DITCLASSYFIED

By^^^ARA Date J ^ Z ^ l

CA^^M^
D_p>if _-C=k.:r_o-^ S ia^o^iB^idt'-s
P .r^^To/-

^P^M

C^. LLi

nj/^-s?

^i^4+feH
i

BECLASSmED
Aathor.tv4///)f^>-^

^T^ARA Date ^7 " O __

t

-iin^ '**t

jop
yOP

ST^CgE^

sj:cBKi

Ry Authority of
Th conmanding Gnria
Axsor Air Forces
21 Itorch 1946
Dats

imtisis

sawKY OF PRRSr^mTION ON RUSSIA GI7EH

on 13 Uorcb
1.
t o bet

Tlio rundfunental aims oV tba SOTlet foreign policy are believed

It

""idation of t e r r i t o r i a l c^lns-

b.

so-called
the Vestem pavara

'J-ty
d.

A^ '-^i -asr " ,vict influence in arsac dominated by the

..w^torn powers,

e.

To strsngtlien their coast and secure additional access to

the oceuBa

f.

To secure bases which vlll counter-balance tl^e UaS> and

British bases.

g.

To gain support of organised labor a l l over tits world i n

oniei' to use t h i s fm'ce aeainst any nxiflonal policy which
the Soviets consider inlmlcsl t o thsEnselvvs; aid l a s t l y

h.

To increase Soviet prestige with Colonial peoples.

2. The f i r s t tiio of tlieaa are most inportanta The f i r s t entaile

coneolidfitlon of Soviet hegemony in peripheral areas; the second includafl
the promotion of friendly governaents in countries contiguous to the Sovie*
3 . IfiiBa
. are being vicorously pushed at the present time and tr^
now nearly c< ^etede The manner of achieving those aiisB varies with the
circumstance rs. In F ^::nria and Rouiaanis Soviet troop* gained possession
of the area t.^^ins^ thw wor. Urtder the protection of Soviet forces local
Ccnnamiats* pe_-.^j beo^ 'Tztromsly active. Elections were held; these
were controlisd and ,.,,;-3i. .J elactionso The Community Party was voted
into power, thus ensuri ^ _ .vcmaent friendly md eubservlent to the
Soviet Union.
'
- 1TOP

SECRET

WECLASSIFTCD

^^ARAPaie

TOP

'^"K

SEfiSII

4^ In I m circumatanees were eonewhat,different, f^ovlet forces

vera In poeaaaHlOD of onJy their aone of occupation and were not In a
poaltlon to control an election or to gusrontee Ita results. For that
raaaon they spoonored a revolution In the Iranian iVovince of Aserbaijan
with Soviet troopo protecting the rovolutlonarlea by denying the area to
Coversnant force** A D autononoua Asorbaljan Republic was proclaljoed
which is canipletelr dominated by Soviet-trained Cconmnlateo
5 Areas which come undsr Soviet control under these or similar
flumare IncI
x
(1) Finland
(2) Poland
(3J Hungary

4}
5)
(6)
<7)
(8)
(9)
(10)

Austria
Roiiaania
Bulsarl.s
Albania
Iran
Korea
Hant^Tiria

In addition, the Danish Island of Bronholm is occupied by

Russian forces^
6. fhisslan clalffla have been made against the northern islands of
Spitsbergen and Bear lalanda; sole trusteeship has been claiiaed of Tripolitanla and strong demands h a w been made of Turkey*
r

? For a long period nothing has been done with respect to these
clalAs, but within the past fa? days developisents with respect to l^irkey
have bean swift.
8. With respect to her econocnr, Russia w i l l not be able to support
a najor war f~ about five ysBrSd, However^ i t should be pointed out that,
if.war devejc^ sooner than that, opposition to Soviet forces w i l l be of
a different nature and quality than during the last war and may not require a war effoit of similar maenituda* Soviet production w i l l >y 1950
be approxlEoatel^ equal t o thst produced as of June, 1 9 ^ . In the long
run Soviet capabllitios vdll increase more rapidly than any other power.,
This la due to thrso thingsi (a) Natural increase of population fmsi
186^ millions at tho present time to an estiqiatod 250 millions trjr 1970;
(b) Soviet control of industry and avowed intention t o stirpaee United
States productioni (c) Political consolidation as discussed above*
9? Because of these things Soviet production i<LIl inorease much mora
rapidly than that of any other power.

- 2 -

TOP

S^CgET

DECLASSIPIED
B^-^^^^ARADate

IQl

'^"(f

sEfiggJ

10, Fc. ^.^ time being diwiAgs snounte to approximately 25% of pre^
capital stocks. Short- -^f) ore most important In rolled steely food
nnd rolling stock. N'on-i^**v^'f nietBls were not daoaged much due to their
interior loc;itlon Coal p
^^lon haa actxially Increased during the war
years* Production of oil remains about the sane and Is juat equal to I946
peacetiae requirements*
U * TVlth the present population of 186^ nilllone^ the Soviet Union
haa no abortage of Ban potter* During the .irar they were nble to muster
approriiiiately 12 million men, daoobillsatlon has been modernte and at
the present tlse there are approodmately 6^ millions In the armed forces*
Of these over 5 millions are in the A m y . 300,000 are in the Ifavy^
including 60,000 In the Haval Air Forces^ and the remaining SOOjOOO are
in the A m y Air Forces.
12. The manner in irtiich the Soviet Air Forces would be coanltted Is
dependent upon Soviet appraloal of the respective probability of the following two casesI
Achievement of soviet aims without involhoatilltiea.
b.
13*

.l'^-)4

>t in major

'^,}o development of a general conflagration.

Obvlouuiv' CBse "" might get out' of conti-ol and become case "b*"

14. % e present order of battle of the Soviet Air Forces is

folXcma I
Euro]

1100 a t r c r c f t
1000

500
"
/ 250 (Polish)
650
"
250
"
250 (Csech)
350
"
310 (lugo.)

Bulgaria
Oeraany
Rumania
Folvid
Austria
Caechoslovakla
Hungary
Tugoslarla
Total a/c in Europe

4050
250
350

Iran
Eoi*e
Tctal e/c outside Russia

4800

JtaBV-XQ

NorthireBtem Ruosla
(cont'd.)

500
3 -

TOP

S E C RE I

/810

DECLASSIFTED
B^'^^^^ARA Date ^ " 5 _

TOP

SECRBT

Ruaala (ctmt'd.)
1100
1100

Baltic Region
TrarL^-Caucnana BegloQ
CrizBca and Odeasa
m i i t a r y Olotrlet
Tur" X ?ailtry
IHstr- '
liosco^y Oliiiak, S^'^* _:td.
Trinnglo
|R>voeiblrak, KrasnojanHk,
Irlcutach Tri^gl^
ftsr Eaat (Soviet)
Total a/c vltiil^ Russia
Total Soviet a/e

500
250
^.r%

250
1500^
!00

UfOOO

"
"'

H (includes 2000 Kaval a/c)

Ion of aircraft in Bulgaria i s notable. The sharp

it froo the V-J Day position of ovor 5,000 alrdenobilisatlon than has beSD carried out elsevhere
15- The distribution of aircraft by toi>ea la not known; In the
IA5 I t waa AS foIloNSs

^H]i

Flghtors
Ground Attack
Bombers
Transports
Training
IHscellaneons
l6. Included in ^& aboa'c fisures are 2,000 TU-2'B and 7^-i4*e, the
newest types of Soviet bombers.. n\9 U5R may also have 2.000 B-25*0 and
A"20B,
w

17*

Preaent types of Soviet aircraft incltide the following eiontplest

T5-2 - a 2-=engined bomber capable of carrying
bonba. 1550-ndle ranee.

C t

EB-4^ - a -a-ongined Diesel bomber capablo of carrying 4.,4O0 Ibu.,

3000Halle range.
U - 7 - Fighter with critical altitude 16,400', pos
develop 405 aph, carrying 4^0 Iba. of bombs
cannon and with a range of 560/620 mllev*

T s f t , carrying 2200 Iba. of anaunitannon and 2 50-calibra machine guna

,000*. 280 mnh and 600-Dile rsR es.

IL-IO
' JL

TOP

SECRET

BECLASSTJTED

B^p-^^^^ARA Dale J 5 Z ? 1

TOP

ElJCREr

All of the abOTB rangaa are total one-way distance; radius of

action appro:icliBately one-half thess figure*
18 Present combat affectivenoas of the Soviet Air Force repreaentc a o M loss throu^ deiaobillMtion but la probab^ higher than British or U.S.
19. Soviet air doctrine, if committed in the newr future, would
repreaent large-scale use of ground attack aircr^^t predominantly dayli^t
operations, short-range flights and relatively small snount of strateglo
sir actlvl^^
20. The Soviet Air Force is capable of some Increaae throu|^ reactivation and can bo reasonably quickly re-deployed* ReAex'vs aircraft
within the USSR could be largely comnitted to fonrard areas as defensive
oanmitBent in case "a** would be small and in case "b" strategic air attacks
inside Russia rrould not materialize on a large scale in the enrly stageso
Bo-deployment Yrould have to consider the posslbllil^ of British attacks
with atomic t *-r using present heavy bomber* in one-way missions^ Limitations to concentrations of f;ovlet aircraft in local areas are fouzid
principally in the losritiroe pro\rlnce0 East of lake Baikal, ehers it la
estimated only 3,000 aircrai't could be sustained under combat conditions
due to traraportotlon bottleneck of trans-Siberian Railroad. In Turkestan
it is estimated a maximum of 600 aircraft could bo stationed which would
bo insufficient to interdict strategic air operation ftrom northwestern
India against vital industrial areas In the interior of the USSR.

21 In caae "b** possible air action against Great Britain or th

D.S.A. would includes
Avrial mining operations against British porta
Stra-tegic air attacks against the British Isles for which
1100 bombera could immadiately be assigned* l.Tlthin six montha
the Soviets could use 5,000 aircraft (bombere and fightera)
in actions against tho Brltieh Isles.
A landing attsmpt involving airborne operations, the USSR could
now lift appropdmately 100,000 troops with available alrboma
equipment. OperationaL problems would undoubtedly keep the
else of any airborne operation '^^rs auch bslov thiso
Suicide aiie-4ray missions of liiidted si>.i, using the EH-^ agalnat
the U.S.A. as far as los Angeles and Dulutho Suicide ii'.^tacki
against mid-Pacific t ^n or conventional attacks in la,Tger
numbers against Okinawa or Japan, ffone of the above acV^'.ons
could substantially affoct the producing capacity of the n. Si
22, The defonaivB commitment in case "b" would envisage prompt
attacks by RAF present types of heavy bombers against occupied areaat
approximately as far as the Soviet western borders.
L

- 5T O P S E C R E T

DECLASSIFIED

A.thont>/2MZ2^^ARA Dale J^IlSL

4^

Ifif

SEORES

23. A s:!/ ' Ion arising in the future, for example a t Hit end of 19i^7j
would ifitneea t.^: follarfr^ 'Ifferences In the altuatlonj
a-

The U. s. 70-Group Air Force would be organised and doployvdp

or at least substantial progreas In that direction would
have been made A

b.

B-36*e would be aval labia to the AAF for strategic booibing

oparatlona*

e.

The British would have about tvo-thlrds of itheir heavy bcmibar

force equipped with Uncolna (VIS).

d. The USSR, Great Britain and the U. S t>uld all have aub
stantlal numbers of jet fighters*
e

The USSR would have In operation two new bombers^ 1!S-6 and
TD-A* Both are ^C-englned and capable of carrying 10,000 Xba^
at 25,000 feet for 2,500 ndles total raige, apeed 250 mph.

2Ac To e?mimerate A ^ ' a conception of Russia's capaMlltiea to expand bar frontlars in each %OD.9 of unrest: These capabilities are arrived
at by consi^ .. ^ig the U & and Britain were In complete cooperation against
RuBSia. The : .- would be from now through 1948.

25, Russia doulnatea tha Petaamo area and can air drop sufficient
troopa to take M&rvlk and it3 three alrflelda at will. Ukssise, airborne
occupation of Spltzbergon end Dsar Island are well within her capabilities^
Britain's sea poirer enables her to axpel Russia froD FJarvllc and the Svalbard Islands when sufficient f.orce can be allocated tberetOo This force
probably will not be available Arom more vital areas. The real value of
the ^valbard Islands is tholr 3500-Bdle separation from Chicago and Pitts-:
burg, so it is the U- S. they threaten Hore than Britain.
ri

26, Russia's 120 Divisions, of which 20 are anoored, and her overwhelming a i r otreneth possess the capability of i i i i t i a l l y overrunning
TTestem Europe to the Ift)!^ Sea, the Bay of Biscayi and the i^eneeSo
The IVostem poirere have a potential maximum of 23 Divisions, including
Trench divlsiona. Russia's a b i l i t y to a i r l i f t 99,000 troops simultaneously gives her the capability to penetrate Spain, but there i s s t i l l a
question of her a b i l i t y t o overcome Spain's 38 Divisions. Neither by a i r
nor by water can she invade England a t t h i s time.
27c Tho 80 Russian Divisions in the Balkans, plus Tugoslavia'a 14
Blvielons along the Morgan l i n o , give Russia the capability to expand into
I t a l y , GreGcij and Kuropean Turfcoy. From iiojor Smith's discussion of the
Russian a i r gt?c^"^:h i n t h i s area the preseuro on Greece and Turkey I s
smply evident.

- 6

TOP

SECRET

TOP
^^P

^m^

4A#

SKCRET
^^0

^i*

tf^V

m^m

^"^

^iv

20. In Xr&n end the Trftn^icaucasua^ Russia has 20 Divislona

v i t h the capacity of tsxpandtOQ t o 50 Divisions. These DLvielons and t ^
a i r regimenta pointed out by Ifejor Smith give R^asaia thp capability of
expandlne to Fhara, Abadan or into the Uosul, Kirkuk area of Iraq, or into
Turkey. I t io est" ited tliat a aerloxjs move in any direction uLll be
accompanied by a drive for Meaopotamlan o i l . Tui'key w i l l fight doggedly
and may hold oij.t sevoral months, but with only sane 150 obsolete aircraft
she must fall* h^^sl& cr^n drive to the ^r^rsian Gulf. Russia haa the
a b i l i t y to tr-kc the Dodecanese Islands* Britain cannot deny Palestine
and Suo to th Ruiislans .1 . i l y .
29. AfgiiTOlstan'e liindoo Eoosh Mountalna form Britain* e defense
l i n e for India. Russia cainot 5nvad India. The RAF can block advances
down the StalinbaiJ-KliybGr . ..as-^Peahawar rout* to Lahore^ The bettor route
from Kuahk t o Farah to Quetl.m'* can also be blocked by British a i r a l t h o u ^
with l e s s easv. !nw f i r s t route a t best could support only 2 Russian
dlTlBlons while tho second could aupport JI to 6 divislonso
30. Russia c ^ overrun E^anchurlai Korea, and China down to the
lellow River a t w i l l . She can also take the China Coast to Shanghai
She can support 70 divisions and over 3000 a i r c r a f t east of laike Baikal.
31o IKTRJJTIONS - Anyone i^o attempts to understand Russia from day
to day i s in daneer of finding himself in a position akin to that Edmund
Burke attributed to tl^ie American Constitution"a ship which r a s a l l s a i l
nnd no anchor**. At the moment consternation in the Amei-ican Press has
achieved a pitch of excitoraont which i s turning even experienced heads
like weflthercocks. To get a proper psrspectivB on Russian Policy I t i s
well to keep in mind the basic tenets of Uanc and Inln Ilia Russian
Government i e driven by a manifest destiny complex t o rula the world-^
i t has been ^Jir-.'vjn and w i l l be driven by t h i s force as long as i t maint a i n s power. Jv.et as American technology^ science and industry find
t h f l ^ l v e s adv:^.., , more tlisn a norroal 20 years during the past fivVf
likewise CosHHilst Russia finds the ftnjlts of her planned ag^raaalons for
the next 100 years ripe and ready to f a l l If she Is willing to take then.
'iihilo we work for peace and good w i l l by every human and supernatural
means open to us ^ we must not l e t out wishes or our fears become emplaced
as our considered opinions. Russia I s on the march -i- she may he considered as having achieved a velocity in the affaire of nations ratheir than
a s t a t u s she can bo stopped but she has no intention of stopping
voluntarily.

- 7TOP

SECRET