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'claim for refund of the amount paid in 1980 is exactly the same subject
matter as [in] the previous claim for refund in 1979" (Page 4, BIR records).
Without waiting for respondent to resolve the claim for refund, petitioners
filed with the Honorable Court on July 29, 1982 the petition docketed as
C.T.A. Case No. 3540, seeking said refund.
During the pendency of C.T.A Case No. 3540, respondent, in a letter dated
April 15, 1985, denied PHILAMLIFE's claim for refund of P643,125.00 as
withholding tax at source for 1980. Moreover, respondent cancelled the Tax
Credit Memo (T.R. No. 141-80) in the amount of P643,125.00 previously
issued to PHILAMLIFE on November 18, 1980 and requested the latter to
pay the amount of P643,125.00 as deficiency withholding tax at source for
1979 plus increments (Pages 62-64, BIR records).
Without protesting the assessment for the amount of P643,125.00 as
deficiency withholding tax at source for 1979, petitioners filed with this
Honorable Court on June 14, 1985 the petition, docketed as C.T.A. Case No.
3943, seeking the annulment of said assessment."
(pp. 1-5, Dec; pp. 112-115, Orig. Rec.)
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SO ORDERED."
(pp. 137-138, id.)
Hence, the instant petition for review filed before this Court by PHILAMLIFE
and AIGI.
In the petition, PHILAMLIFE and AIGI raise the following issues, to wit:
"(1)
Whether or not compensation for advisory services admittedly
performed abroad by the personnel of a non-resident foreign corporation
not doing business in the Philippines (AIGI) are subject to Philippines
withholding income tax.
(2)
Whether or not respondent Commissioner is barred by prescription,
laches, estoppel, or equitable considerations in cancelling the previous
approval of petitioner's claim for refund more than 5 years thereafter, after
it has determined, after investigation, that the advisory services were
rendered/performed abroad by the personnel of AIGI, a non-resident
foreign corporation not doing business in the Philippines.
(3)
Whether or not respondent Court can amend its decision, on a
motion for reconsideration by respondent Commissioner, ordering
petitioner Philamlife to pay P643,125.00 with interest at 20% per annum
until paid 'on the presumption that it has utilized the tax credit memo
already issued' (Ref. Decision, p. 14, line 7) and without any evidence
being presented of actual usage of the tax credit memo."
"Both parties filed before this Court 'Motions for Reconsideration' of the
decision dated March 10, 1993 on March 26, 1993 (respondent) and April
22, 1993 (petitioners).
After trial on the merits, respondent tax court rendered the above decision
on March 10, 1993.
In their first assignment of error, petitioners insist that there is no legal nor
factual bias for the respondent court to conclude that the compensation
paid for advisory services rendered outside the Philippines to petitioner
AIGI, a non-resident foreign corporation not engaged in trade or business in
the Philippines, is considered "rentals and royalties from properties located
in the Philippines" pursuant to Section 37 (a) (4) of the National Internal
Revenue Code. Petitioners contend that petitioner AIGI is not covered by
the above provision of the Tax Code considering that it has no properties
located in the Philippines from which rentals and royalties can be derived.
After a careful perusal of the facts and law of the case, we agree with
respondent court's ruling which comprehensively discusses the above
issue, to wit:
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(1) . . .
(2) . . .
(3) . . .
(4) Rentals and royalties Rentals and royalties from properties located in
the Philippines or from any interest in such property, including rentals or
royalties for
(a) . . .
(b) . . .
(c) The supply of scientific, technical, industrial or commercial knowledge
or informations;
(d) The supply of any assistance that is auxiliary and subsidiary to, and is
furnished as a means of enabling the application or enjoyment of, any
property, or right as is mentioned in paragraph (a), any such equipment as
is mentioned in paragraph (b) or any such knowledge or information as is
mentioned in paragraph (c); or
(e) . . .
(f) Technical advice, assistance or services rendered in connection with
the technical management and administration of any scientific, industrial
or commercial undertaking, venture, project of scheme; and
(g) . . .
(5) . . .
(6) . . .
personal services are considered from sources within the Philippines where
the services are performed within the Philippines and since the services
were ascertained by the Examiner to have been rendered outside the
Philippines the same should not have been subjected to Philippine tax.
Thus, this Court rules that while it is true petitioner AIGI has no properties
in the Philippines, agreement with petitioner PHILAMLIFE necessary for the
latter company's efficient operation and growth, with petitioner AIGI
deriving income form said agreement, petitioner AIGI is well-within the
ambit of Section 37 (a)(7) of the Tax Code.
In our jurisprudence, the test of taxability is the 'source', and the source of
an income is "that activity . . . which produced the income" (Howden & Co.,
Ltd. vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 13 SCRA 601, reiterated in
Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Japan Air Lines, Inc., 202 SCRA 450).
It is not the presence of any property from which one derives rentals and
royalties that is controlling, but rather as expressed under the expanded
meaning of "royalties", it includes " royalties for the supply of scientific,
technical, industrial, or commercial knowledge or informations; and the
technical advice, assistance or services rendered in connection with the
technical management and administration of any scientific, industrial or
commercial undertaking, venture, project or scheme", and others (Section
37 (a) (7) as amended by P.D. 1457).
"On the second issue, this Court believes that the rule on prescription of
assessment and the filing of formal protest will not apply in the C.T.A. Case
No. 3943. The decision of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue revoking
the tax credit memo he has issued and issuing an assessment accordingly
was actually a denial of the claim for refund covering the 1979 withholding
tax at source which was previously granted. The original action that was
filed by the Petitioner which precipitated the so refund filed by Petitioner.
Therefore, the rules on prescription of action in the case of recovery of tax
erroneously or illegally collected shall apply.
Pursuant to Section 292 (now 230) of the NIRC 'no such suit or proceeding
shall be begun after the expiration of two years from the date of payment
of the tax or penalty regardless of any supervening cause that may arise
after payment'. Although counting from the original date of payment of the
tax on December 3, 1979, the filing of the instant Petition for Review on
June 14, 1985 would appear to have been filed out of time, nevertheless,
justice and equity demand that the period during which respondent
approved the herein claim for refund up to the time it was subsequently
cancelled should be deducted from the counting of the two year
prescriptive period. To interpret otherwise, will be opening an avenue for
respondent to technically deprive any legitimate claimant-taxpayer of his
erroneously or illegally paid taxes by simply granting the same at the start
but only to be revoked later upon the expiration of the two year period. By
deducting the period when Petitioner received the tax credit memo on
March 9, 1981 to May 15, 1985 when the same was cancelled by the
respondent only one year and four months had elapsed from the two year
period of prescription when Petitioner filed CTA 3943 on June 4, 1985."
(pp. 12-13, Dec. pp. 123-124, id.)
Moreover, the Supreme Court in the recent case of Commissioner of
Internal Revenue vs. Procter & Gamble Philippine Manufacturing
Corporation, 204 SCRA 377, ruled, to wit:
"In like manner, petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue's failure to
raise before the Court of Tax Appeals the issue relating to the real party in
interest to claim the refund cannot, and should not, prejudice the
government. Such is merely a procedural defect. It is axiomatic that the
government can never be in estoppel, particularly in matters involving
taxes. Thus, for example, the payment by the tax-payer of income taxes,
pursuant to a BIR assessment does not preclude the government from
making further assessments. The errors or omissions of certain
administrative officers should never be allowed to jeopardize the
government's financial position. (See: Phil. Long Distance Tel. Co. v. Coll. of
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Internal Revenue, 90 Phil. 674; Lewin v. Galang, L-15253, Oct. 31, 1960;
Coll. of Internal Revenue v. Ellen Wood McGrath, L-12710, L-12721, Feb. 28,
1961; Perez v. Perez, L-14874, Sept. 30, 1960; Republic v. Caballero, 79
SCRA 179; Favis v. Municipality of Sabongan, L-26522, Feb. 27, 1963)."
Neither do We find error on the part of respondent tax court in amending
its March 10, 1993 decision acting upon the timely motion for
reconsiderations filed by both petitioner and respondent. Said decision
having not attained its finality, the same may still be amended, corrected
or modified by the Court (Adez Realty, Incorporated vs. Court of Appeals,
212 SCRA 623). As shown in its may 19, 1993 resolution, respondent tax
court granted respondent Commissioner's motion for reconsideration since
the dispositive portion of the decision did not order the petitioner
PHILAMLIFE to pay public respondent the amount of P643,125.00 which
amendment is supported by the findings of the respondent tax court.
Finally, in the case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. C.A., 204 SCRA
182, the Supreme Court reiterated, to wit:
"Moreover, it has been the long standing policy and practice of this Court
to respect the conclusions of quasi-judicial agencies, such as the Court of
Tax Appeals which, by the nature of its function, is dedicated exclusively to
the study and consideration of tax problems and has necessarily developed
an expertise on the subject, unless there has been an abuse or improvident
exercise of authority or discretion, the decision of respondent court,
affirming that of the Court of Tax Appeals, must consequently be upheld."
This Court does not find any cogent reason to depart from the above ruling
as applied in the instant case.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DISMISSED by the Court for
lack of merit. The respondent court's decision dated March 10, 1993 and
order dated May 19, 1993 in C.T.A. Cases Nos. 3504 and 3943 are hereby
Affirmed. Costs against petitioners.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
De Pano, Jr. and Verzola, JJ., concur.