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15 ARMY GROUP
TH
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/ 2 ,IUN lCJ4
HEADQUARTERS
APO 650
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The 3rd Photographic Group Reconnaissance is a combat organization
and the Fifteenth Army Group (especially the American 5th Army).
setups have developed within the Group. Although four agencies (MATAF,
15th Army Group, XIII TAC and 5th Army) submit requests to the Group,
only two of these, MATAF &'5th Army, reqUire separate channels and
and XXII TAO does not require separate channels, their needs have not
shaped the operating methods of the Group to the same extent as MATAF's
and 5th Army's. This book is concerned solely with the two contrasting
systems which Bupp1y MATAF and Fifth Army and is issued for the infor
our desire to give the impression that we have a perfect photo intell
igence setup here. We feel that it fits our needs; undoubtedly numerous
changes would be required to fit our 8,1stem into any othe~ situation.
OFll'ICIAL:
~~~~c2F~
DUANE L. KIME
~R~{ff~
Commanding.
3rd I
I "A" PRU
PHOTO I
, GROUP
I
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AIR
LIAISON
SECTION
~
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(
12th \. \
I 5th ARMY
AIR FORCE \', I
I
PHOTO
PHOTO \\ '
I
INTELLIGENCE
I
I
FLYING AND
PROCESSING
5 th a 23rd
SQDS.
';1.
PHOTO
TOPOGRAPHY
941
,.
st ENGR
I
I
FLYING
and
PROCESSING
12 th SODN'
m
I,
II
REPRINTS
BLUE TRAIN"
of
3RD PTS.
INTERPRETATION INTERPRETATION
and
REPRINTS 3 RD PHOTO
3 RD PHOTO INTELLIGENCE
TECH SODN DETACHMENT
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g(!Jf.8fd lIkJHtH VIM 7til4ck ct1M getAfaH Higlt CtmtJlttVUI :faid:
II
HEADaJARTERS
MEDITERRANEAN ALLIED TACTICAL AIR FORCE
A. P. o. 650
20 March 1945
and important role. Its work has been, of necessity, little pub
licized in relation to the publicitl given the air and ground op
efforts.
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6 March 1945
AG 062
smaller scale. This time Air Corps was talking to Air Corps. The bottle
necks were fewer and easier to find. At present, both Tactical Air Force
and Army appreciate aerial photography as never before, and use it to the
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TA CONTENTS
1.
9. NIGHT PHOTOGRAPHY.
..
'PHOTO ..........:LIGENCE
SECOND PHASE REPORTS are more detailed, dealing with all angles
of the target which do not need minute study. They may tell us the
condition of a Marshalling Yard, even to estimating the car turn
over since the previous photo coverage. Often they deal with the
position and turnover of ships (and types of ships) in harbors and
ports, or the arrival of certain ships from other harbors. Again,
t.hey give us details of an airdrome - how many planes, their types,
l'lnd in which dispersal areas they are parked. Serviceability of
bridges and rail lines, along with state of repair since last cover
are discussed in fairly extensive detail.
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~e le8m of e enemy's troop cqncentrations and movements qy
routine cover of his marshalling yards and supply dumps. We can tell
his agressive intentions by a constant check on his artillery dispos
ition.
Work with the 12th Air Force and 5th Army combines purely tac
tical reconnaissance with semi-strategic reconnaissance. The tac
tical phase is concerned with the actual battle area and the ground
and air immediately behind it. Semi-strategic reconnaissance comhs
the area from roughly SO miles to 300-400 miles behind the battle
line. For the medium bombers who do mainly semi-strategic bombing,
~e must have certain intelligence. First, they must have knowledge
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and ~ictures of targets in or er-t~~ de bomb load, priorit,y
and force of planes. Secondly, they must have large scale maps,
obliques, or mosaics of the approach to the targets, ~s well as tar
get charts of the objective itself. Occasionally stereo pairs are
needed to brief pilots, navigators, and bombardiers. Thirdly, they
must have an assessment of their damage to determine subsequent act
ion. And lastly, they must know enemy flak positions, oroer of battle
of enemy aircraft, and course to and from the target. Semi-strategic
reconnaissance is also used extensively by the Army, ~~o must know
where the ene~ is preparing rear defense lines. A constant check is
necessary to determine the extent of activity and to discover strong
points, pill boxes, anti-tank ditches, etc., before the enemy has com
pleted his work and had a chance to camouflage these defenses.
straight and level - which makes him an exoellent target tor tlak.
The same is true when the mission laid on is to strip a road. rail
road or stretch ot river. Or he may have a mission whioh inTolves
taking pictures ot twenty pinpoints (airdranee, marshalling yards,
bridges, eto.) whioh requires excellent navigation and pinpointing.
He has no banb sight except his two eyes. All the time he is taking
pictures he must soan the skies tor eneau aircraft, check the ground
and his map tor landmarks. see that he is taking pictures at the
oorreot interval to conform with his speed and altitude, and of
oourse check the performanoe ot his plane. Weather is one ot his
main bugaboos due to the tact that he is fly1D8 at high altitude.
,.
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PHOTO RECONI AND WEATHER
The high altitude used ~ photo ships makes them subject to nearly
all cloud weather, for roughly 95% of the world's cloud cover exists
below 25 thousand feet. Yfuat would be considered a fine day for other
tYges of operations, sometimes can be a complete loss to photo recon
because of a high overcast of clouds. A single small cloud in the
wrong place can cause a mission to be a complete failure.
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taining pictures of desired targets, any dangerous weather enroute, and
any possibility of the home base not remaining open. This last point
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After the operations officer has been fully informed of the weath
er situation, he either mayor may not request that each pilot be brief
ed on the weather to be expected on his resgective mission. Usually this
does occur if the weather is at all likely to cause any trouble. This
briefing would not only include target c1oudi~ess, but visibility rest
rictions, strong winds, icing danger, and trail level. In addition,
pilots are eager to know at what location they can be sure of finding
large cloud breaks in climbing to and descending from their operational
altitude. The threat of any instrument flying is an important mental
hazard, especially in a fighter type plane. On the pilot's return, the
weather officer will be present during the interrogation to obtain the
latest accurate weather conditions from him. This information is tur
ned into a nearbr weather station which disseminates it to other units
over, its communications system.
I
On days when the weather appears doubtful, the weather officer will
recommend a ftweather hopft to determine the exact extent of the cloudiness.
In such a situation, the operations and inte11i~ence officers will consult
with him in choosing the target area for the mission. The idea behind
such action is to get as much photographic coverage as possible, along
with weather information, for the combat risks which are taken. The
pilot will be sent to the area where the best weather is located and his
report usually decides the feasibility of any continued operations for
the day.
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A SQUADRON
The 3rd Photo Group at the ~resent time has three combat squadrons
under its command. Two of these are directly under 12th AF HQ. (and
~AT.~) for operations, while the third receives its demands direct from
5th Ar~. ~ile the operations of the squadrons working for Tactical
AF, ~nd the operations of the squadron working with 5th Army vary con
siderably in the type of photography accom~lished, their basic organ
ization is similar in all respects.
F-5 type aircraft - P-38 with cameras instead of guns which has
proved an ideal plane for photo recon.
tering the theater in November 1942, the 3rd Photo Group has seldom
been at full strength. However, as Commanding Generals in the various
branches have come to realize the importance of Photo Reconnaissance,
this situation at present has been overcome, and the Group 13 now op
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erating with a full .ilots. There are prob
ably more specialized personnel and departments in a Photo Squadron
than in any other equivalent organization in the Air Forces. The Photo
graphic Laboratory section is composed of highly trained personnel,
equipped so that they can work under any field conditions demanded,
and on a 24 hour basis. A camera repair department is also composed
of experts in their field, who must keep cameras in tip-top shape to
withstand the rigors of high altitude flying where temperatures reach
40-50 degrees below zero. They must know the type film to be used in
various seasons under varying climatic conditions. They must select
film and adjust camera shutter speeds to conform with the weather ex
pected over the target area. They must be ingenious in devising new
camera set-ups to meet tactical demands. The squadron always has a
detachment of Photo Interpreters working with it in the field. These
men are e~erts in transportation, industry, aircraft identification,
engineering, and in any other type interpretation which may be req
uired. At present 3rd Photo Group has a detachment of 37 officers
and enlisted men from the 3rd Photo Technical Squadron interpreting
photos taken qy the 5th and 23rd Photo Recon Squadrons for TAF.
The squadrons usually operate from airdromes approx. 50 to 100
miles behind our own front lines - in the case of ~ Support rough
ly 50 miles, and in the case of Tactical AF support usually about
100 miles. A squadron, of necessity, must be a highly mobile and
flexible unit capable of moving 300 men and equipment without lOBS
of a day's operations. It must be capable of setting up a forward
unit or flight at an advanced base at a moment's notice, and operat
ing without loss of efficiency or speed, to meet specific tacti~al
demands.
While there are parallel units in the Group who have a great
share in producing the finished Photographic Intelligence (such as
the 3rd Photo Tech. Sq., the 3rd Photo Intelligence Detachment, and
the 941st Engineer Bn.) the flying squadron is the basic unit which
gathers the rough intelligence material in the form of photos, and
then starts them through the mill towards the final finished form
which we know as Photo Intelligence. The teamwork necessary is
started when the demands are received in Intelligence and Operations,
where the missions are planned and laid on for flying, and is car
ried on by the pilot, his airplane's ground crew, his camera crew,
photo lab, the plotters, the interpreters and the people who disseminate
the final Photo Intelligence to those whose operations depend upon it.
In no other branch of the Air ~orce do so many different skills
come in for so direct a share in the tactical operation of the unit.
Typical of a day's flying demands received from A-2 Target
Section at Tactical Air Force is the following:
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I
1. Approximately 8 to 10 BDA targets which the Medium Bombers in
tend to hit that day together with their time oyer target.
Approximately 8 to 10 BDA targets Which the IPighter Bombers
have hit the previous day.
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Force. It consists of 20 pinpoints of various types; 6 marshalling
yards for activity and servieeabi1ity, 2 airdromes for active planes
(GAF order of battle), e.nd 12 bridges for serviceability and accom
plishment of any repairs by the enemy (See map on opposite page).
The target area for this mission might be 250 to 300 miles from the
squadron's airstrip. If such were the case it would take the pilot
approximately an hour to gain altitude and navigate to his first tar
get. Slightly more than an hour would be required to navigate to and
get pictures of the other targets; plus another 40 minutes to return
to base. ~en the pilot lands with his pictures he is met Qy the
camera prew, ~o are on hand as soon as his engines stop turning over.
~ile two of the crew unload the film, the pilot gives any special
weather information to a third member of the crew, ~o that particular
processing may be accomplished if the target area weather was not in
accord ~~th the camera settings at take-off (the pilot cannot change
his camera settings after take-off - this must be accomplished on
the ground. Pilots can only control the interval between pictures).
The pilot next goes to the Intelligence tent. Here he gives a fair
ly detailed ~eather report to the Weather Officer, so that other
missions can be planned. Following this he is interrogated by the
Intelligence Officer, to whom he gives all available information re
garding the mission. He first gives any visual observations, .hich
might require a "Flash Peport" to higher HQ. Fe then draws a trace
(shown in illustration on page (14) showing where he took his pic
tures, bis direction of flight over each target, B.nd the sequence
in which targets were photographed. He also gives the time from the
start of photography to the time he took his last pictures, plus·
altitude over each target (Which will roughly determine the scale of
the pictures).
By this time the film has reached the Squadron Photo Laboratory
where it is being processed and printed. Two sets of prints will
reach the 3rd Photo Group Forward Interpretation Section ap~roximate
ly ~ hours after the pilot has landed. One set of prints will be
used by the interpreters, a.nd the other is used by the plotters. The
plotters make overlays which, when placed on the appropriate map,
show the exact areas covered by the photographs. These "plots" are
given wide distribution, so that interested parties may request
photos of the particular area which they are studying~ Before receiv
ir~ the finished prints from the photo lab, the interpreters have
received from the squadron copies of the Pilot's Trace and the Inter
rogation Report (see page 13 ). They now have all information regard
ing the mission and are ready to start interpreting.
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1:500,000 Air Map Used by Pi~ot During Mission
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Targets and Reference Briefed Time Alt. F/L Remarks: Visual Flak - EtA Shipping, Etc.
The 5th ArmY has long been keenl1 aware ot the vital assistanoe
aftorded bY' aerial photography to almost nery branoh ot military
operationa. In order to make the tullest use ot this assistance, it
has set up a closely intesrated liaison system tor transmitting the
photosraPhio needs ot the Ground l"oroe un1 ts to Air l"oroe Reconnaissanoe
units and tor remitting the photographs, together with the military in
tormation gleaned tran them to those 88DI8 Ground Foroe un! ts. This
sY'st_ is not to be tound in any tield manual and deliberatelY' bY'-passes
&n1' normal channels.
The _ineers. Air Support. Artillery. and Planning statt are the
main users ot photo reconnaissance. All their needs are correlated wi th
in the G-2 Section bY' the lhoto Reoon Unit (P.R.U.) which is in oomplete
oharge ot aerial photography and uses ot aerial photography in the 5th
Ursq. All demands and all photographs go through P.R.U. to be passed on
to the branoh oonoerned. It torma the main link between the A.rt1q and
theA1r Corpa and is one ot the main souroes frem whioh the G-2 Seotion
draws information.
The dEllD!Ulds bY' the A.rm'1 tor photo reoonnaissance maY' be divided in
to two distinot parts. First - and most immediatelY' important - is the
taotical work - the photographing of vital areas on the tront line.
DailY' coyerage ot these areas is essential. Artillery locations for
oounterbatter;y tire are top priority because guns can be aocurately lo
cated on photos while .tlash and sound- and observation give onlY' an ap
proximate location. and JI8.Y not be aYailable at all in mountainous ooun
try. SeoondlY', is strategio photo reoon .:. the photographing ot rear de
tense lines. road moyemant. or any signiticant activitY' whioh might reYeal
the an-.JY· s intentiona. Detense lines. while being built. must be photo
graphed at regular interTals in order to spot new emplacements before
they can be ettectivelY' camoutlSBed. This information. tran strategio:
sorties is used mainlY' by the Ar1l'q Planning staft in determining the
OYer-all stratesY ot the campaign..
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from vexious command posts to a s~ecial photo section attached to
Division HQ. This photo section, consisting of experts in photo recon,
all part of P.R.TI., sifts down and correlates the demands and fonrards
them to a corresponding photo section at Corps HQ. Here again, they are
sifted down and passed to the Air Liaison Section at Army HQ. Since
speed is essential, all demands are passed by telephone and all regular
intelligence. channels are by-passed. At A~; the Air Liaison Officer
(a member of p.p-.n.) composes and assesses the demands of the various
corps and gives each a priority in accordance with the Army Plan. The
priority-rated demands are then passed on to the Air Liaison Detach
ment with the P.R. Squadron. This detachment is headed by two staff
officers (A.I,.O's) who coordinate the flying of missions and distri
bution of intelligence. The officers of this detachment are respon
sible for (1) communicating all priority-rated demands to an Air Force
Photo Reconnaissance Squadron and seeing that the Squadron takes the
photos as soon as ~ossible; (2) having the film developed, printed,
plotted, interpreted and mass reproduced at the Photo Center; (3) des
patching the prints with plots and reports directly to the various corps
photo sections which in turn distribute them to the units that had
originally requested them. These A.L.O's contact the photo squadron
directly - there ~ no intervening Air Force channels whatsoever.
Because of this streamlined s,rstem, it is possible to deliver the in
terpreted photos within 24 hours after the derne.nd is made.
The interpretation is done at the 5th Ar~ Photo Intelligence
Center which is composed of personnel from the 3rd P.I.D. and M.A.I.U.
(West). The photos are carefully studied by interpreters and counter
battery officers who compute exact coordinates of artillery positions
to a degree of accurac,y not attainable in computations from flash and
sound; by Engineering expert.s who study roads and bridges to determine
where most damage may be done and time required to repair such damage;
by Air Support experts who assess relative urgen~ of targets for
support bombardment. The most important items of intelligence found
in these front-line missions are ene~ artillery positions. A counter
battery officer from each corps works with the interpreters and acts
as liaison officer between them and the corps counter-battery section.
As each gun is located its coordinates are passed immediately to the
corps by radio. This system enables our artillery to fire on ene~
gtms before nightfall am before Jerry has time to move. It is
possible to relay such information to the corps in less than 6 hours
after the photos are taken. Later, if reprints of a sortie are de
sired, the request is passed to the llBlue Trainll , a lab detachment of
the 3rd Photo Tech. Squadron which specializes in mass production of
photos. These reprints are distributed down through corps, divisions
and regiment and often to companies and platoons.
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The outstanding features of
Sections at Division and Corps. not only for interpretation but for the
expert appraisal of demands. and for their direct transmission to the
Liad.son Section. and tor the direct delivery of the interpreted photo
graphe. These eeotioD8 eerTe to weed out impossible demands. speed up
important demands. and insure proper use of the photographs. (2) Photo
II graphing of enemy artillery loc{ltions every day if possible. Thus, the
~ can anticipate any move of the enemy. since artillery disposition
is usually an indication ot the enemy's intentions. This was partio
ularly Taluable at Anzio where each German cOWlter-attack was anti
oipated and defeated because their artillery locations had given us
the tip-off as to where the attaok would cane. (3) Anticipation by
the Air Liaison Offioer at ArmY of photographic demands. The ALO sits
in OD. all statf oonferences and, by his knowledge of the Army Plan. he
oan anticipate most photosraph~c needs. As a result. many corps needs
are met even before the corps asks for ths. (4) The photo squadron
whioh flies the ~ missions received its demands directly fram 5th
Ar'JrI:f SO that the requests do not have to go through an intermediate
Air Corps HQ,. The ALO merely presents the demands to the squadron in
telligence offioer. The liaison is so ~wift that a photo plane has
aotually started to fly a mission less than a half-hour atter it was
requeeted.
One of the missions flown. for the Anzio beachhead is a good ex
I, ample ot this speed. On February' 16, 1944, while the beachhead was in
I grave danger of beina pushed into the sea, G-2 received ground reports
indicating that Jerrr was D1&ssina tanka near Cisterna. A hurry call
was sent through to the photo squadron and in less than an hour a
plane was photographing the area. It was obvious that Jerry disliked
being photographed at that particular time since the flak almost blast
ed the pilot out at the sky. but his photos showed that a whole }9.nzar
Division was DBssiDg for an attaok. If suoh a large-scale attaok had
oame as a surprise. it is doubtful if the beachhead troops could have
defeated it. But. because of swift liaison within mu, the attack
was antioipated and beaten off.
8eoauee the Italian oampaisn has been a series of quick starts and
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long delays, 5th Army has f-ound it necessary to create a-Planning Staff
who studies how best to overcome the next obstacle. The Germans have a
dapted their strategy to the Italian terrain to such ~~ extent that we
have never l,een able to push thehl ba{lk steadily. During each lull in
the advance U9 the peninsula, the Germans had time to build defense
lines to ~hich they could retire ~hen their current position became un
tenable. Their strategy is to build ~p a fairly deep defensive li~e at
the first suitable terrain feature (molilltain, ridge or river) behind·
their lines. This ~s primarily-to serve as a holding line which, in
case of a break-through, would slow up the Allied advance temporarily
and allow the Germans to consolidate their defenses. Behind this hold
ing line, another much stronger defense line was built - concrete eun
emplacements, pill boxes, barbed wire, mine fields, anti-tank ditches,
etc. When necessary, Jerry retreated, first to his holdtng line; then
to the permanent defense line, where h~ could mAke a determined stand
on favorable terrain. This same pattern of strategy has been followed
throughout the call1?aign. After Salerno, the Volturno P..iver was the
holding line; the Cassino - Garigliano River line was the permanent
one. Again, ~hen we broke through at Cassino, the Adolf Hitler line
held us up while Jerry scrambled back to a line at Palestrina. In this
case, however, the breakthrough from the beachhead by-passed the Pal
estrina line and nullified its value. Jerry was forced to ~>uI1.. out in
a hurry and withdraw in a semi-rout until he reached the Arno River.
Here again, he had built a holding line which gave him time to catch
his breath and prepare to defend the formidable Gothic Line. His
strategy of building two defense lines simultaneously prevented the
Allies from effecting a complete rout. At present, the Germans are
building a holding line at the Po River and a permanent line from
Venice to Lake Garda, in anticipation of the fall of Bologna.
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the val~e of photo recon. Not only in the Gothic Line attack, but in
all major attacks, 5th Army's efficient Photo Recon has been able to
nullify many of the Germans' defensIve advantages. Shovm beloVT is an
annotated mosaic of a portion of the Gothic Line defenses as located
on aerial photographs.
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- - ANT ~':"N~ POSITION C liGHT AA POSITION
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THE FLYING OF AN ARMY SUPPORT PHOTO MISSION
From the time the ALO presents the Ar~- request to the Squadron
Intelligence Officer, its fate is entirely in the hnnds of the Air
COT')s. The fiying of a.n ar~ photo mission involves a great many
problems - many more than entailed qy a fighter or bomber mission.
Photographic considerations, weather, equipment, personnel, enemy
op~osition are a few of the weightiest problems.
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EXtreme oold will oause oondensation on the lens, the slightest vibra
tion will spoil the photographJ the intervalaneter setting (time in
terval between exposures) must be oarefully 'ooordinated with the vary
ing speed and altitude of the plane. sanetimes the camera window rray
beoaoe ooyered with mud pioked up fran the runway during takeoff'. In
spite of excellent maintenanoe, oamera failures orop up frequently and
at very embarr&Bsing times.
PmSONNEL. The missions are flown by pilots who have been expecial
11' tra~ned for photo reconnaissanoe. The fate ot the mission depends en
tirely upon the ability of the pilot to fly his flight lines correotly.
A few pilots are perfect; many are not. Uhf'ortunate17. at this time,
very few pilots are trained. for al"lllY work - that is. flying a series of
Parallel fl1ght lines for a mosaic. Training in the states consists
mainly at ooyering pinpoints and strips. Therefore, each pilot must
be given addi tional training in the flying of JDOsai cs when he arrives
in the squadron. A deoided attempt is made to impress upon the pilots
the importance of their :D1ssions. !'requently, they visit divisions at
the front to S88 for themselTes what the doughboy goes through and how
th-.v oan alleTiate the hardships. Insofar as possible, the pilots are
induced in this way to take a personal interest in their photographs.
When the weatherman gives his O.K., the squadron starts to operate.
The mission is laid on a 1.250,000 air map, in the shape of multiple
flight lines usually totalling about 100 miles. The pilot is then brief
ed, the plane preflighted and the cameras ohecked for flying the mission.
After reaohing his target. the pilot tries to piok out check-points on
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t',e rround ane on his map, 8tarts his first flight line, tllel1 COIl'r'ares
hi~' COl'lPB.SS with the compass heacing on hiR l:"tDp. All tLe while, J1 e
must note the operClt.ion of his CB.meras, correct for wind, wa tc'h out for
flak and ene~T fighters, Bnd keep the nle.ne stre,igl1t end level. It is
not e.t all uncommon for ne"" pilots, shaJcen ly the fact that they C.re a
lone ann' unarr'led over enemy terri tory, to make serious er;-ors, such [: s
flying over the wrong target or failing to s.d tch on the ca;:leras.
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When the pilot has ght lines, he ustmlly flies
back over any portion which he thinks he missed and tries to fill in
the gaps until he runs out of film. On returning to base, the film
is sent to the lab, thence to the plotters at 5th A~ Photo Intell
igence.Center. The next morning the pilot receives a plot showing
exactly where he flew. The plot below ShOWS the results obtained by
the pilot in his attempt to fly the mission on the preceding ~age.
·1fi~.a7
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Below is an e etation report issued on
the pilotts mission. The coordi~ s f . artille~T positions were
radioed to the Corps Artillery within 4 to 8 hours after the pilot
landed.
* * * * * * *
SORTIE USED:
Sortie Unit Pilot Time Date FL Scale Quality
lZPR 87 12PR Sqdn. 1t Allred 1150 15 Jan 24" 1:10,000 A
Covers: A block over Highway No. 64 from VERGATO (1 6926) to BOLOGNA.
Area L 6317 - L 7049 - L 8850 - L 7821
GENERAL NOTE
Except for an overall increase of approximately twenty-one field guns
of light calibre in a general area south of.BQLOGNA, no other change has
taken place to the field artillery situation.
Little military activity and hardly any movement is seen in the areas
covered by the above good qualit,y sortie which was flown over the most
important sector of the tactical front.
I• FIELD ARTILLERY
a) POSITIONS OCCUPIED
* * * * * * * *
This report goes on to list the antiaircraft positions occupied and
unoccupied, some minor defenses, engineering intelligence, end military
activity. The accent is on speedy interpretation, and the infornation is
relayed by telephone or radio to the divisions concerned as soon as possible.
- 26
....
· " .
In addition to the hasty interpret~tion.don~At- the 5th ~ Photo
Intelligence Center, the photos are studied in more detail ~ interpreters
at each division. Below is a sample report issued qy the photo sections of
the 6 South African Armored Division and Task Force 45:
* * * *
APPENDIX 'A' TO G.I.R. NO. R 197
The following additional defenses have been reported by the photo
~
.3. L 76102986 11ft nn .3125 A81:?
n .3167 B452
* * * *
- 27
The FAPIC is an organization that mushroomed out of 5th Army's un
precedented use of aerial photography. An intermediate agency was needed
to be clearing house for all the various uses of photos Qy the Army.
Interpreters, counter-batte~ officers, ALO's, plotters, draftsmen and
engineers all used the same photos but in different ways. In order to
bring these experts under one roof where all the photos would be avaiIE.ble
whenever needed, the FAPIC was formed. It has no recognized Tables of
Organization; it has sprung up as a field expediency and changes its
form as ~he situation changes. The personnel are drawn from Mediterranean
Allied Interpretation Unit (M.A.I.U. West) and the Third Photo Interpre
tation Detachment (3 P.I.D.) The former is a British organization which
originally took care of all the photo work for 5th Arnw. Later, after
American photo technicians were trained and sent overseas as the 3 P.I.D.
the work was divided between the two units. At present, American personnel
predominate under joint supervision.
From FAPIC, interpreters who have been specially trained for ar~
work, are sent down to divisions, corps and army. These men supervise
the various photo sections and, not only interpret photos, but coordinate
demands for coverage and delivery of information and photographic prints.
Thus, any matter pertainine to photo reconnaissance is in trained hands
while it is being passed from divisional interpreter to the photo pilot
and back again. The interpreters are shifted around often enough to in
sure that each realizes his place in the overall setup. So great has
been the success of this system that a good interpreter usually becomes
the right hand man of the commanding general. He must be available at
all times of the day and night to give intelligence on which the fate
of the current operation may depend. In addition, the interpreters
serve as the "'salesmen" of the 3rd Photo Group in that they can ex
plain to the ground forces how the Group operates in supporting them.
Gradually, because of this, a mutual underste..nding has grown up which
has served to bridge the abysmal gap between ground forces and air
corps.
- 28
~
defense lines noting the changes and th~ speed of construction. Thus,
the A~ Planning Staff always has been supplied with detailed infor
mation as to what obstacles lie beyond the present front-line.
* * * *
- 2.9
• f·
This is a two 1 am or tarmac) having
a road width of 16 to of 20 to 24 feet.
The terrain over which the road passes consists of a narrow stream
valley on the east and steep disected terrain on the west. Movement
off the road will be very limited.
There are at present five bridges, two tunnel entrances and one
corniched section demolished. Between Doints L 673212 and L 750290,
the demolition program has probably been carried out. Three other
bridges on this route are at present pre~ared for demolition. There
are six bridges and 1 causeway that are likely sites for further de
molitions.
If complete demolition is carried out, from 5 to 8 days of Eng
ineer work will be required for the initial reopening of the road (1
lane ~passes). Material necessary for construction will be 150 feet
of Bailey bridge, 195 ft of treadway trestle bridge, culverts and
fill.
DETAILS:
I. L 673212 Brid~e partially blown and approaches cratered for
a distance of 70 ft on the north and 100 ft on the south. Original
bridge was single span bow string arch with a 65 ft span length and
15 ft high. Gully has low sloping banks of soft material. Vehicles
have crossed unaided above the bridge.
l2PR363 4068 - 9
II. L 69255 Bridge blown, 4 of 5 spans destroyed, resulting
gap 255 ft long and 25 ft deep. One span apparantly remains intact.
The piers are partially destroyed. The stream has a braided sandy
channel 110 ft wide and a very shallow wet gap 30 to 110' ft wide.•
Ford site located 500 ft below the bridge with two land ap~roaches
will serve as an initial crossing for combat vehicles. Channel ~dth
90 ft at this point and a shallow wet gap 90 ft wide. Track laying or
trestle bridge may be required to make the ford suitable for sup~ly
vehicle~.
l2PR363 4063 - 4
III. L 697261 Road cratered ~ bomb; easily ~-p8ssed.
l2PR363 4062 - 3
IV. L 707277 Bridge blown, resulting gap 95 ft long and 15 ft
deep. Stream has V shaped banks of soft material. Debris blocks gully
making a wet gap 50 ft wide just above the bridge. Combat vehicles
can ford stream 200 yards above the bridge. Culverts and four hours
of bulldozing will be required for a fill crossing just above the
bridge l2PR363 4060 - 1
- 30
....
, , ..... '
V. L 714276 Railroad tunnel entrance blown destroying the road. Re
sulting gap 70 ft long and 15 ft wide. Combat vehicles may possibly
by-pass by cross country movement to the north. IJII!->rovement of exist
ing trails will be required for supply vehicles. Suitable site for a
Bailey bridge across destr~ed section.
12PR363 3061 - '2
* * * * * *
A dispatch office is also ~aintained at YAPIC to distribute the
photos and reports quickly. Jeep couriers run back and forth from here
to Army, Corps and Division at all times of day and night.
Under the auspices of FAPIC, every mission fiown for the 5th Army
goes through the above process of interpretation and distribution until
the photos are wrung dry of every scrap of intelligence. Early in the
war, one of the Army's generals established the tenet that "One photo
is worth a htmdred men". 5th Army's present use of photo recoDDaissance
has done much to prove the truth o.r that statement, and it is with
great justification that the 5th has been called the most "Photo
Conscious" Army in the world.
"
- 31
From the foregoing account of Army sUP90rt photo reconnaissance,
it is obvious that efficient liaison is essential. So many widely
divergent agencies are involved in ?RU that one small bottleneck could
hold up the whole ?rocess. Therefore, an agency has been set up to
supervise the flow of photo intelligence to the Ar~. This is the
nAn ?R.ij. Air Liaison Section, beaded by three British Staff Officers.
Some of their headaches are:
I PI LOT
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- 34
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1 J
immediately to the unit interpreters for hasty counter-battery inter
pretation, and the other two sets were nown by Cub to the Corps con
cerned. Inf'Ol"lll8.tion started to flow to the Corps early in the after
noon. At 1700 hours a Cub new in froll each Corps to pick up what
ever photos had already been interpreted. A counter-battery officer
sorted out these photos while flying b8ck to Corps, gave them to the
waiting Cub artillery spotters and the Corps Artillery started firing
on the batteries by 1800 hours. During the night, a complete inter
pretation of the photos was made in the usual manner.
I:
I I
2. Counter-battery information can be disseminated much more
q nickly. In this moving situation, Geraan batteries do DOt remain
I over night in one position. Thus, information from to~v's sortie is
useless tomorrow. The information must be acquired and used on the
same dq. This has been made possible by the Photo Recon advance
unit. Previously, on the static Cassino front, artillery locations
were radioed to Corps in the late afternoon and evening and the in
terpreted photos reached the Artillery twenty-four hours after the
mission was flown. This was considered satisfactory in such a sit
uation, but would not be fast enough during a prolonged successful
push. During the drive from Cassino to Pisa, the Photo Recon advance
unit was able to get the artillery locations and photos to the
Artillery in five hours. This time-saving, in i tsel!, justifies the
use of such a un! t.
... .
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
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DISPOSITION . OF 3rd PHOTO
~ GROUP FLYING UNITS AND
APPROX. OPERATIONAL AREAS
PRECEDING INVASION OF SO.
FRANCE
-12TH P.R. SQ. ADV. HQ.
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The 12th Photo Squadron has flown the majority of these missions,
with varying degrees of success. Some types of obliques have been
found almost useless; others extremely valuable. After a great deal
of experimentation, the squadron has arrived at definite conclusions
as to what missions should or should not be attempted and what cameras
should be used.
First, let us follow the process of experimentation. In the
winter of 1943, 5th Army sorely needed obliques to plan the attack on
Cassino. Therefore, the 12th Squadron consented to try some dicing
missions with a 6" oblique camera. On each of the missions, the pilots
received intense flak and the missions cost the squadron several planes.
The photographs did not reveal any significant information because of
the small camera coverage. In other words, their value was not com
mensurate with the risk involved. Later, a 12" oblique was installed
for experimentation. This, with some exceptions, gave excellent results,
but the missions were still very dangerous. The Whole front line was
covered with obliques of good scale from Cassino down the Garigliano
River to Gaeta. They were of great value for planning the attack and
for briefing patrols. The French Corps in par ,'ar used the photos
:fo good advantageJ. This Corps was to attack through a spot which the
Germans considered impassable. The terrain was mountainous and the
roads poor. If the attack were to succeed, eve~ path, no matter how
small, had to be utilized fully. Several oblique missions were flown
over Mount Petrella, which was the main terrain obstacle. The photos
revealed terrain information that enabled the French Cor~s to capture
the mountain and break through the Gustave Line. Before the final at
tack along this l.ine, these obliques were annotated with terrain data
and issued to the troops in huge quantities. The success of the attack
may well be attributed in part to these excellent panorama photos.
The next uha@e took place at the Arno Fiver. By this time, the 12ft
obliques, set ~t the proper angle (to eliminate the engine nacelles),
were very satisfactory to the Army. However, the squadron was not
satisfied. The missions were too dangerous; the pilots were getting
shot up consistently because, with a 12" camera, it was necessary to
fly smack over "NO Man's Land" to get decent photos. At the Arno
River, where the ~th Army's advance was again held up, a 21:" oblique
camera was somehow gotten into the nose of a P-3S and tried out success
fully. This cou1& be flown at 3000', 2 or 3 miles behind our lines
and yet give the ~ame scale as 12" flown closer to enemy territory.
Thus, missions co~d now be flown with excellent results and with
minimum danger. It appeared that the ultimate had been reached - but
it was not to be.
The greatest objection to this oblique set-up now was that the
photos did not gi~e a true picture of the terrain. That is, the camera
did not shoot straight at the target but had to be angled in order to
avoid the engine ruacelles of the plane, so that an object did not look
the same in each olf two overlapping photos. Thus, the terrain took on
a distorted a::>pear'ance. There was no way to eliminate this fault as
long as the camera.S were angled forward to avoid the engIne nacelles.
The squadron bad mteanwhile gotten hold of an old non-operational B-:?5
.. ~ ..... . ..
- 40
.
,
... ~ '.. to
A PORTION OF' ONE OF THE ANNOTATED OBLIQUE PHOTOS ':':0 THE GA~IGLIANO
RIVER AS USED BY THE FRENCH COHPS IN THEIR ATTACK O~ THE GUSTAV LINE.
- 41
An ob1iq~e of Mount Belvedere on the 5th Army front which was taken
in a B-25 with a 24 inch camera at 7000 feet. This difficult objective
was subsequently captured by the 10th Mountain Division. The wealth of
terrain detail and clarity of the photo made it ideal for planning the
attack.
which was used to haul plane parts from Naples. The Squadron C.O.
came up with the idea of installing a camera to shoot out of the side
of the B-25. This would eliminate the troublesome engine nacelles
problem and allow room for a camerman who could manually aim the
camera. In addition, the co-pilot could assist in navigating the
plane. The total result would be mo~e accurate photography and more
accurate navigation. Several experimental missions were flown with
24~ and 40n cameras. However only the 24~ camera proved successful.
Lack of overlap and small ground coverage made the 40n practically
useless. At present, this type of oblique flown behind our lines at
3000' is very satisfactory, but is limited in scope in that a B-25
is not as good a photo ship as a P-38, requires a fighter escort, and
cannot safely penetrate enemy territory at such a low altitude.
By the above process of experimentation, the 12th Squadron final
ly arrived at what is felt to be the ultimate in obliques:
a. Safety for the pilot and plane.
b. A camera which gives ~~de coverage and good scale.
2. Missions which are far behind enemy lines and far inland. It
is difficult to navigate over land "on the deck", and avoid intercep
tion and the enemy can and will shoot at the pilot all the WFq back
if he gets back.
Missions which can be flown safely are:
2. Coastline strips that do not pass a large' port. The pilot can
- 43
a
-~-
~-
,,,,I •
tr·
navigate easily, stay away' from flak, and, f in trouble from fighters,
can turn out to sea~and shake them off. Nearly all such missions are
dangerous (note Lt. Dolk's mission below) but their value usually makes
the risk worthwhile. If such missions are to be flown they~st only
be nown when the need is urgent, i.e., invasion, or commando landing.
Below are reports on a few of the Dicing missions flown:
* * * *
* * * *
* * i .. *'" *
~
* * * . *
Another type of oblique is being experimented with at 9resent,
which promises to be of great value to TAF. The "bomber boys" have 111
ways used vertical and trimetrigon photos for briefing, but were not
particularly satisfied with them. Verticals cover too small an a~ea
and do not give the pilot much help in finding his target. Trimetrigon
photos have too small a scale to be of value. In order to cover more
area and get an approach view of the target, two lZ" cameras are being
used currently. One shoots out of the nose of the plane at an angle of
180; the other shoots downward at an angle of 580 to the ground. The
two overlap slightly so that obliques are obtained which cover an area
extending 15 miles from the target right up to the target itself.
These obliques can be annot~ted with the initial point, mileage and
other bombing data, lithographed, and issued in large numbers to the
bomb wings. They have been very well received because of the accurate,
large scale view they give, not only of the target, but also of the
approach. This new type of target chart promises to supolant entirely
the old vertical and trimetrigon charts. The photo missions are flown
at 20 - 25000' and are relatively safe. It is hoped that bombing
accuracy will improve as soon as all targets can be proper~v photogrR?hed
with this new oblique camera setup. (See example on next ~e)
- ,46
E
TARGE:T IS C.474585
MILES
FROM
TARGET
TARGET
10
---13
14
12th A
The following is the mission of the 12th Air Force Photo Center
(in conjunction with 5th A~ Photo Center).
1. To interpret every picture taken by the 3rd Photo Group, ferret
ing out and reoorting every conceivable enemy activit,y to all Armies,
Navies, and Air Forces, both in the Mediterranean and European theatres.
2. To graphically present aerial photographs to ground and air
forces in the form of annotated 9ictures, photo-maps, target charts,
and terreln models.
3. To store aerial photos taken by the 3rd Photo Group and in
telligence material gained therefrom in such a manner that current
9ictures and information on ~~ given tactical area in ene~ territory
can be found within thirty minutes.
The 12th Air Force Photo Center is composed of the 941st Engineer
Aviation Topogra.p~1ic Battalion and the 3rd Photographic Technical
Squadron, whose combined efforts accomplish the aforesaid mission.
- 48
Other types of arge c ertical photography,
taken with the camera pointing directly dO'fmWard. This requires one
or more photos, which must be carefully matched in size, scale, and
shade, so that when assembled they give the effect of a single com
posite ~hoto. From the files in the Print Library the best photos
are selected, contact prints made and assembled into a mosaic. The
scale of the composite is determined ~ computing its relative size
against a map of known scale, and noting on the final prints. IdentifY
ing features surrolmding the target are annotated, and the construction
details of the target assembled from intelligence reports are added in
the marginal information. Thus the bomber units know whether a bridge,
for exam?le, is masonry, steel, or concrete, what type arches or but
tress~s it has, how high it is above water level, and from this infor
mation can decide what size bombs are needed to do the job.
The mosaics covering larger areas are more complex in nature, and
require many operations to complete. These are usually made to show an
area covered by a map nreviously published. One sheet will ordinarily
cover an area of 35 square miles. Assembling photographs into a mosaic
of such a large area requires the use of photographs of many recon
sorties, taken under different weather conditions~ battle conditions,
and with different cameras and planes. The basic problem is that all
photos used tn one mosaic be brought to the same scale, be reproduced
without any effect of tilt, and must match in tone or shade. The prob
lem of tilt is the most difficult to adjust for, since airplanes are
subject to much movement in flying over enemy terri tory. Seldom are
the cameras in a perfectly vertical position when the pictures are
taken. It is therefore necessary to compute the exact position of the
airplane in space at the time the photo was taken and determine whet
her the nose was tilted upward, and whether the wings were level. This
is done in the scaling section, where by means of close comparison
with maps, and considerable mathematical and graphical analysis, the
exact information is established. It is then possible to make a photo
print from the aerial film, and to remove all the distortion caused by
any irregular attitude.of the recon plane. The result is a photo
which can be matched to 8D1 adjacent photo which has bad the same
corrections made.
- 49
R BR OVER ADIGE R.,
G.S.G.S 4164 SHT. 21
'BF
IC~ .. Slf..-.,
Xl
The Engineers produce TERRAIf a "'utthdd developed to
meet the need for a light-weight, portable model. Materials used in
clude cardboard, cloth, paints, glue, sawdust, inks and other draft
ing materials. The relief shown in the models is derived from con
toured maps, while the position and appearance of the features, ~uch
as towns, wooded areas, roads and trails, are taken from the aerial
photos. All models are made up of a group of panels of uniform dim
ensions, painted and colored to approximate the general appearance of
the terrain in the season during which the model Is to be used. This
type of model has been produced for the Air Forces as well as for
the Fifth and Eight Armies.
- 51
cor.:rlOENTIAL
+----f---.----r
NO. 10
REPORTS
AA. BTY.
+
A1RCREW
~ .UettT
~. ~~~~fM;---~~fle;-ffHtmHJRO"'--
I
EXCERPT FROM FLAJC MAP PRODUCED BY 941ST ENGINEERS AND 3RD P.T.S.
- 54
Large scale maps are published showing pos e coJlDllUIlicatiOD tar
gets ill Italy, Austria, Southern Ge1'1llany and the Balkans. Information
pertaining to each specific target shown, as well as reference to aerial
photos covering the target, are listed on these maps.
Several types of flak maps are produced. A large scale II8.P giving
the position of ene~ anti-aircraft batteries 1s published as frequent
ly as required by changing positions. A sJla1l scale Tactical Flak lIap
of Northern Italy is produced weekly showing the area covered by enem;y
fisk batteries.
•
3rd
setup, come to life since the American entrance in ""orld "ar #2. Con
ceived out of necessity, and experience learned from t~:e first year of
the f'ar, they are now fully established, and doing full service. Tt!eir
service is felt in all military branches - Army, Navy and Air Corps.
,, ,
w ... ...
••
.. ,
~·IFi'"
~~,
.."f
~ight become a sizable body of specialists having a variety of tech
nical qualifications.
- ')8
o t
- 59
Strafing Charts. Mosaic annotated as to obstructions to low-flying
aircraft in the vicinity of a designated target. Compiled only up
on request. Distribution to MATAF units only unless specifically re
quested through MPIC.
Air Crew Flak Maps. Two-color map showing radius of fire of all heavy
flak batteries at an altitude of 10,000 ft. Maps issued periodically.
Routine.
Tactical Area Flak ~ap8. Four-color map showing (1) Radius of fire of
all heavy batteries for altitude of 10,000 ft.; (2) Areas of flak re
Dorted b.r air crews; (3) Pinooint location of all heavy and light gun
positions; (4) Total number of guns at any given target. Map issued
periodically over certain geographical areas. Routine.
- 60
Shipping interpretation is divided into second and third phase work.
Secon~ phase interpretation is concerned primarily ~ith Port Activity and
the shipping turnover which occurs between consecutive photographic covers.
Third ohase interpretation is concerned with the present state of any port
under etudy.
Second phase reports record the arrivals, departures, and internal
movements of vessels since the previous cover, and notes any new damage
to ships or port facilities. Third phase reports generally consist of an
annotated mosaic and a written report nresenting the present state, con-'
ditton, or overall picture of port facilities in aqy one port or harbor,
and may include any or all of the following points of information:
1. Extent and location of serviceable quayage.
2. Extent and locatton of quayage mined for demolition.
3. Extent and location of quayage damaged as a result of air
attack or enemy demolition.
4. Position and identification of wrecks, inactive vessels,
and potential blockships.
S. Extent of entrance blockage.
6. Location and capacity of warehouses.
7. Location and identification of various types of cranes.
8. Location of booms.
9. Shipyard activity: Number and types of ships on slipways,
their progress and present state of completion, and number
and type of ships launChed during six month period.
On the opposite page is an annotated photograph of Savona harbor sho.
ing acttve shipping berths, wrecks, extent of harbor entrance blockage,
and potential blockships.
INTELLIGENCE NOTED ON THE ABOVE PHOTO WAS COMPILED FROM A NUMBER OF
SORTIES FLOWN BETWEEN OCTOBER 15 AND DECEMBER 23, 1944.
- 62
.... .
- 63
,.
.. 11 ,
: ,4·-~
The tunction ot ftD" Section is to assess the "Bomb Damage" and re
pairs to ene~ installations. Written reports are issued, accompanied ~
annotated prints, or blackouts when necessary. The tollowing types of re
ports are issued:
1. Detailed assessment ot all damage to a cit,y or town, including
industrial, civic and residential damage. A blackout showing
points ot damage is generally included with this report.
2. Reports on damage inflicted on specitic industrial aDd CODl
.unications targets.
3. Detailed reports on bridges, giving past and present damage
and amount ot rep~ir necessary. Construction and progress
ot repairs is also noted.
The tollowing is an account ot one ot the nUlllerous enemy plans, un
covered ~ the use ot aerial reconnaissance in the hands of a capable
photo interpreter. This is the case ot the -Little Span That Wasn't
There" at the Calsinato railroad bridge. It shows the respect the enelD)"
has for our Photo Reconnaissance, and to what lenghts he will go to de
ceive us.
The bridge 18 a two span aftair on the .,.ital rail 1ine between the
Melan-Turin industrial area and Verona, which is the Grand Central
Station ot Italy. Our reconnaissance for the last two months had re
vealed the bridge to be unssrviceable. Never was Ilore than one span
seen to be in place. Every other bridge on the line, however, had been
repaired and was serviceable. Following the tip-ott that the bridge
was somehow being used, photo interpreters at this section started to
look tor clues. The II1ssing span was only 50 teet long, and interpreters
knew tram experience with other bridges that it was an easy repair job.
Craters on both approaches had been repaired and the track was service
able right up to both abutments. On both approaches there was a large
number ot rolling stock, apparently blocked. However, a more extensive
study showed that they were allan a single track and the other track
was consistently open tor traftic. Then came the clue that told the
story. About 300 yards troll the bridge, parked on a siding, was a rail
road crane with a boom over 100 feet long (see top photo on opposite page).
The evidence was reported and the '5th Photo Recon Sq. flew a night
mission to confirm our suspicions. By the light ota flare, tile little
span was seen to be in place and the bridge was being used tor night
traffic. A locomotive was pulling the crane back to its siding atter
it had done its nightly job (see bottoll photo on opposite page).
Fighter bombers came over shortly atter and destroyed the bridge,
and so wrote the tinish to a story ot teamwork between Photo Recon,
Interpretation and Bombardment.
,...
'-4_" -..
I , •• • •
, r'
-t 6. ~~
. /'V ..
DAY PHOTO SHOWING RAILROAD CRANE AND SPAN "OUT"
. ,
1. The Air Crew rlak Mao - produced for air crews in order to
~rovide them with a concrete picture of the flak defended
areas to be avoided when flying to and from the target.
Due to the shortage of flak weapons the enemy has resorted to the
use of dummy batteries to deceive our photo intelligence. The Germans
rarely, if ever, attempt to set up dummy light gun positions; however,
dummy heavy ~ositions have been found at several places in Northern
Italy. The best examples discovered are the dummy batteries near
Verona, Bolzano, Vicenza and Ostiglia. On unusually good cover, flown
at an altitude of 19000 feet, a twelve gun heavy battery west of Verona
was di~covered to be a dummy. On this excellent scale the guns were
found to be posts placed in the center of the revetments, and six of
the revetments were open ended, indicating that the real guns had been
pulled out. There was no movement in or near the battery, and the RGL
(radio gun laying) em~lacements were unoccupied. The living quarters,
however, were still on the site and there appeared the normal track
activity found at live gun positions.
• •
J' \.; ,(
movement and activity whichrtakes place around a live battery is not
observed, they are reported as being d~ batteries.
The above cited examples, and many others, indicate the enemy has
an active interest in this type of deception. However, most of his
efforts to delude the' interpreter are unsuccessful, and in the few
CAses where it has been difficult to obtain good scale photos, the
complete lack of activity (especially ap~arent in snow) has been de
tected and the Dositions revealed as dummies.
,
,
Co!llDltmications, or HC Bection, exists primarily for Ue purpose of
supplying targets for Tactical Air Force operational units. A very large
portion of the targets attacked by the 12th Air Force and MATAF during the
past 12 months have been rail and road bridges, and other vulnerable
comunmications points. HC section makes detailed photo interpretation
studies of the rail and road networks in enemy territory. Operations
Strangle, Diadem, Mallory Major and Bingo were all centered on the
interdiction of enemy sup?ly routes. Photo Intelligence on targets
attacked was supplied by HC section from route studies and interpre
tation reports. On the Brenner Pass route a detailed strip mosaic was
laid and studied for targets from Verona to Innsbruck, with a view to
permanently blocking this vital lifeline to Germany.
Below and on opposite page are three photos of the S. Nicolo a Po
pontoon bridge. The two day photos show the pontoons lines up along the
river bank. The night photo shows the pontoons assembled into a complete
bridge with the enemy attempting to conceal it by means of smoke
generators.
- 69
..
Below is an example of the HI(S) report (No. 3RI 33S). This indus
try was a sugar refinery at Mirandola. Italy, reported to be making al
cohol, which was later used by the enemy as transport fuel. The Indus
try section identified the individual buildings as ~ell as storage tanks,
and reported the nlant as active. The subsequent attack by fighter
bombers was concentrated on the refinery and storage tanks, rather than
being scattered over the entire factory. As a result the refiner,y and
several tanks were destroyed, and the installation is no longer in op
eration.
, ,
II
ANNOTATED PHOTO lffiICH ACCOMPANIES PRELIMINARY REPORT
.
OBA8LE .BOILER HOUSE
'DESTROYE.1>
DISTRIBUTION HI 2
EXTERNAL 75
INTERNAL 10
ITALY
Sortie 5PRS/5MS3 and SPRS/5M85 continued.
~. Jf"(RANOOLA
(5PRS/85. 20.1.45. 3.112)
REPOBTED FUEL STORES IN SUGAR REFINERY AT ,7 .69 9 1.
i The attack by ftghter bombers has almost destroyed the main
building, severely damaged one, gutted one and inflicted roof
damage on another.
(ii) Two of the storage tanks have been severely damaged, two dam
aged, and 3 tanks remain undamaged.
Photos 3160, 61.
· . .
DISTRIBUTION "K"
External 97
Internal 10
- 74
J
PARTIALLY DAMAGED FREYA
- 75
•• •
~S" Section was formed for the purpose of obtaining intelligence
from photos made with K-25 cameras. These photos have been supplied
by the XXII TAC and DAr Fighter Bombers.
The photos used &re taken at the conclusion of fighter bomber at
tacks with K-25 cameras mounted on the wing of one or the attacking
planes. The resulting photographs are low altitude obliques of the
target and the area immediately surrounding it.
The reports include bomb damage assessment and activit,r for the
communication and dump targets covered. With the reports, a selected
print showing each target reported, is issued. The main difficulty is
identifying and locating targets by use of oblique photos at such low
a1titude. Another difficulty is that photos are usually taken fairly
soon after the attack and in many cases the targets are still smoke
obsucred. However, this type or photography has a definite value,
especially when low overcast weather prevents effective photo recon
naissance.
. ' ~
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In July, 1944 a photographic study and c1assific~tion of enemy
dum~s in Italy was begun ~ the Forward Interpretation Detachment of the
3rd Photo Tech Sq. Later on, this work was carried on jointly with the
Third Phase Inte~retation Unit of 3 P.T.S. which finally, in December
1944, assumed full responsibility for reporting new dumps North of the Po
River as well as writing activity reports on those previously identified.
1 1 ,.,.
AN AMPHIBIOUS, OPERATION
"'D-~' had dawned on the Riviera. Froa where. I sit, the coastline
of Southern 'P'rabce resembles some ragged carcass inf'ested by a Swarll of
devouring ants. Nosing the beaches, the invasion boats lie in scores
while motor vessels dash purposetully between them and the bigger ships
at sea. Thirty odd thousand feet above, .,. celstial gaze registers the
scene as remote and toylike. The griJll fighting to establish a foothold,
the shelling, even the aerial boab&rdment are too sla8.11 in scale to be
seen in det8.il. Only the largest incidents can be picked out. Over
there a whole village is burning, throwing up a huge column of almost
Ilotionless goke. ADd there, just beyond one of the busiest of the
'beaches, a terrific cascade of baabe has pockmarked the' face of the earth.
But although wy powerfUl c8118ras are noting what II\Y peering eyes cannot
detect, of the progress of the battle, of the depth of penetration, I
will know nothing until I listen to the radio news later on. Apart from
a few tires, from this altitude the whole coast inland seems inscrutably
peacetal.
The sole link between me and the invisible tunx>il below is • radio.
Its staccato voice gives ae excerpts from a play IIOre thrilling than
BDY wireless station ever produced.
"Got it I think. Let's go down and give it another squirt." More
trouble ahead for SOlle Jerry transport strongpoint.
"Did you see who that was bailing out? Was he one of ours?" queries
another voice, and saall wonder that wry head whips involuntarily around
when a loud voice yells in wry ear,
"Look outl Behind you on the lefU1t But the incident is probably
taking place twenty thousand feet below and possibly thirty alles away.
When there is nothing IlUch on the air elsewhere, the distress channel
SOllet1aes provides interesting listening. The resigned tones or a pilot
who has gone as far as he can on a faltering engine and who is now giving
his exact position before bailing out into 'The Drink", COllIe over conver
sationally,
"Guess it's packing up. Bailing out approximately fifteen alles
west or Base. Out. "
Occasionally a touch 0 UII"
,I'.
"Thanks a lot - I mad~, it.'
· ,,~ t ~t J
upside down ~'f""ihe end or the ran
'WaY at the JIOll8nt - 'but I made' it! 'f!;aanfs.·. ..,.'
-79
Imagination helps to bridge the gulf of space. Although I cannot
see tragedies and triumphs of the struggle below, the rare flash of an
explosion or a haz,y column of dust from a road, help to make the vast.
sprawling scene less i.personal. There perh!-p!' BO som~ of our tanks
probing deeper into the chequered countljlls de.~ Or.. possi i t i~Ja
Panzer formation rumbling forward to hurl themselvell t.th ."'tidal
wave from the beaches. If I'm lucky I msy catch a g se of bbmbers
at work. While taking pictures of a "bombed bridge half an hour ago I
saw three of our bombers sweep up the valley leaving the bridge area
covered in billowing smoke and dust. They, unlike myself, seemed to
fi t into the earthly scheme of things.
Travel at great speed and altitude tends to induce a certain god
like frame of mind. When a journey of a thousand miles, during which
the Alps appear as scarcely more than wrinkles on the surface of the
world and great invasion neets look like microbes, can be done easily
between breakfast and lunch, distance loses its meaning and the struggles
of man become ignominiously remote and paltry. National capitols, huge
aerodromes slashed out of the soil, leagues of railways and roads, even
Nature's greatest moments resemble something under the naturalist's mag
nif'ying glass.
Here in the rarefied atmosphere where trails can be used as a
burglar alarm against surprise attack and the correct functioning of
his oxygen system stands between the pilot and death in a very few
minutes, the work of aerial swing on the enemy is carried out. Speed
and the ability to spot the hunter before he spots you, are the photo
graphers only defence. "The job entails long solitary nights, using
oxygen all the time, deep into hostile territory. But there are few
P.R. pilots who are not enthusiastic about the nature of their work
and who would not agree that a scene such as the one below me now,
compensates for all the petty discomforts of high altitude flying.
Those tiny ships are there according to ao plan which was drawn up on
intelligence gleaned from our photographs. In the weeks precec!JJ1g the
landings, guns were ferreted out which might have exacted a heavy toll
frCIII the attacking infantry and the intricacies of the beach defences
were pierced by our cameras.
With this mental pat on the back for our trade, I stuff the nose
down on the long descent to base. A hundred miles away the beer ration
should be in by now. Goodluck invasion •••••••• "
-80
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c
- 81
t
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BASIC COVER. Thus the mapping and the defense study jobs were begun.
The next undertaking was that of fl¥ing a broad, convenient block of good
scale cover for use as a general view of the country, a reference library
for interpretation problems, and a basis for the comparative stud,y of
later photos.
The fl3iDg specifications tor good basic cover are relatively strict.
AU prints should be of "A" quality, and sorties should be of similar alt
itude to facilitate the preparation of sosaics or standard-scale gridded
photos. It is most desirable to achieve cover in the fewest number of
prints furnishing adequate side and running overlap. Excessive number of
photos costs much in time and material during the many rehandlings and re
oroerings of the planning period. Tand_ 24" cameras flown at an altitude
of 25,000 to 28,000' provided a satisfactory compromise between fl¥ing
safety and interpretable scale.
F'13ing for the basic cover program began at the coastal spot most
suitable for a landing and worked inland along the likel¥ path of advance.
The job was flown on rush priority until an area some forty by a hundred
miles was cOTered; this backlog was insurance against possible future air
cra!tshortage or adverse flying cQ1ditions. Meanwhile a shadow program
was being fiown for the dual purpose of concealing the arm-r's main plans
and building up cover in an alternative area then being considered.
It took montha to complete the primary area, the shadow area, and fin
ally the regico between. Extremely accurate flak and extremel¥ persistent
fighters Mde it necessary to build up basic cover by strips instead of
the more cuatoaary blocks which involve five or six runs in the same lo
cality. TM pUots became very skil.l!ul at covering a large area with a
few long parallel runs. They di~ not have to retrace their course, or
stq in small areas on an,y missions whether f1y1ng for mapping, mosaic,
road, or pinpoint cover.
The basic cover thus flown was suitable for making mosaics, although
the best camera for general Mosaic work (1:25,000 scale) is the 12" ver
tical, which requires on13 a quarter the maber of prints for the same
coverage and gives less distortion.
If a 12" camera is used at the same time 24" basic cover ia flown,
subsequent preparation of mosaics is much simplified. Cover of areas
not important enough to justify the preparation of a mosaic can still
be given economical distribution, if the need arises, in the form of 12"
photos. For the planning study of Southern France, the invasion coast
was considered important enough to merit the preparation of very large
scale mosaics (1:10,000) at the beginning of the planning period. Other
mosaics were given a much lower priority, but toward the end of the
period 12" m.osaics were prepared to show the country for a hundred miles
along the intended axis of advance.
COVERAGE FOR TACTICAL AIR FORCE: All the photography discussed hither
to was flown primarily for the army planners. Other jobs, meanwhile, were
in hand for the Air Corps and Navy. For the Air Corps, missions were flown
to search out targets, obtain briefing photos, check activity, and assess
bomb damage. Principal targets included harbors, marshalling J8rds, air
dromes, bridges, industrial areas, and radar installations. Frequency of
cover ranged from several times a week to once every three weeks. When
the air program was intensified before "D" day, many more missions were
required, and the Fifth Photographic Reconnaissance Squadron was moved to
Corsica to devote itself entirely to Tactical Air Force support.
DICING MISSIONS AND OBLIQUE PHOTOS: NaTJ' planners and interpreters
submitted photographic demands from the beginning of the planning period.
Working with the ~ interpreters, they made exhaustive studies of all
beach defenses. In addition, they requested special so~ties to help them
in landing recognition and water study problems. High altitude and low
altitude obliques were flown to furnish information for models, perspec
tive drawings, and coastline silhouettes. Pilots were briefed to "rack
up" their aircraft as they crossed the coast after their missions and to
take 6" and 24" shots of the French mainland from about 20,000' altitude.
After 8 little practice in this unusual type of photography, they began
to bring back ver,y descriptive pictures of the terrain.
The low level obliques, or "dicers", were flown for the Army and
Navy jointly. They attempted to furnish recognition shots for approach
and landing, both offshore and inshore; they also gave information about
the exact nature of beach terrain, obstacles, and defenses. The close-in
shots gave 8 description of the beach from the invader's view point. They
showed the exact condition of the beaches with their stakes, tetrahedrons,
walls, ditches, barbed wire, mines, and gun positions. They showed the
seaward faces of all structures which might be fortified; they indicated
the landmarks and routes of attack for the landing parties. Their purpose
was not so much to interpret the defenses (good scale vertical photos
gave more valuable information in the long run, and were much safer to
fly) but to give the ~lanning staff and the invading soldier an inval
uable portrait-of just what had to be faced.
-
Preliminary Study of Beaches from Air
- 86 - ,
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'"
Daring the panU , ere fio1lD elODg the
greater part of the French coast; missions were scattered both for the
sake of security and because the planners considered JIOre than one area.
The rocky, irregular, and highly fortified shore between Cannes end
Toulon was the target of several missions. To reach this area, the
pilot had to navigate accurately at deck level across more than a hun
dred miles of open sea and then fly over short sendy beaches separated
by j\1tting headlands. He had to climb over promontories and then cut
across beaches at en altitude of about 300 feet, Dot more then 100
yards offshore. BaIlking the aircraft in the normal course of turning
resulted in the side cameras shooting either the air or the water, and
had to be avoided. The enell\f fire was a further problem; a ll'rench
pilot was lost on one of these mssions, and an Americen pilot returned
to base with over 200 halt holes. Nevertheless, thanks to the persist
ence end skill of our airmen, the troops obtained excellent dicing
photos or every i.portent invasion beach.
Both six inch and twelve inch focal length cameras were used for
dicing; the six inch gave better continuous close cover of a straight
beach, and the twelve inch gave better scale for a more distant or ir
regular target. Cameras pointed out both sides and forward. The DOse
camera was especially important because it caught gaps when side cameras
missed the target in a bank or had insufficient running overlap. On the
first dicing missions, dried salt spray obscured the nose camera window
after a long ron close to the water. It was necessary to send the air
craft to their target at deck level to avoid spotting by hostile radar,
and so the Twenty-Third Squadron devised a JIISJJtla1ly operated spray
shield which the pilot retracted just before taking pictures.
, SPECIALIZED RECONN OF INVASION BEACHES: The Navy and Army had more
questions to ask about beach conditions than could be enswered by ord
inary oblique and vertical photographs, so specialized reconnaissence
was devised and carried out. What was the state of mnes, booms, UDder
water obstacles, sandbars, and shore bottoms? From time to time, when
the wind was right and the water perfectly sllOOth along certain beaches,
missions were nown for the express purpose of showing the bottom through
clear water. Color fila was used on a few occasions in an effort to
penetrate the water more clearly. Even the surface of the water yielded
information. Beach gradients can be determined by the measurement and
analysis of the wave system built up by the right kind of offshore wind.
T J
The water, as it is blown toward the shore, pus es over the shallows and
stretches across the deeper spots; this tendency is reflected in the
wrinkles in the sea surface, which gave an accurate index to the bottom
depth and gradient. A special camera was used to obtain this intelligence
for the Navy.
THE TACTICAL PHAS~ ll4llliDIATELY PRECEDING "0" DAY: The cover program,
in fact, entered a new phase immediately preceding "D" Lay. ~uch things
as survey, basic, or mosaic photograpny were no longer of prime importance;
during the week before the landing, almost every mission bore direct relat
ion to th~ tactical requirements of the immediate operation. The landing
beaches were given a final check by large-scale cameras, and the roads,
railroads, harbors, and airfields were carefully watched for activity. It
was arranged so that the last missions before the landing could be briefed
from Corsica and land in Italy to be given at once to the interpreters;
vital information could then be radioed to the invasion fleet after all
personnel had embarked.
BEACHEAO SUPPORT: Our story of the planning cycle has now run from
the first survey missions to the last~ute pre-invasion reconnaissance.
It is canplete as far as planning itself goes, and yet i t is not quite ready
to hand over to the normal ~ photo support system because there is a
peculiarly difficult transition period to go through before the establizh
ment of the squadrons on the beachead.
On "D" Day itself and for a day or two thereafter, communications
are immensely difficult and the situation is confused. There is a de
mand for historical record pictures (both large area mapping and de
scri?tive obliques) of the fleet, invaJion craft, and landing operations.
But until the front is stabilized, the greatest use of high altitude
reconnaissance is in watching the broader enemy situation on roads,
railroads, and airports. Radio contact is at first the only method of
communi_cation between the army and the squadron. Questions about eneIllY'
defenses or disoositions asked by the photographic liaison officer with
the forces are delayed in transmitting, and the distance of the aircraft
bases from the invasion coast severely limit the usefulness of photo
granhic support at this stage. Within a very few days a drop area may
be estab"ished so that rush sorties may be delivered to interpreters
on the beach, but generally the fluidity of the situation makes inter
pretation of defenses most difficult wntil a settled front line is
arrived at. Within a week of "D" Day it should be possible to land a
limited ~umber of aircraft each day on a beachhead airstrip. The pilots
are briefed bv the Air Liaison Officer, fly a quick mission, give their
film to a mobile laboratory un! t sent from the squadron on the invasion
fleet, and return nightly to their distant base, where there is relative
safety and convenient maintenance.
1--11
- 89 -
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NIGHT PHOTOGRAPHY
DEVF,La~~T IN B-25: Towa the end of the summer of 1943 interest was
awakened tn the posstbtlitles of ni.ght photo reconnaissance. Some of this
type work had been accomplished by the RAF in the Mediterranean Theater of
Operattons and by the RAF and USAAF in England.
Extensive experimental work was c~rried on with B-25's using magnesium
flash bombs, both Britis~ and American. Experiments were made at various
altttudes from 5000 to 15000 feet, to determlne required air speeds, shutter
speeds, camera and fuse settlngs to obtain satisfactory pictures. Trial
"bomb" runs were made to determine the interval between bomb releases to
obtaIn sufficient overlap for stereosconic cover.
Two camera techniques were used, the "open flash" system, and the "Photo
electric cell" system. In the "open flash" ~stem the camera shutter was
tied open. Film was exposed by the flash of t~e bomb, after which film was
rolled and the unit readied for the next flash. This technique produced good
pictures, but when used in combat was subjected to tnterferance from search
lights and anti-aircraft gun flashes. In the "photo-electric cell" system
a photo-electric cell was connected to the shutter control. The bomb
flash actuated the shutter and wound the film automatically.
The data obtained from training missions was put into practice in combat
and while the results obtained were highly satisfactory more experiments
were conducted to improve technique and to fInd the best equipment su~~~ble
for thie type work. Experiments were conducted using two cameras, port
and starboard in tandem. This gave greater photo coverage and simplified
the pin-point navigation problem. The "photo-electric cell" system was
found to be the better of the two ~stemB used and the Amerlcan flash bomb
was more satisfactory than the BritiSh type used with the B-25 bomb-release
and bomb-bay set-up.
Experiments were carried out installing the units in A. B-24, B-25 and
and A-20, the units being carried tn the bomb bay of the aircraft. Several
units were installed in a B-24 and B-25. Pictures were taken at various
altitudes from 5000 to 15000 feet. Insufficient light, slowness of aircraft,
and weight of the unit ruled out these aircraft. The A-20, with one unit
installed, ~roved to be the most successful. Excellent pictures ware taken
at altitudes varying from 1500 to 3000 feet.
- 90
, ,
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.,-""O't b!tton on '"the control of the plane. When
a picture was to be taken the pilot pressed the button which opened the
camera shutter; when the shutter was fully opened the light flashed, the
film was exposed, the shutter closed and the film was automatically
wound. To date, results obtained in comb~t have been highly 8at~sfactory.
USES OF 1'f!GHT PHOTOGRAPH~: The main tactical value of night photo
reconnaissance is that it Qenetrates tne chief method of ene~ concealment
movement under oover of darkness. Determining traffic movements, locating
enemy dumps and concentrations, checking harbors, marshalling yards,
bridges, ferry sites and strips of railroad are some of the targets covered
by night photography. This type of photography frequently discloses more
activi~ than day photographs and has been used to supplement and check
intelligence gained through normal daytime channels.
LTMI14TIONS: Definite limitations, of necessity, exist in successful
night photo reconnaissance. Interpretation demands must be relatively
simple. Movement of traffic on roads, shipping in harbors, checking pon
toon bridges and similar activities are all natural targets for night
photography. Information needed must not require detailed interpretati~n.
When flash bombs are used, relatively few pinpoints (6 at the most) can
be covered on any one mission, due to the maximum number of bombs that
can be carried.
There are limitations of navigation. Except for the half of the month
in which adequate moonlight is available, targets are difficult to find
unless located on the coast, on large rivers, on main highways, or near
landmarks visible through black nights.
Weather had been one of the chief limitatloDI3. Due to the accuracy of
nav!gatL>n demanded weather c·)ndi tions should be ideal although this
problem may soon be alleviated somewhat by the incorporation of radar
equipment. Experiments along those lines are being c,">nducted at the present
ti.me. The 3rd Photo Reconnaissance Group Is the only USAAF unit employ
ing night photo operations at the present time in this theater. The night
unit consists of two B-~5's and one A-~O.
"JIIDNIGHT ROVER" A new development in night photography is in the
experimental stage in this theater at present. The operation when per
fected will be called "MIDNIGHT ROVER" - the night counterpart of "Rover
1oe". It is planned to use the system when and if the Jerry pulls out of
his present Bologna line and retreats to the Po or the Alps. Missions
will be flown over night pontoon bridges, terries, marshalling yards and
other possible choke-points. Upon completion of the miSSiOIl, an inter
preter will do first phase interpretation trom the negative alone. A~
tempting targets will be passed on to XXIITAC who will direct night
bombers and fighters to the targets. Radar equipment which is vital to
accurate night photography is still lacking, but it is hoped that enough
equipment can be utilized to insure success of these operations. "lIidnight
Rover" is a potentially strong weapon if operated correctly. Howeve~, speed
is of the essence and the g,ystem may or may not have time to prove its worth.
- 91
A
An extremely large-scale night photo of a pontoon bridge over the Po River. Jerry
assembles and uses this bridge at night, then dismantles it during the day. The
bright spot in the photo is the reflection of tte flash unit.
- 92
OOJM>N QUESTtoNS ASKED ABOUT PHOTO RECON
Q. What is the difference between Photo Recon and Tactical Recon (Tac/R)?
A. Photo Recon is fiown at high altitude with cameras having a long
focal length, and giving wide coverage. Tac/R planes usually f'ly at
medium altitude (about 8000') and generally use oblique cameras of
short focal length. Their mission is to photograph specific small
targets (i.e., one gun position, a specific dump, etc.) while Photo
Recon planes cover larger targets (i.e., a whole town, a large area,
a strip of railroad 100 miles long, 10 to 12 airdromes, etc.) Tac!~
also does a great deal of visual reconnaissance, while Photo Recon
does very I ittle due to the high al titude. Tac/R planes fly in pairs
and are armed, while Photo Recon planes fly alone and are unarmed.
On a Tac/R mission, one plane takes the photos and does visual recon
while his partner weaves on his tail~ protects him from interce~tion,
and warns hill if fiak is getting too close. The Photo Recon pilot
has none of these advantages.
Q. Why do Photo Recon ships ny at 20-25,000 feet while medium bombers
fiy over the same targets at 10-12,000 feet?
A. The F-5 (converted P-38) aircraft is built for high altitude and
gives best performance at 24,000 feet. Because the pilot is alone,
unarmed, and virtually unarmored, he is very vulnerable to flak and
interception. Moreover, his cameras at medium altitude do not have
wide coverage; therefore, the pilot is apt to miss his target COli
pletely. At high altitude the wide camera coverage enables a good
pilot to cover his targets 100 percent.
- 93
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shadow and hill shadow, mist and smoke fre~tiently Qb8C!U"9 J>.hotos.
Weather is b.Y far the greatest obsta~le encountered 'in Photo Recon.
nssions be fiown?
Q. What is the effect of flak on a photo mission, and when is flak us
ually encountered?
Q. Why does flak affect a photo Idssion more than a fighter or bomber
mission?
- 94
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A. The photo pilot can take very little evasive action and still get
pictures of his targets. Fighters and bombers can plan their
approach to the target in such a way as. to avoid or minimize the
main concentrations of flak, but the photo pilot's job is to get
photos of those very fiak batteries - therefore, he must fly direct
il1' over them and keep his plane fairly straight and level. This pre
sents a T8ry good target for the n.ak boys below.
A. A photo mission is not suecessf'ul until the pilot "gets his photos
aDd gets th9JI backw • If a photo pilot is forced to land at another
base and- stay OTernight his photos lose such of their value, since
the information on the photos will be too late to be of much tac
tical importance. A fighter or bomber mission is successful as soon
as the target is hit. They M3 land at 8J\V base and re1~ their
reports to the home base.
-95