1.

PhenomenologyandMaterialCulture
JulianThomas
SchoolofArts,HistoriesandCultures
UniversityofManchester
Introduction
While it might be relatively easy to isolate examples of Marxist,
structuralist, or feminist analyses of material culture, studies that openly
identifythemselvesasphenomenologicalarealittlescarcer.Thisissurprising,
given that phenomenology is sometimes represented as a method, and is
predominantly concerned with the human experience of things. In this
contributionIwillarguethattheideasofthephenomenologicaltraditionhave
beenhighlyinfluentialinthestudyofmaterialculture,althoughtheirsource
hasnotalwaysbeenexplicitlyacknowledged.Phenomenologicalinsightshave
beenreadilyadoptedwithinotherschoolsofthought,andtheyalsoamountto
farmorethananepistemology. Yetthislatterpointhasbeenoverlookedby
some recent phenomenological approaches, which understand the term to
mean little more than a methodology in which the investigator bases their
interpretationofaplaceorobjectupontheirunbridledsubjectiveexperience.
As I will hope to demonstrate, this does little justice to the subtlety of
phenomenologicalthought. Thischapterwilldrawoutsomeoftheprincipal
strandsofthetradition,demonstratingalongthewaytheextenttowhichthey
haveinformedthestudyofmaterialthings,andfocusinginparticularonsome
ofthestudiesthathavebeenprofessedlyphenomenologicalincharacter.
Phenomenology is concerned with the human encounter, experience and
understandingofworldlythings,andwithhowthesehappeningscometobe
possible. While empiricism and positivism take the givenness of material
objects as an unquestioned first principle, phenomenologists from Edmund
Husserl onwards have argued that if science is to concern itself with the
acquisition of information through the physical senses (in laboratory
experimentsorfieldobservations)thenthecharacterofexperienceneedstobe
problematised.RationalistslikeDescarteshadsoughttoovercomescepticism
aboutourknowledgeofthephenomenalworldbystartingfromtherealityof
thehumansubjectsthoughtprocesses.Ifwecannotdoubtthatwethink,we
canconstructlogicalproceduresandinstrumentsforevaluatingtheveracityof
oursenseimpressions.YetHusserlwantedtoachieveastillgreaterdegreeof
conviction,byunderstandingpreciselywhathappensintheprocessthrough
whichsomeconceptionofanencounteredthingisgenerated.IfDescarteshad
soughttoarriveatcertaintythroughradicaldoubt,Husserlwantedtoquestion
allofhisownassumptionsandprejudicesabouttheworldinordertoapproach
thepurestessenceofexperience.Yetthissameimperativetocastdoubtonall
presumptionswouldleadphenomenologytowardamuchmorefundamental

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question:whyisitthatthereissomethinginsteadofjustnothing?(Heidegger
2001:1).
Heideggersquestionisacharacteristicallyphenomenologicalone,evenifby
the time he asked it he had broken with his mentor and established a
hermeneutic phenomenology that was radically removed from Husserls
work. Forwhatdistinguishesphenomenologyisnotsimplyaconcernwith
experienceandunderstanding,butanunstintingdemandthatnoaspectofeither
canbetakenforgranted.IntheworkofHeidegger,MerleauPontyandothers
the source ofmany ofthe unexamined assumptions about humanexistence
came to be identified as the western philosophical tradition itself, which
phenomenologyhadoriginallybeenintendedtostrengthen.Aconsequenceof
thishasbeenthatoneofthehallmarksofphenomenologicalthinkingisthe
way that it commonly reverses the causal relationships presumed by
contemporarycommonsense,suchasthosebetweensubstanceandmeaning,
or essence and manifestation. Putting this another way, phenomenological
arguments are often counterintuitive, but they are constructed under the
understandingthatourintuitionistheproductofacontingentorderofthings.
Theemergenceofphenomenologicalthought
Phenomenologyin the acceptedsense began with the work of Franz
Brentanointhelaternineteenthcentury.Brentanoproposedwhathecalleda
descriptivepsychology,whichwastobedifferentiatedfromtheneurological
studyofmentalprocesses,andconcernedwiththesignificanceandcontentof
cognitiveacts(Moran2000:9).Brentanopointedoutthatmentalphenomena
differ from physical ones in that they are always directed at something
(Schuhmann2004:281). Anythingthatdoesnotrefertosomethingelseis
rightfullythesubjectmatterofthenaturalsciences,butadifferentapproach
wasrequiredtoaddressthedirectionalityofconsciousactivity,whichBrentano
referred to as intentionality. Intentionality always takes a form in which
individualmentaleventsareconnectedtooneanotherrelationally,sothata
singleepisodeofsenseperceptionisneverjusttheacquisitionofanatomised
unit of information. In thought and perception, objects appear as
presentations, which form the basic elements of consciousness (Rollinger
2004:259). Theintentionalityofmentalactivityformsawholeorhorizon,
whichrendersthesepresentationscomprehensible.
BrentanosaccountofintentionalitygreatlyinfluencedHusserl,whooriginally
intendedhisphenomenologytobeaformofdescriptivepsychology.Husserl
wantedtoestablishasciencewhichcouldidentifythefundamentalstructures
ofconsciousness,therebyunravellingtheproblemofperception(Moran2000:
60). Intentionality was central to this project, for Husserl held that
consciousnessisalwaysdirectedtowardsomeobject,whetherrealorimagined.
Consciousnessisalwaysconsciousnessofsomething,althoughthissomething

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maybeasabstractasanumberoramathematicalformula.Theimplicationof
thisisthatintentionalityprovidesthebasisfortherelationshipbetweenpeople
andtheirworld,whichisbodilyaswellascognitive,althoughtheobjectsto
whichwedirectourselvesareobjectsasconceptualised. Husserlwantedto
addressthesecognitiveobjectsintheirpurestform:notmentalprocessesbut
theidealentitiestowhichthesereferanddirectthemselves(Matthews2002:
24).ForHusserl,thiswaswhatthephenomenaofphenomenologyamounted
to,thingsthatappearedassuchinconsciousness. Itwouldbeeasytoargue
thatthisamountstoaformofidealism,yetHusserlsviewwasthatinthe
processofthedirectingofconsciousnesstowarditsobjects,somethingabout
theworldbeyondthemindisgiventous(Hintikka1995:82). Forwhilein
some senses the phenomena that Husserl was attempting to isolate were
attributes of the mind, they were also the means by which intuition is
possible.Intuitionisthekindofinsightthatoccurswhenonerecognisesthat
somethingisthecase(Moran2000:10).Intuitionistheexperienceofgetting
thepointandrecognisinghowthingsare. Thisiswhathappenswhenwe
understandmaterial things. It was purity of these moments of insight that
Husserlsphenomenologysoughttocapture,inwhichwecannotdoubtthatwe
have apprehended the real nature of things through our mental apparatus.
Husserl claimed that his phenomenology was governed by a principle of
propositionlessness,anddealtnotinabstracttheoriesbutwiththeattemptto
addressthethingsthemselves(ibid:9).Hestressedthatmaterialthingsare
always torevealed to someone,andthus stressedtheimportance ofhuman
beingsassubjectsofexperience.
Husserlsemphasisonidentifyingexperiencesintheirpurestpossiblestateled
him by the first decade of the twentieth century to establish a working
procedure that he referred to the phenomenological reduction. This was
intendedtoleadtheinvestigatorfromepisodesofperceptiontotheuniversal
essencesthatunderlaythem,bybracketingtheprejudicialassumptionsthat
surrounded any particular experience and exposing the core of pure
consciousness and the phenomena immanent within it. These assumptions
madeupwhatHusserlcalledthenaturalattitude:theaverage,unquestioning,
everyday perspective from which we generally approach the world. The
reduction involved a radical selfquestioning, in which the investigator
attempted to strip away all of the conceptual clutter that tied the core
experiencetoacontingentsetofcircumstances. Bythismeans,itshouldbe
possibletoidentifypreciselywhatconsciousnesswasdirectingitselftowardin
thecourseofanexperience:itsintentionalobject.
Husserlstermfortherawmaterialofexperience,gatheredfromthematerial
world,washyle. LikeKantbeforehim,hearguedthatthismaterialwas
chaoticandformless,andimpossibletoapprehendinitsnativestate.Itisthe
orderingcapabilitiesofhumanbeingsthatrenderhyleticdatacomprehensible,

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throughthewaythatwedirectourattentiontoparticularthings,intheprocess
rendering them as objects of consciousness (Hintikka 1995: 88). This can
happenbecausethehumanmindhasatitsdisposalaseriesofidealobjects,or
noema,whicharefilledbyexperience,therebyprovidingitwithastructure.
The noema are objectsastheyareintended, the vehicles of intentionality,
which specify the expectations that enable a particular phenomenon to be
identified.Thus,forinstance,anoemonforthecolourredmightbecomposed
of a series of conditions which allowed the colour to be identified when
encountered in experience. Husserl considered these noema to be a priori
structures of consciousness, while still providing a bridge between
consciousnessandthephysicalworld.
As a new foundation for the sciences, Husserl intended that the
phenomenological reduction should identify a series of structures that have
priorityoverscientificobservationandscientificexplanation(Matthews2002:
32).Thecausalrelationshipsthatnaturalsciencedealsinarerelationsbetween
entitieswhosecharacterhas already beenestablishedbeforeexplanationcan
begin,andthisrequiresthattheirsignificanceormeaningmustalreadyhave
beengrasped. Husserlsphenomenologywasthusconcernedwiththepre
scientific. Implicitinthisviewistherecognitionthatscienceisaworldly
practice, carried out by human subjects in the phenomenal world, and
containingcontingentelementswhichmustthemselvesbebracketedifoneisto
approachthefundamentalstructuresofconsciousness.Thisbracketingshould
attempttosetasideallaspectsofthelivedworld,inordertograsphowthe
abstract essences of phenomena might appear to a pure consciousness.
Everything else is epiphenomenal and nonessential. Needless to say, this
approach committed Husserl to the belief that particular aspects of mental
functioningaretranscendental.Thenaturalattitudewastobeassociatedwith
theparticularandthehistorical,andeventheassumptionoftheexistenceofa
worldneededtobebracketedinordertoaccessthehorizonofpuresubjectivity
(Moran2000:2).
Ifphenomenologywastobeprescientific,thecriteriaofexplanatoryadequacy
usedinsciencecouldnotapplytoit.Factscouldnotprovideanybasisfor
theverificationofphenomenologicalinsights(Husserl1983:44),sincefacts
were actually constructed in the processes that phenomenology sought to
illuminate.Whathadbeengraspedintuitivelycouldonlybeverifiedthrough
furtherintuitiveinsights. Aswehaveseen,Husserlsfaithinthesecurityof
suchinsightswasconnectedwiththeincontestablerealityofthought,itself
linkedwiththenotionofatranscendentalsubject.Eventually,Husserlwould
cometoarguethatsincesciencewasbuiltupontheoreticalabstractionsthat
weresecondarytothestructuresofexperience,theworldoflivedengagement
(thelifeworld)hadpriorityoverscientificexplanation.Whileitiscommon
toimaginethatsciencedealsinthefundamentalrealitiesofthings,Husserl

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would claim that the truths of science were abstracted from more basic
structures(Ricoeur1974:8).
Noneofthis,however,shouldencourageustobelievethatHusserlwasanti
scientific. His phenomenologyaspiredtoachievethe statusofaneidetic
ratherthana factualscience. Sucheidetic sciences includedgeometryand
mathematics, which concerned themselves with abstract essences instead of
factualobservations. Theirtruthsweredemonstratedbylogicandreason,as
opposedtoinductiveordeductivetreatmentsofevidence.Justasphysicsand
chemistry depend upon the insights of mathematics and geometry, Husserl
believed that phenomenology could become an eidetic science of
consciousness,essentialtothereformofthenaturalsciences.Tothisend,he
proposedthatthephenomenologicalreductionshouldbecomplementedbyan
eideticreduction,inwhichtheinvestigatormovedbeyondthebracketingof
everyday experience to an appreciation of the universal essence of reality
(Moran2000:134).
Heideggerandhermeneuticphenomenology
While Husserl brought the modern phenomenological tradition into
being, it was his pupil Martin Heidegger who radically transformed that
tradition.Heideggersphenomenologyisatonceonethathashadmanymore
points of contact with other modes of inquiry (mainstream philosophy,
hermeneutics,theology,gestaltpsychologyandeventuallypoststructuralism),
andthathashadmoreinfluenceonthestudyofmaterialculture.Heideggers
projectbeganwithHusserlsinsightthatnaturalscienceisawayoffindingout
very particular things about the world, rather than a source of universal
grounding truths. In particular, the sciences are relatively powerless to
understandthefundamentalcharacterofhumanexistence(Zimmerman1990:
19). Aswehaveseen,scienceisgroundeduponadeeperunderstandingof
worldlythings:entitiesarealreadycomprehensiblebeforewebegintoexplain
them. Heideggerdrewuponhermeneuticstoaddressthecharacterofhuman
understanding. But while hermeneutics had hitherto concentrated on the
interpretation of scripture and historical texts, Heidegger argued that
understanding was fundamental to all human existence. To experience,
understandandinterpretisnotjustamethodofinquiry,itisamodeofbeing
(Ricoeur1974:3).ForHeidegger,phenomenologywasnotascienceatall,but
ameansofaddressingwhatevershowsitselftous,andwhateverseemstobe
something(Heidegger1962:51).
ToHeidegger,athingsbeingisitsdisclosureorrevelation,andthisdepends
uponitsbeingunderstoodas(Frede1993:57). Tobeintelligible,anyentity
must be recognisableassomething. Phenomenology is therefore not just
concerned with consciousness, but with the way that the human world is
constitutedasastructureofintelligibility. WhileHusserlwantedtoreduce

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experiencedowntoitsfundamentalatomsbybracketingtheeverydayworld,
Heideggerisemphaticthatthingscanonlyrevealthemselvestousinaworld.
Worldlythingsarenotjustobjectsinconsciousness:theyarealwaysembedded
inacomplexnetworkofrelationsbetweenpeopleandthings,andtheyareonly
comprehensibleassuch(ibid:53).Furthermore,thedisclosureofthingsisnot
amatterofisolatedobjectsbeingobservedbyatranscendentalsubject.Things
only show themselves to a particular kind of being: a mortal human who
always finds themselves embedded in culturaltradition, enmeshedinsocial
relationswithothers,andengagedinpursuingprojectsforthefuture. The
worldcannotbebracketedatall,becauseitformsthehorizonwithinwhich
thingsdisclosethemselves,whilehumanbeingshaveaformofexistencewhich
is inconceivable without its being located in multiple contexts and
relationships:thisisbeingintheworld.ThismeansthatHeideggerradically
reassessesthenaturalattitudeandthelifeworld,arguingthattheordinary
everydayness of human existence is actually constitutive of what Husserl
wouldcallintentionality(Critchley2000:102).
HusserlhadmaintainedtheCartesianrelationshipbetweenobjectandsubject,
andalongwithithadacceptedwhatHeideggerwouldrefertoasthesubstance
ontologyofwesternthought.Thisistheviewthatwhatdistinguishesworldly
thingsistheirobjectgivenness,theirphysicalexistenceaslumpsofmatter.
The world thus comes to be understood as a collection of independently
existing entities, which can be perceived by human subjects, who are
themselves lumps of matter to which minds are in some way connected.
Heideggersconceptionofbeingintheworldisameansofrepudiatingthe
separationofmindandbody,andrejectingtheviewthatphenomenaaregiven
assubstantialentitiesthatarerepresentedinconsciousness(Frede1993:60).
ForHeidegger,thewesternphilosophicaltraditionhasassumedthatthereis
onlyonepossiblerelationshipbetweenpeopleandthings:thatbetweensubject
andobject,inwhichweobservesomeentityinadistanced,dispassionateand
analyticalfashion.Butinreality,thingscanshowthemselvestousinavariety
ofdifferentways,dependingonthekindofinvolvementthatwehavewith
them(Heidegger1962:51).Inparticular,wecandrawadistinctionbetween
thepresentathandandthereadytohand. Theformeristhesituationin
whichthepassiveobserverlooksonsomethingasanobjectofknowledgeor
contemplation,whilethelatterdenotesanengagementinwhichathingisput
touse,perhapsasatoolinsometask(Hall1993:125). Heideggersclassic
exampleofthisisthehammer,whichrecedesfromourexplicitconcernaswe
useittohammerinanail.Wefocusonthetaskratherthanthetool,andinthe
processweachieveamuchmoreprimordialandinstinctualcommunionwithit
thanifwemerelystaredatthehammerfromadistance(Heidegger1962:97).
InBeingandTime(1962)Heideggerexplainsthatwhenweusesomethingasa
pieceofequipment,athingfor,itisalwayspartofanequipmentaltotality,
sothataswellasbeingsubmergedinthepracticeofuse,thethingisalso

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boundintoanetworkofreferenceandconnection.Thehammerisinthefirst
instanceknowntoaspartofaconstellationthatincludesthenail,therooftile,
therafter,andsoon. Oureverydayunderstandingisoftotalities,contexts,
projects and relationships, rather than of isolated objects. Only when the
hammerfailsinuse,malfunctioningorbreakingdown(theheadcomesoff,the
handlebreaks,orthetoolissimplynotheavyenoughforthetask),doesit
becomepresentathand,somethingthatwejustlookatandcontemplateinits
uselessness.
Whatissignificanthereisthatreadinesstohandandpresencetohandareboth
ways in whichthings can be disclosed to us, although they engenderquite
different kinds of familiarity. So the same object or artefact can become
knowntousinaseriesofdistinctways.Theringwhichisafamilyheirloom
canbeatonemomentreassuringandatanotherdepressing,dependingupon
howwearefeeling(Guignon2001:54). Cartesianthoughtwouldholdthat
these feelings about an object are entirely secondary to its existence as a
material thing, and have no bearing upon its facticity. Heidegger would
suggestonthecontrarythatourmoodsorattunementsareworlddisclosing;
theyareimplicatedinthewaythatthingsshowuptousinthefirstplace.
Indeed,inparticularlynihilisticorangstriddenmoods,theworldfailstoreveal
itselfatall.Itpresentsuswithnopossibilities.YetasHeideggerpointsout,
wehavenochoiceoverwhichmoodwewillfindourselvesinatagiventime:
we are delivered over to our mood. This involvement of mood in the
disclosureofthingsunderlinesthewaythatphenomenacanonlybetherefor
humans,whoarefinitebeingscaughtbetweenpast,presentandfutureina
concretesituation(Polt2001:59).Yetthisisnottoarguethattheappearance
ofmaterialthingsasrecognisableentitiesisahumanachievementorwilled
practice.Humanbeingsgroundthepresenceofthingswhethertheylikeitor
not(Heidegger1993:234). It mightbe more accurate tosay that humans
providethespaceinwhichthingscanappear,whichisquitedifferentfrom
willingthemintobeing(Zimmerman1993:244).
WhileHeideggersearlyargumentsaboutthepositionofthingsastoolsinan
equipmentaltotalitymaybeflawed,inabroadersensethewaythatpeoplegain
anunderstandingofmaterialentitiesdependsupona background orhorizon.
Thisbackgroundiscomposedofavarietyofembodiedskillsandmeansof
coping,culturaltraditions,ageneralconceptionofhowtheworldisordered,
andavarietyofhumanprojectsandrequirements(Wrathall2000:94).Itisin
the context of this network of entities and practices that things reveal
themselves,notforthemostpartaspuzzlingorrequiringexplanationbutas
alwaysalreadyunderstood. Itisthereforeamistaketoimaginethathuman
beingswanderaroundtheworld,encounteringisolatedpackagesofinformation
andrenderingthemmeaningful.Thingsarerevealedintheirmeaningfulnessin

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thefirstinstance,andthenotionofapureCartesianobjectwhichhasonly
physicalextensionanddensityisactuallyabstractedfromasignificantentity.
MerleauPontyandLevinas
AlthoughHeideggersworkintersectswithmaterialculturestudiesmost
directly,anotherphenomenologistwhoseideasareofrelevancewasMaurice
MerleauPonty. We have seen that Heidegger used phenomenology as a
springboard for a series of reflections on what he would call fundamental
ontology.ForHeidegger,theadoptionofaphenomenologicalapproach,and
thechallengingofconventionalsuppositionsthatitrequires,leadsusinevitably
into a consideration of farreaching philosophical issues. In particular,
Heidegger was preoccupied with the question of Being, and the contrast
between Being in general and the existence of particular creatures (the
ontologicaldifference).MerleauPonty,ontheotherhand,restrictedhimself
to attempting to understand how human beings conduct themselves under
particular contingent conditions (Matthews 2002: 31). Like Heidegger,
MerleauPonty rejected Husserls search for universal, transcendental
structuresofconsciousness,andindeeddeniedtheexistenceofanysuchthing.
Thiswaspartlybecauseheunderstoodperceptiontobeculturallyformed(Ihde
1993: 76). MerleauPonty also shared Heideggers concern with the lived
world of everyday activity, rather than attempting to create some form of
scienceofhumanexperience.
MerleauPontysfocuswasperception,which(likeHusserl)hetooktobepre
scientific in character. Perception is experience that takes place before
reflection andtheorising (MerleauPonty 1962:131). It is unlike symbolic
communication,foritisnotconcernedwithrepresentation,anditcannotbe
explainedinascientificmanner,foritisnotanobject(Matthews2002:47).
Perceptionisnotsimplyacognitiveactivity,forthesubjectwhoengagesin
experience isalways embodied(MerleauPonty1962:203). This argument
requires a rather different view of intentionality from that proposed by
BrentanoandHusserl,forMerleauPontyimpliesthatitistheincarnatedbeing
thatdirectsitattentiontothingsintheworld.Anembodiedhumanbeingcan
see,andcanmovearound,positionitselfinrelationtothings,andhandlethem.
Sight, touch and movement provide quite particular ways of entering into
relationshipswiththings,andnoneofthesecanbeachievedbyadisembodied
mind. So intentionality is dispersed throughout the body rather than
concentratedinacognitiverealm.MerleauPontystreatmentofperceptionis
distinctively phenomenological, in that he argues that sensations are not
isolatedoratomisedsenseevents. Theycanonlybeunderstoodinthewider
context of a persons immersion in the world. Perception is inherently
meaningful, and people apprehend sensations in terms of what they signify
(mylegisitchy)ratherthanaspuresensedata,whichissomehowgiven
significanceafterithasbeenidentified(thenerveendingsonmylowerlegare

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registeringsomekindofsignalIguessitmustbeanitch). Thebodys
relationshipwiththeworldthatitinhabitsischargedwithmeaning,andeach
sensory episode both draws from and contributes to our experience and
comprehensionofthetotality.
MerleauPontysemphasisontheembodiedpersonasthesubjectofexperience
findsanechointheworkofEmmanuelLevinas,whoperhapsevenmorethan
Heidegger explored the broader repercussions of the phenomenological
approach. Contradicting the western philosophical tradition that afforded a
grounding status to epistemology, Levinas maintained that ethics should be
recognised as first philosophy (Levinas 1998: 100). Levinas ethics is
founded upon a phenomenology of the other person, concerned with the
experienceofbeingfacetofacewithanotherhumanbeing. LikeMerleau
Ponty,Levinasinsiststhatweunderstandtheotherpersontobecorporeal,and
asabeingwhocanexperiencehunger,thirst,pain,pleasure,lustandenjoyment
(Waldenfels2002:65).Ourethicalrelationshipsarenotwithabstractuniversal
subjects,butwiththekindofbeingwhoknowsthepleasureofeating. The
facetofacerelationwiththeotherisinherentlyethical,asitbringsusdirectly
into contact with a living being to whom we are responsible (Wyschogrod
2002: 191). Just as MerleauPonty places embodied perception before the
scientific explanation of conceptual objects, Levinas argued that the
relationship with the other precedes and extends beyond comprehension.
Following Heidegger, he saw being alongside others as constitutive of our
identityashumanbeingsonecanhavenosenseofoneselfasaselfwithout
thepresenceofanother.YetIcanneverbetheotherperson,andIcannever
seetheworldthroughtheireyes. Thereisalwayssomethingabouttheother
person that escapes my understanding. Because I cannot be at all in the
absenceoftheotherperson,andbecausethespeakingpersonaddressesme
directly, I am compelled to offer solicitude to the other in their suffering.
Ethicaldutyisembeddedinrelationshipswhichprecedereasonandscience.
Geography,architectureandplanning
TheconcernsofMerleauPontyandLevinasostensiblydrawusaway
fromthischaptersfocusonmaterialculturestudies.Butbothdemonstratethat
itisimpossibletoinsulatethephenomenologicalapproach,andpresentitasa
neatlypackagedmethodology,whichcanbestraightforwardlyappliedtoa
givenbodyofevidence. Becausephenomenologysystematicallyundermines
themodernwestsprioritisationofepistemologyandthedemandthatethics,
aesthetics,rhetoricandpoliticsbepurgedfromanalysisandexplanation,these
concerns are forever on the brink of erupting into any phenomenological
investigation. Phenomenology deals in worlddisclosure, in which an
engagement with a particular entity leads us into an expanding web of
relationships.Nomatterhowrestrictedtheframeofinquiry,phenomenology
willtendtoleadtowardmoreextensivereflections.

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It was precisely this reflexive dimension of phenomenological thought that

attracted geographers and architects during the 1960s and 1970s. In both
disciplines,theearliertwentiethcenturyhadseenagrowingemphasisona
Cartesianconceptionofspace,inwhichtherelationshipsbetweenobjectscould
be discussed in purely geometrical terms (Gregory 1978: 131). This
perspective appeared to evict human beings from their lived world,
repositioningthemasviewersandinterpretersofadomainofobjects.Theso
calledhumanisticgeographypresentedanalternativewhichfocusedonthe
questionofplace,aphenomenonwhichisarguablydifficulttoaccountforin
quantitativeorgeometricalterms.Aplaceisnotsimplyaregionofspace,but
isexperiencedbypeopleashavingmeaning(Tuan1974:213;Relph1976:15).
This meaning is culturally specific, and needs to be understood from an
insiderspointofview(Lynch1972:29). Muchofthisdebateproceededon
thebasisthatmeaninglessspaceistransformedintomeaningfulplacethrough
human intervention, and thus risked simply reproducing the Cartesian
frameworkofaninertworldwhichisrenderedmeaningfulbyhumanity.None
theless,YiFuTuanpresentedanaccountofplaceandlandscapethatwas
moreauthenticallyphenomenological.Tuanscriticallyimportantinsightwas
thatthegeometricalspaceofscientificgeographywasnotagiven,butwas
itselfasophisticatedculturalconstruction(1974:215).Thismeansthatthereis
nofoundingknowledgeofspacethatismeaningfree,andtowhichmeaningis
added. On the contrary, people discover their world in the process of
understandingit,andTuanlaysmuchstressontheroleofthehumanbodyin
thisprocess.
AlthoughTuansaccounttendstowardthearchetypal,hisattemptstoidentify
fundamentalspatialexperienceshavemuchtocommendthem. Hesuggests
that it is the presence of the body that gives places their structure and
orientation, and that this affects the way that we characteristically create
architecture. Thus,mostroomsaredividedintoabackandafront,andare
accessedbyahumansizedportal(1977:40).Inthesameway,peoplecreatea
spatialunderstandingoftheworldingeneral(includingpartsofitthatthey
haveneverdirectlyexperienced)byelaboratingonthespatialityofthebody.
Mythicalspacecanthususethebodyasamicrocosm,orpresentacosmology
orderedaroundthecardinalpoints,whicharethemselvescentredonthebody
(Tuan1977:96). Placesaremostsignificanttouswhentheyareassociated
withahumanpresence(thatofourselvesorothers),andconsequentiallyTuan
arguesthatbuildingsandmonumentsareinsomesensessubstitutesforhuman
beings,inthattheyconstitutecentresofmeaning(1974:239).Inpremodern
societies,Tuansuggeststhatsuchplacesaredifferentiatedfromthechaoticand
formlessstateofthecosmosatlargebythepresumedpresenceofspiritsand
deities,sothattemplesandshrinesareinstrumentalinthedevelopmentofa
structured conception of the world (ibid.: 234). At the same time, the

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development of a built environment transforms the way that human beings
interact with their world, because architecture refines and sharpens our
experienceofplace(Tuan1977:107).
IdeaslikeTuanseventuallyhadsomeimpactondiscussionsofthedesignand
planningofurbanspaces.Inthepostwarera,townplanningwasoftenbased
uponprinciples ofrationality and efficiency, resultingindevelopments that
were often anonymous and alienating (Relph 1993: 28). The modernist
prescription that an ideal society or living space could be designed in the
abstractandthenconstructedinmaterialformappearedtobecontradictedby
therealitythatdwellingscreatedonanintuitiveororganicbasispromoteda
moreharmoniousexistencethancontemporarymachinesforliving. Where
concrete tower blocks seemed disconnected with the human scale, a
phenomenological approach advocated an architecture that served as an
extensionofthehumanbody(Jger1985:215).Theprimitivegeographyof
embodied experience described by Tuan could thus provide the point of
departureforakindofplanningthatworkedoutwardfrompeopleseveryday
involvementintheworld,ratherthanimposingatotalitarianspatialorderfrom
above. Under these circumstances, the connection between people and
buildingswouldbeaseamlessone,inmuchthesamewayasinHeideggers
descriptionoftooluse:anauthenticformofdwelling.Byfacilitatingpeoples
harmonisationwiththeirlivedworldarchitecturemightbecomemorethanaset
ofaestheticobjects,andcontributetohumanwellbeing(Dovey1993:249).
Anumberofauthorsstressedthataphenomenologicalapproachtoplanning
andarchitecture couldnotlimititselftoconsiderationsofform, buthadto
addresstherelationshipbetweenthebuildingandthedweller(Dovey1985:
34). This might mean either that architecture should emerge out of the
commitmenttoplaceandtheestablisheddwellingpracticesofacommunity,or
that buildings should themselves be capable of engendering a relationship
between people and place. Kimberley Dovey, for instance, argued that
buildings are more likely to enable people to enter into an authentic
relationshipwiththeirworldwhentheythemselvespossessauthenticity(1985:
33). Soratherthanbeingadornedwithwindowshuttersthatdontactually
close,ornonfunctionalchimneys,buildingshaveformsthatarticulatewithlife
asitislived.
Preciselyhowthisapproachtothebuiltenvironmentwouldworkinpracticeis
made a little clearer by Violichs comparative analysis of four Dalmatian
coastaltowns(1985:114). Thisispresentedasanintuitiveurbanreading,
butitisactuallyanattempttodistilfromtheexperienceofwalkingthetown
streetsthoseelementsthatrenderthebuiltlandscapewelcoming,inclusiveor
alienating. Theobviousproblemwithsuchaprojectisthatitisundertaken
fromafirstpersonperspective,yetmakesnoattempttotheorisetheconditions

12.
thatcontributetothespecificityofaparticularpersonsexperienceofplace.
Nonetheless,Violichsaccountproducesaseriesofinsightsthatcouldnot
have been extracted from maps or plans alone. In seeking clues to the
distinctive identities of the four towns, he points to the combination of
topographicandhistorical/culturalelements(Violich1985:114). Giventhat
theyareallharboursettlements,particularstressislaidonthewaythatland
andwatermeetinrelationtotheurbanform(Fig.*.1).ThusPucisceandHvar
wrap around their harbours, while Bol lies sidebyside with the sea, and
Korculathrustsoutintotheocean(Fig.*.2). Theconsequenceofthissetof
relationshipsisthatBolhasdevelopedintoanurbanladderorgridofstreets
runningparallelwiththesea,Puciscerisesupitshillslikeatheatrefromthe
stagelikeharbour,andKorculasarchitecturalqualitiesaresetoffagainstthe
surroundingwater(Fig.*.3).Korculasenclosedqualityisfurtherenhancedby
themountainscapebeyondtheseachannel,anditsoldcentreisdistinctfrom
newer development inland. Visiting Korcula therefore has the particular
qualityofmovingfromthepresentintothepast,andbackagain(Violich1985:
129). Violichspointisthattheconstellationofsocial,culturalandphysical
phenomenathatmakesupthatcharacterofaplacecanonlybediscoveredfrom
within.
TheDayaklonghouse
Violichs reading of Dalmatian coastal towns finds an interesting
comparisoninChristineHelliwellsinvestigationofthedomesticarchitecture
oftheGeraiDayakofBorneo(1996).Violichinsiststhatthevariousstrandsof
urbanidentitycanonlybeintegratedthroughthepedestriansexperienceof
movingthroughthestreets,revealingthemfrominside. Similarly,Helliwell
argues that the search for formal social structures that correspond with an
abstractmappingofthespaceoftheGerailonghousehasobscuredthesocial
reality. Inexperiencingthelonghouseasalivedspace,shealsodiscoversa
sociality that is more protean and seamless than other ethnographies might
suggest.SuchanalysespresentDayaksocietyasbeingcomposedofaseriesof
independent and bounded households, each inhabiting one of the separate
apartmentswhichrunsidebysidealongthelengthofthelonghouse(Fig.*.4).
Yetthelateraldivisionsrepresentedbytheseapartmentsarecrosscutbya
seriesofnamedlinearspaceswhichrunalongtheentirebuilding. Themost
important division of the longhouse is a vertical wall, which separates the
partitionedsleeping,cookingandeatingspaceoftheapartmentsfromtheouter
gallery.Thismeansthattheprimarydistinctionisnotbetweentheindividual
apartments, but between the apartments collectively and this outer space.
While,fromawesternpointofview,itiseasytomisreadtheapartmentsasthe
private space of a family unit, the longhouse community is a collectivity
whichdistinguishesitselffromtheMalaypeoplewhoaregrantedaccesstothe
outergallery.

13.
WhiletheMalay,whoneithereatporknordrinkricewine,areexcludedfrom
the apartments, these are less separate from one another than a
schematicplanwouldsuggest.Althougheachapartmentisoccupiedby
adistinctfamilygroup,thepartitionsthatseparatethemareflimsyand
permeable(Helliwell1996:134).Theyareriddledwithholes,through
whichchildrenandanimalspassbetweenapartments,andwhichafford
glimpsesfromonespaceintoanother. Yetthewesternprivilegingof
visionovertheothersensescouldleadonetounderestimatetheextent
to which an unbroken field of sociability encompasses the entire
longhouse. For even if they are on their own in the apartment, the
inhabitantsofthelonghouseareneveralone.Helliwellrecordsthatshe
oftensawpeopleseeminglytalkingtothemselves,andthatonlyafter
some time did she recognise that such apparent monologues were
alwaysoverheard(1996:141).InthissensetheGeraiconstantlyaudit
eachother,andtheirhabitualactivitytakesintoaccountthecontinual
possibilityofthemembersofonehouseholdinterveningintheaffairs
of another. Just as Violichs peramulations reveal aspects of urban
identitythatcannotbeappreciatedonthemap,soHelliwellsimmersion
in the field of voices within the longhouse uncovers unexpected
dimensionsofGeraisociallife.
TimIngold:makingabasket
Afurtherexampleofhowphenomenologicalideasmightinformour
thinkingaboutmaterialcultureisprovidedbyTimIngold,inanessaythat
dwellsontheweavingofabasket(Ingold2000:33948). Ingoldmightnot
describehimselfasaphenomenologist,butthewayinwhichheusesinsights
drawn from the close observation of things as a starting point for a wider
argument is characteristic of the tradition. He addresses the question of
making from a perspective informed to some extent by Heidegger, and
directly questions our reliance upon the oppositions between culture and
nature, and form and substance. In nature organisms grow, while cultural
artefactsaremade.Butwhatisthedifferencebetweentheseformsofcoming
intobeing? Ingolds suggestion is that a consideration of the crafting of
basketscollapsessomeofouraccepteddistinctions.
Naturalformsliketheshellsofmarinecreaturesaregenerallyconsideredto
havebeengrownfromwithin,directedbyageneticpattern,whileartefactsare
formedfromwithout.Artefactshaveformimposedonthembyhumanagency.
Inbothcasessomekindofblueprintispresumedtoexist,whetherspecified
byDNAorlodgedinthemindofanartisan.Thedifferenceliesinwhetherthe
patternoriginatesaboveorbelowthesurfaceoftheobject,yettheassumption
thatthesurfaceformsacriticalboundaryisbroadlyaccepted.Thesurfaceis
wheresubstancemeetsaction,andthegrowthofnaturalthingsisimmanent
withinthesubstanceitself.ThecrucialquestionthatIngoldasksiswhethera

14.
beehiveismadeorgrown(2000:340). KarlMarxonceremarkedthatthe
worstofarchitectsisbetterthanthebestofbees,forhehasalwaysalready
builtthestructureinhismindbeforethefirststoneislaid.Yetthiscontrasts
withHeideggersargumentthatinordertobuild,wemustfirstlearnhowto
dwellonearth. Webuildbecausewearedwellers(1977a:326). Heidegger
wrote this in the context of the housing shortage that followed the Second
World War, and in the knowledge that its likely solution would be the
constructionofendlessanonymousblocksofflats.Thesewouldrepresentthe
impositionontotheearthofentitiesthathadbeenplannedintheabstract,but
whichhadnoorganicconnectionwiththeirlocation.Hiscounterexampleof
theBlackForestcottageisundoubtedlyromanticandnostalgic,butitmakes
the point that an architecture can grow out of an authentic relationship of
dwellingontheearth.
IngolddistilsfromHeideggeradistinctionbetweenabuildingperspective
and a dwelling perspective, and argues that our habitual error lies in
imaginingthatmakingisratherliketheprocessofrepresentationinreverse:a
fullyformedimageinthemindisreproducedinmaterialform. Thisisthe
buildingperspective,inwhichartefactsarethoughtofassurfacesuponwhich
themindhasstampedapreconceivedform.Formisculturalandsubstanceis
natural,sothatcultureappearstobeacognitivephenomenonwhichfloatsover
thesurfaceofthematerialworldwithouteverpenetratingit.Itisworthnoting
atthispointthatIngolddescribesthesurfaceoftheartefactasthepointwhere
cultureconfrontsnature.ThisseemstoechoHeideggersaccount(1977b)of
the Gestell orenframingasamodeofoccasioningthat challenges nature.
Heideggerarguedthatthemodernerainthewestwascharacterisedbyavision
oftheworldasastockofrawmaterialsthatcouldbesubjectedtothehuman
will.Themoderneraonlyadmittedasinglewayformaterialthingstoreveal
themselves:asinertmatter. Inastrongsense,Ingoldsbuildingperspective
appearstoberelatedtoHeideggersGestell.
ForIngold,thebuildingperspectiveischallengedbyanydetailedconsideration
ofbasketweaving.Abasketisnotmadebyimposingforcefromoutsideupon
abodyofmutesubstance.Thesurfaceofthebasketdoesnotexistbeforethe
weavingbegins:itisactuallybuiltup,andemerges,inthepracticeofmaking.
Forthisreason,thebasketdoesnotclearlyhaveaninsideandanoutsideat
all.Theindividualreedsorcanesthatmakeupthebasketmighteachbesaid
tohaveanexterior,buttheylaceintoandoutofthewovensurface,andthisin
turnistobedistinguishedfromtheinteriorandexteriorofthebasketinits
capacity as a vessel. The individual elements of the basket may be
transformedtoaverylimitedextentintheprocess ofmaking;itismore
accuratetosaythattheyareincorporated.Thestructurethatdevelopsthrough
theweavingisnotonethatisimprintedorstamped(likemoltenmetalina
mouldoracoininadie)byexternalforce:itisthedevelopingtensilestressof

15.
thebasketitselfthatgivesititsshape(Ingold2000:342).Itfollowsfromthis
thatthebasketweaverhasonlyageneralgraspoftheformthatsheisintending
toachievebeforeshebeginswork.Shedoesnothaveamentaltemplate,buta
seriesofskillsorabodyofknowhowwhichinformherengagementwiththe
material. Formgrowsoutofthisinvolvement,ratherthanissuingoutofthe
artisansmind.
ThebroaderargumentthatIngolddrawsoutfromthesepointsisthattheforces
involved in the making of both artefacts and organisms are not contained
withinanysurfaceorboundary,andactuallyextendbetweenanyentityandits
environment (2000: 345). Effectively, this reiterates the phenomenological
messagethatnokindofbeingcanexistwithoutabackground. Thebasket
weaver,likeanymaker,ispositionedinafieldofforcesthatiscomposedof
skillsanddispositionsaswellasmusclepower.Suchafieldexistsinnatureas
muchasinthehumanworld,andbothartefactsandorganismsaregenerated
throughmorphogeneticprocessesthathaveanarrativestructure.Theyarenot
necessarilymappedoutinadvance,andeachepisodeofgrowthbuildsonwhat
hasgonebefore.Whenhumanbeingsmakethings,theyworkwithinaworld
ratherthanactinguponamaterialworldfromoutside.Weavingisthereforea
paradigmofwhathumanbeingsdowhentheycreateartefacts,askilfulcrafting
thatknitsthingstogether.Wecouldgoontoarguethatwhenamodernmotor
car has been designed on a computer screen and the component parts are
assembledinapreciseandautomatedmanneronaroboticproductionline,this
isamostunusualkindofmaking.Itisnotevenasimulationofwhathappens
whenanartisanworkswithhermaterials,fortheoutcomeisalwaysdecidedin
advance,andthereisnosenseofadialoguewithmaterialthings.Thiskindof
production is abstracted and impoverished, derived from and secondary to
weaving,justasscientificanalysisisderivedandabstractedfromtheeveryday.
Phenomenologiesoflandscapeandmonumentality
Theclearestexampleofadebateovertheusefulnessofphenomenology
to the investigation of material culture can be found in relation to recent
experiential studies of landscape and monumentality, which are primarily
archaeologicalintheirsubjectmatter(seeCorcos2001;ChapmanandGeary
2000;CummingsandWhittle2000;Fleming1999;Hamilton1999;Witcher
1998amongstmanyothers).Theprincipalinspirationforthisburstofactivity
hasbeenChristopherTilleysAPhenomenologyofLandscape(1994).Inthis
workTilleysargumentsareinformedbyethnographyatleastasmuchasby
phenomenologicalphilosophy,butthetwostrandsharmonisetotheextentthat
theybothcastdoubtontheuniversalityofcontemporarywesternconceptions
ofspaceandplace.Asurveyoftheanthropologicalliteraturerevealsthatfor
manynonwesternsocietiessupernaturalpowersandancestralpresencesare
immanent in the landscape, and are implicated in the way that people
understand their own place in the lifeworld (Tilley 1994: 59). Particular

16.
landmarksareoftenidentifiedasplacesofancestralormetaphysicalinfluence,
and these may serve as reminders of the past which serve to stabilise
contemporaryidentitiesandsocialrelationships. Onthisbasis,Tilleyargues
thatthereiseveryreasontosupposethattheprehistoriccommunitiesofBritain
alsounderstoodthelandscapesthattheyfrequentedtobeinherentlymeaningful
and filled with spiritual power. Presentday archaeologists, however, are
accustomedtothinkingaboutthelandinCartesianterms,asaninertspatial
resourcethatcanbeboughtandsoldandadequatelyrepresentedonmapsand
aerialphotographs.
It is Tilleys proposed remedyfor this state of affairs that draws his study
closertothemainstreamofphenomenologicalthought. Ifwehaveallowed
ourselvestothinkofprehistoricmonumentsanddwellingsasdotsonmaps,or
atbestasbriefheritageexperiencessandwichedbetweencarjourneys,we
shouldlearntoencounterthemdifferentlybyapproachingtheminthecourse
ofanextensivewalkthroughthecountryside.Tilleyexplicitlystatesthatthis
focus on the site as we experience it within the broader landscape is not
intended as a form of empathy, which might try toshare the thoughts and
feelingsofprehistoricpeople(1994:74). Itissimplythatbyusingourown
body as a means of addressing a megalithic tomb or a standing stone and
establishingrelationshipsbetweenstructureandtopography,wegeneratean
understandinginthepresentwhichstandsasananalogyorallegoryforthoseof
thepast.Itisabasisforhypothesisandargument,ratherthanarevealedtruth
about the landscape and its past. Our experience of the monument in its
modernlandscapeisinformedbyanentirelydifferentculturaltraditionfrom
thatofpastpeople,andmoreoverthelanditselfhasalteredirrevocablyoverthe
pastsixthousandyears. The landscapeis itselfarecordofgenerations of
human activity, which have added field boundaries, houses, roads and
telegraphpolestoitssurface. YetTilleyarguesthatthereisstillsomething
aboutthelandthatremainsstableovertime:
The skin of the land has gone for good, and can only be partially
recovered through the most diligent of scientific analyses; but not its
shape. Thebonesofthelandthemountains,hills,rocksandvalleys,
escarpmentsandridgeshaveremainedsubstantiallythesamesincethe
Mesolithic,andcanstillbeobserved(Tilley1994:734).
SomecriticshavearguedthatalthoughTilleyforswearsempathy,heimplicitly
relies on a degree of essentialism in claiming that we share a common
physiognomywithprehistoricpeople,andthatconsequentiallyaspectsofour
worldlyexperiencearecomparable(Karlsson1998:188). Alternatively,itis
suggested that Tilleys accounts of the landscape context of the megalithic
tombsofsouthwestWalesandtheBlackMountains,andoftheDorsetCursus
arespecifictoawhite,middleclassman. Ifoneweredisabledorpregnant,

17.
onesphysicalengagementwiththeseplacesmightbequitedifferent(Brck
1998:28).Ontheotherhand,afirsthandexperienceofaplacecanonlybe
undertakenfromasinglesubjectposition.IthaswhatHeideggerwouldcalla
quality of mineness. I can hypothesise how different a past persons
experiencemightbe,butonlyfrommyownlocatedembodiment. Whatis
undeniableisthatthereareinsightsinTilleysbookthatcouldnothavebeen
generatedinanyotherway. HisdescriptionofwalkingtheNeolithiclinear
earthworkoftheDorsetCursusasakindofspatialnarrativethatleadsthrough
aseriesofunexpectedencounterscouldonlybedevelopedoutofanembodied
practice of being in place. Regrettably, as we noted above, the fresh and
compelling character of the analyses presented in A Phenomenology of
Landscape has inspired an outbreak of landscape phenomenologies which
sometimeslackthephilosophicalgroundingoftheoriginal
In a parallel and related development, archaeologists have also become
interestedintheexperientialdimensionsoftheinteriorspacesofprehistoric
monuments (e.g. Barrett 1994: 969; Pollard 1995; Richards 1993; Thomas
1993; 1999: 3461). These studies share some common ground with the
architecturalanalysesofViolichandHelliwell,butfocusinparticularonthe
ways that constructed spaces both constrain and facilitate performance,
interaction and experience. Ceremonial monuments such as the megalithic
tombsofearlierNeolithicBritain(c.40003000BC),orthehengeenclosures
ofthelaterNeolithic(c.2500BC)wereatonceelaboratearchitecturalforms
andlocationsthataffordedintensesensorystimulation.Amegalithictomblike
thatatWestKennet(Fig.*.5)containedtheremainsofthedead,whichwere
apparentlysubjecttoperiodichandlingandreordering,whilealsoproviding
thesettingorstageforencountersandactivitiesofconsumptiononthepartof
theliving. Suchanarchitecturemighthavechoreographedandrestrictedthe
actsandmovementofpersonsinsidethemonument,buttheymightequally
have provided guidance or cues in the reproduction of ritual activities.
Moreover,aswellassaturatingthesensesoftheparticipants(smellsofrotting
bodies; tastes of mortuary feasts; vocal sounds enhanced by the restricted
space;lightsflickeringinthedarktombinterior),themonumentestablishes
positionsinwhichpeoplecanstandinrelationtooneanother,andthushelpsto
constructsubjectpositionsfromwhichpeoplecanspeakinanauthoritative
fashion.Investigationsofthiskindhavebeencriticisedonthegroundthatthey
are somewhat anonymous, and that while they are concerned with bodily
experiencetheydonotaddresstheparticularidentitiesofthepeopleinvolved
(e.g.Hodder2000:245).However,itmightbefairtoreplythatthepointof
thesestudiesistodocumentexperientialworldsandformsofsubjectification
thatareremotefromourown,ratherthantoattempttorecoverindividuals
whoarecomparablewiththoseofthemodernwest.

18.
Conclusionandsuggestionsforfurtherresearch
Phenomenology developed out of an imperative to secure western
sciencebyascertainingthepreciserelationshipbetweenconsciousnessandthe
materialworld. Yettherecognitionthatscienceissecondarytoorderived
from the structures of human existence that phenomenology revealed had
profound consequences. Since the Scientific Revolutionof the seventeenth
centurywesternthoughthadreliedonthenotionthatsciencehadaprivileged
access to the fundamental nature of the universe. Husserl had implicitly
claimedthatphenomenologywasconcernedwithanorderofrealitythatwas
moreprimordialthanthataddressedbythenaturalsciences. Heideggerand
MerleauPonty, by arguing that our most basic understandings can only be
generated in the context of a social and phenomenal world, transformed
phenomenologyfromasearchforabstractessencestoaninterrogationofthe
everyday. This shift from the transcendental to the immanent can be
understood as part of a more general twentiethcentury trend, which
acknowledgestheimportanceofordinarylife. Inturn,wecouldidentifythe
emergence of material culture studies with this growing interest in the
quotidian.Whatdistinguishesphenomenology,however,isadesiretoseethe
everydayasanappropriatelocationforattendingtothedeepestofexistential
questions.Ameditationonadiscardedshoecanleadintoaquestioningofthe
nature of art, and so on. This is because the tradition refuses to separate
philosophicalknowledgefromtheworldofthings,whileviewingthinkingas
anembodiedpractice,andseesnoobservation,howevermundane,asimmune
fromanunendingcritique.Phenomenologyconsequentiallyhasaninvaluable
contributiontomaketotheinvestigationofmaterialculture,butitmustdothis
withoutrelinquishingitscriticalspirit.
Inmorespecificterms,itisclearthatthefullpotentialofphenomenological
approaches to material culture is far from having been realised. While
experientialanalysesofarchitectureandlandscapeinpresentandpastcontexts
havebeenundertaken,thesehaveoftenconcentratedonthevisualand(toa
lesserextent)thetactileaspectsofhumanengagementswithspaceandplace.
AsHelliwellsaccountoftheGerailonghousedemonstrates,aconcernwith
soundandsmellcansignificantlyenhanceourunderstandingofthesenseof
place, as well as enabling us to address the role of memory in everyday
experience. By comparison, portable artefacts have been less intensively
studied from a phenomenological standpoint than places and structures.
Ingoldsaccountofbasketweavingopensthewayfornewapproachestoa
varietyofformsofmaking. Whiletheappositenessoftheseideastothe
study of textiles is obvious, the relinquishment of an attachment to the
culture/nature dichotomy and the substance ontology might have dramatic
consequences for our conception of (for instance) flintknapping. Moving
beyond the conventional focus on production and consumption, an
investigation of the haptic qualities of objects might prove productive,

19.
particularly in the context of the massproduce material culture of the
contemporarywest,wheretheimpactofphenomenologicalthoughthasbeen
slim. Finally, a keystone of the phenomenological approach is the
understanding that the subjective aspects of experience are not superficial
elementsconstructedonthebedrockofaninvariantmateriality,butarethe
meansthroughwhichthematerialworldrevealsitselftous.Itmighttherefore
be instructive to consider the question of the variable ways in which the
(presumablyculturallyconstructed)moods,attunementsandemotionalstates
of people in a variety of contexts disclose their material surroundings and
conditionstothem.

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Figures

Fig.1:AtypicalDalmatianharbour:Supetar,Brac.(Photo:author).

Fig.2:FourDalmatiantowns(From:Violich,F.1985Towardsrevealingthe
senseofplace:anintuitivereadingoffourDalmatiantowns. In:D.
SeamonandR. Mugerauer(eds.) Dwelling,Place andEnvironment,
11336.NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress).

24.

Fig.3:Korcula,seenfromthesea.(Photo:author).

Fig. 4: The Gerai Dayak longhouse (From: Helliwell, C. 1996 Space and
societyinaDayaklonghouse. In:M.Jackson(ed.) ThingsasThey

25.
Are: New Directions in Phenomenological Anthropology, 12848.
Bloomington:IndianaUniversityPress).

Fig.5:TheentrancetothemegalithictombatWestKennett,northWiltshire
(photo:author).