iranian
state. T h e war coincided with a thrcc-pronged policy by the regime to prevent the use o f the
military for counterrevolutionary purposes. This policy was partly inspired by two failed coup
attempts in the spring o f 1980. According to this policy:
1.
T h e pasdaran should be enlarged and trained for the dual task o f fighting Iraq
and maintaining internal security, but among other things, keeping check o n the
military;
2.
Organising a large number o f militia know as basiijis (mobilisation) which would

be under the control o f the pasdaran and serve in the War;
3.
T h e military should be fully Islamicised, enlarged and equipped to fight the

invading Iraqi forces. 63
W ith respect to the first goal the growth o f the pasdaran o r Revolutionary Guards continued
throughout the war. The expansion o f the revolutionary Guards created a countervailing
armed force against the traditional military. Prior to the w ar the pasdaran had served an
extremely useful function in monitoring and controlling rival elements o f the post-revolutionary
power bloc, and enforcing many o f the clerical decrees. By the conclusion o f the war w ith Iraq
63 Eric Hooglund, "Iran and the Gulf War," M E R IP Middle East Report 17:5 (September-October
1987), p. 17.
M E \ti acted from Sepehr Zabih, The Iranian Military in Revolution and War, (Routledge, 1988),
p. 128.
372
the pasdaran had swelled to over 1/4 million active troops/* 1 The establishment o f the
Ministry of Revolutionary Guards institutionalised this element of the theocracy. The second
goal was also achieved over the course of the war. The basijis (Mobilisation o f the
Oppressed) could at times reach one million volunteers.'' The ranks of both organisations,
moreover, tended to draw heavily among the young, urban poor and lower middle classes
which had the effect o f securing support for the regime/'*
A t the same time, the Islamicization o f the regular military was accelerated duiing the
war. In the first month o f the war the Ideological-Political Directorate o f the Armed Forces
(IP D ) was created in order to purge suspected opponents from the military and the police.
D ifferent branches o f the IPD aggressively indoctrinated the Ministry of Defense, the ground
forces, the A ir Force, Navy and General staff. As the war continued, the regimes confidence
in the regular forces was slowly restored. By the middle o f the war, for example, this growing
trust can be detected in Hashcmi-Ralsanjanis address on Army Day: "This is a most
remarkable event that has taken place in the Islamic Republic of Iran. A n army on which
world and regional arrogance and the shahs regime had pinned its hopes as the guardian o f
the interests o f arrogance and the policemen for the interests o f regional reaction has, with
todays developments, been transformed into the policemen o f Islam and the interests of the
deprived ." 67
The expansion o f revolutionary organizations on the military level was complemented
61
From The Military Balance, 1987-88, p. 99.
65
Ibid.
66 See discussion of Pasdaran and state ministries in Halliday, "Year IV o f the Islamic Republic,"
op. cil., p. 7 and especially note 10.
67
373
by growth of civilian organizations. The civilian counterpart to the pasdaran - the Jahad-e
Sazandeghi or Reconstruction Crusade - was another popular organization commandeered
early by the IR P in order to concretize rural support for the regime .68 Broadly designed to
promote rural development, its function continually expanded throughout the war, especially in
areas heavily damaged by fighting. War-damage also provided the opportunity for the
continual expansion o f regime-directed organizations including the Housing Foundation and
the Foundation for the Affairs of the W ar Immigrants. 60 In conjunction with the popular
revolutionary bodies, especially the Komitehs, these organizations are involved in the
reconstruction o f war-torn areas. Their efforts were overseen by the Central Headquarters for
Renovation and Reconstruction of the War-Damaged Regional. Other civilian measures had
the effect o f extending the influence of the clergy. Ration cards, for example, were distributed
by the local mosques, which thus place the clergy at the centre o f the nation-wide distribution
network. "The mosques," notes Milani, "thus became a powerful economic and political force
at the community level. " 70
The War and the Mostaz'efm:
During the difficult period o f regime consolidation and rudimentary conflict, the war
provided the regime with an excuse for the slow pace of economic reform. The revolutionary
',s See Emad Ferdows, "The Reconst: ection Crusade and Class Conflict in Iran," M E R IP Reports
13:3 (March-April 1983).
60 This discussion is indebted to Hooshang Amirahmadi, "War Damage and Reconstruction in the
Islamic Republic of Iran," in Post-Revolutionary Iran, eds. Hooshang Amirahmadi and Manoucher
Parvin (Wcslview Press, 1988), especially pp. 142-146
70
Sec discussion in Mohsen M . Milani, op. cit., quote from p. 287.

374
promises of a better life for the mostazefin (dispossessed), which form one o f the primary
social bases o f the radical clerics, remained unfulfilled throughout the war. Much o f this
condition reflected the rudimentary conflict between clerics who advocated radical economic
reforms, especially the massive redistribution of land, and those conservative clerics that
favoured the economic status quo, and who stressed Islams sanction o f private property.7'
r reaching reform measures with respect to the nationalization of foreign trade, land telbim
and the distribution of exiles property were vetoed by the Council o f Guardians (contioiled by
the conservative clergy) . 72 In other words, basic conflict between the reform-minded and the
conservative clergy effectively stalled any meaningful changes of behalf of the destitute Iranian
masses.7' By the end o f the decade these conflicts had failed to resolve themselves, and signs
were emerging that each fraction among the clerics was cultivating a new social base.7'
The war with Iraq provided both a powerful argument for lowering expectations among
Irans poor, and a convenient excuse as to why their condition had not improved.
Regardless
o f the underlying socio-political reasons that lead to the impasse on socio-economic reforms,
The best discussion of this tension during the initial phase of clerical consolidation may be
found in Hossein Bashiriyeh, The Slate and Revolution in Iran. 1962-1982, (Croom Helm, 1984), pp
111-185.
71
n For a discussion o f the different factions among the clergy and the role of the Council o f
Guardians see Dilip Hiro, op. cit., pp. 240-250.
77 On the manner in which this conflict manifested itself with respect to land reform throughout
the war period see Shaul Bakhash, "The Politics of Land, Law, and Social Justice in Iran," in Iran's
Revolution: The Search fo r Consensus, ed. R. K. Ramazani (Indiana University Press, 1990).
14 The conservative camp had support among the traditional capital of the ba/aar, landowners,
and the modern bourgeoisie, the radicals receive support from the urban poor and the peasantry, and
the moderates (including Rafsanjani) garner support among the modern middle class. See Ahmad
Ashraf, "There is a Feeling that the Regime Owes Something to the People," in M ERIP. Middle East
Report 19:1 (January-February, 1989), pp. 13-18.
375
ihc war could be held out as the primary factor behind the problems. 75 The following excerpt
from Mana.sheris detailed account o f Iranian politics from the middle o f the decade reveals
this connection:
The revolution had not yet cased the burdens of the mostaz'efm. For Khomeinis
regime, which pledged to serve the mostaz'efm, this was not only frustrating but
also potentially dangerous.... Responding to these problems, Khomeini occasionally
instructed the Government to mitigate the burden o f the mostazefin. At the same
time, he set out to explain, or explain away, the economic problems, presenting
hardship as the price that loyal believers should pay in their struggle for Islam and
the revolution. Similarly, he tried to lower material expectations, urging the
mostaz'efm not to expect quick gains and advising them against consumerism. 76
As the Islamic revolution entered the Thermidor, therefore, the war proved an invaluable
excuse for the continued plight of Iran s poor. This dynamic allowed the clerics to avoid
alienating one of their primary bases o f support.
Propulsion o f the Clencal Political Project:
The war entered into the process of revolutionary consolidation in Iran. In general, it
assisted the accession o f the radical clerics to power and the marginalization of opposition
forces including the liberals, the radical left and the Islamic left. Free from the fetters o f
legitimate dissension and critique, the clerics were thus able to implement their political
project. In practice, this meant the thorough desecularization or Islamicization o f Iranian
society. T h e prosecution of the war, therefore, had a direct bearing on the broad policy
71 See discussion in Fred Halliday, "The Revolutions First Decade, in M E R IP Middle East Report
19:1 (January-February 1989), pp. 19-20.
76
Middle East Contemporary Sutvey 9 (1984-1985), pp. 441-442.

376
directions o f post-revolutionary Iran. In particular, the political project o f the regime has
'
resulted in a loss o f social powerfor Irans subordinate
constituenciesincluding
women, the
working classes and the ethnic minorities. This indirect effect of the war, moreover, has often
been accompanied by a direct appeal to special wartime circumstances in order to further
clerical policy. It is valuable tobriefly address theeffects o f the war upon
constituencies.
each of these soci.il
The MuUocracy and Women:
T h e dcsccularizalion o f Iranian society went hand in hand with the reinforcement o f

oppressive conceptions o f gender in Iran. It is insufficient to paint the contrast between the
position o f women in pre-revolutionary Iran and the position of women in post-revolutionary
Iran as one between emancipation and reaction . 71 Although meaningful progress in the
wom ens struggle was made under the Phalavi monarchy, many o f the changes had a cosmetic
character and were top-heavy or state-heavy. In 1936 Reza Shah banned the veil and allowed
women to attend Tehran University. These successes were tempered by the fact that only a
relatively small group o f upper and upper-middle class women could abandon the veil safely
during the Phalavi monarchy. The banning o f the veil, moreover, was a directive on high and
did not stem from the genuine expression o f womens experience. Indeed, under Reza Shah
any independent organization was forbidden. Guily Nashats discussion o f Reza Shahs reforms
with respect to women elaborates this crucial point:
77 Some writings do speak glowingly o f changes under the Shah. For example, see Badr ul Moluk
Bamdad, From Darkness into Light: Women's emancipation in Iran, (Exposition Press, 1977).
377
... the force and repression that accompanied the enactment of his policies hurt the
cause of womens advance because it stifled the development o f a political culture
and experience among women. The fate o f the Patriotic W omens League
illustrates this point. The League was formed in 1922 by a group of women with
socialist tendencies who had been active in the Constitutional Revolution.... the
womens league was affiliated with the Socialist Party, which had resumed its
activities in the 1920s. Reza Shah used the various political groups at the
beginning of his rise to power to consolidate his hold over the political system.
However, once he had established firm control, he began to eliminate and disband
any groups with any semblance of independence. Although the aim o f the
Womens League was merely to "emphasize respect for the laws and rituals of
Islam, to promote the education and moral upbringing of girls, to encourage
national industries, to spread literacy among adult women, to provide care for
orphaned girls, etc.," it was not allowed to survive and was closed in 1932.78
This trend was partly reversed through the interregnum and into the Shahs reign. In
particular, there was a flowering o f womens organizations and groups including the Council o f
W omen o f Iran, the womens League o f Supporters o f the Declaration o f Hum an Rights and
the W om en Teachers Association. 79 The efforts o f these groups were instrumental in
ttchieving the reforms o f the 1960s. One o f the six primary features o f the Shahs White
Revolution was the extension of female suffrage. The passage o f the Family Protection Law o f
1967 marked another achievement for the womens movement. The 1967 law circumscribed
the unilateral prerogatives o f husbands regarding divorce and polygamy. 80 These legal
changes were complemented by a significant expansion in the educational opportunities for
women, and a much greater role fo r women in the growing Iranian economy .81
Guity Nashat, "Women in Pre-Revolutionary Iran: A Historical Overview," in Women and

Revolution in Iran, cd. Guily Nashat (Weslview Press, 1983), pp. 27-28.
18
79
Sec discussion in Bamdad, op. cit., pp. 105-112,
150 See discussion in Gholam-rc/a Vatandoust, "The Status o f Iranian Women During the Pahlavi
Regime," in Women and the Family in Iran, ed. Asghar Fathi (E. J. Brill, 1985), pp. 114-121.
81 See discussion in S. Kaveh Mirani, "Social and Economic Change in the Role o f Women: 19561978," in Nashat, op. cit., pp. 69-86.
378
T w o conclusions can be drawn with respect to the condition o f women under the
Phalavi monarchy. First, there was the development of a clear feminist consciousness among
Iranian women .82 Secondly, there were some modest legal and social gains for women,
especially with the modernization drive o f the post-1953 period. Both o f these trends were
dramatically reversed in the post-revolutionary period. One of the primary forms of Iranian
desecularization was the fatva or religious decree. Through these measures women were
forced to observe the hejab which includes wearing the chador or veil in public. The 1967
Family protection Law was quickly suspended, and the theocrats replaced this with a system
that sanctions polygamy.8 One o f the most striking changes was the encouragement o f the
sigeh or m at'a practice of temporary marriages.8' According the this practice, a man could
take a w ife for as little as an evening. Critics of the practice have widely characterized it as a
form of legalized prostitution. As the following critique of the practice reveals, the regime
directly linked its promotion of mat'a with the prosecution of the war:
W hat motive, other than the satisfaction of lust, is there when a women fo r two
hours becomes sigeh of a man, or a man for one or two hours enters into a sigeh
contract with a woman? T h e difference here is that we camouflage such
corruption with Shariah. The justification that sigeh is an instrument to take care
o f extra women caused by the war is ill-founded. My question is, how many men
w ho died in war left their wives behind? I dont think there were many. Besides,
how is a sigeh arrangement, a temporary arrangement, a panacea for such
womens problems? 85
82 Sec discussion following on Adcle Ferdows, "Shariati and Khomeini on Women, in Kcddie and
Hooglund, op. cit., pp. 141.
83 See discussion in "Women, Marriage and State in Iran," in Women, State and Ideology, cd.
Haleh Afshan (State University o f New York Press, 1987).
8) See discussion in Shahla Haeri, "The Institution of M uta Marriage in Iran: A Formal and
Historical Perspective," in Nashat, op. cit., pp. 231-251.
85
Cited in Tahmoores Sarraf, op. cit., p. 126.

379
Legal changes have frequently been enforced by roving officers directly linked to the Komitchs
Women not wearing the chadour have often been dealt with very harshly by the authorities.
Understandably, observation o f the hejab almost became universal.
T h e theocratic regime has promoted a conception of women that relegates them to the
function o f family care and child rearing.8'1 The following exposition from one o f the leading
media organs of the regime is extremely revealing:
|
|
j
\
I
|
A women in the environment outside the family would lead to the propagation of
corruption and permissiveness, which itself would lead to the weakening of the
marriage bond and absence of warmth and cordiality within the family circle... The
women o f our society through their work inside the family and the fulfilment of
the essential duty of motherhood, teach their children the lesson of faith in god,
piety and sacrifice...87
!
i
!
In other words, women have been encouraged to preoccupy themselves with the "precious
function o f motherhood, rearing alert and active human beings." 88 This position has been
partly premised upon the belief that women are not physically or intellectually equipped to
deal with many social roles. The following interview between journalist John Simpson and
Mrs. Barzin Maknoun, a faculty member at Tehran University, and an Iranian official attached
to a literacy programme of UNESCO, reveals the extent of this view within the theocracy:
86 See discussion in Nira Yaval-Davis, "Women and Reproduction in Iran," in Women, Nation,
State, eds. Nira Yaval-Davis and Floya Anthias (St. Martins Press, 1989).
87 Keyhan International, February 5, 1987, cited in Hamid R. Kusha, Iran: The Problematic of
Women's Participation in a Male-Dominated Society, Sociology Department, University o f Kentucky,
Working Paper # 136, 1987.
88
Mohsen M . Milani, op. cit., p. 309.

380
Maknoun:
The things that concern women in Iran are often misunderstood, purposely so,
in the rest o f the world. It is our task here to show what Islam says about these
things, and about what the real Islamic women should be. You have to study
the Holy Koran, which shows that only Islam gives true rights to women - and
more rights to women than men. But women are not fit to have every kind of
responsibility. A women cannot become what Imam Khomeini is, for instance.
Simpson:
You mean that women arent the intellectual equals o f men?
Maknoun:
No, I dont mean that at all. What we believe is than men and women are
actually equal, but they theyre made differently. Men are stronger is some
things and women arc stronger in others. A woman can get as close to Allah as
a man can, but in a different way. A man can use his intellect to get there, and
a women will use her high emotions. But they are both equal in the sight of
God. You sec, there are big differences physically between men and women,
and these differences make it difficult for them to do the same things. A
woman can be a mother and care for a child, because o f her high emotions. A
man cannot do that. His duties arc to support his wife and his family, because
hes made that way.
The ideological links between the natural inferiority of women and the prevailing Islamic
definition of a womans role within society are clearly evident in the above excerpt.
Expectedly, there has been a growing practice of segregation, especially in public places.
Enrolment by women in higher education declined. 69 The theocratic sense of a womens
social function, combined with the turmoil of the war-stressed economy, greatly decreased
employment opportunities for women.90
Under the Islamic programme of the radical theocrats the social power of women has
appreciably slipped. The modest gains of the Phalavi era were erased. Autonomous womens
organizations have ceased to function in any meaningful political manner. Womens activity is
69 Sec Shahizad Mojab, The Islamic Governments Policy on Womens Access to Higher Education
and its Impact on the Socio-Economic Status of Women, Michigan State University, Working Paper #
156, 1987.
90 Sec Valentine Moghadam, Women, Work and Ideology in Post-revolutionaiy Iran, Michigan State
University, Working Paper # 170, 1988.
381
subordinated to the task of creating a better Islamic society, as defined by the fundamentalists.
Traditional conceptions o f women as corrupters of men, as naturally inferior beings, and as
:
i
male possessions have been reinforced throughout the post-revolutionary period. The war, by
assisting the clerics in their bid for total control of the revolution, and by providing them with
conditions - wartime exigencies - that could be used to justify almost anything, greatly
contributed to these deteriorating circumstances for women.
j-
Repression o f the Kurds:
In the aftermath of the revolution demands for regional autonomy and self rule quickly
'i
surfaced from among Irans numerous ethnic groups including the Baluchis, Arabs,
j
i
Azerbaijanis Turks, the Qashqai Turks, Turkomanis and the Kurds.fl' O f these ethnically
tinged struggles, the Kurdish resistance was by far the most vocal and aggressive. From the
outset the radical clerics adamantly refused to accept the demands that surfaced from Iran's
ethnic quarters. Among other things, such an acceptance was entirely inconsistent with the
basic theocratic premise of a unified Islamic nation. The stage for confrontation was quickly
set. T h e initial stages o f the war distracted the regimes attention and diverted their resources,
which gave the various ethnic groups space to acquire nominal de facto control o f their
affairs. 2 In the long run, this ephemeral benefit was greatly outweighed by the fact that the
war hardened the intolerance o f the theocratic regime against internal opposition,
91 For an interesting discussion in this respect see: Nikki R. Kcddie, "The Minorities Question
in Iran," in The Iran-lraq War: New Weapons, Old Conflicts, Shirin Tahir Kheli and Shaheen Ayubi,
eds. (Praeger, 1983).
92
See discussion by David Menasheri in Middle East Contemporary Survey 5 (1980-1981), pp. 552
554.
382
strengthened its security apparatus, threw a large section of the population firmly behind it,
especially throughout the central region, and frequently took Tehrans armed forces into the
ethnic zones, thereby greatly enhancing their administrative and military presence.
These effects were most visible in the case of the Kurdish struggle in the Western
region of the country. The Kurdish opposition has traditionally been lesser organized than
their counterparts in Iraq.9' In the aftermath of the revolution the Kurdish opposition
consolidated itself into two primary groups, the Komala and the Kurdish Democratic Party of
Iran (K D P I). Komala claims to be acting directly in the interests o f the Kurdish peasantry.
The K D P I, however, emerged as the stronger of the two. The post-revolutionary civil war in
Iran predates the Iran-Iraq war by more than a year. Prior to the war Tehran and the Kurdish
groups oscillated between periods of dialogue and periods of armed confrontation9' The
most violent encounters took place in the month of August 1979.
T h e K D P I managed to function as a de facto government in many areas of Kurdistan
by constructing roads, building houses, organizing schools and operating hospitals. Overall,
however, their power continually declined throughout the war. This can be partly attributed to
the fact the war further divided the Kurdish opposition, especially in view of the K D P Is
determination to battle Tehran regardless of the Iraqi invasion.95 By 1985 the Komala and
^ For a discussion of the Kurds in Iran see A. R. Ghassemlou, "Kurdistan in Iran," in People
Without a Country: The Kurds in Kurdistan, ed. Gerard Chaliand (Zed Books, 1980).
91 For the initial period of the Kurdish struggle in Iran after the revolution see Middle East
Contemporary Survey v. 3, 1978-1978, pp. 527-528, v. 4, 1979-1980, pp. 467-469, v. 5,1980-1981, pp.
554-556, v. 6 , 1981-1982, pp. 550-551, v. 7, 1982-1983, pp. 537-538.
95
See discussion by David Menasheri in Middle East Contemporary Survey 5 (1980-1981), pp. 554-
555.
383
1
\
I
?
{
the K D P I had declared war upon each other.11" In addition, Tehran did not hesitate to move
forces to the region whenever possible.1 From the outset of the w ar Iranian forces,
i
|
especially the Revolutionary Guards, fought intensely for control o f the towns and increasingly
limited Kurdish control to the mountain areas. T h e peshmergas were subject to similar
methods o f warfare as Iraq. The Kurdish homeland, moreover, became an integral front in the
war with Iraq. W ith Tehrans summer offensives of 1983, K D PI control was essentially
crushed. As the war progressed the Kurdish region became totally militarized.'*1 Although
the Kurdish opposition groups continued to operate throughout the course of the war, their
operational capacity and influence greatly declined.
As part o f their counter-insurgency campaign, the theocrats inflicted severe devastation
upon the Kurdish population. In an interview in 1988, KDPI leader Ghassemlou summarized
that the Iran-Iraq war had "caused the total ruin of Kurdistan
A report by a British
health official who visited Iranian Kurdistan during the war provides an indication of the
extent of the deterioration for the Kurds and the link to the war:
Overall, the war has caused a marked decrease in the provision of health care in
Iranian Kurdistan. There has been total disruption of certain services in the rural
96 See discussion in Martin van Bruincssen, "The Kurds Between Iran and Iraq," MERIP Middle
East Report 16:4 (July-August 1986), p. 22.
97 Accordingly, the claim by Charles G. MacDonald that "the Gulf war has occupied and drained
Khomeinis forces to such a degree that it limited Khomeinis ability to repress and defeat the
Kurds..." is overstated. See "The Impact of the Gulf War on the Kurds," in Middle East Contemporary
Survey 7 (1982-1983), p. 267.
98 According to one Kurdish figure, more that 200,000 soldiers stationed and 3,(XM) bases were set
up by the theocrats. Speech by Hassan Sharafi, General European Representative of the Kurdish
Democratic Party of Iran, Paris, October 15,1989.
99 Interview o f Dr. Ghassemlou with Ferdinand Hcnnerbichlerfor the Austrian Newspaper Wiener
Zeittmg, 1988.
384
areas for (he past three to four years, including immunization programmes and
vector control in those regions where malaria is endemic... The situation in the
towns is difficult to assess, but the fact they are under Iranian control acts as a
serious deterrent to people from the rural areas visiting them in order to attend
those health services which arc still functioning; for people actually fight in the war
|i.e the pcshmcrgas] such a visit is too dangerous to be considered. Thus, although
it is possible for some people living in the West of Kurdistan to obtain medical
care in Iraq (despite the high cost in terms of money and time) and for others to
visit the towns in Iran, in general the overall access to medical services and the
availability of health care has greatly declined as a result of the war.100
Throughout the war many Kurds were indiscriminately arrested and incarcerated. In the words
of one Kurd "Khomciny pense que tout le monde au Kurdistan, meme les chat el les chiens
sont mcmbres du P.D.K.I. ou du K O M A L A . " 101 Many political prisoners were routinely
tortured. 11,2 Thousands of Kurds were forcibly relocated. 102 Perhaps the most dramatic
cases of abuse concern those Kurdish prisoners whose executions were rushed so that their
blood could be collected to fill shortages at the front. 101
The Iran-Iraq war, one could summarize, was a war against the Kurdish people - its
hidden agenda. The position of the Kurds within Iran deteriorated throughout the war. The
war played into this deterioration. In an indirect sense, it strengthened the position o f the
theocrats who had taken a hard line on Kurdish demands for autonomy. More directly, the
war encouraged further factionalism between Kurdish camps. The war went directly into
m Bruce Dick, Health Problems and the Provision of Health Care in Iranian Kurdistan," paper of
the Refugee Health Group Evaluation and Planning Centre, London School of Hygiene and Tropical
Medicine, 1983.
101 Federation Internationale dcs Droits de lHomme, Rapport de Mission, Iran: Mission au
Kurdistan, 1983.
102 Ibid .
m For example sec press release, September 6 , 1984, The Kurdish Program, New York.
101 Sec summary o f report by Christian Rostoker, Secretary General of the Federation of the
Rights of Man, Paris, France, August-Seplembcr, 1983.
385
Kurdish lands. It wreaked havoc upon the Kurdish population.
Working Class Opposition:
The war was used as a pretext for the repression o f any potentially disruptive social
action. Most notable here was the stark suppression of worker activity in the aftermath of the
revolution using whatever economic, political, ideological or military means were necessary.'0'
Three days after the insurrection o f February 14, 1979, Khomeini ordered all workers to return
to work. In the face of worker intransigence Khomeini made the intention of the Provisional
government clear: "Any disobedience from, and sabotage o f the implementation of the plans of
the Provisional Government would be regarded as opposition against the genuine Islamic
Revolution."
Despite initial resistance from the workers, a more fundamental transformation in
labour relations was afoot in the first few months o f the Islamic Republic. In the aftermath of
the revolution industrial elements of the working class began a struggle for control over the
entire operation of the worksite. The vehicle for these efforts were known as workers councils
or shuros. The radicalization of many workers in the revolutionary aftermath, combined with
the unique opportunity created by the fact that many factory owners and directors had lied the
country, contributed to the rise o f a period of "control from below" at production sites.
Workers gained considerable control o f the financial, adminstrative, productive and distributive
operations of many companies. A t times worker militancy included taking owners or managers
as hostages. The practical degree of control by the workers varied widely. In some cases the
105 Analysis here is based upon Assef Bayats contributions. See "Workers Control After the
Revolution," MERIP Reports 13:3 (March-April 1983) and Workers and Revolution in Iran, (Zed Books,
1987).
386
workers acquired de facto autarchy within the operation. An example o f extensive workers
control may he represented by the ease of Chit-e-Jahan textile factory in the industrial town of
Karaj close to Tehran. The shura at Chit-e-Jahan symbolically occupied the former office o f
the factorys SAVAK agent that was used to interrogate workers. The shura heavily
influenced all elements of production, doubled the minimum wage, reduced top salaries by
two-thirds, set up a workers library, and distributed a daily litre o f milk to each worker. 106
The threat of extensive "control from below" was immediately sensed by both factions
of the power factions o f the post-revolutionary power struggle: the "liberals" and the clerics.
Within a few months o f the insurrection the Bazargan government attempted to reassert
authority at the top by appointing liberal professional managers. The pro-Khomeini clergy
sought to counter the independent workers shuras by setting up Islamic shuras and by
establishment o f the Islamic Associations in the factories. Bayats discussion of this system,
known as maktahi management, is valuable:
It is management by those whose position derives not from certain relevant skills
(education or experience) but is based mainly on character and personal, or more
importantly, ideological connections with the ruling clergy, especially the IRP....
They were in authority to preserve the presence of the ruling party in the
factories, these being the most vulnerable parts of Iranian society. For them the
policy o f worker participation was limited to the corporatist shuras and Islamic
Associations. In essence, their major policy was repressive one-man management;
if they did not achieve this, they demanded workers cooperation in a participatory
management structure. Their strategy was hierarchical Islamic corporatism.
Whilst profit maximization was their main objective, it was not the only one. By
nature, maktabi management is committed to certain ideological and political
measures, the implementation of which disrupts production or wastes working
time.... This type of manager views the secularism of liberal managers as antiIslamic. They use force and tight control instead of peaceful dispute settlement
88
106 See discussion in Chris Goodey, "Workers Councils in Iranian Factories," M ER IP Reports no.
(June 1980), pp. 6-7.
387
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and reformist mediums - a policy of repulsion rather than incorporation. 107
$
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The Islamic Associations had direct links to the ruling clergy within the Islamic Republican
>
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Party. "The Associations." notes Bayat, "were the vehicle for the consolidation of the clergys
power in the workplaces in opposition to both liberal managers and the independent
shuras. " 08 In order to combat worker militancy the theocrats set up labour sections within
the Pasdaran and the Basijis. Although the working class may have been the battering rani of
ijj
the revolution, the regime clearly expressed early and immediate opposition to their basic lorin
o f independent organization.
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The gradual establishment of clerical control within the workplace was boosted by the
outbreak of the war with Iraq. The regime continued to Islamicize the workplace throughout
j
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the war. Maktabi management acquired greater prevalence with the removal of Bani-Sadr and
the waning influence of liberals. The regime proclaimed work as a duty comparable to
fighting at the front: "To work itself, Khomeini admonished cement workers in Tehran, "is a
jihad (crusade) for the sake o f God; God will pay for this jihad - the jihad of labour which you
[workers] are carrying out inside the barricade of the factory."10'' Under the stress o f war the
regime refused to tolerate sustained worker disruption. Strikes and protests were put down
with force. The theocrats paraded disabled soldiers around work sites in order to embarrass
workers into accepting lower wages and poor working conditions. The destruction of truly
independent worker organizations, moreover, significantly lessened the ability of labouring
groups to resist the demands made upon them by the warring stale.
107
Bayat, Workers and Revolution in Iran, pp. 175-176.
108
Bayat, Workers and Revolution in Iran, p. 101.
100
Bayat, "Workers Control After the Revolution." p. 23.

388
Conclusion:
The continuation of the war on Irans part can thus be attributed to the distinct
advantages that it brought to the theocrats. The war provided the regime with a unique
opportunity to consolidate its power. The regime could invoke a comprehensive war-populism
to mobilize the population and sustain revolutionary fervour. It could eliminate political
opposition under the cloak of wartime necessity. The theocrats extended their control of
revolutionary institutions. They used the war to contain disruptive social behaviour. As long
as the war created these advantages, efforts to end it would not gather significant momentum
within ruling circles.
The severe drop in world oil prices in 1986 began to weaken the policy of "war, war
until victory". The growing war-fatiquc among the Iranain population, and especially the Iraqi
military gains in 1988, softened Irans position more and more. Nonetheless, something more
fundamental had cleared the way for peace. The theocrats had essentially cemented their
power. The 1979 revolution unequivocally belonged to them. One of the clearest indications
that the Islamic regime had consolidated its power came with the disbanding of the IR P in
1987. The IR P had failed to develop a mass base of support, and had essentially finished its
important political function of creating cohesion among the radical clerics. As the war entered
its final stages the theocratic regime faced "no internal threat to its power. " 110 There was no
need to continue the war. It had outlived its usefulness.
11(1 Fred Halliday, "Irans New Grand Strategy," MERIP Middle East Report 17:1 (January-February,
1987), p. 7.
389
Chapter Ten
The War and Bathist Consolidation in Iraq
<r
2?
Introduction:
{
!s
Saddam Hussein was bristling with confidence when Iraqi forces invaded Iran on
September 22, 1980. He initially expected the war to be finished by the Eid al-Adha or
r.
Feast of the Sacrifice on October 20. The enormity of Saddam Husseins miscalculation
$
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became increasingly evident as the war lengthened and its fortunes shifted. The war
I
ji
created monumental burdens for the regime including steep yearly bills, sharp economic
losses and sustained declines m oil revenues. In view ol these costs, lor most ol the war
I|
the Ba'th regime was eager lor some kind of a resolution. Nonetheless, the war was very
I
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**
kind to the Ba'th regime. Its prosecution provided the regime with special opportunities
to consolidate political control and extend its influence across Iraqi society. The
f
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repressive arm of the regime expanded with the war and a potentially solid base of
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support among Iraqs emerging capitalist class continued to grow. The regime presented
itself as defender of the Arab homeland and protector of Islamic laith against the Persian
infidels. Saddam Hussein, in a manner reflecting the personality eult that was being
erected around him, stood valiantly at the helm of the Arab struggle. T h e Ba'th regime
continued to extend its tentacles into Iraqi society. Ba'thist political consolidation went
hand in hand with the continuing repression of all non-Bathist political opposition. The
'
war was unkind to Iraqs political opposition. In addition to the fundamental ideological
cleavages that plagued Iraqs beleaguered political opposition, the war added new sources
of disagreement and frequently exacerbated older fissures among them. These conditions
created few opportunities for subordinate social groups, such as women or the working
classes, to actively promote their interests and enhance their social power. In addition to
these indirect effects created by the strengthening of the regime, the war directly
contributed to a deteriorating condition for most disadvantaged social groups, an effect
most visible with respect to the Kurdish population in the north of the country.
Prosecuting the War:
Iraqs desire for peace was driven by the steep economic costs of the war. Initially,
the regime sought to keep the Iraqi population insulated from the burdens of the war, an
approach widely dubbed as a "guns and butter" policy. The financial strains of the war,
however, rather quickly proved to be too great. Most problems for the regime arose from
the loss of oil export revenues. Attacks on Iraqs southern port facilities o f Mina Bakr
and Khor Amaya resulted in severe damage and closure early in the war. Prior to the war
almost 3 million b/p/d were being exported through the Gulf terminals. The closing of
Iraqs Gulf facilities caused a sharp drop in oil exports o f about 2 million b/p/d. Moreover,
this damage nullified the effect of the so-called "strategic pipeline" which could move oil
from the northern oil fields to the southern oil fields o r vice versa, depending upon
whether it was preferable to export it through the Persian G u lf or the Mediterranean Sea
(premiums were usually received if Iraq could get the oil to the Mediterranean). This left
Iraq with access to the Mediterranean terminals o f Yumurtulik through the Turkish
391
pipeline and Banins through the Syrian pipeline. The Turkish pipeline had frequently
been sabotaged. Iraqs precarious export situation was greatly exacerbated with the closing
o f the Syrian line, for political reasons, in April o f 1982. The regime immediately set
about to overcome this vulnerability by constructing new pipelines and exploiting other
means of petrochemical exports. T h e possibility of constructing new pipelines through
Turkey, Jordan and Saudia Arabia were examined, with the Jordanian option being the
least preferred route due to the vulnerability of Israeli attack. The regime employed anti
drag chemicals on its Turkish pipeline in order to increase transit capacity.' At the same
time, the regime began exporting crude oil and petroleum products by truck through
Turkey and Jordan. By July o f 1983, for example, it was estimated that 12,(MX) tonnes of
fuel oil and 25,000 tonnes of other refined products were being exported by truck through
Turkey and Jordan each day. 2 Shipments through the Jordanian port of Aqaba were so
important that Iraq was partially financing Jordanian road const!uction, in addition to its
own six-lane expressway, in order to link Baghdad with Jordans Red Sea terminals.' In
1985 Iraq began pumping oil around Kuwait and through Saudi Arabia to the Red Sea
port o f Yanbu* al-Bahr. These efforts resulted in modest increases in Iraqs oil
production. For the first three years of the war, Iraqi oil production stood at about 1/3 of
its 1980 levels.
This corresponded with a drastic reduction in oil revenues. Iraqs annual
See discussion in Frederick W . Axelgard, "War and Oil: Implications for Iraqs Postwar
Role in G ulf Security," in Iraq in Transition: A Political, Economic, and Strategic Perspective, ed.
Frederick W . Axelgard (Wcstvicw Press, 1986), pp. 9-11.
1
2 Figure from Middle East Review 1985, p. 110. Sec discussion about alternative oil outlets
and facilities pp. 1 1 0 -1 1 1 .
These infrastructural projects are discussed in Middle East Survey, 1983, pp. 167-169.
392
oil revenue fell from $26 billion US dollars in 1980 to just $10 billion in 1981, 9.5 in 1982
and 8.5 in 1983.4 Over the next three years, however, oil exports began to slowly
increase, reaching 45 per cent o f the 1980 level in 1984, 53 per cent in 1985, and 61 per
cent in 1986.5 Small revenue recoveries in 1984 and 1985, however, were more than
offset by the sharp decline in oil revenues from $27 US per barrel to $10 U S per barrel in
1986.6
At the outset of the war the regime had more than US $35 billion in foreign
reserves. As the war passed through its third year Iraq faced an increasingly precarious
financial situation. Its foreign reserves were effectively gone, oil revenues could no longer
cover the cost of imports and the war. As its financial situation deteriorated, Iraq
negotiated payment deferments between contractors, foreign governments and financial
institutions. The extent o f these deferments was revealed by Iraqi Foreign Affairs
Minister Tariq Aziz towards the end of 1984:
In 1982-83, when we found ourselves in financial difficn'.ty, we approached these

[foreign] companies and told them: "If you want to continue these projects, then
lets agree on a different pattern of payments." Accordingly, we reached
agreement with everybody - with all the West European firms, with firms
belonging to East Europe and the Soviet Union, and with other Third World
countries. We had about 900 foreign companies working in Iraq at that time and they arc still working. We did it in 1983 and in 1984.7
Figures extracted from Arab Oil and Gas, May 16, 1986.
Figures from Middle East Review, 1986, 1988.
6 The price drop in 1986 was an ironic blow to Iraq since it had basically raised exports to
its "full export and refining capacity" by the end o f that year. See Arab World File, March23,
1988, no. 2618.
Quoted in Middle East Review, 1986, p. 115.

393
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Iraq also sought trade credits with foreign governments, including a $230 million credit
from the United States Department o f Agriculture in 1983. Loans were negotiated with
foreign creditors, including a $500 million dollar Euroloan." The most extensive financial
assistance came from Iraqs neighbouring Arab G u lf countries including Kuwait, Saudi
Arabia, Q atar and the United Arab Emirates. These countries, especially Saudi Arabia
and Kuwait, provided large quantities of cash, credit and oil exchanges that helped to
underwrite the costs of the war. By the end of 1987 Iraqs external debt was widely
estimated to be more than $50 billion US.
The financial burdens o f the war forced the regime to quickly curtail its extensive
development plans. 9 Many scheduled development projects were postponed as Iraqs
financial position deteriorated. Development contracts for the remainder of the war were
essentially limited to infrastructural and strategic projects directly linked to exporting oil
and prosecuting the war. Beyond these economic constrictions, however, the war has had
a much more enduring effect on the Iraqi economy. The fiscal burdens of the war
accelerated the expansion o f Iraqs private sector, thus continuing a trend well under way
prior to the war . ' 0 Saddam Hussein, recognising that an explicit endorsement o f private
enterprise was inconsistent with its rhetorical posture, rationalized the move towards
These financial arrangements arc discussed in detail in Middle East Review, 1984, pp. 123
128.
Some o f these issues have been addressed in Basil al-.Bustany, "Development Strategy in
Iraq and the War Effort: The Dynamics o f Challenge," in The Iran-Iraq War: An Historical,
Economic and Political Analysis, ed. M.S. Azhary (Croom Helm, 1984) and Jonathan Crusoe,
"Economic Outlook: Guns and Butter, Phase Two?" in Iraq in Transition: A Political, Economic,
and Strategic Perspective, ed. Frederick W. Axelgard (Westview Press, 1986).
9
10
See discussion in Chapter 8, pp. 342-345.

394
private enterprise with a somewhat typical Ba'thist foray into social theory:
Private enterprise must not control life. Similarly, the socialistic enterprises must
not control life. If any one of them controls life alone, it will not realize its
objectives, and the socialistic enterprises will not realize their human objectives.
Private enterprise, if it monopolizes life, has its well-known disadvantages. In this
regard I will not try to flatter anybody. However, coexistence between the two
sides realizes mans happiness. Those who want to profit can profit, but man will
be happy in carrying out such activities, be it a socialistic or a private activity. I
will go so far as to say that both will end up realizing a socialistic objective
because both of them meet human needs in a general and acceptable framework
from the standpoint of socialist principles."
The encouragement o f the private sector reflected an overall strategy to increase

economic production in a war-stressed economy. 12 Complementary reforms were also
undertaken in the state sector, including efforts to reduce bureaucratic drag and
interference.1 In the agricultural sector Law 35 o f 1983 gave official sanction to a trend
that saw the private exploitation of land increase significantly. 14 In the industrial and
11 Speech by Saddam Hussein, Baghdad Voice of the Masses, January 20,1986, FBIS: Daily
Reports, January 21,1986.
12 Some have argued that this move reflects the growing influence of Saddam Hussein after
the removal of the al-Bakr faction from the ruling coterie. Saddam Hussein, so the argument
runs, was ideologically disposed to free-market economy all along. Saddam Hussein, in other
words, was a closet capitalist constrained by a socialist regime. He could not promote his view
until his full accession to power in 1979. This argument, however, tends to overdraw the
socialist character of the Bath regime. A more accurate portrayal should call attention to the
shifting emphasis on state-controlled capitalist development verses state-encouraged capitalist
development under the severe strains of war. The ideological shift - if there was one - is far less
profound. For an outline of the ideological explanation see Middle East Contemporary Survey
11 (1987), pp. 377-378.
Sec discussion in Middle East Review, 1988, pp. 75-76.

14
For a discussion of these trends with respect to the agricultural sector see Robert
Springborg, "Infitah, Agrarian Transformation, and Elite consolidation in Contemporary Iraq," The
Middle East Journal 40:1 (Winter 1986).
395
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trade sectors, Law 113 was implemented after the military reversals o f the summer o f
1982.
L aw 113 provided substantial investment incentives including tax concessions and
low interest loans to private and mixed industrial firms.1' Towards the latter stages o f the
war Iraq s economic restructuring included the selling of state land, farms and factories to
the private sector, encouragement o f private enterprise, a greater emphasis on the quality
o f productive output and the introduction of an export drive." The basket o f policies to
I
encourage the private sector by the end o f the war included the easing o f legal
restrictions, tax concessions on industrial inputs, slate funding for private firms and the
lifting o f ceilings on private investment. 17
The high economic costs directly associated with the war created a strong desire
for peace within the Ba'th regime. This prolonged wish contrasted rather sharply with the
regimes confidence at the outset o f the war. Saddam Husseins earlier optimism led him
to attach impossible conditions to the first United Nations ceasefire resolution of
September 28, 1980. T h e Ba'th regime, that is, demanded that Iraqs "rights and
sovereignty" be fully recognized, a demand meaning entire Iraqi control over the Shalt a!
A rab waterway, and one which was impossible for Iran to accept. For the remainder of
the war Iraqs stated war aims included recognition that it had merely responded to
Iranian aggression, agreements from Iran that it would stop fomenting internal unrest, and
15
See discussion in Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958: From
Revolution to Dictatorship, (I.B. Tauris and Co. Ltd, 1990), pp. 265-266.
16
See discussion in Middle East Economic Digest, August 15, 1987.
17
See discussion in Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, "Iraq Since 1986: The
Strengthening of Saddam," Middle East Report 20:6 (November/December 1990), p. 22.
full sovereignly over the Shall a I-Arab.'* Although these conditions evolved little
throughout the war, their emphasis had to be taken in the context o f Iraqs growing desire
for peace. By the end o f 1982 Iraq was clearly prepared to search for a compromise
solution to end the war.1 Iraqi military strategy was often aimed at forcing Iran to sue
for peace, and was therefore not part of a long-term strategy to prevail militarily. Ira q s
attempts to internationalize the war by attacking G u lf shipping or its frequent attacks
upon Irans oil exporting facilities, as examples, were measures aimed at bringing Iran to
the negotiating table. Iraq remained eager for peace as long as this did not mean the
replacement or dismantling o f the regime, and particularly the removal o f Saddam
Hussein. T h e speed w ith which Iraq accepted Security Council resolution 598, that is, a
full year before Iran, reflected the radically differing inclinations towards peace by the two
regimes.
The War and Political Consolidation:
Although the w ar was extremely costly to the regime economically, it still created
unique political opportunities. The political effects o f the war upon the Bath regime, one
could summarize safely, were much more benign than its economic effects.
The war
provided the regime w ith opportunities to enhance its profile and extend its political
18
On Iraqi positions see contributions by U riel Dann and Gidion Gera in Middle East
Contemporary Suney, v. 5, 1980-1981 - v. 12, 1988.
See discussion in Glen Balfour-Paul, "The Prospects for Peace," in The Iran-Iraq War, ed.
M.S. El-Azhary (Croom Helm, 1984).
397
control.
Within the closely guarded political atmosphere o f Ba'thist Iraq the extent o f
these political benefits are difficult to overestimate. Perhaps most importantly, the war
provided the regime with an opportunity to engage in its own populist strategies. The
regime used the war to exploit cultural motifs and mythologies aimed at creating a sense
o f unity among the Iraqi people. This process was carried on throughout the war.
Consequently, although the regime would have opted to end the war much earlier in the
decade, it could at least live with its positive political ramifications.
One patent collection o f themes embodied within the strategy o f war-populism
surrounded the characterization of the war as part o f a broader Arab struggle. The
Arab/Persian dimension to the war was trumpeted widely by the regime, as clearly
revealed in the name given to the war by Iraq - Qadisiyat Sacldant - which harks back to
the Arab/Persian struggles o f the seventh century. The regime intentionally recalled
military commanders from the original Qadisiyah in order to create the sense o f historical
continuity: "O descendants o f Al-Muthanna, Sad Ibn Abi Waqqas, AlQ a aq and Khalid
Ibn al-Walid. It is th e banner of al-Qadisiyah and the honour o f the mission once again
which Ira q and the Arabs have placed in your hands and upon your shoulders."2" Iraqi
soldiers were described as "ancestors of the heroes o f the first al-Qadisiyah, and heroes of
the second al-Qadisiyah [Iran-Iraq war itself] . " 21 In short, the Balh regime skilfully held
the war out in the cause o f the Arab nation. Iraq was presented as the defender o f "the
Revolutionary Command Council statement, Baghdad Domestic Service, September 22,

1980, FBIS: Daily Reports, September 23, 1980.
20
21
Baghdad Voice of the Masses, February 22,1984, FBIS: Daily Reports, February 22, 1984.
398
Arab nations independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. " 22
Brethren, O masses of the glorious Arab nation. When Iraq waged this
honourable and valiant battle [against Iran], it had a strong belief that it was
defending the Arab nations sovereignty, honour and rights. Iraqs lands and
waters arc part of the Arab sovereignty and Arab honour... He who threatens
Iraqs sovereignty threatens the entire Arab sovereignty. He who usurps part of
the Arab homeland in its eastern or western section, in its centre or in any of its
parts is a foe that must be deterred; and the territory must be liberated from his
grasp. We do not distinguish between one usurper and another.23
Iraq was characterized "as an impregnable dam protecting the eastern flank of the Arab
homeland" and as a "dam that will eventually protect our brother in the G u lf ." 24 "How
would Irans aggressiveness and evil affect the Arabs" queried Saddam Hussein towards the
close o f the war, "if Iraq did not act as a wall? " 23
The war with Iran was thus part o f a continuing struggle of the A rab nation to
purge its land o f "the aggressors" and to free the Arab nation from "slavery and
exploitation ." 2'1 As Saddam Hussein proclaimed early in the war: "The Arabs have waged
many wars and battles in the modern age. They were forced to enter all these wars
22 Speech delivered by Iraqi Foreign Minister Hammadi at U N Security Council, October 15,
1980, FBIS: Daily Reports, October 17, 1980.
23 Saddam Husseins address to Iraqi peoples, Baghdad Voice o f the Masses, September 28,
1980, FBIS: Daily Reports, September 29, 1980.
21 First reference from Baghdad Domestic Service, June 20,1982, FBIS: Daily Reports, June
22, 1982, second reference from Baghdad IN A, March 26,1984, FBIS: Daily Reports, March 27,
1984.
25
Baghdad Domestic Service, October 18, 1987, FBIS: Daily Reports, October 19,1987.
Saddam Husseins address on New Hegira Year, Baghdad IN A , November 9, 1980, FBIS:
Daily Reports, November 10, 1980.
399
including this war which was begun by Iran and in which Iraq was the Arab side. " 7 Iran
threatened the freedom and independence o f the Arab nation: " If the Turks managed to
rule th e Arabs for hundreds o f years, the Iranians can do likewise."2* According to the
regime, the very integrity o f the Arab people was at stake: "Some people say he
[Khomeini] wants to take the nations back to the Middle Ages..." declared Deputy Prime
M inister Tariq A ziz during the third year o f the war, "(but] his aim is in fact much more
dangerous - he wants to divide the body of the A rab nation."2'* Accordingly, the entire
Arab nation should celebrate the fruits o f military victory: "It is indeed significant that the
Arabs should consider al-Faw battle to be their own," claimed Saddam Hussein shortly
after Iran had been driven from the peninsula in 1988, "and in fact it is their own
battle ."-10
At the pinnacle o f the Arab struggle stood the figure o f Saddam Hussein - the
other side o f Qadisiyat Saddam. When the war was carried into Iraqi territory, Husseins
position as defender of the Arab nation was fully exploited. Bombed-out shops in Basra
were strewn with posters hailing Hussein as "the second great conqueror o f the Persian
Army . " 31 T h e process o f creating a personality cult around Saddam Hussein was eased by
27
Baghdad IN A , November 10, 1980, FBIS: Daily Reports, November 12, 1980.
Interview with Saddam Hussein, Baghdad, Al-Jumhuriyah, January 28, 1988, FBIS: Daily
Reports, February 5, 1988.
28
29
30
Le Figaro, December 21,1982, FBIS: Daily Reports, December 23, 1982.

Baghdad IN A , April 21, 1988, FBIS: Daily Reports, April 22, 1988.
31
See discussion in Marion Farouk-Sluglett, Peter Sluglett and Joe Stork, Not Quite
Armageddon: Impact of the W ar on Iraq, M ERIP Middle East Report (1984), p. 24.
400
the war. Saddam Hussein was hailed as the father o f all Iraqis, guardian of the revolution
and historical leader of Islam and the Arab nation. The war provided a litany of
opportunities to extend and reinforce these notions. The following excerpt from Sabah
Salmans column in ath-Thawrah demonstrates the aggrandizing o f Saddam Hussein in the
context o f thinly veiled references to the war:
He is the man of the revolution, the captain of its destiny, and the originator of
historical roles and great deeds which require a commander and strong
decisionmaking. Saddam Husayn is that strong man and destined originator of
strong decisions... I know that Saddam Husayn is stronger than most men because
he is in the right. Due to his faith, his greatness is beyond doubt, because to him
life without honour is a vast desert, desolate and full of wild beasts. Its bleak hills
hold nothing but sand and thorns. For this reason, he believes that he who would
remain calm in the heart of the whirlwind must coexist with the unthinkable or he
cheats himself of a dreamy peace in the midst of a stormy world.
Salman continues:
He thus soars on the winds to remain above them, with personal honour for the
sake of the great culture of Iraq. Saddam Husayn does not wager on the era and
its coincidence because todays era is fabricated and not a time to calm the storm.
Saddam Husayn is a man of history and the greatest wager is on him, because
while the era is the ally of the opportunist who seizes power, history is a record of
infinite duration which opens its pages to heroes. My explanation is the absolute
truth.-'2
During the war Saddam Hussein could be found sipping tea with Iraqi peasants or gently
kissing Iraqi infants. The intended message o f the contrived scenarios was unmistakable.
Saddams preservation was inseparable from the preservation of Iraq and the Arab nation.
M ath-Thawrah, July 2, 1983, FBIS: Daily Reports, September 1, 1983, my emphasis.

401
A second body of themes centred around Iraqi nationalism. The Iraqi man
&
became the national symbol, transcending any class, religious or ethnic divisions within
Iraqi society. 53 The new Iraqi man was blessed with "uniqueness" and graced with
t?
"boundless energy" .34 The new Iraqi man was "a disciplined and patient citizen, capable
o f coping with all critical conditions."55
... our modern man is developed and is completely different from the one who
existed before. Our modern Iraqi is more enduring, more precise, more energetic,
and better prepared to meet responsibility. The bases of the revolutions faithful
men has expanded and covers all Iraq. The base of reserve of leaders - both in
civilian and military life - has increased... It is all the Iraqis who have now passed
the tests and who have sincerely and certainly proved to be loyal through their
sacrifices by carrying the gun in defense of Iraq and in building Iraq in an
exemplary manner.-5*
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The modern Iraqi "is stronger than natures challenges"57 and the product of a rich and
illustrious past: "You arc the sons of the Tigris and Euphrates. You are the sons of
Adams tree and Noahs ark, which came to rest on your land. You are the sons o f the
civilization o f Mesopotamia, which illuminated the world when the rest o f mankind was
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55
See discussion in Stephen R. Grummon, The Iran-lraq War; Islam Embattled, The
Washington Papers, 92 (1982), chapter 3.
if
34
Baghdad Domestic Service, March 14, 1981, FBIS; Daily Reports, March 16, 1981.
55
Baghdad voice of the Masses, January 6 , 1981, FBIS: Daily Reports, January 7, 1981.
56
Baghdad Domestic Service, January 29, 1983, FBIS: Daily Reports, January 31, 1983.
37 Saddam Husseins July 17 Anniversary Address, Baghdad INA, July 17, 1981, FBIS: Daily
Reports, July 21, 1981.
402
living in darkness."58
Aspects of the war were directly linked to these themes of
Iraqincss. The war was held to have "renewed the ancient Iraqi history and culture, which
extends thousands o f years." Indeed, the war was necessary in order to preserve the
Iraqi character: "This new character constitutes new ground for glory, pride, happiness and
prosperity. This new character must not be conquered." 40 Iraqs successes in the war
were directly linked to the power o f the Iraqi spirit: "The strong Iraqi w ill and the creative
Iraqi genius have completely reversed the situation on the enemies... Last year, the solid
Iraqi will, the deep-rooted Iraqi unity, and the great Iraqi ability were tested. Last year,
the enemy tried to move from one sector to another on the front, looking for any military
or political loophole... On cvcty section o f the Iraqi borders, the enemy found the Iraqis
alert, unified, and ready to sacrifice in order to defend their dear, lofty Iraq ." 41 In his
address on Army D ay in 1986 Saddam Hussein linked wartime steadfastness and success to
the special qualities o f the Iraqi men and women:
O glorious Iraqi men and women, the great achievements we attained in our
steadfastness in the face of aggression and in the field of construction and
prosperity, the achievements that are admired by the nation and appreciated by
the world, arc the result of bravery, ability, and patience expressed by the brave
Iraqi men in this long and honourable battle... This war has become one of the
major events in modern history. This is the result of the Iraqi women and mens
patience as well as the result of their sacrifices, persistence, and their strong
58
Baghdad Domestic Service, October 8 , 1980, FBIS: Daily Reports, October 20, 1980.
Saddam Husseins address on Revolution Day, Baghdad Domestic Service, July 16,1987,
FBIS: Daily Reports, July 20, 1987.
40
Baghdad IN A , March 30, 1982, FBIS: Daily Reports, March 31,1982.
41
Baghdad Voice of the Masses, July 16, 1984, FBIS: Daily Reports, July 17, 1984.
403
insistence on facing evil and aggression...
Iranian attacks on the besieged city of Basra frequently provided occasions to extol Iraqi
virtues: "The Iraqi citizen is standing on the borders o f our Basra more lofty and with
greater dignity and pride, knowing only continuous offering which embodies the value.
2
ethics, and nobleness in the full sense of the word."1'

A third collection o f themes sought to present Iraq as a beleaguered nation at the
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hands o f foreign forces, thus exploiting and reinforcing xenophobic themes embedded
within Iraqi culture. "The battle being waged by Iraq today against the ruling clique in
Ira n is no mere dispute between two Third World states," declared Saddam Hussein in
1982, "but a result o f the wide scheme planned by known international sides and
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implemented both direct and indirectly in order to force Iraq to give up its independent
stands..."4' Similar themes arc in ample evidence in the following address by Saddam
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Hussein to th e Iraqi people:
O Iraqis, you have destroyed the great conspiracy at its most serious phase. You
have destroyed the conspiracy against your present, future, hopes, security, honour,
and sovereignty and conspiracy against the security, honour, and sovereignty of the
Arab nation by your heroic confrontation. The conspiracy has been destroyed and
defeated, and its evil wind, which was feared by our righteous people, has
receded... This conspiracy is now wallowing in the bitterness of defeat. The parties
to this conspiracy are cursing one another, and all of them are cursing their bad
j
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42
Baghdad Voice of the Masses, January 6 , 1986, FBIS: Daily Reports, January
43
Baghdad Voice of the Masses, February 28, 1984, FBIS: Daily Reports, February 28, 1984.
41
Baghdad Voice of the Masses, January
, 1982, FBIS: Daily Reports, January
404
, 1986.
, 1982.
The war was presented as the machinations o f the "covetous big powers" that "depend on
certain elements in the region to carry out the plan o f subjugating the Arab nation and
controlling the Arab homeland."4'' A t the centre o f these conspiratorial activities was the
United States and the forces o f Zionism. The following analogy by Saddam Hussein draws
on the powerful familial themes to stress the American role:
When you arc a friend o f Mazin and Saddam Hussein for instance, and the two
quarrel, what is you duty as a friend? It is to come between them and settle their
dispute, is it not? But if Saddam Hussein sees you unsheathe your dagger and
give it to Mazin, would not this mean that you are asking Mazin to stab Saddam
Hussein? The United States has done this more than once.47
"The United States claims neutrality in the G ulf war and publicly calls for ending it. Then
it becomes clear," asserted Bath party founder Michel Aflaq, "that is not a neutral party
and that it gives weapons to those who perpetrate terrorism ." 48
T h e themes of Zionist aggression involved a number o f twists and turns. A t times
the war was presented as an evil distraction from the real task of fighting Zionist
aggression. Iraq had to extricate itself from the battle with Iran in order to fight the
" Baghdad Domestic Service, March 22, 1987, FBIS: Daily Reports, March 23, 1987, my
emphasis.
16 Saddam Husseins 17 July Anniversary Speech, Baghdad Voice of the Masses, July 17,
1983, FBIS: Daily Reports, July 18,1983.
47
Baghdad IN A , January 2, 1983, FBIS: Daily Reports, January 4, 1983.
48
Baghdad Voice o f the Masses, April
, 1987, FBIS: Daily Reports, April 8 , 1987.

405
Zionist enemy on its south-western flank.4 A t other times parallels were drawn between
Iranian aggression and Zionist aggression: "Of course, there has been foreign
encouragement o f this factor (expansionism). The Zionists have been the first to
encourage it because they found in it a means to harm the Arab nation ." '0 O n other
occasions direct links were asserted between Zionism and the war with Iran. "We never,
from the very beginning," claimed Iraqs defense minister Adrian Khayrallah, "had any
illusion about the Iranian regimes links with Zionism ." ' 1 Zionism was accused sometimes
o f completely controlling the war, as reflected in an al-Qadisiyah editorial in 1986: "It
became clear the Khomciniyitc war which was imposed on our triumphant people and
great Iraq was masterminded by the Zionist circle and was given a Khomeinyitc facade and
for unrealistic, totally irrelevant reasons, led by the sick dreams of the Khomeinyiles who
wanted to spread their hegemony over Iraq, the Arab gulf stales, and other Islamic
states. " 52 The Zionist motive in the war was essentially counterrevolutionary: "Zionism
sees, observes and realizes that the plan for liberation is found primarily in Iraq."5
Zionist forces, o f course, did not act alone but in the context o f a much broader United
40 See, for example, address by Naim Haddad, speaker o f the National Assembly, November
1, 1980, FBIS: Daily Reports, November 3, 1980.
so Interview with Saddam Hussein, Guro Al-Ahram, March 18, 1988, FBIS: Daily Reports,
March 22, 1988.
51
52
London, Al-Tadamun, February 20, 1988, FBIS: Daily Reports, February 24, 1988.
Baghdad Voice of the Masses, November 9,1986, FBIS: Daily Reports, November 10,1986.
53 Saddam Hussein address to Iraqi cabinet, Baghdad IN A , December 25, 1980, FBIS; Daily
Reports, December 29, 1980.
406
Statcs-Zionist-Iranian "plot" against Iraq and the Arab nation.54 In order to strengthen
its claims the regime continually drew links between war-related events and Israel.
Personal links, for example, were drawn between Khomeini and Zionism, including
coverage o f Khomeinis apparent medical treatment by a "Zionist medical team of five
physicians."" The Iran-contra affair provided further fodder:"... after 7 years o f the war,
the world wakes up to discover shameful details about the special and dirty cooperation
between U.S. organs and the Zionist entity - a cooperation with those claiming to be
patriotic Muslims and those claiming to seek the Liberation of Jerusalem. This is their
true nature. They could not deceive or dupe us." 56
A fourth collection o f themes centred around the war and the struggle o f Islam.
The Ba'th regime portrayed itself as defender of the Islamic faith. As with all wars, God
was enlisted in the Iraqi cause. Islam was presented as the preserve o f the Arab nation:
"... the language o f the Koran, o f the angels - the language spoken in paradise - is Arabic
and no other ." 57 Iraqi successes in the Faw peninsula in 1988, for example, were
attributed to God who "asks man to organize and legitimize his endeavours. " 58 The
regime also cultivated the importance of martyrdom. Fallen Iraqi soldiers were described
54 Statement of the Regional Command o f the Bath party, Baghdad INA, April 4, 1984,
FBIS: Daily Reports, April 5, 1984.
55
Sec Baghdad INA, November 1, 1987, FBIS: Daily Reports, November 2, 1987.
Baghdad Voice of the Masses, December 1,1986, FBIS: Daily Reports, December 2,1986.
57
Madrid, El Pais, January 27, 1983, FBIS: Daily Reports, February 2, 1983.
58 Saddam Hussein address, Baghdad Voice o f the Masses, April 24, 1988, FBIS: Daily
Reports, April 25, 1988.
407
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as "righteous martyrs" whose "blood has not gone in vain". Protecting Iraq and "its glories
of past and present" was characterized as "the purest and greatest deeds before God.""*
Today, our great grandfather, the father of all martyrs, al-Husayn ... stand as a
lofty symbol of heroism, glory and firmness in defending right. This is the vow of
Iraqis and the Iraqi army. It became clear to our grandfather al-Husayn that he
was facing the enemys huge army with few men. He was sure that the enemys
army would triumph and he became afraid that history, the kinsfolk and those
malicious ones would not be fair to him if he pulled back. Yet, his soul
enlightened his way and gave birth to willingness to give and to sacrifice. He
moved forward to fight and continued to fight until he fell as a martyr. He
preferred to gain the glories of heaven rather than the glories of earth. Since
then wc have considered this a symbol for all believers and fighters. Now, 1300
years after his martyrdom, al-Husayn remains a symbol for us. We, his grandsons,
are proud to be connected with him, we are proud to be tied to him in soul and
blood. The army and the people are one and they fight to defend right, justice
and the holy land of Iraq which harbours the remains of our grandfather Ali, may
God brighten his face.60
"The martyrs," declared Saddam Hussein, "arc Gods guests who will live in paradise.'" 1
A t the same time the denigration of the Iranian regime was directly linked to the
leitmotifs of Bathist war-populism: "The Iraqis have always been a source o f great
generosity to mankind. T h e Arabs have always been a major source o f enlightenment and
abundance for mankind. O n the other hand, the Persians have always been invaders and
aggressors, expanding to th e detriment o f others and destroying other nations
59 Saddam Hussein address on Iraqi Army Day, Baghdad Voice of the Masses, January
1987, FBIS: Daily Reports, January 6,1987.
60
Baghdad INA, March 30,1982, FBIS: Daily Reports, March 31, 1982.
Saddam Husseins July 17 Anniversary Address, Baghdad Domestic Service, July 17, 1982,
FBIS: Daily Reports, July 20, 1982.
61
408
civilizations." 62 The Iranian regime was summed up as the antithesis of Arabism, a form
o f racist anti-Arabism or shu'ubism lay at the heart of their motives. 63 The Iranian
regime, moreover, was frequently accused of practising a misguided or ill-informed brand
o f Islam: "The religion whose ideas Khomeini advocates," declared Saddam Hussein during
the war, "is not an Islamic religion. The knowing believers of Iran itself are now saying
this." 61 Tehran was also generally branded as perfidious and correspondingly presented
itself as the exposer of falsehood and the purveyor of truth .65 Khomeini was often
portrayed as a religious fraud or charlatan: "A man of religion must be truthful. I f he is a
liar," asserted Saddam Hussein, "then he does not deserve to be a man o f religion or claim
to be righteous." 66 The regime held that "the path chosen by Khomeyni is not an Islamic
path" and the he "espouses a mistaken, deviant Islamic line." On other occasions
Khomeini was described as "a politician working under the guise of religion" or as "a
backward man of religion." 67 Iranian aggression against Iraq was thus unlslamic, as
evident in Husseins Open Letter to the Iranian people in 1983:
62 Saddam Husseins address to National Assembly, Baghdad Voice of the Masses, November
4, 1980, FBIS: Daily Repons, November 5,1980.
63 For example, sec Communique 2,789 by the Armed Forces, which stressed that A ir Force
strikes during August of 1987, derived their legitimacy from the merger of shu'bist and Zionist
tendencies. Baghdad voice o f the Masses, August 29,1987, FBIS: Daily Repons, August 31,1987.
6' Baghdad Voice of the Masses, January 21,1987, FBIS: Daily Repons, January 22,1987.
65 For example, see text of Saddam Husayns Open Letter to Iran, Baghdad voice of the
Masses, August 2, 1986, FBIS: Daily Repons, August 4,1986.
66
Baghdad Domestic Service, March 6,1984, FBIS: Daily Reports, March 7,1984.
67
For example, see Baghdad IN A , December 2, 1983, FBIS: Daily Reports, December 5,
1983.
409
... you arc contravening the Islamic faith because you are not only attacking a
neighbouring state and violating the Prophets tenets which say take care o f thy
neighbour and then of their brother, but also attacking the land of the holy places
and the tombs of Imam Ali and our lord and grandfather Husayn and the tombs
of our great forefathers. This land is not only defended by the Iraqis who are
sacrificing their lives for it, but is also defended by the divine will. Almighty God
is on the side of right against wrong, against aggressors and on the side o f the
victims of aggression. God will bless those who defend the holy land and not
those who invade it as aggressors.68
The Islamic slogans emanating from Iran were presented as a ruse fo r Zionist activity:
"Right from the beginning, we sensed the movement of Zionist fingers behind the
aggression coming from the East. W e felt that the false Islamic slogans they raised were
only a cover, not a true Islamic call."6
Consequently, through the war the regime was able to manipulate cultural motifs
aimed at counteracting the centrifugal culture of contemporary Iraq. The regime,
expressed conversely, exploited the centripetal forces of patriotism, nationalism and
faith. 70 O ut of discord and division the regime could enlist the war to momentarily
manufacture unity and harmony. It could cultivate the spirit o f Iraqincss o r Arabness and
employ it for political gain. "A defensive struggle against an Iran on the offensive," writes
Dilip H iro, "helped Saddam Hussein to forge national unity to a degree he had not
thought possible before ." 71 In times of peace, the Iraqi Shi'i from the south of the
country might be favourably disposed towards the activities o f the Shii clerics. In war,
68
Baghdad Voice of the Masses, February 15, 1983, FBIS: Daily Reports, February 16, 1983.
60 Saddam Husseins address to members of the Executive Council of the Popular Islamic
Conference Organization in Baghdad, Baghdad Voice of the Masses, February 21, 1987, FBIS:
Daily Reports, February 24,1987.
70
See discussion by Uriel Dann in Middle East Contemporary Survey 9 (1984-1985), p. 174.
71
Dilip Hiro, The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict, (Paladin 1990), p. 257.
410
however, ihis potential was radically undermined. As Phebe M a rr w rites:"... as Arab

Sunnis and Shi'ah from all parts o f Iraq fought in the trenches together, they developed
shared experiences, a greater sense of community, and a deeper identity as Iraqis. " 72 The
war helped foster a transcendent Iraqi spirit that partially overrode the verticle universes
o f sectarianism and ethnicity or the horizontal universe o f class.
The war, from the perspective o f Iraqs necessarily clandestine political opposition,
helped promote a social discourse of Iraqiness that dampened its opportunity to gain
support and blunted its opportunity to promote change. For most of the war the regime
laced organized political opposition from at least three different sources: the Kurds in the
north, the Iraqi Communist Party in the north, and the Shi'i opposition primarily in the
south. The w ar potentially provided the opposition with unique opportunities, including
possibilities fo r logistical and financial support from Iran and Syria and a stimulus for the
opposition groups to form a united front .73 T h e distractions o f war, however, provided
the B ath regime with special leverages against internal opposition. Th e regime easily
branded political opposition as traitorous, anti-Arab and atheistic. This tendency received
even greater force when Ira n crossed into Iraqi territory. "The incursion o f Iranian troops
into Iraq," notes one commentator, "made it appear that the Opposition was siding with
the enemy in threatening th e countrys very soil." 74 I t would appear that the Shi'i
opposition has been most adversely affected by this linkage. T h e Shi'i did not defect en
72 Phebe Marr, "The Iran-Iraq War: The Iraqi Experience and its Lessons," (Unpublished
manuscript).
73
See discussion in Middle East Contemporary Survey 5 (1980-1981), p. 585.
74
Ofra Bengio, Middle East Contemporary Survey 7 (1982-1983), p. 572.

411
masse from the military in the face o f war with Iran, a factor which possibly reveals that
"Iraqi Shi'is unambiguously consider themselves Iraqis first and Shiis second."7' In
addition to this disadvantage, the war itself caused further fragmentation among Iraqs
opposition forces:
This problem [differing views on the war] is crucial. Up till now, some parlies
have insisted that ending the war does not serve the cause o f overthrowing the
Iraqi regime. They place their hopes on an Iranian military victory to rid them of
Saddam. Other forces, notably the Communists, hold the two tasks of ending the
war and overthrowing the regime as equally important. In their view, changing
the regime is one of the "internal affairs of the Iraqi people," best served through
"formulating the most precise program and slogans" around which to mobilize
people to fight to end the war and "punish those who waged it."7h
Even within the Iraqi Communist Party the war created intense factionalism and
discord.77 Attempts to form a politically effective oppositional front were largely
unsuccessfully in the face of enduring mutual antagonisms and suspicions.
Despite the Ba th regimes aggressive war-populism Iraq s political opposition
remained a serious concern fo r the regime. An indication of this may be found in the
Revolutionary Command Councils Resolution no. 840 which authorized the death penally
to those who publicly insulted the president, the RCC, the BaTh Party, the National
75 Marion Farouk-Sluglett, Peter Sluglett and Joe Stork, "Not Quite Armageddon: Impact of
the W ar on Iraq," M E R IP Reports 14:6/7 (July-September 1984), p. 26.
76 Isam al-Khafaji, "Iraqs Seventh Year: Saddams Quart dHeure?", Middle East Report
(March/April 1988), p. 38.
77 See discussion in Middle East Contemporary Survey 11 (1987), pp. 437-438.
412
Assembly or the cabinet.78 This decree reflected the continued force of the extremely
repressive Bath political project in Iraq. Expressed in its starkest terms, if nationhood or
faith failed to bond the Iraqi people to the Bath regime, then fear would be the regimes
political solvent.79 The ubiquitous policing apparatus of the Bath regime continued to
play an important protective function throughout the war, and extended their wartime
activities to deal with such problems as smuggling, forgcty and the black market.80
Reports of human rights abuses by the regime continued throughout the war.81
Moreover, the military greatly expanded during the war. By the conclusion of the war the
regular army numbered almost 1 million active personnel and the Popular Army numbered
over half a million.82
The war thus helped to strengthen the regime politically. T h e Ba'th regime stood
at the helm of Iraqs defense against Iran. It provided the Ba'th regime w ith a unique
opportunity to cultivate and exploit socially unifying and politically levelling themes. T h e
war thus allowed the regime to retard, if not substantially reverse, the politically estranging
tendencies o f Iraqs rather severe class and communal cleavages. T h e regime was afforded
a unique opportunity to fashion social harmony out of social dissonance. For the Iraqi
78 Ibid., p. 437.
79 The idea that fear is the cement of the Iraqi body politic is the primary theme in Samir
al-Khalil, Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq, (University of California Press, 1989).
80 Sec discussion in Middle East Contemporary Sutvey 10 (1986), pp. 368-369.
81 For example, see Amnesty International, Report and Recommendations to the Government
of the Republic o f Iraq, January 1983.
82 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance (1987-1988), p. 100.
413
people their problem was less the Bath and more Iran, a feature that tended to confirm
the A rab proverb: "Me against my brother; me and my brother against my cousin; me, my
brother and my cousin against the foreigner." I f absolute support for the regime still
faltered under the exceptional circumstances of war, as in the ease o f the IC P or the
Kurds or the Shii clerics, then the regime could use Ira n s "aggression" to discredit the
opposition. Failing this, the w a r provided a blanket pretext to do whatever was necessary
to contain political opposition. Understandably, the removal o f the war pretext was of
serious concern to the Bath regime as the likelihood o f a ceasefire became evident in
1988. As one commentator o n the Iraqi scene wrote: "After the ceasefire Saddam
Hussein is no longer able to claim he is defending the homeland or use the war as a
justification and smokescreen for mass repression and terror in Iraq."8-'
The war provided an additional political benefit to the regime. There is some
evidence to suggest that the privatization push was concentrating economic power in the
hands of relatively small number of people.81 This concentration, in addition to the
expanding trends among the capitalist class in evidence well before the war, is likely to
continue carving out a small social base for the Ba'th regime. The necessities o f war, in
other words, likely expanded the regimes potential base of support among Iraqs
burgeoning capitalist class.
83 Jabr Muhsin et al., "The Gulf War", Saddam's Iraq: Revolution or Reaction?, ed. C A R D R I
(Zed Books, 1986), p. 240.
84 Thirteen o f the seventy factories that were privatized by the regime, for example, were
bought by the al-Bunniyyah family. This family owns 36 o f the largest private enterprises in Iraq
and over 45 million square meters of land. See discussion in "On the Way to Market: Economic
Liberalization and Iraqs Invasion," Middle East Report 21:3 (May/June 1991), p. 18.
414
Within the regime, Saddam Hussein maintained tight control. H e received a

resounding endorsement at the Bath Party congress in 1982. Saddam Hussein carefully
placed close family members and trustful relatives in strategic political positions to help
guard against challenges to his rule. An extremely watchful eye was also kept over the
military, especially in times of success, and military leaders who sought domestic
recognition were quickly clipped. Finally, Saddam Hussein adroit shunted political figures
from post to post in order to preclude the development o f countervailing power centres.85
The War and Subordinate Social Groups:
T he political strengthening o f the Bath regime throughout the war entails a

profound social cost. The regime is premised upon a unlikely world that denies the
political meaningfulness of social cleavage and stratification. Disempowered social
constituencies within Iraqi society must subordinate themselves to the Ba'thist ideal, an
ideal generally guided by the overriding principle o f regime maintenance. By helping to
strengthen the regime, therefore, the war contributed to the continuing disempowerment
of Ira q s subaltern social groups. More specifically, by strengthening the political position
of the Bath regime the war did little to enhance the social condition o f Iraqs Kurdish
peoples, its working classes or Iraqi women. Beyond this indirect effect, the war often
entered directly into the continued oppression o f Iraqs socially disempowered groups.
85 These tactics have received their most explicit treatment in Middle East Contemporary
Survey, v. 9, 1984-1985, pp. 462-464. v. 10,1986, pp. 363-368, v. 11,1987, pp. 427-431, v. 12,1988,
pp. 504-511.
415
Consequently, an independent examination of each social constituency is beneficial in

order to gain an appreciation of the social costs o f the war.
The War and Labour:
The war contributed to the deteriorating position of the Iraqi working class. The
position o f labour was entirely subordinated to wartime imperatives. Workers were
encouraged to "increase and improve" their output in order to satisfy the needs o f the
"military effort". High worker productivity was deemed to be equivalent to fighting at the
front lines:
You know that one gives more under decisive confrontational circumstances,
particularly when the issue concerns self-defense and sovereignty, freedom, and
independence. This is the case with the Iraqis now. They arc exerting efforts in
the field of construction on an equal basis with the fighting spirit in the front line
trenches in defense of Iraq. Those who are exerting efforts in the field of
construction, away from the direct contact lines with the enemy, do this out of
patriotism, as we have explained. They feel that those who are confronting the
enemy are better than they are because they regard that confrontation as being
carried out with weapons; they have to assert their patriotism by being equal to
their brothers who are confronting the enemy with their bodies in defense of Iraq.
This is the prevalent spirit now in building a new Iraq. Therefore, the job that
used to take 6 hours to complete can now be completed in three hours or less.86
In the interests of the war effort workers frequently 'accepted cuts in their pay,
86 Saddam Husseins interview with Cairo al-Ahram, Baghdad INA, December 2, 1983, FBIS:
Daily Reports, December 5, 1983.
416
volunteered to work overtime and on public holidays, and waived their vacations.87
The regime filled its labour shortages during the war by hiring Egyptian migrant
labour. Foreign labour w'as frequently estimated to be over a staggering 1 million
workers.88 Migrant labour was unable to make demands for better wages or working
conditions without being punished or sent home. A fter the war reports surfaced that
migrant workers were frequently beaten and that Iraqi employers frequently refused to pay
them.8 Beyond merely filling vacant jobs created by the war, migrant labour represented
the worst-case scenario for worker disempowerment. Deprived o f any means of
controlling their working conditions, and functioning under extremely vulnerable
conditions because of the threat of deportation, expatriate labour helped the Bath regime
insure that labour disruptions during the war would be kept to a bare minimum.
Throughout the course of the war Iraqi workers were afforded no opportunity to
empower themselves through organization and collective action. Iraqi labour codes
enacted in 1970 or 1987 did not recognize the right to collective bargaining. Strikes were
recognized by law but banned in practice. In essence, workers had little power to resist
the demands that were being placed upon them. Th e Federation o f Trade Unions was
directly linked to the Ba'th party and amounted to an instrument of regime control rather
than worker empowerment. In order to partially address this problem, the Workers
Democratic trade Union Movement in the Iraqi Republic was formed in order to
87 Sec discussions in Middle East Contemporary Survey, v. 7., 1982-1983, p. 567, v. 8,19831084, p. 477.
88 For a discussion of labour in Iraq see Sluglett et al, op. cit., pp. 28-9.
Sec "Egyptian Workers arc Fleeing Iraq", New York Times, November 15,1989.
417
j
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\
\
clandestinely organize workers.90

Under the forces of privitization the regime also attempted to restructure its
i
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control o f the labour force.
Federation of Trade Unions and replaced it with the Iraqi General Federation o f Trade
I
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Unions.
In March o f 1987 the regime summarily abolished the
A t the same time, union membership was restricted to workers in private and
mixed enterprises. Employees in state enterprises are now denied the right to union
membership. The Labour code o f 1970 was abolished and Saddam Hussein declared that
workers would henceforth put in 12-hour-days in the interests of the war effort.01 These
moves were clearly linked to the requirements o f the privatization drive. On the one
hand, the newly formed Iraq i General Federation of Trade Unions is organically linked with
i'
the Bath party, and is clearly designed as an instrument of control over the private sector
labour force that will inevitably expand with the restructuring of the Iraqi economy. On
the other hand, by denying state-scctor workers any union membership o r recourse to
meaningful labour legislation, the stale was free to fully control its own workers and
streamline its operations (a process that included cutting excess workers who were
previously guaranteed jobs by the state). At the same time, Iraq intentionally created a
glut of workers by allowing industry the right to import Arab labour at a time when a
large potential pool o f labour would be returning from the front.02
In the face o f a stronger regime and under the pressures of war the position o f the
90 From Iraq Solidarity Voice, no. 20, July 1988, C A R D R I.

01 See discussion in Middle East Watch, Human Rights in Iraq, (Yale University Press, 1990),
p. 37.
91 This point is made by Kiren Aziz Chaudhry, "On the Way to the Market," op. cit., p. 17.
418
working classes and lower middle classes in Iraq deteriorated. Trade unions amounted to
nothing more than instruments of control by the regime. State repression insured that the
labour force would remain docile. Authentic resistance by Iraqs labouring class, in short,
was not possible during the war. The regime, in other words, extracted everything it could
out of the Iraqi workforce.
The War and Women:
Prior to the war the womens movement in Iraq was denied the opportunity for
free and open political expression. Authentic womens organizations, that is, organizations
proceeding from the social floor and acting independently of the Bath regime, could not
function within Iraq. Feminist activists were often incarcerated or expelled from the
country. Consequently, it has often been noted that women have achieved parity with
men only in the area o f detention and torture.93 The war did little to change this bleak
scenario. The nature o f the effect of the war upon the social power and condition of
women in Iraq was twofold. First, by contributing to the political consolidation o f the
Ba'th regime, the war inhibited the operation of womens organizations beyond B athist
paternalism. Consequently, the only Iraqi womens organization allowed to operate within
the country was the Bathist dominated General Federation of Iraqi Women. The G F IW
was essentially geared to containing the womens movement within the confines o f the
Bathist world view. The G F IW became one of the chief tools of the regime in mobilizing
9-' Sec discussion in Deborah Cobbet, "Women in Iraq," in Saddams Iraq: Revolution or
Reaction?, cd. C A R D R I (Zed Books, 1986), pp. 128-129.
419
women into vacant workplaces during the war. In 1984 it was revealed that more that
30,000 women were working for nothing.4' This mobilization was viewed as remedial and
temporary. By th e end o f the war all efforts were being made to demobilize the bulk of
the female workforce. In terms of the emancipatory struggle o f women, the equation with
the war was straightforward. To the extent that the war strengthened the regime, the
womens movement in Iraq continued to be enfeebled.
The second effect related to the manner in which the war reinforced traditional
conceptions of gender in Iraq. In particular, the view of women as mother and childrearer
was widely promoted as a result of the war. In an address to the Executive Bureau o f the
G F IW , for example, Saddam Hussein drew direct links between procreation efforts and
the war:
We believe that our motto must be that each family produce five children, boys
and girls, as God wishes, and that the family which does not produce at least four
children deserves to be harshly reprimanded. We should also express
dissatisfaction with this family because history shows that there arc many
possibilities that trends, jingoism, and other cases may emerge in our Arab east
that may pose a threat to Iraq. In any case, our geographic location dictates on
us to have a population capable of defending Iraq and enabling Iraqis to live a
proud life.95
Accordingly, Saddam Hussein has explicitly argued that a woman o f child-bearing age
should procreate rather that get an education:
94 Kuwait al-Anba, April 12, 1984, FBIS: Daily Reports, April 17, 1984.
95 Baghdad al-Jumhuriyah, May 4, 1986, FBIS: Daily Reports, May 8, 1986.
420
... education in Iraq is spreading at the expense of childbirth ... if a man comes to
me an'' ir k me to allow him to study for his Masters degree or PhD then I would
proba-'lv let i.im do so. If, however, a twenty-eight year old women comes to me
with th same request then I would have to calculate how long it would take for
her to get her doctorate, and I would see that this may take her beyond the age
of marriage ... I consider the raising of a family to be far more important than
getting a PhD. We must unashamedly let this be known to Iraqi women.96
Throughout the war Baghdad was strewn with anti-contraception posters exhorting
mothers to procreate for their country. The G F IW organized meetings to explain the
need to procreate and to present gifts to "fertile" women.97 Womens traditional
nurturing and supportive role was occasionally assigned heroic status in the context o f the
war;
While the Iraqi peoples sacrifices are living evidence of their sincerity, faith, and
love for principle, the sacrifices of Iraqi women top all other great and eternal
deeds. They have recorded the greatest epics of courage, patience, and faith in
the history of our nation. O Iraqi women, your sacrifices and efforts make you an
example of courage and generosity. You have been a mother, a wife, a daughter,
and a sister to the brave fighters. You have urged them to take initiatives and to
make sacrifices; you have alleviated the suffering of soldiers who emerge form the
dust of battles and combat. You have encouraged martyrdom.98
The traditional view o f women as childbearer and caretaker within the family unit was
frequently reinforced in the interests o f the war effort. A t the same time, the repressive
political atmosphere o f the Bath regime means that organizations determined to break
96 See discussion in Celine Whittleton, Jabra Muhsin and Fran Hazelton, "Whither Iraq?" in
Saddam's Iraq: Revolution or Reaction?, ed. C A R D R I (Zed Books, 1989), p. 248.
97 See discussion in Middle East Contemporary Survey 10 (1986), p. 371.
98 Saddam Husseins Revolution Anniversary Address, Baghdad Domestic Service, July 16,
1987, FBIS: Daily Reports, July 20, 1987, my emphasis.
421
down these traditional views o f Iraqi women will not freely operate. T h e war. therefore,
strengthened conventional conceptions of gender and undermined the opportunity to
break them down. In other words, the war exacerbated the oppressive cultural code of
Iraqi society which relegates women to a rather narrow array of life options.
The W ar and the Kurdish Peoples:
The onset o f the Iran-Iraq war created new possibilities for the Kurdish insurgency
in Iraq. Prior to the war the condition of the Kurdish peoples was disrnal. The
insurgency had suffered a serious blow as a result of the Algiers Accord of 1975. Kurdish
opposition had split into two rival factions, namely, the Kurdish Democratic Parly (K D P )
led by Ma'sud Barazani and the Patriotic Union o f Kurdistan (P U K ) led by Jalal
Talabani. T h e Bath regime was engaged in a policy to destroy the culture and
community-centred life o f the Kurdish people. Extensive relocation, Ba'thization and
direct repression numbered among the facets of the Ba'thist programme.
By distracting the regime and diverting its resources the Iran-Iraq war created
openings for the Kurdish struggle. A t the outset of the war the K D P extended its
influence and control in the north o f the country. In order to offset growing KDP
influence Baghdad entered into negotiations with the PU K. The intent of these
negotiations on the part o f the Bath regime was to cut into the KDP-Iranian alliance,
w The most detailed accounts of the Kurdish struggle are found in Middle East Contemporary
Survey, v. 2 through to v. 12.
422
while the goal of the PUK was to acquire greater influence in the region.100 Negotiation
between the P U K and Baghdad reflected the intense factionalism that plagued the
Kurdish opposition. Perhaps more than anything else, the internecine divisions within the
Kurdish insurgency greatly restricted its ability to make meaningful gains despite Baghdads
preoccupation with the war. The opportunities for cooperation among the two main
Kurdish factions increased with the collapse o f negotiations between Baghdad and the
P U K in January of 1985. A s relations between the K D P and the P U K warmed towards
the end o f the war, the strength o f the Kurdish resistance increased and seriously alarmed
the Ba'th regime.101
Despite this control the war was directly associated with a deterioration in the
conditions of the Kurdish peoples. Beyond politically expedient instances Baghdads
relationship with the Kurds has been extremely destructive. It is aimed at nothing less
than the obliteration of Iraqi Kurdistan. In August o f 1983, for example, approximately
8,000 members of the Barzani clan disappeared after being hauled away by the regime.
Their late remains unknown.102 The regime engaged in an extensive counter-insurgency
campaign. Thousands of Kurds have been incarcerated on political grounds. Political
100 O n the Kurdish alliances with Iran see Omar Sheikhmous, "The Kurds in the Iraq-Iran
W ar - and Since," paper presented at the International colloquium on Ethnicity and Inter-state
Relations in the Middle East, Berlin, April 20-23, 1989.
101 An interesting account of this growing control can be found in "Sons of Devils," The New
Yorker, November, 1987.
102 Aspects of these disappearances are well documented in a submission to the Working
group on Enforced o r Involuntary Disappearances, Centre for Human Rights, United Nations,
May 23, 1988, by Preparatory Committee entitled Eight Thousand Civilian Kurds Have
Disappeared in Iraq: 1Vhat has Happened to Them.
423
prisoners were frequently subjected to political torture. T h eir property was generally
confiscated and then auctioned. It has been estimated that some 75 per cent o f the
villages in Iraqi Kurdistan have been destroyed through aerial bombardment, levelling or
burning. The Kurdish region occasionally had economic blockades imposed against it, and
basic items such as food, heating oil and medication frequently failed to reach the civilian
population. Tens of thousands of Kurds have been continued to be forcibly relocated
throughout the country. The Kurdish Legislative Assembly amounted to little more than
an instrument o f control by the regime. Only Kurdish members o f the Bath party were
permitted to run in its elections.103
Towards the end of the war the Kurdish peoples faced further catastrophes. In
view of the growing Kurdish control as the war progressed, the Ba'lh regime apparently
resorted to chemical weapons assaults upon areas controlled by insurgent forces as early as
1987
im
most visiblc attack occurred in the town of Halabja along the Iranian
border. O n March 16 and 17 the town was hit with chemical weapons that included
mustard gas and cyanide.105 The chemical attacks upon Halabja killed an estimated 5,(MX)
residents and forced more than 50,000 to flee the town.10" Survivors o f the Halabja
attack were relocated in the new "Saddam City of Halabja" 15 kilometres away from the
103 See discussion, for example, in Middle East Contemporary Survey 10 (1986), p. 382.
101 See "Chemicals arc not the Kurdish Issue", The Kurdish Program, Program Update,
March 1989.
105 See "The Use of Chemical Weapons: Conducting an Investigation Using Survey
Epidemiology, JAMA 262:5 (August 4, 1989).
106 See The Christian Science Monitor: Special Report, December 1988.
424
old city. Reluctant residents are encouraged to move by the regime with small parcels o f
land and a subsidy to build a house.107
With the ceasefire o f July 1988, the Kurdish situation resembled in many ways the
abrupt collapse of their movement in 1975 under the terms of the Algiers accord. The
ceasefire allowed the highly experienced Iraqi army to turn its attention northwards.
Within days o f the ceasefire an estimated 60,000 Iraqi forces, support by tanks, fighters
bombers and helicopters, commenced a six-week offensive to re-control Iraqi
Kurdistan.106 Kurdish insurgent forces were thrown onto the defensive and limited to
small-scale hit-and-run operations. It was the Kurdish people, however, that once again
received the brunt of Baghdads aggression. There were widespread reports that the Ba'th
regime was using chemical weapons, notwithstanding the international reaction to the
chemical massacre at Halabja. The relocation programmes were intensified as the regime
attempted to water down the Kurdish population in the north. Thousands of Kurdish
villages were razed and their inhabitants resettled throughout Iraq. A ll in all, the summer
offensive o f 1988 amounted to the collapse o f any meaningful Kurdish resistance. The
entire Kurdish population now faced the harshness of the Ba'th regime, a regime
hardened by the menacing nature o f the Kurdish struggle during the Iran-Iraq war.
The chemical weapons assault upon the Kurdish population, the incarceration and
torture of much of its population, and the systematic efforts to make Kurds into a minority
in their own homeland amounted to genocide. Martin van Bruinessens observations o f
107 Sec discussion in Human Rights in Iraq, op. cit., pp. 90-91.
1118 See detailed discussion by Ofra Bcngio, Middle East Contemporary Survey 12 (1988), 523525.
425
,-p
&
1986 that the "news from Kurdistan is sad and grim" rang truer by the end of the war."w
The gains during the war on the part of the resistance did not translate into anything
meaningful for the Kurdish peoples. They merely invited a harsher response by the Bath
regime. International outrage over Baghdads brutal policies failed to change or improve
anything. Eight years of war, at best, simply increased the hardship of the Kurdish people.
K<
p
f
Conclusion:
S '
The conclusion of hostilities of the Iran-Iraq war clearly fell with Iran. The Iraqi
regime, especially after the successful Iranian counteroffensive during the second year of
the war, was eager, if not desperate to end the war. The unpredictability associated with
$
the staggering costs o f the war undoubtedly influenced this strong desire within the
regime. Nonetheless, the regime managed to finesse its way through the war, and in the
end its political position was enhanced. The corollary of this consolidation was the decline
I
in the social power o f subordinate groups within the Iraqi social canvas. Their
organizations could not operate openly o r freely or independently of the Bathisl political
structure. Their interests were subverted in the face o f the war effort. The net effect of
%
I
v*
$
the war was the concretization of a political atmosphere in which women, the working
the future. It remains to be seen how the utter devastation ol Iraqi society in the lirst two
I
|
months o f 1990 will change this extremely bleak scenario.
classes or the Kurdish groups would be unlikely to advance their self-interests well into
109 Martin van Bruinessen, "The Kurds Between Iran and Iraq," M E R IP Middle East Report
16:4 (July-August 1986), p. 14.
426
Conclusion
Towards the Critical Study o f War:
This study began by outlining two very different responses to the question "Why
Study War?". It contrasted the conventional study o f war with the critical study o f war.
The conventional study o f war tends to view war as a necessarily destructive and harmful
event. Research on war in the twentieth century forms sharp parallels with the classical
study o f theodicy. War and peace are contrasted with each other much as Augustine
would have posed evil against good. Research has proceeded with a sense o f urgency,
almost an apocalyptic fervour, especially in the face of the destructive capabilities of
modern armaments. The simple reason for studying war is to eradicate it. The stately
idea o f securing peace by preparing for war - si vis pacem para bellum - has been
supplanted with the conviction that peace can be secured by knowing or understanding
war. To this end, conventional research has employed a naturalistic model of science
essentially derived from the study o f biology, chemistry or physics. War becomes the
thing to be explained. Analysts seek to provide a nomological portrait o f war. This
objective knowledge can then be employed to suppress or manipulate or coax the causal
variables so that war can be contained and eliminated. In Popperian terms, we enlist our
cumulative body o f scientific knowledge in a "piecemeal" fashion in order to "engineer" a
better, more peaceful world. Anatol Rapaport's idea o f releasing the cold logic of
mathematics upon a subject where "passions obscure reason" aptly sums up this research
venture. Acknowledgements about the difficulty of following through with this intellectual
enterprise have not led these scholars to challenge their most basic scientific assumptions.
Their faith remains firm. W e found that the conventional study o f war frequently draws
upon the study o f epidemiology for guidance and inspiration. The inoculation o f humanity
against social diseases such as war, so the analogy runs, is not unlike the inoculation o f an
individual against typhoid, yellow fever, polio and so on.
T h e conventional enterprise rests upon some of the most fundamental premises of
the Enlightenment era, especially the inherent faith in human reason and the idea that
knowledge could be used into order to sculpt a better world. O ur purpose in this study is
not to indict this approach. It is powerful if only because it has garnered widespread
subscription. T h e conventional study o f war embodies a moral elegance and rational allure
that commands intellectual mindfulness and respect. The Herodotian lament is as
disciplining as it is sobering. Nonetheless, we have cautiously outlined an alternative
response to our original question and called it the critical study o f war.1 It is broadly
defined as the contemplation o f war in terms o f dialectical critiques o f social power. The
critical study o f war rejects the classical liberal conception o f society in favour of radical
formulations that draw attention to skewed configurations o f social power among
countervailing social groups (especially socio-economic classes, racial groups and the
1 T o date the critical study of war has had relatively few contributions. See Arno J. Mayer,
"Internal Causes and Purposes of War in Europe, 1870 - 1956: A Research Assignment," Journal
o f Modem History 41 (September 1969); Lars Dencik, "Peace Research: Pacification or
Revolution?" Contemporary Peace Research Ghanshyam Pardesi cd. (Harvester, 1982); Ole Jess
Olsen and lb Martin Jarvad, "The Vietnam Conference Papers: a case study of a failure o f Peace
Research," Peace Research Society: Papers 14 (1970); Herbert G. Reid and Ernest J. Yanarella,
"Toward a Critical Theory of Peace Research in the United States: the Search for an Intelligible
Core," Journal o f Peace Research 13:4 (1976).
428
sexes). In this sense, the critical study of war addresses its subject matter in terms of race,
class and gender. The appellation "critical" is not chosen lightly; it flows from our view o f
society. Critical commentary was traditionally the commentary about social crisis.1 The
view that society is inherently conflictual, that is, that its constituencies are generally on
contradictory social paths that are likely to lead to social and political crises, invites the
exploitation of the common etymological origins o f the words critique and crisis.3 The
critical study of war, therefore, could be alternatively defined as the critique o f societys
inherently conflictual processes as they relate to warfare. W e comment upon contradictory
social processes and social crises, in other words, from the vantage point o f war. More
directly, the critical study of w ar thus concerns itself with the relationship between various
social constituencies on the one hand and the outbreak and course o f war on the other.'*
M ore bluntly, we ask what w ar has to do with social crises?
We are motivated by the preliminary suspician that warfare tends to reinforce
skewed relations o f social power and thereby frustrate or block the emancipatory
ambitions o f subordinate constituencies. Thomas Paines idea that taxes have not been
raised to carry on wars but that wars have been raised to carry on taxes accesses the
spirit of the critieal approach. In line with Marxs profound assessment of capital in the
Trinity Formula, war is not a thing to be manipulated o r controlled by human engineers
2 This meaning is still with us today. The idea of a "Critical Care Unit" in a hospital, for
example, links the word critical with bodily emergency or crisis.
3 Sec chapter one o f Scyla Benhabib, Critique, Norm and Utopia: A Study o f the Foundations
of Critical Theory, (Columbia University Press, 1986).
4 The critical study of war is not without its critics. See William Eckhardt, "The Radical
Critique of Peace Research: A Brief Review," Peace Research 18:3 (1986).
429
but rather a complex social process within and between specific social formations that
belong to distinct historical epochs.5 We also embrace a consequcntialist ethic that seeks
to judge warfare directly in terms o f its effect upon emancipatory struggles. It was in this
sense that we could conceive of a just war, that is, a war that is fought on behalf of
struggling social classes and groups rather than in terms o f its relationship to dcontological
or juridical abstractions. Finally, the critical study of war attaches itself to novel premises
concerning the relationship between theory and practice. That is, in contrast to
instrumentalist views, the critical study o f war seeks to transform social oppression by
means o f self-education and heightened awareness. It aims to provide a clearer picture
for oppressed groups themselves. While this may appear to be a lofty goal, it could be
suggested that the conventional approach is much more Panglossian. In our defense, one
could point to the 1991 G u lf War, for example, and observe that many North American
labour unions came out against the US governed intervention, and drew upon their
experience in Vietnam to formulate of their position. The working classes, they often
argued were the ones that fight and die in war.
5 Arguably this is the essence of Marxs view of capital. In volume I I I of Capital he writes:
... capital is not a thing, but rather a definite social production relation, belonging
to a definite historical formation of society, which is manifested in a thing and
lends this thing its specific social character... It is the means of production
monopolised by a certain section of society, confronting living labour-power as
products and working conditions rendered independent of this very labour-power,
which are personified through this antithesis capital. It is not merely the product
of labourers turned into independent power, products as rulers and buyers of
their producers, but rather also the social forces and the future.
Karl Marx, Capital, Book Three: The Process o f Capitalist Production as a Whole, cd., Frederick
Carrel, (Progress Publishers, 1959), pp. 814-815.
430
The C ritical Study o f the Iran-Iraq War:
W e have applied our critical approach to the Iran-Iraq war. In summary, we can
draw attention to its class imprint and conclude that it was a middle class war. One
clement o f the modern middle class in Iraq, bathed in an unlimited supply of oil revenues,
was threatened by the aggressive posture o f the traditional middle class regime in Iran.
Both regimes were mired in struggles with social forces in their respective countries. The
Bath regime was threatened by the activities o f Iraqs traditional middle class - the
clerics - as they sought to mobilize the urban underemployed and unemployed. The
thcocrats in Iran were struggling for control o f the post-revolutionary state apparatus
against elements o f the modern middle class, and were attempting to extend their class
hegemony across Iranian society in the face o f opposition from all shades of the political
spectrum. These class dynamics undergirded the slide to war.
T h e course o f the war also had a profound impact upon the relationship among
different constituencies in both countries. Both regimes, we might summarize, tended to
win the war in the sense that their political positions were strengthened. In Iran, the war
contributed directly to the consolidation of the radic 1 clerics. Among other things this
meant that the social position of the working classes, ethnic minorities and women
appreciably slipped in the face of the mass desecularization and Islamicization o f Iranian
society. In Iraq, the political position o f the Ba'th regime was reinforced. In view of the
Ba'thi political project, which refuses to tolerate any genuine or authentic opposition, this
consolidation resulted in the deterioration of subordinate constituencies across the Iraqi
social canvas, especially o f the working classes, women, and the Kurdish minority.
431
1
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Our analysis of Iran and Iraq was greatly enhanced through the rcconceptualized
state-society dynamic outlined in Chapter Three. Both Iran and Iraq were addressed as
modulating entities characterized in terms o f contending social groups. T h e drift to war
began when the old social formations of the Qajar dynasty and the Ottoman empire began
to disintegrate. W e could say that the drift to war began in 1858 with the Ottoman landcode and th e work of M idhat Parsa, or 1869 with the opening of the Suez canal, or at the
turn o f the century with the growing exposure o f Iranian intellectuals to Western ideas, or
in 1926 with the full accession of Reza Shah in Iran. These dates are pivotal not because
they venture far into the past, but because they mark key points in the socio-economic
transformation o f contemporary Iraq and Iran. These changes unleashed and tailored the
social forces, especially the modern middle classes, the disaffected traditional middle
classes, the working classes, the urban poor and peasants that formed the heart o f the
socio-political struggles throughout the twentieth century. As these social forces
congealed in the post-W W II period the road to war began.
T h e immediate political conflicts that precipitated the Iran-Iraq war were
addressed with guidance from the alternative stream of security analysis outlined in Chapter
Four. We drew attention to the rising tensions and insecurity between Iran and Iraq in
the months prior to the outbreak o f war in September 1980. We argued that the
developing security problems between the two countries were undergirdcd hy three
distinguishable political dynamics, namely, the efforts by Iran to incite Iraq s Shii
population, the alarm that a potential Shii rebellion created for the Ba'th regime, and
Iraqs efforts to secure and stabilize oil revenues. Each of these dynamics was directly
rooted in the broader socio-economic transformations that accompanied the gradual
432
insertion o f Iran and Iraq into the world economy over the century' prior to war. Irans
efforts to incite a Shii uprising in Iraq was entailed within a theocratic-populist discourse
that formed part o f the intense struggle among the social forces vying for control of the
1979 revolution. In Iraq, the Shii struggle reflected the efforts by the clerics to protect
themselves from the broad processes o f cultural secularization and economic
modernization that had drastically eroded their social prestige and material condition. The
fact that the Shi'i population was favourably disposed to these clerical efforts was rooted
in the processes, especially changing land-tenure structures, that had turned the Shii tribal
members into indigent peasants, prompting many of them to seek better lives in the city,
and leaving them as proletarianized workers and underemployed labourers that constitute
the bulk o f Iraqs urban poor. Again, the Ba'thist efforts to secure and stabilize oil
revenues, a struggle that impelled it to seize upon Irans momentary weakness in the
aftermath o f the Islamic revolution, was immediately rooted in the regimes struggle to
contain subordinate social forces in a repressive political environment, and nurse its
developing social base among Iraqs capitalist class.
W c have uncovered the social origins and social foundations o f the Iran-Iraq war.
It was a w ar of two societies in crisis. There can be no doubt that it was terribly costly. Its
human and material tolls are staggering. But the war was also socially devastating. It
entrenched repressive political regimes and continually eroded the social power of
subordinate constituencies. And in an important sense the war never ended. Iraqs
invasion o f Kuwait in 1990 may be partly understood in terms of the same forces that led
it to invade Iran in 1980. The subsequent mauling o f the society o f Mesopotamia will
undoubtedly have a profound effect upon subordinated social groups in Iraq and
433
throughout the region. They are unlikely to be favourable.
Extension of Study:
The critical study o f war can be significantly extended. A comparative analysis

could be undertaken in regions with different colonial experiences. T h e fractionated
colonial history of twentieth century Middle East, for example, differs radically from the
colonial experience in Central America, southern Africa o r southeast Asia. Consideration
must be given to varying resource wealth. Regional conflict and war among the
impoverished states in the Horn o f Africa may be impelled by different state/society
dynamics when compared with the oil-rich G u lf states. W e should also compare the
effects o f different regional relationships to the international economy. Areas that supply
agricultural products such as Central or South America, o r cheap labour, as in the Pacificrim may yield different effects when compared with the G ulf region where the primary
bond centres around the oil resource. Similarly, we would want to compare regions with
different cultural traditions, especially those that lack a unifying cultural baseline such as
Islam.
Beyond regional comparisons the critical analysis of war could also be extended
back in time. Two recent comprehensive examinations o f warfare in the modern era have
emerged.6 Although both studies are extremely scholarly they underscore the need for a
6 T h e first was Paul Kennedys The Rise and Fall o f the Great Powers: Economic Change and
Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000, (Random House, 1987). A more recent study is David
Kaisers Politics and War: European Conflict from Philip I I to Hitler, (Harvard University Press,
1990).
434
critical survey o f warfare in the modern era. What would a critical approach have to say,
for example, about the Wars of the Roses, the Thirty Years War, the wars in the New
World, the wars of the Ottoman Empire, King Williams War from 1689 to 1713, Queen
Annes W ar (o f Spanish Succession) from 1702 to 1713, King Georges W ar (o f Austrian
Succession) from 1740-1748, the Seven Years W ar commencing in 1756, the Napoleonic
Wars, the Russo-Persian and the Russo-Turkish Wars and W orld W ar I and World War
II.
We might anticipate that the class nature of warfare during the mercantilist era, as an
example, would be significantly different from the class nature o f World Wars I and II.7
Again, w e might hypothesize that the social nature of regional warfare in the post-W W II
period is fundamentally different from the social nature of warfare prior to 1945. The
critical study o f war, moreover, to the extent that it emphasizes previously unobserved
dynamics, might yield a radically different prognosis about the so-called post-cold war era,
a prognosis likely to contradict the hubristic celebratory-culture of American unipolarism.
Beyond applying the critical study o f war to different historical epochs, we can
explore the much broader relationship between modern waifare a- '1 *he evolution of
modern society. An infinite number of questions can be posed. W ith respect to gender
we could ask: How has modern war contributed to the social construction of gender and
the oppression of women? In what way have the liberating forces fo r women during
warfare been carried over into post-war periods? In what manner are traditional
conceptions o f gender reinforced through the prosecution o f war? How is warfare itself
imbued with gender? With respect to class struggle: In what manner has warfare assisted
7 Perry Anderson appears to have been the only writer to explicitly call for a periodization
of war. See Lineages of the Absolutist State, (Verso, 1979), pp. 31-37.
435
j
/f
or impaired the emancipatory struggles of the working class? Has the historical support
for warfare varied among different social classes? What are the relative roles o f social
classes in the origins o f warfare? How docs war reinforce cultural themes upon which the
]
i
configuration of class power rests? With respect to racial struggle: How has warfare
)
s
s
5
consolidated political systems at the expense of racial minorities? In what manner has the
prosecution of warfare reinforced racial themes that in turn reinforce skewed distributions
I
o f social power? And more locally, for example, how has the Canadian experience o f
t
s
warfare affected the social condition of the indigenous people?
The Development o f International Relations Theory:
The particular view of society that informs the critical study o f war necessitates
that we overcome the limited conceptualizations of the slate/society complex that
predominates the analysis o f International Relations. In Chapter Two we noted that a
sclerotic conception o f the state and society has prevailed in the study of war. In
particular, society tended to be viewed in holistic or monolithic terms with little attention
afforded to social stratification or cleavage. Secondly, when attention was given to social
cleavages, society was not viewed as a dynamic and continually evolving entity. Calls to
revamp the analysis o f state and society within the field of international relations have
been increasingly voiced throughout the 1980s.8 In Chapter Three we provided an
8 For example sec Robert Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond
International Relations Theory," Millennium 10:2 (Summer 1981). Similarly, see R.B.J. Walker,
"The Territorial State and the Theme of Gulliver," in International Journal 29:3 (Summer 1984),
529-552.
436
alterative analysis o f state and society that drew heavily upon recent debates. We
explicitly rejected the liberal conception of society in favour of conceptions which
emphasize skewed relations of social power, especially class power. This conception of
society poses a fundamental challenge to analysts o f war. Recent contributions to the
study of war in international relations, such as Robert Gilpins War and Change in
International Politics, still tend to employ conceptions of state and society that entirely
overlook relations o f social power. In the strongest possible terms, we contend that an
adequate understanding o f war can only be achieved by examining the relationship
between evolving configurations of social power on the one hand and warfare on the
other.
With repscct to the study of security it was argued that conventional analysis
suffers from a scries of limitations. First, it tends to assume that prevailing
characterizations o f security can be freely extended across society. Second, conventional
analysis frequently reifies prevailing security problems by seeing them as the given or
core security concerns o f the state or by deducing them from the state system. Third,
conventional analysis tends to examine security problems in correlative terms, that is, as
corresponding to some objective condition in the world. Finally, wc argued that
conventional security analysis generally fails or refuses to acknowledge the inherent
political content o f security problems. This study overcame these limitations. It avoided
universalizing the security concerns, it addressed security problems in terms of socio
political struggles within society, it considered security problems in terms o f social actors
Robert Gilpin, War and Change in International Politics, (Gimbridge University Press, 1981).
437
within wider cultural and political nets, and recognized the inherent political nature of
security discourses.
International relations has historically been animated by debates that set the terms
of reference for subsequent generations o f scholarship. The Idealist challenge to Realist
thinking and the behaviourial challenge to the traditionalists constituted the two primary
theoretical axes well into the 1970s. More recently, the paradigmatic debate reinvigorated
the field and o f .; e d a fresh way of approaching the discipline.10 According to this
debate, International Relations can be divided into a number o f contending paradigms that
embody different assumptions regarding the key actors, issues and dynamics of global
politics. The most common division identifies three paradigms - Realism, Liberalism and
Structuralism - and suggests that research within the field will be more or less
commensurate with one of the three. A comparison of standard text-books within
international relations, such as Morgenthaus Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for
Power and Peace or Kal Holstis International Politics: A Framework for Analysis, with Paul
R. V io tti and M ark V. Kauppis recent contribution entitled International Relations
Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism reveals the extended effect o f the paradigmatic
debate upon the teaching of the discipline.11
An engagement with the paradigmatic debate from the perspective of this study is
revealing. The thrust here stands in dramatic contrast to analyses that seek to explain war
10 See Michael Banks, "The Inter-Paradigm Debate," in International Relations: A Handbook

of current Theory, eds. Margot Light and A.J.R. Groom (Lynne Reinner Publishers, Inc., 1985),
11 Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism,
Globalism, (Macmillan Publishing Company, 1987).
438
with reference to the distribution of power across the state system. This study, that is,
helps to disclose the severe limitations of the Realist paradigm, as exemplified in Stephen
Krasners recent contribution to the field entitled Structural Conflict: The Third World
Against Global Liberalism^2 W hile states may indeed gaze at each other in a manner
befitting gladiators, as Hobbes famous analogy claims, in order to understand why one
particular state becomes a threat to another, or why one state suddenly casts wary glances
towards its neighbours, w e must look at societal-level relations. Analysts must consider
the manner in which socio-economic and socio-political struggles inside the state come to
condition inter-state relations. Dynamics of inter-state power stand in a relational manner
to these social floors. Dynamics of inter-state power are not universal; they are entirely
contingent. Configurations of inter-state power, that is, can only play themselves out
when allowed to do so by uplifting determinations of the social floor. Relations o f state
power, so to speak, will only matter if underlying balances among social forces permit
them to matter. The very reasons, for example, why Iran was a threat to Iraq in 1980, as
opposed to Kuwait or Turkey o r Saudi Arabia, cannot be adequately explained by
reference to international power systems or balances o f power in the M iddle East.
Nonetheless, this study has carefully avoided the ritualistic commination against the
dominant Realist paradigm. This is largely due to the fact that during the 1980s another
challenge has emerged that radically criticizes many of the fundamental precepts o f the
entire field o f international relations, especially its positivist foundations. Any paradigm
purporting to offer the definitive account o f international relations immediately comes
i; Stephen Krasner, Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism, (University
o f California Press, 1985).
439
under suspicion. Analysis must recognize that paradigms are neither right nor wrong but
rather politically saturated. These observations could be summarized as the challenge of
critical theory. "Theory," summarizes one of the main contributors to this debate, "is
always for someone and for some purpose."1' The fact that the so-labelled structuralist
paradigm is most amenable to the analytical thrust o f this study, in conclusion, reflects the
"purposeful" nature o f the analysis, and not any claim that this paradigm is closer to the
"truth".
The critical theoretical debate in international relations is currently bifurcated into
two contending streams, one which could be labelled post-modern or post-structural, and
one which could be labelled nco-Gramscian.u The primary distinction centres around the
continuing emphasis upon social power. The post-modern strain unfortunately fails to
consistently address the issue of skewed social power and therefore is more often .han not
accompanied by a relatively obscure and dangerously malleable political agenda. The post
modern writings are often inaccessible, stylistically torturous and completely devoid o f any
empirical references or analysis. It would not be unfair to suggest that the critical
challenge has so far made a nominal contribution to the international relations field as a
whole, but that its potential impact is considerable. This study shares many o f the
concerns that have been raised by the critical theoretical tradition within international
13 Robert W. Cox, "Postscript, 1985" in NeoRcalism and its Critics, (Columbia University
Press, 1986).
14 The post-modern strain in best represented by the work o f Ashley and Walker, especially
their debates in Alternatives and their 34:3 (September 1990) contributions to International Stadia
Quarterly. The neo-Gramscian tradition is best represented by Robert W. Cox, particularly his
Power, Protlucdon and World Order. Social Forces in the Making o f Histoty, (Columbia University
Press, 1987).
440
relations, particularly its lack of concern with social power and social oppression, the
tendency to reify analytical categories, the failure to address the discourse o f the
International Relations field as part of a wider social discourse and cultural traditional, its
positivist reflex and the tendency to deny that the field has an inherent political cut.
T h e contribution o f these writings will be strengthened considerably by taking
them out o f their subjunctive guise. This study does not purport to further the theoretical
challenges raised by critical commentators in the field. It has sought rather to outline the
points o f the critical theoretical compass as they relate to the local subject domain of war.
It has, so to speak, descended from the abstruseness of the critical challenge with the aim
o f giving the theory o f war an unambiguous political hue. In doing so it makes a
contribution to the sparse empirical corpus o f the critical challenge. Studies of this nature
must, ultimately, speak to those subordinate groups that occasionally have to live through
the horrors of modern warfare. It must be useful to those who are attempting to better
their social condition. If it misses here, it simply fails.
441
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A CRITICAL STUDY OF THE IRAN-IRAQ

a dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of

Permission has been granted to the LIBRARY OF YORK

I recommend that the dissertation prepared

A CRITICAL STUDY OP THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR

be accepted in partial fulfillment of the

This dissertation contrasts two approaches to the study o f war in international

I wish to thank the participants of the Donner Workshop on Conflict Management.

The Critical Study o f War

Analyzing the Social Foundations of War

Analyzing Societies and States in the ThirdWorld

Amplifying the Social Dimensions of Security

The Iran-Iraq War

Conventional Accounts o f the Iran-Iraq War

Social Transformation and Revolution in Iran

State and Society in Iraq:

The Developing Security Problematic Between Iran and Iraq

The War and Clerical Consolidation in Iran

The War and Ba'thist Consolidation in Iraq

Conventional and Critical Study of War

The Critical Study of War

The Prevailing Response:

sciences interest in so-called conventional warfare."9 The tenor o f the research

Students of war are under a special injunction to "publish or perish. War is

A t the core o f the naturalistic understanding of social and political inquiry is

the demand for empirical explanatory theories of human behaviour. When

thing to be explained; war is explicated by identifying those independent variables

have been isolated and rendered susceptible o f intellectual definition.12

But in his assessment o f these gaps Wilkinson

12 Luther Lee Bernard, op.cit., p. 213.

W c see, therefore, in the prevailing response to our original question, an

17 Hanson and Russett, op. cit., p. 9.

Science, like Art, is fun, a playing with truths, and no game

O ther commentators rationalized the challenge o f Peace Research in a similar manner.

19 Sec "Introduction", War, It Causes and Correlates, p. 5.

The form of characteristically scientific knowledge in the modern period thus

order lo produce a desired outcome or prevent an undesired one are

A prescription based on faulty analysis would be unlikely to produce the

The Critical Response:

As reasonably compelling and as morally alluring as the conventional response first

social concerns generally privileged by critical theory. The ontological suppositions

w It is appropriate here to briefly speak of the term 'critical. It is important to recognize

rather as part o f a complex socio-political dynamic.'1 T h e critical study o f war must

41 Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, (Beacon Press, 1964), ix.