Anti-Corruption Versus Political Security: Reflection On The Vietnamese Context

42
Int. J. Diplomacy and Economy, Vol. 2, Nos. 1/2, 2014
Anti-corruption versus political security: reflection on

the Vietnamese context
Vu Cong Giao
School of Law,
Vietnam National University Hanoi,
E1 Building, 144 Xuan Thuy Road,
Cau Giay District, Hanoi, Vietnam
E-mail: giaochr@gmail.com
Abstract: This paper demonstrates that key driving force of anti-corruption
attempts of Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) is concern about the damage
that corruption is causing to its legitimacy. This leads to strict control of the
CPV over civil and political rights during anti-corruption process, which
springs up from the fear that these rights may be used to raise the people
against the mono leadership of the CPV. The author believes that, the CPVs
anti-corruption strategy is strongly influenced by Lee Kuan Yews theory, in
which democracy is not an indispensable factor for economic development and
fighting corruption. Because of this, the CPV is now facing a dilemma:
Constraining political freedoms makes the anti-corruption work at standstill,
while tolerating those freedoms may cause risks for the mono leadership of the
CPV in the country. The author concludes that, without more far-reaching
political reforms, corruption in Vietnam can not be dealt with.
Keywords: Vietnam; corruption; anti-corruption; political security; political
freedoms; human rights; civil and political rights; Communist Party of
Vietnam; CPV.
Reference to this paper should be made as follows: Giao, V.C. (2014)
Anti-corruption versus political security: reflection on the Vietnamese
context, Int. J. Diplomacy and Economy, Vol. 2, Nos. 1/2, pp.4270.
Biographical notes: Vu Cong Giao is a Lecturer of Human Rights and
Constitutional Laws of the School of Law under Vietnam National University.
Overview of anti-corruption in Vietnam
1.1 A long-term struggle and a comprehensive legal framework

Anti-corruption has been a historical effort in Vietnam because it started immediately
after the country attained independence in 1945 and continues to date.
A few days after reading the Declaration of Independence in Hanoi (19th August
1945) that fathered the new independent country of Vietnam, President Ho Chi Minh sent
a letter to his comrades who were leading provinces, in which he emphasised that one of
the most serious demerits of governmental staff is stealing public property for private
use and asked to punish bribe takers by law (Ho Chi Minh, Complete Works, Vol. 4:
166). As argued by some local authors, this shows that the CPV started its anti-corruption
Copyright 2014 Inderscience Enterprises Ltd.
Anti-corruption versus political security
43
work immediately after it seized power from French colonialism [Son and Luc et al.,
(2008), p.153].
A series of relevant events have happened in Vietnam showing that the fight against
corruption has been continuously carrying out since after Independence to date, of which
the typical ones include:
In terms of laws, on November 23, 1946, President Ho Chi Minh signed the
Presidential Degree No.64-SL establishing a Special Inspection Section. Among crimes
within the jurisdiction of the Section is bribery. This can be considered the first legal
document of Vietnam relating to anti-corruption. Following this Degree, to present,
hundreds of legal documents including laws, ordinances, degrees, resolutions (of the
National Assembly), circulars, decisions, etc., have been adopted by the National
Assembly, the Government and Ministries of Vietnam, which directly or indirectly
mentioned the issue of curbing corruption.
In terms of policies, in the Resolution adopted in its third Congress (from 5 to
10/9/1960), the CPV (Communist Party of Vietnam, hereinafter the CPV) pointed out the
requirement for fighting against activities of embezzlement and wastage. This
requirement was repeated and emphasised in the Resolutions adopted in the later CPC
Congresses (the fourth organised from 14 to 20/12/1976, the fifth from 27 to 31/3/1982,
the sixth from 15 to 18/12/1986, the seventh from 24 to 27/6/1991, the eighth from 28 to
61/7/1996, the ninth from 19 to 422/4/2001, the tenth from 18 to 425/4/2006) and also
the Resolution of the XIth CPCs Congress which was recently held in January 2011 as
well as in many Resolutions adopted by the CPVs Central Committee during this
duration. Some of the later resolutions, particularly those adopted after Doi Moi,
contained not only vague callings, but also specific instructions regarding personnel and
organisational work of the CPV with the aim to enhance the effectiveness of the fight
against corruption. The commitment to anti-corruption has been directly reflected in
many strong statements in various documents, which were recently adopted by the CPV.
In this regard, two typical examples are worth quoting. The first was made at the
10th Congress of the CPV, which affirmed their determination to punish decisively and
strictly people who are openly corrupt, regardless of their position, whether on active
service or retired [CPV (2006c), p.41]. The second was stated at the 3rd Conference of
the Xth Party Central Committee of the CPV, which reads the entire Party, political
system, and the whole of society shall be determined to prevent and fight corruption, to
stop and gradually push it back [CPV, (2006b), p.23].
The anti-corruption work was expedited by the CPV since the mid of 1990s after the
collapse of the former Soviet Unions and the system of Eastern European socialist
countries as well as a series of shaking disturbances in the rural area of Vietnam, of
which the significant legal activity was the 1998 Ordinance on Anti-Corruption (revised
2000). Since then, a dozens of relevant laws have been adopted of which the landmark
one is the 2005 Law on Anti-Corruption (revised 2007 and 2012). Vietnam signed the
UN Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) in December 2003, and ratified in June
2009 and participated in a review of its implementation in 2011.
Thanks to the CPV and Governments efforts, Vietnam now has a quite
comprehensive legal framework against corruption, in which the Anti-corruption Law is
the backbone. Passed by the National Assembly of Vietnam on 29th November 2005,
was the amended in August 2007 with only one article added relating to the establishment
of Anti-corruption Steering Committees in provinces. Again, it was amended in 2012 to
44
V.C. Giao
reform the system of Anti-corruption Steering Committees and tighten measures of

property disclosing.
In general, the main policies reflected in the 2005 Anti-corruption Law of Vietnam
(revised in 2007 and 2012) include:
Creating legal basis for fostering publicity and transparency of state apparatus,
which is presented through a series of provisions on publicity, transparency in
activities of agencies, organisations, units in all sectors (Section 1, Chapter II).
Reforming public administration with a view to enhance the independence and

accountability of agencies, organisations or units, which is manifested through the
regulations on regimes, norms, criteria, responsibilities of the heads, as well as
requirements for administration reform, renewal of management of technologies and
payment notes in functioning of state agencies, organisations or units (Sections 2, 5
and 6 of Chapter II).
Improving management of human resources, which is mainly evinced through the

series of provisions on codes of conducts, rules of professional ethnics, changes of
working positions of public servants (Section 3, Chapter II), as well as the provisions
on disclosing of properties and incomes of public servants (Section 4, Chapter II).
Strengthening mechanism for detection of corruption, which is laid down in the

Chapter III of the Law (Detection of Corruption).
Engaging the society in the fight against corruption, this is evidenced through the
chapter VI of the Law (Role and responsibilities of the society in corruption
prevention and combat).
The above-mentioned content of the Anti-corruption Law of Vietnam made it one of the
most wide-ranging anti-corruption laws in Asia in terms of thematic scope, according to a
desk review of Asian national laws against corruption [DANIDA, (2009), p.8]. In
addition to the 2005 Anti-corruption Law, a National Strategy against Corruption up to
2020, which was announced on May 12th, 2009 and took effect on June 1st, 2009, is also
a legal landmark in the legal framework against corruption in Vietnam. This marked the
first time in the country when anti-corruption work was expanded to a national systematic
plan of action. The document sets viewpoints and objectives, as well as focuses on
solutions and a specific implementation plan in the fight against corruption in Vietnam up
to 2020. In addition, the document specifies responsibilities of state agencies and
organisations in the socio-political system in the implementation of the strategy.
1.2 The exclusive role and corruption inside the CPV

The CPV is a Marxist-Leninist party and operates on the principle of democratic
centralism [CPV, (2011), p.1] established in 1930. From a few hundred members at the
beginning, by 2010, the CPV had over 3.6 million members, amounting to 4% of the
population. With a large organisation from the central to grassroots levels and a great
number of members connected to each other by ideology, the CPV is one of the largest
and well-organised political parties in the world. These factors, particularly the broad
organisation that connects directly to the state apparatus from the central to grassroots
levels, help the CPV hold and control the unique political power in Vietnam during the
45
last haft century. Nevertheless, learning from the collapse of the Communist Bloc in the
last two decades, the CPV perceived that all the above factors are not the key to maintain
its sole political leadership. This perception has motivated the CPV to initiate and
organise the implementation of the Renovation in 1986.
Although Article 4 of the 1992 Constitution of Vietnam stipulated that the CPV is
the leading force of the State and the society (with no references to only) and there is
no provisions prohibiting the establishment of political parties, in fact, the CPV is the
unique and there is no other political party could be established in Vietnam.1
Since the CPV is the only ruling party in Vietnam, no other domestic forces can
interfere with and oversee activities of the Party. At present, financial activities of the
CPV is mainly controlled via its inspection commission. In recent years, its inspection
commission detected more and more corrupts cases inside the CPV though they were
rarely made public to the media. Specifically, in the 10th CPVs Congress (2006a), its
Central Inspection Commission has found the amount of violation more than 136 billion
VND (CPV, 2006a), which has almost doubled (91.99%) that in the 9th Congress (in
2001). These amounts of violation show that the incidence of corruption within the CPV
is not high (in comparison with the state apparatus, although many people believe that
this is only the tip of the iceberg); however, the high increase in this figure in two
consecutive CPVs Congresses implies that corruption has developed rapidly inside the
Party. In this regard, the above report of the CPVs Central Committee for Inspection:
...through financial inspection, the violations are worrying, where have inspection, there
have violations at different levels, a number of officials have been disciplined
(CPV, 2006a).
The principle of criticism and self-criticism is considered as the main weapon of the
CPV in fighting corruption internally, but it is not fully obeyed in practice. To illustrate,
in many places corrupt members of the CPV are elected to leadership positions in the
Party and state agencies. Defendants in notorious corruption cases recently, such as
Huynh Ngoc Sy (West-East highway case in Ho Chi Minh City), Pham Thanh Binh
(Vinashin case), Duong Chi Dung (Vinalines case) and Bui Tien Dung (PMU18 case), in
addition to their high-ranking positions in their offices, all held high positions in the
CPVs units therein. Prime Minister, Mr. Nguyen Tan Dung, has admitted that although
Vinashin corporation has almost 6,000 workers are CPVs members, corruption have
happened in a long period of time without any complaint letter by any of them, while the
heads of this corporation were elected by many CPVs units (VietnamNet, 2013). The
CPVs Central Standing Committee has recently noted that despite the pressure of the
Party disciplines, A significant number of CPV members and state officials, among who
are those keep leadership and managerial positions and even high-ranking positions, have
experienced degradation in political ideology, moral values, lifestyle, with different
demonstrations of losing their ideal, increased individualism, opportunism, materialism,
discretion, indiscipline, etc. [CPV, (2011), p.171].
1.3 Limited achievements and questioned political will

All of the above discussion shows that the CPVs strong political will and considerable
efforts against corruption. However, some recent studies have showed little results gained
by the CPV in this area. Specifically, despite of the CPVs efforts, the position of
Vietnam in the ranking of the Transparency International (hereinafter TI) from 2000 to
2012 (TI CPI 20002012) is always low.
46
Table 1
V.C. Giao
CPI and country ranks of Vietnam in 20002012
Year
Corruption perception index (CPI) of Vietnam
Country rank of Vietnam
2000
2.5
75/90
2001
2.6
55/91
2002
2.4
85/102
2003
2.4
100/133
2004
2.6
102/145
2005
2.6
107/159
2006
2.6
111/163
2007
2.6
123/180
2008
2.7
121/180
2009
2.7
120/180
2010
2.7
116/178
2011
2.9
112/182
2012
2.2
123/176
Regarding CPI, the TI has divided the countries around the world into 10 groups
(9.010.0; 8.08.9; 7.07.9; 6.06.9; 5.05.9; 4.04.9; 3.03.9; 2.02.9; 1.01.9 and no
data). As shown in Table 1, Vietnam has never escaped from the second lowest group of
CPI (the second highest group of corruption) from 2000 to 2012, though the CPI has
fluctuated a bit throughout the years. In terms of country rank, Vietnam has always been
at the bottom of the group with the highest rates of corruption from 2000 to 2012, also
with minor fluctuations.
Figure 1
Peoples perceptions of corruption prevalence (see online version for colours)
Note: % saying corruption is prevalent, by income
Supporting the CPI, the TIs 2010 Global Corruption Barometer Report showed that 63%
of respondents believed that corruption in Vietnam had increased in the previous three
47
years and 35% of respondents believed that the States anti-corruption policies were
ineffective (TI GCB, 2010), while a survey conducted by the Governmental Inspectorate
and the World Bank in 2012 show that 82.3% of respondents believed that corruption
was widespread and extremely prevalent nationwide (although the level of corruption
was less prevalent at lower level of authorities) [WB and GI, (2012), pp.3132].
From a different aspect, the majority (86.5%) of citizens perceived corruption as
serious and very serious at the national level (although corruption is perceived as less
serious at the lower level of authorities) [WB and GI, (2012), p.33].
Figure 2
Peoples perceptions of corruption seriousness (see online version for colours)
Note: % saying corruption is serious, by income
Also according to the above survey, corruption is widespread in many economic sectors
and has spread to many parts of the State, including areas that are considered of moral
importance, such as education, health, social policy, humanitarian, charity, and in law
enforcement agencies. The report shows that there are high levels of agreement among
public officials, firms and citizens about the ten sectors most impacted by corruption
(top-down), which are:
1
traffic police
land management
customs
construction
transportation
mineral management
health
economic police
tax
10 planning and investment [WB and GI, (2012), pp.3839].
48
Figure 3
V.C. Giao
The most corrupt sectors according to public officials, enterprises, and citizens
(see online version for colours)
Note: % selecting sector as among the top 3
Corruption in Vietnam is not only common in the relationships between state agencies
and the private sector, but also in the relationships among enterprises. The study
Integrity and Transparency in Business Initiative for Vietnam (ITBI project)
revealed the presence of corruption among enterprises. According to this study,
61.5% of enterprises gave money to the persons in charge of contract negotiation. The
proportion of enterprises that invited their clients to banquets was 47.3%. Most
enterprises offered kickbacks to their clients to some extent (Vietnam Economic Forum,
July 26, 2011).
As identified by the CPV on its Resolution of the 11th Party Congress (2011):
Corruption, waste, red tape, negatives and social evils have not been prevented or
repelled but have become increasingly complicated [CPV, (2011), p.46]. Hence, it is not
surprising that there is increasing skepticism of Vietnamese people on the CPVs
commitment against corruption, as quoted: the Party and the State have been criticising
corruption in society while people in positions of power have obviously been acting
corruptly as if they knew nothing about it. Corruption has increased, and with more
sophistication and complexity. Corruption has fostered systematic wrongdoing
[CECODES, (20080, p.11]. More evidently, skeptical attitude of local people towards the
CPVs commitment against corruption is admitted by the Vietnamese Government in its
National Strategy on Anti-corruption to 2010, which reads: Corruption remains
widespread and serious, particularly in sectors such as land management and use,
investment and construction, equitization of state owned enterprises, use of state capital,
natural resources and assets. This has eroded public confidence in party and state
leadership [Vietnamese Government, (2009), p.1].
49
Main factors limiting the effectiveness and efficiency of anti-corruption

work
The survey conducted by the Governmental Inspectorate and the World Bank in 2012
also indicates the ten most common causes of corruption include:
1
lack of serious penalties for corrupt people
erosion of public officials ethics
existing ask-give mechanism
limited checks-and-balances for powerful public officials
complicated and cumbersome administrative procedures
poor control of assets and income of powerful public officials
many loopholes in regulations governing public capitals and assets management
no or very few corruption cases detected
low transparency and information disclosure in public agencies
10 weakness in human resource promotion and appointment [WB and GI, (2012), p.66].
From other angles, interviewees of this research2 reveal that, although the legal
framework against corruption in Vietnam is comprehensive, it has, in practice, trivial
effect due to various factors limiting the effects of the anti-corruption work of which the
followings are the important ones:
2.1 First, group interest vs. anti-corruption

As argued by all interviewees, the political will against corruption in Vietnam is
primarily found in the CPV and Vietnamese Government, but not of the whole society.
Moreover, the political will is weakened and questionable because of group interest. In
this regard, there is an unspoken fight inside the CPV, at all of its levels, between the
CPVs members who resolutely combat corruption and those who try to slow down, or
even resist, the struggle to maintain their privileges. The reason is very simple, the CPV
is a ruling party so almost all its members are also government officials and many of
them (and/or their relatives), are involved in corrupt acts. These CPV members are
normally verbally supportive while practically undermining the fight against corruption
in the country.
2.2 Second, gap of understanding regarding corruption

There is a gap of understanding regarding corruption pertaining to the Vietnamese
Government and international institutions. Specifically, while according to international
institutions, the definition of corruption includes any acts of demanding money outside
of fixed charge or taking commissions for favours on the part of the civil servants, the
Vietnamese governments unspoken view is that civil servants can conventionally take a
certain margin, or commission, on the fixed charge for whatever they do in their job.
This mainly results from the fact that no civil servants in the country can make a living
50
V.C. Giao
on their salary alone, therefore, they have no choice but to provide for their families,
because the Government cannot. Thus, the Government accepts the practice of civil
servants receiving fixed charges or commission in order to keep the government system
alive.
The irrational aspects of the salary regime in the government system, and its relation
to corruption situation in Vietnam have recently been re-emphasised by many local and
foreign specialists in local media (Vo Quoc Tuan, Martin Painter and Nguyen Huu Dung,
VietnamNet 11-12/9/2010). In order to solve the problem, the Vietnamese Government
has been pursuing salary reform, and tightening of legal provisions on financial
management in government offices. However, as observed by some local specialists, the
initiatives are generally halfway measures and therefore bring very little effect.
Specifically, according to Mr. Nguyen Huu Dung, Director of the Institute for Labour
Sciences, from 1960 to present following salary reforms, the factual salary of government
officials in Vietnam has not increased. Rather, it has been gradually decreased. As noted
by Mr. Dung, in 1960, the minimum wage of government official was 27.5 VND which
was equivalent to 2/10 tael of gold, while in 2010, the minimum wage of government
official is 730,000 VND which is equivalent to only 1/30 tael of gold (VietnamNet,
2010). That is the reason why corruptions is still very common in government offices in
Vietnam under the various forms of commission or fixed charges and are normally not
considered corrupt acts, but undeclared incomes of government officials as called by
another local specialist, Vo Quoc Tuan (VietnamNet, 2010). In this regard, as noted by an
interviewee, it is only considered an issue when the commission is an outrageously
large sum, or an individual keeps all the commission to himself, instead of distributing
it fairly among the members of his team or department, in proportion to their respective
positions. In other words, what matters is not whether there was an exchange of money
outside of the rules with regards to administrative work, but how large that sum was and
whether they fairly shared it among themselves.
2.3 Third, piecemeal and non-continuous approach to tackling corruption

As observed by many interviewees of this research and also some authors [TI, (2006),
p.34], the Vietnamese Government has a generally piecemeal and non-continuous
approach to tackling corruption. Although Government has already adopted the National
Strategy Anti-Corruption, it is not clear that they are being pursued systematically and
regularly. Moreover, although almost all the government agencies have developed their
own plan against corruption following the National Strategy, those plans are often
formalistic but do not provide a practical and systematic approach to tackling corruption
in their own ranks. Hence, the fight against corruption in Vietnam generally still reflect
characteristic of movements (formalistic and unsustainable way of working) in doing
every social and legal programmes and campaigns in the country.
2.4 Fourth, political immunity in investigating and prosecuting corruption

Although the CPV and Government have always pledged to root out corruption
regardless of who is involved, there is little evidence suggesting that this is what really
happens in practice. In this regard, while the neighbouring socialist country of China has
prosecuted (and even executed) some very high ranking officials including a member of
Politburo of Chinese Communist Party, there have not been cases in which the
51
Vietnamese officials at minister ranking and over so far prosecuted though there are
many cases in which very high ranking official were denounced. In fact, there have been
so far several cases in which some high-ranking officials were dismissed or prosecuted
for mismanagement, but almost all of them are under ministerial position. As examples,
Deputy Prime Minister Ngo Xuan Loc, former Central State Bank Governor Cao Sy
Kiem, and former State Customs Chief Phan Van Dinh, were dismissed for
mismanagement in a CPV self-criticism campaign in November 1999; or in the typical
case of Nam Cam (a very famous head of a national wide organised crime gang) in 2003,
among 154 defendants tried alongside Nam Cam were several senior CPVs officials
including Former Deputy Minister of Ministry of Police Bui Quoc Huy (who was
sentenced to three years in jail for dereliction of duty); the former Head of State Radio
Tran Mai Hanh (who was given a ten-year sentence and fined 128 million Dong
(US $8,000) for receiving bribes); Former Deputy Head of People Supreme Procuracy
Pham Sy Chien [who was also convicted of receiving bribes and given a six-year
sentence and fined 434 million Dong (US $27,000)]. In addition, in PMU18 case, Vice
Minister of Ministry of Transport Nguyen Viet Tien was arrested and prosecuted, but
finally cleared from the criminal charge the decision caused a lot of controversy in
Vietnamese society. Since Doi Moi 1986, only one minister and one member of the
National Assembly have been dismissed during their term of office and got light
sentences of some years imprisonment because of corruption, including Mr. Vu Ngoc
Hai, who was former Minister of Ministry of Energy sentenced three years of
imprisonment in 1995 under the crime of irresponsibility caused serious damages
committed during the time he led the building of the North to South 500KV electric wire
system of Vietnam and Mr. Le Minh Hoang, who was, at the time of being arrested and
sentenced to 4 years of imprisonment for corruption in 2009, a member of the National
Assembly and Director of the Electricity Service of Ho Chi Minh City.
The above mentioned situation clearly shows that unlike China, Vietnam is still not
ready to deal with serious accusations against top or senior officials of the CPV and
Government. In other words, political immunity in fighting corruption is still a big
problem facing Vietnam.
2.5 Fifth, weak institutional coherence and disregarded role of civil society
Institutional coherence refers to the relationship between the key institutions tasked with
the fight against corruption. Institutional coherence is necessary because it allows
engaging different stakeholders, mobilising various resources and tackling the problem of
overlap in fighting corruption. In Vietnam, institutional coherence relates to the relation
between government agencies, CPVs system and civil society organisations. However,
by way of priority, focus should be on the cooperation between different agencies of
government apparatus and between government agencies and civil society organisations.
Relating to the cooperation between various agencies of government apparatus, all
interviewees of this research and many authors [Son and Luc et al., (2008), p.177;
TI, (2006), p.7, p.34] believed that there is still a lack of clarity on how the various
anti-corruption agencies in Vietnam work together. Specifically, the National
Anti-Corruption Steering Committee is formally tasked with leading the fight against
corruption, but so far nobody could expound upon the manner in which the State Audit,
Public Security Forces, Peoples Procuracy, and Government Inspectorate are to
collaborate. While the cooperation mechanism is still not clear, jurisdictional disputes
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V.C. Giao
and even institutional rivalry are considerable between these institutions. In this regard,
although the National Strategy against corruption recently specifies some principles for
these institutions to work together, it remains to be seen how successful these principles
will be implemented. To date, all interviewees of this research agreed that anti-corruption
activities in Vietnam are still wide-ranging and uncoordinated, frequently consisting of
statements and slogans.
In relation to the second aspect, some studies show that the fight against corruption in
Vietnam has been so far not based on the people or civil society [CECODES, (2008),
pp.2021]. In this regard, though the CPV and Government have a relatively strong
tradition of public consultation through mass organisations, consultation is actually quite
formalistic and narrowly-based. That is one among reasons why state agencies are more
at home with secrecy than openness [TI, (2006), p.34] and many people and local civil
society organisations are mistrustful and ignorant of the fight against corruption since this
work has been considered the responsibility of state agencies such as the Party
Committees and government agencies [CECODES, (2008), p.21]. Specifically, many
people even complained that dissemination of anti-corruption documents and information
is mostly directed to Party units rather to community, and: where local government
activities are required to be transparent, only key officials, representatives of mass
organizations and the Fatherland Front are allowed to present, while the public are not
invited. Officials commonly say people know nothing about supervision [CECODES,
(2008), p.21, p.40].
2.6 Sixth, degeneration of the CPVs system and state apparatus

During the time of two Vietnam Wars in the 20th century, the CPV did succeed in
building its effective system of party units and an integrity state apparatus, which can be
considered as one of main reasons for its victory in the 9-years struggle against the
French (19461954) and 20-years fight against the Southern Governments backed by the
US (19541975). However, the CPVs system and its state apparatus have been both
gradually depraved after Vietnam became united since April 1975, and that depravation
process has been impulsive since Doi Moi (1986).
All interviewees in this research and many authors now share a high consensus on the
serious degeneration of the CPVs system and Vietnamese state apparatus, as well as on
its relation to corruption situation. As mentioned in many studies [TI, (2006), p.34;
Son and Luc et al., (2008), p.177; CECODES, (2008), p.37] degeneration, inter alia,
manifests in the aspects of:
1
nepotism is commonplace across all state institutions
widespread corruption within all state agencies, including the judiciary, inspection
and investigation institutions, as well as in the CPVs offices
common tendency for politicians and officials to operate outside the law
widespread access to off-the-books funds.
Here, degeneration is both, the factor pushing corruption in the sense that it creates and
widen environment for wrongdoings in the state apparatus, and the consequence of
corruption in the sense that the depraving process of the CPVs members and state
officials are stepped up in the corruption situation.
53
In addition to corruption, there are various elements fostering the above mentioned
degeneration process, including the formal existence of merit-based appointment
systems, the poorly or no enforced legal documents on state management, the crisis of
socialist ideology and moral values, and the lack of codes of conduct for civil servants.
As noted by some interviewees, the degeneration of the CPVs system and state apparatus
can be considered the underlying factor answering why the national mechanism in
general and government apparatus in particular of Vietnam are yet to be efficient in
curbing corruption.
2.7 Seventh, weakness and dependence of the judiciary

As one of three main branches of power that interprets and applies the law in the name of
the state, the judiciary plays a very important role and would significantly contribute to
the success in the fight against corruption provided that judicial independence is
respected and judges are well-trained.
Similar to other former socialist countries, judicial system in Vietnam has never been
authentically free from the control of the CPV and Government. Although the 1992
Constitution and the 2002 Law on the Organization of Peoples Courts grant the judiciary
formal independence, as asserted by almost all interviewees of this research and many
authors, the judiciary of Vietnam in practice is still strictly governed by the CPV [TI,
(2006), p.31; Global Integrity, (2006), p.78]. Specifically, judges are formally protected
from the influence of government bodies and the CPV by law, but in practice, ability of
judges to arrive at independent verdicts is severely limited. This is particularly true for
high-profile corruption cases, in which although the trial is not completely a formality,
but verdicts are usually enforced and the CPV and Government usually influence judges
prior to cases going to trial.
Dependence on the CPV counteracts the effects of judicial system of Vietnam in the
fight against corruption. As observed by some interviewees, in almost all big corruption
cases, the Supreme Court has to ask for instructions from the CPV before opening the
trial about who can be charged and which sentences should be returned. The similar story
happens at the local courts, where judges handling a corruption case have to ask for
directions from not only upper courts, but also from the CPVs local units. A very simple
reason here is that the corrupters are almost all high-ranking government officials who
are also senior members of the CPV. In this context, dismissing corrupters, or passing too
gentle sentences which are not suitable to corruption crimes are quite often in the court
system of Vietnam.
In addition to its dependent status, there are some other factors contributing to the
weakness of the judiciary in the fight against corruption in Vietnam, which include [TI,
(2006), p.31]:
1
low degree of judicial professionalism (Vietnamese judges have no specific training

to handle corruption cases)
there are no specific rules on gifts, conflicts of interest and post-employment

restrictions for members of the judiciary
judges are not required to give reasons for their decisions while court decisions are
rarely made publicly available (although the Supreme Court recently started
publishing its decisions)
54
4
V.C. Giao
there are no unique provisions on whistle blowing within the judiciary.
All of the above are also obstacles to the court system in Vietnam playing a role in the
fight against corruption. As a matter of fact, although administrative courts the most
important one in the court system in terms of anti-corruption have been established in
Vietnam to review administrative decisions of which many relate to corruption or
wrongdoings of government agencies and officials, reviews are very uncommon as
revealed by many interviewees of this research. Because of that, oversight of the
executive in Vietnam still mainly rests with the CPV and National Assembly.
Furthermore, the above factors also result in corruption within the judiciary. In this
regards, although it is believed that the situation more frequently occurs during the
inspection and investigation process prior to trial [TI, (2006), p.31], as noted by some
interviewees, corruption also occurs during the trial process. In practice, in addition to a
number of cases came to light in which mainly officials in the Government Inspectorate
and Peoples Procuracy allegedly received bribes in order to prevent cases from
developing, there are also many cases revealed in which judges or court clerks took
bribes to lighten the penalty for corrupters.
Various expedient have been used to force the judiciary in Vietnam dependent on the
CPV and the Government, of which the most mentioned by interviewees and many
authors refers to the mechanism of the judges appointment. Specifically, according to the
2002 Law on the Organization of Peoples Courts, judges at all levels are appointed by
State President for a period of five years, at the proposal of the people council and
approved by the CPV units of the same level. Furthermore, there are many political
requirements, for example, the candidate needs to be a member of the CPV, added to
professional criteria making the judge appointments are not completely based on merit.
The system of term of office notes that appointments which include the involvement of
the CPVs unit and non-professional state agencies in the process, together with political
requirements, establishes that local judges cannot oppose but have to conform to
instructions of the CPV and Government for their position. These also allow the CPV and
Government trusting and directing members of the judiciary to operate within their
control, particularly in the cases of corruption.
2.8 Eighth, lack of adequate legal framework and feasible mechanism of

implementing the right of access to information held by public bodies.
There is broad consensus on the need for access to information held by public bodies as a
tool to help tackle the very serious and difficult problem of fighting corruption. In this
regard, TI notes that access to information is perhaps the most important weapon against
corruption [TI, (2003), p.6]. Other authors also have the same opinion that access to
information is a key tool in combating corruption [Privacy International, (2006), p.7;
Mendel, (2008), p.3]. In practice, all actors in the fight against corruption including civil
society organisations, journalists, members of parliaments, watchdog NGOs around the
world are using this right to expose wrongdoings of government officials and government
agencies as well as to help root it out.
The importance of the right to information to the fight against corruption has
therefore been formally stipulated in the UN Convention against Corruption, 2003. The
Convention is redolent with references to transparency and openness. It variously calls on
states parties to ensure public transparency generally [Articles 5(1) and 10(a)], openness
55
in relation to civil servants and funding for electoral candidates [Articles 7(1) (a) and
(3)], and transparency in public procurement and finances [Articles 9(1) (a) and (2)]. It
also has a provision on corporate openness [Article 12(2) (c)].
Unfortunately, all interviewees of this research and many local authors (Kien et al.,
2006; Giao, 2010) agreed that the current legal framework on access to information in
Vietnam is still undeveloped, while the mechanism of implementing this right is
ineffective. They all consider that the weakness of legal framework on access to
information is one of the most challenges in the fight against corruption in Vietnam.
Negative impact of corruption and anti-corruption on political security
As revealed in many studies, in the corruption context, the risks of violation of civil and
political rights may come from three main following circumstances:
Firstly and directly, corruption may prevent people from exercising civil and political
rights, since corruption is a denial of accountability and transparency of state agency
system. For instance, an ordinary citizen may fail in his/her suit because the judges have
received bribes from the respondent. Similarly, a good candidate in a local election may
be defeated by his/her opponent because the opponent has used a huge amount of money
to illegally buy votes, and even to buy local press, etc. In this regard, Daniel Kaufmann
has demonstrated that the level of corruption is inversely proportional to the level of
voice and accountability, as well as to the level of press freedom and the level of civil
liberties [Kaufmann, (2004), pp.1921].
Secondly and indirectly, corruption leads to attempts at protecting privileges of
corrupt political leaders. Logically, in order to keep huge economic benefits gained from
corruption, corrupt political leaders often try to cling to power so that they can hold
corruption opportunities attached with their governing positions [Buckley, (2002), p.183].
Normally, this is a kind of collective effort to maintain the monopolisation of resources
by networks of patronage as said by a specialist [Cockcroft, (1998), p.14]. In this
connection, the corrupt governments will have to face opposition from the public and
their response to that is accordingly suppressive, which primarily lead to restrictions of
civil and political freedoms such as freedom of press, freedom of expression, freedom of
association [Buckley, (2002), p.183]. In serious cases, corruption may induce internal
disturbances or social unrests, which cause severe threats to all human rights. For
example, corruption was cited to justify for all of eight coup detats occurred in Thailand
since beginning of the 20th century. Widespread corruption is believed the causation of
the collapse of Ferdinant Maccots government in the Philippines in the early 1990s, as
well as that of Mohamed Suhartos regime in Indonesia in the late the same decade. In
Vietnam, corruption is considered as the main cause of many social unrests since 1990
[TI, (2006), p.16]. Here, in almost all cases, although corruption by itself is not
necessarily the main factor in the outbreak of internal unrests or disturbances, it fuels and
thrives a country on such catastrophic situations by fostering social, political and
economic inequalities, giving rise to grievances among politically and economically
marginalised groups, and delegitimising the political leadership.
Lastly, the danger to civil and political rights may also arises from the anti-corruption
process, in which due to the special character of corruption act as a kind of secretive and
victimless crime, some governments may resort to measures which may be deemed in
conflict with human rights standards to fight against corruption. In this connection, it is
56
V.C. Giao
worth mentioning the case of the Independent Commission Against Corruption of Hong
Kong (ICAC). Although it is a very successful national anti-corruption agency, the ICAC
is also strongly criticised for overruling individuals right to privacy about their own
wealth and activities, and placing the burden of proof of innocence on any defendant
whose wealth seems to mysteriously surpass his income [Buckley, (2002), p.178], which
are both civil rights formally recognised in Article 14 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).
All three above contexts have been existing in Vietnam, however, while the first and
the last ones are generally not different from those in other countries, the second is
characterised by a typical situation of Vietnam.
The characteristic is, while in many countries, at the central level, corruption mainly
and directly leads to the increase in attempts at holding purely economic interests of a
group of political leaders, through keeping their privileges of corruption; in Vietnam,
corruption indirectly, but mainly leads to the increase in efforts to protect the existence of
the whole political regime, in the sense of very strong political purpose but not, or less
economic interests.
The above conclusion can be proved by many statements and instructions so far
launched by the CPV and its top leaders, which indicate that corruption is not only an
obstacle to the social and economic development of the country but also the challenge to
keep the stability of the socialist regime. For example, in 2004, Mr. Phan Van Khai, who
at that time was the member of the CPVs Poliburo and Prime Minister of Vietnam,
stated that: Corruption is the most serious threat to the regime (RFA, 2006). A similar
statement was just made by Mr. Nong Duc Manh, General Secretary of CPV in May
2006, in which he confirmed that, corruption threatens the survival of our system [TI,
(2006), p.18]. More officially, during the 10th Party Congress in April 2006, the CPV said
publicly that corruption posed a threat to the very survival of the communist rule
(Thanh Nien Online, 2006).
Two questions emerged here are Why in Vietnam does corruption lead to the increase
in attempt at protecting the political regime? And What is special this feature makes in
relation to consequences of corruption for political security in Vietnam?
In relation to the first question, after the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the
system of Eastern European socialist states in early 1990s, the CPV has conducted a
study and came to conclude that, corruption is one of the main factors created the drama.
This conclusion was soon substantiated in Vietnam. The first and the most famous social
unrest in Vietnam since the country united in 1975 occurred in Thai Binh in the late
1997, in which hundreds thousands of farmers in this northern province uprose against
local corrupt officials. Although this disturbance was peacefully settled, it was a shock to
the CPV, since the farmers in this province are very famous for their absolute confidence
in the CPV during both national struggles against foreign invaders of France and the
USA, especially for their considerable contribution to the victory in the Vietnam War.
After that, several social unrests have been happened in Vietnam and almost all of these
either directly or indirectly linked to corruption.
The Thai Binh disturbance and other social unrests severely undermined the CPVs
reputation and consolidated its fear that corruption may make the regime crumbled. In
addition, taking advantage from the problem, all political dissident groups (mostly based
outside Vietnam) argue that corruption is the inherent defect of the communist regime
and cite the widespread corruption situation as the evident of the justification for
changing the regime from mono-party to multi-parties political system. From all
57
mentioned events, as shown by the statements quoted above, the CPV believes that
corruption is a real danger to its position as the leading party of the society of Vietnam.
In regard to the second question, the above characteristic creates a feature in
solving the relation between anti-corruption and political security in Vietnam. While in
countries under the dictatorial regime, corruption may lead to restrain, or even to
completely prohibit civil society and media involving in activities against corrupt
officials and governments, in Vietnam, civil society and media, especially after
the passage of the 2005 Anti-Corruption Law, are allowed to engage in anti-corruption
process, provided that they have to subdue their objectives in the way that all
criticism and activities in this area should be directed to the social, moral and governance
aspects of corruption only, but should not be linked to the political facet of the
problem that may bring about the discussion on the unrepairable weakness of the socialist
regime in regard, as well as to the attacks on the reputation and the leadership of
the CPV. For example, it is possible if a newspapers publish articles to denounce a
corrupt official and even to criticise shortcomings of the government in combating
corruption, but its editorial board will face very high risk of dismissal or even more
serious upshots if the articles containing arguments that corruption is the inherent defect
of the authoritarian socialist regime and multi-parties system is therefore the basic
solution to this problem.
However, the limited involvement of civil society and mass media in anti-corruption
process does not necessarily mean that corruption has positive effect on political
security in Vietnam. Rather, this reflects the overall strategy of the CPV for political
reform in which, this process does not direct to the changing political system from
one-party to multi-parties regime. Instead, it only concentrates on three aspects:
1
subjecting the CPV and Government officials to the rule of law
increasing the effectiveness of the government machinery
strengthening the oversight role of the National Assembly, civil society and mass
media vis--vis the Government.
This strategy was firstly set up by the CPV after the breakdown of the former Soviet
Union and then become the principle governing the CPVs actions. That means, all
activities in every area, including anti-corruption, have to follow the approach.
Furthermore, in theory, the suppression of political security resulting from the
attempts of the CPV as a politically-motivated and collective effort, is logically stronger
than that of other governments as mainly economically-motivated and group endeavour.
This is true in practice. Despite strong and continuous condemnation from international
community, the CPV has so far insisted that it will not tolerate the emergence of
opposition parties. Overt political opposition has typically been dealt with harshly.
Private press at any form is not allowable3. All civil societies are put under the control of
the Vietnamese Fatherland Front, the system established by the CPV. The judiciary and
the National Assembly are not independent of political influence. Rule of law is therefore
still poorly developed, and checks and balances on the politically powerful are very
weak. This context obviously shows the really bad situation of political security in
Vietnam, which is always ranked by the Freedom House since 2007 as one of the
countries in the world without democracy (Freedom House).
58
V.C. Giao
Anti-corruption while restricting political freedoms: a controversial

strategy of Vietnam
From above analyses, it is possible to define that, engaging civil society and mass media
in activities against corruption while maintaining the strict state control over political
freedoms that are sensitive to the sake of the one-party system is the strategy of the CPV
for anti-corruption in Vietnam. The practice shows that, while this strategy brings about a
certain level of freedom for local civil society and mass media to discuss social, moral
and governance aspects of corruption, it even tightens restrictions regarding the freedom
of association, freedom of press, as well as freedom of expression in relation to the
political aspect of corruption.
There are two main questions primarily emerged from this context: How can the CPV
argue for the need of combating corruption while restraining political freedoms? And
How can the CPV argue for the rationale of combating corruption in the context of an
authoritarian state?
The first question has been partly dealt with earlier while mentioning events in which
corruption was cited by political dissident groups to excite people against the socialist
state. However, besides the fear of political dissident groups using corruption as a tool to
fight against the regime, the CPV may also reason that, while corruption primarily
reflects the problem of governance, demands of civil, political rights basically refer to
issues of ideology or political interests. That means, even the CPV can get success in
curbing corruption, it is till faced claims to political freedoms from political
oppositionists. In other words, achievements in combating corruption are not enough for
the CPV to maintain the authoritarian regime. Restraining civil and political rights is
therefore still needed during the anti-corruption process.
For the second question, the answer can actually find out after addressing two
sub-questions: Why does an authoritarian state also need to fight against corruption? and
Why can an authoritarian state record achievements in this work?
Regarding the first sub-question, although government agencies and governmental
staffs are considered as the perpetrators of both corruption and human rights suppression,
there are some differences between two these kinds of perpetration. The differences
between human rights suppression and corruption may be shown in Table 2.
Table 2 implies that while human rights suppression mainly originates from the
policy of governments, corruption acts are primarily initiated by governmental officials.
And, while human rights suppression consolidates the stability of the existing regime by
conquering its political dissidents, corruption causes an aversion of the public to the
existing regime by providing illegal privileges for a group of government officials.
Fighting against corruption is therefore indispensable to maintain the existence of an
administration. This is the reason why governments, including authoritarian ones, are all
in need of combating corruption.
Practice shows that, governments, regardless democratic or undemocratic, rarely issue
policies publicly in favour of corruption but may quite often bring out regulations openly
restrain civil and political rights. In addition, almost all governments pay attention to
combating corruption, at least in a formalistic way, since they all aware that corruption is
by no means beneficial to the stability of the regime, and by declaring war against
corruption, the government can raise or regain its prestige in the community.
Government Officials
(main perpetrator)
Businessmen
Ordinary Citizens
Corruption
Government Agencies
(main perpetrator)
Government Officials
Human rights
suppression
To gain economic
interests/favours/privileges,
etc. for corrupt officials,
bribers and their relatives
Mainly economic, but not

political purpose
Mainly individual, collective
to some extent
(group, but not state) action.
Mainly political, but not

economic purpose
Mainly collective (state), but
not individual action.
To conquer political
opposition in order to keep
the stability of existing
political system/regime
Characteristic
Motive/objective
Harmful for the stability of

the existing political regime.
Harmful for all individuals
and the community
Harmful for democracy and

human rights
Consequence
Table 2
Perpetrators

59
Differences between human rights suppression and corruption
Anti-corruption
work
Human rights
work
States (main actor)

Civil Society
International Community
States (both actor of HRs work

and perpetrator of HRs violation)
Civil Society (main actor)
International Community
Corruption
free
Human rights
for all
Objective
Good governance-based/centred
Focus on but not limited to
transparency/accountability/integrity
of state
Criminalisation is the main

method but checks and
balance systems are very
important.
Propaganda, education,
pressurisation, etc.
Criminalisation included,
but not the main method.
Human dignity-based/centred
Including but not focus on
transparency/accountability/integrity
of state
Measure
Characteristic
Table 3
Actors
60
V.C. Giao
Comparation between human rights work and anti-corruption work
61
Relating to the second sub-question, although anti-corruption work relies on the

apparatus of checks and balances, the main measure to combat corruption is
criminalisation [UNODC, (2006), p.34], which is the prerogative of states. This means, in
dealing with corruption, every state, regardless authoritarian or democratic, can use this
weapon and by which, may get some success, especially in terms of detection and
punishment, provided that said state holds a strong political will of solving the problem.
In other words, to some extent, the achievements in combating corruption are not too
much depended on the democratic level of a state. The Singapore case may be the best
evidence for this argument.
It seems that up to here the CPVs strategy is shown reasonable. However, there are
some more questions emerged: What is the rationale of restricting civil and political
rights during anti-corruption process, according to the international human rights law?
And To what extent an authoritarian state can get success in curbing corrution?
For the first question, we have to examine whether the political freedoms that may be
restricted during anti-corruption process fall into theories of derogation or restriction of
rights under international human rights law?
Firstly, it is impossible to make use of the theory of derogation of rights for the above
context, since according to the ICCPR, this theory is only applicable to the state of
emergency.4 Meanwhile, corruption situation can not be considered serious enough to
proclaim the state of emergency and suspend the rights under it, since at whatever level,
corruption can not threaten the life of the nation.
Here, someone may intentionally or unintentionally mistake threaten the life of the
nation for threaten the life of the political regime in order to support the restrictions of
rights during anti-corruption campaigns. However, this is a completely wrong perception,
since the term of nation is different from that of political regime. Plainly speaking,
while the term of nation shows the concept of the whole population in the country, that
of political regime only demonstrates a group of people following the same political
idea or theory. Threaten the life of the political regime therefore does not mean threaten
the life of the nation, but rather threaten the fortune/future of a group of people in the
country. In this connection, the proclamation of a state of emergency as the consequences
of threaten the life of the political regime is a violation of international human rights
law.5
Secondly, while both ICCPR and International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) allow restrictions to be imposed on the exercise of some
rights, the related provisions also contain limitation clauses, in order to avoid the abuse of
restrictions.
The limitation clauses may be summarised as follows: the restrictions must be
prescribed by law (Articles 12, 18, 19, 21 and 22 of the ICCPR and Article 8 of the
ICESCR). They must be imposed in a democratic society (Articles 14, 21 and 22 of
ICCPR and Article 8 of ICESCR), in order to protect national security (Articles 12, 14,
19, 21 and 22 of ICCPR and Article 8 of ICESCR) or public order (Articles 12, 14, 18,
19, 21 and 22 of ICCPR and Article 8 of ICESCR), or public safety (Articles 18, 21 and
22 of ICCPR ), or public health or morals (Articles 12, 14, 18, 19, 21 and 22 of
ICCPR), or rights and freedoms of others (Articles 12, 18, 19, 21 and 22 of ICCPR ).
Excluding the first clause, whether the restrictions of political rights during
anti-corruption process are compatible with other limitation clauses?
In relation to the clause of in a democratic society, this clause means that a state
may impose certain restrictions of rights as necessary in a democratic society. Logically,
62
V.C. Giao
in this connection, the restrictions do not undermine democracy itself. And, the
necessary in a democratic society does not mean that only the views of a group, even
the majority, should prevail. Both of requirements are obviously not met in the context of
Vietnam, since the restrictions of political freedoms imposed by the CPV are
undoubtedly contrary to the basic democratic principles, and they are launched based on
the political will of the CPV only.
For the clause on the national security, the basic principle here is that restrictions of
rights may be imposed in order to protect national security. However, national security
does not mean the mere security of a political regime. It therefore can not be invoked as a
reason for imposing limitations of rights to merely prevent the threat to the stability of the
political regime, as done by the CPV.
Similar arguments may be used in regard to the clauses of public order and public
safety. Here, the protection of public order and public safety is understood to mean
that the protection of the very basis of the functioning of society, which refers to the life,
property, moral and physical integrity of the public, rather than the protection of the
existence of a government or a political system.
The clause relating to public health or morals covers not only the protection of the
general health or morals of the community as a whole, but also the protection of the
general health or morals of its individual members. The morals here refer primarily to the
protection of the moral ethos of the society. In this respect, there is not any direct
connection between anti-corruption activities that may be conducted by political
dissidents and public health or morals, even these activities are contributing to the
improvement of moral life of the society.
On the last clause relating to rights and freedoms of others, although it has not yet
defined by the Human Rights Committee or the European Court of Human Rights, this
clause should not be used as a pretext for restricting the exercise of rights in any anticorruption process, since there is no any justification for the use of it in the context.
Whose rights and freedoms should be protected in this case? If any, they should be the
rights of anti-corruption activists rather than the right to hold privileges of corrupt
officials.
In short, pursuant to international human rights standards, there is no rational basis
for the derogation and the restriction of any civil and political rights during anticorruption process.
Now, we will change to deal with the second question: To what extent an
authoritarian state can get success in curbing corruption?
In regard to this question, while it is difficult to define the exact level of success that
an authoritarian state can achieve in eliminating corruption, it is possible to predict that,
while every government can get results in this area, there would be a limitation on the
attainments of the authoritarian states. This limitation results from the fact that anticorruption work is not only based on criminalisation, but also on the apparatus of checks
and balances at both domestical and international levels. The checks and balances
apparatus is also very important in fighting corruption, since it is the basis of prevention
measure, whereas as guided by the UN, corruption can be prosecuted after the fact, but
first and foremost, it requires prevention [UNODC, (2003), p.6]. However, any the
apparatus of checks and balances is attached with various democratic standards and
institutions such as the rule of law, civil liberty, freedom of press, freedom of association,
freedom of expression, judicial independence, etc. In this regard, anti-corruption work is
closely connected with and can not escape from certain areas of human rights work. This
63
means, in theory, a complete success in dealing with corruption, even in a relative sense,
can not be obtained by the authoritarian states, since in such kind of state, there is not a
genuine apparatus of checks and balances existing, and anti-corruption work and human
rights work is separated. The relation between anti-corruption work and human rights
work is partly illustrated in Table 3.
Are China and Singapores model in combating corruption suitable for

Vietnam?
As demonstrated in the previous section, in theory, corruption can only be ended by

concurrently reforming the state management system and democratising the society. Both
of these tasks require truly observing civil and political rights. In connection with this
argument, however, some may pose the following question: How have China and
Singapore, countries which are also considered authoritarian states, attained great success
in the fight against corruption while Vietnam has not?
Relating to the case of China, it would firstly be prudent to say that the country is not
a success story in this area. Like in Vietnam, although considerable attempts have been
made by the Communist Party and Government of China in recent decades to combat
corruption, corruption in the country is still a very serious, as shown by the
CPI (Corruption Perception Index) on the TI ranking since 2001 to 2012 (TI CPI,
20012012):
Table 4
CPI of China in 20012012
Year
CPI of China
2001
3.5
2002
3.5
2003
3.4
2004
3.4
2005
3.2
2006
3.3
2007
3.5
2008
3.6
2009
3.6
2010
3.5
2011
3.6
2012
3.9
In Table 4, we can see that in the period of 2001 to 2012, although the CPI fluctuated a
bit among years, China has never escaped from the level 3 (fourth lowest group among
10 levels of CPI, which means the fourth highest groups of corruption). In comparing to
Vietnam, China has achieved some but very little more success in curbing corruption (the
CPI of China in the duration has been always one level higher than that of Vietnam,
which has never got out of the level 2), which may thanks to wide use of the very strictest
measure (death penalty) and mercilessly punishing corrupters including highest ranking
officials of the Communist Party and Government. However, the anti-corruption record
64
V.C. Giao
of China is still much lower than territories in which Chinese dominated, which can be
seen in Table 5.
Table 5
Governance and Anti-corruption Ranks of China, Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan
China
Hong Kong
Macau
Taiwan
1998
2004
1998
2004
1998
2004
1998
2004
Voice/accountability
7.9
7.3
45.5
51.9
N/A
50
68.6
75.7
Political stability
49.6
46.6
82.4
91.3
N/A
87.9
83.6
62.6
Governmental
effectiveness
64.5
60.1
89.1
92.3
N/A
82.2
90.7
85.1
42
35
98.4
99.5
N/A
91.6
85.9
88.7
Rule of law
52.4
40.6
90.8
90.3
N/A
91.8
84.9
77.8
Corruption control
60.7
39.9
90.2
90.6
N/A
91.6
83.6
73.9
Regulatory quality
In Table 5, from a comparative perspective, the World Bank sees Chinas anti-corruption
work as comparatively weaker than that of Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan, the
territories are also ruled by Chinese but different to mainland China in terms of political
regime. This is because all five related indicators (voice and accountability, government
effectiveness, rule of law, political stability and regulatory quality) of China are lower
than those of the said territories.
Because of that, it is confident to conclude that China has been facing the same
problems in the fight against corruption with those in Vietnam, which are mainly resulted
from the single party system. That is the reason why the CPV, while looking at China to
learn some experiences, has never cited China as a model to follow in combating
corruption while they often made with Singapore.
In relation to the case of Singapore, generally, the CPVs viewpoints on the
relationship between economic development and anti-corruption with democracy and
political freedoms are very similar to the theory which Lee Kuan Yew, who was the
former prime minister of Singapore since 1959 to 1990, has initiated and followed to lead
his island state from a very poor country to an economic tiger in Asia, as well as to one
of the most corruption-free countries around the world. In short, his theory may read:
democracy is not an essential element for the economic development in general, and for
the success in combating corruption in particular. But, the question here is, is Lee Kuan
Yews theory workable when applying in the Vietnamese context? In other words, does
the Singaporean model prove to be more suitable for Vietnam?
In order to answer the above question, it is first essential to investigate the factors
contributing to the success of Singapore in the fight against corruption, then to examine
the Vietnamese context to define whether similar factors exist and where.
In general, the strategy against corruption in Singapore is based on three pillars:
1
a perfect national apparatus of government which is able to provide the best

administrative services for the public
an optimal national legislation system in which all the administrative procedures has
been publicising at the highest level
a very high salary paying system for government officials.
65
While those factors undoubtedly help to reduce opportunities, as well as incentives of

corruption of government officials, they require necessary conditions in terms of financial
and human resources which very few countries can satisfy. Specifically, excluding
Singapore, no other country around the world can afford to pay salary to such a degree
that it is sufficient for their government officials to have no incentives of earning more
income from corruption. For developing countries like Vietnam, this condition is
undoubtedly impossible. Even for the two first factors, which are not too much dependent
on financial resources, experience around the world shows that, almost all governments
that tried administration reform, but only a few had success. In other words, a perfect
machine of government operations based on an optimal national legislation system is still
a dream of most countries including Vietnam. Various reasons may be cited in this
regard, however, the main one is the lack of local wholehearted and skilful politicians and
public servants a typical and common weakness of developing countries, and Vietnam
is not an exception.
Table 6
Comparison between Singapore and Vietnam

Vietnam
Singapore
Authoritarian regime*
Poor human rights record
Strong political
commitment in curbing
corruption
Similarities:
Differences:
Size of territory
Big 331,210 sq km
Small 697 sq km
Size of the population
Big 92,477,857 (estimated

in July 2013)
Small 5,460,302 (estimated

in July 2013)
Very low
Very high
Level of state management

Level of economic
development
Very low (GDP per capital:

$3,600, estimated in 2012)
Very high (GDP per capital:

$61,400, estimated in 2012)
Notes: *In this regard, it should be noted that although two countries are both ranked as
authoritarian states, political freedoms in Singapore in practice are much better
than that of Vietnam. Citing the freedom of association for example, while the
emergence of opposite political parties is still not tolerated in Vietnam, there are at
least four political parties existing in Singapore. In addition to the Peoples Action
Party (PAP) of Lee Kuan Yew, three its opposite parties are competing with PAP
including Singapore Democratic Alliance (SDA, includes National Solidarity
Party or NSP, Singapore Justice Party or SJP, Singapore National Malay
Organization or PKMS, Singapore Peoples Party or SPP) of CHIAM See Tong;
Singapore Democratic Party (SDP) of CHEE Soon Juan and Workers Party (WP)
of Sylvia LIM Swee Lian.
According to management theories, a country which satisfies the conditions mentioned

above is normally small in terms of the size of the territory and population, since the
common principle here is the smaller the size of the country, the easier the state
management. Singapore would therefore be regarded as a special case, or even, an
exception, in which the irregular theory of development and anti-corruption without
democracy advocated by Lee Kuan Yew could be applicable and verified. In practice,
66
V.C. Giao
Singapores success is now still unique. There have not been any countries around the
world, which had achievements as Singapore did while following this model.
More specifically, in order to measure the possibility of success in putting the theory
of Lee Kuan Yew into practice for anti-corruption in Vietnam, it is necessary to compare
the related factors between two countries in Table 6 (CIA, 2013).
Table 6 shows that, despite the fact that Vietnam and Singapore have some similar
features, they are different in all factors influencing the development of a national
strategy against corruption, which refers to the size of management structures, as well as
financial and human resources. Therefore, although in the short run, Vietnam may record
some achievements thanks to its strong commitment to fighting corruption like Singapore
did, however, it cannot succeed in dealing with this problem in the long run with the Lee
Kuan Yews theory, because Vietnam does not meet any conditions, which are necessary
to apply the strategy against corruption used by Singapore.
The latest hopeless attempt of the CPV
As ealier mentioned, since Doi Moi 1986, the CPV has continuous efforts in combating
corruption. In its Sixth to the Eleventh Party Congress, corruption was specifically
stipulated in the documents of the Party, with increasing attention being paid to the
problem. At the same time, top leaders of the Party continuously emphasise corruption as
a national disease, an internal invader, and the most serious threat to the existence of
the regime (CPV, 2012). In addition, the Party has recently made many attempts to
rectify its organisation in order to prevent corruption. Following the Resolution of the 6th
CPVs Central Committee in 2003 which firstly mentioned the property disclosure and
identified that the head of the Party committee have to be responsible for anti-corruption
in scope of charge, the Resolution No. 12-NQ/TW of 11th the Party Central Committee
in January 2012 mentioned a number of more concrete measures in anti-corruption. One
year before that, on 1 November 2011, the Party Central Committee issued Regulation
No 47-Q/TW on 19 things that Party members are not allowed to do, more than half of
which (from 7th16th subjects) relate directly to corruption.
The above resolutions are considered as ... blowing a new spirit to the fight against
corruption of the CPV. However, many observers doubt about the effectiveness of new
measures, which considered a repeated story (BBC Vietnamese, 2012b), and will not
create any significant change; otherwise this will leads to separation within itself (BBC
Vietnamese, 2012c).
The progress of the two conferences (6th and 7th) of the CPV Central Committee
organised in 2012 shows that the preciseness of the above mentioned warning. In the
5th Conference of the 11th CPV Central Committee (May 2012), the model Central
Steering Committee for Anti-Corruption headed by the Prime Minister has been replaced
by a new Commission under the same name but placed under the management of the
Politburo and headed by the General Secretary. In addition, two agencies of the Party, the
Central Internal Affairs Committee and Central Economic Committee, have been reestablished to support the Party in supervising the states activities. Nevertheless, the
CPV also appointed a member of its Central Committee Mr Nguyen Ba Thanh, former
Secretary of Da Nang Partys Committee, who has a good profile on management to be
the head of the Central Internal Affairs Committee. These movements are seen by some
experts as assisting the Party in promoting the anti-corruption work (BBC Vietnamese,
67
2012a). However, some people doubt the success of these measures as there are concerns
that these initiatives are not institutional changes towards the promotion of the rule of
law, independence judiciary, freedom of media and civil-society proven core elements
in the success of the fight against corruption in the world. The key issue here lies in the
fact that a patient cannot operate a surgery on himself (BBC Vietnamese, 2012d).
The fact that Mr. Nguyen Ba Thanh was not elected as an additional member of the
Politburo in the 7th Conference of the 11th CPV Central Committee shows that the
internal fight within the Party has become a obstacle to its anti-corruption efforts as with
his position of a member of the Central Party Committee, Mr. Nguyen Ba Thanh can
hardly promote his important role when the fight against corruption is facing with the
interest group whose head has a much higher position than he in the Party organisation.
The failure to elect Mr. Nguyen Ba Thanh (and Mr. Vuong Dinh Hue) to the Politburo
shows that the CPV is very divided and its majority does not have true intention to fight
corruption.
In overall, this situation urges the CPV to repel corruption to maintain its sole ruling
position. This is a difficult puzzle and the CPV is in a dilemma situation: If not decisively
fight against corruption, the Partys legitimacy continues to be seriously damaged and
facing the risk of collapse. However, a decisively fight against corruption demands an
expansion of democracy in society that also leads to the Party losing its exclusive
position of power. The latest progress of the 6th and 7th CPV Central Committee
Conferences also demonstrates another arising problem: the anti-corruption determination
also leads to the severe separation within the Party, as fighting corruption directly affects
the position and interests of the interest group that is emerged and growing stronger in the
Party since Doi Moi. All the above points show that, without a true political reform, the
chance to win in the fight against corruption led by the CPV is almost impossible.
Concluding remarks
The key driving force of the anti-corruption attempts in Vietnam is concern about the
damage that corruption is causing to the CPVs reputation and legitimacy. This leads to
the strict control of the CPV over civil and political rights during anti-corruption process,
which springs up, inter alia, from the perception and the fear that media, NGOs and
political dissident groups may use corruption as the justification to raise the people
against the leadership of the CPV, or to incite social unrests and internal disturbances in
the society.
Intentionally or unintentionally, the anti-corruption strategy of the CPV is strongly
influenced by the Ly Quang Dieus theory, in which democracy is not an indispensable
factor for economic development, as well as for the progression in fighting corruption.
However, with various differences from Singapore regarding all main factors which
are conditions for the success of this country in combating corruption, it is a big
adventure of Vietnam to follow the Ly Quang Dieus theory. With its current strategy
copying the model of Singapore, the CPV may get some achievements in curbing
corruption in the short run, but it can not get success in dealing with this problem in the
long run, since without political freedoms, absolute power will be brought up, meanwhile
according to Lord Acton: Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts
absolutely.
68
V.C. Giao
Because of its controversial strategy, the CPV is now facing a dilemma that makes
the anti-corruption work in the country is at standstill. This dilemma may read:
constraining political freedom makes the anti-corruption work formalistic, and much less
effective as desired to rescue the CPVs reputation, however, tolerating civil and political
rights may also cause risks for the leadership of the CPV, because it may lead to the
breakdown of the single party system in Vietnam.
Which countries in the world should be model for Vietnam in eliminating corruption
and when necessary reforms in this area will be taken by the CPV are big questions that
require further researches. However, while Singapore model has been obviously causing
high risks for the implementation of international human rights standards and its future is
still questionable, there are many other successful stories in the world that Vietnam can
be examined, for example, Hong Kong, South Korea, Japan, and Nordic countries, in
which corruption free is in parallel with the high level of both economic development and
human rights protection. And, political reforms are dispensable in the Vietnamese
context. Without more far-reaching reforms, in the long run, corruption in Vietnam can
not be dealt with, economic development of the country can not continue to grow up, and
consequently, the reputation and legitimacy of the CPV cannot be guaranteed
indefinitely./.
References
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BBC Vietnamese (2012b) Party Rectification is a Recorded Old Story, 28 February.
BBC Vietnamese (2012c) Party Rectification to Avoid the Collapse of the Party, 2 January.
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Himself, 14 December.
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vn/cpv/Modules/News/NewsDetail.aspx?co_id=30287&cn_id=416909 (accessed 12 June
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National Political Publisher.
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the Party building at present and Document of the 11th National Party Congress, National
Political Publishing House, Hanoi.
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Plenum of the 11th Central Committee, 7 May [online] at http://www.cpv.org.vn/cpv/
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Notes
1
There is a period when two other political parties existed and operated besides the CPV: the
Democracy Party of Vietnam (19441988) and the Socialist Party of Vietnam (18461988).
However, these parties were in fact extended arms of the CPV rather than an independent or
opposition political forces. Because of that, when the pluralism developed and led to the
collapse of the Communist Bloc, with the reason of the end of its historical mission, the above
two parties claimed their voluntary dissolve in 1988.
This paper is a part of the authors PhD thesis of Philosophy in Human Rights and Peace
Studies at the Mahidol University of Thailand from June 2006 to June 2011. The thesis, and
the conclusions and recommendations within it, are mainly based on the analysis of secondary
data and documents (desk review), and additional knowledge and information gained from
interviews conducted during the field work in Vietnam. Interviews were conducted with 10
leading local specialists on human rights and anti-corruption, who are working for the
Ministry of Justice, Vietnam Lawyers Association, the Government Inspectorate, the
Supreme Court, the Supreme Procuracy and the Law School under National University of
Vietnam.
The latest event in regard is the Instruction No.37 dated 29 November 2006 signed by Mr.
Nguyen Tan Dung, the Primer Minister of Vietnam, in which stipulates that: Determinately
prohibit private press at any forms.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 4 (1) stipulates that: In time
of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which is
officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present Covenant may take measures derogating
from their obligations under the present Covenant to the extent strictly required by the
exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with their other
obligations under international law and do not involve discrimination solely on the ground of
race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin.
According to the principles governing states of emergency stipulated by Human Rights
Committee and the European Court of Human Rights, a state of emergency must be actual or
imminent and must involve the whole nation as well as threaten the organised life of the whole
community [see Paul Sieghart Paul, The International Law of Human Rights, OUP, Oxford,
(1992), pp.110118]. And, according to the Sircusa Principles, a proclamation of public
emergency and consequent derogations from ICCPR obligations that are not made in good
faith of the situation of posing a threat to the life of the nation is a violation of international
human rights law (see, the Review of the International Commission of Jurists, Geneva, No. 36,
June 1986).

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42

Int. J. Diplomacy and Economy, Vol. 2, Nos. 1/2, 2014

Anti-corruption versus political security: reflection on

Overview of anti-corruption in Vietnam

1.1 A long-term struggle and a comprehensive legal framework

Anti-corruption versus political security

reform the system of Anti-corruption Steering Committees and tighten measures of

Reforming public administration with a view to enhance the independence and

Improving management of human resources, which is mainly evinced through the

Strengthening mechanism for detection of corruption, which is laid down in the

1.2 The exclusive role and corruption inside the CPV

Anti-corruption versus political security

1.3 Limited achievements and questioned political will

Corruption perception index (CPI) of Vietnam

Country rank of Vietnam

Peoples perceptions of corruption prevalence (see online version for colours)

Note: % saying corruption is prevalent, by income

Anti-corruption versus political security

Peoples perceptions of corruption seriousness (see online version for colours)

Note: % saying corruption is serious, by income

10 planning and investment [WB and GI, (2012), pp.3839].

Note: % selecting sector as among the top 3

Anti-corruption versus political security

Main factors limiting the effectiveness and efficiency of anti-corruption

lack of serious penalties for corrupt people

erosion of public officials ethics

existing ask-give mechanism

limited checks-and-balances for powerful public officials

complicated and cumbersome administrative procedures

poor control of assets and income of powerful public officials

many loopholes in regulations governing public capitals and assets management

no or very few corruption cases detected

low transparency and information disclosure in public agencies

2.1 First, group interest vs. anti-corruption

2.2 Second, gap of understanding regarding corruption

2.3 Third, piecemeal and non-continuous approach to tackling corruption

2.4 Fourth, political immunity in investigating and prosecuting corruption

Anti-corruption versus political security

2.6 Sixth, degeneration of the CPVs system and state apparatus

nepotism is commonplace across all state institutions

widespread access to off-the-books funds.

Anti-corruption versus political security

2.7 Seventh, weakness and dependence of the judiciary

low degree of judicial professionalism (Vietnamese judges have no specific training

there are no specific rules on gifts, conflicts of interest and post-employment

2.8 Eighth, lack of adequate legal framework and feasible mechanism of

Anti-corruption versus political security

Negative impact of corruption and anti-corruption on political security

Anti-corruption versus political security

subjecting the CPV and Government officials to the rule of law

increasing the effectiveness of the government machinery

Anti-corruption while restricting political freedoms: a controversial

Mainly economic, but not

Mainly political, but not

Harmful for the stability of

Harmful for democracy and

Anti-corruption versus political security

Differences between human rights suppression and corruption

States (main actor)

States (both actor of HRs work

Criminalisation is the main

Comparation between human rights work and anti-corruption work

Anti-corruption versus political security