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Field
ecurity
handbook
Field
Security
Series
OCTOBER 2 0 0 8
Notice
This brochure, which has been prepared by the General Secretariat of the Council, does not commit either the EU
institutions or the Member States.
Further information can be obtained from the Public Information Department of the Communication Unitin
Directorate-General F, at the following address:
General Secretariat of the Council
ruede la Loi 175
-1048 Brussels
Fax
E-mail
Internet
A great deal of additional information on the European Union is available on the Internet.
It can be accessed through the Europa server (http://www.europa.eu).
ISBN 978-92-824-2380-6
DOI 10.2860/32782
European Communities, 2008
Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged.
Printed in Belgium
DGF-Communication / Cration graphique - RS 34/2008
October 2008
3
3
Building up a Mission
Overview
10
11
12
13
14
15
OPLAN
16
17
18
21
21
22
Overview
22
ESDP Missions
23
EUSR Teams
24
GSC Actors
25
Overview
25
26
29
30
31
33
Field Actors
34
Overview
34
Host State
35
aseixecuanyM youc s
He
October 2008
36
37
38
39
Wardens
42
43
45
Overview
Applicability of Security Arrangements
45
46
47
51
55
Overview
55
56
58
59
61
63
65
66
69
69
70
Legal Framework
71
72
73
76
Low Risk
78
Overview
78
79
81
84
Medium Risk
Medium Risk - Telecommunications
85
86
* Voue, c&zvtce
aseLSECuemM
October 2008
88
High/Critical Risk
90
92
Overview
92
Introduction
93
Office Security
94
96
99
Overview
99
100
Overview
100
General Principles
101
103
105
Overview
105
106
107
108
Record of Personnel
109
111
113
Communications
114
116
116
Safe Havens
117
Essential Reserves/Supplies
120
Wardens
121
123
124
125
126
Overview
126
127
130
Bomb Threats
131
133
c&^cecueny&oue: camice
-0..
::;
111
October 2008
137
Overview
137
138
General Principles
140
143
147
Monitoring
148
Communication Structure
149
Relocation
150
151
Departure Point
152
Exit Routes
153
155
Safe Havens
156
IV
157
158
159
Contingency Plans
161
Overview
161
Contingency Planning
162
163
Planning Process
164
167
Overview
167
168
170
171
172
173
175
*"
as<!LCecuamMVoiMzceeuice
October 2008
Preface
Full title
Field Security Handbook for the protection of personnel, assets, resources and
information
Background
Scope
Content and
intended
recipients
This Handbook therefore defines the guidelines for the organisation and
management of security in civilian deployments, under both ESDP missions
and EUSR teams.
As such, it should be made available to those responsible for the elements of
security described in it.
"Mission"
October 2008
Introduction
Apart from this Field Security Handbook, other documents define security
policies and standards which are common to all EU civilian crisis management
missions. This part presents such documents.
Contents
asdcccuenymyoue ceeuicc
See Page
4
6
7
October 2008
Aim
The Council approved on 7 June 2006 a "Policy of the European Union on the
security of personnel deployed outside the European Union in an operational
capacity under Title V of the TEU" whose aim is to ensure that all reasonably
practicable measures are taken to protect personnel deployed outside the
European Union from harm and injury.
The current version of this Policy is set out in Council document 9490/06. It
is due to be revised in the course of 2008 in the light of lessons learned and to
take account of new structures in EU civilian crisis management.
"Field Security
Policy"
Scope
Core measures
The Field Security Policy rests on integration between headquarters and the
field. Its core measures are the following:
risk assessment and security assessment, undertaken by the GSC
protective measures designed to ensure an operationally acceptable level of
security of personnel, assets (including premises, transport and
communication), resources and information in the area of operations, which
include:
- ensuring the visibility and distinctiveness of the mission from other actors
in the same area of operations
- concluding, whenever possible, a status of mission agreement with the host
State
Continuedon next page
as.cecuenyjs yaue teernes
-k
FIELD SECURITY H A N D B O O K
October 2008
Core measures
(continued)
The Field Security Policy clarifies the roles, responsibilities and core tasks for
the security of personnel respectively of:
Note
The role, responsibilities and core tasks of the CivOpCdr are described in doc.
9919/07 and will be included in a revised Field Security Policy.
Individual
members
/ft"
k
FIELD SECURITY H A N D B O O K
October 2 0 0 8
Title and
publication
October 2008
Document
October 2008
Building up a Mission
Overview
Crisis
management
mission
documents
The Field Security Policy states that, "In the case of a crisis management
operation, the security dimension will be addressed when preparing the
planning documents, including the CONOPS and the OPLAN to be approved
by the Council, and the Joint Action (accompanied by a financial statement) to
be adopted by the Council. The resulting security measures will be elaborated
in a mission-specific security plan and apply to all personnel deployed as part
of the operation."
EUSR
documents
The Field Security Policy also provides that, "In the case of deployment of an
EUSR, the security dimension will be addressed in the Joint Action
(accompanied by a financial statement) on the appointment of the EUSR. The
resulting security measures will be implemented by the EUSR on the basis of
an assessment of security arrangements for him or herself and assigned
personnel in the field."
Contents
This part briefly explains the build-up process for a mission and, in particular,
how security considerations are reflected in that process and in the
corresponding documents.
Note
See Page
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
October 2008
Introduction
Crisis management
document
Report
Report
Report
CMC
CONOPS
Council Joint Action
Mission planning
team
OPLAN
Mission
MSP
Security elements/
documents
Preliminary security
assessment
Security assessment
Security recommendations
Draft security management
concept
Draft missionspecific SOS
and SORS
Security organisation
Release ofEUCI to third
parties
Security management
concept
Missionspecific SOS and
SORS
SOPs
Contingency Plans
Evacuation and Relocation
Plans
10
October 2008
Exploratory
mission
Exploratory missions usually include security experts from the GSC Security
Office, who will establish tentative relations with UN agencies/UNDSS,
LEAs, NGOs, Member States' representatives and relevant security staff of the
European Commission to determine the general security environment, threat
analysis, security risk assessments, highlighting up front as many of the
potential security issues, in broad terms, that any mission in the area is likely
to face.
Report
Security
elements in the
report
11
October 2008
Fact-finding
mission
Report
Security
elements in the
report
The security elements usually covered in the fact-finding mission report are as
follows:
12
October 2008
On the basis of the fact-finding mission's report, the PSC has additional
elements to evaluate the launching of an operation. When a political
agreement has been reached among Member States, a technical fact-finding
mission is sent to the crisis area to assess the technical and organisational
aspects of the deployment of the operation.
Technical fact-finding missions may include a security expert from the
Security Office's Engineering Sector. Depending on the size and scope of the
mission, a representative from the External Protection Section of the GSC
Security Office may also be present.
Report
Upon returning from the technical fact-finding mission, each member presents
a completed checklist of elements he/she had to verify and contributes to the
final report of the mission. This report serves as a basis for the subsequent
elaboration of the operation's needs in terms of:
budget
procurement
personnel
13
October 2008
Concept of
operation
(CONOPS)
On the basis of the CMC and the decision to take action, a CONOPS is
developed. That document can be seen as the detailed mandate of the Council
t 0 the HoM.
Compared to the CMC, the CONOPS contains more detailed provisions on
technical aspects:
personnel
logistics
CIS
procurement
security, etc.
Security
elements in the
CONOPS
Responsibility
for drafting
security
elements
At this stage the GSC Security Office, working in collaboration with CPCC, is
responsible for interpreting security policy and defining the security
component of the CONOPS based upon previous findings made during the
earlier fact-finding and technical verification missions.
14
FIELD SECURITY H A N D B O O K
October 2 0 0 8
The Council Joint Action establishing a mission is the legal cornerstone ofthat
mission, as it constitutes a legally binding decision. It provides the mandate
for the mission, defines strategic options and the financial reference amount.
Security
elements in the
Joint Action
15
October 2008
OPLAN
Definition
The OPLAN is the key document for the conduct of the operation as such. It
can be seen as the response of the HoM on how he/she intends to implement
the mandate conferred by the Council. Consequently, it is the HoM and
his/her Planning Team who draft the OPLAN working with the CPCC.
The OPLAN is as detailed as possible as to the implementation of the
operation and contains detailed technical annexes on:
personnel
logistics
CIS
procurement
security, etc.
Security
elements in the
OPLAN
r/he OPLAN also contains, as an annex, the MSSOS, established on the basis
of the GSC Security Office recommendations and contained in the CONOPS.
It is worth noting that at this stage, the HoM is presenting the effective
business case for:
the upgrade of the MSOS applicable to the riskrating provided by SIAC (or
other appropriate risk rating for risk not covered by the SIAC report), or
the introduction of new MSSOS
This is based upon the identification of other specific direct/indirect threats
against which new risk mitigation are deemed appropriate and necessary.
These MSSOS should never fall below the standards set by MSOS. To the
extent that MSSOS is considered a variation of MSOS, GSC Security Office
validation of the new measures must be obtained. GSC Security Office
reserves the right not to accept any such variations which it deems jeopardises
the EUs duty of care requirements..
To the extent that MSSOS is considered an enhancement of MSOS, it is
CPCC responsibility, in the case of an ESDP mission, to consider the
technical, financial and procurement implications for such enhancements and
recommend accordingly. In this instance the GSC Security Office need only
be informed of the upgrade in order to validate it.
16
FIELD SECURITY H A N D B O O K
October 2008
Definition
The MSP describes the security arrangements for the daily activity of the
Mission as well as for emergency situations such as:
hostilities
accidents
major public disorder
natural disasters
missing persons
abduction, etc.
Living
document
Further
guidance
Responsibility
for drafting the
Security Plan
17
October 2008
General
The evacuation plan, contingency plans and SOPs are essential parts of the
MSP.
Contingency
plans
natural disaster
fire
pandemic
public disorder
kidnapping
Continuedon next page
18
FIELD SECURITY H A N D B O O K
October 2 0 0 8
SOPs
As part of its security management, the mission - more specifically, the MSO
- develops its own SOPs to describe the exact actions to be taken by specified
personnel in any given circumstances within the relevant country.
SOPs include, but are not limited to:
travel management
accreditation of visitors
management of classified information
fire prevention
leave procedures
real life support
communications
reporting
guard orders
bomb threats
ambush attack
illegal check points
19
October 2008
Introduction
Responsibility for planning and launching a mission and for managing such a
mission is shared by many actors, both at the GSC and in the field.
This part first outlines the chain of command/authority and communication for
ESDP missions and EUSR teams. It then goes on to describe the roles,
responsibilities and tasks of the actors involved in planning and managing the
security of a mission.
Contents
See Page
22
25
34
21
October 2008
With the exception of the strategic and political level, the overall chain of
command/authority and communication is different for ESDP missions and
EUSR teams.
This chapter presents this chain in a schematic form.
Contents
See Page
23
24
22
-k
October 2008
ESDP Missions
Council
PSC
SG/HR
CivOpCdr
CPCC
GSC
Security
Office
t
WKC
J2
Chain of Command
<$
O
t CX
.o
4-
Chain of Communication
t/1 ej
+-
* .s
I >
co 'C
co
Head of Mission
c
o
GO
MSO
._J
23
October 2008
EUSR Teams
Council
PSC
SG/HR
24
October 2008
GSC Actors
Overview
Introduction
The role of the GSC in planning and managing the security of a mission is
described in the Field Security Policy and, as far as the Security Office is
concerned, in its mandate.
This chapter describes the roles, responsibilities and tasks of each of the actors
involved.
Contents
See Page
26
29
30
31
33
October 2008
Mandate of the
GSC Security
Office
Training
Additionally, the GSC Security Office organises and manages all GSC field
security training programmes and related issues for preparatory actions and
assists both ESDP and EUSR missions in managing their responsibilities in
this respect.
Continuedon next page
26
FIELD SECURITY
HANDBOOK
October 2008
Monitoring and
compliance
verification
How often
Report
Recommendations
27
_____
October 2008
Security Office
support
The GSC Security Office has expertise in a variety of areas which can be
drawn on by missions and EUSRs on request as detailed hereafter:
Internal Protection:
- personal protection
- hostage situation management
Security Engineering and Logistics:
- selection of mission locations
- drawing up functional and technical specifications for buildings and
security systems
EUCI Security and Investigations:
- providing advice on the protection of EU classified information
- assistance with technical sweeping
- assistance with management of security clearance process
28
October 2008
Risk assessment The Field Security Policy specifically attributes to the SITCEN action through
and risk rating the Single Intelligence Analysis Capability ("SIAC") the responsibility for
providing the Council with a risk assessment, including defined risk ratings, of
the threat against personnel in an intended area of operation to help the
Council to take a view on security measures required before establishing a
crisis management operation.
To allow missions to react appropriately to situations as they develop, it is
against these risk ratings, and others as appropriate and necessary if particular
risks are not covered by the SIAC assessment, that the generic MSOS
requirements are broadly defined. The MS-SOS define the specific risk
mitigation measures aimed at reducing the known risks associated with theatre
of operations.
Communication
29
October 2008
Overall
responsibility
The Civilian Operation Commander has overall responsibility for ensuring that
the EU's duty of care with regard to personnel safety and security is properly
discharged in ESDP missions in accordance with the Field Security Policy and
its supporting standards documentation. This also applies where the EU
provides a civilian support component to an operation led by another
international organisation.
Support to HoM He/she assists in the HoM's planning of security measures for personnel,
assets, resources and information within the mission area.
30
October 2008
Guidance and
advice
On the CivOpCdr's behalf, the CPCC will conduct the tasks in the field
security area such as the budgeting and logistical planning of the
implementation of agreed security requirements and advise on the measures
and solutions to meet those security requirements.
Horizontal
activity
Activity in
collaboration
with the
Security Office
31
October 2008
Operations
support activity
Review/closure
32
October 2008
Presentation
Reporting
security
incidents
All security incidents relating to ESDP missions, their staff or visitors should
be reported to the WKC. This is distinct from the SITCEN to which incidents
relating to GSC staff, EUSR missions, their staff and visitors should be
reported. ~
33
October 2008
Field Actors
Overview
Introduction
The Field Security Policy describes the roles, responsibilities and core tasks
incumbent on the actors present in the field.
This chapter presents such roles, responsibilities and tasks.
Contents
See Page
35
36
37
38
39
42
43
34
October 2008
Host State
Primary
responsibility
Where consent has been given for a crisis management mission, the
government of the Host State has the primary responsibility for ensuring the
security and safety of personnel travelling or deployed within its borders in the
context of a crisis management mission.
This responsibility flows from every government's inherent function of
maintaining order and protecting persons and property within its jurisdiction.
Provisions to be Where possible, the EU shall conclude a SOMA or MoU with the Host State
agreed with
in question.
Host State
Privileges and
immunities
EU's own
measures
''
35
October 2008
Characteristics
of EUSR
missions
An EUSR may have a support team in the country (or one of the countries)
covered by his/her mandate. The number of people in a support team is
variable.
General
responsibility
In accordance with the Field Security Policy, the EUSR will, in relation to the
security of personnel, take all reasonably practicable measures, in conformity
with his/her mandate and the security situation in his/her geographical area of
responsibility, for the security of personnel under his/her direct authority, by
applying, mutatis mutandis, the specific measures incumbent upon a HoM
listed on page 37 below.
Specific
responsibilities
Besides, he/she will ensure that any recommendations made following security
assessments are implemented and provide written reports at regular intervals
on their implementation and on other security issues to the SG/HR, the
Council and the Commission.
36
October 2008
Appointment
General
responsibility
Specific
responsibilities
aseLCECuenytsyoue teewce
37
October 2008
Constitution
Role
Composition
a
Ide lly such a team includes (non-limitative list):
Adjusted
composition
38
October 2008
Mission Security When required by MS- SOS or by the GSC Security Office's security
Officer
assessment, an MSO will be appointed. This individual will be a professional
security technician.
In accordance with article 14 of SG/HR Decision 198/03 and to ensure that the
candidates have the security technical skills needed for this critical position,
the GSC Security Office will participate in the selection process of MSO
candidates.
Responsibilities
of the MSO
Coordination
and reporting
responsibilities
39
October 2008
Personnelrelated
responsibilities
Security and
confidentiality
responsibilities
Mission Security In EU crisis management operations without a dedicated MSO, the HoM or
Focal Point
EUSR will designate a Mission Security Focal Point to assist him with the
above responsibilities.
In this case the HoM or EUSR may:
ask the CPCC GSC Security Office, as appropriate, to provide punctual
advice on security matters affecting the mission, or
request the CPCC or GSC Security Office, send an expert to:
- to provide on-the-spot advice
- to assess security requirements, or to provide support when necessary
Continued on next page
40
October 2008
Relationship
The MSO may seek CPCC assistance with respect to planning the
with CPCC
implementation of agreed security measures. CPCC shall be responsible for
(ESDP missions) the processing of security information and, where necessary, reporting it to or
seeking advice from the GSC Security Office. Similarly, the CPCC shall be
responsible for reviewing and giving the necessary approvals, as appropriate,
to upgrades to MS-SOS. Such approvals must be conveyed to the GSC
Security Office for final acknowledgement and validation as appropriate.
41
October 2008
Wardens
Introduction
Zone covered
Duties
The warden has the following duties and responsibilities (in addition to his/her
other responsibilities as a member of the mission):
function as a channel of communication between the HoM and mission
personnel in his/her zone
keep the MSO permanently informed of any events or information which
might affect the security conditions of the mission
ensure that mission personnel in his/her zone are informed with regard to
security arrangements and emergency phases in effect
check to see that instructions on precautionary measures are being followed
ensure that one person is designated to maintain contact with visitors to the
mission residing temporarily at hotels within the warden's zone
carry out other duties as assigned by the HoM or their MSO
Instructions
Instructions to wardens are contained from page 121 below, under "The
Mission Security Plan".
October 2008
Rationale
Some of the larger countries have specific areas that are separate from the
mission headquarters in terms of both distance and exposure to emergencies.
For such areas, the HoM, in consultation with the SMT, will appoint an ASC.
Who is it?
If necessary, the ASC may be a deputy MSO and have responsibilities similar
to those of the MSO.
For areas where this is not necessary, coordination of security matters may be
exercised by an individual officially designated by the HoM for that purpose.
Responsibilities
The ASC, on the HoM's behalf, coordinates and controls the security
arrangements for the area, including the appointment of wardens.
As regards field security, ASCs have responsibilities similar to those of the
MSO and report to the MSO on security issues.
In addition, they keep the MSO continuously informed with regard to
incidents or developments in the area which have a bearing on the security and
protection of mission personnel, assets, resources and information.
43
October 2008
Contents
See Page
46
47
45
October 2008
s^.CE<:uer7y@ youe
46
teewcE
October 2008
Non-compliance The following table describes what happens when EU crisis management
with instructions mission personnel refuse to comply with the instructions of the HoM/EUSR:
Stage
1
Description
The personnel should be informed, in writing, that their action
may be considered as an act of defiance and that failure to
comply with security and protection arrangements may result in
the institution of disciplinary proceedings and the imposition of
disciplinary measures as provided for in the relevant regulations.
If, after this notice, a member of personnel still refuses to comply
with the instructions, he/she/they should be informed that they do
so at their own risk and that it may not be possible to include
them in any subsequent relocation/evacuation arrangements.
letters should be forwarded to the GSC Security Office, via the CPCC in the
case of ESDP mission members (see sample letters on the next page)
it is the responsibility of the HoM/EUSR to ensure compliance in this
regard since any insurance benefits which have been negotiated especially
for specific hazardous missions may not be applicable if mission
personnel refuses to comply with security instructions
Mission vs.
national
instructions
k
ase.CEcueny@ youe CEIZUCE
47
October 2008
Sample letter:
First Notice
First Notice
Date:
To:
(if applicable)
Through:
From:
Subject:
Compliance with the safety and security regulations to protect the assets,
resources and information of the mission is mandatory. I would urge you to
follow my instructions with regard to the implementation of the Mission
Security Plan. Furthermore, I would remind you that non-compliance may
have serious consequences and may possibly entail referral to your parent
organisation or the institution of disciplinary proceedings and the imposition
of disciplinary measures as provided in the relevant regulations.
Date / Time:
48
October 2008
Sample letter:
Second Notice
Second Notice
Date:
To:
Through:
(if applicable)
From:
Subject:
Following receipt of the first notice of your non-compliance with securityrelated decisions and instructions dated [...], it is my duty as Head of Mission
to inform you that any personnel refusing to comply with my security
directives is jeopardising the protection of the personnel, assets, resources and
overall security of the mission.
You are hereby formally informed that any further failure to comply with the
Mission Security Plan will be at your own risk, and that it may not be
possible to include you in subsequent evacuation arrangements. Further, I
must point out that by refusal to comply, the EU will be relieved of further
responsibility.
Receipt acknowledged or verified:
Date/Time:
as^-iEcuenyia
youe CEOUICE
49
October 2008
Points 13 and 36(b) of the Field Security Policy require the GSC
(SITCEN/SIAC) to define risk ratings. These , and others as appropriate when
particular risk are not assessed by the SIAC reports, will guide the level of
physical and procedural protection measures, consistent with MSOS, to be
provided for in preparing and conducting crisis management operations. SIAC
risk ratings also determine the level of risk allowances for mission personnel.
Risk ratings
The following five risk ratings have accordingly been defined (cf. doc.
11422/06) regarding:
the nature of direct threat against an EU presence in the field (i.e. mission,
staff and infrastructure), and
the nature of indirect threat arising from the local environment:
NEGLIGIBLE
LOW
MEDIUM
HIGH
CRITICAL
51
October 2008
Criteria used
The following criteria are used by the GSC for determining the ratings
included in its risk assessments:
Internal situation
International situation
Terrorism
Organised crime
Health/medical
Attractiveness of EU
mission as a target
On ratings
socio-political instability
brutal changes after elections
internal armed conflict
failing security apparatus
military disorganisation
ethnic disorders
religious disorders
poor economy
local weaknesses at the infrastructure level (road
network)
hostile environment and armed conflicts; and
presence of EOD devices (mines, explosives,
booby traps)
hostile environment
armed conflicts
territorial claims
incursions of armed bands
domestic
international
capabilities and intentions of the concerned groups
logistical support in the population and/or the
neighbouring countries
clear threats
history of attacks against international presence
(including modus operandi)
operating environment
level of corruption
trafficking (either as hub or transit route)
money laundering
arms smuggling
links with terrorism
proclivity to natural disasters
pandemics
poor humanitarian situation in the
country/neighbouring countries
infrastructure (hospitals, clinics, medical
assistance)
for local opponents
for domestic or internationally operating terrorists
Risk assessments will always provide ONE overall rating amalgamating the
as<.tECueny youe Ceevice
52
October 2008
risks in each area. Depending on circumstances, they may also highlight the
ratings for one or more of the most significant risk components.
The SIAC risk ratings are provided in a scheduled basis and updated
appropriately.
October 2008
The security phase system serves the purpose of adopting security procedures
commensurate with the current situation in the area of activity and/or
deployment of a mission.
Contents
See Page
56
58
59
61
63
65
66
55
October 2008
Deciding a
phase change
Maintaining a
status board
The CivOpCdr shall be responsible for informing the SG/HR of the status of
security phases for all mission areas in his weekly report.
CPCC shall be responsible for maintaining a full status board of the security
phases relevant to each area covered by ESDP missions. This is to be updated
on a weekly basis and a consolidated report submitted to the GSC Security
Office.
The EUSRs shall each be responsible for submitting to the GSC Security
Office, on a weekly basis, the relevant security phase in place in the areas
covered by their missions. The GSC Security Office shall, in turn, submit a
consolidated report to the SG/HR. The GSC Security Office shall maintain a
consolidated security phase status board for each ESDP and EUSR mission.
This shall be shared with DGAIB to notify all other GSC staff possibly
travelling to the country in question.
56
October 2008
Declaring a
Security Phase
Urgency
EUSR
An EUSR may only declare a change of phase for his/her own mission or
support team.
Reduction of
security phases
October 2008
Definition
This phase is the normal one, when there are no threats against the mission's
personnel, assets, resources and information.
Travel
Travel should take place in accordance with the procedures contained in the
missionspecific SOS and in the relevant SOPs.
Other measures
58
October 2008
Phase One should be declared when one or more isolated incidents have
occurred in a part or in all the AoR of the mission and these incidents have not
targeted EU personnel, assets, resources and information.
Declaration
The HoM or EUSR may declare Phase One to warn mission personnel that the
security situation in the country or in a portion of it warrants this declaration
and that they should take action as outlined for this phase, as well as be
prepared to take action as outlined for subsequent phases.
Travel
Implicit in the declaration of Phase One is a ban on travel to the area where the
incidents happened without the prior clearance of the HoM or EUSR. The
necessary precautions are to be taken before and during travel.
Other measures
Phase One having been declared by the HoM and WKC informed, WKC shall
notify the CPCC and the GSC Security Office of the change of status.
Phase One having been declared by the EUSR and SITCEN informed,
SITCEN shall notify the GSC Security Office of the change of status.
Upon declaration of Phase One, the HoM and/or EUSR, as appropriate, shall:
notify Member States' representations in the safe haven country, as well as in
nearby countries, of the implementation of Phase One
convene the SMT and establish a coordination centre. It is essential that this
centre be located in a suitable position to coordinate security arrangements
and emergency measures
convene a meeting of wardens with the following agenda:
- review and update the security plan
- check and update lists of mission personnel and locations within the
country
- identify mission personnel members for specific security-related tasks
ensure that ASCs are advised to maintain regular contact with the HoM or
EUSR
advise the MSO or doctor of any medical condition which might require
attention should relocation/evacuation be ordered
Continued on next page
59
October 2008
Other measures
(continued)
60
October 2008
Definition
Phase Two should be declared when one or more isolated incidents have
occurred in a part or in all the AoR of the mission and these incidents have
targeted EU personnel, assets, resources or information.
Declaration
The HoM or EUSR mission may declare Phase Two - Restricted Movement to
signify a much higher level of alert than the precautionary phase and to impose
important restrictions on the movement of all EU crisis management mission
personnel.
Travel
During this phase all mission personnel will adopt precautionary measures in
order to prevent any kind of incident.
Travel to the areas where the incidents took place should only occur:
when specifically authorized by the HoM or EUSR as necessary travel, and
when they have filled out the required travel clearance form
Other measures
Phase Two having been declared and WKC informed by the HoM, WKC shall
notify the CPCC and the GSC Security Office of the change of status. Phase
Two having been declared by the EUSR and SITCEN informed, SITCEN shall
notify the GSC Security Office of the change of status.
Upon declaration of Phase Two, the HoM and/or EUSR, as appropriate, shall:
notify the Member States' representations in the safe haven and nearby
countries that Phase Two has been implemented
instruct all EU mission personnel living and/or deployed in the areas where
the incidents took place to remain at home, except those who are required to
maintain operations or implement security measures
determine, in consultation with the SMT, which staff members could be
considered as non-essential in the event that Phase Three is implemented
notify all EU mission personnel deployed in the area where the incidents
took place of the following measures they must immediately take:
- pack one suitcase of clothing per person (each not exceeding 15 kg).
Label each suitcase with name
- prepare extra food to be taken in case next phase is implemented
- ensure that updated copies of inventories of personal effects are submitted
for transmission to headquarters, keeping copies for personal records
ensure the ASCs are advised to maintain regular contact with the HoM or
EUSR
Continued on next page
61
October 2008
Other measures
(continued)
notify EU mission personnel in other parts of the country not affected by the
declaration of Phase Two that all travel to the affected area must be cleared
maintain close liaison with government authorities, as appropriate
obtain from host government details of any road or rail restrictions and the
current situation of ports and airports, as applicable
request, as appropriate, police or military assistance for road control and/or
escort duties in the area where the incidents took place
convene a meeting of wardens with the following agenda:
- review and update the security plan
- check and update lists of mission personnel and locations within the
country
- identify mission personnel members for specific security-related tasks
advise the MSO or doctor of any medical condition which might require
attention should relocation/evacuation be ordered
advise the WKC in the case of ESDP staff or visitors, or SITCEN in the case
of EUSR staff or visitors, of any cases of hospitalization or other medical
problem that could need special attention
update essential reserves and supplies:
- refuel all EU crisis management mission vehicles
- check food, water and gas supplies
- check flashlights, candles, matches and first-aid kits
62
October 2008
Definition
Mandatory
actions
Essential vs.
non-essential
EU mission
personnel
Other measures
63
October 2008
Other measures
(continued)
Fielding of new
mission
personnel
64
October 2008
Definition
Phase Four should be declared when incidents have occurred in a part or in all
the AoR of the Mission targeting or not targeting EU personnel, assets,
resources or information but contributing to a downgraded general situation in
the AoR that makes it impossible to pursue the activities of the mission.
Declaration
Actions
With the declaration of Phase Four, the HoM or EUSR will take all of the
following actions:
notify the Member States' representations in the safe haven country, as well
as in nearby countries, of the implementation of Phase Four
notify the host government and request assistance as necessary
notify wardens or otherwise instruct EU crisis management mission
personnel on action to be taken
review the Security Plan and make necessary adjustments
partially activate the Evacuation Plan
preparation of relevant instructions for Phase V
Member States'
representations
65
October 2008
Definition
Phase Five should be declared when the general situation in all the AoR of the
Mission is so downgraded that the activities of the Mission become impossible
and all remaining personnel of the Mission must leave the AoR or the
Country.
Declaration
The decision to initiate Phase Five - Evacuation, which should be taken by the
SG/HR, signifies that the situation has deteriorated to such a point that all
remaining EU mission personnel are required to leave.
In case of emergency, the HoM could declare Phase Five and inform the
CivOpCdr as soon as possible thereafter, through the WKC. The WKC should
notify the CivOpCdr, who will in turn notify the SG/HR, who will confirm the
declaration as soon as possible.
In the case of an EUSR mission, the EUSR should notify the SITCEN as well
as the SG/HR, who will confirm the declaration as soon as possible.
The WKC must notify the CPCC and the GSC Security Office as soon as
possible.
The SITCEN must notify the GSC Security Office as soon as possible.
Mandatory
actions
With the declaration of Phase Five, normally by the SG/HR, the HoM or
EUSR will take all of the following actions:
notify the Member States representations in the safe haven country, as well
as in nearby countries, of the implementation of Phase Five
activate and implement the Evacuation Plan
activate the Destruction Plan for sensitive resources and information
notify the host government and request assistance as necessary.
designate a senior locally-recruited staff member as officer-in-charge and
issue instructions for, inter alia:
- the safety and welfare of locally-recruited staff members
- the security and safekeeping of EU facilities, assets, resources and
information
Continued on next page
66
October 2008
Member States* The Member States representations in the safe haven country will be
representations responsible for the evacuated personnel in terms of organizing their reception,
for assistance in finding accommodation and for the payment of any
subsistence allowance payable to them.
They will also lend all possible assistance to evacuated EU crisis management
and EUSR mission personnel on a reimbursable basis.
Relocation of
individual
members of
personnel
67
October 2008
Introduction
The MSOS are a set of security measures and arrangements aimed at ensuring
the appropriate protection of mission personnel, assets, resources and
information.
The MSOS are a reference document with defined norms and criteria. They
have to be adapted to the security risk situation of each Mission, thus
becoming the MS-SOS. This consideration is vital as the risk rating will guide
the level of physical and procedural protection measures consistent with
MSOS, to be provided for in preparing and conducting crisis management
operations.
These risk ratings will always provide one overall rating amalgamating the
risks in the area. Depending on the circumstances, they may also highlight the
ratings for one or more of the most significant risk components which in turn
will define the mission specific enhancements which, as seen, will give rise to
MS-SOS.
These measures are broadly grouped by SIAC Risk Rating according to the
risk situation. When a risk rating is declared, all the measures described under
this phase have to be implemented forthwith.
Contents
See Page
70
78
85
90
92
69
October 2008
General Aspects
Contents
Topic
Legal framework
Minimum Security Operating Standards
Linkage between MSOS and the SIAC Risk Ratings
Basic Concepts and Terminology
See Page
71
72
73
76
70
October 2008
Legal Framework
Requirements
Paragraph 18(c) of the Field Security Policy foresees that for civilian crisis
for civilian
management operations and EUSRs, a mission-specific security plan should
operations
te
iSSUQ respectively by the HoM or the EUSR based on generic field
security operating standards.
Generic
standards
Updating
Paragraph 36(e) of the same policy document requires the GSC to produce
generic field security operating standards. This Part of the Field Security
Handbook sets out those standards.
such
This Part will be periodically updated by the GSC Security Office based on
experience gained on the ground and the development of international best
practice.
71
October 2008
The MSOS set out in this Part are designed to establish standard criteria for
minimum security arrangements to ensure the safety and security of personnel
deployed in EU crisis management missions and in support of EUSRs in order
to reduce risk to the mission's personnel, assets, resources and information to
an operationally acceptable level.
They provide guidance for developing and implementing a mission-specific
security plan.
They constitute the baseline MSOS and have been developed through
discussion, coordination and review of common standards and good field
security practices applied by other international actors in the crisis
management field.
Mandatory
minimum
standards
The baseline MSOS is a generic document that sets out the mandatory
minimum operating security standards for all EU civilian crisis management
operations and EUSRs.
Mission-specific
SOS
As part of the OPLAN, HoMs and their SMTs or, in the case of the EUSRS,
the Joint Action, are required to develop and implement MS-SOS and a
Mission Security Plan, drawing on MSOS and taking account of countryspecific requirements set out in the security assessments conducted by the
GSC Security Office.
Variations to the Varying circumstances and environments may require the HoM ot the EUSR
MSOS
to adapt the requirements of the MSOS to a particular operational situation.
GSC Security Office field assessments will recommend any such variations
which should be taken into account by the HoM or the EUSR in developing
their mission-specific security plan.
Responsibility
and
accountability
72
"k
October 2008
Low Risk
baseline
requirements
The MSOS are presented on page 69 et seq. of this Handbook and are set out
in a structure broadly in line with the SIAC risk ratings.
The MSOS requirements identified for the Low Risk environment are the level
of permanent security cover against which subsequent risk rating requirements
can be compared.
The Low Risk environment sets out the minimum standards:
at the pre-implementation stage, before a crisis management operation is
launched, or
once the mission has started and when the risk rating is not elevated
There are three subsequent risk rating benchmarks, as set out on page 51 et
seq. of this Handbook.
Cumulative
requirements
The risk rating requirements are cumulative, i.e. those requirements starting at
Low Risk are implicit to all other phases.
Example
The requirements of MSOS under High Risk environments include all the
requirements of Low and Medium Risk environments.
Transition from
a lower to a
higher risk
rating
Transition from As risk levels are reduced, a return to a lower risk rating may be called by
a higher to a
SIAC. This must be done in close consultation between SIAC, PSC, HoM
lower risk rating a n d / o r E U S R w i t h S M T a n d C P C C SITCEN must notify GSC Security
Office of any reduction in the risk rating.
Deciding a
change
Risk rating changes are decided as set out on pages 51 et seq. of this
Handbook.
Such decision is based on a change in the risk rating attributed by the SIAC to
a particular theatre of operations.
Continuedon next page
......
73
October 2008
Different risk
ratings in one
theatre
Linkage
between risk
ratings and
security phases
The single risk rating enables missions to define the baseline requirements
which may be enhanced/tempered by MS-SOS. The purpose of linking MSOS
^0 m e j-jsk rating is to enable the budgetary and procurement considerations to
^ e realistically respected whilst maintaining an over watch of the component
elements which define the single rating.
Concurrently, the security phase system exists to enable missions at the
regional and local level to respond effectively to events in a timely manner and
to follow measured procedural responses without being hamstrung by
potentially unachievable requirements or unrealistic expectations.
Example
A country may be considered as a medium risk country generally whilst
considered low in the capital. A particular area may be operating at security
phase 2. An event occurs which has the potential to escalate quickly. The
overall risk climate may remain the same but the SMT might elect to place
those staff in the immediate area on a higher alert status, perhaps moving to
security phase 3. This can be effected quickly and with the minimum of
description. As the situation deteriorates further or improves, the SMT can
respond accordingly.
The aim is to ensure that throughout the planning and management of the
mission, MSOS, enhanced by MS-SOS, as defined by ongoing risk
assessments and effective planning for contingencies, will enable the mission
to be robust enough in its resiliency. The security phases merely define the
procedures to be followed in response to events.
Timing for
implementing a
higher risk
rating
When moving up to a higher risk rating (e.g. Low to Medium) the increased
measures for the new rating should be implemented without delay, hence the
paramount importance of pre-planning to allow for budgetary and procurement
considerations.
The expectation is that the requirements of a higher risk rating should be fully
implemented within 48 hours from the rating change.
Continued on next page
:;;.'
74
October 2008
Planning
Impact on
budget
In accordance with paragraph 32 (e) of the Field Security Policy, the Council
w ill ensure that sufficient human, material and financial resources are made
available for an operation to implement measures for the security of personnel
commensurate with the level of threat assessed in the intended area of
operation including, where necessary, the provision of a protection element for
the mission.
The HoM or EUSR will accordingly take due account of MSOS and MS-SOS
when preparing his/her mission budget.
Frequency of
SMT
meetings
It is mandatory that all SMTs meet on a regular basis. The frequency of these
meetings will be determined by the security phase in effect at the duty station.
p o r those duty stations where there is no phase in effect, SMTs are expected to
meet monthly or as needed; for duty stations in phase 1, the SMT shall meet
monthly; for duty stations in phases 2, 3 and 4, meetings will be weekly or as
needed, as dictated by circumstances. For duty stations which are in phase 5
and where the SMT is located outside the duty station, meetings will be held
daily or more frequently, as required.
In all cases, minutes of the meetings will be produced and submitted to the
GSC Security Office and all members of the SMT within 48 hours.
75
October 2008
Emergency
Communication
System (ECS)
Emergency
power supply
Road traffic
The provision of:
accidents (RTA)
appropriate vehicles
instructions for their use
procedural requirements
Adapted to the terrain and meteorological conditions mission personnel will be
required to work in (i.e. mountainous, abundant snowfall or icy conditions,
jungle, etc.) is an essential security responsibility.
Field vehicle
76
October 2008
Emergency bag
~k
77
October 2008
Low Risk
Overview
Introduction
Low Risk sets out the minimum standards at the pre-implementation stage
before a EU crisis management operation is launched or, once it has started,
when the risk is not elevated.
Contents
See Page
79
81
84
78
October 2008
With regard to an ECS in Low Risk countries, the term "appropriate and
available means" would typically mean cellular/mobile telephones, together
with satellite telephones.
Local
Establish an ECS throughout the operational area utilizing "appropriate and
Sub-Operating available means" in order to:
Offices
provide communications between the ASC and the AMSO, SMT within the
Area
provide communications between ASC and HoM/EUSR & MSO in the main
place of operations
Individual
Personnel
Procedures
79
October 2008
Requirements
80
October 2008
Central Mission
Office/Main
Duty Station
risk Assessment
Field Security H andbook
Mission Security Plan
MSSOS
security SOPs
emergency and medical evacuation procedures
relevant country maps
Warden Systems:
established and operational
exercised regularly
Building Emergency/Evacuation Plan, including an EUCI destruction plan:
established for all EU offices and facilities
exercised every three months
Local Sub
Operating
Offices/Local
Duty Stations
asttcecueny
youe EOUCE
k
81
October 2008
Local SubOperating
Offices/Local
Duty Stations
(continued)
Vehicles
All EU mission vehicles may be utilised throughout all areas of the country
when in Low Risk.
Drivers must have a relevant and valid, national driving licence.
All EU vehicles appropriately registered by the Host Government and
correctly insured in the country.
All vehicles appropriately marked (logos/flags/decals) as per mission SOPs.
Personnel
HoM and EUSR to ensure all EU mission personnel are appropriately insured
against malicious acts.
All personnel provided with Security-in-the-Field factsheets.
All personnel required to make themselves aware and comply with the
Mission Security Plan, MSOS, MS- SOS and relevant policies.
All new personnel provided with country-specific security orientation briefing
by HoM, EUSR or MSO.
Continued on next page
82
October 2008
Personnel
(continued)
Training
all personnel to complete Web-based e-learning Basic Security Awareness
training, expected to be available from mid 2008
in addition, throughout the process of MS-SOS development and
implementation, security managers must be aware of the need to provide
training and briefings for staff in general and for those with security
responsibilities
based on GSC Security Office guidelines the MSO will be responsible for
implementation of the mission security training
.....
83
October 2008
Local Sub
Operating
Offices/Local
Duty Stations
Vehicles
Standard
Mandatory
Equipment
When an MSO is appointed to a mission, the mission budget will provide the
MSO with the following standard mandatory equipment:
radio equipment
telephone (satellite and cellular)
laptop computer and accessories
digital camera
GPS
first aid kit (as appropriate for offices and vehicles)
advanced first aid kid (as appropriate for 1st responder and advanced trauma
treatment)
field tool equipment
84
October 2008
Medium Risk
Requirements
Contents
See Page
86
88
85
October 2008
Central Mission ECS is to be reinforced with fully operational, independent radio network
Office/
utilizing UHF, VHF and/or HF equipment as appropriate.
Main Duty
Station
Note
Radios are required from for Medium Risk environments because they provide
an independent means of communications whose capabilities are not matched
by cellular telephones and, perhaps, hand-held satellite telephones.
Security channel for HoM/EUSR, MSO and SMT members incorporated into
radio networks.
A system is to be established to ensure all ECS communications are monitored
24/7.
All emergency calls are to be serviced 24/7. A simple system of identifying a
duty officer may be appropriate for monitoring purposes, In this way security
linkage is maintained between all security officials at the duty station.
A 24/7 common-system radio room is to be established, operated and
equipped with base station radios, satellite telephone, email, etc..
A CCC to be established. It is to be located in or close to the radio room and
is to be used during crises. It does not need to operate 24/7, but is to be
equipped with all the necessary resources to ensure such an operation. Radio
room and CCC are not to be used as storage or other disruptive uses.
Satellite telephone provided to HoM/EUSR, MSO and other key individuals.
Offices to be equipped with operational satellite telephone capacity.
Essential staff are to be identified and provided with VHF/UHF radios as
appropriate.
Initiate resource contingency plan as appropriate for the move to high risk
rating.
Continuedon next page
86
October 2008
Local
Sub-Operating
Offices/
Local Duty
Stations
Vehicles
Individual
personnel
Procedures
87
October 2008
Central Mission Travel clearance procedures are to be established and implemented. This
Office/Main
includes countryspecific travel clearance procedures.
Duty Station
Security authorisation request system established.
Documentation:
same as Low Risk
countryspecific travel authorisation procedures in effect
Contingency plans are required for the procurement and installation of
appropriate specialised equipment.
Local Sub
Operating
Offices/Local
Duty Stations
Personnel
Tracking
System
In the Medium Risk environment the HoM and EUSR are responsible to be
aware of the location of all EU mission personnel at all times and shall
instigate an effective and reliable Personnel Tracking System to monitor their
whereabouts.
All personnel to be provided briefing on mission security arrangements and
missionspecific Security Plan.
All personnel to prepare individual 'emergency bags'.
MSO provided with additional equipment appropriate to conditions.
Continued on next page
October 2008
Personnel
ascLCECuenyeyoue eeutce
tf
89
October 2008
High/Critical Risk
Local Sub
Operating
Offices/Local
Duty Stations
Vehicles
sdscueny
90
youe eeuics
Personnel
October 2008
Gsctscuenymyoue
cseutcs
:
91
October 2008
Contents
See Page
93
94
96
92
FIELD SECURITY
HANDBOOK
October 2008
Introduction
Protective
For hostile areas of operation exposed to threats from conflict or war,
equipment
including:
against weapons
and artillery
explosive attack
artillery/mortar fire
aerial bombardment
heavy-machine gunfire
ambush attack
landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO)
Protective equipment and facilities may be appropriate in the development of
mission-specific SOS.
Protective
facilities
When to use
protective
equipment
Safe rooms, body armour, ballistic blankets and blast resistant film (Phase
Three) are required only if the security assessment performed establishes a
likely threat from a bomb and/or other ballistic threat. The Security Office
maintains the minimum standards required for bunkers, ballistic blankets and
blast protective film for glass.
General
personal
protection
equipment
fi"
93
October 2008
Office Security
Introduction
Physical security To the extent that the situation in the mission location warrants, some or all of
measures
the preventive measures contained in the Guidelines for physical security for
EU crisis management or EUSR mission headquarters should be implemented,
wherever practical.
Funding
Where the necessary funds for additional security measures are not available,
requests for appropriate additional financial provisions should be channelled
through the normal procedures applicable to the mission.
Selection of
In the selection of mission office premises, security should be one of the most
important criteria.
office premises
Areas in which possible targets for insurrection or terrorism are located, such
as military installations, political party headquarters, etc., should be avoided
wherever practical.
Commercial buildings in suitable urban areas have in general a better
reputation with regard to security than converted "single family" residences
surrounded by gardens or open spaces. Ground floor offices are much more
vulnerable to incidents of terrorism than those located on upper floors.
Fire protection
Adequate fire escapes should be available and should be clearly marked and
the corridors uncluttered.
Fire-fighting and other equipment must be accessible to all personnel and
regularly checked.
Continued on next page
94
October 2008
How to act in
case of
emergency
95
October 2008
Responsibility
The primary responsibility for the security and protection of the EU crisis
management and EUSR mission personnel and property rests with the host
government.
Often, governments, due to economic difficulties or lack of manpower, may
not be able to provide the necessary protection when there is a partial or total
breakdown of law and order resulting in increased criminal activity.
Funding of
protection
measures
Criteria for
determining
protection
measures
The following criteria apply for determining whether such measures are
justified:
the HoM or EUSR has confirmed that - based on the EU risk rating - the
area is at 'high' to 'critical' and that the government is not in a position to
provide the necessary protection. In the case of commercially rented
residences, the landlord will not install the protective devices required or
provide the protective services needed
the type of crime is essentially violent in nature and not just petty thievery
the incidence of crime demonstrates that it is widespread and not limited to
isolated instances
the preventive measures in question are commonly used in the foreign
community and are generally considered necessary
appropriate measures should be implemented to provide additional security
for single female members of staff who may be living alone
as<z.cscueny&youe cseuiCE
96
October 2008
Protection
measures
Selecting a
residence
Reporting
The HoM or EUSR or their MSO will report to the SITCEN (in the case of
EUSRS) and WKC (in the case of ESDP missions) and to the GSC Security
Office all incidents in which EU crisis management mission or EUSR
personnel and their property have been affected by common crime or violence.
Proceedings against common crime and violence shall include promptly
reporting to the host country authorities.
Record-keeping
Upon receipt of a report of an incident the WKC (in the case of the receipt of
a report from an ESDP mission) shall, according to the established incident
management procedures, notify the relevant departments, agencies and
personnel according to the criticality of the incident. In turn, those
departments and agencies are responsible, through their own duty officers, for
the maintenance of a full record of the sequence of events. Upon completion
of a period of duty, the respective duty officer shall be responsible for
informing and briefing his/her successor fully.
97
October 2008
Aim ofthe
mission security
plan
The primary management tool for security preparedness for any EU crisis
management or EUSR mission is the Mission Security Plan.
The aim of the plan is to detail the responsibilities of individuals, the actions to
be carried out and the sequence to be followed to ensure the security of
mission personnel, assets, resources and information.
Contents
See Page
100
105
126
99
October 2008
Introduction
The mission security plan is based on the MS-SOS and on the OPLAN. It has
to be implemented before the mission starts.
Contents
See Page
101
103
100
October 2008
General Principles
Responsibility
Purpose of the
plan
The purpose of the plan is to detail the actions to be taken to ensure the safety
and security of EU or EUSR mission personnel, their assets, resources and
information in response to the general situation and to any emergency
situation resulting from civil or political unrest or natural disasters.
Validation
The GSC Security Office will validate mission security plans for all ESDP
missions conducted Title V of the TEU.
Flexibility
The number and type of security situations which might occur at an EU crisis
management operation location are infinite.
There will be a great many ways of dealing with each situation, the most
appropriate of which can only be determined at the time of implementation of
the mission security plan.
In addition, the most appropriate way of dealing with a situation may vary
from area to area within a country or city and from hour to hour in a quickly
evolving situation.
Therefore, the basis for any mission security plan is that it is not a plan per se
but rather a series of well thought-out options to be drawn upon, reviewed and
revised as circumstances dictate.
The basic options should be prepared so as to apply to a full-scale evacuation
as well as to the relocation of smaller numbers of mission personnel.
Continued on next page
101
October 2008
Updating
Preparation
Summary guidelines for the preparation of the mission security plan are
contained on pages 99 et seq..
More detailed guidelines are presented in the Guidelines for MSO.
In preparing the mission security plan, the HoM/EUSR should ensure that it
addresses the specific needs and reflects the specific conditions of the country
or environment his/her mission operates in.
Continuity
The mission specific security plan, security measures taken by the host
government and any supporting arrangements decided by the HoM/EUSR
and/or the CivOpCdr should enable EU missions to continue to carry out their
normal functions insofar as this is appropriate in the light of disturbances,
hostilities, natural disasters, etc.
Note
There may be instances when normal functioning may not be possible at all.
Security
Classification
The mission security plan and all related sensitive documents have to be
classified in accordance with the Council's security regulations. Such
documents shall be classified at least RESTREINT UE.
102
October 2008
Precautions
Validity of
documents
Travellers
cheques
Medical record
Ensure that anyone with a medical problem (diabetes, etc.) has this on record
both at home and in the mission HQ.
Information should include:
ailment
type of medication
where to obtain medicine
doctor's name and address
blood type
allergies, etc.
Have handouts ready, that explain clearly the specific safety and security
precautions that each individual should take in the form of food, supplies and
actions.
Provide information regarding the personnel policies and compensation
policies in the event of property loss and damage, applicable to EU mission
personnel in case of an emergency evacuation.
Continuedon next page
103
October 2008
Specific
arrangements
Ensure that specific arrangements are in place with selected Member States'
diplomatic missions for cooperation on security-related matters and
communicate these to the CPCC, who will inform the Council Security Office
in the case of ESDP missions. In the case of the EUSRS, the EUSR shall
communicate these directly to the Council Security Office.
Disaster-prone
areas
Restrictions on
mission and
visitor travel
When a security situation arises, it is essential that the WKC (in the case of
ESDP missions) or SITCEN (in the case of EUSR missions) be immediately
advised whether restrictions should be imposed on mission and visitor travel
to the country concerned. WKC and SITCEN will in turn notify the CPCC
and the GSC Security Office. In any event, the GSC Security Office should
notify DG A1B and seek clarification from the GSC Travel Office of all staff
intending to travel to the affected region. SITCEN should notify relevant
Heads of Unit of restrictions. Heads of Unit will then be responsible for
ensuring that individuals are advised and that the restrictions are respected.
Any communication reporting a security situation should also contain
information on how it affects travel to or inside the country.
104
October 2008
About these
guidelines
The present guidelines are intended to flag a number of issues and questions
which must be addressed by each HoM in the preparation of options.
This list, by its nature, is not exhaustive. Every EU crisis management
mission location and every situation will be unique and it is the responsibility
of the HoM, EUSR and the SMT to anticipate the situations which might
arise with respect to their duty station.
Contents
The mission security plan will contain the following basic information:
Topic
Summary of Security Situation at EU Mission Location
Officials Responsible for Security
Listings of Mission Personnel for Security Purposes
Record of Personnel
Record of Locally-Recruited Mission Personnel
Division of Country/City into Zones
Communications
Selection of Coordination Centre/Concentration Point
Safe Havens
Essential Reserves/Supplies
Wardens
Duties of the Zone Wardens: Phase One
Duties of the Zone Wardens: Phase Two
Duties of the Zone Wardens: Phases Three, Four and
Five
Security
Elements
See Page
106
107
108
109
111
113
114
116
117
120
121
123
124
125
In addition to the above topics, the mission security plan has to include at least
the following security elements:
SOPs
contingency plans
evacuation plan, medical or otherwise
relocation plan
105
October 2008
Outline
The mission security plan will include a brief outline of the security situation
and likely areas of concern regarding the aims and tasks of the mission.
State of
preparedness
106
October 2008
At Council
Headquarters
At the mission
location
The plan will list the names and regular functions of all officials directly
concerned with and responsible for the implementation of the mission
security plan, including:
107
October 2008
Introduction
Records
Subject to Data Protection provisions, each HoM and EUSR will maintain an
up-to-date record in the format shown under "Record of personnel" on page
109 below.
Similar information in a suitably modified format should be maintained for
locally-recruited staff members (see "Record of locally-recruited mission
personnel" on page 111 below).
A copy of these records and their updates will be sent to the WKC (in the case
of ESDP missions) and SITCEN (in the case of EUSR missions) as a reference
in case of a developing or actual security situation.
108
October 2008
Record of Personnel
EU Mission
designation
Staff Member
Family Name
First Name
Date of birth
Nationality
ID Card No.
Local address
Street, number
City
Postal code
Country
Quarter
Floor
Entrance
Type of building
Attach location sketch
Telephone
number
Direct line
Home country
address
Street, number
Switchboard
City
Postal code
Country
Next of kin in
home country
Name
Kinship
Address
Telephone
09
Passport
October 2008
Name
Number
Issued
Expiry
Date & Validity
of visas
Health record
Blood type
Allergies
Typhoid
Cholera
Yellow Fever
Rabies
Others
Inventory of
valuables
To be submitted on (Date):
Other relevant
information
Important!
no
October 2008
EU Mission
designation
Staff Member
Family Name
First Name
Date of birth
Nationality
ID Card No.
Address
Street, number
City
Postal code
Country
Quarter
Floor
Entrance
Type of building
Attach location sketch
Telephone
number
Direct line
Next of kin
Name
Switchboard
Kinship
Address
Telephone
111
Health record
October 2008
Blood type
Allergies
Typhoid
Cholera
Yellow Fever
Rabies
Others
Other relevant
information
Important!
112
October 2008
The plan will clearly indicate the zones into which the country has been sub
divided.
City zones
It will also indicate the zones into which cities have been sub-divided.
Map
Responsible
persons per
zone
The plan will clearly indicate the warden and deputy warden responsible for
each zone on the map, as well as the ASC, where appropriate.
EU mission
personnel per
zone
Locallyrecruited
personnel
113
October 2008
Communications
Introduction
Good communications, both internal and external, are a critical and essential
element of any security arrangement. Every effort must be made to ensure
that such communications are available under all circumstances.
Public
In the first instance, the available public communications (telephone, email,
communications SMS, fax) should be relied upon.
In cases of emergency such facilities are most vulnerable and may not be
available at all. H oM and EUSR missions should therefore have alternative
communication means in case of a breakdown or suspected compromise of
public communications facilities.
Minimum
Security
Operating
Standards
Available
means of
communication
The mission security plan will describe in detail the means of communication
which are available and ensure their adequacy:
between the mission location and Council H eadquarters
within the country:
between the mission HQ and/or coordination centre and mission locations
outside the main place of operations, and
within the main place of operations between wardens and the coordination
centre and between vehicles and the coordination centre
to and between neighbouring countries
Continued on next page
wI
114
October 2008
Communications, Continued
Means of
communication
available to
HoM/EUSR
Technical issues This section will also include detailed information regarding frequencies to be
used, call signs and radio procedures.
Contingency
Plan
In the event of electrical power failure, the radio network will be dead within
two days because the batteries cannot be recharged.
Contingency plans should therefore be put in place whereby the radio system
will work on a fixed schedule in the absence of electricity and otherwise be
turned off.
Training
115
October 2008
Alternative
locations
The plan will indicate one or more possible coordination centres and one or
more possible concentration points. These will have been agreed with the
provider (military, Government, etc.).
It may not always be possible for all mission personnel to come to the
designated concentration centre. Therefore, alternative locations should be
foreseen.
Criteria for
concentration
points
116
October 2008
Safe Havens
Safe Haven
The plan will indicate a realistic safe haven for each area of the country and
indeed neighbouring country as well as regional alternatives. The selection of
these must be determined by the practicality of each option which must
ensure that mission personnel are not exposed to further risks or dangers by
the particular choice. Similarly, all steps must be taken to establish the
necessary memoranda of understanding with the identified host government
and contingencies considered to ensure that EU mission personnel are
safeguarded fully (e.g. ensuring that at mission members have appropriate
visas). Movement of EU mission personnel during relocation/evacuation may
require the use of land, air or sea transportation or any combination thereof.
Three means of
The plan will provide detailed information regarding how the safe haven
would be reached by the three means of transportation, as applicable:
transportation
by air
by road and/or
by ship
By air
Chartering of aircraft
Detailed information will be provided regarding the possibilities of locally
chartering aircraft, bearing in mind that national carriers, notwithstanding
prior arrangements, may not be available at the last moment during times of
crisis.
In addition, information, including the leadtime required for charter, will be
provided regarding charter possibilities in neighbouring countries. It should
be borne in mind that it sometimes becomes difficult to acquire landing and
fuelling rights for these aircraft.
Aircraft
For planning purposes, an estimate should be provided regarding the number
of persons who might be evacuated in each phase so as to be able to
determine what kind of aircraft would be required and how many flights will
be required.
Airports
Detailed information will be provided regarding available airports and what
type of aircraft they can accommodate.
Detailed information will also be provided regarding alternative routes from
the concentration point to the airport.
Continued on next page
117
October 2008
By Road
Itinerary
The plan will include a detailed itinerary of all possible overland escape
routes, including the conditions of roads, distances between points and
refuelling possibilities.
In addition, the plan will detail whether there are any tunnels or bridges on
the road which might not be operational. Detailed maps of these escape
routes will be provided.
Vehicles
In the first instance, official vehicles will be used to move mission personnel
from their homes to concentration areas, to the airport and possibly to the safe
haven.
All official vehicles to be used will be identified; the plan will include
information regarding the vehicles':
usual location
passenger capacity
cargo capacity
whether the vehicle is adequately identified as belonging to an EU crisis
management mission
if not whether decal/flag will be required
the type of fuel used
By Ship
118
October 2008
Replacement of
Warden system
After the declaration of Phase Three, when only core mission personnel
remain, the warden system will be in disarray. A second system should
therefore be put in place.
When wardens are changed, the list should be updated as necessary, taking
into consideration wardens going on leave or completing their assignment.
asaecueny
119
October 2008
Essential Reserves/Supplies
Estimates of
requirements
The plan will include estimates of requirements for drinking water, food
reserves, medical supplies and fuel reserves to support the EU crisis
management mission for a reasonable period of time.
Plans should be drawn up regarding where these reserves would be kept.
EU
identification
materials
vehicle decais
flags
armbands
reflective vests
120
October 2008
Wardens
Introduction
Responsibility
121
October 2008
Wardens, Continued
Sample letter
Date:
To:
From: Head of Mission
covering
The following are duties of the Warden during the preparation and
implementation phases of the mission security plan:
Topic
Duties of the Zone Wardens: Phase One
Duties of the Zone Wardens: Phase Two
Duties of the Zone Wardens: Phases Three, Four and
Five
See Page
123
124
125
122
October 2008
Visits and
checks
Although Phase One procedures should have been observed as normal routine
precautions, wardens will visit the mission personnel in their zone and check
to see that the procedures have been observed.
For their guidance, the initial instructions given to all mission personnel are
as described below.
For EU mission
personnel
For locallyrecruited
mission
personnel
123
October 2008
Wardens will visit all mission personnel in their zone and give them the
following instructions:
all non-essential mission personnel will remain at home. If they want to
leave their home for urgent reasons, e.g., medical treatment, etc., they will
contact their warden and make the necessary arrangements
for EU mission personnel, check that one suitcase of clothing is packed with
a limit of 15 kg. per person. The suitcase must be clearly labelled showing
the person's name and nationality. Check that identity cards, passports,
health certificates and reserve finances are at hand
prepare food and water to take to the concentration area in case Phase Three
is declared
Procedures
during subsequent phases
Wardens will also advise the staff members in their zone of the procedures to
be observed during subsequent phases.
124
October 2008
Relocation,
suspension,
evacuation
The following table lists the activities that take place during Phases Three,
Four and Five:
Stage
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Description
The HoM will inform wardens of the time and place where EU
mission personnel are to be concentrated.
Wardens will inform all EU personnel of this Phase and give them
the following instructions:
Leave home at...
If they do not have a vehicle, they are to wait at their home until
they are picked up by EU transport.
They are to leave their home with their personal documents, food
and prepared luggage.
Turn off electricity, gas, water and heater connections.
Make sure their home is locked.
Arrange for vehicles (private or otherwise) to move to prearranged concentration area.
Wardens will record the details of each vehicle leaving the zone.
Wardens will accompany the last vehicle from their zone to the
concentration area.
In the concentration area, Wardens will be responsible for the
checking of all mission personnel from their zone and arrange for
the parking of their transport.
Wardens will receive further instructions from the HoM/EUSR.
Wardens will carry out all duties assigned to them by the
HoM/EUSR and will accompany the staff members from their zone
to the designated area.
125
October 2008
Definition and
characteristics
Mandatory
SOPs
Optional SOPs
Contents
See Page
127
130
131
133
126
October 2008
Introduction
Contact
outside the
office
Demonstrators
inside the office
Avoid taking any risks and bear in mind that the first consideration must be
the personal safety of all mission personnel.
Isolate the group in a pre-arranged area, preventing access to telephones,
facsimile and telex, to the extent possible. If necessary, consider
disconnecting telephone, facsimile and telex.
Attempt to speak only to the designated spokesperson, preferably apart from
the main group.
Make every effort to persuade the occupants to leave the premises
immediately and peacefully. The function of the mission offices should be
explained, with special emphasis on their role.
Ascertain the reasons for the occupation. If asylum is sought, it should be
explained to the group that neither the HoM nor the EUSR is a diplomatic
envoy and the premises are not an embassy, therefore no refuge or protection
can be given.
Notify the appropriate government department, normally the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, and keep it informed of developments.
Notify the SITCEN, in the case of the EUSRs and WKC in the case of the
ESDP missions immediately. In all cases, instructions will go to the HoM or
EUSR who will then coordinate actions with the offices concerned.
Warn other EU crisis management mission facilities in the country/city of the
occupancy and, if it is thought necessary, the government should be asked to
provide protection to those premises as a preventive measure.
Continuedon next page
...
127
October 2008
Continuing
normal
operation
Role of the office The role of the office in this situation should be non-participating and any
action that would in any way encourage or make it easier for the unauthorized
occupants to stay on should be avoided. Only urgent medical attention should
be given when required.
Statements to
the press
No statement to the press or other media should be given at any time or under
a n y circumstances unless authorized specifically by the SG/HR in the case of
EUSR missions and the CivOpCdr in the case of ESDP missions.
Continued on next page
128
October 2008
Petitions
Assistance from
third parties
Safety and
security of
mission
personnel
Finally, under any circumstances, the first concern of the HoM or EUSR
should be the safety and security of all mission personnel, and to this end
unnecessary exposure to risks should be avoided.
In all cases it is important for mission personnel to keep as low a profile as
possible and to maintain a formal position at all times.
129
October 2008
Reporting to the EU crisis management and EUSR mission offices, as well as individuals
HoM or EUSR members of mission personnel, can become the object of anonymous
or their MSO
threatening telephone calls.
Although such calls are usually empty threats, they should not be dismissed
lightly and should be reported to the HoM or EUSR or their MSO, no matter
their nature.
Action by the
HoM or EUSR
and their MSO
The HoM or EUSR or their MSO should immediately inform the authorities
and, if feasible, request their assistance in tracing the call.
It is especially important that the contents of the call as well as all other details
be reported as accurately as possible for subsequent evaluation of the threat in
relation to other available information.
Training of
mission
personnel
Personnel members who are likely to receive such calls (telephone operators,
persons who have received such calls before, etc.) should be provided with
instructions on how to handle this type of call.
Guidelines and forms to that effect are contained in the 'Guidelines for
MSOs'.
Questions to be
answered
Response to the
threat
Is it a crank call?
Does it relate to a personal matter?
Is it directed against the recipient in his/her official capacity?
Is the call directed against the EU programme in the country?
How serious is the threat?
asdscueny
130
youe semes
October 2008
Bomb Threats
Bomb plan
Floor wardens
Floor wardens should be appointed who, in case of evacuation, will ensure that
no one is left behind and who would also be briefed on what to look for during
searches of their respective areas.
Evacuation
procedures
In the event of a bomb threat, a full or partial evacuation of the premises may
be in order. Consideration should be given to:
131
October 2008
Search
132
October 2008
Description
The HoM or EUSR shall report the incident by the fastest means
of communication available to the SITCEN (in the case of GSC
staff or EUSR missions) and WKC in the case of ESDP missions.
The SITCEN/WKC (as appropriate) shall inform the CivOpCdr
and other appropriate authorities, including the GSC Security
Office. The CivOpCdr shall inform the SG/HR at the earliest
opportunity. In the case of an incident involving an EUSR
mission member, SITCEN shall notify the SG/HR
Reporting to the In addition, the HoM or EUSR in whose mission the arrest or detention has
government
taken place shall immediately contact the Foreign Ministry of the government
concerned
concerned and request:
all relevant information about the arrest or detention, and
the government's cooperation in arranging as a matter of urgency that
representatives of the EU accompanied by a medical physician of their
choice be given access to the individual arrested or detained
Content of the
report to the
Secretary
General / High
Representative
asascuenyAyoue
if
semes
133
October 2008
Content of the
report to the
Secretary
General / High
Representative
(continued)
Updating
reports
If information on some of the items listed above is not available without delay,
the available information should be forwarded immediately to the CivOpCdr
through the WKC (in the case of an ESDP mission) or to the SG/HR's office
through SITCEN (in the case of an incident involving EUSR mission members
or GSC staff) and the missing items shall be communicated in a
supplementary report or reports as soon as possible.
Additional information relevant to the case shall also be reported as soon as
possible.
In this way the availability, at headquarters level, of accurate and up-to-date
information on each EU crisis management or EUSR mission personnel who
has been arrested or detained or who has disappeared or been killed may be
ensured.
Statements to
the media
Headquarters'
response
Determining what further action may be required will involve the SG/HR and
the Permanent Representation to the EU of any seconded national expert or
EU citizen concerned.
Arrest/detention
by unauthorized
or unknown
person(s)
134
October 2008
Suspension of
operations
The SG/HR (in consultation with the CivOpCdr in the case of an incident
involving an ESDP mission) will determine what action to take and may
request Member States to bring the necessary pressure to bear on the
government or authority concerned.
135
October 2008
Introduction
Contents
See Page
138
140
143
147
148
149
150
155
156
158
159
137
October 2008
Document status The following table shows the status of this document:
Produced by
Date Production
Document owner
Reviewed by
Translated by
Date of last revision
Distribution list
HoM /EUSR
Scope
Aim
The aim of this EERP is to provide planned, agreed and, where possible,
practised procedures for the emergency evacuation of mission personnel from
the AoR to areas where their safety can be assured and/or where they can
continue activity.
Objectives
138
Structure of the
Plan
October 2008
The following table shows the structure of the EERP. A small description
briefly explains each section of the plan.
Section
Document, status, scope
and structure of the plan
General Principles
Organisation and
Responsibilities of the
EMT
Emergency Management
Team/Brussels
Monitoring
Communication Structure
Relocation
Assembly Areas and
Central Assembly Point
Departure Point
Exit Routes
Relocation Destination
Safe Havens
Contingencies
Contents
Describes the philosophy of emergency planning
and the commitment to protect mission
personnel.
Explains the general principles for managing an
emergency situation of evacuation and
relocation.
Outlines the duties and responsibilities of the
EMT in the event of an emergency evacuation
of mission personnel from the theatre of
operations.
Describes the activities of the EMT/B at the
GSC in Brussels.
Describes the importance of monitoring a
situation and the system of notification from the
EMT to mission staff.
Outlines the general principles of the
communication structure.
Outlines the general principles of the relocation
process.
Describes the various assembly locations.
Describes the Departure Point.
Outlines the various types of transportation and
suggests routes that can be taken in the event of
an emergency relocation.
Describes the actions to be taken at the
relocation destination.
Outlines options available if emergency
relocation is not possible.
Outlines the "actions on" in the case of
unforeseen or unplanned events.
139
October 2008
General P rinciples
Importance of a
staged
evacuation
Health and
safety
Protecting the health and safety of everyone in the Mission is the first priority
during an emergency.
Reasons for
relocation
One common means of protection is evacuation. The safety and well being of
all mission personnel takes precedence over mission and personal property and
equipment. Emergency evacuation planning is designed to be implemented
when mission is directly threatened by security risks. Under this scenario,
there may be a requirement to either gradually relocate staff to their country of
origin or to evacuate at short notice to a safe haven.
Emergency
Management
Team
The EMT with the HoM/EUSR as its Team Leader will manage and control
any disruption to mission activity and coordinate, if required, the evacuation
and emergency relocation of mission personnel.
In the case of an incident, as support structure the EMT/B will be set up at the
GSC to advise and assist the EMT.
The EMT has the authority to implement the procedures outlined in this
document in accordance with the Security Phase System. Should it become
necessary, due to the complete breakdown of communications, the HoM may
make unilateral decisions.
140
Emergency
Management
Team
(continued)
October 2008
The EMT has the task of ensuring that Local Emergency Plans are updated
and workable, and that all agreed procedures, measures and personnel
necessary for the implementation of the EERP are in place. During a
deteriorating situation, the EMT will maintain close liaison with the EMT/B
and will provide regular local situation reports and assessments.
The EMT controls the actual implementation of the EERP when the decision
to evacuate or relocate is reached. As noted above, the HoM, in consultation
with his EMT, will have the authority to make the decision to evacuate and
relocate.
Emergency
Planning
Principles
It is likely that there will be an escalating situation, rather than a single major
event, which will necessitate the implementation of the EERP.
In the event of a gradually escalating direct threat to mission personnel all
personnel will be relocated gradually, according to their job functions and the
level of threat, or immediately if the threat warrants an immediate emergency
evacuation:
Continued on next page
...
141
General Outline
of relocation
(continued)
October 2008
Relocation
destination
Preferred relocation destination for all staff will be a Safe Haven Country.
The EMT is authorized to require staff to stay in the Safe Haven Country in
view of return.
Relocation Party The EERP is based on the presence of a defined number of mission personnel.
EU staff on business trip in the AoR will be relocated in the same way as
mission personnel. Other expatriates might attempt to join the evacuation
party, especially if a chartered aeroplane or other means of transport is made
available. In case the EMT considers cooperation with other entities to be
advantageous, all arrangements should be made beforehand, and the EERP
adapted accordingly. Other evacuees, with exception of those foreseen in the
EERP, are not allowed to participate as they may jeopardise the safety of
mission personnel.
In the case of EUSRs and their staff, the EERP may actually be managed by
the EC Delegation or one of the Member States' embassies. In this case, it is
the responsibility of the EUSR to ensure that his/her staffare fully aware of
the requirements of the EERP and that the mission's plan fully complements
that of the Delegation or Embassy. Further, they have a responsibility to be
fully aware of the mechanics of the EERP.
Costs of
relocation
The costs of evacuation and repatriation are borne by the EU, including
additional costs to be made for preparatory actions or costs made at the
relocation destination.
Approval of HoM/EUSR must be sought for all financial actions relating to
the EERP.
142
October 2008
Membership
Team Leader
Logistics/Communications
Finance / Transportation
Personnel
Security
Meeting Place
Member
HoM/EUSR
Deputy
Members and
Deputies
The role of the Members will be to assume full responsibility for the
performance of the EERP, and the carrying out of the tasks discussed in this
document.
The Deputies will stand in for the Member in the case of absence. The
Deputies must be familiar with all aspects of the Member's responsibilities as
outlined in this EERP.
Responsibilities
of the Team
As the individual with overall responsibility for the safety and security of
mission personnel, the HoM/EUSR will function as the EMT's Team Leader.
Leader
Continuedon next page
143
Responsibilities
of the Team
Leader
(continued)
October 2008
The Team Leader, with the CMT, will monitor and assess the local security
environment and decide on any action required, including the moving from
one Security Phase to another. The Team Leader will also:
monitor the situation and brief staff and the SG/HR and other EU bodies as
appropriate
call EMT meetings as required and organise the agenda
authorise expenditure as required
authorise media contact. No statements should be made without his/her
authorisation
select and nominate Assembly Areas and Safe Havens
Liaison
responsibilities
of the Team
Leader
Responsibilities
of the Deputy
Team Leader
The EMT Deputy Team Leader will stand in for the CMT Team Leader when
he/she is not available to attend EMT meetings and will be responsible for the
day-to-day supervision, co-ordination and implementation of the relocation
plans. The Deputy Team Leader will also:
diplomatic representations
the host nation government, including its military and police authorities, as
required
senior staff of other AoR-based international crisis management actors
other authorities, groups and individuals as required
Responsibilities
towards the
personnel
The EMT must ensure availability of all relevant information on all mission
personnel. It will:
maintain personal records of all staff
maintain an up-to-date contact list of staff
prepare lists of evacuees for each Security Phase and monitor their progress
during relocation/evacuation
144
Responsibilities
towards
Transportation
October 2008
The EMT must coordinate with the host nation government to identify and
facilitate the best available means of transport and ensure that transport
resources are always available to expedite a gradual relocation or an
emergency evacuation.
Additionally, the EMT shall:
ensure all documentation for the movement of personnel, internally and
externally, is current and available
maintain contact details of airlines and shipping lines
maintain timetables of scheduled flights from the AoR and other nearby
airports and ferry departure tables
identify seasonal / climatic problems likely to affect movement.
with the assistance of the EMT/B arrange for the reception, transportation,
accommodation and onward movement of evacuees
arrange the loading or safe storage of personal possessions in case of gradual
relocation
Responsibilities
for Logistics
The EMT is responsible for ensuring all emergency supplies, required for a
gradual relocation or an emergency evacuation, are available and easily
accessible. The EMT shall:
arrange stockpiles of nonperishable food and water to last at least 1 week in
nominated residences and safe havens
arrange basic medical supplies and access to appropriate medical facilities
and services
establish and maintain communications links, internally and externally
Responsibilities
for Finance
The EMT is responsible for ensuring that emergency funds, required for a
gradual relocation or an emergency evacuation, are available and easily
accessible. The EMT shall:
ensure availability and provision of currency and/or traveller's checks
ensure all insurance issues regarding an emergency evacuation are dealt with
Responsibilities
for Security
The EMT, assisted by the MSO, will advise all staff on all security issues
relating to an emergency evacuation and the EMT will implement security
measures as required. Their activities may include:
providing regular current assessments of the local security situation and
communicate them to the WKC (in the case of an incident involving ESDP
mission staff) or SITCEN (in the case of an incident involving EUSR
mission staff or GSC staff) and the EMT/B
providing regular security briefings to mission personnel
Continuedon next page
'
45
October 2008
Responsibilities
for Security
(continued)
security
security
security
security
security
of communications
of meeting rooms used by the EMT
of documentary records
of the safe havens and nominated staff residences
escorts for senior mission personnel as required
146
October 2008
Organisation
The EMT/B will be operating in close liaison with the SITCEN (in the case of
an incident involving EUSR mission staff or GSC staff) or WKC (in the case
of an ESDP mission) and advise the SG/HR and the CivOpCdr (where
relevant) on actions to be taken, including notification to Member States.
Members of the
EMT/B
The EMT/B will be developed specifically for the mission and the crisis
situation. The EMT/B is headed by the SG/HR.
Ideally it should have representatives of the following entities:
SG/HR Private Office
DSG Private Office
SITCEN
WKC
DGE
EUMS
CPCC
GSC Security Office
Presidency representative
and be able to draw on the punctual assistance of other relevant services, i.e.
financial, legal, DGA V, etc.
Responsibilities
The EMT/B is in command and control of all aspects of the crisis situation.
The members of the EMT/B will operate according to the Security Phase
System:
either as dislocated task force (on-call duty is compensatory), or
as permanent consolidated and centralized management team
(24/7 duty)
147
October 2008
Monitoring
Routine
Monitoring
Sources of
Information
148
October 2008
Communication Structure
Warden Contact All mission personnel must know the contact details for their Warden. All
new mission personnel and visitors must be made aware that the Warden
System exists and know which Warden they should communicate with in the
event of an emergency.
Notification
during
emergency
149
October 2008
Relocation
Relocation
Process
Head counts
The MSO should take head counts during the relocation operation at AA, on
the CAP and on the DP.
Confusion in the assembly areas can lead to unnecessary and dangerous search
and rescue operations.
The MSO should establish a method for accounting for mission staff, for non
mission personnel and remaining core personnel during evacuation.
Contents
See Page
151
152
153
150
October 2008
Definition
AAs and CAP are locations (hereafter "assembly locations") where personnel
will gather prior to moving to the chosen DP before relocation.
Areas may combine two functions i.e. the AA can also be the DP, although
this decision needs to be correctly assessed since in time of emergency a DP
may be overflowing with evacuees.
Location
AA's and the CAP should be located for general ease of access, and should
provide a level of security.
The AA will usually be the residence of the local Warden or a senior
employee.
A high level of discretion (at least RESTREINT UE) should be exercised with
regard to all assembly locations.
Responsibilities
Assembly locations may change according to the situation and the means of
relocation or evacuation.
The nominated Warden will be responsible for calling each group to the
nominated assembly locations.
Wardens are designated to account for all mission staff.
The names and last known locations of personnel not accounted for should be
determined and given to the EMT.
Transport to the Staff will travel to the assembly locations with means preagreed with the host
nation.
AA
: :
151
October 2008
Departure P oint
Transport from
the AA's to the
DP
From the AA's or the CAP each group, under the control of the Warden, will
m 0 V e to the DP.
The EMT would take responsibility for moving all the evacuees to the DP for
the relocation or emergency evacuation (to the airport, ferry terminal or
overland).
The method of transport from the AA to the CAP/DP will depend on the local
situation and the means of transport available. The first option should be via
the host nation organized transport. In extreme cases the EMT may arrange
for helicopters to pick up staff at the assembly locations for transportation to
the DP.
Evacuation by
air
Primary DP
Evacuation
overland
Primary DP
Evacuation by
ferry
For an evacuation by ferry (or other vessels), the primary DP's will be:
Primary DP
152
October 2008
Exit Routes
Preparations to
be made
Possible
Evacuation
Routes
Air
Sea
Land
153
October 2008
Transportation
Availability
Air
Sea
Land
ferry
chartered vessel
The following options for evacuation from the AOR by land
exist:
road
rail
154
October 2008
External
assistance
reception
In the event of relocation the EMT/B will arrange for reception teams to meet
mission personnel at the intermediate and final destinations to respectively
facilitate their stopover and arrival.
Arrangements for lodging of staff will be made.
The Safe Haven Country is the preferred primary relocation destination for all
staff since a Member State support system can quickly be put in place.
Failures
In a full scale emergency some mission personnel may miss the uplift. In that
event they should:
try to reach a safe haven and stay there
get in touch with their Point of Contact in the theatre, in adjacent countries
or in Brussels
Return of staff en route to a DP to attempt to find missing staff is not
authorised since it can jeopardise overall safety.
155
October 2008
Safe Havens
Selecting a
location as a
Safe Haven
Typically, the nominated safe havens will be residential quarters outside the
main potential areas of trouble (see above).
Hotels selection
Basic supplies
Any safe haven should be fitted out and stockpiled with the basic necessities
as a matter of course.
156
October 2008
Location
A Safe Haven should be capable of being stocked with food, water, fuel,
medicines and all necessary supplies and equipment for all persons for at least
one week. Further, a Safe Haven should be:
located away from potential trouble spots, government buildings and other
possible strategic targets
easily accessible to staff and their families
be able to ensure a good level of security
be large enough to accommodate personnel and any EU or Contributing
States representatives who may be visiting at the time
Equipment
check
Supplies check
157
October 2008
Assessment
The assessment process and actions taken will depend on the Security Phase
reached. The following will need to be considered by the remaining members
of the EMT in situ and the EMT/B.
Assessment
Actions
158
October 2008
Contact list
Contact details
159
October 2008
Contingency Plans
Overview
Introduction
This part covers the "when" and "why" of contingency planning. It considers
the relationship to early warning, operations planning and deeds assessment
and identifies indicators which will suggest when it is prudent to initiate the
planning process.
Contents
See Page
162
163
164
161
October 2008
Contingency Planning
Definition
Identify
Critical
Services
and
Operations
Assess the impact of potential emergencies and determine the need for backup
systems. Areas to review include:
Identify
Internal
Resources and
Capabilities
Establish
Procedures
162
October 2008
Criteria for
Contingency
Planning
Difference
between
CP and OP
Structure
::
163
October 2008
Planning Process
Definition
Scenario
Identification
Prediction of a "The only predictable thing about a scenario is that it will be wrong".
Scenario
This may be true, but it doesn't really matter that much. It is important to
settle for one or more scenarios for planning purposes and if the influx is
smaller, one knows one is well prepared, and if it is greater, one immediately
realises the importance.
Continuedon next page
164
-k
October 2008
Policy/strategic The planners need to have some vision of the direction of the overall
objective
operation. To the extent possible this should be a shared vision. It is not
Identification
unusual for the various partners to hold different policy approaches to a
particular problem. If these can not be reconciled at least they should be
known and understood by all parties.
Nevertheless an effort should be made to agree on some overall principles
through establishing overall objectives for the response operation. All
activities undertaken in the plan will need to be consistent with these overall
objectives.
The overall objectives can simply be accomplished by brainstorming in
plenary. In order to divert any open confliction debate some effort may be
required prior to the final planning process to find a formula acceptable to all
parties.
The policy objectives are normally of a general nature and noncontroversial.
Objective identification is a substantive and detailed part of the planning
process. For each sector the planners should agree, in as much detail as time
will permit, on the:
objectives including standards
activities/tasks
who is responsible for implementing the task
time frame for implementation
165
October 2008
Contents
See Page
168
170
171
172
167
October 2008
Incident and
consequence
management
Among the core measures for the security of personnel, the Field Security
Policy provides for an incident and consequence management system to be
established in a consistent way between operations in the field, the General
Secretariat of the Council, participating Member States/contributing Third
States and the Council (through the PSC).
This system is to cover "serious security incidents or threats to the security of
personnel, whether caused by accidents, conflict, malicious acts, criminal acts,
kidnap and hostage situations or medical emergencies".
Its reporting, communication and analysis requirements are summarised in the
scheme set out in the next page:
168
Contributing
third States
Participating
Member States
/
Reporting as
necessary
Commun i c a ting
General
Secretariat
of the Cou ncil
"Analysing
Communicating
Reviewing and
improving security
measures and
structures
EUSR
Head of Mission
Force Commander
(in military
operations)
International
Organisations
October 2008
Key elements
A security incident report should cover, if possible, all the elements set out
below:
reporter identification
-Name
- Function
- Reporting time
- Reporting place
incident identification
-Date
- Time
- Country
- Place
- Location details
Reporting
incident description
action taken locally
assistance requested from Brussels
impact of incident
further remarks
170
October 2008
Communication Incidents affecting an ESDP mission will be handled at GSC level according
to the detailed chain of communication set out below.
WKC DO
CPCCDO
Alerts CPCC DO
Alerts SITCEN
Alerts Mission
if appropriate
Assists WKC DO in
alerting Key Personnel
:.
If so instructed, alerts
Desk Officers and Hi
Rank Personnel
Assists WKC DO in
alerting Desk Officers
and HiRank Personnel
If so instructed, calls
an Operations Crisis
Meeting
Assists WKC in
calling an Operations
Crisis Meeting
Supports
implementation of
CPCC/Operations
Crisis Meeting
decisions
Supports
implementation of
CPCC/Operations
Crisis Meeting
decisions
171
October 2008
Introduction
The Field Security Policy provides that "Analysis of serious security incidents
will be undertaken regularly by the GSC to allow for the continuous review
and improvement of the measures and structures for the security of personnel
deployed in crisis management operations."
In order to implement this requirement, the GSC Security Office is has been
developing an automated security incident reporting system (SIRS). SIRS will
allow relevant actors in the field to report safety and security incidents to
headquarters a posteriori. It will be a tool for collecting data in a systematic
and standardised way. The statistical results from SIRS will allow medium
and long range planning of field security needs and allow continuous
improvement to the way the safety and security of staff is managed in the
field.
172
October 2008
EU classified
information
(EUCI)
Council's
Security
Regulations
Protecting EUCI Espionage by state and criminal actors in a field security environment is
in a field
endemic.
environment
Third state intelligence agencies involved or interested in the area where the
EU is projecting itself, will try to gain access to classified information to
further their own goals. These may be contrary to the objectives and interests
of the EU.
Criminal actors may also become affected by EU action in a particular area
and may seek information allowing them to hamper developments affecting
the criminal activity they are involved in.
While EUCI should be protected as a matter of course under Council Decision
2001/264/EC, protecting EUCI in a field environment takes on a special
importance as its compromise of loss may, besides affecting EU interests, also
affect the safety and security of EU staff deployed in the area.
Release to third
countries
173
Practical
guidance
October 2008
Management
Destruction
174
October 2008
List
The table below explains the meaning of the acronyms and abbreviations used
throughout this handbook.
Acronym/abbreviation
AA
AoR
ASC
CAP
CCC
CivOpCdr
CMC
CONOPS
CPCC
CRT
DP
ECS
EERP
EMT
EMT/B
EUCI
ESDP
EUSR
GSC
HEST
HoM
LEA
MoU
MSO
MSORS
MSOS
MSP
MS-SOS
NGO
OPLAN
PSC
SG/HR
SIAC
SIRS
SITCEN
SMT
SOMA
SOP
SORS
SOS
Meaning
Assembly Area
Area of Responsibility
Area Security Coordinator
Central Assembly Point
Crisis Coordination Centre
Civilian Operation Commander
Crisis Management Concept
Concept of Operation
Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability
Civilian Response Team
Departure Point
Emergency Communications System
Emergency Evacuation and Relocation Plan
Emergency Management Team
Emergency Management Team/Brussels
European Union Classified Information
European Security and Defence Policy
EU Special Representative
General Secretariat of the Council
Hostile Environment Security Training
Head of Mission
Law Enforcement Agency
Memorandum of Understanding
Mission Security Officer
Minimum Security Operating Residential
Standards
Minimum Security Operating Standards
Mission Security Plan
Mission-Specific Security Operating Standards
Non Governmental Organisation
Operation Plan
Political and Security Committee
Secretary-General/High Representative
Single Intelligence Analysis Capability
Security Incident Reporting System
EU Joint Situation Centre
Security Management Team
Status of Mission Agreement
Standard Operating Procedure
Security Operating Residential Standards
Security Operating Standards
175
UN
UNDSS
WKC
October 2008
United Nations
United Nations Department of Safety and
Security
Watchkeeping Capability
176
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