Quantitative Risk Assessment Summary Report Botany Industrial Park 2012 09 25

QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT
SUMMARY REPORT
BOTANY INDUSTRIAL PARK
PREPARED FOR: NSW Department of

Planning
DOCUMENT NO: 20613-001

REVISION: 1
DATE: 25 September 2012
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25 September 2012
20613-001 BIP QRA 2012 Summary Rev 1
Sherpa Consulting Pty Ltd (ABN 40 110 961 898)

Phone: 61 2 9412 4555
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DOCUMENT REVISION RECORD

REV
DATE
DESCRIPTION
PREPARED
CHECKED
APPROVED
METHOD
OF ISSUE
26/06/2012
QRA Report
document
restructured
Draft for comment
J Polich
G Peach
J Polich
PDF
3/08/2012
Revised Draft for

comment
J Polich
G Peach
J Polich
PDF
31/08/2012
Submission to NSW
DoP
J Polich
G Peach
J Polich
PDF
25/09/2012
Minor updates
Submitted to NSW
DoP
J Polich
G Peach
J Polich
PDF
RELIANCE NOTICE
This report is issued pursuant to an Agreement between SHERPA CONSULTING PTY LTD (Sherpa
Consulting) and Orica Australia Pty Ltd which agreement sets forth the entire rights, obligations and
liabilities of those parties with respect to the content and use of the report.
Reliance by any other party on the contents of the report shall be at its own risk. Sherpa Consulting
makes no warranty or representation, expressed or implied, to any other party with respect to the
accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of the information contained in this report and assumes no
liabilities with respect to any other partys use of or damages resulting from such use of any information,
conclusions or recommendations disclosed in this report.
Title:
Quantitative Risk Assessment
Summary Report
Botany Industrial Park
Document:
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QA Verified:
E JOHNSON
Date: 25 September 2012
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CONTENTS
ABBREVIATIONS ...................................................................................................................................... 8
1.
SUMMARY ...................................................................................................................................... 11
1.1. Background.............................................................................................................................. 11
1.2. Risk Methodology .................................................................................................................... 11
1.3. Scope ....................................................................................................................................... 12
1.4. Objectives ................................................................................................................................ 13
1.5. Links to MHF ............................................................................................................................ 13
1.6. Revision History ....................................................................................................................... 13
1.7. Findings ................................................................................................................................... 14
1.8. Adequacy of Safeguards and Recommendations ................................................................... 16
1.9. Risk Acceptability..................................................................................................................... 16
2.
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................. 18
2.1. Background.............................................................................................................................. 18
2.2. Requirement for Study ............................................................................................................. 18
2.3. Responsibility........................................................................................................................... 19
2.4. Objectives ................................................................................................................................ 19
2.5. Document Structure ................................................................................................................. 20
2.6. Links to Major Hazards Facility Regulations ........................................................................... 20
2.7. Revision History ....................................................................................................................... 20
2.8. Software Version ..................................................................................................................... 21
2.9. Scope ....................................................................................................................................... 21
3.
2.10.
Limitations and Exclusions .............................................................................................. 22
2.11.
Links to Other Studies ..................................................................................................... 22
2.12.
Methodology .................................................................................................................... 26
2.13.
Risk Criteria ..................................................................................................................... 26
BIP SITE DESCRIPTION ................................................................................................................ 30

3.1. Location ................................................................................................................................... 30
3.2. Site Security............................................................................................................................. 30
3.3. BIP Site Fire Fighting and Emergency Response Systems .................................................... 33
3.4. Safety Management Systems .................................................................................................. 34
3.5. Accounting for the SMS in QRA .............................................................................................. 35
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4.
FACILITY DESCRIPTIONS ............................................................................................................. 36

4.1. Overview .................................................................................................................................. 36
4.2. Facility Design Basis and Hazardous Material Inventories ..................................................... 36
4.3. Qenos Olefines Process .......................................................................................................... 36
4.4. Qenos Alkathene Facility ......................................................................................................... 39
4.5. Qenos Alkatuff Facility ............................................................................................................. 41
4.6. Huntsman Surfactants Facility ................................................................................................. 42
4.7. Orica ChlorAlkali Facility .......................................................................................................... 45
4.8. Orica GTP ................................................................................................................................ 48
4.9. Qenos Site Utilities .................................................................................................................. 48
4.10.
5.
Other Operators Outside BIP .......................................................................................... 48
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION ............................................................................................................ 50

5.1. Hazardous Materials ................................................................................................................ 50
5.2. Hazardous Material Properties ................................................................................................ 50
5.3. Hazardous Incident Scenarios ................................................................................................. 50
5.4. Incident Scenarios Included in QRA ........................................................................................ 51
6.
CONSEQUENCE MODELS ............................................................................................................ 52

6.1. Overview .................................................................................................................................. 52
6.2. Assumptions for Consequence Models ................................................................................... 52
6.3. Dispersion Model ..................................................................................................................... 55
6.4. Explosion Modeling ................................................................................................................. 56
6.5. Estimation of Fatality, Injury, Irritation and Property Damage Effects ..................................... 57
7.
FREQUENCY ASSESSMENT ........................................................................................................ 63

7.1. Frequency Assessment ........................................................................................................... 63
7.2. Generic Equipment Failure Frequencies ................................................................................. 63
7.3. Chlorine Drum and Cylinder Failure Frequencies ................................................................... 65
7.4. Probability of Protection Operating .......................................................................................... 65
7.5. Human Error ............................................................................................................................ 66
7.6. Ignition Probability ................................................................................................................... 66
7.7. BLEVE Frequency ................................................................................................................... 66
7.8. Process Specific Incident Frequencies ................................................................................... 67
7.9. External Events........................................................................................................................ 68
7.10.
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Domino Incidents ............................................................................................................. 69

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8.
RISK MODEL................................................................................................................................... 71
8.1. Risk Quantification ................................................................................................................... 71
8.2. Risk Presentation..................................................................................................................... 71
8.3. Risk Model Input Data Summary ............................................................................................. 72
8.4. Population Data ....................................................................................................................... 73
9.
RISK RESULTS AND COMPARISON TO CRITERIA .................................................................... 74

9.1. Individual Fatality Risk ............................................................................................................. 74
9.2. Injury Risk - Fire and Explosion ............................................................................................... 75
9.3. Property Damage - Fire and Explosion ................................................................................... 76
9.4. Injury / Irritation Risk Toxic Gas............................................................................................ 76
9.5. Societal Risk ............................................................................................................................ 81
9.6. Comparison of Risk Results with Previous Studies................................................................. 83
9.7. Risk Reduction Potential ......................................................................................................... 84
9.8. Risk to the Biophysical Environment ....................................................................................... 84
10. OVERALL CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................................. 85

10.1.
Risks Compared against HIPAP 4 Criteria ...................................................................... 85
10.2.
Adequacy of Safeguards and Recommendations ........................................................... 85
10.3.
Risk Acceptability............................................................................................................. 86
11. REFERENCES ................................................................................................................................ 87
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INFORMATIVE APPENDICES
APPENDIX 1.
CUMULATIVE QRA REVISION HISTORY
APPENDIX 2.
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION WORD DIAGRAMS
APPENDIX 3.
METEOROLOGICAL DATA
APPENDIX 4.
EVENT TREES
APPENDIX 5.
POPULATION DATA
APPENDIX 6.
PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED RISK CONTOURS
CONFIDENTIAL APPENDICES
Note: These appendices contain security sensitive information and are therefore confidential in
accordance with the notes to section 14 of the Government Information (Private Access) Act 2009.
CONFIDENTIAL 1.
HAZARDS
CONFIDENTIAL 2.
FACILITY DESIGN BASIS USED IN THE QRA
CONFIDENTIAL 3.
RISKCURVES PARAMETERS
CONFIDENTIAL 4.
RISK CONTRIBUTOR DETAILS
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TABLES
Table 2.1:
Table 2.2:
Table 2.3:
Table 2.4:
Table 2.5:
Table 2.6:
Table 3.1:
Table 6.1:
Table 6.2:
Table 6.3:
Table 7.1:
Table 7.2:
Table 7.3:
Table 7.4:
Table 7.5:
Table 8.1:
Table 9.1:
Table 9.2:
Table 9.3:
Table 9.4:
BIP Site Facilities ........................................................................................................... 18

Changes to BIP Facilities (since previous Risk Studies) ............................................... 23
Facility Risk Assessment Studies Used to Compile BIP QRA ...................................... 25
NSW Risk Criteria, Existing Plants ................................................................................ 27
NSW Risk Criteria, New Plants ..................................................................................... 27
NSW Escalation Risk Criteria, New Plants .................................................................... 28
Summary of Safety Related Procedures ....................................................................... 34
Inventory Limitations ...................................................................................................... 53
Toxicity Criteria .............................................................................................................. 58
Probits Estimated from HID Data .................................................................................. 60
Generic Equipment Failure Frequencies ....................................................................... 63
Drum and Cylinder Failure Frequencies ........................................................................ 65
Failure of Safeguards .................................................................................................... 65
Human Error Probabilities ............................................................................................. 66
Process Specific Incident Frequencies.......................................................................... 67
Riskcurves Input Data.................................................................................................... 72
Individual Risk Comparison with Existing Plant Criteria ................................................ 74
Individual Risk Comparison with New Plant Criteria ..................................................... 75
Toxic Injury / Irritation Risk (New Plants)....................................................................... 76
Indoor Toxic Exposure Probit for Societal Risk Calculation .......................................... 81
FIGURES
Figure 1.1:
Figure 2.1:
Figure 3.1:
Figure 3.2:
Figure 9.1:
Figure 9.2:
Figure 9.3:
Figure 9.4:
Figure 9.5:
Figure 9.6:
Figure 9.7:
Figure 9.8:
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Cumulative BIP Individual Fatality Risk ......................................................................... 17

Societal Risk Criteria ..................................................................................................... 29
BIP Site Location ........................................................................................................... 31
BIP Site Layout .............................................................................................................. 32
Cumulative BIP Individual Fatality Risk ......................................................................... 77
Injury Risk Heat Radiation 4.7kW/m2 ......................................................................... 78
Injury Risk Overpressure 7kPa ................................................................................... 78
Property Damage Heat Radiation 23kW/m2 .............................................................. 79
Property Damage Overpressure 14kPa ..................................................................... 79
Injury Risk Toxic Gas (ERPG3) .................................................................................. 80
Irritation Risk Toxic Gas (ERPG2) .............................................................................. 80
Societal Risk .................................................................................................................. 83
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ABBREVIATIONS
ABS
Australian Bureau of Statistics
ACGIH
American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists
AEGL
Acute Emergency Level
AIHA
American Industrial Hygiene Association
ALA
Air Liquide Australia
ALARP
As Low As Reasonably Practicable
AS
Australian Standard
ASU
Air Separation Unit
BERT
Botany Emergency Response Team
BIP
Botany Industrial Park
BLEVE
Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion
BOM
Bureau of Meteorology
C2s
Aliphatic hydrocarbons with 2 carbon atoms (at Olefines these are mainly ethane,
ethylene (ethene) and acetylene (ethyne))
C3 splitter
Large distillation column and associated equipment designed to separate propane

and propylene to make high purity (polymer grade) propylene for sale to Basell
(formerly Montell). Located in Olefines OBL area.
C3s
Aliphatic hydrocarbons with 3 carbon atoms (at Olefines these are mainly propane
and propylene)
C4s
Aliphatic hydrocarbons with 4 carbon atoms (at Olefines these are mainly butane,
butene and 1,3 butadiene)
CAP
ChlorAlkali Plant
CIPS
Critical Instrumented Protective Systems
Cl2
Chlorine
CSTR
Continuously Stirred Tank Reactor
DCS
Distributed Control System
DG
Dangerous Goods
DIPNR
Department of Infrastructure, Planning and Natural Resources, NSW (now

Department of Planning, NSW)
DMDS
Dimethyl disulphide, cracking furnace additive
DoP
Department of Planning, NSW
DUAP
Department of Urban Affairs and Planning, NSW (now Department of Planning, NSW)
ECS
Emergency Chlorine Scrubber
EIS
Environmental Impact Statement
EIV
Emergency Isolation Valve (usually remotely operated)
EM
Ethyl mercaptan (ethanethiol), odorising agent for LPG
EO
Ethylene Oxide
ERP
Emergency Response Plan
ERPG
(US EPA) Emergency Response Planning Guideline
ESD
Emergency Shutdown
FDT
Fractional Dead Time
FeCl3
Ferric Chloride
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FHA
Final Hazard Analysis
FSS
Fire Safety Study
FTA
Fault Tree Analysis
GTP
Groundwater Treatment Plant
HAZOP
Hazard and Operability study
HCB
Hexachlorobenzene
HCl
Hydrogen chloride
HDPE
High Density Polyethylene
HID
(UK) Hazardous Installations Directorate
HIMA
High Integrity
HIPAP
(NSW) Hazardous Industry Planning Advisory Paper
HSE
(UK) Health & Safety Executive
HV
High voltage, 1 kilovolt AC or higher
Hypo
Sodium Hypochlorite
IBL
Olefines: Inside Battery Limits (inside the ethylene production and processing area)
ICA
Induced Condensing Agent
IDLH
Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health
ISCV
Internal Safety Control Valve (on LPG tanker)
LA
Low Aldehyde
LEL
Lower Explosive Limit
LLDPE
Linear Low Density Polyethylene
LOC
Loss Of Containment
LPG
Liquefied Petroleum Gas (mainly odorised propane)
MGA
Map Grid of Australia (GDA 1994)
MHF
Major Hazards Facility
MPP
Multi Purpose Plant
MSDS
Material Safety Data Sheet
NIS
Non Ionic Surfactants
NRV
Non-return valve (one way valve)
NSWFB
New South Wales Fire Brigade
OBL
Olefines: Outside Battery Limits - outside the ethylene plant production and
processing area but within the overall Olefines plant area of control. Olefines OBL
includes the hydrocarbon storages and the C3 splitter.
Offsite
Outside the boundaries of the land owned by BIP or its constituent companies.
P&ID
Piping and Instrumentation Drawing
Pasquill
stability
A method of classification of weather stability (used in dispersion modelling)

developed by Pasquill
PFD
Probability of Failure on Demand (for protective device) or

Process Flow Diagram
PG
Packaging Group
PGP
Polymer Grade Propylene (high purity propylene suitable for manufacture of

polypropylene)
PHA
Preliminary Hazard Analysis
pmpy
Per million per year
PO
Propylene oxide
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ppb
Parts per billion (usually vol/vol for gases)
PPE
Personnel Protective Equipment
ppm
Parts per million (usually vol/vol for gases)
PSV
Pressure Safety Valve
QRA
Quantitative Risk Assessment
RGP
Refinery Grade Propylene (mixture of mainly propylene with some propane)
SDV
Shutdown Valve
SH&E
Safety Health and Environment
SIL
Safety Integrity Level
SLOD
Significant Level of Death
SLOT
Specified Level of Toxicity
SMS
Safety Management System
SPC
Special Purpose Company
SRV
Safety Relief Valve or

Safety Response Vehicle
TEEL
(US) Temporary Emergency Exposure Limits
TLV
Threshold Limit Value
TNT
Tri-Nitro Toluene (explosive)
TWA
Time Weighted Average (method of calculating toxic exposure)
UEL
Upper Explosive Limit
VCE
Vapour Cloud Explosion
VWA
Victorian Workcover Authority
w/w
Weight/weight (basis for concentration values)
XSFV
Excess Flow Valve
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1.
SUMMARY
1.1.
Background
The Botany Industrial Park (BIP) is a large integrated petrochemical and chemical
manufacturing complex located at Matraville, NSW (formerly ICI Australia). Multiple
companies own and operate plants at the site. Facilities include Chloralkali, operated
by Orica, an Olefines plant and plastics manufacturing plants operated by Qenos, and
a Surfactants Facility operated by Huntsman. Utilities and other services support these
plants. There are also a number of remediation processes occurring at the site.
The BIP has a residential area immediately to the east along Denison St, and in all
other directions adjoins industrial or commercial land uses.
A cumulative Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) drawing on detailed design
information and the results from previous risk studies has been prepared for the
operating facilities at the BIP.
1.2.
Risk Methodology
The QRA has been carried out to comply with one of the Conditions of Consent for the
subdivision of the BIP, which requires a Cumulative Risk Assessment for the BIP to be
produced in accordance with Hazardous Industry Planning Advisory Paper No 6,
Hazard Analysis (Ref 1).
The QRA focused on the effects of potential major accident scenarios and atypical
events with the potential to have impacts outside the BIP site boundary. It does not
cover long-term or chronic impacts or continuous small emissions. These are
addressed via other mechanisms such as environmental protection licences, site
remediation action plans and occupational health and safety management regulations.
The QRA model was set up in the commercially available risk software TNO
Riskcurves version 2.7/P4 and used to generate the individual fatality risk, injury and
irritation risk, property damage risks and societal risk results as required by the
condition of consent.
In broad terms, risk was estimated quantitatively by:
identifying hazardous incident / release scenarios.
estimating the physical consequences, i.e. the extent of fire, explosion or toxic
release, and the associated impact on people for the defined release scenarios
due to heat radiation from fire events, explosion overpressure or acute toxic
exposure.
combining the consequence and impact results with incident frequency information,
plant grid information and population data to determine risk.
For this QRA, the results of the risk calculations have been presented in four forms:
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Individual Fatality Risk: the likelihood of fatality to notional individuals at locations

around the site, as a result of the defined fire / explosion and toxic gas release
scenarios. This is shown as contours on a map of the area. The units for individual
risk are probability (of fatality) per million per year. By convention it is assumed that
people are located outdoors, are always present and take no evasive action if an
incident occurs. The results are presented cumulatively for all fire/explosion and
toxic gas impacts.
Injury and Irritation Risk: is the likelihood of injury or irritation to individuals at

locations around the site as a result of the same scenarios used to calculate
individual fatality risk. As for individual risk, evasive action is not allowed for.
Results are presented as contours and are shown separately for fire/ explosion
injury, and toxic injury and irritation impacts, as there are different criteria for
flammable and toxic gas exposures.
Escalation / Property Damage: is the likelihood of property damage occurring to

surrounding facilities as a result of exceeding threshold levels of heat radiation or
overpressure. Results are presented as risk contours.
Societal Risk: takes into account the number of people exposed to risk. Whereas
individual risk is concerned with the risk of fatality to a (notional) person at a
particular location (person 'most at risk'), societal risk considers the likelihood of
actual fatalities among people exposed to the hazard and allows mitigating effects
such as probability of presence, whether they are located inside or outside etc, to
be accounted for, hence requires population data as an input.
Risk results have then been compared to the criteria given in Hazardous Industry
Planning Advisory Paper No 4, Risk Criteria for Land Use Safety Planning (Ref 2). Risk
criteria are given for new plants. For existing plants, HIPAP4 states that ideally the risk
criteria should also apply to existing plants whilst recognising this may not be possible.
HIPAP4 also contains guidance relating to the use of risk criteria for assessing
proposed developments in the vicinity of hazardous facilities.
1.3.
Scope
The integrated BIP QRA comprises:
a fully quantitative risk assessment for the Qenos Olefines, Orica ChlorAlkali and
Huntsman Surfactants plants.

a limited number of scenarios which have the potential to have an impact outside
the BIP site boundary for the Orica Groundwater Treatment Plant (GTP) and
the Qenos Alkathene and Alkatuff facilities.
Hazardous incidents identified for Qenos Site Utilities operations within the BIP and the
industrial gas processing operations in the areas to the immediate north of the BIP
boundary (leased to Air Liquide and BOC Gases), were found to have no impact
outside the BIP boundary. Hence there are no scenarios for Qenos Site Utilities, BOC
or Air Liquide included in the cumulative BIP QRA.
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1.4.
Objectives
The main objectives of the study were to:
update the quantitative consequence and risk assessment models established for
each facility on the BIP to a common basis to enable integration into a cumulative
risk model for the BIP.
quantitatively evaluate the cumulative level of risk from the BIP to surrounding land
uses and compare the calculated risk levels with the risk criteria published by
Department of Planning in HIPAP 4.
identify any changes compared to previously published risk levels.
The BIP QRA is intended as an indication of risk status. It is used as a tool to ensure
that risk levels do not increase over time, either due to changes in the facilities
themselves or dues to changes in surrounding land uses.
As the main purpose of the work is to show risk status over time, QRA modelling
methodology including software version, modelling parameters and assessment
criteria are generally not changed for the updates. This is to avoid changes in risk
results due to model alteration or assessment criteria, rather than due to changes in
risk scenario input data.
1.5.
Links to MHF
The Huntsman Surfactants, Orica Chloralkali and Qenos Olefines facilities are Major
Hazard Facilities (MHFs) under NSW Regulations and submitted their first Safety
Reports to NSW Workcover in February 2012. The Safety Reports are for individual
facilities and include risk assessments. However they do not present cumulative risk
results for the BIP.
The objective of the Safety Report is to demonstrate that the risks associated with an
MHF have been eliminated, or if this is not achievable, adequate controls must be
implemented to manage the risk to a level that is as low as reasonably practicable
(ALARP). A Safety Management System (SMS) must be in place that ensures the
effectiveness and reliability of the controls.
Whilst a brief description of the operator SMS and also relevant risk control measures
is included in the BIP QRA, the QRA does not include detailed adequacy assessments
of control measures or details of assurance of their integrity via the relevant facility
operators safety management system, as this is covered in the individual operators
MHF Safety Report.
1.6.
Revision History
The QRA model was first compiled in 2006 and last issued to the DoP for comment in
2010. This latest issue (2012) includes some relatively minor updates made as a result
of the MHF/Safety Report process. These have made minimal difference to the overall
risk results.
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The QRA report document has also been restructured to include an expanded
summary for easier use in discussions with third parties, and the majority of technical
detail has been transferred into appendices.
1.7.
Findings
Hazardous Incidents
Potential hazardous incidents include:
Fire and explosion scenarios (including decomposition and BLEVEs) at the Qenos
Olefines and Huntsman Surfactants facilities which have the largest flammable
inventories of the facilities on the BIP site.
A small number of fire and explosion scenarios at the Qenos Alkatuff and
Alkathene facilities. These plants have relatively small flammable inventories,
hence only a small number of worst case scenarios have the potential to have an
impact outside the BIP boundaries.
Toxic gas release scenarios from the Orica ChlorAlkali facility, with a small number
(with no offsite fatality potential) from the Qenos Olefines Plant, the Orica GTP and
the Huntsman Surfactants Plant which contribute to toxic gas injury and irritation
risk.
Individual Fatality Risk

As shown in Figure 1.1, the individual risk contours for the cumulative BIP operations
demonstrate that most HIPAP 4 quantitative criteria for individual fatality risk (for new
plants) are satisfied as follows:
The 1x10-6 per year risk contour, applicable for residential areas encroaches
slightly (around 35m) across Denison St into a small part of the residential area.
The 0.5 x10-6 per year contour extends approximately 50 to 100m beyond the BIP
site boundary in most directions, but does not encroach into any sensitive land
uses. (The nearest sensitive use is Matraville Public School around 400m from the
Denison St boundary. The risk level at the school is below 1 x 10-8 per year).
The 5 x10-6 per year contour does not extend into any commercial land uses
(which are east along Denison St or to the north of the BIP).
The 10 x10-6 per year contour does not extend into any recreational land uses.
The 50 x10-6 per year contour is entirely within the main BIP site boundary,
satisfying the criterion that this contour be contained within the site for industrial
land uses. The exception is the area around the Nant St storages where the
contour extends beyond the BIP boundary into neighbouring industrial areas.
Fire and Explosion Injury Risk

The 50 x10-6 per year contour for the heat radiation or overpressure criterion in the
vicinity of the northern BIP area does not extend into residential areas. However there
is a small encroachment (approximately 40m) over the eastern BIP boundary across
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Denison St into the residential area for the overpressure (7 kPa) injury risk contour and
to a lesser extent the heat radiation (4.7 kW/m2) injury risk contour.
Toxic Gas Injury/Irritation Risk
Injury and irritation risk have been represented as the frequency of exposure to
concentrations exceeding the ERPG3 and ERPG2 levels set for toxic materials. Injury
and irritation risk criteria are set for residential and sensitive areas only. These criteria
are not strictly applicable to existing plants. Normally toxic injury and irritation risk is
calculated for new developments only, however the BIP subdivision Conditions of
Consent included a requirement that these risks be estimated to provide a baseline in
case of any future developments at the BIP.
The toxic gas irritation and injury risk levels in residential areas exceed the criteria
given in HIPAP 4 as the relevant contours extend into residential areas.
Escalation Risk
Within the BIP, the risk of either overpressure or heat radiation impacts between the
Huntsman Surfactants and Qenos Olefines facilities is less than 50 x 10-6 per year,
hence the risk of escalation between the major flammable inventories within the BIP is
low. The 50 x 10-6 escalation risk contours (showing exceedance of 23 kW/m2 or 14
kPa threshold levels) extend very slightly offsite into some neighbouring potentially
hazardous facilities, specifically ALA to the north of Olefines and Mobil immediately
adjacent to the Nant St tank farm.
Societal Risk
Societal risk results were compared against the provisional criteria published in HIPAP
4. Compared to the selected criteria, the societal risk due to the BIP is broadly in the
As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) zone. It does not encroach into the
intolerable zone.
Comparison with Previous Results
There have been a number of previous QRA studies prepared in relation to upgrades
or projects covering facilities on the BIP. However prior to the compiled QRA described
in this report, there have been no cumulative QRA studies. For example there was no
combined risk profile for flammable and toxic fatality risks. Previous studies have used
different methodologies so an approximate comparison only was included in this QRA.
In summary:
Individual fatality risk contours for fire and explosion events are smaller than
previously published fire and explosion results.
The risk contribution from the Orica Chloralkali area in the south of the BIP is very
similar to previous results.
There have been no previous studies presenting injury/irritation or escalation risks on

the same basis as this QRA, hence a detailed comparison to previous results is not
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made. However it can generally be inferred that injury, irritation and escalation risks
would also tend to decrease if the individual fatality risk has decreased.
1.8.
Adequacy of Safeguards and Recommendations

Each of the potentially hazardous incidents defined has a number of preventative and
mitigation control measures and safeguards in place, resulting in low predicted
frequencies for high consequence accident events. No step change risk reduction
measures were identified in the course of preparing the QRA.
The BIP QRA is intended as a risk status report and while it identifies existing risk
control measures and safeguards, it does not provide a detailed demonstration of the
adequacy of the control measures in place to control risks to levels considered As
Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) or assess incremental risk reduction
measures that could be implemented to further reduce risk levels. This is addressed in
the facility MHF Safety Reports.
Specific recommendations have not been made as part of the study.
1.9.
Risk Acceptability
Overall, when considering the individual fatality and societal risk results, these are
reasonably low and have decreased when compared with results presented previously
for the BIP. This is largely due to significant reduction in overall flammable and toxic
inventories at the BIP resulting from closure of some plants (Vinyls) and replacement
of the Orica Chloralkali plant with a modern low inventory facility. However there are
still some high consequence events with the potential to affect populations in proximity
to the BIP, specifically:
Flashfire /explosions due to large leak or rupture of the ethylene sphere .
Flashfire/explosions (including BLEVEs) due to large leak or rupture of the

propane/propylene storages.
Ethylene oxide decomposition events.
Liquid chlorine leaks from in-transit road tanker or in-transit drums.
There is a small encroachment of the 1x10-6 per year individual fatality risk contour into
the Denison St residential area, and toxic gas injury and irritation risk levels in
residential areas are also higher than the criteria that would apply to a new
development. Societal risk results are in the ALARP region which indicates that the risk
is not unacceptable, but that it is not negligible.
These results are consistent with the NSW Department of Planning 2001 Botany /
Randwick Industrial Area Land Use Safety Study (page 20 Ref 23) which retains a
consultation zone in the vicinity of the eastern boundary of the BIP. The Land Use
Safety Study recommends that the NSW DoP be consulted regarding any proposed
residential development within or near the Departmental Consultation zone, and also
states that high residential densities should still be avoided due to potential societal
risk implications.
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FIGURE 1.1:
CUMULATIVE BIP INDIVIDUAL FATALITY RISK
LEGEND:
0.5 x10-6 per year
1 x10-6 per year
5 x10-6 per year
10 x10-6 per year
50 x10-6 per year
Site boundary
Google Earth
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2.
INTRODUCTION
2.1.
Background
The Botany Industrial Park (BIP) is a large integrated petrochemical and chemical
manufacturing complex located to the west of Denison St, Matraville, NSW. The site
was operated as a single site under the ownership of Orica Australia (formerly ICI
Australia) until late 1998. In 1998, changes resulting in the sale of some Orica plants
and land on the BIP, or formation of joint venture companies occurred, resulting in
multiple owners and facility operators at the site.
The site was subsequently subdivided (in 1999) to form the Botany Industrial Park
(BIP). There are now six main industrial complexes on the site, which are operated by
three different companies; Orica, Huntsman and Qenos (formerly a joint venture
between Orica and Exxon Mobil, which was sold to the China National Chemical
Corporation in March 2006), as summarised in Table 2.1. The overall role of managing
the BIP is rotated between the three main operating companies. There are also some
areas on the BIP owned by or leased to non-manufacturing companies.
TABLE 2.1:
2.2.
BIP SITE FACILITIES
Plant
Operator
Description
Olefines
Qenos
Manufactures ethylene from ethane feedstock

for use in downstream plants
Alkathene
Qenos
Manufactures low density polyethylene plastics
Alkatuff
Qenos
Manufactures linear low density and high density

polyethylene plastics
Site Utilities
Qenos
Supplies electricity, steam, nitrogen etc. to the

various plants at the site
Surfactants
Huntsman
Manufactures ethylene oxide for use in

downstream plants to make a range of materials
such as detergents, glycols, surfactants
ChlorAlkali Facility
Orica
Manufactures chlorine, hydrochloric acid, caustic

soda, ferric chloride, and sodium hypochlorite
Air Separation Plants
Air Liquide
Air separation units (x 2) manufacturing oxygen

and nitrogen.
Hydrogen (H2) trailer storage
CO2 dry ice manufacture using CO2 from
Huntsman.
CO2 Facility
BOC Gases
CO2 dry ice manufacture

NOTE: this site previously had H2 trailers and H2
cylinder filling and a CO2 purification plant.
However these facilities were decommissioned
in 2001.
Requirement for Study

One of the Conditions of Consent set by the NSW Department of Planning (DoP) for
the BIP subdivision required that a cumulative site quantitative risk assessment (QRA)
be prepared and maintained (Schedule 3, Condition 4, DA 30/98) in accordance with
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the guidelines published by the DoP Hazardous Industry Planning Advisory Paper
No. 6 - Guidelines for Hazard Analysis (Ref 1) as follows:
4.
Site Cumulative Risk Assessment

1
(a) The SPC will maintain an updated Cumulative Risk Assessment for the BIP. The
Assessment report: shall include individual fatality, injury and irritation risk and societal risk using
the most recently available population and meteorological data. This report and all
documentation shall be in accordance with. the Department's Hazardous Industry Planning
Advisory Paper No 6: Hazard Analysis Guidelines.
(b) Each member of SPC must provide the relevant information and resources to the SPC to
ensure that the Assessment is reviewed and updated as necessary.
(c) The Site Cumulative Risk Assessment report shall be maintained as a 'living document' and
updated as modifications occur on the BIP. The updated report shall be submitted to the DirectorGeneral for approval on a three yearly basis.
(d) All State significant development applications submitted to the Department for consideration
containing a preliminary hazard analysis must include updated BIP Cumulative Risk Assessment
results.
2.3.
Responsibility
The BIP coordinates the preparation and integration of the cumulative BIP site QRA. A
separate risk assessment study is maintained for each manufacturing facility by the
responsible operator. The separate risk assessments have been integrated with each
operating company providing input to the QRA compilation process for their facilities,
to form the cumulative BIP site QRA. The compiled results are reported in a summary
document. The summary document is provided periodically to the NSW Department of
Planning (DoP). Updates may be made to the QRA, for example if significant changes
occur at the facilities.
Sherpa Consulting has been retained by Orica on behalf of the BIP to assist in
preparing the compiled BIP QRA and the associated summary report using results
drawn from the individual facility QRAs. This report is the compiled BIP QRA summary
document.
2.4.
Objectives
The objectives of the QRA study are to:
Identify hazardous incidents associated with the BIP manufacturing facilities that
have the potential to have an impact outside the BIP site boundary.
Update the quantitative consequence and risk assessment models established for
each plant on the BIP to a common basis to enable integration.
Quantitatively evaluate the cumulative level of risk from the BIP to surrounding land
uses.
Compare the calculated risk levels with the risk criteria published by Department of
Planning in HIPAP No 4 (Ref 2) and also to relevant results from previous hazard
analyses.
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The BIP QRA is intended to comply with the relevant Condition of Consent and is used
as a tool to ensure that risk levels do not increase over time, either due to changes in
the facilities themselves or due to changes in surrounding land uses.
2.5.
Document Structure
The QRA is structured into the following sections
2.6.
Summary (Section 1): This is a plain english summary of the QRA process and
main results and can be used for discussion with third parties.
Main Report (Sections 2 -11): Details of the approach and structure of the QRA
and the overall results.
Informative Appendices: These contain details of methodology and main input

assumptions.
Confidential Appendices: Some of the information used to prepare the QRA is

regarded as security sensitive, for example inventories of hazardous material and
locations of these inventories. These are included only in a confidential section of
the QRA report in accordance with section 14 of the Government Information
(Private Access) Act 2009.
Links to Major Hazards Facility Regulations

The Huntsman Surfactants, Orica Chloralkali and Qenos Olefines facilities are Major
Hazard Facilities (MHFs) under NSW Regulations. The first Safety Report was
submitted for each facility to the regulator (NSW Workcover) in February 2012.
The objective of the Safety Report is to demonstrate that the risks associated with an
MHF have been eliminated, or if this is not achievable, adequate controls must be
implemented to manage the risk to a level that is as low as reasonably practicable
(ALARP). A Safety Management System (SMS) must be in place that ensures the
effectiveness and reliability of the controls.
Whilst a brief description of relevant risk control measures is included in the QRA, the
QRA does not include detailed adequacy assessments of control measures or details
of assurance of their integrity via the relevant facility operators safety management
system, as this is covered in the MHF Safety Reports.
2.7.
Revision History
A revision history of the cumulative QRA describing the main changes between
revisions is contained in APPENDIX 1.
The initial cumulative QRA model was compiled in 2006 using commercially available
software TNO Riskcurves. The QRA model was used to generate results in the form of
individual fatality risk, injury and irritation risk, property damage risks and societal risks.
The cumulative QRA was issued to the DoP for comment in 2007 and reissued to DoP
in 2009 and 2010 incorporating DoP comments. This updated revision (2012) was
prepared after each MHF operator on the BIP had prepared their first MHF Safety
Report. A review of the completed Safety Report work by each operator indicated that
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the BIP QRA was representative and generally consistent with the hazard identification
and risk assessments undertaken as part of the Safety Report preparation. Some
minor updates to the QRA have been made resulting in inclusion of a small number of
additional scenarios for the Qenos Olefines and Huntsman Surfactants (specifically
Propylene Oxide (PO) Storage) facilities.
2.8.
Software Version
Riskcurves version 2.7/P4 has been used for the QRA including the current (2012)
QRA. A major change in structure of the software and internal models was made
between version P4 and the next release Riskcurves 7 and backwards compatibility
was not retained.
As the main purpose of the work is to show risk status over time, it was decided to
maintain the QRA model in Riskcurves P4 to avoid changes in results solely due to
modelling changes, rather than changes due to updates to input data.
2.9.
Scope
The BIP QRA covers the following process facilities, as well as tanker loading /
unloading operations and storages associated with each facility:
Qenos Olefines plant Inside Battery Limits (IBL). This is the production and
processing facility where ethylene is produced from an ethane feed.
Qenos Olefines plant Outside Battery Limits (OBL). This is outside the ethylene
plant production and processing area but within the overall Olefines plant area of
control. Olefines OBL includes hydrocarbon storages and the C3 splitter as well as
the Nant St tank farm.
Qenos Alkathene which produces low density polyethylene plastics from ethylene
feed.
Qenos Alkatuff which produces linear low density and high density polyethylene
plastics from ethylene feed.
Huntsman Surfactants Plant which comprises: three continuous plants, i.e. the
Ethylene Oxide (EO), Glycols and Glycol Ethers Plants, and also the batch plants,
comprising three non-ionic surfactants (NIS A, B, C) plants, the Multi-Purpose Plant
(MPP), and the Specialties plant.
Orica ChlorAlkali Facility which comprises the ChlorAlkali Plant (CAP) where
chlorine gas is produced, the Products Plants where all manufactured chlorine is
used (Hydrochloric Acid, Ferric Chloride and Sodium Hypochlorite plants) as well
as an in-transit chlorine road tanker, drum and cylinder storage area.
Orica Groundwater Treatment Plant (GTP) which treats contaminated groundwater

using an air stripping and thermal oxidation process.
Qenos Site Utilities which supplies steam and power, as well as other utilities to the
BIP.
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Pipelines carrying toxic/flammable materials within the BIP.
Air Liquide manufacturing operations comprising Air Separation Units (ASUs)

manufacturing oxygen and nitrogen.
Air Liquide dry ice (CO2) packing operations (separate site to ASU site).
BOC Gases dry ice (CO2) packing operations.
The focus is on events which may cause an impact offsite, with offsite defined as
outside the BIP boundaries.
2.10.
Limitations and Exclusions

The QRA does not cover:
Vehicle movements within the BIP.
Vehicle transport to and from the BIP.
Pipelines external to the BIP.
The study focussed on the effects of potential accident scenarios and atypical events.
It does not cover long-term or continuous emissions, or occupational, health and safety
issues that may arise from routine plant operations. These are addressed via other
mechanisms such as environmental protection licences and occupational health and
safety management systems.
Whilst the QRA identifies existing risk control measures and safeguards, it does not
provide a detailed demonstration of the adequacy of the control measures in place to
control risks to levels considered As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP). This
activity is carried out by the various operating companies for each facility as part of the
Safety Report required under the NSW Major Hazards Facility (MHF) legislation as
described in Section 2.5.
2.11.
Links to Other Studies

This report supersedes all cumulative quantitative BIP risk results previously provided
to DoP. It provides a summary of the overall BIP risk model, risk results and
conclusions regarding the cumulative level of risk, including individual fatality risk,
societal risk, injury and irritation risk. It also provides details of the main inputs to the
risk assessments (e.g. hazard identification, meteorological and population data).
2.11.1. Previous Site QRAs for Individual Facilities
The 1996 Ethane Conversion FHA (Ref 9) provided the most recent fire and explosion
risk contours for the BIP site prior to completion of the BIP QRA.
The 2006 ChlorAlkali QRA (Ref 6) provided the most recent toxic risk contours, but
only for the ChlorAlkali Facility. (Note that the ChlorAlkali QRA is an update of the
Chloralkali FHA as required by the CAP upgrade conditions of consent, Ref 7). The
chloralkali FHA/QRA only included scenarios associated with chloralkali (i.e. toxic
impacts). It did not include a cumulative risk assessment for all plants on the BIP.
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There have been a number of changes and closures of facilities on the BIP since these
studies which have had the overall effect of significantly reducing inventories of
flammable and toxic materials. These are summarised in Table 2.2.
TABLE 2.2:
CHANGES TO BIP FACILITIES (SINCE PREVIOUS RISK STUDIES)
Facility
Covered in
previous
Study
Operator:
ICI Australia
Olefines
Yes
Converted from naphtha Yes
Flammable and to ethane feedstock in
toxic
1996.
inventories
Fire / explosion risk

presented in Ethane
FHA 1996. Toxic
materials not covered
in 1996.
Both flammable / toxic
covered in integrated
BIP QRA
Polythene:
Alkatuff
Yes
Flammable
inventories
Major upgrade in 2001

Yes
which increased plant
capacity from 86,000tpa
to 125,000tpa
polyethylene
The uprate project

increased Class 3
storage inventory
Polythene:
Alkathene
Yes
Flammable
inventories
Major instrumentation
Yes
upgrade in 1995. In
1997 the plant
homogenisation
capacity was increased,
and in 2003 the plant
degassing and
deflossing capacity was
also increased.
No significant
inventory changes
Propathene
Yes
Flammable
inventories
Closed and demolished
Closure resulted in
elimination of
significant flammable
inventories
Operator:
ICI Australia
Site Utilities
No
No significant
hazardous
inventories
Vinyls / EDC
Yes
Closed and demolished
Flammable and
toxic
inventories
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Major changes in
status since previous
studies
Covered
Comments
in
integrated
BIP QRA
2012
Qenos
Qenos
No significant changes
Yes
No significant
flammable / toxic
inventories. Brief
qualitative discussion
only in BIP integrated
QRA.
Closure resulted in
elimination of
significant flammable
and toxic inventories
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Facility
Covered in
previous
Study
Major changes in
status since previous
studies
Operator:
Orica Australia
ChlorAlkali
Facility
Yes
Toxic
inventories
Products
Plants
Hydrochloric
Acid
Yes
Commissioned in 1994,
Proposed plant upgraded
at the time
instrumentation in late
1990s then in 2008.
Covered
Comments
in
integrated
BIP QRA
2012
Orica Australia
Mercury cell plant

closed in 2001 and
replaced by modern
membrane cell plant.
Yes
Replacement plant
resulted in significant
reduction in toxic
inventories, i.e.
removal of all
liquefaction and bulk
liquid Cl2 inventories
Yes
Products
No
Plants Ferric
Chloride
Commissioned in 1995
Products
Plants
Sodium
Hypochlorite
No
Converted from batch to Yes

continuous in 2001
upgrade
Operator:
ICI Australia
Huntsman
Surfactants
Flammable and Uprated in 1997

explosive
Changes involved
inventories
process and
instrumentation
improvements.
Yes
Operator:
Not applicable
Orica Australia
Groundwater
Treatment
plant (GTP)
Commissioned 2005
Yes
Planning submission
(FHA, Ref 3)
demonstrated no
offsite fatality risks
with low injury /
irritation risks.
HCB
Repackaging
Commissioned 2007
Not included.
Planning submission
(PHA, Ref 4)
demonstrated no
significant offsite
risks.
Carpark
remediation
project
Approval sought in
2007.
NOTE: Project has been
completed (2012) and
decommissioning
commenced
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No significant
changes in
inventories.
Not included.
PHA (Ref 5) indicated
no significant offsite
risks.
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2.11.2. Facility Risk Assessments

There have been various updates to BIP site risk profiles provided to regulatory
authorities as part of planning approval requests or environmental assessments for
upgrade projects occurring on the site. However most of these studies did not provide
a total cumulative BIP risk profile but focused on changes in the risk levels associated
with individual facilities.
In 2006 a separate risk assessment study and associated report was prepared for
each major operating plant on the BIP which ties together previous planning studies
such as Preliminary or Final Hazard Analyses (PHA or FHAs). These facility risk
assessments superseded the various hazard analyses studies carried out as part of
the planning process as summarised in the Table 2.3.
In general the individual risk assessments are internal documents. The exception is the
standalone Orica Chloralkali plant QRA which is required to be submitted to NSW DoP
as part of the conditions of consent for the 2001 Chloralkali replacement project.
The individual risk assessments have been integrated to form the cumulative BIP site
QRA, and used to prepare this cumulative BIP QRA report.
TABLE 2.3:
FACILITY RISK ASSESSMENT STUDIES USED TO COMPILE BIP QRA
Facility
Reference to most
recent facility Risk
Assessment
Distribution
Planning Studies
incorporated / superseded
by most recent facility Risk
Assessment
Choralkali
Quantitative Risk
Assessment Report
ChlorAlkali Orica Nov
2006 (Ref 6).
This is periodically
updated and sent to
DoP as per Conditions
of Consent for
replacement Chloralkali
Plant project.
Final Hazard Analysis

Replacement Chloralkali
Plant Orica Australia Pty Ltd
Botany Industrial Park,
March 2000 (Ref 7)
Olefines
Quantitative Risk
Assessment Report
Qenos Olefines Aug
2006 (Ref 8)
Internal Qenos
document
Final Hazard Analysis for ICI

Olefines Ethane Conversion
Project ICI Botany, NSW,
March 1995 (Ref 9)
Alkatuff
Risk Assessment Report Internal Qenos

Alkatuff Qenos Nov 2006 document
(Ref 10)
Final Hazard Analysis for the

Qenos Alkatuff Plant
Upgrade Project March 2000
(Ref 11)
Alkathene
Risk Assessment Report Internal Qenos

Alkathene Qenos Oct
document
2006 (Ref 12)
Not applicable
Site Utilities Risk Assessment Report Internal Qenos

Site Utilities Qenos Nov document
2006 (Ref 13)
Not applicable
Surfactants Quantitative Risk

Assessment Report EO
Huntsman Nov 2006
(Ref 14)
Final Hazard Analysis for the

ICI Surfactants Plants,
Botany, October 1997 (Ref
15)
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2.12.
Facility
Reference to most
recent facility Risk
Assessment
Distribution
Planning Studies
incorporated / superseded
by most recent facility Risk
Assessment
Air Liquide
and
BOC
Gases
Risk Assessment
Report, Non- BIP
Operators, Botany
Industrial Park April
2009 (Ref 16)
Internal Orica
document
Not applicable
Methodology
The BIP QRA study was carried out in accordance with HIPAP No 6 and included the
following main steps:
2.13.
Hazard Identification and development of potential incident scenarios. These were

compiled from the individual facility risk assessments and MHF Safety Reports
which were prepared taking into account previous hazard and risk studies, with
input from operations personnel and review of plant incident records.
Consequence assessment. This was carried out quantitatively using commercially

available software packages including TNO Effects (Ref 17), the US EPAs ALOHA
(Ref 18), Shell FRED (Ref 19) and some spreadsheet models from the TNO Yellow
Book (Ref 20).
Risk assessment. The risk assessment approach was a Quantitative Risk Analysis,
ie a Level 3 Assessment, as described in Multi-level Risk Assessment (Ref.21).
Guidance contained in the TNO Purple Book was used to define assumptions
made in preparing the QRA (Ref 22).
Quantitative risk results were generated by TNO Riskcurves v2.7/P4 and

presented as individual fatality risk contours, injury / irritation risk contours and
societal risk graphs.
Risk Criteria
For this study the estimated risk levels are compared to the NSW DoP quantitative
criteria in HIPAP 4 (Ref 2).
2.13.1. Individual Risk
Individual risk represents the probability of a specified level of harm (usually fatality or
injury) occurring to a theoretical individual located permanently at a particular location,
assuming no mitigating action such as escape can be taken, hence is considered to
cover vulnerable individuals such as the very young, sick or elderly.
Individual fatality risk criteria for existing plants are expressed in terms of
appropriateness of further development in the vicinity of a facility, as given in Table
2.4.
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TABLE 2.4:
NSW RISK CRITERIA, EXISTING PLANTS
Description
Risk from
Existing Facility
(per year)
No residential intensification should take place where pre-mitigation

-6
residual risk levels are in excess of 10x10 per year
10 x 10
Residential intensification may be appropriate where mitigating measures

can be implemented to reduce risk exposure to less than the one in a
million per year individual fatality risk level, provided the pre-mitigation
residual risk levels are below the 10 in a million per year individual fatality
risk level
1 to 10 x 10
No intensification of residential development
1 x 10
No intensification of sensitive uses
0.5 x 10
-6
-6
-6
-6
NSW DoP quantitative individual risk criteria for new plants are also available, and are
more extensive than existing plant risk criteria. These are summarised in Table 2.5.
They are expressed in terms of individual fatality risk or likelihood of exposure to
threshold values of heat radiation, explosion overpressure or toxicity. Escalation
criteria (i.e. likelihood of property damage to neighbouring facilities due to exceeding
specified overpressure or heat radiation levels) are given in Table 2.6.
TABLE 2.5:
NSW RISK CRITERIA, NEW PLANTS
Description
Risk
Criteria
(per year)

Fatality risk to sensitive uses, including hospitals, schools, aged care
0.5 x 10
Fatality risk to residential and hotels
1 x 10
Fatality risk to commercial areas, including offices, retail centres, warehouses
5 x 10
Fatality risk to sporting complexes and active open spaces
10 x 10
Fatality risk to be contained within the boundary of an industrial site
50 x 10
-6
-6
-6
-6
-6
Injury / Irritation
-6
Fire / Explosion Injury risk incident heat flux radiation at residential areas
2
should not exceed 4.7 kW/m at frequencies of more than 50 chances in a
million per year or incident explosion overpressure at residential areas should
not exceed 7 kPa at frequencies of more than 50 chances in a million per year
50 x 10
Toxic Injury - Toxic concentrations in residential areas should not exceed a

level which would be seriously injurious to sensitive members of the community
following a relatively short period of exposure at a maximum frequency of 10 in
a million per year
10 x 10
Toxic Irritation - Toxic concentrations in residential areas should not cause

irritation to eyes, or throat, coughing or other acute physiological responses in
sensitive members of the community over a maximum frequency of 50 in a
million per year
50 x 10
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-6
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TABLE 2.6:
NSW ESCALATION RISK CRITERIA, NEW PLANTS
Description
Risk Criteria
(per year)
Escalation
-6
Incident heat flux radiation at neighbouring potentially hazardous

installations or land zoned to accommodate such use should not exceed
2
a risk of 50 per million per year for the 23 kW/m heat flux contour
50 x 10
Overpressure at neighbouring potentially hazardous installations or the

nearest public building should not exceed a risk of 50 per million per year
for the 14 kPa overpressure contour
50 x 10
-6
2.13.2. Societal Risk

Societal risk is a measure of the probability of incidents affecting an actual population
(rather than a theoretical individual as in individual risk). It is usually presented in the
form of an f-N curve which is a graph indicating the cumulative frequency of fatality (f)
of a population of size N or more people. Generally societal risk is considered in
three regions (Ref 21):
Intolerable region represented by an upper criterion line above which the activity
would be regarded as unacceptable in proximity to a population.
Negligible represented by a lower criterion line below which the activity would be
regarded as posing acceptable risk levels.
Region in between where the risk may be acceptable depending on the benefits of
the activity, but risk reduction measures should be implemented to reduce the risks
where practicable. This is known as the ALARP or as low as reasonably
practicable region. Provided other quantitative and qualitative criteria of HIPAP 4
are met, the risks from the activity are considered tolerable in the ALARP region.
HIPAP 4 provides some provisional societal risk criteria as shown in Figure 2.1. NSW
DoP have also published a Land Use Safety Study of the Botany / Randwick Industrial
Area, 2001 (Ref 23, though it is noted that this is no longer in print) which contains
societal risk criteria that are the same as those given in HIPAP 4.
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FIGURE 2.1:
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3.
BIP SITE DESCRIPTION
3.1.
Location
The main BIP site occupies 73 hectares, bounded to the north by Corish Circle, to the
east by Denison St, to the south by Beauchamp Rd and to the west by the Botany
Goods railway line easement. In addition, Qenos owns land to the west of the railway
line near Nant St which contains a tank farm, and Orica also owns some undeveloped
land (known as Southlands), to the south-west of the main BIP site.
The land around most of the BIP site perimeter is zoned commercial and industrial.
The area around Corish Circle at the northeast corner of the site is zoned recreational
(Hensley Athletic Field), and beyond this to the north is the commercial Eastgardens
shopping complex. Land adjacent to part of the eastern boundary of the BIP has
significant residential areas along Denison Street and further east.
Several schools are located in Matraville along Bunnerong Rd, about 400m east of
Denison St. On the western side, there are residential areas extending west from
Stephen Rd. Banksmeadow Public School is located near Stephen Rd, about 650m
southwest of the nearest BIP boundary.
A map of the area showing the location of the BIP in the context of its surroundings is
presented in Figure 3.1.
A site layout is given in Figure 3.2 showing the major operating areas on the BIP and
other operators immediately adjacent (BOC and Air Liquide) to the BIP.
3.2.
Site Security
The BIP site is a secure site, with all vehicle entry controlled through the gatehouse at
Gate 3, which is manned 24 hours per day.
There are security patrols by security guards and cameras installed around the BIP. In
addition, all the plants on the BIP have lighting throughout the night to aid observation.
The BIP site is fully fenced (adequate construction) and non-operating gates are
locked. Security of the site is also achieved by site personnel vigilance and security
patrols by security guards and cameras. Non-operating gates are locked.
Security personnel are site inducted, have a checklist of areas to inspect and report on
unusual incidents.
Personnel gain vehicle access via Gate 3 or pedestrian access by swipe pass at
various gates around the BIP perimeter. Access for visitors must be prearranged with
the gatehouse and a BIP company contact.
Visitors to any process areas must be accompanied by an inducted person and report
to the control room prior to visiting the plant area.
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FIGURE 3.1:
BIP SITE LOCATION
Main BIP Site
Nant St
NOTE: The boundaries shown on the map are only indicative
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FIGURE 3.2:
BIP SITE LAYOUT
Note: Boundaries are indicative only.
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3.3.
BIP Site Fire Fighting and Emergency Response Systems

The BIP is a long established chemical manufacturing site. Existing BIP site and
operator infrastructure and services are in place to minimise potential safety or
environmental impacts associated with potentially hazardous operations on the site.
Unless noted for particular incident scenarios as described in Section 6, the
effectiveness and response time for firefighting or other emergency response have not
been specifically accounted for in the QRA.
3.3.1. Emergency Response
Each operating plant on the BIP has an emergency response plan linked to the overall
BIP integrated emergency response plan (ERP). The basic philosophy is that local
incidents are handled at the plant level by staff trained to implement measures such as
spill containment and first aid firefighting (e.g. use of extinguishers or monitors).
Incidents more severe than this at Qenos and Huntsman will involve response by the
Botany Emergency Response Team (BERT) with the Safety Response Vehicle (SRV).
An alert to Gate 3 security will initiate response by the BERT, and also by the
emergency services as initiated by alarms to the Fire Brigade.
3.3.2. BIP Firewater Systems
The BIP has fire protection and emergency response systems in place as follows:
Site firewater supply system supplied throughout the operational plant areas and
associated buildings.
Site process alarm system and evacuation alarm system.
Site emergency response procedures (3-4 minutes by BERT with SRV).
Fire brigade response (within 10 minutes, with typical response within 4 minutes).
The BIP site firewater system is described in detail in the BIP Fire Safety Study (Ref
24). In summary, firewater for the BIP reticulation system is stored in two storage
tanks, and pumped to various areas around the BIP via a firewater ring main system.
The No 1 Tank (capacity 5.7ML) is a firewater storage tank and a towns water break
tank, feeding both the firewater system and the BIP process water system. No 2 Tank
(capacity 6.8ML) is a dedicated firewater tank connected to the towns main.
Multiple diesel powered pumps supply a site wide ring main at 1050 kPag. The system
can supply up to 610 L/s for 4.75 hours with no towns water import. This is the
maximum BIP site demand rate (for Qenos Olefines in the north of the site). The next
largest demand is Huntsman in the east with a maximum demand of 300L/s. Fire
Brigade booster connections are provided at the firewater tanks.
3.3.3. Mobile Safety Response Vehicle
The BIP SRV has the facility to deliver water, foam or dry chemical powder and is
equipped to handle a range of emergency situations.
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3.4.
Safety Management Systems

All facilities on the site operate under well established safety management (SMS) or
integrated safety, health and environment (SH&E) management systems which aim to
ensure that all activities which may have an impact on safety, occupational health or
the environment, are carried out in a manner that fully complies with relevant statutory
regulations and codes and the corporate standards of the particular operator.
In summary, each operators SMS includes the common elements described in Table
3.1. These elements are similar to the SMS requirements outlined in NSW DoPs
Hazardous Industry Planning Advisory Paper No 9- Safety Management. There are
also a number of agreed BIP procedures which apply to all BIP occupants. Amongst
those relevant to plant safety are procedures dealing with the Emergency Response
Plan, excavation, and security.
As noted in Section 2.6, assessment of adequacy of the SMS is central to preparation
of the Safety Report under NSW MHF regulations and is not covered as part of the
QRA.
TABLE 3.1:
SUMMARY OF SAFETY RELATED PROCEDURES
PROCEDURE
PURPOSE
Hazard
Identification and
Risk Assessment
To identify the hazards, assess whether safeguards are adequate and

ensure processes are in place to maintain the effectiveness of safeguards
Operations and
Maintenance
Procedures
To clearly define the method of operations of the plant.

To ensure that accurate information about important aspects of the plant
design and its operations are available and up to date.
To define for the operators and maintenance team the methods by which
sections of the plant may be safely and efficiently withdrawn from service,
repaired and restored to safe efficient operating condition.
To ensure that protective systems are in a good state of repair and function
reliably when required to do so. This includes scheduled testing of trips and
alarms and relief devices.
Operator Training,
including safety
and emergency
training
To enable operators to run the plant to meet objectives safely.

To enable trades personnel to carry out maintenance work so that they are
themselves safe and do not jeopardise the plant safety systems or the
safety of others.
To provide personnel with an understanding of possible hazardous
situations and the ability to respond appropriately.
To provide an understanding of and practice in the use of basic emergency
equipment that might be needed in tackling an emergency (e.g. self
contained breathing apparatus, safety showers).
Permit to Work
To safeguard trades personnel (and others) and the plant by ensuring that
the plant is safe to work on, that the correct job is done using the right
equipment, that any safety procedures are understood and adhered to, that
operators know which parts of the plant are being worked on and that the
plant is returned to safe condition before being returned to service.
Control of Plant
Modifications
To ensure that proposed changes to both equipment and operating

methods achieve the desired benefits without any unforeseen and
undesirable side effects.
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3.5.
PROCEDURE
PURPOSE
Emergency
Procedures
To facilitate effective response to emergencies. To prevent or minimise the

effect of potentially hazardous events by being prepared.
Unusual Incident
Reporting and
Investigation
To learn from "unusual incidents" that may or may not have had a
hazardous outcome, but could have under different circumstances, to be
proactive in preventing their occurrence.
Scheduled
Management
Auditing of
Procedures
Assurance:
To ensure that operating management are continually aware of how well the
defined procedures and systems affecting safety and loss prevention are
being followed in practice. To enable corrective action to be taken to
improve adherence to procedures.
Accounting for the SMS in QRA

The QRA does not attempt to quantitatively account for the quality of the procedural
aspects of an SMS. This is because data used to estimate event frequencies in a QRA
is largely based on generic historical information from a variety of plants and
processes with different standards, designs and management systems. This
assumption is believed to be conservative in that it will overstate the risk from modern,
well-managed installations.
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4.
FACILITY DESCRIPTIONS
4.1.
Overview
There are two main facilities on the site producing feedstock for downstream plants:
1. At the northern end of the BIP, the Olefines plant manufactures ethylene,
propylene and co-products by cracking ethane feed supplied to the BIP by pipeline.
The ethylene is reticulated around the BIP and used by the Qenos Alkathene and
Alkatuff Plants, and the Huntsman Surfactants Plant.
2. At the southern end of the BIP is the ChlorAlkali Facility. The ChlorAlkali Plant
(CAP) uses salt, water and electricity to manufacture gaseous chlorine, caustic
soda and hydrogen using electrolysis in a membrane cell plant. All produced
chlorine is consumed in the Products Plants, comprising the sodium hypochlorite
(Hypo) plant, the hydrochloric acid (HCl) plant and the ferric chloride (FeCl3) plant.
4.2.
Facility Design Basis and Hazardous Material Inventories

Annual throughputs and maximum flowrates of feed and product streams for each
facility at the BIP from the individual facility risk assessment reports have been used to
prepare the QRA. Storage and process inventories of hazardous materials (i.e.
flammable and / or toxics) at each facility are also used to prepare the QRA. The QRA
generally used the maximum working capacity for storages, and normal process
vessel / isolatable inventory unless noted otherwise in a particular scenario.
Details of limiting cases and inventories are provided in the Confidential Appendices
section of the report.
4.3.
Qenos Olefines Process

The Olefines facility comprises two main areas, the ethylene production process
(referred to as Inside Battery Limits or IBL) and other areas, referred to as Outside
Battery Limits (OBL).
4.3.1. Ethylene Process (Inside Battery Limits)
The following major equipment items are within the IBL process area:
Cracking furnaces manufacturing ethylene and other hydrocarbons, normally using

ethane feedstock, and associated quenching towers.
Gas compressors and associated heat exchangers and vessels.
Gas separation area (consisting of a number of distillation columns and ancillary

equipment) which separates the different products of the cracking furnaces.
Dimethyl disulphide storage and pumping for cracking furnace dosing.
In the ethylene manufacturing process, ethane feedstock is diluted with steam and
thermally cracked in tubular pyrolysis furnaces to yield a mixture of ethylene, ethane,
propylene, butadiene, gasoline, fuel gas and fuel oil. Residual ethane is recycled and
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recracked; other materials leave as products2. The gases leaving the furnaces are
rapidly cooled and quenched with circulating oil and then with water to condense the
heavier products. The furnace effluent gas after quenching is washed with caustic to
remove acid gases and then condensed prior to cryogenic distillation which separates
the various components of the cracked gas.
Ethylene, recovered at a purity of greater than 99.9%, is mainly used in the Qenos
polyethylene plants (Alkatuff and Alkathene Plants) and Huntsman Surfactants plant
on the BIP. Some ethylene gas is distributed to offsite customers via pipeline. It is also
possible to import or export liquid ethylene via Port Botany.
4.3.2. Olefines Outside Battery Limits
The following major equipment items are outside the main ethylene manufacturing
process, and are referred to collectively as OBL (Outside Battery Limits):
C3 splitter area which purifies refinery grade propylene (RGP) from Caltex and
from the IBL gas separation area into polymer grade propylene (PGP) and
propane.
Emergency gas disposal (comprising a ground furnace and elevated flare).
Storages including refrigerated ethylene, propane, polymer grade propylene and

C4 hydrocarbons.
Ethyl mercaptan storage and odorising facility for dosing propane while it is being
loaded into LPG tankers.
Loading bay for loading tankers with LPG (odorised propane), polymer grade
propylene and other hydrocarbons.
Nant St storage tanks, two tanks of which are currently leased to Mobil.
Olefines pipelines on the BIP, including pipelines conveying:

o
ethane to Olefines
refrigerated liquid ethylene to and from the ethylene sphere
ethylene gas from the ethylene sphere
ethylene gas to offsite customers
RGP to the Olefines C3 splitter.
RGP is imported by pipeline from the Caltex refinery at Kurnell. Together with smaller
quantities of byproduct propylene from the Olefines operations, this is purified in the
plant area known as the C3 splitter. The main product is Polymer Grade Propylene
(PGP) which is loaded in to LPG tankers for transport to the Basell Polypropylene
business at Clyde. Byproduct propane from this operation and from the Olefines Plant
is sold as LPG. Other hydrocarbons are processed as required, stored and loaded to
tankers for sale to other Qenos customers.
2
All the furnaces can crack LPG so this can be used if ethane feedstock is unavailable. Propane and C4 product
may also be re-cracked if required.
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4.3.3. Other
The following pipelines connecting the Olefines plant with Port Botany are not included
in this QRA.
ethylene gas line for import or export of ethylene
a propane/butane pipeline for backup feedstock transfers (used occasionally).
4.3.4. Design Safety

Technical safety measures used to limit potential hazards associated with the
chemicals are summarised as follows:
Four items of critical duty piping (potential flashing hydrocarbon release exceeding
15 te) were identified in the ethylene plant design and robustly designed; they are
routinely monitored to ensure integrity. In the QRA, generic pipework frequencies
of failure for these sections of critical piping were reduced by a factor of 10.
The number of flanges (joints) has been kept to a practical minimum in flammable
fluid pipelines, reducing the potential leak sources as far as practicable. For this
QRA, the pipeline and joint failure frequencies used are based on the length of
piping and number of joints as per the P&IDs and layouts.
Critical instruments and loop components for selected high-risk plant areas have
been graded using industry-standard guidelines. Where protective systems have
been accounted for in the QRA (e.g. a trip / shutdown function), the current
specified maintenance frequency has been used to assess the reliability of the
system.
There is a dedicated high integrity safety instrumented system (the HIMA system)
which automatically shuts down critical sections of the plant if an unsafe condition
is detected. Where the HIMA has been included in an assessment of protective
systems, it is assumed that a SIL 3 reliability is achieved.
There are two large furnaces or flares (the ground flare and the elevated flare)
which are designed to safely combust excess hydrocarbons from relief systems
and emergency valve operations, so that inventories of hydrocarbons can quickly
be emptied from the plant vessels in an emergency shutdown. This has not been
specifically accounted for in the QRA.
Remotely or automatically operated emergency isolation valves are installed on

selected vessels, pump suction lines and pipelines to limit the quantity released
should a leak occur. In the QRA these have been assumed to operate at a
reliability assessed using the current specified maintenance frequency and generic
EIV failure data.
High integrity double mechanical seals are installed on many pumps handling
flashing hydrocarbon fluids (accounted for in QRA by choice of seal leak
frequencies).
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4.4.
Non-return valves are fitted on the discharges of all pumps handling flashing
hydrocarbon fluids to minimise backflow from the destination vessel in the event of
a serious pump LOC. Where NRVs were fitted, the inventory used in the QRA for
pump failures was the supply vessel to the pump, not the destination vessel.
Plant storages where hazardous liquid spills can occur are bunded. In the QRA, for
liquid spills into a bund, the available surface area of the bund was the maximum
available surface area for a fire or for evaporation.
Mechanical excess flow valves (XSFV) are installed on the main discharge line
from the C4 sphere F178, the filling hose lines at the LPG tanker loading bay, and
the LPG tanker. These are designed to shut immediately if there is unexpectedly
high flow through the valve such as would be caused by a serious line failure. In
the QRA these have been assumed to operate for leak scenarios with a flow
greater than the XSFV setting, at a reliability assessed using generic XSFV failure
data.
Gas detectors are located throughout the site which would initiate an alarm and
alert personnel in case of a flammable hydrocarbon release (used in setting
release durations).
Fire sensors near many vessels will stop the discharge pumps and shut vessel
discharge valves to the pump suction automatically in the event of fire. This is not
specifically accounted for in the QRA except to set leak durations for the case
where EIVs operate as designed.
The ethylene sphere is protected by both a firewater deluge system and a steam
curtain to aid dispersion of ethylene gas following a leak, (not specifically
accounted for in QRA).
Major storages of flashing hydrocarbons and the associated pumps are protected
by automatic fire deluge systems, (not specifically accounted for in QRA, except in
BLEVE likelihood calculations).
Firewater monitors are placed at strategic points for fire fighting, (not specifically
A steam curtain can be generated to prevent escaping hydrocarbons reaching the

cracking furnaces and igniting, (not specifically accounted for in QRA).
Qenos Alkathene Facility

4.4.1. Alkathene Process
The Alkathene plant produces polyethylene using a high pressure continuous reaction
process with ethylene as the feedstock. The reaction is catalysed by organic
peroxides. The plant consists of four parallel production trains. Units 1 and 2 were built
in 1957, Unit 3 in the early 1960s, and Unit 4 in 1984. Reactor drench systems
designed to prevent aerial decompositions were installed in the early 1980s.
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In each unit, ethylene is compressed in two stages, firstly up to 25 Mpa, and then to
the reactor operating pressures of approximately 120 MPa to 160 MPa. The reaction
takes place continuously in a stirred cylindrical vessel of approximately 500 L capacity
at an average temperature of 2500C. Catalysts (initiators) are injected into the reactor
vessel by catalyst dosing pumps.
The polymerisation of ethylene is exothermic. Decomposition reactions are a known
process hazard. The heat of reaction is carried away with the gas/polyethylene mixture
leaving the vessel. On average, about 18% of the ethylene is converted to polythene.
The remaining gas is recirculated.
The mixture of gas and polyethylene from the reaction vessel passes through a
product cooler and into the separator, from where much of the gas returns to the
25 MPa system to be cooled and re-compressed, and recycled to the reactor.
The polyethylene is let-down to a low pressure hopper at approximately 100kPag,
where nearly all the remaining gas is separated.
Product is removed from the hoppers gear pump or screw extruder which extrude the
polyethylene through a die-face cutter which produces small granules. The granules
are stored in silos. They are then despatched in bulk containers.
The Alkathene plant is designed in a modular fashion to reduce the flammable
inventory in each reaction train.
Each reaction train has a separate compressor bay and a separate high pressure
reaction bay (each containing a reactor, separator and cooler). The ethylene
inventory for each reaction train is approximately 1400kg. Each reactor bay is
shielded by concrete blast walls to minimise the extent of damage if an explosion
does occur.
Each reaction unit is provided with an Emergency Shutdown system (ESD system).
For the QRA, this is assumed to always operate to limit the maximum release
inventory to 1400kg.
High pressure / high temperature process equipment is also separated from bulk
storages, utilities and polyethylene product handling areas.
A water drench system is provided for each reactor to prevent ignition of the
hydrocarbon gas released to atmosphere from the reactor if the burst disc ruptures
(i.e. prevent an aerial decomposition by quenching the hot carbon particles
produced in a decomposition in the reactor). This system has been proven in
practice to considerably reduce the chances of an aerial decomposition following a
reactor burst disc release.
There are 6 ethylene gas detectors in each high pressure reaction bay, and 6 in
each compressor bay. These raise an alarm in the control room but do not
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automatically initiate any emergency measures. There are also gas detectors in
the propane storage area. (Not specifically accounted for in QRA).
4.5.
Qenos Alkatuff Facility

4.5.1. Alkatuff Process
The Alkatuff plant manufactures polyethylene products known as Linear Low Density
polyethylene (LLDPE) and High Density polyethylene (HDPE), using a fluidised bed
reaction system. The process (UNIPOL) is licensed from Univation (formerly known
as Union Carbide Corporation (UCC)). The UNIPOL process, compared to
conventional polyethylene plants, is a "low pressure" process characterised by
relatively small inventories of gaseous hydrocarbons and very low inventories of liquid
hydrocarbons.
The polymerisation reaction takes place in a fluidised bed reactor into which the
ethylene supplied by pipeline from Olefines, hexene, hydrogen, isohexane (ICA),
activator and catalyst are injected. The reaction takes place at a moderate temperature
(around 100C) and pressure (up to 2400kPag). A recycle gas flow is used to cool the
reactor and is maintained by a single stage centrifugal recycle gas compressor,
provided with an elaborate labyrinth seal to protect against recycle gas leakage. The
overall reaction and cycle gas system pressure is modulated by the control of the
incoming ethylene feed rate. The reaction rate is controlled by catalyst addition rate.
Polyethylene resin is produced. This is purged with nitrogen to remove residual
hydrocarbons, extruded and cut up to form granules which are stored and loaded into
road tankers for bulk delivery to customers.
The main means of achieving process safety is tied to choice of technology. The
process is continuous, fluidised bed and gas phase.
The largest hydrocarbon inventory in the process is in the reactor/cycle gas

process (4.2te hydrocarbon, about 6.3te in total including inerts), with the ethylene
and hexene purification systems containing a total of about 2.8te hydrocarbon.
Emergency isolation valves (EIVs) are provided at the main ethylene feed, at each
feed into to the reactor/cycle gas system and at each pump, i.e. the hexene and
isohexane (ICA) charge pumps and the tanker unloading bay.
Various process trips (including high pressure and high temperature in the reactor
or feed purification system) initiate shutdown and isolation of the reactor, and
automatic blowdown to the emergency flare. To stop the reaction on emergency
shutdown a catalyst poison is injected into the reactor.
The plant is provided with a dual purpose flare system which functions as a
continuous ground flare during normal operations and as an emergency flare under
pressure relief conditions. During a major plant upset (i.e. reactor/cycle gas PSV
relief or ESD initiation) pressurised areas of the plant are relieved to the
emergency flare. The pressure relief system is sized to remove the largest
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hydrocarbon inventory in 5 minutes. Pressure vessels are provided with

appropriately sized relief valves which relieve to flare.
4.6.
Gas detection is provided at specific potential leak points in areas including the
cycle gas / reactor system at the compressor seal and expansion joints area and at
various levels of the reactor structure (grade and catalyst injection platform),
hexene purification area and hexene reactor charge pump, isohexane reactor
charge pump, unloading bay and storage areas, and the polyethylene product bins
vapour space. Generally, there is no automatic shutdown on gas detection (with
the exception of tripping the electric drier regeneration heater).
Huntsman Surfactants Facility

Ethylene oxide (EO) is produced in the EO plant and is then used in the following
derivatives plants:
The Glycols Plant
The Glycol Ethers Plant
The Condensates Plants (NIS A, B and C).
Some of the derivatives produced by the plants listed above are then used as feed to
the Multi-Purpose Plant (MPP) and Specialties Plant.
4.6.1. Ethylene Oxide Plant
In the presence of a silver catalyst, ethylene and oxygen react to form ethylene oxide.
Carbon dioxide and water are also formed in a parallel reaction along with trace
quantities of acetaldehyde.
The reaction takes place by passing a combined make-up / recycle gas stream
containing ethylene, oxygen and inert gases through a shell and tube reactor. The
pressure at the reactor inlet is approximately 2000kPag and the gas temperature at the
reactor outlet ranges from approximately 245oC with new catalyst to 280oC with old,
less active catalyst. The heat of reaction is removed by a recirculating heat transfer oil.
The conversion of ethylene in each pass is not complete, so the exit gas is recycled
following removal of firstly ethylene oxide and then carbon dioxide by dissolution in
water and potassium carbonate liquor, respectively. The ethylene oxide is purified by a
series distillation processes with two product grades: low aldehyde (LA) ethylene oxide
and normal grade ethylene oxide. Both product grades are stored in dedicated,
purpose-built bullets.
The reactor gas system is primarily comprised of nitrogen, ethylene and oxygen. The
composition is tightly controlled to avoid ethylene and oxygen ratios which can lead to
runaway reactions and ultimately an explosion in the reactor system.
4.6.2. Glycols Plant
The Glycols Plant and Glycol Ethers Plant operate continuously to produce a range of
glycols and ethers. The technology and chemistry of the plants are very similar.
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In the glycols plant, water, ethylene oxide and recycled glycol are reacted at 118220oC and 2270kPag to produce glycol in a tubular plug flow reactor. The reaction,
which is exothermic, occurs between ethylene oxide and water. Recycle glycol is used
to control product distribution.
The reaction converts all of the ethylene oxide to glycol and the reaction products are
then dried (water removed, leaving liquid glycol mixture) and separated into mono-, di-,
tri- and heavy glycols in a series of vacuum distillations.
4.6.3. Glycol Ethers Plant
In the Glycol Ethers plant, reaction is carried out in a similar fashion to the glycols
plant. Ethylene oxide is reacted with various alcohols to produce a wide range of
ethers. Again all ethylene oxide is reacted out in the plug flow reactor. Temperatures
and pressures are generally higher than in the glycol process, with 160-230oC and
3030kPag being typical. A similar refining process to the glycols plant is used to purify
the ethers, with the first step being the removal of excess alcohol.
Propylene oxide campaigns are also run at the glycol ethers plant resulting in Glysolv
products.
4.6.4. Condensates Plant
The three NIS plants operate in the same fashion. Surfactants are produced by batch
processes which react ethylene oxide (or propylene oxide for some campaigns) and a
variety of raw materials to produce a wide range of end products. More than three
hundred products are produced by the three plants.
The NIS A Plant consists of six independent CSTR reactors, four of 8 tonne capacity
and two of 6 tonne capacity. Each reactor has separate feeds for ethylene oxide and
other raw materials. Internal coils connect to water and steam utilities to provide
cooling and heating at different stages of the batch. Two reactors may also be fed with
propylene oxide. An ejector system provides a vacuum if required, or the reactor can
be padded or pressurised with nitrogen. A stirrer within the vessel provides circulation
throughout the batch. Reaction temperatures vary from 120oC to 165oC, and
pressures from partial vacuum to 250kPag.
The NIS B and C Plant reactors use an external circulation loop to provide heating and
cooling but otherwise operate in a similar fashion to NIS A. Each reactor is supplied
with ethylene oxide and propylene oxide. The NIS B Plant reactor has a 30 tonne
capacity, while the C Plant has two reactors of 20 tonne and 5 tonne capacity.
4.6.5. Multi-Purpose Plant
The Multi Purpose Plant (MPP) contains a single 16 tonne batch reactor and two
blending vessels. The plant is used to produce batches of specialty chemicals which
cannot be produced in the NIS plants. The major products produced on this plant are
brake fluid intermediates , biodegradable surfactants derived from glucose and Amine
Oxides. It is a very flexible plant which uses raw materials from the NIS Plants and
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external sources. The MPP does not use ethylene oxide or propylene oxide as a
feedstock.
4.6.6. Specialties Plant
The Specialties Plant produces formulated coolants and brake fluids and a range of
further derivatised non ionic surfactants and blends. The plant has a single reaction
vessel (CSTR) in which surfactants are sulphated or phosphated using sulphamic acid,
phophorus pentoxide or polyphosphoric acid. The reactions are mildly exothermic and
are controlled manually.
Technical safety measures of particular interest which are used to control the
hazardous nature of the chemicals are summarised as follows:
Critical duty piping and vessels have been identified and robustly designed and are
routinely monitored to ensure integrity (not specifically accounted for in QRA).
The number of flanges in the pipelines has been kept to a practical minimum in the
flammable gas systems, reducing the potential leak sources as far as practicable
within the constraints of providing maintenance access to valves and fittings. For
this QRA, the pipeline and joint failure frequencies used correspond as closely as
possible to the actual length of piping and number of flanges installed.
Critical instruments and loop components for selected high risk plant areas have
been graded and are maintained as per Critical Instrumented Protective System
(CIPS) guidelines. This has been accounted for in the fault trees prepared for the
facility QRA.
Emergency isolation valves are installed on selected pipelines to limit the amount
released should a leak occur (accounted for in maximum inventory defined in
QRA).
Higher integrity double mechanical seals are installed on all pumps handling the
more hazardous fluids (accounted for in QRA by choice of seal leak frequencies).
Magnetic drive pumps are used at selected locations (seal leaks prevented).
Excess flow valves are installed (e.g. on the propylene oxide lines exit the storage
tank) to limit the amount released if a pipe broke etc. These are not specifically
accounted for in the QRA.
Ethylene oxide is stored at refrigerated conditions (minimising the consequences of

a loss of containment compared to a pressurised release).
Back flow prevention systems have been installed to help prevent reverse flow of
contaminated ethylene oxide to the bulk storage tanks (prevents the catastrophic
failure of the bulk tanks due to uncontrolled, exothermic reactions), this is
accounted for in the choice of frequencies in the QRA.
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4.7.
Fire water is available for use as a water curtain to aid dispersion of a gas leak.
(Not specifically accounted for in the QRA).
A number of gas detectors are located throughout the site which would initiate an
alarm and alert personnel in case of a flammable gas release, (not specifically
Orica ChlorAlkali Facility

The ChlorAlkali Facility consists of the ChlorAlkali Plant (CAP) area, the Products
Plants and the chlorine drum and cylinder storage area.
4.7.1. ChlorAlkali Plant
The CAP is divided into a number of principal process areas:
Brine plant: Raw salt, delivered to site by truck is dissolved in heated water and in
brine returning from the cells. Mineral impurities present in the salt are detrimental
to the membrane process and are removed by chemical precipitation and filtration,
followed by ion exchange and nanofiltration.
Electrolysis: Using purified brine and electricity, banks of membrane cells produce
wet chlorine at the anodes and wet hydrogen gas and caustic soda (33% w/w
NaOH) at the cathodes.
Brine Dechlorination: Saturated brine ex the membrane cells is acidified and

treated with sodium sulfite to remove chlorine, then recycled to the brine
dissolution area. The chlorine from the dechlorination process is used in the Hypo
plant.
Purification, drying and compression: Chlorine gas is cooled then dried using
sulfuric acid so that it can be handled in carbon steel equipment. It is then
compressed to 185 kPag but is not liquefied. Compressed gaseous chlorine is
used in the HCl, FeCl3 and Hypo plants.
Hydrogen: Hydrogen produced in the cells is cooled and compressed then piped
for use in the existing HCl plant. Any excess is vented to atmosphere via an
elevated vent pipe.
Caustic soda: Caustic soda produced in the cells is concentrated from 33% w/w to
50% w/w by evaporation, then stored in tanks and loaded into tankers for delivery
to customers.
Emergency Chlorine Scrubber (ECS): Emergency scrubbing capacity is provided

by the emergency chlorine scrubber. During a plant upset chlorine from the plant is
directed to the ECS and reacted with caustic soda forming sodium hypochlorite. A
small flow of excess chlorine (<10% of total production) always passes through the
ECS to control the pressure in the chlorine header. The ECS consists of a packed
tower, pump tank, two pumps, cooler, emergency caustic dump tank, two suction
fans and an emergency chlorine ejector (N2 powered).
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4.7.2. Sodium Hypochlorite Plant

The hypo plant consists of one packed tower, a caustic tank, circulation pump and
duty/standby fans. It operates in continuous mode and produces sodium hypochlorite
from chlorine and caustic soda. This is stored and supplied to customers by road
tanker. Excess chlorine from the make towers is vented through the backing tower (a
caustic scrubber) which removes any chlorine.
4.7.3. HCl Plant
Synthesis of hydrochloric acid is a two stage process. Chlorine and hydrogen are
supplied to the burner at about 50kPag and reacted together at high temperatures in
the absence of air to produce hydrogen chloride gas, which is then absorbed into water
forming acid at 33% w/w concentration. The synthesis units operate at a slight positive
pressure of 5kPag. The product acid flows by gravity to 8 storage tanks. From here
the acid is loaded into road tankers for distribution to customers.
4.7.4. Ferric Chloride Plant
Ferric chloride is produced in a continuously operated plant by reaction between
chlorine and iron, and the addition of pickle liquor and/or water. The iron feed is
comprised of fine gauge off-cuts in the form of pellets.
The product flows by gravity to storage tanks and is loaded into road tankers for
distribution to customers.
Excess chlorine from the reaction is vented through the Hypo Plant make tower (a
caustic scrubber).
4.7.5. Chlorine Storage
Chlorine drums and cylinders are delivered to Botany by truck from other facilities in
Victoria or Queensland for interim storage prior to distribution. They are not filled or
used at Botany. A bulk chlorine road tanker may also park on the Botany site.
The significant technical safety features and means of inclusion in the QRA are:
Inventory minimisation: The chlorine plant is a gas plant, designed to operate at

very low pressures and ambient temperatures with minimal inventory of chlorine.
There is no storage of gaseous or bulk liquid chlorine in the manufacturing plant.
The inventory at any given time is limited to what can be trapped in the process
equipment (estimated to be around 150kg based on piping and vessel volumes).
Chlorine production is stopped by tripping the cells (i.e. isolating power).
The chlorine side of the chlorine plant operates under a slight vacuum up to the
suction of the chlorine compressor. For small leaks, provided that the compressor
or ECS fans are running, air will be sucked into the system rather than chlorine
leaking out. The reliability of the ECS has been assessed via fault tree for the
QRA.
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The length of chlorine pipelines has been minimised and the number of flanges on
chlorine pipelines reduced to a minimum, reducing potential leak sources as far as
practicable. For the QRA, the pipeline and joint failure frequencies used
correspond as closely as possible to the actual length of piping and number of
flanges installed.
The chlorine supply pipework to the downstream derivative plants can be vented to
the emergency caustic scrubbing system (ECS). There are no vents direct to
atmosphere. The ECS is permanently online with a small flow of chlorine passing
through it. In the event of a plant upset, the chlorine produced by the cells is
diverted to the ECS. The ECS is designed to absorb the full chlorine production
rate (3.5 tonne/hr) for 10 minutes, with a maximum chlorine level of less than 3
ppm in the ECS exhaust. In the event of a chlorine plant trip, the chlorine in the
equipment and derivatives plant supply pipework is vented to the ECS. The
likelihood of failure of the ECS has been assessed using fault tree analysis.
A number of gas detectors are located at the site boundary, which initiate an alarm
and alert personnel in case of a chlorine release. These are not specifically
accounted for in the QRA.
No flammable or combustible material is stored in the vicinity of the liquid chlorine

storage area. The likelihood of a fire involving a parked tanker, drum or cylinder is
therefore considered negligible and is not assessed quantitatively.
Emergency capping equipment for holes and leaks from drums and cylinders is
available. Fire water is available for use as a water curtain to aid dispersion of a
chlorine leak. This is not specifically accounted for in the QRA.
The chlorine road tanker is parked in a dedicated area, close to the drum storage
area, away from the main thoroughfare (minimising the probability of impact with a
moving vehicle). As noted previously no tankers are filled or unloaded on site.
The HCl plant relies heavily on an instrumented protective system. All critical trips
are hardwired including independent trip initiators in the field. The likelihood of
failure of the HCl plant control systems resulting in chlorine or a hydrogen chloride
release has been assessed using fault trees.
The hypo make tower circulation pumps and fans (both duty / standby) are backed
up by emergency power to ensure high reliability. Excess chlorine is vented via the
backing tower. The backing tower is a caustic scrubber designed to reduce
chlorine levels to below 1ppm during plant upset conditions. The likelihood of a
process upset resulting in chlorine release via the backing tower has been
assessed using fault trees.
Excess chlorine is vented via the backing tower at the Hypo Plant.
Backup Power: Critical equipment, i.e. the DCS, the ECS circulation pumps and
fans, is backed up by a diesel generator as emergency power supply. The ECS
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fans are also backed up by a nitrogen ejector that does not require power. The
reliability of this arrangement is assessed in the fault tree analysis.
4.8.
Orica GTP
Groundwater (contaminated with chlorinated hydrocarbons, primarily ethylene
dichloride, EDC) is pumped to a nitrogen padded groundwater feed tank. It is dosed
with hydrochloric acid then pumped to air strippers. Air is passed countercurrently up
through a falling column of water, transferring almost all the volatile chlorinated
hydrocarbons from the water to the air. Heavier contaminants remain in the water.
The contaminated air is drawn into a thermal oxidation unit where it is heated to a high
temperature in the presence of air to break down the contaminants to form carbon
dioxide, water vapour, hydrochloric acid and chlorine.
The gas stream leaving the thermal oxidation unit is cooled, quenched with a weak
hydrochloric acid (HCl) solution (5 wt%) then passes through the acid absorber where
the remaining hydrogen chloride is recovered. The air stream then continues to the
caustic scrubber to remove other acid gases and chlorine to meet emission
specifications. The air stream is then mixed with hot air before exiting the plant via a
34m high stack at about 106C forming an invisible plume under almost all
atmospheric conditions.
The stripped water from the air strippers is pumped to activated carbon adsorber beds
which remove the remaining hydrocarbons.
4.9.
Qenos Site Utilities

The Site Utilities plant comprises 3 medium pressure boilers, two are coal-fired and the
other gas fired. These boilers are used to supply the BIP with 6.2MPa steam, some of
which is letdown to supply 2.8MPa, 1.1MPa, & 0.5MPa steam via seven conversion
stations. The average site steam load is approx 110te/hr with larger amounts required
during plant disruptions or start-ups.
To service the coal-fired boilers a stockpile of coal is maintained with an average
inventory of 3000 tonnes. Natural gas is supplied to the remaining boiler via a main
underground pipeline managed by Olefines Plant.
In addition to steam, Site Utilities also supplies cooling water, instrument air,
demineralised water, de-aerated water and manages electricity, firewater, towns water
and nitrogen distribution. Site Utilities is also responsible for the site effluent treatment
and discharges to Malabar Sewage Treatment Plant.
4.10.
Other Operators Outside BIP

4.10.1. Air Liquide
Air Liquide Australia (ALA) operates two sites in Baker St on the north perimeter of the
BIP.
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Dry Ice Manufacture

The northern site produces Dry Ice from carbon dioxide (CO2) which is a byproduct
from the Huntsman EO plant. Gaseous CO2 is first pressurised and refrigerated to form
liquid CO2, which is allowed to expand in an atmospheric chamber. When CO 2
converts from liquid to gas, there is an extreme drop in temperature. This causes some
of the gas to freeze, yielding both snow-like CO2 and vapor CO2. The snow is then
hydraulically pressed into dry ice blocks and pellets. The CO2 vapor produced during
the production of dry ice is captured and recycled using a recovery system to maximise
the yield of dry ice.
The dry ice is packed into boxes and removed from site by truck.
Air Separation Plant (ASU)
The ASU plant is located on Baker St on the north boundary of the BIP close to the
Olefines cooling towers. There are 2 ASUs which manufacture oxygen and nitrogen for
use at the BIP. Air is compressed, impurities removed, dried, cooled to cryogenic
conditions and then separated into its component gases in a cryogenic distillation
process, producing liquid nitrogen and liquid oxygen. These gases are then vapourised
and distributed by pipeline.
Gaseous oxygen is compressed and piped from ALA to the Huntsman EO plant.
Gaseous nitrogen is piped to Site Utilities for distribution around the BIP.
This site also stores a number of hydrogen trailers. The trailers are used to supply
hydrogen to the Qenos Alkatuff plant and also a polypropylene plant located at Clyde
on the Shell Refinery site.
4.10.2. BOC Gases
BOC Gases is located on Anderson St on the north boundary of the BIP. BOC
produces dry ice from a CO2 feed stream from ALA using a similar process to ALA.
The BOC site previously compressed and stored hydrogen and also filled cylinders
with hydrogen supplied from the Orica Chlorine Plant. However the upgraded CAP
(operational from 2001) no longer produces excess hydrogen and the hydrogen filling
operations at BOC have been decommissioned.
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5.
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
5.1.
Hazardous Materials
There are a large number of potentially hazardous materials at the BIP site which have
the potential to cause injury or property damage. As the focus of the study is on the
potential to cause an impact outside the BIP boundary, flammable fluids and volatile
toxic materials with the potential to lead to a fire, explosion or toxic release are the key
concern.
Some materials on the BIP are handled in minor quantities or have a low potential
offsite acute impact (e.g. Class 8 corrosives, combustible materials at ambient
temperature, minor storages of Class 3 materials, for example in flammable liquids
cabinets etc). These have been identified and the basis for screening from the offsite
risk assessment is described in the individual facility risk assessments (Refs 7 to 14).
They are not discussed in the compiled BIP risk assessment.
5.2.
Hazardous Material Properties

The hazardous materials that are handled at each plant that are flammable, toxic or
both are considered to have the potential to result in an offsite risk, hence are
considered in the compiled BIP QRA. A brief description of the hazards and relevant
physical properties of each material is included in the Confidential Appendices section
of the report.
5.3.
Hazardous Incident Scenarios

Potentially hazardous incidents associated with each facility have been identified as
part of the individual facility risk assessments. These are presented in hazard
identification word diagrams showing the compiled incident scenarios together with
their causes, potential consequences and the safeguards in place in APPENDIX 2
(reproduced from Refs 7 to 14).
A column showing which incidents are included in the development of scenarios for the
quantitative risk calculations is included in the hazard identification tables. Only the
events with potentially significant off-site consequences have been included in the
cumulative BIP quantified risk assessment described in subsequent sections of the
report (i.e. yes in appropriate column in the tables in APPENDIX 2).
For each facility the scenarios were identified by:
Review and update of previous hazard studies. Facility design, maintenance and
operations personnel participated in the reviews.
Review of any additional hazard identification work carried out by the various BIP
operators.
Review of hazardous incidents that have occurred at the facilities as recorded in

the facility operators incident reporting system. These reviews indicated that there
have been no fires, explosions or toxic releases resulting in fatalities at the BIP, or
in significant asset damage. A number of small fires at some of the facilities have
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occurred that have been quickly controlled. No events with significant offsite
process safety implications were identified over the last 10 years..
5.4.
Review of hazard audits completed for each facility in the last few years.
Review of the MHF Safety Reports 2012
Incident Scenarios Included in QRA

Representative scenarios have been defined for quantitative consequence assessment
and inclusion in the QRA.
In summary:
The majority of fire, explosion and BLEVE scenarios are associated with the
Olefines and Huntsman facilities since these plants have the largest flammable
inventories of the facilities on the BIP site.
A small number of worst case fire, explosion and BLEVE scenarios are included for
Alkatuff and Alkathene which have relatively small flammable inventories.
The majority of toxic release scenarios are associated with the ChlorAlkali facility,
with a small number (with no offsite fatality potential) also defined for the Qenos
Olefines Plant, the Orica GTP and the Huntsman Surfactants Plant for inclusion in
the toxic injury and irritation risk model.
There were no scenarios defined for Site Utilities or the BOC or Air Liquide
operations with the potential to cause offsite effects, hence there are no scenarios
included in the BIP QRA.
Each of these types of scenarios has a number of individual quantitative release cases
associated with it. Assumptions made to define the individual release cases and to
perform the quantitative consequence assessment are described in the following
section, Section 6, of this report.
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6.
CONSEQUENCE MODELS
6.1.
Overview
Consequence analysis involves qualitative and/or quantitative review of the identified
hazardous incidents to estimate the potential to cause injury or fatalities, damage to
property or damage to the environment.
In this study, fire and explosion events (jet fires, pool fires, flashfires, vapour cloud
explosions, BLEVEs) and toxic releases were all assessed.
Consequence calculation was carried out using commercially available risk and
consequence assessment software, TNOs Riskcurves v2.7, EffectsPlus v5.5, the US
EPA Aloha v5.4.1 and ABB Eutechs program Disp2 v1.0.0.2, supplemented by
spreadsheet models from the TNO Yellow Book. The consequence models used within
Effects and Riskcurves are documented in the TNO Yellow Book (Ref 25).
For each scenario an appropriate release rate equation is selected based on the
release situation and initial state of the material. Pool size and evaporation calculations
are performed where necessary and, for heavier than air gases such as propane, EO,
chlorine etc, a heavy gas dispersion model is used to model dispersion behaviour and
estimate gas cloud sizes. Any inventory or flow restrictions are entered.
Dose-related heat radiation, overpressure and toxicity effects are then calculated from
the consequence results and exposure times using probit equations to estimate the
probability of fatality at a particular location.
Assumptions made to develop the scenarios and modelling parameters used in
Riskcurves are briefly discussed below. The scenarios modelled and associated input
data assumptions are contained in the individual facility risk reports.
6.2.
Assumptions for Consequence Models

6.2.1. Release Sources
Continuous releases to atmosphere from piping failures have been modelled using four
failure cases, corresponding to full pipe fracture, 50mm, 13mm and 3mm holes.
Gasket failure is likely to result in a gap equivalent to the area between two flange
bolts. This has been modelled as a hole with an equivalent diameter of 13mm. Vessel
failures have been modelled as catastrophic rupture and leaks of 50mm, 25mm, 13mm
and 6mm.
These generic failure cases are comparable to those used in a number of published
risk assessment studies described in Lees (Ref 26).
6.2.2. Release Rates
Release rates were calculated by Effects from standard flow rate correlations based on
the material state (gas or liquid), the process temperature and pressure and hole size
defined. Where a calculated release rate is greater than the maximum possible
process flow rate, (for example if the flow is limited by a pump, control valve,
production rate etc), the release rate is specified as equal to the limiting flow rate.
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6.2.3. Flash and Evaporation Rate

When a spill of volatile liquid, or pressurised or refrigerated liquefied gas occurs, some
material will initially flash off and evaporate, with the remaining liquid evaporating at a
lower rate due to the cooling of the liquid spill. Flash and evaporation rate calculations
were performed by Riskcurves assuming a concrete surface as all areas are
hardstanding. In some cases a maximum pool spreading area was defined based on
the plant layout (kerbing or bunding in place).
6.2.4. Release Inventory
Inventories available for release were generally taken as the maximum tank / vessel
capacity for storage vessels, or the normal working inventory within an isolatable
section for process systems such as pipelines. Assumptions are summarised in Table
6.1 with further explanation following the text.
TABLE 6.1:
INVENTORY LIMITATIONS
Type of System /
Scenario
Maximum Inventory
Assumption
Comments
Storage vessel, road

tanker etc.
Normal working capacity for

storage tanks and filled
volume for tankers
As notified to NSW WorkCover

in accordance with NSW DG
Regulation
Process system / vessel

isolation / plant shutdown
occurs very quickly.
Normal working volume of

isolatable section.
Volume converted to mass

using normal operating
temperature and pressure,
(and an average or typical
density for multi-component
systems).
Process system / vessel

isolation fails.
Inventory calculated from

defined release duration (e.g.
time to manual isolation) or
maximum inventory in unisolated system (whichever is
lower).
BLEVE
Two thirds of normal working

volume for all except
Huntsman.
Allows for partial vaporisation

of contents through relief valve
which almost always precedes
a BLEVE
For Huntsman, normal

working capacity for vessels,
and filled volume for tankers
6.2.5. Maximum Inventories

Process Vessels
For process vessels, it has been assumed that the release will continue until the entire
inventory in the isolatable section has been released, as no isolation is possible for
vessel ruptures or holes. In the cases where a vessel is connected to another vessel
without isolations, it has been assumed that failures of either vessel can release the
combined inventory of both vessels. Vessel inventory has been taken as the normal
working volume of the vessels, in keeping with the principles of QRA.
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Storages
The normal working volumes of material in storages were used as the inventory
available for release. In the cases of road tankers, the volume was taken as the filled
volume. The exception is the case of BLEVE scenarios. It is known that a significant
portion of the vessel must be exposed to flame impingement for sufficient time to
weaken the metal to cause it to rupture. During this time much of the liquid will be
boiled off. It was assumed that the mass in the vessel at the moment of BLEVE was
two-thirds of the vessel capacity.
6.2.6. Release Duration
If a maximum inventory (e.g. storage or a process vessel) was defined, the release
duration to exhaust the inventory was calculated by Effects. However in some cases
the analyst defines the duration of the event based on ability to isolate the area. An
example of this is a system fitted with EIVs, for the case where the EIVs operate as
required, the maximum inventory available for release is still that within the isolatable
section. For a failure case, i.e. if the isolation fails to occur, the amount is limited by the
time taken to stop and control a release by some alternative means.
For items where isolation is possible, durations of 3 to 60 minutes to isolate and control
a leak from a plant have been assumed. The 3 minute duration has been chosen for
scenarios which would initiate an automatic shut down of the plant. In reality, automatic
shutdown is likely to be initiated within a few seconds up to a minute, in which case 3
minutes is highly conservative.
A 5 to 15 minute duration has been chosen for small leak scenarios which rely on a
manual response (i.e. where operator intervention is required to stop the leak, usually
by shutting down production or closing valves). This extended period includes the time
required for the operator to detect the source of the leak and decide on the appropriate
action to take.
The maximum duration of any scenario is set to one hour for releases from the body of
storage vessels where isolation would take some time to achieve.
Pipelines
For pipelines which may be some distance from the main plant and not near gas
detectors the isolation period has been taken as three minutes to allow for time to
detect the leak and respond to the event by remotely shutting the pump suction valve
or stopping the pump.
An estimate has also been made of the probability of failure to stop the feed pump or
shut the inlet isolation valve in this time and this has been modelled as a release
duration of ten minutes or until inventory is exhausted, whichever is the lower. In this
case, it has been assumed that it will be possible to isolate the feed after ten minutes,
as typically the location of the pipeline failure will be some distance from the manual
isolation and so manual isolation will be possible.
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Pumps
For inventories where there is gas detection nearby and remote isolation e.g. around
flashing hydrocarbon pumps, it has been assumed that most isolations would occur
after one minute i.e. after detection of the gas leak and operation of emergency trips.
An estimate has also been made of the (low) probability of failure of the pump suction
valve to be closed in this time. This case has been modelled as a release duration until
inventory is exhausted, on the assumption that no alternative action can be taken,
given that the manual isolation valve between the pump suction and the vessel will
generally be too close to the pump to be safely closed.
For many pumps connected to process vessels the inventory is exhausted in one
minute or less and so the additional modelling is not needed; however where the
inventory is large enough to require a much longer release, this case has been
modelled at a frequency adjusted for the lower probability (i.e. trip failure case).
6.3.
Dispersion Model
The SLAB model within Effects / Riskcurves is used for dense gas dispersion
calculations. Dispersion from a ground level evaporating pool, a horizontal or vertical
jet or an instantaneous release can be modelled. The model predicts dispersion
behaviour by solving the conservation equations for mass, momentum and energy.
The resulting gas cloud is treated as a steady state plume, a transient "puff" or a
combination of the two, depending on the release duration. In the case of a finite
duration release, cloud dispersion is initially described using a steady state plume
model as long as the source is active. Once the source has been shut off, subsequent
dispersion is calculated by the transient puff model. For instantaneous releases the
transient puff model is used for the entire calculation.
For dispersion of low momentum releases (e.g. ambient temperature vapour from an
evaporating pool) a Gaussian dispersion model is used.
6.3.1. Meteorological Data
Meteorological data from the Sydney Airport site (a few kilometres from the BIP) has
been used as an input to the dispersion modelling. Data from 1999-2004 was
consolidated by the Bureau of Meteorology (BOM) to six wind/weather combinations
(wind speed/Pasquill stability category) and 12 directional categories and provided to
Orica in the format suitable for input to the dispersion model. In general the most
stable meteorological conditions (F stability) lead to the largest effect distances for
toxic releases. See APPENDIX 3 for the dataset used.
Other environmental factors used in the dispersion modelling are:
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Ambient air temperature:
20oC
Soil temperature:
20oC
Relative humidity:
70%
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6.3.2. Terrain Effects

Ground roughness affects turbulent flow properties of wind, hence dispersion of a
released material. Terrain effects are taken into account to some degree in dispersion
modelling by use of a parameter known as surface roughness length.
A surface roughness factor of 1m was used (Ref 17), corresponding to an area with
densely located low buildings or an industrial area with low structures such as the BIP.
6.4.
Explosion Modeling
Effects uses the Multi-Energy method for estimation of explosion effects. The key
feature of the Multi-Energy method is that the explosion is not primarily defined by the
fuel air mixture but by the environment in which the vapour disperses. Partial
confinement is regarded as a major cause of blast in vapour cloud deflagrations. If
there is no confinement, a flashfire (i.e. no overpressure effects) would occur rather
than explosion.
Location of Explosion
Ignition is assumed to occur at the centre of the gas cloud formed.
Confinement
The degree of confinement must be defined as an input to the model. Essentially, this
is the proportion of the total mass in the cloud used in the dispersion and subsequent
explosion calculation. For example, if 2,000kg is entered as a total mass and 50% as
confinement then 1,000kg is the maximum amount that can be included in the
explosion calculation. The actual amount used in the Multi-Energy explosion model is
calculated by the dispersion module.
For this study, the following percentage confinement values have been used:
10% for pipelines and isolated storages;
25% for open plant areas and most storages;
50% for main plant areas; and
75% for the congested plant areas.
Blast strength
The initial strength of the blast is also variable, depending on the degree of
confinement and on the reactivity of the gas. In the Multi-Energy method the initial
strength is represented by a series of curves relating overpressure to distance, where
curve 1 means slow deflagration and curve 10 means detonation.
For explosions in process plant environments the initial strength is thought to lie
between 4 to 7 on the scale (Ref 25). For this study curve 7 (strong deflagration) was
used for most scenarios.
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6.5.
Estimation of Fatality, Injury, Irritation and Property Damage Effects

6.5.1. Fires and Explosions
The following methodologies are used within Riskcurves for the calculation of fatality:
Flash Fires: 100% fatality within the flashfire envelope and no fatality effect outside
the envelope (due to the short duration).
Jet Fires:
100% fatality within the dimensions of the flame. The flame is modelled
as a rectangle. Outside the flame, heat radiation levels are calculated at
particular points using the view factor method. Fatality is calculated
using the probit equation below with an exposure duration of 20 seconds.
Probit = -36.38 + 2.56 ln (tQ1.33)
t
Q
exposure time (sec)

heat flux (W/m2)
Note that this probit is only valid for very short exposure durations (less
than 1 minute). For the purposes of this risk assessment, it is assumed a
person has 20 seconds to escape from heat radiation (i.e. an exposure
duration of 20 seconds).
Pool Fires:
100% fatality within the diameter of the pool fire. Heat radiation effects
past the edge of the pool fire are calculated using the view factor method
and fatality via the probit as given above for jet fires. The pool fire is
assumed to be circular with the centre located at the tank / bund centre.
Explosions: Riskcurves calculates explosion fatality by first calculating the diameter of

the flash fire and then assuming 100% fatality within this area. The
explosion fatality effects are taken into account by assuming an average
1.25% fatality until the overpressure drops to 10 kPa or less. This method
is based on an analysis of fatalities that occurred in the LPG Mexico city
disaster in 1984 where the majority of people were in fact killed by falling
rubble etc, rather than directly by overpressure.
BLEVE:
100% fatality within the diameter of the fireball projected onto the ground.
Heat radiation outside the diameter of the fireball is calculated as per the
probit equation given above for jet fires, but using the estimated BLEVE
duration calculated by Riskcurves (usually of the order of 8 12 seconds)
rather than 20 seconds.
As for explosions, overpressure effects can cause an additional 1.25%
fatality up to the 10 kPa overpressure radius. However, for BLEVEs the
peak overpressure is normally within the fireball radius so overpressure
effects do not contribute to the fatality calculations.
For the injury and property damage effects of fires and explosions, the HIPAP 4 criteria
can be modelled in Riskcurves, i.e. the analyst provides the values of interest and
results are plotted accordingly. In this case 4.7 kW/m2 and 7 kPa are the levels defined
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in HIPAP 4 for injury risk assessment, and 23 kW/m 2 and 14 kPa for property damage.
Riskcurves can then be used to generate contours showing the frequency of
exceeding these threshold values.
6.5.2. Mitigation for Heat Radiation
For impinging jet fires, and heat radiation from BLEVEs, jet fires and pool fires,
protection for people and property from these effects may be provided by intervening
structures, vessels etc which could absorb or deflect the flames or the radiation.
By convention in individual fatality risk calculations for land use planning, these
mitigating effects are not taken into account in the calculation of damage from heat
radiation. Hence results for the effects of heat radiation are likely to be conservative.
Mitigation effects due to shielding of indoor populations from heat radiation effects are
accounted for in societal risk calculations. Refer to Section 9.5 for further information.
6.5.3. Acute Toxic Effects
As required by HIPAP no 4, the risk of a receptor experiencing an acute toxic effect
including immediate irritation, serious injury or fatality is considered in the QRA. Table
6.2 summarises the criteria used for the assessment of acutely toxic materials
considered in this QRA. Note that ERPG values have been used for assessing injury
and irritation risk for chlorine and HCl for consistency with previous assessments. For
new scenarios (ammonia) included in the 2012 QRA, AEGL values are used for
assessing injury and irritation risk as these are consistent with the Safety Report.
Note that offsite fatality effects due to toxicity (of unignited releases) are not
considered credible for the toxic materials handled at Olefines (mercaptan, 1,3
butadiene and DMDS) and Huntsman (EO and PO), hence injury and irritation effects
(of unignited releases) only have been included in the QRA. (Note that these materials
are also flammable). The text following the table provides further details of the toxicity
assessment basis adopted.
TABLE 6.2:
Material
Chlorine (Cl2)
TOXICITY CRITERIA
Concentration
1% Fatality at 15 mins
exposure
Injury
Irritation
(ERPG-3 Ref 29) (ERPG-2 Ref 29)
Probit (Ref 22)

n
(ppm min)
ppm
ppm
ppm
89
20
2223
150
20
-4.86 + 0.5ln(c
2.75
t)
Hydrogen Chloride (HCl) -35.76 + 3.69ln(ct)

2
(Note 3)
Ammonia
-16.29 +ln(c t)
3381
2700
Ethyl Mercaptan
Not applicable
360
1,3 butadiene
Not applicable
5000
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Material
Concentration
exposure
Injury
Irritation
(ERPG-3 Ref 29) (ERPG-2 Ref 29)
Probit (Ref 22)

n
(ppm min)
ppm
ppm
ppm
DMDS
Not applicable
250
50
EO
Not applicable
500
50
PO
Not applicable
750
250
Notes:
1. ERPGs are from 2008 (periodic updates take place).
2. No ERPGs set for ethyl mercaptan. Interim AEGL 2 and 3 (60 mins exposure) used.
3. AEGL3 (10 minute) and AEGL 2 (10 minute) have been used for ammonia for consistency
with the Safety Report
Fatality
In QRAs, probability of fatality is usually estimated from probit equations of the form:
Pr = A + b ln(cnt)
c
t
concentration (ppm)
time (min)
These can then be converted to a probability of fatality using the error function
transform:
Probability = 0.5(1 + erf(
Pr 5
))
2
There are probits published for many common industrial toxic materials (e.g. ammonia,
chlorine, hydrogen chloride, TNO Purple Book, Ref 22).
Where a probit is not available (e.g. ethyl mercaptan), the Hazardous Installations
Directorate (HID), part of the UK HSE, has published a set of values known as the
Specified Level of Toxicity (SLOT) which corresponds to 1% fatality, and Significant
Level of Death (SLOD), which corresponds to 50% mortality (Ref 27). The SLOT and
SLOD can be used to estimate fatality effects.
Ethyl mercaptan, EO and PO are included in this list. For these chemicals, the value of
n in the fatality probit equation is 1. Using the quoted values for SLOT and SLOD
allows the toxic fatality probit for these chemicals to be estimated, these results are
summarised in Table 6.3. These probits indicate that high exposures exceeding 3,000
ppm are required for 1% mortality to occur for a 15 minute exposure duration.
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Given the highly flammable nature of EO and PO, and the relatively low fatality toxicity
of ethyl mercaptan, EO and PO, fatality effects offsite due to toxicity of unignited
releases of these chemicals have not been included in the QRA.
TABLE 6.3:
Material
PROBITS ESTIMATED FROM HID DATA
Estimated Concentration Causing 1 % Fatality

exposure
SLOT
(1% fatality Ref 27)
n
ppm min
SLOD
(50% fatality Ref27)
n
Estimated Probit
n
(ppm min)
ppm
ppm min
Ethyl mercaptan
-17.58 + 1.68 ln(ct)
11067 1.66E+05
6.62E+05
EO
-15.40 + 1.68 ln(ct)
3120
4.68E+04
1.87E+05
PO
-15.74 + 1.70 ln(ct)
3440
5.16E+04
2.04E+05
For 1,3 butadiene, US data from the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease
Registry (Ref 28) indicates that concentrations over 100,000 ppm (10% w/w) are
needed to cause human fatality due to toxic exposure. As this concentration exceeds
the LEL of 2% v/v, it is unlikely such concentrations could be experienced in residential
areas, as the gas cloud either would have ignited before reaching these areas or would
have dispersed. Therefore the possibility of toxic fatality from exposure to 1,3
butadiene has been excluded.
DMDS does not appear to have a published probit and it is not included in the UK HID
list. For DMDS, spill scenarios are of the order of 200L (from drums) with evaporation
rate and associated dispersion calculations estimating low concentrations offsite (well
below the DMDS ERPG-2 of 50ppm). Therefore there is considered to be no risk of
offsite fatality.
Refer to Table 6.2 for the probit constants used in this QRA for HCl and Cl2.
Injury / Irritation
Injury due to toxic exposure depends on the nature of the material, the concentration,
the duration and mode of exposure and also on the sensitivity of the person exposed.
It therefore follows that toxic criteria applicable to one chemical will not necessarily be
appropriate for another chemical. HIPAP No 4 injury and irritation risk criteria for toxic
gas exposure were given in Table 2.5 as follows:
Injury: "Toxic concentrations in residential areas should not exceed a level which would be
seriously injurious to sensitive members of the community following a relatively short period of
exposure at a maximum frequency of 10 in a million per year."
Irritation: "Toxic concentrations in residential areas should not cause irritation to eyes or throat,
coughing or other acute physiological response in sensitive members of the community over a
maximum frequency of 50 in a million per year."
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Establishing criteria for a particular chemical necessitates determination of the terms

"seriously injurious", "sensitive", "relatively short" and "irritation". The American
Industrial Hygiene Association's (AIHA) Emergency Response Planning Guidelines
(ERPG) provide data on "injury" toxic exposure levels for a few industrial chemicals for
exposure periods of one hour as follows.
Emergency Response Planning Guidelines are values intended to provide estimates
of concentration ranges above which one could reasonably anticipate observing
adverse health effects; see ERPG-1; ERPG-2; ERPG-3. The term also refers to the
documentation that summarises the basis for those values. The documentation is
contained in a series of guides produced by the Emergency Response Planning
Committee of the American Industrial Hygiene Association (Ref29 ).
As required by DoP, the QRA makes the following interpretations:
Serious Injury
occurs due to toxic exposure to Emergency Response Planning

Guideline Level 3 (ERPG-3) concentration. ERPG-3 is defined
as the maximum airborne concentration below which nearly all
individuals could be exposed for up to 1 hour without
experiencing or developing life-threatening health effects.
Irritation
occurs due to toxic exposure to Emergency Response Planning

Guideline Level 2 (ERPG-2) concentration. ERPG-2 is defined
as the maximum airborne concentration below which nearly all
individuals could be exposed for up to 1 hour without
experiencing or developing irreversible or other serious health
effects or symptoms that could impair an individual's ability to
take protective action.
Where ERPGs have not been defined (e.g. for ethyl mercaptan), Acute Emergency
Guidelines Levels (AEGL) (60 minutes) have been used. They are defined in a very
similar way to ERPGs as follows, however also have values set for a range of times:
AEGL-3
is the airborne concentration (expressed as ppm or mg/m3) of a

substance above which it is predicted that the general
population, including susceptible individuals, could experience
life-threatening health effects or death.
AEGL-2
is the airborne concentration (expressed as ppm or mg/m3) of a

substance above which it is predicted that the general
population, including susceptible individuals, could experience
irreversible or other serious, long-lasting adverse health effects
or an impaired ability to escape.
It is known that increasing the duration of exposure to toxic materials tends to increase
the harmful effects. Hence, use of the 60 minute ERPG/ AEGLs are regarded as a
conservative basis of comparison for serious injury, since the definition covers a 1 hour
exposure duration, rather than the relatively short exposure period mentioned in the
HIPAP 4 injury criteria.
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Refer to Table 6.2 for the values used in this QRA to assess toxic injury and irritation
risks.
6.5.4. Mitigation for Toxic Releases
By convention in individual fatality risk calculations for land use planning, mitigation is
not accounted for. For toxic exposure scenarios, it is assumed that people are located
outdoors, are always present and take no evasive action if an incident occurs.
This is a conservative assumption when considering toxic gas incidents (particularly for
materials with good odour warning properties at levels well before disabling effects
occur such as chlorine), as people are in fact very likely to be able to escape or take
evasive action by moving away, upwind or inside and closing windows and doors.
Mitigation effects are accounted for in societal risk calculations. Refer to Section 9.5 for
further information.
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7.
FREQUENCY ASSESSMENT
7.1.
Frequency Assessment
The frequency of an event is defined as the number of occurrences of the event over a
specified time period; with the period in risk analysis generally taken as one year.
Two approaches can be used to estimate the frequencies of hazardous events. The
first method is to use statistical data relating to failure of whole systems or equipment
items. Secondly, complex events can be broken down into contributing factors and the
overall event frequency estimated from the known frequencies of the smaller events
using fault tree analysis. Assumptions made for frequency calculations are described
below.
7.2.
Generic Equipment Failure Frequencies

For piping and equipment mechanical failures, base frequencies have been estimated
either from data compiled and historically published for internal use by ICI (Mond data
Ref 30), from frequency estimates published by the Institution of Chemical Engineers
(Ref 31), the CCPS (Ref 32), and by the Dutch Committee for the Prevention of
Disasters (Ref 22 the Purple Book). These are usually expressed on a per m of pipe
or per equipment item basis per year, or per million operating hours.
P&IDs have been used to estimate the number of flanges etc and pipe lengths have
generally been estimated from layout and mechanical drawings.
The frequency of rupture of pipework between the vessel and the nearest isolation
valve has been included to the standard vessel rupture frequency given in Table 7.1
and is not considered separately.
TABLE 7.1:
GENERIC EQUIPMENT FAILURE FREQUENCIES
Type of Failure
Failure Rate
(per year)
Source
Piping
-6
3 mm hole
13 mm hole
50 mm hole
3 mm gasket (13 mm hole equivalent)
Guillotine fracture (full bore):
< 50 mm
> 50 mm but < 100 mm
> 100 mm
9 x10 / m
-6
3 x10 / m
-6
0.3 x10 / m
-6
5 x10 / joint
Bellows - fracture (full bore)
4000 x10 / bellow
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-6
0.6 x10 / m
-6
0.3 x10 / m
-6
0.1 x10 / m
-6
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Type of Failure
Failure Rate
(per year)
Source
Pressure Vessels (Storage and Process, except reactors)

6 mm hole
13 mm hole
25 mm hole
50 mm hole
Catastrophic failure - Pressure Vessel
-6
24 x10
-6
6 x10
-6
3 x10
-6
3 x10
-6
1 x10
All ICI Mond
Pressure Vessels (Reactors)

For reactors generic failure frequencies pressure vessel x 10
are increased by a factor of 10
Purple Book
Atmospheric Tanks
6
Catastrophic failure Non-metallic

atmospheric tanks
0.021per 10 operating hours
Catastrophic failure - atmospheric tank

Large leaks atmospheric tank
Small leaks atmospheric tank
5 x10
-6
5 x10
-6
10 x10
-6
CCPS
Purple Book
Centrifugal Pumps
Seal failures - assume 13 mm hole at
pump discharge pressure
-6
5000 x10 (single mechanical

seal)
-6
2500 x10 (double mechanical

seal)
All ICI data

(used in
previous
QRAs)
-6
10000 x10 (single mechanical

seal below 20C or above
100C)
-6
5000 x10 (double mechanical

seal below 20C or above
100C)
Shaft failure assume 50 mm hole at
pump discharge pressure
100 x10
Casing failure equivalent to suction

pipe rupture at pump
10 x10
-6
All ICI data

(used in
previous
QRAs)
-6
All ICI data

(used in
previous
QRAs)
Double diaphragm dosing pumps

Pump leak
250 x10
Catastrophic pump failure
50 x10
-6
Purple Book
(pumps with
additional
containment)
-6
Tanker loading
Hose failure
Hose leak
4 per 10 operating hours
Purple Book
Purple Book
Purple Book
40 per 10 operating hours
Container Handling
Liquid spills (Olefines - DMDS drums
and EM container)
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7.3.
Chlorine Drum and Cylinder Failure Frequencies

Chlorine drum failure rates are based on a study conducted by ICI UK into failures
associated with chlorine drum storage and handling operations (Ref 33).
TABLE 7.2:
DRUM AND CYLINDER FAILURE FREQUENCIES
Type of Failure
Failure Rate
Static Drum Failures:

-6
Catastrophic failure drum
0.1 x 10 per year / drum
3mm hole drum
5 x 10 per year / drum
Catastrophic failure cylinder
0.1 x 10 per year / cylinder
-6
-6
Drum Handling Failures:
7.4.
-6
Probability of dropping drum during transfer
1 x 10 / transfer
Probability of valve damage per drop
0.001 / drop
Probability of plug damage per drop
0.002 / drop
Probability of Protection Operating

A number of safeguards such as emergency isolation valves (EIV) or shutdown valves
(SDV), excess flow valves (XSFV) and gas detection are provided to limit the
consequences of a release at the various facilities. The probability of these not
operating on demand has been included for applicable scenarios. Table 7.3
summarises the reliability estimates used.
TABLE 7.3:
FAILURE OF SAFEGUARDS
Safeguard
Fails to
Operate on
Demand
Unit
Source
Comments
EIV or SDV
1.7 x10
per demand
(Ref 34)
Comprises 8.3 x10 for

solenoid valve and 8.3
-3
x10 for isolation valve.
Based on failure 0.1 t/yr
fail to danger 1/3 of time
and 6 monthly testing
XSFV clean service 1.3x10
per demand
UK HSE (Ref C3s are clean service

35)
XSFV dirty service
0.1
per demand
Estimated
C4s are an example of

dirty service as they tend
to polymerise
Flammable gas
detection initiates
shutdown (C3/C4
loading areas
Olefines)
4.04 x 10
per demand
Olefines
QRA (Ref 8)
2 of 3 gas detectors and

SIL3 rated shutdown
system. This value does
not include shutdown
valve / solenoid.
-2
-2
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7.5.
Human Error
The following estimates of human error (Ref 36) have been used as a guide for the
purposes of determining human response in various situations and incorporated into
fault trees where appropriate.
TABLE 7.4:
7.6.
HUMAN ERROR PROBABILITIES
Activity
Probability of
Error
Probability of failing to take correct action in high stress situations with

one minute in which to act
0.9-1.0
Error in non-routine operation when other duties present
0.1
Error in routine operation where some care is needed
0.01
Error in routine simple operation
0.001
Ignition Probability
In the case of a release, an event tree can be derived for each material to determine
the probability of:
No ignition (i.e. safe dispersal or toxic impact)
Immediate ignition (jet fire, pool fire)
Delayed ignition (vapour cloud explosion, flash fire).
Probabilities of ignition for each of these events (where applicable) were derived
depending on the material in the release based on guidance in the Purple Book (Ref
22). A description is given in APPENDIX 4.
7.7.
BLEVE Frequency
The ideal way to estimate BLEVE frequency would be a model which takes into
account the spatial relationships between equipment items, and wind speed and
direction data to determine the likelihood that an impinging jet fire or pool fire could
initiate a BLEVE.
However this is not practical for large facilities such as those on the BIP. Hence a
simplified approach was taken based on the approach suggested in the Purple Book
(Ref 22). This used a proportion of the catastrophic failure rate for a vessel as the
likelihood of an instantaneous release which could cause a BLEVE. This base
frequency was adjusted by the following factors as recommended by the Purple Book:
whether the material was in storage, process or in a road tanker.
the probability of immediate ignition of the release, which in turn depended on the
type of material (flammable liquid, unreactive gas, reactive gas) and the mass of
material released.
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This approach gave BLEVE frequencies at Olefines and Huntsman ranging from
approximately 10-9 (for small inventories) to 10-5/yr (for large inventories, and EO road
tanker operations) (Refs 8, 14).
The resulting frequency was reduced if the vessel was protected by a water deluge
system, which if it functions correctly, will prevent a BLEVE by keeping the affected
vessel cool enough to protect the vessel metal from overheating and failing. An
estimate was made of the failure probability of a deluge system which gave a failure
rate on demand of approximately 0.06 (Ref 8).
Therefore BLEVE frequencies for protected vessels at Olefines and Huntsman were
taken as unprotected vessel BLEVE frequency divided by factor of a 10.
7.8.
Process Specific Incident Frequencies

The frequencies of some specific process incidents (i.e. release scenarios related to
control system failure or human error) or failures of complex process safeguards have
been estimated and incorporated into the risk analysis using fault tree analysis. Table
7.5 lists the events and estimated frequencies included in the BIP QRA.
The fault trees are contained in the individual facility risk assessments for ChlorAlkali
and Huntsman (Refs 6 and 14).
TABLE 7.5:
PROCESS SPECIFIC INCIDENT FREQUENCIES
Process Incident Description
Frequency
(per year)
Failure (per
demand)
Orica ChlorAlkali Facility

Undetected Failure of Emergency Caustic Scrubber (ECS)
-3
1x10
4.5x10
-4
Chlorine release due to plant trip and simultaneous ECS

failure
1.4x10
-6
Chlorine release through Hypo plant (make and backing

towers both fail)
1.x10
Chlorine release from in-transit road tanker
5.7x10
-6
Chlorine release from HCI plant during start up / shutdown

(failure of control systems)
7.9x10
-5
Chlorine release from HCl plant due to ratio control failure
2.2x10
-5
Hydrogen chloride release from HCl plant stack during full

production
4.8x10
-8
Hydrochloric acid release during HCl road tanker filling
1.9x10
-3
Pool Fires (break tanks and tank farm)
5.4x10
-6
Hot Oil Pool Fire Medium Spill
3.7 x10
-4
Hot Oil Pool Fire Large Spill
9.5 x10
-5
Chlorine release through ECS, normal plant operation
-5
-6
1x10
Huntsman Surfactants Plant
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Process Incident Description
7.9.
Frequency
(per year)
Failure (per
demand)
-5
4.7 x10
-4
-5
-7
-7
Cycle Gas Explosion
1.4 x10
Purification Column (D503) EO Decomposition

NIS Reactor Internal Explosion (vapour space explosion)
2 x10
NIS Reactor EO Decomposition
4 x10
EO Road Tanker BLEVE
8 x10
External Events
There are a number of external events that could cause a leak or explosion at the BIP.
7.9.1. Plane Crash
The BIP is a few kilometres from Sydney's Kingsford Smith Airport and hence there is
potential for aircraft impact on the BIP site. In 1990, the Australian Centre of Advanced
Risk and Reliability Engineering Ltd (ACARRE) considered the risks associated with
increased operations at Kingsford Smith Airport due to the third runway. The ACARRE
study examined the likely frequency of aircraft crashing onto various sites within the
Port Botany region, including the Botany site (then ICI Australia Pty Ltd).
As part of the FHA for the replacement CAP (Ref 7), the result from the ACARRE
study was used to determine the risk from aircraft crashes with a potential for knock-on
effects at the Botany site. The conclusion was that there was a very low incremental
level of risk for this event hence it is not included as a specific cause in the BIP QRA.
7.9.2. Earthquakes
Earthquake events may also cause plant damage sufficient to cause a release.
Frequencies and consequences of these events were also estimated as part of the
FHA for the replacement CAP (Ref 7) with the conclusion that earthquakes of sufficient
intensity and duration to cause severe damage are very low likelihood at the BIP
hence it is not included as a specific cause in the BIP QRA.
7.9.3. Other Events
Other external events that may lead to propagation of incidents include:
Subsidence
Landslide
Burst Dam
Vermin/insect infestation
Storm and high winds
Forest fire
Storm surge
Rising water courses
Flood
Storm water runoff
Breach of security
Lightning
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Tidal waves
Forest fire
None of these contributory events poses any significant risk to the BIP.
Security issues have been discussed previously (Section 3.2) and are subject to
dedicated corporate assessment and review processes in recent years as given the
increased global risk of terrorism. Security risks are not quantified as part of the QRA,
i.e. no adjustments to frequency or consequence calculations have been made to
account for any factors affecting security.
7.10.
Domino Incidents
A potentially hazardous event within a plant can cause further incidents in the same
plant, or in some cases in other plants. The secondary event is called a domino event.
With any large site there is potential for a severe incident in one area to cause a
knock-on or domino incident in another area.
Historically in process plants, the main knock-on events are caused by heat radiation
from fires and overpressure or missile damage due to explosions. Hence for the BIP,
Olefines and Huntsman, which have the largest flammable inventories, are the facilities
with the most potential to cause an escalated event.
As the main materials at ChlorAlkali (chlorine and HCl) are toxic, the potential for
knock-on effects in other areas of the BIP resulting from a release of these gases is
minimal.
7.10.1. Within Olefines
The main Olefines hydrocarbon storages are located some distance from the ethylene
process plant and the C3 splitter area, and are well protected with water spray
systems. It is therefore considered highly unlikely that ethylene process plant events
could significantly damage the Olefines OBL storages.
A number of technical safeguards including ESD and blowdown capability are provided
as noted in Section 4.3.4. Escalation within the Olefines plant is considered unlikely,
and in any case the worst consequence / impacts will be similar to or less severe than
the more severe events considered in the QRA already (e.g. BLEVEs of LPG storage
and road tankers, catastrophic failure of the ethylene sphere F349, large releases from
C3 splitter etc).
The QRA therefore does not include an additional frequency or consequence
allowance for escalation within Olefines.
7.10.2. Within Huntsman
A study which reviewed the major concerns of incident propagation due to a cycle gas
explosion (chosen due to its relatively high frequency compared to other events) has
been previously conducted (Ref 14). The study concluded that the risk of propagation
within the Huntsman facility is acceptable. Other higher likelihood events such as an
EO pump explosion and flange fire were also been included in the evaluation. These
events are potential initiators for a Purification Column EO decomposition. Hence, they
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have been included in the fault tree for this event. Again, the evaluation shows that the
risk of propagation within the Huntsman facility is acceptable.
Further analysis of lower frequency incidents within Huntsman was therefore not
conducted as part of the QRA.
7.10.3. Between Huntsman / Olefines / Chloralkali
It is also possible that an event in the neighbouring Qenos plants may cause a knockon event in the Huntsman plants or vice versa. The nearest Qenos hazardous
inventory is more than 150 metres from Huntsman which is a large separation distance
hence can be qualitatively considered as at low risk of being affected by a knock-on
incident.
The potential for Olefines or Huntsman events to affect the chlorine plant is also
considered low, as the nearest process plant with a significant flammable inventory on
the BIP is a significant distance away. (Huntsman, more than 150m away from the
chlorine plant process area and much further from drum storage and road tanker).
However the risk of an incident at one of the major BIP facilities affecting the other is
assessed quantitatively using the HIPAP 4 criteria for escalation / property damage to
neighbouring sites (i.e. 50x10-6 per year of exceeding 23 kW/m2, and i.e. 50x10-6 per
year of exceeding 7 kPa). Refer to Section 9.3 for the results.
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8.
RISK MODEL
8.1.
Risk Quantification
Having established the consequence and frequency for each event of interest, risk
quantification requires the following calculation (for individual incidents which are then
summed for all potential recognised incidents).
Risk = Frequency x Consequence
A separate summation is carried out for each consequence of interest, e.g. injury,
individual fatality etc. In this case the risk summation is done using Riskcurves
v2.72/P4.0, a software package developed by TNO to perform risk calculations. The
programme performs consequence calculations using the assumptions described in
previous sections, for user defined hazardous incident / release scenarios, then
estimates the effects on humans and combines these results with incident frequency
information, plant grid information and population data to determine risk. The risk
results can be presented as risk contours, societal risk curves or risk transects.
8.2.
Risk Presentation
For this QRA, the results of the risk calculations are presented in four forms:
Individual Fatality Risk: the likelihood of fatality to notional individuals at locations

around the site, as a result of the defined fire / explosion and toxic gas release
scenarios. This is shown as contours on a map of the area. The units for individual
risk are probability (of fatality) per million per year. By convention it is assumed that
people are located outdoors, are always present and take no evasive action if an
incident occurs. The results are presented cumulatively for all fire/explosion and
toxic impacts.
Injury and Irritation Risk: is the likelihood of injury or irritation to individuals at

locations around the site as a result of the same scenarios used to calculate
individual fatality risk. As for individual risk, evasive action is not allowed for.
Results are presented as contours and are shown separately for fire/ explosion
injury, and toxic injury and irritation impacts, as there are different criteria for
flammable and toxic exposures.
Escalation / Property Damage: is the likelihood of property damage occurring to

surrounding facilities as a result of exceeding threshold levels of heat radiation or
overpressure. Results are presented as risk contours.
Societal Risk: takes into account the number of people exposed to risk. Whereas
individual risk is concerned with the risk of fatality to a (notional) person at a
particular location (person 'most at risk'), societal risk considers the likelihood of
actual fatalities among people exposed to the hazard and allows mitigating effects
such as probability of presence, whether they are located inside or outside etc, to
be accounted for, hence requires population data as an input.
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8.3.
Risk Model Input Data Summary

The basic input data used in the Riskcurves model is summarised in Table 8.1.
TABLE 8.1:
Data Required
RISKCURVES INPUT DATA
Source / Assumptions
Location in QRA
Report
Facility Capability / Design Basis:

Plant nameplate capacities This data represents the upper limits Confidential
and limiting inventories /
assumed to develop Riskcurves input Appendices
flows etc.
scenarios. Essentially if any capacity /
inventory changes made remain
within this range, the QRA remains
valid
Riskcurves model inputs:
Physical conditions of
material at the point of
release
Process plant PFDs, NSW DG

notification records, operations
personnel input.
Input scenario
tables in individual
facility reports
Release co-ordinates
All maps and data were converted to

a Map Grid of Australia (MGA)
(GDA94) basis and all release
scenarios assigned to an MGA X,Y
grid point.
Input scenario
facility reports
Impact distance and effect Dispersion, fire and explosion models

area for each
as described in Section 6.2 of this
concentration/dose of
report.
concern
Calculated by
Riskcurves.
Probability of fatality
corresponding to a
particular location or
scenario
Calculated by
Riskcurves.
Probit equations as per the

assumptions described in Section 6.5
of this report.
Frequency of each incident Generic and fault tree estimates as

per the assumptions described in
Section 7 of this report.
Input scenario
facility reports
Wind/weather data
Sydney airport data 1999-2004

provided and consolidated to
Riskcurves format by BOM
APPENDIX 3
Population data for

surrounding area
Census 2001 data provided by ABS

for a 5km radius from BIP
supplemented by some additional
point sources. This was then
processed in mapping software
packages to distribute it over a 50m
by 50m grid. Various probability of
presence assumptions are described
in Section 8.4 of this report
APPENDIX 5
Calculation parameter files Summary of settings for Riskcurves

calculations. Generally from
Riskcurves technical manual (Ref 37)
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8.4.
Population Data
For the initial cumulative QRA population data from the 2001 Census was obtained
from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) and used as the basis for defining the
population data around the BIP site. Data was obtained for a radius of approximately
5km from the BIP site which is larger than the largest estimated fatality consequence
distance for any of the scenarios in the BIP QRA (the largest impact distance is from a
liquid chlorine leak from an in-transit 13 tonne road tanker).
As per previous QRAs for the BIP site, 10% of the population during the day was
assumed to be outdoors (with daytime being between the hours of 7 am to 7 pm) and
5% outdoors at night.
By convention the population on the site under consideration is set to zero. For this
study the population on the whole BIP site, Nant St, the rail corridor and Southlands is
set to zero. (This was agreed between Orica and DoP during discussions at the time of
the initial BIP site subdivision, and is the same as the convention used in the previous
QRAs prepared when the site was wholly owned by Orica).
Refer to APPENDIX 5 for further details of the population data used.
The 2006 Census data was also obtained for the 2012 QRA update. A review of the
changes since 2001 was carried out and indicated relatively minor increases in
population hence the 2001 data was retained for the QRA study. Refer to APPENDIX 5
for further details.
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9.
RISK RESULTS AND COMPARISON TO CRITERIA
9.1.

Figure 9.1 shows the cumulative individual risk contours for all facilities on the BIP.
Table 9.1 shows a compliance assessment against the HIPAP 4 criteria for existing
plants. For information only, Table 9.2 shows a comparison with the risk criteria for
new plants.
The risk level exceeds 1 x10-6 in a small part of the residential area on Denison St but
is below 10x10-6 per year in all areas. Based on the HIPAP4 existing facility risk
criteria guidance no intensification of residential development should take place in this
area.
Overall the BIP facilities are also very close to satisfying all the individual fatality
criteria for new plants. However there is a small encroachment (around 30m) of the
1x10-6 per year contour across the Denison St eastern BIP boundary into the
residential area.
TABLE 9.1:
INDIVIDUAL RISK COMPARISON WITH EXISTING PLANT CRITERIA
Description
Risk
Criterion
(per year)
Compliance Comments
Individual Fatality Risk Existing Plants Criteria for Residential Areas

-6
No residential
> 10 x 10
intensification
should take place
where premitigation residual
risk levels are in
-6
excess of 10x10
per year
Contour slightly extends across all BIP

boundaries except the eastern Denison St
boundary which is closest to residential areas.
The contour does not reach residential areas in
any direction.
Marginal
A small encroachment (about 30m) into
exceedance
residential uses in Denison St on the eastern
BIP boundary.
No intensification guideline is therefore
applicable to area east of BIP along Denison St
No intensification
of residential
development
> 1 x 10
No intensification
of sensitive uses
0.5 x 10
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-6
-6
Complies
Contour does not extend to sensitive land uses
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TABLE 9.2:
INDIVIDUAL RISK COMPARISON WITH NEW PLANT CRITERIA
Description
Risk
Criterion
(per year)
Comments
Individual Fatality Risk New Plants All Land Uses
9.2.
Sensitive uses,
including hospitals,
schools, aged care
0.5 x 10
Residential areas
and hotels
1 x 10
Commercial areas,
including offices,
retail centres,
warehouses
5 x 10
Sporting complexes
and active open
spaces
10 x 10
Contained within the

boundary of an
industrial site
50 x 10
-6
Contour extends across all boundaries but not near any

sensitive uses (Matraville Botany Public School
(Beauchamp Rd), Botany Public School (Page St),
Banksmeadow Public School (Stephen Rd), the
Eastgardens Shopping Centre kindergarten and the
private school near Matraville Post Office
-6
Contour slightly extends across all BIP boundaries. A

small encroachment (about 30m) into residential uses in
Denison St on the eastern BIP boundary. The contour
does not reach residential areas in any other direction.
-6
Not shown, but lies inside 1 x 10 /yr contour, hence

does not reach the nearest commercial developments
(Various commercial businesses in Denison St to the
east).
-6
-6
Generally within or close to BIP boundary except for

Nant St area to west
Does not reach any open space uses (nearest is
Hensley Athletics Field to north).
-6
The main BIP operations comply.

Because of the proximity of the Nant St tank storage
boundary to the surrounding land, there is a marginal
encroachment by this contour of about 25m. Escape by
personnel from a developing pool fire would be
straightforward. It should also be noted that this criterion
does not apply to existing industrial developments.
Injury Risk - Fire and Explosion

Figure 9.2 and Figure 9.3 show the injury risk contours for heat radiation and
overpressure, i.e. potential to exceed 4.7kW/m2 or 7kPa in residential areas (assuming
no mitigating action such as moving away or sheltering from a heat source).
It can be seen that the 50 x10-6 per year contour for the heat radiation or overpressure
criterion generally does not extend into residential areas. However there is a small
encroachment (less than 30m) across the eastern BIP boundary into residential areas
along Denison St for both the overpressure (7kPa) and heat radiation (4.7kW/m2) injury
risk contours.
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9.3.
Property Damage - Fire and Explosion

Figure 9.4 and Figure 9.5 show the escalation / property damage risk contours for heat
radiation and overpressure, i.e. potential to exceed 23kW/m2 or 14kPa in neighbouring
facilities. These assume no mitigating action to protect any property (e.g. application of
cooling water, emergency response etc).
There is no interaction between the Huntsman and Qenos Olefines facilities, for either
overpressure or heat radiation impacts, hence the risk of escalation between the major
flammable inventories within the BIP is low.
Figure 9.5 showing the escalation / property damage risk contour for overpressure,
(i.e. potential to exceed 14kPa in neighbouring facilities) indicates that the BIP facilities
comply with the HIPAP 4 explosion overpressure propagation damage risk criterion for
new plants, except for a very small encroachment into the south-eastern corner of the
ALA site (to the north west of Olefines). The ALA site is a potentially hazardous
adjacent industrial installation, where flammable gases such as hydrogen and other
Dangerous Goods such as liquid oxygen are handled.
Figure 9.4 shows the risk contour representing the potential to exceed 23kW/m2 in
neighbouring facilities. This heat radiation contour shows that the BIP facilities do not
comply with the HIPAP 4 heat radiation propagation damage risk criterion for new
plants in the Nant St area and to the north of Olefines.
9.4.
Injury / Irritation Risk Toxic Gas

The HIPAP 4 toxic injury and irritation risk criteria apply to new rather than existing
developments however as discussed previously provide a baseline for comparison for
any future developments at the BIP. HIPAP 4 also suggests that these criteria should
be taken into account when assessing the appropriateness of additional residential or
sensitive development.
Figure 9.6 and Figure 9.7 show the injury (i.e. frequency of exceeding ERPG3
threshold value) and irritation risk (i.e. frequency of exceeding ERPG2 threshold
value). These do not comply with the new plant criteria as the contours extend well into
residential areas around the BIP as summarised in Table 9.3.
TABLE 9.3:
Description
TOXIC INJURY / IRRITATION RISK (NEW PLANTS)
Risk Criterion
(per year)
-6
Injury residential 10 x 10
areas
Irritation
residential areas
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-6
50 x10
Comments
Extends from the BIP around 500m from the southern site
boundary into residential areas to the south east and
about 250m from the east site boundary into residential
areas in the southern part of Denison St.
Extends from the BIP around 500m from the southern site
boundary into residential areas to the south east and
about 200m from the east site boundary into residential
areas in the southern part of Denison St.
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FIGURE 9.1:
CUMULATIVE BIP INDIVIDUAL FATALITY RISK
LEGEND:
0.5 x10-6 per year
1 x10-6 per year
5 x10-6 per year
10 x10-6 per year
50 x10-6 per year
Google Earth
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FIGURE 9.2:
INJURY RISK HEAT RADIATION 4.7KW/M2
LEGEND:
50 x10-6 per year
FIGURE 9.3:
INJURY RISK OVERPRESSURE 7KPA
LEGEND:
50 x10-6 per year
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FIGURE 9.4:
PROPERTY DAMAGE HEAT RADIATION 23KW/M2
LEGEND:
50 x10-6 per year
FIGURE 9.5:
PROPERTY DAMAGE OVERPRESSURE 14KPA
LEGEND:
50 x10-6 per year
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FIGURE 9.6:
INJURY RISK TOXIC GAS (ERPG3)
LEGEND:
10 x10-6 per year
FIGURE 9.7:
IRRITATION RISK TOXIC GAS (ERPG2)
LEGEND:
50 x10-6 per year
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9.5.
Societal Risk
Societal risk is a measure of the probability of incidents affecting an actual human
population (rather than a theoretical individual as in individual risk). Mitigation is
therefore taken into account. For example, societal risk calculations take into account
the probability of people being inside (less vulnerable) or outside (more vulnerable)
during a toxic gas release.
9.5.1. Mitigation Taken into Account
Toxics
The concentration of gas inside a building engulfed by a gas cloud will rise gradually
until the release has stopped and the cloud passed. The indoor concentration then falls
gradually towards zero. The peak concentration will be much less than that outside,
(unless the duration of the release is very long or the building has very high ventilation
rates). Hence, a person inside will normally be exposed to significantly lower gas
concentrations than someone outside and the risk of fatality from a toxic gas escape
will be significantly less for a person located indoors than the risk in the open at the
same location.
In QRA, this effect can be approximated by using a modified probit equation to
calculate toxicity impacts for the reduced dose experienced by indoor populations
(Fielding Ref 38). The modified probit approach is shown in Table 9.4. Toxicity impacts
experienced by the outdoor population are calculated using the standard probit used
for individual fatality risk calculations.
TABLE 9.4:
INDOOR TOXIC EXPOSURE PROBIT FOR SOCIETAL RISK CALCULATION

Use Fielding, Probits for Indoor Risk Assessments and Low
Variance probits,
SAFETI Users group Sept 1993
n
Outdoor
Pr = a + b ln(c t)
Indoor
Pr = ai + b ln(c t)
ai = a - b (1.0627n-0.6842)
Cl2 outdoor
Cl2 indoor
HCl outdoor
HCl indoor
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0.5
2.75
-5.98503
0.5
2.75
-35.76
3.69
-37.1567
3.69
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Fire and Explosion

As noted previously, barriers or being indoors will provide significant shielding from
short duration heat radiation exposures such as occur during a flashfire or BLEVE. The
societal risk calculations have allowed for this by assuming that the proportion of the
population located indoors will not experience fatality due to a flashfire or BLEVE as
they will be shielded from direct flame engulfment and heat radiation effects. It is noted
that there is some risk that this type of scenario will ignite building materials trapping
occupants within the building, still resulting in fatality, however the assumption is
regarded as a reasonable approximation to account for reduced exposure of indoor
populations to fire events.
A mitigation factor has not been included for reduced exposure of indoor populations to
heat radiation exposure from jet fires or pool fires. However these have much more
limited effect areas (i.e. effects are generally contained within the BIP site) and tend
not to contribute significantly to societal risk in any case.
No mitigation has been applied to populations exposed to explosion scenarios, i.e. no
differentiation has been made between indoor and outdoor populations exposed to
explosions / overpressure. This is because fatality could be caused either inside due to
collapse of buildings or outside from fragments/missile effects.
9.5.2. Societal Risk Results
Societal risk results are presented as f-N curves, which show the cumulative frequency
of fatality to N or more people.
Figure 9.8 shows the societal risk results compared against the criteria that have been
published in HIPAP 4 and those used in the Botany Land Use Planning Risk Study
(see Section 2.13 of this report). As discussed societal risk criteria have not been
formally set in NSW. However the following broad conclusions can be drawn from the
results:
The societal risk is in the ALARP zone. It does not extend into the intolerable
area.
There is an approximately proportional reduction in frequency as the number of

fatalities increases, i.e. the frequency of 10 fatalities is around one order of
magnitude (i.e. a factor of 10) lower than the frequency of 1 fatality, and the
frequency of 100 fatalities is around one order of magnitude lower than the
frequency of 10 fatalities.
The societal risk is dominated by fire / explosion risks (> 80% and hard to see the
line on the graph as it almost coincides with the total BIP curve), rather than toxic
exposures (around 10%-15%). This is largely due to the relatively small frequency
of liquid chlorine release scenarios (from drums and in-transit road tanker) and the
mitigation offered by the majority of the population being located inside.
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FIGURE 9.8:
9.6.
SOCIETAL RISK
Comparison of Risk Results with Previous Studies

9.6.1. Individual Fatality Risk
Individual fatality risk results have been previously presented separately for fire /
explosion and toxic risks in the following studies:
Olefines Ethane Conversion FHA (Ref 9) from 1995 (fire and explosion risk only).
Replacement chlorine plant FHA (Ref 7) from 2000 (toxic risk only).
These have been reproduced in APPENDIX 6. It can be seen that:
the individual fatality risk contours in this QRA are smaller than the previous fire
and explosion results from the Ethane FHA.
The risk contribution from the Chloralkali area in the south of the BIP is very similar
to that in the FHA.
Also note that the QRA methodology was somewhat different so the results are not
directly comparable and detailed comparison is not attempted. There are a large
number of differences in the flammable scenario models in the BIP QRA compared to
the last cumulative fire/explosion risk QRA submitted to DoP (Ethane Upgrade 1995).
There were also plants included in the 1995 QRA that have now been closed down
and demolished. In particular, the now-closed Vinyls Plant was a significant contributor
to offsite risks and would have contributed to the larger fire / explosion risk contours.
There are minimal differences in the methodology used to assess toxic impacts. More
information for each type of impact is given in APPENDIX 6.
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9.6.2. Injury / Irritation / Escalation

There have been no previous studies presenting Injury / Irritation or Escalation Risks
on the same basis as this QRA, hence a detailed comparison to previous results is not
made. However it can generally be inferred that injury, irritation and escalation risks
would also tend to decrease if the individual fatality risk has decreased.
9.6.3. Societal Risk
Cumulative risk within the Botany/Randwick Industrial Complex, including but not
limited to operations on the BIP, was considered by the NSW Department of Planning
in 1985. The study was updated in 2001 (Ref 23) and estimated the societal risk from
the main risk contributors in the area, including those at BIP. The overview report did
not list individual contributors to societal risk, but did note that overall societal risk
following construction of the new Chlorine Plant and the closure of liquid chlorine
manufacturing on the BIP would be close to the negligible region (p20, Ref 23).
The societal risk results presented in this QRA are generally in the ALARP rather
than negligible region. If population densities increased further around the BIP societal
risks levels would also increase back towards the intolerable region.
9.7.
Risk Reduction Potential

The BIP plant designs and operations already include a number of hardware features
and safety management systems that reduce risks significantly. No major risk
reduction measures are recommended as a result of this QRA.
Note that these comments do not preclude ongoing incremental risk reduction activities
as are carried out under operational improvement programmes and measures
identified in preparing the facility Safety Reports under the NSW MHF legislation.
9.8.
Risk to the Biophysical Environment

The main concern relating to environmental risk from accident events is generally with
effects on whole systems or populations. Whereas any adverse effect on the
environment is obviously undesirable, there were no incidents of this nature identified
in the individual fatality risk assessments, hence this type of risk is not addressed in
this QRA.
There are also a number of legacy issues on the BIP site resulting from historical
operations at Botany. These are managed by the Orica Legacy project team as part of
an ongoing site remediation programme. These issues are not covered in the QRA as
they tend to involve persistent pollutants rather than substances that could cause an
accident such as a fire, explosion or toxic release. In addition, as the BIP remediation
programme advances, these materials will be progressively removed from the site and
surrounds, eliminating the risk.
The currently operating process plants do not use, handle or produce significant
quantities of persistent pollutants (heavy metals, solvents etc) hence will not create
additional ongoing environmental impacts on soil or groundwater.
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10.
OVERALL CONCLUSIONS
A QRA drawing on detailed design information and the results from previous risk
studies has been prepared for the operating facilities on the BIP. The combined QRA
comprises:
a full quantitative risk assessment for the Qenos Olefines, Orica ChlorAlkali and
Huntsman Surfactants plants
some worst case scenarios for the Orica GTP, Qenos Alkathene and Alkatuff
facilities.
Hazardous incidents identified for Site Utilities operations within the BIP and the
operations at the areas leased to Air Liquide and BOC Gases were found to have no
impact outside the BIP boundary, hence no scenarios for Site Utilities, BOC or Air
Liquide are included in the cumulative BIP QRA.
The QRA model has been set up in TNO Riskcurves using recent meteorological and
population data and has been used to generate results in a variety of forms including
the risk of individual fatality, injury and irritation risk, property damage risks and
societal risk.
10.1.
Risks Compared against HIPAP 4 Criteria

Overall the cumulative risk from the BIP facilities is very close to satisfying all individual
fatality criteria for new plants. However there are some exceptions as follows:
There is a small encroachment (less than 30m) of the 1x10-6 per year contour to
the east of the Huntsman facility across the Denison St eastern BIP boundary into
the residential area.
There are also some small encroachments of the fire and overpressure injury risk
contours into residential areas along Denison St and of the escalation contours into
potentially hazardous land uses.
The toxic injury and irritation contours extend several hundred metres into
residential areas hence do not comply with the new plant criteria.
The societal risk levels are within the ALARP range, hence are not unacceptable.
10.2.
Adequacy of Safeguards and Recommendations

Each of the potentially hazardous incidents defined has a number of preventative and
mitigative control measures and safeguards in place, resulting in low predicted
frequencies for high consequence accident events. No step change risk reduction
measures were identified in the course of preparing the QRA.
The BIP QRA is intended as a risk status report and while it identifies existing risk
control measures and safeguards, it does not provide a detailed demonstration of the
adequacy of the control measures in place to control risks to levels considered As
Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) or assess incremental risk reduction
measures that could be implemented to further reduce risk levels.
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Specific recommendations have not been made as part of the study.

10.3.
Risk Acceptability
Overall, when considering the individual fatality and societal risk results, these are
reasonably low and have decreased when compared with results presented previously
for the BIP in 1992 and 1995. However there are still some high consequence events
with the potential to affect populations in proximity to the BIP, specifically:
Flashfire / explosion due to large leak or rupture of the ethylene sphere (F349)
Flashfire / explosion due to large leak or rupture of the C3 storages
Ethylene oxide decomposition events
Liquid chlorine leaks from in transit road tanker or drums.
Societal risk results are also in the ALARP region which indicate the risk is not
unacceptable but that it is not negligible. Any further increases in population would
obviously increase the societal risk.
These findings are consistent with the findings of the Botany / Randwick Industrial
Area Land Use Safety Study (page 20 Ref 23) which states that high residential
densities should still be avoided due to potential societal risk implications.
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11.
REFERENCES
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
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Department of Urban Affairs & Planning (NSW) Hazardous Industry Planning Advisory
Paper No 6 Hazard Analysis, 2011
Department of Urban Affairs & Planning (NSW) Hazardous Industry Planning Advisory
Paper No 4 Risk Criteria for Land Use Safety Planning, 2011
Pinnacle Risk Management Pty Ltd (18 April 2005) Final Hazard Analysis Groundwater
Treatment Plant Orica Australia Pty Ltd Botany Industrial Park
Sherpa Consulting Pty Ltd (4 April 2006 ) Preliminary Hazard Analysis Proposed HCB
Repackaging Plant Botany Industrial Park, NSW doc no J20064-001 Rev 2
Sherpa Consulting Pty Ltd (30 May 2007) Preliminary Hazard Analysis Proposed Car
Park Waste Encapsulation Remediation Directly-Heated Thermal Desorption
Technology Botany Industrial Park, NSW doc no J20115-001 Rev 3
Sherpa Consulting Pty Ltd (2 Nov 2006) Quantitative Risk Assessment Report
Chloralkali Facility Orica, Botany Industrial Park doc no J20082-003 Rev 1
SHE Pacific Pty Ltd (March 2000) Final Hazard Analysis Replacement Chloralkali Plant
Orica Australia Pty Ltd Botany Industrial Park, NSW EN0331-08-S1005 Rev C
Orica Engineering (Aug 2006) Quantitative Risk Assessment Qenos Olefines, Botany
Industrial Park doc no EN.2190.001 Rev C1
ICI Engineering, (March 1995) Final Hazard Analysis for ICI Olefines Ethane
Conversion Project at ICI Botany Site, NSW
Sherpa Consulting Pty Ltd (Nov 2006) Risk Assessment Report Alkatuff Qenos, Botany
Industrial Park doc no 20082-001 Rev 1
SHE Pacific Pty Ltd (March 2000) Final Hazard Analysis for the Qenos Alkatuff Plant
Upgrade Project
Sherpa Consulting Pty Ltd (26 Oct 2006) Risk Assessment Report Alkathene Qenos,
Botany Industrial Park doc no 20082-002 Rev 1
Sherpa Consulting Pty Ltd (Nov 2006) Risk Assessment Report Site Utilities Qenos,
Botany Industrial Park doc no 20082-004 Rev A
Pinnacle Risk Management Pty Ltd (Nov 2006) Quantitative Risk Assessment
Huntsman Corporation Australia, Botany Industrial Park Rev C
ICI Engineering, (October 1997) Final Hazard Analysis for the ICI Surfactants Plants,
Botany
Sherpa Consulting Pty Ltd (April 2009) Risk Assessment Report, Non- BIP Operators,
Botany Industrial Park 20082-007 Rev A
TNO Department of Industrial Safety Safety software EFFECTS DAMAGE
EFFECTSPLUS EFFECTSGIS version 5.5, User and Reference Manual Version
manual: 5.5 Release: 11 Last edited: 05 September, 2003
US EPA, CAMEO (ALOHA), http://www.epa.gov/ceppo/cameo/what.htm##haz
Shell Global Solutions (2003): Technical Guide for the Shell Shepherd Desktop,
Version 1.0.4.5
TNO Yellow Book, Methods for the Calculation of the Physical Effects of the Escape of
Dangerous Material, CPR 14E, Parts 1& 2, Committee for the Prevention of Disasters,
3rd edition 1997
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21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
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37
38
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Document ID:
Department of Urban Affairs and Planning (1997): Multi-Level Risk Assessment,

Sydney.
TNO Purple Book, Guidelines for Quantitative Risk Assessment, CPR 18E, ,
Committee for the Prevention of Disasters, 1st edition 1999
NSW Department of Urban Affairs and Planning (2001) Botany / Randwick Industrial
Area Land Use Safety Study Overview Report
SHE Pacific Pty Ltd Shewring, D. (2000), Fire Safety Study of the Botany Industrial
Park, NSW Volume 1 Site Wide Issues Rev B
TNO Yellow Book, Methods for the Calculation of the Physical Effects of the Escape of
Dangerous Material, CPR 14E, Parts 1& 2, Committee for the Prevention of Disasters,
3rd edition 1997
Lees, FP (1996), Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 2nd Edition
Hazardous Installation Directorate, Assessment of the Dangerous Toxic Load (DTL) for
Specified Level of Toxicity (SLOT) and Significant Likelihood of Death (SLOD),
http://www.hse.gov.uk/hid/haztox.htm
Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, Division of Toxicology, Center for
Disease Control, USA, Medical Management Guidelines for 1,3-Butadiene, May 2004
http://www.aiha.org/1documents/Committees/ERP-erpglevels.pdf 2008
ICI Engineering Department, Process Safety Guide 14 - Reliability Data, ICI PLC (UK)
A W Cox, F P Lees and M L Ang, Classification of Hazardous Locations, Institution of
Chemical Engineers, 1990
CCPS Reliability Data
Mant W D, (1993) Chlorine Drum Hazard Analysis, internal Orica (ICI Australia at that
time) memo to DA Beattie, ICI Engineering UK.
K. Walters, Managing Safety Critical Instrumentation, ICI Engineering, 1997
UK HSE, Safety Report Assessment Guide: LPG - Criteria, 2003
Kletz, Trevor A, An Engineers View of Human Error; chapter 7, Institution of Chemical
Engineers, 2nd Edition, 1991
TNO Division of Environmental Sciences (May 2000) TNO Safety Software Suite
Riskcurves Version P4.0 User Manual
Fielding, Probits for Indoor Risk Assessments and Low Variance Probits, SAFETI
Users Group Sept 1993
20613-001
1
25 September 2012
Page 88
INFORMATIVE APPENDICES
Document:
Revision:
Revision Date:
Document ID:
20613-001
1
25 September 2012
INFORMATIVE
APPENDIX 1. CUMULATIVE QRA REVISION HISTORY

This appendix summarises the main changes or updates made in the QRA.
Revision
Doc number
Date
Description
Comments
J20082-005
15/10/2007
Final Issue to BIP
Compiled including comments from all BIP

operators.
J20082-005
14/11/2007
Issued to DoP
Initial issue of compiled QRA to DoP
J20082-005
08/07/2009
Revised Toxic
Injury/Irritation Basis
Draft for review by NSW
DoP
Updated based on DoP comments. Main

changes as follows:
J20082-005
20613-001
20/10/2010
1.
Injury / Irritation risk basis revised

from ERPG2/ERPG1 to
ERPG3/ERPG2 respectively (as
required by DoP for consistency
with previous studies covering
chloralkali plant toxic risks).
2.
Additional information re risk

contributors in residential areas
provided.
3.
Inclusion of some discussion re

Orica GTP and also ALA and
BOC Gases.
Minor text edits
Minor text updates based on DoP meeting

comments 30/11/2009
Draft for BIP comment
Main changes as follows:
Document restructure
Post MHF minor updates
to QRA model
1.
Inclusion of NH3 water treatment

chemical scenarios for Olefines
(from MHF work)
2.
Additional scenarios for

Huntsman PO storage and
unloading area (from MHF work)
3.
Report restructured to simplify

the main body of the report,
expand the summary and
relocate technical information to
appendices.
4.
Separated security sensitive

information into a Confidential
section of the report
20613-001
03/08/2012
Revised issue for BIP

comment
20613-001
31/08/2012
Issue to DoP
20613-001
25/09/2012
Minor updates and reissue Included reference to relevant

to DoP
confidentiality legislation
Document:
Revision:
Revision Date:
Document ID:
20613-001 APPENDIX 1
1
25 September 2012
INFORMATIVE
APPENDIX 2. HAZARD IDENTIFICATION WORD DIAGRAMS

This appendix reproduces the Hazard Identification Word Diagrams included in the
individual facility risk assessments. Scenarios summarised in the attached tables were
compiled based on previous studies, supplemented by operating experience and
incidents that have occurred at the facilities and other similar installations.
Section A2.1 from Olefines QRA (Ref 8)
Section A2.2 from Alkathene Risk Assessment (Ref 12)
Section A2.3 from Alkatuff Risk Assessment (Ref 10)
Section A2.4 from Huntsman QRA (Ref 14)
Section A2.5 from ChlorAlkali QRA (Ref 6)
Section A2.6 from Site Utilities Risk Assessment (Ref 13)
Section A2.7 from GTP FHA (Ref 3)
Section A2.8 from Non- BIP Operators Risk Assessment (Ref 16)
Document:
Revision:
Revision Date:
Document ID:
1
25 September 2012
INFORMATIVE
TABLE A2.1: OLEFINES HAZID WORD DIAGRAM

FACILITY/ EVENT
CAUSES/
COMMENTS
POSSIBLE
CONSEQUENCES
QUANTIFIED
(Y/N)
PREVENTION/DETECTION/
PROTECTION
Entire Olefines Plant - Plant Wide Protection Systems

Hydrocarbon Leaks flammable liquids or
gases, liquefied
flammable gases,
combustible liquids
process and storage
vessels, pumps,
piping and other
equipment
LOC caused by
corrosion, impact
damage, seal failure,
maloperation,
process upset, or
other cause
Pool fire, jet fire, flash

fire or vapour cloud
explosion possible.
BLEVE possible if
pressurised vessel
exposed to sufficient
heat radiation
Yes (except for

leaks from
flanges and
small holes
which do not
have offsite
consequences)
Plant Layout:
to below LEL for minor leaks

n danger to
vessels from engulfing flames
Fire Safety Systems:
emergency vent valve actuators, and vessels containing more than 3 te
of flammable liquid or liquefied gas
on several reboilers and all flashing hydrocarbon storages.
Some activated automatically and others manually
or manually
on of
any leaks (wet steam, earthed piping to minimise static generation and
hence likelihood of ignition of gas cloud)
Appropriate training and equipment testing
Document:
Revision:
Revision Date:
Document ID:
1
25 September 2012
INFORMATIVE
FACILITY/ EVENT
Hydrocarbon Leaks
(continued)
CAUSES/
COMMENTS
As above
POSSIBLE
CONSEQUENCES
As above
QUANTIFIED
(Y/N)
PROTECTION
Protection Against Leaks:
mm
area
ion EIVs and discharge NRVs on most pumps handling flashing
hydrocarbon liquids. EIV activated by fusible link, control room or
remote location
initiated emergency depressuring of critical inventories to
flare
Critical Duty Pipelines:
discharge piping is to pressure vessel standards
Instrumentation and Electrical Safety:
stem) to
minimise process upsets from control system failures
HIMA trip and alarm system
on steel
Hydrocarbon Leaks
(continued)
As above
As above
Back up diesel generator to provide power for critical plant systems

instrumented systems
Document:
Revision:
Revision Date:
Document ID:
1
25 September 2012
INFORMATIVE
FACILITY/ EVENT
CAUSES/
COMMENTS
POSSIBLE
CONSEQUENCES
Hydrocarbon leaks
propane, PGP and
other hydrocarbons
during tanker loading
or unloading
Leak caused by
corrosion, impact
maloperation,
process upset, or
other cause
Jet fire, flash fire or

vapour cloud explosion
possible
Note: pool fire is
unlikely for propane
and PGP since their
normal boiling point will
cause them to flash off
BLEVE possible if
pressurised vessel
exposed to sufficient
heat radiation
Document:
Revision:
Revision Date:
Document ID:
QUANTIFIED
(Y/N)
Yes (except for
leaks from
flanges and
small holes
which do not
have offsite
consequences)
PROTECTION
Plant Layout:
Fully attended operation (by driver)
Operator supervised entry/connection/disconnection/departure
Fully automatic filling control
Boom gate closed until filling and vapour recovery hoses, Scully
earthing system and plant air hoses are disconnected
Tanker valves interlocked closed unless plant air hose connected
Tanker brakes interlocked on unless filling and vapour recovery hose
disconnected
Excess flow valves in filling lines closing on abnormally high flow e.g.
due to loading hose rupture
Self-sealing couplings to reduce chances of major leaks if driveaway
while still connected
Fire detectors and gas detectors automatically shut down tanker filling
Automatic deluge system if fire in loading bay
Control, Alarms and Trips:
Dedicated control system for tanker filling, with automatic shutdown on
abnormal conditions
Other Safety Systems:
as for main plant
1
25 September 2012
INFORMATIVE
FACILITY/ EVENT
Leaks 1,3
butadiene, EM,
DMDS
Document:
Revision:
Revision Date:
Document ID:
CAUSES/
COMMENTS
POSSIBLE
CONSEQUENCES
QUANTIFIED
(Y/N)
Leak caused by
corrosion, impact
maloperation,
process upset, or
other cause
Exposure to irritating or
injurious concentrations
of toxic vapour
Potential for fatality if
exposed to very high
concentrations of EM
or DMDS for prolonged
period (Note: no
known fatalities from
EM or DMDS
exposure, probably due
to the disagreeable
odour present at low
concentrations)
Yes (except for

leaks from small
holes which do
not have offsite
consequences)
PROTECTION
Leak Prevention, Detection and Suppression Systems:
Gas detector in EM storage building
Local and remote alarms (to main Olefines control room) on high EM
gas concentration in EM storage building
Foam available to blanket liquid EM spill
Sump in bund to reduce surface area and hence evaporation rate for
lower volume spills
Three activated carbon beds in series to scrub EM fumes from air

exhausted from EM building
Double diaphragm DMDS pumps to prevent a single diaphragm failure
from causing a release
Nitrogen padded DMDS tank to prevent release to atmosphere
DMDS tank pressure safety valve relieves to flare
1
25 September 2012
INFORMATIVE
FACILITY/ EVENT
CAUSES /
COMMENTS
POSSIBLE
CONSEQUENCES
QUANTIFIED
(Y/N)
PREVENTION/DETECTION
PROTECTION
Nant St Storages Systems

Hydrocarbon Leaks Nant St Storages
hydrocarbon
flammable or
combustible liquids
Document:
Revision:
Revision Date:
Document ID:
LOC caused by
Pool fire
corrosion, impact
damage, pump seal
failure, maloperation,
process upset, or
other cause
Yes all
possible causes
combined into
single fully
developed pool
fire for each tank
Plant Layout:
Hazardous area classification
Pumps not located under vessels or pipeways
Drainage to minimise fire danger
Bunding provided which contains normal working volume of largest tank
Mobil tank discharge and filling line valves closed unless transfer in
progress
Tanks fitted with remotely operated discharge isolation valves
Mobil tanks fitted with remotely operated inlet isolation valves
Duplicated level measurements and alarms to reduce the chances of
overfilling
Deluges on pumps handling flammable liquids. Activated manually
Fire detectors at pumps and vessels
Sprinkler systems on tanks. Activated manually
Fire-retardant foam distributed to tanks via sprinklers
Appropriate training and equipment testing
1
25 September 2012
INFORMATIVE
FACILITY/ EVENT
CAUSES /
COMMENTS
POSSIBLE
CONSEQUENCES
QUANTIFIED
(Y/N)
PREVENTION/DETECTION
PROTECTION
Boiler Water Treatment Chemicals

Ammonia leak from
drum valves or
tubing
Ammonia leak or
failure of drum
Document:
Revision:
Revision Date:
Document ID:
LOC. Valve damage Toxic dispersion

caused by drop or
impact damage
during handling
Tubing failure
installed drums
Yes liquid
releases only
Vapour tubing
releases not
included. No
offsite effects
Mechanical integrity :
Drums UN approved drop tests, periodic inspections, test stamp etc
LOC due to
corrosion,
catastrophic failure
due to
manufacturing or
maintenance defect
Yes
Mechanical integrity :
Drums UN approved drop tests, periodic inspections, test stamp etc
Toxic dispersion
Traffic drum area is very infrequent and is controlled by a hot work

clearance
Impact protection from vehicles
1
25 September 2012
INFORMATIVE
TABLE A2.2: ALKATHENE HAZID WORD DIAGRAM
Document:
Revision:
Revision Date:
Document ID:
1
25 September 2012
INFORMATIVE
Rev
Date
Description
Prepared
Checked
Comments
0
1
2
23/11/2004
13/01/2005
18/04/2006
Draft for comment

Issued with Draft Report
Issued with Rev 0 Report
J Polich
J Polich
J Polich
n/a
n/a
P Uhrig (Qenos)
Collated from previous hazard studies
Notes
1
HAZID
No
Unchanged from previous issues
Alkathene battery limit taken as ethylene block valve HV8411

Ethylene header outside EBV considered elsewhere as part of common BIP facilities
Area
Activity / Operation
Material
Hazardous Event
Causes
Consequence
Description
Ethylene supply pipeline Ethylene supply

(3000kPa)
Ethylene
Leak from pipework
Flange, valve or fitting leak Fire / explosion

Impact
Compression and
reaction
Ethylene
Leak from high pressure

pipework
Pressure/temperature
cycling
Ethylene compression
Fire / explosion
Vibration
Impulse line failure
Leaks from flanges, valve
stems, drains
Thermal shock of coolers
when cooling water turned
on
Liquid carryover from low
pressure separators,
causing compressor failure
and leaks
Compression and
reaction
Hot oil system
Reactors
Polymerisation reaction
Prevention
High pressure piping included Gas detectors

Two fires in HP section
in critical piping inspection
- one due to a loose
schedule (6 monthly schedule) CCTV monitoring
flange and leak post
maintenance
Plant visual inspections
- one due to O2 ingress to
HP separator and flange
blew out (instead of burst
disc - burst disc since
relocated to separator)
Ethylene leaks past the

glands
Internal explosion
Vented chamber to atmosphere

Gland leaks collected in gland
leak lines
Ethylene
Ethylene decomposition
reaction in reactor
High pressures used in

process (up to 160MPa)
Explosion
Low operating temperature

reduces the likelihood of
decomposition
Oil
Ethylene
Decomposition reaction
Protection / Mitigation
Battery limit EBV HV8411

(remote actuation)
No
EBVs located on ethylene feed

lines
Yes
Included in Olefines
Small inventory
Blast walls
No
Pressure relief (burst discs )

Compressor trip systems (for
secondary compressors this
includes high temp, motor current, Blast walls
high pressure, rate of temperature
change)
Local event
Yes
Burst discs located on separators

Seal-less pumps
Explosion
N2 blanketing
Explosion
Ethylene stripped from waste

tank by N2 purge bubbling into
bottom of pit
Internal explosion
Stirrer failure or poor
mixing (lumps on stirrer )
leading to catalyst pooling Aerial decomposition
in reactor
Steam from the heating
jacket in the low pressure
hoppers has reached the
reactor, corroding the
stirrer bearings
Overdose of catalyst
Rev
Procedures and automated

sequence controls for
sweetening the system with
ethylene
Catalyst carryover to
separators
Fitting, flange, pump leaks Fire
Explosive atmospheres in
the oil recovery tanks
Explosive atmospheres
Waste Oil Pit
Carried forward Comments

for analysis
(qual or quant) in
QRA?
High level alarms
Leak in compressor
crankcases
Ethylene decomposition
reaction in separator
Loss of containment of heat
transfer oil from the hot oil
system
Ethylene dissolved into oil
from the compressors
Detection
Pipeline located away from

roads, forklift traffic etc
Ethylene
Ethylene
Control Measures / Safeguards

(try to formulate these in terms of barriers)
Procedures for introducing

cooling water
Oxygen contamination or
excess nitrogen
Comments re
Frequency (site
experience - takes into
account control
measures)
2 aerial decompositions Stirrer vibration monitors, motor Gas detectors

have occurred since early current trips
CCTV monitoring
1980s (when quench
system installed)
Plant visual inspections
Controlled failure - at shell to

roof weld
No
Local effects
No
Local effects
1
1
Ethylene supply ESD valves
Yes
Quench system
Reactor burst discs
Blast walls
Automated dosing system
App2 Alkathene HAZID FINAL.xls

HAZID
Print Date: 26/10/2006
HAZID
No
Area
Material
Hazardous Event
Causes
Consequence
Description
Ingress of oxygen, eg via
booster compressor
Ethylene
Gas holder
Ethylene
Leaks from reactors
Explosive atmosphere
forms inside vessel
Ethylene leak to
atmosphere
7
Product
Storage silos
Extrusion / Granulation
Product storage
Ethylene
Catalyst
Catalyst storage and

handling
Catalyst K
Instrument impulse line

failure
Thermal creep
Wave rings (cold gas on
shut down)
Fisher valve catalyst
injection points
Air ingress
Comments re
Frequency (site
account control
measures)

Prevention

for analysis
(qual or quant) in
QRA?
Detection
Gas detectors
Ethylene supply ESD valves
Low suction pressure trip
Fire/ explosion
Regular PVIs (6 monthly)
Yes
Low pressure trip on compressor

s
Low level alarm on gasholder
No
Gas detectors
Yes
Yes
Blast walls
Internal explosion
Flange leaks or fitting leaks Fire/Explosion
Water seal
Purging / sweetening
procedures
Inspection procedures
High ethylene
Failure of purge fans
concentrations in the weigh
bins
Internal explosion
Purge fans
Explosion in gear pumps

Polymer leak
High pressure
High pressure
Internal explosion
Fire
Buildup of ethylene
Failure of purge
High temperature from air
drying, overheats pellets
Internal explosion
fire
High pressure trip

Difficult to ignite
Very slow leak due to high
viscosity
Air purging of silos
High temperature alarm and
trip
Ethylene can leak back

into the hot water system
from catch pots
Internal explosion
No
Use of one-off catalyst
Fire
Yes
High ethylene
concentrations in
pressurised water system
(Unit 4 only)
Reaction of incompatible
chemicals
Spill from bulk catalysts
storage
Self decomposition in bulk

storage
Rev
Tank overfill
Fire
Fitting / flange leak
Evaporation of oil and self
ignition of catalyst
High concentration of
Fire/ explosion
catalyst
Stored diluted in oil
Visual
Fire hoses
No
Local impact
No
Local impact
High level alarm on tanks
Catalyst store burnt down Stored diluted in oil

in 1994
Tanks are cooled
Self contained collection pit to

minimise oil evaporation
No
Tank designed to withstand

decomposition
Yes
Local impact
1
local impact
Fire protection systems

10
Propane storage
Propane
Leak from vessel
(unodourised)
Overfill
Fire / explosion
BLEVE if impingement occurs
Leak from reactor supply

piping
Overpressure
Impact
PVIs occur every 10 Years.

Includes checks on PSVs and
physical function (not flow) of
XSFVs
Gas detectors
Deluge system over tanks
High level alarm and trip
Relief valves
Gas detectors
XSFV at vessel vapour offtake
Yes
Yes
Vapour withdrawal (no

liquid offtake)
No
Small quantities
EBV at propane injection points

upstream of ethylene
compressors
11
Water Treatment
Chemical dosing
Corrosives:
Reaction of incompatible
- Hypo
chemicals
- Sulfuric Acid
Hypo and H2SO4 mix
Toxic gas formation
Separate bunds
Splash guards
App2 Alkathene HAZID FINAL.xls

HAZID
TABLE A2.3: ALKATUFF HAZID WORD DIAGRAM
Document:
Revision:
Revision Date:
Document ID:
1
25 September 2012
INFORMATIVE
Rev
Date
Description
Prepared
Checked
Comments
15/03/2005
Draft for comment
J Polich
n/a
30/05/2006
Final
J Polich
G Peach (Sherpa)
P Grosskopf (Qenos)
Collated from previous hazard studies, operations

experience
Updated to include UNIPOL OSS Major Process Hazard
review
HAZID
No
Area
Material
Hazardous Event
Causes
Consequence
Description
Ethylene supply pipeline

(3000kPa)
Ethylene supply
Ethylene
Leak from pipework
Flange, valve or fitting leak Fire / explosion

Impact
Alkatuff Reactor and

Cycle Gas System
Reaction
Ethylene
Reactor vessel failure or

failure of associated
pipework
Corrosion, weld failure,

fabrication defects
Rapid depressurising of cycle

gas system and the release of
gaseous ethylene resulting in a
flash fire or explosion if the
material is ignited
Comments re Frequency Control Measures / Safeguards

(site experience - takes (try to formulate these in terms of barriers)
into account control
measures)
Prevention
Detection
Pipeline located away from

roads, forklift traffic etc
Carried forward for analysis in

Risk Assessment?
Rev
Qualitative?
Quantitative
Detected by process flow/pressure Manual activation of remote EIV

monitoring and alarm
No
No
Process upset condition detected Auto emergency shutdown and

by diverse protective systems (low venting of the cycle gas to flare
pressure, low cycle gas flow)
system
Isolate feeds (Type 1 & 2 kill)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Very small leak rate
Discharge through elevated

vent
Degasser operates at ambient
temperature, reducing quantity
of flash gas
No
No
Primarily a liquid spill pool fire local impacts
Inspection schedule
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Sudden or catastrophic
Routine inspection and
failure of this vessel is
maintenance
highly improbable since
the vessel is designed
especially for its operating
regime
Fail open of C2 feed valve

cause overpressure
Comments
Refer to cumulative BIP

report
PSVs
Blocked plate dead head

Cycle Gas System
Reaction/ compression Ethylene
Expansion joint (bellows)

rupture [4 off in cycle gas
system]
External factors
Corrosion, weld failure,
fabrication defects, fatigue
failure, misalignment
Rapid release of cycle gas at

high velocities and with air
entrainment following fracture of
the double-ply bellows
Whilst complete guillotine Inspection schedule

fracture of the joint is very
unlikely, fractures of
significant sizes could be
postulated [75 mm and
100 mm equivalent
diameters]
Expansion joints have a double-ply

system with early warning of leaks
provided by interspace high/low
pressure alarms (duplicated
system)
Gas detection
Relatively small but partially

confined clouds are possible
4

Cycle Gas System
Hexene Purification and

Hexene/Hexane Drying
System
Reaction/ compression Ethylene
Hexene supply
Hexene
Cycle gas compressor seal

failure
Sudden failure of the

compressor seal system
due to mechanical attrition

System
Hexene supply
Hexene /
hexane
Compressor seal system has an Gas detectors will alarm at low

elaborate protective system to detection levels
ensure compressor operability
Small ethylene release with low

probability of ignition
Rupture of hexene degasser Catastrophic failure of the Liquid spill
Whilst explosion of
vessel due to: Unidentified
hexene vapour is possible
construction defect
(LEL 1.2%), the small
External impact
quantity of vapour in this
Corrosion
unconfined release
scenario means that the
probability of ignition
followed by explosion is
very low
External fire impingement
Release of cycle gas at

restricted velocities through the
labyrinth seal system
Rupture of hexene/hexane
drier
Loss of potentially 4 tonnes of

liquid hexene
Catastrophic failure of
these vessels is highly
improbable because of
the rigorous design
reviews, testing and
inspection procedures
Loss of potentially 1.4 tonnes of Delayed ignition is unlikely

hexane or hexene from each
to result in a vapour cloud
drier
explosion (due to small
release mass and open
layout in vicinity of the
vessels); a flash fire is
more likely to ensue
Gas detector systems in the

vicinity of the hexene charge
pumps would register early
warning of a major hexene/hexane
release incident.
Manual isolation of faulty seal

mechanisms
0
0
A pool fire is possible but the

drainage system would prevent
envelopment of the vessels
within the flame zone
App2 BIP QRA Alkatuff HAZID.xls

HAZID
HAZID
No
Area
Material
Hazardous Event
Causes
Consequence
Description
Comments re Frequency Control Measures / Safeguards

(site experience - takes (try to formulate these in terms of barriers)
into account control
measures)
Prevention
Detection
Carried forward for analysis in

Risk Assessment?
Comments
Rev
Qualitative?
Quantitative
No
No
OHS issue
Process plant upset condition will Emergency Isolation Valve (EIV) No

be detected by protective systems at the vessel discharge point
Shutdown of the hexene transfer
pumps
No
Small liquid pool fire
No
Small liquid pool fire
Pool fire - similar to

unloading bay spill but
smaller quantity
Collection of hexene/hexane
vapour in the drain system
could lead to a confined space
explosion if ignition sources are
present

System
Maintenance
Hexane
Exposure to n-hexane
Maintenance activities
releasing small pockets of
hydrocarbon liquid
containing n-hexane
Health effects on maintenance

workers from neurotoxic
properties of n-hexane
Selected iso-hexane supplier to Gas detector in area is able to

Use of appropriate personal
avoid this issue (i.e very low
measure 10% LEL which is
protective equipment
conc on n-hexane).
equivalent to STEL levels of nhexane in product so gas detector
is a credible warning of
unacceptable n-hexane
concentrations
Correct procedure to purge
equipment to minimise residual
hexane
Hexene Transfer System Hexene supply

(within Plant)
Hexene
Rupture of pipework leading External factors

from hexene purification
vessel to driers or from
hexene/hexane driers to
reactor
Potential for small scale pool

fire
Defective design material,

weld failure
Hexene Transfer System Hexene supply

(within Plant)
Hexene
Hexene lift pump failure
Sudden mechanical failure Loss of hexene liquid at

involving charge pump
ambient temperature and
seal/shaft
moderate pressure
fire
Pumps fitted with double

mechanical seals
Sudden mechanical failure Loss of hexene liquid at

of casing
ambient temperature and
moderate pressure
fire
Magnetic drive pump

eliminating potential seal and
shaft leakages.
Automatic shutdown of hexene

transfer pump as well as closure
of the EIV at supply vessel
Process plant upset condition will

be detected by reactor protective
system eg low pressure resulting
in shutdown of pump .
Most casing failures will stop the No

pump and as there is negative
hydrostatic head, hexene flow will
cease.
Gas detector located near pump

Manual closure of EIV.
will alarm allowing leak to be
detected and leak source isolated.
10
ICA Transfer System

(within Plant)
ICA supply
iso-hexane
Rupture of pipework
between ICA storage tank
and drier
Defective design material,

weld failure
Loss of liquid ICA (ambient

temperature)
Potential for small scale flash

fire and/or pool fire
Sudden mechanical failure Loss of ICA liquid (as above)
involving ICA charge pump
Inspection QA procedures
External factors
11
Ethylene Purification
ethylene
Exothermic reaction in
ethylene drier molecular
sieve during regeneration
procedure
Backflow of reactive gases Potential for exotherm in

/ inadvertent injection of
molecular sieve resulting under
impurities (eg. water)
certain circumstances in vessel
fracture (from thermal effects).
Pumps are double mechanical

diaphragm with inner
diaphragm failure alarm
Backflow protection to ensure
reactive gases do not flow back
onto the purification beds and
then result in exotherms and
decomps.
Process plant upset condition will

be detected by reactor protective
system eg low pressure resulting
in shutdown of pump .
Flammable gas detectors near
pumps
Flammable gas detectors near
pumps
Automatic EIV closure
Yes
No
Automatic EIV closure
Yes
No
Multi-thermowell temperature
detection causes automatic
activation of emergency
shutdown and depressurises
vessels to flare
No
No
Severe local event - no

offsite effects given large
distance to BIP boundary
Human error in the manual

regeneration technique in
combination with protective
systems failure
App2 BIP QRA Alkatuff HAZID.xls

HAZID
TABLE A2.4: HUNTSMAN HAZID WORD DIAGRAM

Event
Cause/Comments
Possible Consequences
Prevention/Protection
In QRA
ETHYLENE OXIDE PLANT CYCLE GAS SYSTEM

Cycle gas explosion
Passing oxygen valve

causing high oxygen
levels and explosive
mixtures
Impurities in oxygen or
nitrogen supply, e.g.
hydrocarbons
Damage to plant piping

and equipment
Independent oxygen trips in place on cycle gas

composition
Injury to personnel
Emergency depressuring system installed
Toxic gas escape
Critical monitoring of oxygen content in place
Rupture of hot oil system

and subsequent fire, if
ignited
Low cycle gas flow trips
Release of ethylene or
natural gas to atmosphere
- fire, vapour cloud
explosion (VCE) if ignited
EIV (emergency isolation valve) on ethylene feed line

to EO plant plus manual isolations
Yes
Pressurised N2 interlock on OMS
Deposition of catalyst dust

in pipework or vessels
Loss of recycle
compressor drive
Inadequate nitrogen
purging of Oxygen
Metering Station (OMS) at
startup
Analyser failure / isolation
Reverse flow of cycle gas
into oxygen supply line
Ethylene or natural gas
supply line failure
Mechanical impact
Corrosion
Weld defect
Gasket leak
Document:
Revision:
Revision Date:
Document ID:
Yes
Critical piping procedures

Gas detection in reaction area
1
25 September 2012
INFORMATIVE
Event
Cause/Comments
Oxygen supply line fire
Particle impingement
Knock-on effect to
ethylene oxide system
with possibility of
deflagration
Particle filters
Hot oil fire causing

damage to plant
Piping and vessel integrity (on preventative

maintenance program)
Decomposition of ethylene
oxide within vessels and
pipework
Double seals used on pumps with alarm function

should one seal fail
Adiabatic heat of
compression
Impurities, e.g.
hydrocarbons
In QRA
No
Piping < 100 mm DN (reduced risk on oxygen

enhanced combustion)
Oxygen purity specification
Gasket leak
Hot oil fire
Cycle gas explosion

Reactor failure
Leaks from piping or
pumps due to:
Seal leaks
Inventory can be dumped in a sealed storage tank
Casing failure
Area bunded with drainage to a remote pit
Shaft failure
A foam spray system is installed in the area and

around the dump pit
Mechanical impact
Yes
Corrosion
Gasket failure
Document:
Revision:
Revision Date:
Document ID:
1
25 September 2012
INFORMATIVE
Event
Cause/Comments
In QRA
ETHYLENE OXIDE PLANT EO PURIFICATION SECTION (PURIFICATION AND REFINING COLUMNS SYSTEMS & CO2 STRIPPER)
Ethylene oxide
deflagration within vessel
or pipework
Overheating pumps due

to:
Damage to plant piping

and equipment
Dry run conditions
Injury to personnel
Dead-head conditions
Toxic gas escape
Bearing failure
Rupture of hot oil system

and subsequent fire, if
ignited
Impeller off-balance
Fire in insulation due to
ethylene oxide leak and
ignition (reacts with water)
Polymerisation or
isomerisation reaction
catalysed by:
Use of reliable bearings and controlled maintenance

procedures. Temperature probes on pump casings
Yes
Flanges not insulated and water deluge system

installed.
Non-alkaline and unreactive insulation material used
(Foam Glass closed cell insulation)
Routine pipe and vessel inspections
Use of controlled maintenance procedures
Rust
Organic peroxides
Chemical cleaning agents
Oxygen
Nitrates
Alkalis / acids
Salts
Water
Low levels in columns (too

Document:
Revision:
Revision Date:
Document ID:
1
25 September 2012
INFORMATIVE
Event
Cause/Comments
much heat from reboilers)
In QRA
Low level alarms

Use of low pressure steam in reboilers (i.e. restricts
maximum temperatures attainable)
Particles causing sparks in

ethylene oxide and
oxygen mixtures
Cleanliness during maintenance
External fire
Gas detectors
Deluge systems
Ethylene oxide leak/fire
Gasket failure
Mechanical impact
causing hole in pipework
or vessel
Vapour cloud explosion
Ethylene oxide
decomposition within
pipework and/or vessels
Minimised number of flanges

Use of gas detectors
Double mechanical seals used
Corrosion
Ignition due to static, hot

pipework etc
Pump seal leak
Toxic gas escape
Cooling water failure

causing relief valves to lift
Injury to personnel
Vessel failure
Major plant damage and

serious injury to personnel
Routine vessel and critical piping inspections
Release of ethylene oxide

to atmosphere - fire,
UVCE if ignited
EIV (emergency isolation valve) on line to EO storage
Nozzle failure
Yes
Critical piping identified according to model procedure

Hazardous area classifications defined
Fire if ignited
Yes
Pipe failure
Ethylene oxide storage
line failure
Mechanical impact
Corrosion
Weld defect
Yes

Fire water systems
Gasket leak
Document:
Revision:
Revision Date:
Document ID:
1
25 September 2012
INFORMATIVE
Event
Cause/Comments
In QRA
ETHYLENE OXIDE STORAGE

Ethylene oxide tank or
bund fire
Gasket failure

pipework etc
Ethylene oxide lines insulated (tank area only)
Corrosion
Ethylene oxide
pipework and/or vessels
Pump leak
Toxic gas escape
Tank overflow
Injury to personnel
Mechanical impact
or tank
Damage to tanks and

surrounding equipment
Tank BLEVE
Document:
Revision:
Revision Date:
Document ID:
Yes
Magnetic drive pumps installed

Critical duty piping identified according to model
procedures
Water deluge system installed
Nitrogen padding and refrigeration system
EIV's installed in piping
1
25 September 2012
INFORMATIVE
Event
Cause/Comments
Ethylene oxide
tanks or pipework
Impurities due to:

NIS tight shut-off trip valves tested individually on a

regular basis. These trip valves are activated by a
number of independent signals
Backflow from
glycols/ethers or
condensate plants
Rust etc (as above)
Offsite effects, e.g. broken

windows could result
Toxic gas release
In QRA
Yes
Tank contents, emergency dumping system installed

Break tanks installed
Stainless steel piping
Increased refrigeration capacity
Low flow trips installed

Temperature probes on shrouds
Overheating due to pump
problem, e.g.
Liquid full sensors

Power monitor
Deadhead conditions
Some DCS interlocks (NIS Plants)
Dry run conditions
Bearing monitor
Bearing failure
Impeller off balance
Fire in insulation due to

ethylene oxide leak and
ignition (reacts with water)
Vapour cloud explosion
Vessel failure
Nozzle failure
Pipe failure
Foam Glass closed cell insulation

Routine vessel and critical piping inspections
Yes
Offsite effects, e.g. broken

windows could result
Toxic gas release
TANKER LOADING
Document:
Revision:
Revision Date:
Document ID:
1
25 September 2012
INFORMATIVE
Event
Cause/Comments
Hose failure or tanker

overfill
Tanker driveaway

- fire, VCE if ignited
Loading controlled by ethylene oxide technician
Mechanical impact
Excessive wear
Failure of protection
systems
Possible road tanker

BLEVE or EO
decomposition within the
road tanker
In QRA
Yes
Precautions include grades in loading bay (i.e. wheel

chocks unnecessary)
Gas detectors
Appropriate EIV's, spring loaded, quick shut manual
valves, excess flow valves and NRV's on liquid and
vapour return lines
Fire safety systems, e.g. deluge system
Spillage catchment - bunded area
Hose register for EO hoses
GLYCOL AND GLYCOL ETHERS PLANTS

Glycol-ethers alcohol
reaction system rupture
Operating conditions are

high pressure and
temperature
Release of ethylene oxide,

alcohol - fire, explosion if
ignited
Multiple reactor trips, EIV's, flammable gas detectors

installed
Pump or gasket leak
Damage to plant and

injury to personnel
High pressure fire water monitors
Equipment failure due to:

Corrosion
Fatigue
Yes
Critical duty pipeline inspection
Deluge system
Damage to EO Control
Room
Mechanical damage
Over pressurisation (e.g.
reaction with impurities)
External or lagging fires
Document:
Revision:
Revision Date:
Document ID:
1
25 September 2012
INFORMATIVE
Event
Cause/Comments
Loss of containment in
alcohol column
Over pressurisation
Release of alcohol and

ethers to atmosphere
small fire or explosion if
ignited (size limited by
inventory)
High pressure steam trip
Contamination of break
tank with possible
deflagration
Multiple independent trips
Fire, if ignited (size limited

by inventory)
Routine maintenance
Damage to plant and

injury to personnel
Piping preventative maintenance programs
Backflow from reactors
Damage to plant
Multiple independent trips, EIVs in place
Gasket failure
Injury to personnel
Critical duty piping inspected
Mechanical impact
causing hole
Release of toxic gas
Fire water systems

to atmosphere fire,
UVCE if ignited
EIV (emergency isolation valve) on line to Glycols
Furnace explosions
Isolation valves on the natural gas feed line
Loss of column control

Equipment failure
Severe gasket or pump
seal leak
Backflow of ethylene
oxide from glycols or
glycol-ethers
High reactor pressure and

Instrument / control
system malfunction and
In QRA
No
Column operates at relatively low pressure and

inventory
Yes
Break tank helps prevent contamination of bulk storage

tanks
NRV failure
Hot oil piping / reboiler
loss of containment
Equipment failure due to:

Mechanical impact
Corrosion
Gasket failure
Ethylene oxide break

tank fire/explosion/EO
decomposition
No
Fire protection systems
Yes
Corrosion
Tank overflow
Ethylene oxide to Glycols
line failure
Mechanical impact
Corrosion
Weld defect
Yes

Fire water systems
Gasket leak
Explosion in the Glycol
Document:
Revision:
Revision Date:
Document ID:
Ignition of a flammable
No
1
25 September 2012
INFORMATIVE
Event
Cause/Comments
Ethers furnace
mixture within the furnace
typically are only local

impact events
Set startup procedure for lighting the furnace
Burner management
system failure
In QRA
Inspections on the oil tubes
Tube rupture
TANK FARM
Tank or bund fire,
explosion
Static electricity
Tank failure
Relief valve failure
Knock-on effect to other

tanks
Corrosion (particularly at
tank base)
Vapour emissions
Tanks fitted with vent/vac breakers and overpressure

swing lids
Tank integrity monitoring
High level alarms installed
Pump leakage
Tanks bunded
Pipeline or tank failure
Fire protection systems including reticulated foam and

fixed cooling water systems
Tank overfilled
Yes
Drain valve left open

Unreacted ethylene oxide
in products
N2 padding system failure
Document:
Revision:
Revision Date:
Document ID:
1
25 September 2012
INFORMATIVE
Event
Cause/Comments
In QRA
NIS PLANTS
Ethylene or propylene
oxide break tanks
fire/explosion/EO
decomposition
Backflow from reactors
Damage to plant
Multiple independent trips, EIV's in place
Gasket failure
Injury to personnel
Critical duty piping inspected
Mechanical impact
causing hole
Release of toxic gas
Magnetic drive pumps installed
Yes
Water deluge systems
Corrosion
Tank overflow
Pump failure
Reactor ruptures
External fire
Runaway reaction due to
excessive ethylene oxide
Unreacted ethylene oxide
present at end of batch
Impurities, e.g. air through
open vent line, catalysing
unagitated batch
Bursting discs ruptured

initially then vessel if
pressure relief not fast
enough
Damage to plant, e.g.
missiles, blast wave etc
Fire deluge systems
Yes
Relief valves / bursting discs

Critical control system checking of raw material feeds
Product testing
Injury to personnel
Loss of cooling water /

pump
Oxygen not removed prior
to ethoxylation (flammable
atmosphere present)
Excessive EO added to
vessel with subsequent
decomposition
Document:
Revision:
Revision Date:
Document ID:
1
25 September 2012
INFORMATIVE
Event
Cause/Comments
Reactor or piping leak

leading to a fire
Gasket failure

pipework etc
Double mechanical seals used
Mechanical impact
or vessel
Corrosion (underground /
under lagging)
Toxic gas escape
Piping and vessel preventative maintenance

procedures
Injury to personnel
Fire if ignited
Flammable materials are present for approximately

40% of the time
Release of raw materials unlikely to ignite (largely

combustibles or handled
in small quantities)
Factory procedures
In QRA
Yes
Pump seal leak

Reactor loop bellows
failure
Raw materials loss of
containment
Raw materials include:

Acids, e.g. phosphoric,
acetic
Ammonia
Hydroxides, e.g.
potassium, sodium
No
Operator training
Toxic vapours
Loss of containment due

to, e.g.:
Vessel failure
Gasket leak
Pipe failure
Pump problem
Overfill
Document:
Revision:
Revision Date:
Document ID:
1
25 September 2012
INFORMATIVE
Event
Cause/Comments
In QRA
PROPYLENE OXIDE STORAGE

Propylene oxide tank or
bund fire
Gasket failure
Mechanical impact
or tank
Corrosion

pipework etc
Toxic gas escape
Propylene oxide flows by pressure differential (no

pump used)
Injury to personnel
Tank BLEVE
Yes
Pump leak
Critical duty piping identified according to model

procedures
Tank overflow
Water deluge system installed

Nitrogen padding system
EIV's installed in piping
High level trip of storage tank MHF upgrade
Fire at the propylene

oxide road tanker
unloading bay
Tanker driveaway
Hose / coupling failure
Release of propylene
oxide - fire if ignited
Unloading controlled supervised by driver
Possible road tanker

BLEVE
Gas detectors
Yes
Precautions include grades in loading
Appropriate EIV's, spring loaded, quick shut manual

valves, excess flow valves and NRV's on liquid and
vapour return
Fire safety systems, e.g. deluge system
Storage tank bunded
Hose register for PO hoses
Document:
Revision:
Revision Date:
Document ID:
1
25 September 2012
INFORMATIVE
TABLE A2.5: CHLORALKALI HAZID WORD DIAGRAM
Document:
Revision:
Revision Date:
Document ID:
1
25 September 2012
INFORMATIVE
BIP QRA 2006
Rev
Date
Description
Prepared
Checked
Comments
0
1
28/02/2005
9/05/2006
J Polich
J Polich
n/a
n/a
Collated from FHA, operations experience
21/08/2012
Draft for comment

Minor Updates to match
MHF HAZID
Minor Updatesas per CA
comments
J Polich
n/a
Crosschecked with MHF HAZID work as included in HS

database (Scenarios all PHS2 Rev A as at 9/5/05).
Notes
1
In the new CAP plant, very few events have occurred so there is minimal comment regarding frequency
HAZID
No
Area
Material
Hazardous Event
Causes
Consequence
Prevention
Brine at high pH. Acidic (i.e.. Online analysers and alarm.

low pH) conditions required for
Cl2 release
Brine at high pH. Acidic
Level detection of tanks
conditions required for Cl2
release
Overfill protection of tanks.
CAP
Brine treatment and brine

circuit
Chlorine
Release of chlorine
Failure of the
dechlorination system
Evolution of chlorine from the

spent brine
CAP
Brine treatment and brine

circuit
Chlorine
Large spill of spent brine

onto the ground.
Overfilling of tanks.
Evolution of chlorine vapours

from spent brine.
Operator error (e.g. failure

to close valve, or
erroneous opening of
valves, maintenance
activities etc ).
Failure or rupture of piping.
CAP
Cells - electrolysis /
catholyte system
Chlorine
Failure of piping or
associated equipment
Impact or other
mechanical damage.
Chlorine leak
Valve left open.
CAP
catholyte system
catholyte system
Chlorine
Hydrogen
Pressure seal relieves
High pressure blows the

seal.
Very low rate of chlorine
formation (<0.01kg/s)
No
Localised effect
Escape respirators for plant

personnel & visitors
Yes
Very large spill included

in QRA consequence
calcs
Cl2 detectors in the cell area.
Shut down and chlorine air

purge of piping to the ECS .
Yes
Large leaks included in

QRA with generic failure
frequency. Small leaks
assumed to suck air in.
Operating procedures ensure

level maintained in the seal.
High pressure trips cell power

supply
Double redundancy pressure trip
is first line of defence
The pressure seal is relieved to

the ECS which is sized for 10
minutes absorption of the full
production.
Yes
Included as a demand
on ECS
Membrane configured to
minimise pressure fluctuation
and exposure to gas phase,
therefore maximising
membrane life.
Continuous monitoring of
differential pressure across the
membranes, and the
concentration of hydrogen in
chlorine.
Plant trips (stopping H2

production) on cell membrane
differential pressure upset, high
H2 pressure, low brine flow or
low caustic flow.
Yes
Yes
System operates under slight

vacuum (up to -10 kPag), i.e.
air will leak in for small leaks
Minimum of 2 valves between

Cl2 and atmosphere. NRV
designed to let air into system
rather than chlorine out
Cl2 ex seal to the ECS (i.e.. no
loss of containment unless
scrubber fails).
Operational error during

maintenance of the seal.
Process explosion involving High pressure in cells
Hydrogen breaks through
hydrogen
causes membrane failure. membrane
Maintenance issue (wear

and tear) of membrane.
Rev
suitable materials of
construction
Periodic Non Destructive
Testing (NDT).
Wrong gasket material or

faulty flanges.
CAP
Detection

for analysis
(qual or quant)
in QRA?
Regular maintenance and

periodic inspection of pipelines,
instruments and tanks.
Corrosion, wear and tear.

Description
1
Comments re
Frequency (site
account control
measures) see Note 1
Hydrogen/chlorine explosion in
cells, electrolyser or in
downstream equipment
Explosion causes equipment
damage, subsequent H2 leak
and fire
Maintenance of membranes.
Electrolysers trip on high voltage

(stopping H2 production).
Loss of brine or caustic

flow with power still on
causes membrane to fail.
6
CAP
catholyte system
Hydrogen
Hydrogen leak
Leak from pipework,

flange, e.g due to
corrosion, mechanical
impact
Local torch fire, radiation

impact on adjacent equipment /
plant.
Continuously welded pipeline

to limit potential leak sites,
minimum number of flanges
around equipment items.
Low pressure trips of H2 supply

system, initiated both upstream
and downstream of hydrogen
compressor discharge pressure
control valve
Located in open-sided structure

or in open, providing good
natural ventilation and reducing
likelihood of explosion.
App4 BIP QRA ChlorAlkali HAZID Rev 2

HAZID
Print date: 31/08/2012
Page 1 of 6
BIP QRA 2006
HAZID
No
Area
Material
Hazardous Event
Causes
Consequence
Comments re
Frequency (site
account control

Description
Prevention
Build up of hydrogen, delayed

ignition and explosion.
Low hydrogen pressure in plant

(approx 2 kPag in cells and
50kPag downstream of
compressor) minimises leak
rate, likelihood of ignition and
subsequent fire damage
Detection

for analysis
(qual or quant)
in QRA?
Rev
Appropriate electrical
hazardous area classification
and equipment provided
suitable for area classification.
CAP
catholyte system
CAP
Chlorine cooling, drying and Chlorine

compression
CAP
Chlorine

compression
Chlorine Dioxide
decomposition / explosion
during chlorate destruction
Procedure not followed
Failure of piping or
associated equipment
Corrosion (eg dryer failure) Chlorine leak

, wear and tear.

Testing (NDT).
Wrong gasket material or

faulty flanges.
Valve left open.
Suitable materials of
construction
Main plant trip trips the

compressor but fails to trip
the rectifier
Impact or other
mechanical damage.
Fault in electrical circuit,
interference.
Gaseous chlorine release
Chlorine production maintained

at full rate without the
compressor evacuating the
chlorine from the piping. High
pressure in header and relief
of pressure seal
Procedures
Cl2 ex seal to the ECS

i.e.. no loss of
containment unless
scrubber fails and
operator fails to trip
power.
Periodic testing of plant trips.
No
Small , turbulent release

- no offsite effects.
Cl2 detectors in the cell area.

Yes
Included at generic pipe

/ equipment leak
frequencies
Chlorine alarms to control room.
Emergency scrubber (ECS)

designed to absorb at least 10
minutes of full production
chlorine stream.
Yes
Included as a demand
on ECS
No release - plant
shutdown only.
Same type of scenario

as HAZID 2
Manual shut down of plant.
10
CAP

compression
Failure of chlorine
compression.
Power failure causes

failure of the compressor.
Chlorine gas not compressed.
Preventative maintenance
Any compressor trip causes

power supply to rectifiers to trip
Failure of compressor
coolant
11
CAP

compression
Large spill of chlorinated

H2SO4 (from drying) onto
the ground.
Overfilling of tanks.
Operator error (e.g. failure

to close valve, or
erroneous opening of
valves).
Failure or rupture of piping.
Evolution of chlorine vapours

from chlorinated H2SO4
Overfill protection of tanks.
Level detection of tanks
Plant depressurises to ECS i.e.. No

the chlorine contained in process
equipment can safely be
evacuated through the system to
the scrubber. Scrubber sized for
10 min full production rate.
Automatic shut-down of plant in
case of power failure.
Power to safety critical
equipment supplied from the
emergency diesel generator.
Escape respirators for plant
personnel & visitors
Yes
Regular maintenance and

periodic inspection of pipelines,
instruments and tanks.

HAZID
Page 2 of 6
BIP QRA 2006
HAZID
No
12
Area
CAP
Material

compression
Hazardous Event
Process fire (i.e not

hydrogen related)
Causes
Dry chlorine reaches

titanium cooler
Consequence
Comments re
Frequency (site
account control

Description
Prevention
Chlorine / titanium fire in cooler

- chlorine release via failed
equipment
Titanium used in wet chlorine

area of plant only (directly ex
cells). Water spray into candle
filter to ensure dry chlorine
does not reverse flow.
Chlorine / iron fire if

Metal fire in chlorine
temperature above 150oC, compressor - chlorine release
equipment damage
via failed equipment
Water cooling of chlorine gas

in compressor system.
Detection

for analysis
(qual or quant)
in QRA?
Rev
No
Local event only
Yes
ECS failure probability

estimated via fault tree
Yes
ECS failure probability

estimated via fault tree
No
Small quantities , local

effect only.
Release frequency
estimated by Fault Tree
Monitoring of chlorine exit gas

temperature of sealing liquid.
Alarm and trips on high
temperature.
Centrifugal liquid ring

compressor. Unlikely to cause
significant temperature rise in
process fluid
13
CAP
Emergency Caustic
Scrubber (ECS)
Chlorine
Loss of ECS suction

through CAP
Failure to open/close the

correct valves (e.g. after
shut down)
Loss of power
Chlorine release in event of

simultaneous plant upset
see FAULT TREE
Blocked absorption tower

due to salting out (due to
high caustic strength)
14
CAP
Emergency Caustic
Scrubber (ECS)
Chlorine
Failure of the caustic soda

absorption circulation in
ECS.
Pump failure.
Hypo Plant
Hypo destruction
Hypo
Reaction between
hydrochloric acid (or other
acids, e.g. sulphuric acid)
and sodium hypochlorite.
Hypo Plant
Hypo production
Chlorine
Back-up diesel generator for all

critical equipment in case of
power failure.
Caustic concentration to ECS

dump tank limited to 18% to
avoid scrubber salting up.
Nitrogen ejector provides some

suction - no power supply
required
Alarm on failure of the circulation Chlorine detector in ECS stack
flow.
Power failure.
Critical equipment, such as the

standby pump, will start up
automatically if the duty pump
fails
Pumps designed to ride
through voltage dip
Pumps on diesel generator

emergency power back-up
Loss of caustic soda

supply.
Caustic supplied from bulk

caustic storage large
inventory
Emergency caustic dump tank

contains some backup caustic
supply.
Mixture in drains.
ORP measurement used to

ensure caustic strength is in
correct range
Formation of chlorine - toxic
release.
Contact in process piping.
16
Position detection (DCS) on

valves.
Critical equipment, such as the Chlorine detector in ECS stack

standby fan will start up
automatically if the duty-fan
fails.
Chlorine release in event of

simultaneous plant upset.
Wrong strength caustic.
15
Procedures
Hypo caustic strength

Pump failure.
circulation or suction failure
Fan failure
Drain design prevented

any mixing of acids (HCl,
H2SO4) and Hypo.
Strict procedures for

activities such as hypo
destruction
Chlorine passes through make

tower into back tower, Cl2
breakthrough if backing tower
fails
Critical equipment, such as the Low flow alarm on circulation flow Backup tower exists at the Hypo Yes
standby fan will start up
Caustic concentration controlled, plant
automatically if the duty-fan
deviations detected as per ECS
fails.
Wrong strength caustic

causes plugging of make
towers

HAZID
Page 3 of 6
BIP QRA 2006
HAZID
No
17
Area
Hypo Plant
Hypo production
Material
Chlorine
Hazardous Event
Failure of feed chlorine

piping
Causes
Consequence
Comments re
Frequency (site
account control


for analysis
(qual or quant)
in QRA?
Rev
Description
Prevention
Detection
Chlorine release.

Testing (NDT).
Cl2 detectors in hypo

Yes

/ equipment leak
frequencies

Yes

/ equipment leak
frequencies
Goes through Hypo backing

tower
No
Cl2 detectors

Yes
Unlikely - same sort of

scenario as hypo make
tower failure but less
likely. No frequency
defined and not
explicitly included in
QRA.
/ equipment leak
frequencies
Limit switches on valves (DCS

controlled)
Automatic nitrogen purge on

startup and shutdown.
Yes
Release frequency
Wrong gasket material, or

faulty flanges.
Valve left open.
construction
Impact or other
mechanical damage.
18
19
Ferric Plant
Ferric Plant
Chlorine feed
Reaction
Chlorine
Chlorine

piping
Chlorine unreacted and

breaks through stack
Chlorine release.

Testing (NDT).

faulty flanges.
construction
Valve left open.

Impact or other
mechanical damage.
Ineffective absorption in
make towers
Cl2 detectors
Chlorine breakthrough, release

to atmosphere
Loss of suction in backing

towers
20
21
HCl Plant
HCl Plant
Chlorine feed
HCl synthesis
Chlorine
Chlorine

piping
Chlorine release.

Testing (NDT).

faulty flanges.
Valve left open.
construction
Bellows failure
Bellows use minimised - only at

burner to cater for temperature
differential
Impact or other
mechanical damage.
Release of toxic gases from Cl2 or H2 feed valve stuck Chlorine release from top of
the stack of the HCl plant. open or opens prematurely stack.
during start up.
FAULT TREE
Trips on flame failure,

instrument air failure, chlorine
low pressure, hydrogen low
pressure, flame failure.
Cl2 or H2 feed valve fails

to close during shut down.
Chlorine detector in the vent

stack from the scrubber.
Ratio control failure.
Monitoring of synthesis unit

bursting disc with trip on failure
detection
N2 ingress to H2 feed Cl2 not within H2 / Cl2

flammability range

HAZID
Page 4 of 6
BIP QRA 2006
HAZID
No
Area
Material
Hazardous Event
Causes
Consequence
Comments re
Frequency (site
account control
Description
22
HCl Plant
HCl synthesis
Hydrogen Chloride
Release of toxic gases the

stack of the HCl plant.
Failure of absorption water HCl release from top of stack.

or major, prolonged failure
of cooling water.
23
HCl Plant
HCl synthesis
Chlorine
Explosion in burner unit
Attempt to ignite with

flammable atmosphere in
unit.
Flame failure and no or
inadequate nitrogen
purging.
Leak of hydrogen gas from
supply line
Hydrogen
24
HCl Plant
Hydrogen compression and Hydrogen

supply
Hydrogen fire

Prevention
FAULT TREE

for analysis
(qual or quant)
in QRA?
Detection
Low absorption water flow trip

HCl detector in stack
Burner shutdown
Yes
Release frequency
Localised effect
Automatic isolation valves

No
(number and location) to stem
hydrogen flow and extinguish fire
by stopping fuel supply
Localised effect
small hydrogen inventory and

leak areas minimised as far as
possible.
No
Localised effect
provision of nitrogen to snuff

flame
No
Localised effect
Confined explosion in burner

chamber. Internal damage to
synthesis unit.
Burn back into hydrogen or
chlorine supply lines.
Automatic nitrogen purging

after shutdown and prior to
start-up.
Automatic shutdown of plant
after flame failure.
Flame detection to warn of flame Burst disc may rupture with

No
failure.
small release of HCl or chlorine.
Local torch type fire with

radiation impact on adjacent
equipment / plant.
Low hydrogen pressure in plant

(approx 2 kPag in cells and
50kPag downstream of
compressor) minimises leak
rate, likelihood of ignition and
subsequent fire damage
Low pressure trips of H2 supply

system, initiated both upstream
and downstream of hydrogen
compressor discharge pressure
control valve
Compressor failure
Rev
Flame arresters in hydrogen and

chlorine supply lines.
Low pressure trip of supply to

burner local to burner
25
26
27
HCl Plant
HCl Plant
HCl Plant
Hydrogen compression and Hydrogen

supply
HCl synthesis
Hydrochloric acid bulk

storage and handling
Hydrogen
Hydrochloric acid
Explosion in hydrogen
compression area
Hydrogen fire at vent
Leak of hydrogen along

cable ducting.
Explosion in switch gear
Leak of hydrogen into

compressor crank case.
Ignition of plant vent stack
by lightning or static
Explosion in crank case,

equipment damage
Local torch type fire with
radiation impact on adjacent
equipment / plant.
Overfill of HCl stock tank or Overfill protection fails.

major spill of HCl into bund
due to failure of tank.
Aqueous hydrochloric acid spill

into bund. Release of toxic HCl
fumes.
Appropriate seal at end of

cable ducting.
Lightning protection for stack

and piping electrical continuity,
burn through tubing and alarm.
Maintenance of equipment and

instruments
Mechanical failure of tank.
28
29
30
HCl Plant
Chlorine
drum and
cylinder
storage
Chlorine
drum and
cylinder
storage
Hydrochloric acid bulk

Storage and handling
Storage and handling
Hydrochloric acid
Chlorine
Chlorine
Spill during HCl tanker

loading
Impact
Failure of loading arm at
tanker loading bay or
overfill of tanker.
Manual intervention for HCl spill - Yes

foam available to apply to spill
surface to minimise evaporation.
Loading arm rather than hoses

used
Bunded area
Procedures for moving drums. Cl2 detectors. (Attended

operation in any case)
Emergency procedures / capping Yes

equipment to disperse vapours
escaping from damaged drum.
Failure of the equipment

(lifting beam/crane) used
to move containers.
Drums handled using load

rated, recommended lifting
equipment.
Personnel with detailed

knowledge and understanding of
how to handle a chlorine
emergency
Operator error.
Drums designed to withstand

dropping from height.
Mechanical impact
Catastrophic failure
Bunded area
Maintenance of equipment and

instruments
Tanker overfill protection

fails.
Dropping of drum / cylinder Wrong method used to
during handling
move containers.
Leak from static drum /

cylinder
Stack exit at least 20m from

other equipment items.
Manual intervention for HCl spill - Yes
foam available to apply to spill
surface to minimise evaporation.
Aqueous hydrochloric acid spill

into bunded unloading bay.
Release of toxic HCl fumes.
Damage to drum (eg,

catastrophic rupture, leak from
valve or plug) with subsequent
release of chlorine to
atmosphere.
Release of chlorine to
atmosphere.
Valves on drums capped.

Drums stored away from road Cl2 detectors
way i.e not exposed to impact.
Drums designed and

maintained to relevant codes
and standards.
Emergency procedures / capping Yes

equipment to disperse vapours
escaping from damaged drum
Release frequency
Frequency estimated
from ICI drum failure
data
Frequency estimated
from ICI drum failure
data

emergency
Corrosion

HAZID
Page 5 of 6
BIP QRA 2006
HAZID
No
Area
Material
Hazardous Event
Causes
Consequence
Comments re
Frequency (site
account control
Description
31
Chlorine
drum and
cylinder
storage
Sampling from drums
32
Chlorine
drum and
cylinder
storage
Sampling from drums
33
Bulk tanker
Static tanker
parking area
Chlorine
Release from sampling

apparatus
Technician error
Release of << 1 kg Cl2.
Overpressure of
apparatus, eg blockage in
tubing

Prevention
Activity has been carried Procedures
out over many years.
(while drum filling was
done at Botany)
Release has occurred
once (March 2005)
Other
Storages
Bulk Hypo storage
Attended operation
Personal chlorine monitor
Attended by technician.
No
Standby man
SCBA
Isolation / recapping of sampling
apparatus
Very small bore tubing (1/8")
connected to drum
SCBA
No
Isolation at drum valve and
sample apparatus valve by
technician wearing PPE.
Emergency procedures to
disperse chlorine if isolation
cannot be achieved.
This activity will be

discontinued at Botany
and transferred to
Laverton.
This activity will be

discontinued at Botany
and transferred to
Laverton by late 2005.
A sampling release
frequency has therefore
not been included in the
QRA.

Yes
emergency
Frequency estimated
from HSE UK Transport
study data
Bund
No
Frequency: unlikely with

high level interlock
proposed for upgraded
storages.
No
Very unlikely that any

significant reaction
would occur given
bunding and drainage
system design
Hypo spill - OHS issue
only
Release from drum while

withdrawing sample
Technician error
Release of liquid chlorine from Release from drum side

drum valve
has never occurred.
Procedures
Attended operation (technician

and standby man)
Personal chlorine monitor
Atmospheric fixed chlorine
detectors
Chlorine
Leak from parked tanker
Valve leak
Release of chlorine to
atmosphere
Tankers designed and

maintained to relevant codes
and standards
Cl2 detectors
Plant log each shift to check

tanker
Mechanical impact
34
Sodium
Hypochlorite
Leak from storage
Overfill
Rev
Detection
Chlorine
Flange leak

for analysis
(qual or quant)
in QRA?
Spill of hypo, localised fumes
Possible
Catastrophic failure of tank Large spill of hypo, fumes

(construction defect,
impact etc)
Very unlikely
35
Other
Storages
Bulk Hypo storage
Sodium
Hypochlorite
Mixing of leaks with acidic

medium in drains, chlorine
formation
Leak in hypo system, drain Chlorine evolution from drain

system is acidic
Very unlikely
36
Other
Storages
Hypo tanker loading
Sodium
Hypochlorite
Leak during unloading
Driveaway
Hose failure
Spill of hypo, localised fumes
Unlikely
37
Other
Storages
Hypo tanker loading
Sodium
Hypochlorite
Mixing of hypo with

incompatible material in
road tanker, chlorine
formation
Residual chemicals in
tanker (i.e wrong /
undedicated tanker used)
Tanker parked in wrong
loading bay
Evolution of Cl2.
38
Other
Storages
Other Storages - Bulk

Ferric Chloride
Ferric chloride
Leak from storage
Overfill
Spill of ferric localised fumes

(acidic)
Catastrophic failure of tank Large spill of ferric, acidic

(construction defect,
fumes
impact etc)
Tanker parked in dedicated

area away from road, impact by
vehicles etc
Fill enable and pumps
High and high high level alarms
interlocked with high level.
in tanks
Appropriate materials of
construction
Located to minimise likelihood
of impact
Maintenance and inspection
Drain systems designed so
there are no interconnections
between acid and hypo
sources.
Bund high level alarms
Maintenance of equipment
(hoses)
Driver training and loading
procedures
Very unlikely that a large Dedicated loading bays for acid
quantity of acid and hypo and hypo in separate locations.
would mix without a stop Dedicated tankers including
being activated . More
contractual cleaning
likely that a small residual requirements.
reacts, however Cl2
Tankers generally empty
quantity is limited by
before refilling.
residual amount.
Permissives (control room)
before loading can occur
Loading bay sump high level

alarm
Bund
No
CCTV monitoring of loading bay

Driver attendance
E stop (locally and in control

room)
No
Given the controls in

place, a large release
with the potential to
have offsite effects is
considered very
unlikely.
Possible
Fill enable and pumps

interlocked with high level.
High and high high level alarms

in tanks
Bund
No
Corrosive chemical limited onsite effect area
Very unlikely
Appropriate materials of
construction
Located to minimise likelihood
of impact
Maintenance and inspection

HAZID
Page 6 of 6
TABLE A2.6: SITE UTILITIES HAZID WORD DIAGRAM
Document:
Revision:
Revision Date:
Document ID:
1
25 September 2012
INFORMATIVE
BIP QRA 2005
Rev
Date
Description
Prepared
Checked
Comments
1/02/2006
Draft for comment
J Polich
n/a
Initial issue
HAZID
No
Area
Material
Hazardous Event
Causes
Site Utilities NG supply line and

metering station
natural gas
Natural gas leak from

supply piping
Site Utilities Boiler house
natural gas
Consequence
Comments re
Frequency (site
account control
measures)
Description
Prevention
Detection
Flange leak
Valve leak
Corrosion
Impact from heavy vehicle
running off road (2nd St)
into pipebridge
Leak from fuel gas supply, Flange leak
build up of flammable gas Valve leak
within building.
Corrosion
Jet fire if ignited.

Outside piping in uncongested
locations, (i.e accumulation
and explosion extremely
unlikely).
Small leaks possible some issues with

corrosion of elbows on
pilot gas line
Large leaks unlikely
Few flanges - piping is mostly Low pressure alarm

welded
Piping inspected every 3 years
as part of statutory boiler
inspections.
Confined explosion
Damage to equipment,
operator injury / fatality
Unlikely
natural gas
Leak from fuel gas supply

piping and immediate
ignition
Flange leak
Valve leak
Corrosion
Torch / jet fire
Small leaks possible

Large leaks unlikely
coal
Coal dust explosion
Accumulation /
disturbance of dust on
surfaces
Unlikely
operator injury / fatality. Initial
explosion may disturb any dust
on surfaces, leading to
secondary explosions.
Few flanges - piping is mostly

welded
inspections.
Few flanges - piping is mostly
welded
inspections.
Daily housekeeping inspection Hazardous area classification
Washdowns of coal hoppers
Site Utilities Boilers 1 and 2 coal

fired
coal
Fire/ explosion in coal fired Incorrect ignition

boilers
procedure (e.g. wrong
order, wrong accelerant)
Unlikely .
Highly flammable
accelerants banned on
BIP) post explosion in
2005)
Site Utilities
natural gas
Internal explosion in no 3
boiler
Flame-out
Accumulation of
flammable atmosphere
and restart
Site Utilities Coal handling
coal
Coal dust explosion in

conveyors
Site Utilities Coal storage
coal
Fire in stockpile
Accumulation /
disturbance of dust on
surfaces
Hot spot
Site Utilities
10
Site Utilities Flammable liquids

11
Site Utilities Boiler and steam

distribution
Boiler 3 - NG fired
Corrosives storage
and handling
acid / caustic (for Spill of corrosive material

demin plant IEX
beds)
Class 3 materials Spill of flammable liquid
Steam
Release of steam

for analysis
(quantify) in
QRA?

Rev
No
EIV at gas metering station
(manual activation from Olefines
or Site Utilities).
Manual isolation valves at
metering station and at Olefines
(other end of p/l )
Large building (20m high, by
No
80m by 20m) with natural
ventilation , roof line ventilation
(NG lighter than air)
Local event only. No offsite

effect or escalation potential

Fire extinguishers
No
A
effect or escalation potential to
other BIP plants
Procedures for startup
Fire extinguishers
No
A
other BIP plants
Unlikely
Burner management system (Hard Burner management system (Hard

wired)
wired)
Burner management system (hard

wired). Includes pre-start and
shutdown purge sequences, valve
position detection, high/low gas
pressure trip, flameout detection,
detection of high combustible
content in flue gas and trips
No

A
other BIP plants
Unlikely
Internal washdown (daily)
Smoky fire
Unlikely
Turnover of stockpile, Minimum Smoke detection

stocking policy

A
other BIP plants
A
Equipment leak, delivery

error
Spill into bund, operator

splashing / injury
Possible
Procedures
Sprinklers in conveyors (manual No

activation)
Conveyor trip lines
Conveyor to remove material
No
from pile if hotspot detected
Sprinklers around perimeter
Stored in bunded areas
No
PPE

Equipment leak, delivery

error
Pool fire if ignition occurs
Unlikely
Procedures
Very small quantities (<< 1000L) No

In DG cabinets

Equipment leak, eg
corrosion, flange / valve
leak, trap failure
Burns / operator injury
Possible
Equipment maintenance
OHS issue
Noise of leak
No
BIP QRA Site Utilities HAZID.xls

HAZID
Page 1 of 1
TABLE A2.7: GTP HAZID

Equipment Item
Material released
Leaks from pipes or vessels from the air stripper to the

plant exhaust vent
EDC or HCl in air
Toxicity
Yes
Irritation impacts only
Leaks from recovered waste EDC liquid Isotainer and

transfer system including connecting piping and hose
EDC
Pool fires, toxicity,

BLEVE
No
No offsite consequences as
per GTP FHA ( Ref 3)
Leaks from recovered waste EDC liquid storage

systems
EDC
Pool fires, toxicity
No
Natural gas line leaks
Natural gas
(methane)
Fires, UVCE, flash

fire
No
Thermal oxidiser explosion
Natural gas
(methane)
Confined explosion
No
Caustic scrubber (loss of reflux flow) resulting in HCl

breakthrough
HCl in air
Toxicity
No
Document:
Revision:
Revision Date:
Document ID:
Potential Impact
In BIP QRA
Comments
1
25 September 2012
INFORMATIVE
TABLE A2.8: NON-BIP OPERATORS HAZID WORD DIAGRAM

Event
Cause/Comments
In QRA
AIR SEPARATION UNIT (ASU)

Explosion in ASU
Hydrocarbon in
atmosphere (e.g.
upset in flare at
olefines).
Accumulation of HC in liquid
oxygen in condenser or other
ASU equipment
Explosion / fire in ASU coldbox
Missiles
Significant asset damage
Atmospheric hydrocarbon detection.

Continuous hydrocarbon measurement in
liquid oxygen.
Olefines cooling towers provided buffer
between ASU and process equipment (also
around 300m separation to major hydrocarbon
inventories).
No
Offsite impact
possible but
extremely unlikely
given controls a
very well
understood hazard
with ASUs
Hydrogen leak from

trailers
Leaks from flange,

tubing etc
Burst disc fails
Fire / explosion
Burst discs discharge piping to safe (elevated)

location
H2 detection and alarms (audible and visible)
Fire detection
Fire water monitors (manually activated from
remote location)
No
Localised impact
Fire / Explosion in
oxygen compressor
O2 leak into enclosure

Particulates in oxygen
stream
Grease / oil / other
incompatible materials
Oxygen enrichment inside

enclosure and fire
Particulate impingement
internal to piping, fire initiation
Explosion
Suitable materials of construction for oxygen

equipment
Oil free compressor (suitable for oxygen
service)
Maintenance procedures to prevent use of
unsuitable lubricants, degreasers etc
O2 compressor located in concrete blast
enclosure
No
Localised impact
Document:
Revision:
Revision Date:
Document ID:
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25 September 2012
INFORMATIVE
APPENDIX 3. METEOROLOGICAL DATA

Meteorological data from the Sydney Airport site (about 2km from the BIP) has been used as an
input to the dispersion modelling. The Bureau of Meteorology (BOM) consolidated data from
1999-2004 into six wind speed/Pasquill stability categories and directional probabilities to provide
average conditions as shown below.
Note:
day
3.0 B
4.1 C
3.6 D
7.7 D
3.7 E
2.0 F
night
4.07
11.09
6.61
26.93
48.70
13.79
7.81
15.84
13.85
TOTAL
4.07
11.09
20.4
34.74
15.84
13.85
51.29
99.99
Notes
allocate 100% to day
allocate 100% to day
allocated based on low D occurrence in day / night dataset
allocated based on high D occurrence in day / night dataset
allocate 100% to night
allocate 100% to night
All times (42656 cases) representative groupings

Wind speed (m/s) and stability class
Direction wind from
% occurrence
Total
(degrees true)
3.0 B
4.1 C
3.6 D
7.7 D
3.7 E
2.0 F
345 - 015
N
9.1
6.91
7.49
4.33
13.78
15.3
015 - 045
6.56
6.11
8.12
15.34
10.89
9.8
045 - 075
3.63
3.83
5.85
6.82
2.43
4.26
075 - 105
E
5.76
6.89
7.52
2.62
2.16
2.88
105 - 135
9.84
10.53
9.84
7.14
2.93
2.59
135 - 165
7.48
7.08
7.7
12.83
2.94
1.71
165 - 195
S
4.49
5.14
7.4
20.74
2.37
2.13
195 - 225
3.74
3.04
6.38
8.17
3.52
3.57
225 - 255
6.1
4.46
6.98
7.36
7.19
6.55
255 - 285
W
11
8.07
6.55
8.32
10.24
8.16
285 - 315
19.69
23.29
12.74
3.7
17.15
17.57
315 - 345
12.61
14.65
13.43
2.64
24.4
25.49
Total
100
100
100
100
100
100
Number of cases
1737
4731
8702
14819
6758
5909
42656
Fraction of total (%)
4.07
11.09
20.4
34.74
15.84
13.85
99.99
Bureau of Meteorology on behalf of the Commonwealth of Australia
Document:
Revision:
Revision Date:
Document ID:
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25 September 2012
INFORMATIVE
APPENDIX 4. EVENT TREES

When a release occurs, there are a number of different possible outcomes. These can be
represented by an event tree which indicates the different outcomes and the probability of
each outcome. The ultimate outcomes have a combined probability depending on the
path.
An example for the continuous release of a pressurised liquefied gas is:
PRESSURISED CONTINUOUS
LIQUEFIED GAS RELEASE
Probability of
Immediate Ignition (1-P2)
Probability of
Ignition (P1)
Probability of
Explosion (P3)
Poolfire
Torchfire
Explosion
Probability of
Delayed Ignition (P2)
Probability of
Flashfire (1-P3)
Flashfire
Leak
Frequency
Probability of
No Ignition (1-P1)
Safe
dispersal
(or toxic
effects)
The following table gives the values of P1, P2 and P3 as used in this QRA, based on the
guidance given in the Purple Book.
P1 probability of
ignition after
release
P2 - probability of
delayed ignition (if
ignition occurs)
P3 - probability of
explosion (if delayed
ignition occurs)
Hydrogen SAFETI
group 6)
0.7
0.35
0.53
Methane (SAFETI
Group 6)
0.7
0.35
0.53
Ethylene (SAFETI
Group 7)
0.9
0.45
0.6
Ethane (SAFETI
Group 4)
0.4
0.2
0.53
Butadiene (SAFETI
Group 4)
0.4
0.2
0.53
Propylene (SAFETI
Group 4)
0.4
0.2
0.53
Propane (SAFETI
0.4
0.2
0.3
Material
Various facilities
Olefines:
Document:
Revision:
Revision Date:
Document ID:
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25 September 2012
INFORMATIVE
Material
P1 probability of
ignition after
release
P2 - probability of
delayed ignition (if
ignition occurs)
P3 - probability of
explosion (if delayed
ignition occurs)
Butane (conservatively 0.4

assumed same as
propane)
0.2
0.3
Benzene (SAFETI
Group 2, FP 11C)
0.15
Gasoline (FP above

45C)
0.15
Ethyl Mercaptan (FP

approx 45C)
0.15
Dimethyl Disulphide
0.10
(less volatile than EM,
FP approx 16C)
Diesel (much less

0.05
volatile than gasoline)
Group 3)
Huntsman:
Ethylene Oxide
0.95
0.48
0.68
Propylene Oxide
0.70
0.35
0.53
Methane
0.70
0.35
0.53
Ethylene
0.90
0.45
0.60
Chlorine
Hydrogen Chloride
ChlorAlkali:
It was assumed that for liquefied hydrocarbons, the probability of a pool fire or a jet fire
following delayed ignition was negligible, that is, the events following delayed ignition are
either a flash fire or a vapour cloud explosion. This is a conservative assumption, since the
consequences of a vapour cloud explosion or flash fire following delayed ignition are more
severe than a pool fire or a jet fire for a given release.
It was also assumed that for these materials, the likelihood of a pool fire is low because
the materials will quickly flash to vapour. The possible exception to this is the refrigerated
ethylene storage sphere (part of Olefines OBL), where a pool fire is possible if sufficient
refrigerated ethylene leaks into the bund to provide residual liquid after the initial flashing
of vapour, and ignites.
However ALOHA modelling shows the heat radiation from a fully developed pool fire3 in
the bund around the sphere has comparable effects to those predicted by Effects for a jet
fire from a 50 mm hole, and Riskcurves does not successfully process pool fires of
refrigerated materials. Hence for consequence and risk modelling, jet fires were selected
as the scenario, but obviously in practice bund fires are a possible consequence of a
sufficiently large leak.
A fully developed poolfire (ie with liquid occupying the entire bund) requires a release of about 4 te of
ethylene
Document:
Revision:
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Document ID:
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25 September 2012
INFORMATIVE
APPENDIX 5. POPULATION DATA

A 5.1. Updates to Population Data (2006 Census data)
The most recent population estimates are from the Census 2006 data. This includes both
2006 data and projected data for 2010. The previous issue of the BIP QRA used Census
2001 data as described in Section A5.2 onwards of this Appendix.
A comparison of the projected data from 2010 from 2006 Census with the Census 2011
data used in the previous revisions of the BIP QRA is shown in the table below. This
represents populations with approximately 5km radius of the BIP.
Note that there are some differences in the methodology used to compile the data due to
software changes and changes in the collection district boundaries the Census over which
population is collected so the data sets are not on an identical basis.
TABLE A5. 1: COMPARATIVE CENSUS DATA
It can be seen from Table A5.1 that there has been a relatively small increase in
residential populations, with a large increase in employment populations.
The key driver for societal risk is populations located outside during the night. This is
because outside populations are most exposed (no building mitigation effects), and
atmospheric conditions at night / early morning (E/F stability) result in the largest toxic or
flammable clouds hence biggest effect distances.
Document:
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INFORMATIVE
Table A5. 2 shows a comparison of the population data spilt on a day and night basis as
per the rule sets previously used and described in the following sections. It can be seen
that in the whole area under consideration there is a relatively small increase in the
outside night time population.
In addition a comparison of the population densities for day and night outside populations
is shown in Figure A5.1 and Figure A5.2. These show that the night time population
increases are not in the immediate vicinity of the BIP and that they most likely reflect an
increase in density and changing land use area wide.
It is therefore considered that while increases in population data would increase the
societal risk, this effect would be relatively small. Therefore the BIP QRA 2012 still uses
the 2001 Census data as is described in the following sections of this Appendix.
TABLE A5. 2: COMPARATIVE GRIDDED POULATION DATA , DAY AND NIGHT
Riskcurves Societal Risk Input
QRA 2006
QRA 2012
Day
Night
Day
Night
Outside
8,478
5,897
15,693
6,892
Inside
78,997
116,167
142,042
130,796
TOTAL
87,475
122,064
157,735
137,688
NOTE:
These totals reflect the data after it has been gridded and adjusted for inside / outside
proportionality. The gridding process introduces some errors and the overall totals are therefore
not identical to the totals shown in Table A5. 1.
A 5.2. Source Data 2006 BIP QRA

For the 2006 QRA, residential population data from the 2001 Census was obtained from
the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) for use in societal risk calculations. This was
supplemented by point source data from various sources for industrial / commercial
population and concentrated populations such as schools and shopping centres close to
the BIP.
Data was obtained for areas within a 5km radius of the BIP site which is greater than the
largest estimated impact area to the 1% fatality consequence level (around 2.9 km for a
liquid release from a parked Cl2 tanker).
The table below summarises the various data sources used to compile the population data
input to the QRA.
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TABLE A5. 3: POPULATION DATA SOURCES

Data
Source
Comments
Data for general area:

Residential
population
Aust Bureau of Stats

www.abs.gov.au)
Latest available Census data is 2001.

This data represents the maximum residential
population (i.e night time)
Data was supplied by ABS as a centroid for
each Census Collection District (X,Y, no of
people) for regions out to 5km from BIP site.
Employed
population
Transport & Population

Data Centre
NSW DoP
This data represents the number of people who

travel into the area close to the BIP for work, i.e
the commercial / industrial population. The data
is produced by NSW DoP from information
collected in the Census.
Data was supplied by DoP for each Travel Zone
within around 5kms of BIP site as a centroid
(X,Y, no of people).
Additional point sources:

Schools
Dept of Education for

public schools from
www.schools.nsw.edu.
au/schoolfind/locator/in
dex.php
Catholic schools http://ceo.syd.catholic.e
du.au/our_schools/cont
act_our_schools.html
Enrolment data from websites.

This data represents some additional point
source populations (day time only). They have
been added to reflect the locations of possible
sensitive populations.
Eastgardens
shopping centre
Estimated
Eastgardens Shopping Centre population is

assumed as 4500 shoppers (in addition to the
staff who are identified in DoP travel zone data)
for day time only. This is about 12% more in
total than has been used in previous studies (eg
Cl2 FHA used a total of shoppers and staff of
5250) but has no specific basis as shopper
numbers couldnt be obtained from Westfield
(though car spaces are 3263).
A 5.3. Day and Night Populations

Weighting factors have been applied to the raw data to distribute population between day
and night and inside and outside populations. The factors used are summarised in the
following table. These factors have no specific basis. They are similar to factors used by
the UK HSE for land use planning. They seem reasonable and have been agreed with
DoP in previous studies (eg Replacement CAP FHA, Ref 7).
The factors are shown in Table A5. 4.
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TABLE A5. 4: WEIGHTING FACTORS

Factor
Value
Comments
Day and Night Time Weighting

Factor
0.5
Assumed that day is 7am to 7pm
Night Time population
Fraction of population outside

at night
Residential only.
Census data values used for residential
population.
All schools and industrial / commercial = 0
0.05
Day Time Population
No particular basis. Has been used before in

previous studies approved by DoP.
Residential - use 1/3 of Census value.
(Remaining 2/3 assumed at work out of area)
Add schools, hospitals etc as point sources
(though some of these may already be include in
Census)
Add Eastgardens shopper numbers as a point
source
Other industrial / commercial - use values in
Travel Zone data from DoP.
Fraction of population outside

during day
0.10
No particular basis. Has been used before in

previous studies approved by DoP.
Population on BIP site

(i.e BIP, Nant St, rail corridor
and Southlands)
Convention used in QRA as focus is risk to

external populations, not employee risk
A 5.4. Data Compilation

To convert the raw population data into a form useful for input to the QRA, the approach
taken was:
1. The data was combined to form a data file (X,Y, number of people) for night
population and another for day population, where X,Y is the location. X,Y grid
co-ordinates used are all Map Grid of Australia (MGA) (GDA94).
2. Compiled data file was averaged over a 100m by 100m grid using a mapping
software programme.
3. An XYZ file was generated for the 100m by 100m grid.
4. The multiplying factors in the table above were applied to the XYZ data file to give
separate inside and outside population files from the total population, day and night
populations (i.e. 6 files in total).
Figures A5.1 and A5.2 give a graphical representation of the resulting population data
used as an input into the QRA for societal risk calculations.
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Figure A5.1: Comparative Day Time Outside Population

Basis: No of people per 100m by 100m grid
Day_Outside_2012 QRA (For Comparison only)
Day_Outside_2006 QRA (Used in Both 2006 and 2012 BIP QRA)
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Figure A5.2: Comparative Night Time Outside Population

Basis: No of people per 100m by 100m grid
Night_Outside_2012 QRA (For Comparison only)
Night_Outside_2006 QRA (Used in Both 2006 and 2012 BIP QRA)
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APPENDIX 6. PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED RISK CONTOURS

A 6.1. Overview
Risk results of various forms have been previously presented to NSW DoP (during the
1990s / 2000). The QRA methodologies were somewhat different than used for this
update so the results are not directly comparable and detailed comparison is not
attempted. However some broad comparisons are given in this appendix.
Risk contours in this QRA are smaller than those previously presented. This is
considered to be primarily because of the closure of several plants on the BIP.
A 6.2. Individual Fatality
Individual fatality risk results have been previously presented separately for fire /
explosion and toxic risks in the following studies:
Olefines Ethane Conversion FHA (Ref 9) from 1995 (fire and explosion risk only).
Replacement chlorine plant FHA (Ref 7) from 2000 (toxic risk only).
A comparison showing the fire / explosion and toxicity results on a separate basis is
presented in Figures A6.1 and A6.2. It can be seen that:
The individual fatality risk (fire/explosion only) results in this QRA are smaller than
the previous fire and explosion results from the Ethane FHA. Apart from
differences in modelling methodology, several plants on the BIP have closed down.
In particular, the now-closed Vinyls Plant was a significant contributor to offsite
risks and would have contributed to the larger fire / explosion risk contours.
The risk contribution from the Chloralkali area (i.e toxic contribution only) in the
south of the BIP is very similar to that shown in the FHA.
A 6.3. Injury / Escalation for Fire / Explosion

There have been no previous studies presenting Injury or Escalation Risks on the
same basis as this QRA, hence a detailed comparison to previous results is not made.
For example, the Olefines Ethane Conversion FHA presented injury risk as a
combined total for the heat radiation and overpressure threshold values (i.e single
contour showing combined total frequency of exposure to 4.7kW/m 2 or 7kPa), whereas
this updated QRA presents the injury contours for heat radiation (one contour showing
total frequency of exposure to 4.7kW/m2) and explosion overpressure (another contour
showing total frequency of exposure to 7kPa) separately as per HIPAP 4 criteria.
A comparison between the Ethane FHA and current QRA using the combined
overpressure and heat radiation results is shown in Figures A6.3 and A6.4. It is
difficult to make any direct conclusions from this comparison as the fundamental
modelling assumptions, (for example heat radiation probits, equipment failure
frequencies, dispersion model for developing explosion / flashfire scenarios), and
software used in the Ethane FHA were significantly different to that used in this current
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version of the BIP QRA. There are also a larger number of scenarios included in the
current QRA than in the previous ISORIS model used for the Ethane QRA.
However it can generally be inferred that injury and escalation risks would also tend to
decrease if the individual fatality risk has decreased, assuming that the same basis
has been used to prepare the studies.
A 6.4. Modelling Differences
Fire / explosion modelling:
Cumulative fire/ explosion risks at the BIP were last assessed and submitted to DoP
for the 1995 ethane upgrade when the Olefines plant was converted from naphtha to
ethane feed. The Ethane Upgrade QRA (1996) was prepared using a software
package called ISORIS. ISORIS is an older generation QRA programme with relatively
inflexible input options for defining scenarios. It was primarily developed for comparing
project options such as choice between sites, plant layouts or different process
technologies.
While archived copies of the ISORIS software are available within Orica, it cannot be
used easily for toxic impacts or societal risk calculations. Hence ISORIS was not an
appropriate choice for a cumulative QRA of the BIP where individual fatality and
societal risk assessment for both fire / explosion effects and toxicity impacts where
required.
Some broad differences in the ISORIS approach compared with the Effects /
Riskcurves approach used for the BIP QRA are summarised below. As stated in the
BIP QRA, no attempt is made to quantify the effect of any of these differences as there
are so many.
Broadly there are a lot more scenarios, with more detailed frequency and consequence
modelling in the BIP QRA (over 950 scenarios for all plants) than would be defined in
an ISORIS model.
QRA Step
Item
ISORIS
(Ethane Upgrade
FHA 1996)
EFFECTs / Riskcurves
(BIP QRA 2007)
Hazard ID
Scenario
definition for
QRA model
Standard set of
scenarios for major
equipment items
based on isolatable
inventories.
Larger number of scenarios

covering more items of
equipment.
Each scenario defined
individually taking into
account probability of
isolation failure etc via
event trees.
More detailed site grid used
to locate scenarios
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QRA Step
Item
ISORIS
(Ethane Upgrade
FHA 1996)
EFFECTs / Riskcurves
(BIP QRA 2007)
Consequence
Assessment
Explosions
TNT model
TNO model
Flashfires:
not included
Dispersion to LEL
Toxic dispersion
not included
Dispersion models (SLAB

or Gaussian)
Explosions
Probit
Average probability of
fatality from edge of
flashfire to peak
overpressure radius
Flashfires:
Not included
100% fatality within flashfire

area
Heat radiation
Point source method

and probit
View factor method and

probit
Frequency
Assessment
Standard set of
scenarios for major
equipment items
based on isolatable
inventories (though
frequencies could be
manually modified).
Event tree models using

generic failure frequencies,
then ignition probabilities
and isolation failure to
develop a suite of scenarios
for each release
Escalation Risk
Not known
Frequency correction of
additional scenarios defined
for escalated events (e.g.
BLEVEs) initiated by other
events (e.g. jet fires)
Risk Contours
ISORIS
Output is a text grid
where the isorisk
contours numbers are
manually linked up.
Riskcurves v2.7/P4
Output is a grid file with
contours prepared in
contouring package Surfer.
Probability
Fatality
of
Toxic Impacts:
The methodology used to assess toxic risks for the BIP QRA is very similar to that
used in the most recently prepared QRA study covering toxic effects (from the
chloralkali facility only, Ref: Quantitative Risk Assessment Report Chloralkali Facility
Orica, Botany Industrial Park, Rev 1 Nov 2006).
Note that this Nov 2006 Chloralkali QRA report is an update of the FHA submitted for
the replacement chloralkali project in 2000. The Nov 2006 update was prepared and
submitted to the NSW DoP as per the conditions of consent for the replacement
chloralkali plant (DA 35/98). There were some technical changes between the
replacement chloralkali plant FHA and the updated Nov 2006 QRA, mainly a different
chlorine probit and method of estimating societal risk (refer to Appendix 1 of the Nov
2006 QRA). These both had the effect of slightly reducing the individual fatality risk
contours and societal risk curve compared to the FHA results.
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The only difference between the BIP QRA methodology for assessing toxicity risks and
the methodology used in the Nov 2006 chloralkali QRA report is the choice of
endpoints for injury and irritation risk.
The BIP QRA originally used ERPG2 and ERPG1 values to represent injury
irritation risk respectively. After discussion with DoP it was agreed that ERPG3
ERPG2 were to be used to maintain consistency with the only previous toxic
study, i.e the Nov 2006 chloralkali QRA study which used adjusted ERPG3
ERPG2 endpoints.
and
and
gas
and
It should also be noted that the Nov 2006 Chloralkali QRA study covered the
chloralkali facility only. The cumulative BIP QRA assessment for toxic injury and
irritation risk also covers scenarios involving various toxic materials at Olefines and
Huntsman.
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FIGURE A6.1: COMPARISON OF FIRE / EXPLOSION INDIVIDUAL FATALITY RISK CONTOURS

Individual Fatality Risk Ethane Conversion project, Ref 9
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FIGURE A6.2: COMPARISON OF TOXIC INDIVIDUAL FATALITY RISK CONTOURS

Individual Fatality CA plant FHA Ref 7
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FIGURE A6.3: COMPARISON OF FIRE / EXPLOSION INJURY RISK

50PMPY OF EXCEEDING 4.7KW/M2 OR 7KPA
Injury Risk Ethane Conversion project, Ref 9
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FIGURE A6.4: COMPARISON OF FIRE / EXPLOSION ESCALATION RISK CONTOURS

50PMPY OF EXCEEDING 23KW/M2 OR 14KPA
Escalation Risk Ethane Conversion project, Ref 9
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QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT

BOTANY INDUSTRIAL PARK

PREPARED FOR: NSW Department of

DOCUMENT NO: 20613-001

Sherpa Consulting Pty Ltd (ABN 40 110 961 898)

DOCUMENT REVISION RECORD

Revised Draft for

Date: 25 September 2012

Limitations and Exclusions .............................................................................................. 22

Links to Other Studies ..................................................................................................... 22

Risk Criteria ..................................................................................................................... 26

BIP SITE DESCRIPTION ................................................................................................................ 30

FACILITY DESCRIPTIONS ............................................................................................................. 36

Other Operators Outside BIP .......................................................................................... 48

HAZARD IDENTIFICATION ............................................................................................................ 50

CONSEQUENCE MODELS ............................................................................................................ 52

FREQUENCY ASSESSMENT ........................................................................................................ 63

Domino Incidents ............................................................................................................. 69

RISK RESULTS AND COMPARISON TO CRITERIA .................................................................... 74

10. OVERALL CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................................. 85

Risks Compared against HIPAP 4 Criteria ...................................................................... 85

Adequacy of Safeguards and Recommendations ........................................................... 85

11. REFERENCES ................................................................................................................................ 87

CUMULATIVE QRA REVISION HISTORY

HAZARD IDENTIFICATION WORD DIAGRAMS

PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED RISK CONTOURS

FACILITY DESIGN BASIS USED IN THE QRA

RISK CONTRIBUTOR DETAILS

BIP Site Facilities ........................................................................................................... 18

Cumulative BIP Individual Fatality Risk ......................................................................... 17

Australian Bureau of Statistics

American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists

Acute Emergency Level

American Industrial Hygiene Association

Air Liquide Australia

As Low As Reasonably Practicable

Air Separation Unit

Botany Emergency Response Team

Botany Industrial Park

Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion

Large distillation column and associated equipment designed to separate propane

Critical Instrumented Protective Systems

Continuously Stirred Tank Reactor

Distributed Control System

Department of Infrastructure, Planning and Natural Resources, NSW (now

Dimethyl disulphide, cracking furnace additive

Department of Planning, NSW

Emergency Chlorine Scrubber

Environmental Impact Statement

Emergency Isolation Valve (usually remotely operated)

Ethyl mercaptan (ethanethiol), odorising agent for LPG

Emergency Response Plan

(US EPA) Emergency Response Planning Guideline

Fractional Dead Time

Final Hazard Analysis

Fire Safety Study

Fault Tree Analysis

Groundwater Treatment Plant

Hazard and Operability study

High Density Polyethylene

(UK) Hazardous Installations Directorate

(NSW) Hazardous Industry Planning Advisory Paper

(UK) Health & Safety Executive

High voltage, 1 kilovolt AC or higher