Ti

6.

Hegemony

The traditional definiti on o f 'hegemony' is political rule or

domination , especially in rel ations between states. Marxism
extended the definit ion of rul e or d omination to relations between social classes. and especiall y to definiti ons of a ruling
closs. 'Hegemony' th en acquired a
signifi cant sense In
the work of Antonio Gramsci,ca rried out under great difficulties
in a Fasc ist prison between 1927 and 1935. Much is still uncertain in Gramsci's use of the concept. but hi s work is one of the
ma jor turning-points in Marxist cultural theory .
Gramsci mad e a distinction between 'rule' (dom inic) and
'hegemony', 'Rule' is expressed in directly politi cal form s and in

tim es of crisis by direct or effective coerci on. But the more

normal situation is a compl ex interlocking of politi cal, social,
and cuhural forces, and 'hegemony', according to different
interpretati ons, is either this or the active social and cultural
forces which are its necessary elements. Whatever the im p li cations of the concept for Marxist p olitical theory (which has still
to recogni ze many kinds of direct polHi cal control , social class
contTOl , and economi c control, as well as this more general
formati on) , the effects on cultural theory are immediate. For
'hegemony' is it concept which at once Includes and goes
beyond two powerful earlier concepts: that of 'c ulture' as a
'whole social process', in which men defin e and sha pe thei r
whole lives; and that of 'ideology', in any orits Marxist se nses, in
wh ich a system of meanings and values is t he expressi on or
projecti. n of a particular class interest.
, ' Hegemon y' goes beyond 'cu lture', as previ ously defin ed , in
its insistence on relating tll e 'whole sod al process' to sPeci fic
dis.tributions of power and influence. To say that 'men' defin e
and shape thei r whole li ves is true onl y in abstraction . In any
actual society there are specific inequalities in means and therefore in capacity to realize this process. In a class society these are
primaril y inequaliti es between classes. Gra Dlsci therefore in troduced the necessary recogniti on of dominance and subordinain what h as still , however, to be recognized as a w hole
process.
It is in just this recognit ion of thew ho le ness of the process that

Hegemony

109

th econcept of 'h egemony' goes beyond 'ideology'. What is deci

si ve is not onl y th e conscious system of ideas an d
the
whole lived social process as practically organized by specific
and domin ant mean ings and values. Ideo logy, in its norma l
senses, is a relatively form al and articulated system of meanings,
values, and beli efs, of a kin d that can be abstracted as a ' worldvi ew ' or a 'class outlook '. This explains its popularity as a
concept in retrosp ective analysis (in base-superstru cture m odels or in homology), since a system of ideas can be abstracted
from that once livin g social process and represented , u sually by
the selection of 'l eading' or typica l 'ideologists' or 'ideological
features', as the decisive form in which conscio usness was at
once expressed and controlled (or, as in Althusser, was in effect
unconscious, as an imposed structu re). The relatively mh ed ,
confused , incomplete, or inarticulate consciousness of actual
men in that period and society is thus overridden in thenam e of
th is decisive generali zed syst em, a nd indeed in structural
homol ogy is procedu rall y excl uded as peripheral or ephemeral.
It is the full y articulate and systematic forms whi ch are recogn izable as ideology, and there is a corresponding tendency in
the analysis of art to look onl y (or similarly ful1 y articu late
and systematic expressions o( this ideology in the content
(base- superstructure) or form (homology) of actual work s. In
less se lective p rocedures, less dopendent on the inherentclassicism of th e definiti on of form as ful1 y articulate and systemati c,
the tendency is to cons idor works as variants of, or as variably
affected by, the decisive abstracted ideo logy.
More generally, this sense of 'an ideology' is applied in
abstract ways to the actual consci ou sness of both dominant and
subordinated classes, A dominant class 'has' this ideology in
relatively p ure and simpl e (orms. A subordinate class has, in on e
version , nothing but this ideology as its consciousness (since the
production of al1 ideas is, by axiomatic defmition, in ,the
of those who control tho primary means of produch on) or, to
another version , has this ideology imposed on its otherwise
different consciou sness, which it must struggle to su stain or
develop agai nst 'ruling-class ideology'.
The concept of hegemony often , in practi ce, resembl es these
defin itions, bu t it is distinct in its refu sa l to equ ato consciousness with the articulate formal system which can beand ordinar
i1y is abstracted as ' ideo logy'. It of course docs not exclu de the

rn
110

Marxism and Ulera' ure

Hegemony

111

articulate and formal meanings. values and beliefs which a

dominant class develops and propagates. Out it does not equate
these with consciousness, or rather it does not reduce consc iousness to them. Instead it sees the relations o f domination
and subordination, in their forms as practical consciousness. as
in effect a sa tUfUtiUII o f UI C whole process uf li ving- liut uuly uf

political and economic activity, nor only of manifest social

activity. but of the whole substance of lived identit ies and relations hips. to such a de pth that the pressures and limits of what
can ultimately be seen as a specific economic, political, and
cu ltural system seem to most of u s the pressu res and limits of
s impl e experience and oommon sen se. Hegemony is then not
only the articulate upper level of 'ideology', n or are its forms of
control only those ordinaril y seen as 'manipulation' or ' Indoctrination '. It is a whole body of practices and expectations, over
the wholo of liv ing; our senses and assignments of energy, our
shaping perceptions of ou rselves and our world . It is a lived
and consti tutsystem of meanings and
ing-which as they arc expcri,e nced as practices appear as reciprocally confirming. It thus constitutes a sense ofrealit y for m ost
people in the society, a sense of a bsolute beca use experienced
rea lit y beyond which It is very difficult for most mem bers of the
society to move, in most areas of their lives. It is, that is to say, in
the strongest sense a 'culture' . but a culture which has also to be
seen as the lived dominance and subordination of particular
classes.
There are two immediate advantages in th is concept of
hegemony. First, its forms o f domination and subordination
correspond much m ore closely to the normal processes of socia l
organization and cont rol in developed societies than the more
fam iliar projections from the idea of a ruling class. whi ch are
usually based on much earlier and simpler historica l phases. It
can spea k, for exampl e, to the realities of electoral democracy,
and to the s ignificant modern areas of 'leisure' and 'privato life' .
more s peCi ficall y and more actively than older ideas of domination, with their trivializing ex planations of s imple ' manipu lation ', 'corruption', and 'betrayal '. If the pressures and limits of a
given form of domination are to this extent experienced ond in
practice in!er noJized. the whole question of class rul e, and of
opposition to it. is transfonned . Gramsci's emphas is on the
creation of an alternative hegemon y, by the practical connection

of many different forms of s tru gg le, including those not easil y

recognizable as and indeed not primarily 'political' and
'economic', thus leads to a much m ore profound and more active
sense of revolutionary activity in a highly developed society
than the pe rsisten tly a bstract models deri ved from very different
h is torica l situation s. The sou rces of any alternative h egemony
are indeed difficult to defin e. For Gramsci they spr ing from the
working class, but not this class as an ideal or abstract construction. What he sees , ralhor, is a working people which has. pre-cisely, to become a class, and a potentially hegemonic class,
against the pressures and limits o f a n existing and powerful
hegemon y.
.
Second , and more immediately in this context, there IS a
whole different way of seeing cultural activity, both as tradition
and as practice. Cu ltural work and activity are not now, in any
ordinary sense. a supers tructure: not only because of the depth
and thoroughness at which an y cu lt ural hegemony is lived, but
because cultural tradition and practice are seen as much more
than superstructural expressions- reflections, mediations. or
typifications-of a formed social and economic structure. On
the contrary, they are among the basic processes of the formation
itself and, furth er, related t 08 much wider area ofreaJity than the
abstractions of 'socia l' and 'eco nomic' experience. People
seeing themselves and each other in d irectly personal relationships; peopJe seei ng the natural world and themselves in it;
people us ing their physical and material resources for what onc
kind of society spec ia li zes to 'leisure' and 'entertainment' and
'art'; all these acti ve experiences and practices, whidl make up
so much of the reality of a culture and its cultural production can
be seen as they are, without reduction to other ca tegories of
content. and withou t the characteristic straining to fit them
(directly as reflection, indirectly as mediation or typifica tion or
analogy) to other and determining manifest economic and politica l relationshi ps. Yet they can still be seen as elements of 8
hegem on y; nn inclusive social ond cul tural formation which
indeed to be effective has to ex tend to and include, indeed to
form and be formed fr om, this whole area of lived experience.
Many difficulties then ari se, both
and
cally, but it is important to recognize how many blind alleys w e
may now be saved from entering. [f any li ved culture is necessar
ily so ex tensive. the p roblems of domination a nd subordination

11?

Marxism and Literature

on the one hand, and of the extraordinary complexity of any

actual cultural tradition and practice on the other, can at last be
directly approached.
There is of course the diHiculty that domination and subordination, as effective d escriptions of cultural formation. will, by
man y, be refu sed ; that the alternative language of co-operative
shapin g, of common contribution, which the traditional concept
of 'culture' so notably expressed, will be fou nd preferable. In
this fundamental cho ice there is no alternative , from any
socia list posit ion, to recogn it ion and emphas is of the massive
historica l and immediate experience of cl ass domination and
subord ination, in all th eir different fonns. Thi s becomes, very
quickly, a matter of specific experience and argument. But there
is a closely related problem within the concept of 'hegemon y'
itselJ.ln some uses, though not I thi nk in Gramsci, the totalizing
tendency of the concept, which is significant and ind eed cru cial, is converted into an abstract totaliza tion, nnd in this form it
is readily compatible wit h sophistica ted senses of 'the superstructure' or even' id eology' , The hegemony , that is, ca n be seen
as more un iform, more static, and more abstract than in practice ,
if it is rea lly understood , it can ever actually be. Like any other
Marxist concept it is particularly suscept ible to epochal as distin ct fro m historical definition, and to categorica l as dist inct
from su bstantial description. Any isolation of its 'organ izing
principles', or of its ' determ ining featu res' , which have indeed
to be grasped in experience and by analysis, can lead very
quickl y to a totalizi ng abstraction . And then the problems of the
realit y of domination and subordination, and ofth eir relations to
co-operative shaping and oommon contribution , can be quite
falsely posed.
A lived hegemony is
a system or a
It is
of expericnces ,relaTionsliTps. a nd acti vities, with s pecific and changi ng
pressUres and limits. In practice. that is, hegemon y can never be
singular. Its internal structures are h ighly complex, as can readil y be seen in an y concrete analysis. Moreover (and this is crucial, reminding us of the necessary thrust ofthll concept ), it does
not just passivoly ex ist as n form of dominance. It has continually to be renewoo, recreated , d efended, and modifted. lt is also
co.i1tfnually
altered , cluillcnged by pressures
nol -at all its own. We havetne'iilo add -to the oonrept of

Hegemon y

113

hegemon y the concepts of

tive hegemony, wh ich are real nnd persistent elements orpractice.
" Uon be t wee n
One way of expressing the necessary d"lstlDC.
practical a nd abstract senses Within th e concept 15 to speak of
'the hegemonic' rather than th e 'hegemony' , and of '.the domin ant' rather than simple 'domination'. The reahty of an y
is th at,
hegemon y, in the extended politica l. and
while by definit ion it is always dommant,.lt IS
or exclu sive. At any ti me, forms ofalteroahve ordl reclly oppositional politi cs and culture exist as signi fi cant elements in the
society. We shall need to explore thei r conditions and their
limits but their active presence is d ecisive, not onl y because
they have to be incl uded in an y historical
d is.tinct from
epocha l) analysis, bu t as forms w hich have had
on the hegemonic process itself. Tha t is to say,
ca l and cultural emphases, and the man y fonus of opposloo n
and strugg le, are im portant no t onl y i n t hemsel
but as
live features of what the hege monic process has 10 prach ce had
is
to work to control. A static hegemon y, of the
indicated by abstract totalizing definiti ons of a
'Ideology' or 'world-view', ca n ign ore or isolato
an?
op position, but to the extent that they 8.re slgmflcant the decisive hegemoniC function is to control or
or even
inco rporate th em. In this active
t?e hegemonIC; has t? be
seen as more than the simple transmiSS ion oCan (unchanglOg)
d ominance. On the contrary, an y hegemoniC process must
especia lly alert and responsive
the
and
tion which question or threa ten Its dom103nce . The re,a hly of
concultural process must the n always incl ude the efforts
tribut ions of those who are in one way o r another outSide or a t
the edge of the terms of the specifiC hegemon y.
Thus it is misleading, as a general method, to reduce all
political and cultural init iatives and con tributions to the lenns
of the hegemon y. That is the reductive conseq uence
radically diHerent concept of 'superstructure' . The specific functions of 'the hegemoniC', 'the dominant',
to be
stressed, but not in ways which suggest any n prlon totality. The
most interesting and d ifficult part of an y cultural
complex societi es, is that which seeks to grasp
hegemoOlc 1D
its active and formative but also its transformational processes.

11 4

Mar xism an d Literatu re

Works of art, by their substantial and general character. are often

especia ll y important as sources of this complex evidence.
The major theoretical problem. with immediato effect on
met hods of analysis. is to distinguish between alternative and
oppositional initiatives and contributions which are made
with in or against 8 specific hegemony (which then sets certain
Umits to them or which can succeed in neutralizi ng, changing or
actually incorporating them ) and other kinds of initiative and
contribution which are irreducible to the terms of the original or
the adaptive hegemony, and are in that sense independent. It
can be persuasively a rgued that all or nearly all initiatives and
contributi ons. even when they take on manifestly alternative or
oppositional forms, are in practice tied to the hegemonic: that
the dominant culture, so to say, at once produces and limits its
own forms of counter-culture. There is more evidence for this
view (for example in the case of the Romantic critique of industrial civilization ) than we usua ll y admit. But there is evident
variation in speci fic kinds of social order and in the character of
the consequent alternative and oppositional formati ons. It
would be wrong to overlook the importance of works and ideas
which, while clearly aHected by hegemonic limits and press ures, arc at least in part significan t breaks beyond them, which
may agai n in pa rt be neutralized, reduced, or incorporated. but
which in their most active elements nevertheless com e through
as independent and original.
Th us cultural process must not be assumed to be merely
adaptive, extensive, and incorporative. Authentic breaks within
and beyond it, in speciJicsocia l conditions which can vary from
extreme isolation to pre revo!utionary breakdowns and actual
revolutionary activity, have often in fact oa:urred. And we are
better able to see this. a longside more general recog niti on of the
insistent pressures and limits of the h egemonic, if we develop
modes of ana lysis which instead of redUcing works to fini shed
products. and activities to fixed positions, are capable of discernin g, in good faith, the finite but significant openness of
many actual initiatives and contributions. The finite but significa nt openness of ma n y works of a rt, as signify ing form s
mak.ing poss ible but also requiring persistent and variable signifying responses, is then especia lly relevant.
4

7.

Traditions, Institutions, and Formations

Hegemony is always a n active process, but this does not m ean

that it is simply a complex uf duminant features and eleme nts.
On the contrary, it is always a more or less adequate organization
and interconnection of otherwise separated-and even dispa rate
and -practices, which it specifically inoor
POTatos in a significant1:ultufe and an effective social order,
These are themselves living resolutions- in the broadest sense,
political resolutions-of specific economic realities_ This pro..
cess of incorporation is of major cultu ra l importance. To understand it, but also to understa nd the material on which it toust
work, we need to disti nguish three aspects of any cultural process, which we can ca ll traditions, institutions, and formations.
The concept oftrodition ha s been radica ll y neglected in Marx
thought. It is usua ll y
as at best a secondary
Iacror, which may at most modify other and more decisive hi s
torical processes. This is not only because it is ordinariJy diagn osed as superstructure, but a lso because 'trad ition' has bee n
commonly understood as a relatively inert, historicized segment
ofa social structure: tradition as the surviving past But this
ve rsion of tradition is weak at the very point where the incori>Oratinifscmsc of tradition is strong: where it is seen , in fact , as
an actively shap ing forcc. For tradit io n is in practice the-most
evident expressi"olf of the dominant imd hegemonic pressures
anClliffiifs. It is always 'more than an inert historic ized segment;
indeed-it is tneffiOsf powerful practical means of incorporation..
W-nar-v:'ena-ve to see is not just 'a tradition' but a seJect iye
tiOdition: an inten tionall selective version $If .a...s.hap-in.s-pasL
and-a pre-S1iapEM:rprescnt, which is then
the-proc--ess-6f"socf3Tand cultural definition and identification.
It is usually not difficult to show this empirica lly. Most versions of 'tradition ' ca n be qukldy shown to be radically selective. From a whole possibleo reo of past and present, in a particu
lar culture, certain meanings and practices ore selected for
emphasis and certain other mea nings and practices are neg
lected or excl uded. Yet, withi n a particular hegemony, and as
one of its decisive processes, thi s selection is presented and
usually successfull y passed off as 'the tradition', 'the s ignificant

seen-

116

Traditions, Institutions, and Formations

Marxism and Literature

past', What has then to be sa id about any tradition is that it is in

tpis sense an aspect of con temporary soci&rancrcuJlural
za tion, in the interest of the dominance of 8 specific class. It is a
versio'o of the past whfch is intended to conn ect with and ratify
the presen t. What it offers in p ractice is a sense of predisposed
continuity.
There are, it is true, weaker sen ses of 'traditi on'. in explicit
contrast to 'innovation' and 'the contemporary ', These are oft en
points of retreat for groups in the society which have been left
stra nded by some particular h egemonic development. All that is
now left to them is the retrospective affirmation of 'traditional
values', Or. from an op posite position, 'traditional habits' are
isolated, by some' current hegemonic development, as elements
of the past which have now to be discarded. Much of the overt
argument about tradition is conducted between representatives
ofthcse two positions. But at a deeper level the hegemon ic sense
of tradition is always the most active: a deliberately selective
and copnecting process which offers a historica l and cultural
ratification of a con temporary orcler.
It is a very powerful process. since it is tied to many practical
continuities- famili es, pl aces, institution s, a language-which
are indeeddirectly experienced. It is also, a t any time. a vulnerable process, since it has in practice to discard whole areas of
significance, or reinterpret or dilute them, or conver t them into
forms which support or at least do not contradict the really
important elements of the current hegemony. It is significan t
that much of the most accessible and influential work oC"llie
coun ter-hegemony fs-hWorical:the

and

;ocoveryol

um MsilftI e effect unless the h nes to the p resent , in the

actual process of the selective tradition, are clearly and actively
traced . Otherwise any recovery can be simply residual or marginal. It is
of c;oJ1.!!.cctioll , w here a version of the
pastlsused to ratify the present and to indica te directions for tii-e
future, that a selt:dive traaition is at once powerful and vulnera-sos killed in mak n g active selective
connections, dismissing those it does not want as 'out of da le' or
t _at!acking those it cannot incorporate as
ccaonted' or 'alien. ' Vulnerable beca use the rea l record is effei:::
lve
and many of the alternative _or
pracltcal conlin ulti es are sull available_ Vulneraofe also because
10

- ---------

_.

_..

117

the selective version of'a living tradition' is

often in complex and hidden --pressures and limits_ Its

.-

materia l
substan ce
Includmg complex elemen ts of style and
tone and of basic method, can still be recognized,
brokcn :...This stru ggle-C
or
is
understandably a major part of all contemporary cultural
activity'.
. llis true that the effective establishment of a selecti,,:e tradition ('.an be said to depend on iden tifiable institutions , But it is
u:mtereStln18te of tbe -proctss-=toSiJ'ilpOsetIiiitTfclepends on
institutions alone. The relations between cultural. political. and
economic institutions aTe themselves very complex, and the
substance of these relations is a direct indication of the character
of the culture in the wider sense. Ou t it is never
question of
formally identifiable institutions. It is also a question of formations; those effecti ve movenlents aildleiidenc ies. in Intellectual
artistic life, which have significant and sometimes decisive
influence on the active development of a cult ure. and which
have a variable and often oblique relation to form al institution s,
Formal instituUons, evidently, have a profound influence on
theactfvew cia l prOCess. Whll.l is a bs tracted in orthodox 'Socioly ractice, in
actual sOciel; : -a
ogY-as -'socialization' is
'Spcc1Iic'krrnrormcorooration: ltsdescri'p tioii-as
the uni versal abstract process on which all human bein gs can be
said to depend , is a way of avoiding or hiding this specific
content and in tention. Any process of socialization of course
includes things that alIhumaDoemgs- have-to learn, but iioy
s peCIIC process les .IS neccss3IyTiiar-rung to a'selected range
of meami!js, values. and practices Wliicn, IiI-OW-VCry cfoseness
theirassoc1atioD.vith necessarYJc-arni ng -;-consfi tute t he real
willlOaHons olthehegemoll1c: ln atam il y c.hiJa:ren""""iiFe-careafQ1
and tnUglif to care for Themselves. but \viiliin-lliis nfssnry
process ffi"noam-entararids lecti\iifattitua s tusel(lo 0 ars, to
a social order, ana to tne
.a nd unconsC iously taught Ed'ueatlon--transffiilsn ecessa:ry
knowledge and
by a-pat ticu.larselectioti1tOIl1
the whole
ana with intrinsic attitu:des--;1XJ"'fllt()

-an

-in

of

any

118

TradiHons. Institutions, and Formations

Marxism a nd Literature

learning and soc ial relations. which are in practice vi rtually

inextrica ble. Institutions such as churches are explicitly inoor
porative. Specific communities and specific places of work.
exerting powerful and immediate pressures on theconditions of
living arid of making a living, teach , confirm . and in most cases
finalli' enforC'.c selected meanings , values. and activities. To
describe th e effect of 811 insti tutions of these k inds is to arrive at
a.n important but still incomplete understanding of incorpora.
h on. In modern societies Wtl have to add the major communica
tions systems. These ma teriali7-8 selected news and opin ion, and
a wide range of selected perceptions and attitudes .
Yet it qin still not be supposed that the sum of a ll these
institutions is an orga n ic hegemony. On t.he oontrary,
because it is not 'socialization' but a specific and complex
is il} pr{lJ:J-ice fy.11 of contradictions and of
This is
!!luslEgl
-to J!JP
achv.!f!.es of
stat..f-l.1!RllilLIl.tl..\'. Such apparatus
exi'Sls, although variably. but the whole procoss is much wider.
and is in some important respects selfgenerating. By selection it
is possible to identify common features in famil y, sc hool, com
munity, work, and oommunications, and these are important.
But just because they 8.re specific processes, with variable particular purposes, and with variable but always effective relations with what must in any case, in the short term. be done. the
practical consequence is as orren confus ion and conflict 00..

hegemonic

DS

.YaTues, as t
a ,t.!w.Qmllcalls.Vtd, An
etrcctive incorporation is usually in practico achieved; indeed to
est.ablish
a
society it must be aCh .ieved. But
T1!e true condition of hegemony is
with the
hegemolUc -fOr'tIfs: 'a sjiecific and mternalized 'socialization'
wlHdnSexpec:ted to be positive but wbiCll,11'That is not possi
ble, will rest on a (resigned)recognition of the inevitable and the
necessary. An effective cuJtur.t in this sense, is always more
i.!l!"_ti.!I;l!!q-M: ;Wt only- because t hese c.ruil)e
seen. in analysi s, to derive much of their character from it, but
H) s _l!t
qf.J! whole c.ulture_that!b&
crucial mferreTution s, incluctin&.-confusions and conflicts are

reaJfr .!'egit@.jiiQ.--

- - . -'

- .-

This is why, in any analysis, we have also to include forma-."_.

-- - ----- _.---

.
I

-:-'.

119

lions . These are most

movements an
tendcncie (literary. artistic. pli1Ji)sophi
or scientific) which
can usually be read il y discerned aftor thei r formative produc
lions. Often. when we look furth er, we find that these are artiCU
lations of
be wholly
Ule1r
fonnaJ. moanin!s nndv ues,
WIllal
6e
pOsTiVe1y-cOn traste
!his factor is
the
ilnportance f'Or"1fi6 undcrslalldmg of what IS habitually
specialized as int.ellectual aDd artistic life. In this fundam ental
relation between the institutions and formations of a culture
there is great historical variability , buti!.is
tic of developed complex societies ttiattorftlaHons. as dlstinCl.
from instilutions. play an increasingly important role.
Moreover, since such forma tions relate, inevitably. to real sOCial
structures. and yet have highly variable and often obliq ue
lions with formally di sce rnible social institutions, any SOC ial
and cultural anal sis of them
illfferenffrom thOse evcfapeifforinslitutions. What is really being
a-nalysed, in -each case. is -i
Moreover, within an apparent hegemony, whIch can be read.tly
described in generalizing ways, there are not only alternative
and oppositional formations (some of them, at
stages, having become or in the process of becomIng alternatIve
and oppositional institutions) but, within what can be recognized as the dominant effectively varying formations which
resist any simple redu'c tj on to some generalized hegemonic
function.
11 is at this point. normally, that many ofthosn in real contact
with such formations and their work retreat to an indifferent
emphasis on the complexity of cultural activity . Others
ait08ether deny (even theoretically) the relation ci
formations IlDd
wor _to"'1.11e"s"Ociaf processpJl
I
e
"iilafe'"ffalSOcl-arprocess. OtbC;:s8g8.in.
th_e
re81Tiy
"Ortfie rormations is grasped. render ffiIs baa (0 tdeiil constiiJcITOns=:noUI1t1iIt-tla8itiollS, literary and nnistic fraartions 15tories " of ideas. psychological types, spiritual
-which indeed acknowledge and define formations, often much
more substantially than the usual generalizing accounts of explicit social derivation or superstructural function , but only by
radically displaci ng them from the immediate cultural process.

sucn

when

120

Marxism and

8.

As a result of this

the formations and their work

active social and cultu'ral su bstanci!" iliat iJi;y
afe:
our own culture.,this
disJitiH:..
made t.cmJ?Oranly or comparativel y cODvincingby the
of dertvahve and superstructural interpretation, is itself,
and qU ite centrally. hegemonic.

. =-..-.. -------

Dominant, Residual, and Emergent

The complexity o f a culture is to be found not only in its variable

processes and thei r social definiti ons- traditions, institutions,
a nd formations- but also in the dynamic interrelations, at every
point in the process, of historically varied and variable ele
ments. In what I ha ve called 'epochal' analysis, a cultural pro
cess is se ized as a cultu ral system, with determinate dominant
features: feudal culture or bourgeois culture or a transition from
one to the other. This emphasis on dominant and definitive
lineaments and features is important and oflen, in practice,
effecti ve. But it then often happens that its methodology is
preserved forth e very different fun ction of historica l analysis, in
whicha sense ofmovement within what is ordinarily abstracted
as a system is crucially necessary, especially if it is to connect
with the future as well as with the past. In authentic historical
analysis it is necessary at every point to recognize the complex
interrelations between movements and tendencies both within
and beyond a specific and effective dominance. It is necessary to
examine how these relate to the whole cultural process rather
than only to the selected and abstracted dominant system. Thus
'bou rgeois culture' is a significant generalizing description and
nypothesis, expressed within epochal anal ysis by fundamental
comparisons with 'feudal culture' or 'socialist culture'. HoweVer:a.sa deSCripti on of cultural process, over four or five centu ries and in scores of different societies, it requires immediate
l)istorical and internallycomparalive diITerentiatioQ. Moreover,
this Is acknowledged or praCtically CillTie-d out, the
'epochal ' definition can exert its pressure as a static type against
which all real cultural process is measured , either to show
'stages' or 'variations' of the type (which is still historical
analysis) or, at its worst, to select supporting and exclude 'mar
ginal' or 'incidental ' or 'secondary' evidence.
Such errors are avoidable if, while retaining the epochal
hYlXlthesis, we can find terms which recognize not only 'stages'
and 'varia tions' but lhe internal dynamic relations of any actual
process. We have certainly still to speak of the
and the 'effective ', and in these senses of the he.8.en;lOOI.c..:'lJut
we find that wena ve also to speak , and incfOOd with furth er