Chinese Internal Politics - RKS

2016

For Next Wave

1. More Aff defense cards
2. More Link Cards

Notes
Important Terms/People
CCP Chinese Communist Party Ruling political Party Right now
-

All other names listed below the CCP in the above chart are the political
parties that although exist in the CCP dont really have much power or
influence.

PLA Peoples Liberation Army Chinese Military

NPC National Peoples Congress Legislative Assembly
Politburo Group of Party Elites that the NPC reports to
Xi Jinping Current President
Hung Hsiu-chu & Li Yuanchao Vice Presidents
Li Keqiang Premier (Like
Prime Minister
or VP)
Xi Jinping, Li
Keqiang,
Zhang
Dejiang, Yu
Zhengsheng,
Liu Yunshan, Wang Qishan, Zhang Gaoli - Current Politburo Members
Government Structure
For unencesarry reasons we can ignore the level of government below the
national level. First is the National Peoples Congress. Under China's 1982
constitution, the most powerful organ of state is meant to be the National People's
Congress (NPC), China's parliament. In truth, it is little more than a rubber stamp for
party decisions. The congress is made up of nearly 3,000 delegates elected by
China's provinces, autonomous regions, municipalities and the armed forces.
Delegates hold office for five years, and the full congress is convened for one
session each year. This sporadic and unwieldy nature means that real influence lies
within a standing committee of about 150 members elected from congress
delegates. It meets every couple of months. In theory, the congress has the powers
to change the constitution and make laws. But it is not, and is not meant to be, an
independent body in the Western sense of a parliament. For a start, about 70% of
its delegates - and almost all its senior figures - are also party members. Their
loyalty is to the party first, the NPC second. They answer directly to the Politburo

and are responsible for the bulk of the legislation In China. However, they most
often merely exist to approve the actions of the politburo.
The Politburo is what most of the DA revolves around. Every significant
decision affecting China's 1.3bn people is first discussed and approved by a handful
of men who sit on the party's political bureau (politburo), the nexus of all power in
China. The 24-member Politburo is elected by the party's central committee. But
real power lies with its nine-member standing committee, which works as a kind of
inner cabinet and groups together the country's most influential leaders. How the
standing committee operates is secret and unclear. But its meetings are thought to
be regular and frequent, often characterised by blunt speaking and disagreement.
Senior leaders speak first and then sum up, giving their views extra weight. The
emphasis is always on reaching a consensus, but if no consensus is reached, the
majority holds sway. Once a decision has been made, all members are bound by it.
Although policy disagreements and factional fighting are widely believed to take
place in private, it is extremely rare for these to break into the public domain. When
they do as happened in 1989 when the leadership battled over how to deal with
the Tiananmen protests it is a sign of all-out power struggle. New politburo
members are chosen only after rigorous discussion and investigation of their
backgrounds, experience and views. To reach the top, people need a strong record
of achievement working for the party, to have the right patrons, to have dodged
controversy, and to have avoided making powerful enemies. Because theres only 9
people in the Politubro at any time its easier to make the DA about that because
you can make more warrant specificity rather than discussing it in terms of the 1800
person NPC.
Factions Just a few key to know
I. Tuanpai/CCYL (Chinese Communist Youth League) group
Common point for members is that they build their career in the ranks of
Chinese Communist Youth League. CCYL group was the largest one in 16th CC with
24 full and 33 alternate members and the number rose to 41 full members and 41
alternate members in 17th CC. Cheng Li even counts total number of 86 CCYL group
members (or 23%). Two former CCYL cadres are in 17th PSC Hu Jintao, core of the
4th generation and Li Keqiang, one of two members of the 5th generation n 17th
PSC. In 17th Politburo there are 8 tuanpai out of total number of 25 members. Even
though CCYL group is internally divided on central and local cadres, it is still the
most coherent and powerful group in current leadership.
II. Princelings
Princelings are second largest group in 17th CC when it occupies 22 full
member seats and 4 alternate member seats. It is also increase compared to 16th
CC where princelings held 15 full members and 5 alternate ones. Out of 25
members of Politburo, 7 members are princelings. Term princeling refers to children
of former high-ranked officials of the CCP. Yet, compared to their rival group CCYL
their denominator is family background rather than professional experience as it is
case of CCYL. That makes the group noticeably less coherent. Chen Li elaborates on

this Important to note is that princelings are not necessarily part of monolithic
organization or a formal network and thus strong patron-client ties are not common
within
this coalition. In addition, the political interests of the princelings are not always
identical, and infighting often occurs over power and wealth. As an elite group
princeling are far less cohesive than tuanpai.
III. Qinghua Clique
Qinghua cliques position is declining. Whereas in 16th CC there were 16
Qinghua graduates, in 17th Central Committee there are only 10 Qinghua alumni. If
we look at number of Qinghua university graduates in 3rd and 4th generation and
compare it with forthcoming 5th generation, we can see significant decline from 93
to 8. This indicates that role of the Qinghua graduates will further decrease in
coming years. Yet, leaders of 4th and 5th generation, Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping are
both Qinghua graduates.
IV. Shanghai Gang
Shanghai Gang is closely connected with leader of 3rd generation leader
Jiang Zemin and it was at the height of its power during 16th CC due to Jiang Zemin
s policy of placing his protg to high ranked posts. In the 16th Central Committee
there were 17 members identified as gang members, 13 full members and 4
alternate members. This size of the group significantly dropped to 9 and only one of
them Wu Bangguo is member of the PSC. Given to number of corruption cases
against prominent members of the Shanghai Gang, group became increasingly
unpopular among party cadres. Cheng Li notes low scores of votes member of
Shanghai group have received during elections to five national institutions during
session of 10th National Peoples Congress.
These are four basic groups within CCP. However, as Bo points out that these four
factional groups have distinctive characteristics does not necessarily mean that
they are mutually exclusive. In fact, there are some overlaps between these groups.
Being a member of the Shanghai gang, for instance, does not necessarily prevent
one from being a member of Qinghua clique. And being member of the CCYL group
is not necessarily incompatible with being a member of the Princelings. This is, for
example, the case of Xi Jinping who belongs to both princelings and Qinghua clique
or Hu Jintao who is CCYL group member and Qinghua graduate.
Notes
Like I said above, the DA functions similar to how a regular politics DA would,
except that this doesnt involve an agenda item. In a normal politics DA some bill is
passing in the squo but the plan causes some form of controversy which prevents
its passage, and thats bad. This DA focuses instead on the institutional process of
the passage of the plan and its effects on each member of the CCP and Politburo. In
the status quo the party is splitting into factions now. These factions are defined
along many lines such as Princelings and Populists, hardliners and realists, etc.
These factions are putting the party in an odd position as almot all decisions should

be made with unanimous consent. A world where major party issues such as new
engagement policies with the US, South-China Seas disputes, etc. would pit the
different groups against eachother which would not be positive. A world where the
party elders begin to fight eachother would be bad for the stability and legitimacy of
the PRC. In the squo the party is solid now but is also beginning to falter means that
a huge schism could be catastrophic for the party. If the party collapses it takes
down the economy and stability with them. At that point it becomes more about
how stable the CCP is and what the tisk is if it were to collapse; So you could read
any kind of CCP collapse impact cards to access a wide variety of impacts. In my
opinion thes best link cards are about political reform because there are a lot of
people in the government right now who are unhappy with the direction that the
party has been moving in and that they desire reform, whereas others are against it
because they benefit from things like corruption and bribery. I believe that you
could quite easily beat the other team on sheare knowledge alone. If you know
everyone in the Politburo and how the whole system works and start throwing out
names off the top of your head while the other team is trying to figure out who is
even fighting it makes a very persuasive link argument because you would have a
ton of warrants that the aff wont be able to know how to respond to.
To win the DA you need to win a couple of things. There is no risk of a CCP
collapse coming in the status quo. The argument you are making is that the party is
stable right now, but rests precariously on the risk of collapse if that makes any
sense. You need to argue that unprovoked, there is no risk of anything bad
happening, but the plan changes that. The contrary is true for the affirmative. If the
aff can win that a collapse is inevitable then they can make a coherent link turn
argument that the affirmative is key to things like political stability and reform or
just overall prevention of anything bad happening. Or you can simply just make that
collapse is inevitbale and that the plan doesnt cause anything and impact
inevitable. Personally I think the link turn would be stronger but thats just my
opinion
For impact stuff the RKS lab also put out a bunch of files and cards about ccp
authoritarianism good, military modernization bad, CCP stability bad, etc. that could
also be good and provide you with some more in depth scenarios and interesting
impacts than of those provided in this file. I have included some cards in here about
impacts for the sake of centralization but for more specific scenarios you should
check them out. Essentially the impact chain would just be a little inversed, in the
sense that your impact would no longer be based off of CCP collapse bad but rather
just continued CCP stability is good, and that the status quo preserves that. Those
files can be found on openevidence
In terms of the affirmative, there are a couple of key arguments that I think
would be best. First is your generic say yes argument that you probably read on
case. If you can make an overarching claim that china with unanimously accept the
plan without any opposition it functions both as a no link argument and a way
through which to frame the solvency debate. Similarly, there is probably not a very
high risk that the governments ruling party will just completely collapse because
like the President and the Premier couldnt agree on energy policy or something

really small so this DA also works better on large affirmatives. However, these
arguments also go the other way. If the neg can win that china would say no it can
be a way to frame the link debate that china says no due to whatever reason makes
it so much more likely that there is not a concencus over such a policy and that its
not as popular as the affirmative claims making it a much higher risk that the plan
triggers the link.
I think the aff also need to attack the link and internal link debate for this DA
because honestly I think its both kinda sketchy but at the same time kinda
rediculous and unlikely. So for example if youre trying to focus on the link level
debate because youre debating like a CP or something then your best bet would be
to probably be to spend a bulk of the 2ar just talking about how the CCP is stable in
the status quo and how collapse is unlikely. For example, not everyone was happy
when Xinping rose to power not everyone was happy. Similarly in the 4 years since
he has taken office, he has done things like allow the economy to grow at an
unprecedented 7% growth rate as well as huge internal anti-corruption campaigns.
These have put the economy in a good point as well as tackled one of the main
sources of internal struggle. If the attmepted elimination of corruption didnt put the
party in a tough spot already and caused internal division then its quite unlikely
that a very minor policy about icebreakers perhaps would cause a total government
shutdown.
Now also this link debate is perhaps interesting. Now theres two types of
links you should be aware of. The first is some very specific infighting cards that talk
about internal factioning and fighting. If they are there you should always try to use
those. Now the second is about US-Sino trust and cooperation. The argument for
this is that there is strategic mistrust in the status quo between the two
governments meaning that the risk that the chinese will be so willing to just
cooperate with the US over something is low without some form of domestic and
internal backlash. I think its an argument you could make persuasively to a judge
but I would use the infighting cards when available. Also, just a side note but If
someone asks you about some form of internal stability/infighting question you
could half jokingly make some form of answer about how even if there was
instability the government would never allow people to publish information on it and
so the lack of information about this could theoretically flow neg because any
attempts to hide it show further instability.
Some cards may be overhighlighted. You should do your own highlighting.
- Anonymous

1NC Economy
Prime minister and President fighting now but we cannot be
sure of stability further negotiations only escalate tensions.
Tom Phillips 5/25, the Beijing correspondent for the Guardian, 5-25-2016,
"China's 'feud' over economic reform reveals depth of Xi Jinping's secret state,"
Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/may/26/chinas-feud-overeconomic-reform-reveals-depth-of-xi-jinpings-secret-state
Yet this headline and the accompanying 6,000-word article attacking debt-fuelled growth has sparked weeks of

alleged political feud at the pinnacle of Chinese politics between the president,
Xi Jinping, and the prime minister, Li Keqiang, the supposed steward of the Chinese economy. The
recent Peoples Daily interview not only exposes a deep rift between [Xi and Li] it also
shows the power struggle has got so bitter that the president had to resort to the
media to push his agenda, one commentator said in the South China Morning Post. Clear divisions
have emerged within the Chinese leadership, wrote Nikkeis Harada Issaku, claiming the
two camps were locking horns over whether to prioritise economic stability or
structural reforms. The 9 May article penned by an unnamed yet supposedly authoritative scribe
warned excessive credit growth could plunge China into financial turmoil , even wiping out
speculation over an

the savings of the ordinary citizens. As if to hammer that point home, a second, even longer article followed 24
hours later this time a speech by Xi Jinping in which the president laid out his vision for the Chinese economy

Xi has decided to
take the drivers seat to steer Chinas economy at a time when there are intense
internal debates among officials over its overall direction, Wang Xiangwei argued in the South
and what he called supply-side structural reform. Taken together, the articles signal that

China Morning Post. Like many observers, he described the front page interview as a repudiation of Li Keqiangbacked efforts to prop up economic growth by turning on the credit taps. Chinas economy stabilised in the first
quarter of this year as a record 4.6 trillion yuan (477.3bn) of credit was released, leading some to question
Beijings commitment to structural reforms. China watchers have been left bamboozled at the mystifying way in

Some read the

articles as a sign relations between Xi and Li are breaking down and predict the
latter could be replaced next year by the presidents current anti-corruption tsar
Wang Qishan. As evidence they point to the widespread suspicion that the first Peoples Daily article was the
which top-level policy making debates have played out in the pages of the party newspaper.

work of Liu He, a Harvard-educated economist who went to school with Xi during the 1960s and is now one of his

Others believe the articles suggest major policy changes are imminent or are
designed to remind provincial officials that a massive new stimulus campaign similar
closest advisers.

to that seen during the global financial crisis in 2009 is off the menu. The very fact that this gets played out in
the Peoples Daily leaves us all thinking, What is going on? said Fraser Howie, the co-author of Red Capitalism:
the fragile financial foundation of Chinas extraordinary rise. Yes, its indicative of something but like so much in
China we are not exactly sure what it is indicative of. Bill Bishop, the publisher of Sinocism, a newsletter about
Chinas politics and economy, admitted he was also struggling to untangle the crazy speculation. We all have to
start exercising our atrophied Pekingology muscles to figure out what is really going on. Bishop said one plausible
scenario was that Li would be sidelined from economic affairs at next years 19th Communist party congress and
replaced by Wang Qishan in a bid to advance painful but necessary economic reforms. From the perspective of
reform, Wang has got a great reputation and in many ways would be much more effective within the bureaucracy.
Certainly people are afraid of him. During a tour of Chinas northeastern rust belt this week, Xi reaffirmed his

If we hesitate in making decisions and do things halfway, we will

lose this rare opportunity, he said, according to Chinas official news agency. Howie said he saw the
battles over economic policy less as a boxing match, in which red and blue teams traded punches, and
more as a raging forest fire where police officers and fire fighters were tripping over
commitment to reforms.

each other as they tried different techniques to extinguish the flames of a rapidly
fading economy. There is this mismatch of endeavours. They all understand they need to
solve the problem. I just dont think they fully appreciate the coordination that is
needed to solve it, the financial markets expert said. Howie said Li could not have been thrilled about
having his policies rubbished so publicly by the presidents team. Clearly [Xi] is saying: Whats gone before isnt
working. We cant continue to do it. This is hardly rousing support for Li Keqiang and what has gone before. But he

a Tony Blair-Gordon Brown-style feud was playing out between Chinas two
most powerful men. I dont believe it is that vitriolic or open or contentious , he said.
rejected the idea that

Bishop said he also believed there was more consensus over the economy than many outside observers admitted.
The idea that the leadership doesnt understand how bad the problems are and that foreign experts have a much
better idea of what is going on in the Chinese system I think are hogwash. I think they are very clear how bad it is.
Whatever the truth,

the saga has underlined how under Xi, a centralising strongman president
dubbed the Chairman of Everything, Chinas already intensely secretive political system has
become even more opaque. The fact that we are even speculating about this is
quite remarkable because frankly nobody has any idea, said Bishop. And I guarantee you that
most people at the top level of Chinese government probably have no idea what is
going to happen.

Economic engagement with the US splits the party in half and

cause legitimacy crisis
Cary Huang 14, "Academics' questions point to Communist Party divide over
dogma," South China Morning Post, 9/30/2014,
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1611328/eight-questions-set-forth-unifycommunist-party
The Communist Party must bridge ideological divides that are driving a wedge
between its factions, party analysts have said ahead of a key meeting this month. Academics at the Central
Party School have raised eight ideological questions, the answers to which they say will be crucial
to the direction of the country's development, according to a report by Shanghai Thinkers Forum, a
theoretical journal run by the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences. The article was also posted on the People's

around the need to maintain the traditional communist

ideology as the party tries to establish a capitalist-style market economy. The issues run
Daily website. The questions revolve

from the contradictions between the tenets of socialism and market economics; to how to promote core socialist
values; and the need to settle the theory of class struggle. Question marks have also been raised over
interpretations of Soviet-era Marxism, modern governance of state affairs, the role of market forces in resource
distribution, the coexistence of Marxism and traditional Chinese culture, and the mechanics of a market economy
under a centralised government. The article comes as the party prepares for its fourth plenum in Beijing on October
20-23, a gathering expected to cover major political and ideological issues, including the rule of law and judicial

under the leadership of Xi Jinping who, in the two years since

has launched both anti-corruption and ideological campaigns
to "purify" the party to justify its sole rule of the world's most populous nation. The ideological
debate is reflected in the wrangle that two leading party publications - Qiushi (Seeking
Truth), the party's theoretic journal, and the Study Times, a key product of the Central Party School - have
engaged in over late leader chairman Mao Zedong's theory of class struggle. Analysts
said this rising debate highlighted the ideological dilemma the party had struggled with
since the mainland embarked on market reforms 35 years ago. "This is a very interesting debate.
At the core is the Communist Party's difficulty in re-establishing its legitimacy as
political and economic conditions change," said Professor Zhiqun Zhu, director of the China Institute
at Bucknell University in the United States. Zhu said the debate reflected deep divisions among
party officials and scholars, disputes that could widen the party's internal
reform. The plenum will convene
becoming general secretary,

gaps and create opposing political camps. "It may also be conducive to
redefining the party's very identity in the 21st century and lead to the
transformation of the party [into one] that will become more politically
open and tolerant." Xigen Li, an associate professor at City University's department of media and
communication, added: "The issue of ideological correctness and reality is always a dilemma, which is difficult to
resolve under China's current political system." Li said the dilemma and the debates over the ideological issues
would continue and have the benefit of bringing the issues to the table for those in power to face seriously. " While

ideological emancipation is the final solution - and the dilemma will exist for some
time - at least some compromise could be made to solve compelling issues in
economic development rationally and efficiently," Li said.

Debates over economic reform and economic policies cause

party fracturing and legitimacy decline.
Jinghan Zeng 14, researcher for the Department of Politics and International
Studies, Social Sciences Building, University of Warwick, Coventry,
Institutionalization of the authoritarian leadership in China: a power succession
system with Chinese characteristics?, Contemporary Politics, pg. 297,
economic performance has been considered to be a
principal (if not the sole) pillar of legitimacy in contemporary China (Shambaugh 2001, Wang
In explaining the CCPs legitimacy,

2005, Perry 2008, Zhao 2009). However, my recent study on Chinese intellectuals debate on regime legitimacy

in China that simply relying on economics is not sufficient

even if the economy continues to do well (and of course, there is a clear understanding that bad
finds that it is clearly recognized

economic performance will harm legitimacy) (Zeng 2014). In addition to economic performance, stability is also

scholarship mostly uses

stability to refer to social stability an unwritten social contract between the party
and society. According to this contract, the party delivers material benefits to the citizens
as a trade-off for their compliance with the existing political status quo. However,
political stability within the CCP has not received sufficient attentions . In the CCPs
discourse, its ruling capacity () decides its legitimacy (Party 2004). As a professor of the
Central Party School argues, the cadres appointment system is crucial to the CCPs ruling
capacity and thus to its legitimacy (Zhao 2011). 296 Jinghan Zeng Arguably, the CCPs ruling
capacity is built on its internal stability. In the other words, this internal stability is a
prerequisite for the CCPs ruling capacity to maintain its legitimacy by maintaining
social stability, promoting economic growth, and defending national interests. The
institutionalization of the leadership transition is a crucial factor in maintaining this internal stability.
As Hughes and May (1988) argues, the transfer of political power from one substantive ruler
to another is generally regarded as a major test of the stability and legitimacy of a
political system. This paper provides a notable addition to link power succession with regime stability and
considered to be important to political legitimacy in China (Breslin 2009); China

legitimacy

CCP legitimacy decline and infighting causes economic decline

and depression
Zack Beauchamp 15, writer for Vox News, "The politics of China's market decline
are much more worrying than the economics," Vox, 8/25/2015
http://www.vox.com/2015/8/25/9201737/china-stock-market-politics

China's economic transition is not a minor problem. If it fails, we could be talking

about a serious collapse in China's GDP growth, with potentially dire economic
consequences. "If by 2022 they're dragging their feet, and none of the major reforms seem to be
really taking hold, they will be in pretty serious economic trouble," Ma told me in a July
conversation. Specifically he thinks it'll "look a lot like Japan's 'lost decade'," the period starting in the 1990s in

structural trends an aging

population, labor market volatility, a lot of economic headwinds they can't control and
they're really being forced to change, whether they want to or not," he continued. This will be more
which Japan's productivity and growth fell substantially. "Look at a lot of the

painful for some groups within China than others. Take China's migrant workers: Between 200 million and 300
million people who travel around the country for work. "They want what the urbanites have, but they can't really
get it because of inequality in terms of residence permits, as well as access to social services and opportunity," Ma

Without sustainable economic growth, this enormous population potentially a source of

consumption and growth will be left in the lurch. That translates to enormous numbers of people living
poorer lives than they could have otherwise, as well as a serious political liability for
China's leadership. And that's to say nothing of the rest of the world, which has come to rely on continued
Chinese growth as a key engine of the global economy. It's not clear precisely what the
consequences of a Chinese slowdown would be, but it certainly wouldn't be good. So it's in everyone's
interests that China succeeds at transitioning its economy. Except, that is, for the Chinese
elites who will likely try to take advantage of the stock market collapse to protect their own
interests consequences for others be damned.
said.

Chinese economic collapse causes conflict escalation and

internal rebellion South China seas, taiwan, and east china
seas all scenarios for escalation
Ted Galen Carpenter 15, a senior fellow at the Cato Institute and a contributing
editor at The National Interest, is the author of ten books and more than 600 articles
on international affairs. His latest book, Perilous Partners: The Benefits and Pitfalls
of Americas Alliances with Authoritarian Regimes, 9-6-2015, "Could China's
Economic Troubles Spark a War?," National Interest,
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/could-chinas-economic-troubles-spark-war-13784?
page=2
Global attention has focused on the plunge in the Shanghai stock market and mounting evidence that

Chinas

economic growth is slowing dramatically. Moreover, the contagion appears to be spreading,

characterized by extreme volatility and alarming declines in Americas own equity markets. Those worries are
compounded because there always have been doubts about the accuracy of Beijings official economic statistics.

experts believed that Chinese officials padded

the results, making the countrys performance appear stronger than it actually was.
If China is now teetering on the brink of recession, the political incentives for
officials to conceal the extent of the damage would be quite powerful. The focus on the
Even before the current downturn, some outside

possible wider economic consequences of a severe Chinese economic slowdown is understandable, since the

ramifications could be extremely unpleasant for the U.S. and global economies. But
we should also be vigilant about how such economic stress might affect Beijings diplomatic and military behavior. It
is not unprecedented for a government that feels besieged to attempt to distract a discontented public by
fomenting a foreign policy crisis. In Henry IV, Shakespeare pithily described that process as the temptation to busy

The implicit
bargain that has been in place since the onset of market-oriented reforms in the late 1970s has
been that if the public does not challenge the Communist Partys dominant political
position, the Party will deliver an ever-rising standard of living for the people. The
giddy minds with foreign quarrels. Chinas leaders likely feel increasingly uncomfortable.

bloody Tiananmen Square crackdown in 1989 was a graphic reminder of what

happens if the Partys position is challenged. However, until now, the economic portion of the
bargain seemed secure, characterized by breathtaking, often double digit, rates of growth . It is uncertain
what happens if the Party can no longer maintain its part of the implicit bargain, but
it is likely that a dangerous degree of public discontent will surface. Beijing might refrain
from deliberately provoking a major foreign policy crisis, since the Chinese economy depends heavily on export

the need to preserve and

strengthen national unity and distract the public from mounting economic troubles
is likely to impel Chinese leaders to adopt very hardline policies in at least three
areas. And all of those situations entail the danger of miscalculations that could lead to war. One issue is the
South China Sea. Beijing has made extraordinarily broad territorial claims that encompass
some 90 percent of that body of water. China is pressing its claims with air and naval
patrols and the building of artificial islands. Those policies have brought Beijing into acrimonious
disputes with neighbors such as Vietnam and the Philippines, which have rival territorial claims, and
with the worlds leading maritime power, the United States, which resists any manifestation of Chinese control
over the South China Sea and the crucial commercial lanes that pass through it. The conditions are in place
for a nasty confrontation. Chinese leaders have already stressed the countrys alleged historical
claims to the area, and made it clear that it will not tolerate being subjected to humiliation by
outside powers. Such arguments are designed to gain domestic support by reminding the Chinese people of
the countrys long period of weakness and humiliation in the 1800s and early 1900s. A second issue is Taiwan.
Beijing has long argued that Taiwan is rightfully part of China and was stolen from the country
in the Sino-Japanese war in 1895. Although Chinese leaders have exhibited patience regarding the issue
markets, and access to those markets would be jeopardized by war. However,

of reunification, relying in large measure on growing cross-strait economic ties to entice Taiwan to eventually accept

Beijing has also reacted very sharply whenever Taiwanese officials have pushed
independence, as during the administration of Chen Shui-bian from 2000 to 2008.
The danger or renewed confrontation is rising, since public opinion polls indicate that the
nominee of Chens old party, the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party, will be
Taiwans next leader. A new crisis in the Taiwan Strait would be extremely serious, since the United
States has obligated itself to consider any Chinese efforts at coercion as a grave breach
of the peace of East Asia. Yet there is little doubt that there would be widespread domestic support on the
that outcome,
an agenda of

mainland for a stern response by the Beijing government to a Taiwanese attempt to enhance its de-facto
independence. Indeed, there might be more political danger to the regime if it did not take a strong stance on that

third possible arena for crisis is the East China Sea. China is increasingly adamant about its
claims to the DiaoyuSenkaku islands, which are under Japanese control. From Chinas
perspective, those islands were stolen by Imperial Japan at the same time that Tokyo took possession of
Taiwan following the 1895 war. And ginning up public anger against Japan is never difficult. China just
issue. The

finished celebrating the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, which is touted in China as the Chinese
Peoples War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War. Recalling Japans invasion
of China, and the resulting atrocities, was a prominent theme of the various commemorative events. But the

Anger at Japan over the ongoing East China

Sea dispute and other matters has already produced anti-Japanese riots in Chinese
cities, characterized by attacks on Japanese businesses and automobiles. There is a
powerful incentive for Chinese leaders to take an uncompromising stance on the
Diaoyu/Senkaku feud, confident that the Chinese people will back such a stance. All of this suggests
that the United States and its allies need to proceed cautiously about dealing with
China, especially on these three issues. Now is not the time to press a Chinese
leadership that likely feels beleaguered by the countrys economic woes. The last thing
animosity is not based solely on historical grievances.

we should do is give those leaders further temptation to distract the Chinese people with a foreign policy

confrontation. Such a strategy entails the grave risk of miscalculation and escalation, and that would be a tragedy
for all concerned.

1NC Warming
Prime minister and President fighting now but we cannot be
sure of stability further negotiations only escalate tensions.
Tom Phillips 5/25, the Beijing correspondent for the Guardian, 5-25-2016,
"China's 'feud' over economic reform reveals depth of Xi Jinping's secret state,"
Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/may/26/chinas-feud-overeconomic-reform-reveals-depth-of-xi-jinpings-secret-state
Yet this headline and the accompanying 6,000-word article attacking debt-fuelled growth has sparked weeks of

alleged political feud at the pinnacle of Chinese politics between the president,
Xi Jinping, and the prime minister, Li Keqiang, the supposed steward of the Chinese economy. The
recent Peoples Daily interview not only exposes a deep rift between [Xi and Li] it also
shows the power struggle has got so bitter that the president had to resort to the
media to push his agenda, one commentator said in the South China Morning Post. Clear divisions
have emerged within the Chinese leadership, wrote Nikkeis Harada Issaku, claiming the
two camps were locking horns over whether to prioritise economic stability or
structural reforms. The 9 May article penned by an unnamed yet supposedly authoritative scribe
warned excessive credit growth could plunge China into financial turmoil , even wiping out
speculation over an

the savings of the ordinary citizens. As if to hammer that point home, a second, even longer article followed 24
hours later this time a speech by Xi Jinping in which the president laid out his vision for the Chinese economy

Xi has decided to
take the drivers seat to steer Chinas economy at a time when there are intense
internal debates among officials over its overall direction, Wang Xiangwei argued in the South
and what he called supply-side structural reform. Taken together, the articles signal that

China Morning Post. Like many observers, he described the front page interview as a repudiation of Li Keqiangbacked efforts to prop up economic growth by turning on the credit taps. Chinas economy stabilised in the first
quarter of this year as a record 4.6 trillion yuan (477.3bn) of credit was released, leading some to question
Beijings commitment to structural reforms. China watchers have been left bamboozled at the mystifying way in

Some read the

articles as a sign relations between Xi and Li are breaking down and predict the
latter could be replaced next year by the presidents current anti-corruption tsar
Wang Qishan. As evidence they point to the widespread suspicion that the first Peoples Daily article was the
which top-level policy making debates have played out in the pages of the party newspaper.

work of Liu He, a Harvard-educated economist who went to school with Xi during the 1960s and is now one of his

Others believe the articles suggest major policy changes are imminent or are
designed to remind provincial officials that a massive new stimulus campaign similar
closest advisers.

to that seen during the global financial crisis in 2009 is off the menu. The very fact that this gets played out in
the Peoples Daily leaves us all thinking, What is going on? said Fraser Howie, the co-author of Red Capitalism:
the fragile financial foundation of Chinas extraordinary rise. Yes, its indicative of something but like so much in
China we are not exactly sure what it is indicative of. Bill Bishop, the publisher of Sinocism, a newsletter about
Chinas politics and economy, admitted he was also struggling to untangle the crazy speculation. We all have to
start exercising our atrophied Pekingology muscles to figure out what is really going on. Bishop said one plausible
scenario was that Li would be sidelined from economic affairs at next years 19th Communist party congress and
replaced by Wang Qishan in a bid to advance painful but necessary economic reforms. From the perspective of
reform, Wang has got a great reputation and in many ways would be much more effective within the bureaucracy.
Certainly people are afraid of him. During a tour of Chinas northeastern rust belt this week, Xi reaffirmed his

If we hesitate in making decisions and do things halfway, we will

lose this rare opportunity, he said, according to Chinas official news agency. Howie said he saw the
battles over economic policy less as a boxing match, in which red and blue teams traded punches, and
more as a raging forest fire where police officers and fire fighters were tripping over
commitment to reforms.

each other as they tried different techniques to extinguish the flames of a rapidly
fading economy. There is this mismatch of endeavours. They all understand they need to
solve the problem. I just dont think they fully appreciate the coordination that is
needed to solve it, the financial markets expert said. Howie said Li could not have been thrilled about
having his policies rubbished so publicly by the presidents team. Clearly [Xi] is saying: Whats gone before isnt
working. We cant continue to do it. This is hardly rousing support for Li Keqiang and what has gone before. But he

a Tony Blair-Gordon Brown-style feud was playing out between Chinas two
most powerful men. I dont believe it is that vitriolic or open or contentious , he said.
rejected the idea that

Bishop said he also believed there was more consensus over the economy than many outside observers admitted.
The idea that the leadership doesnt understand how bad the problems are and that foreign experts have a much
better idea of what is going on in the Chinese system I think are hogwash. I think they are very clear how bad it is.
Whatever the truth,

the saga has underlined how under Xi, a centralising strongman president
dubbed the Chairman of Everything, Chinas already intensely secretive political system has
become even more opaque. The fact that we are even speculating about this is
quite remarkable because frankly nobody has any idea, said Bishop. And I guarantee you that
most people at the top level of Chinese government probably have no idea what is
going to happen.

Chinese environmental policy directly trades off with a focus

on economic growth shift towards green economy almost
impossible
Xu Tang et al. 15, Dr. Xu Tang is an Associate Professor at China University of Petroleum, Beijing, with research
interest in energy-environment-economic systems analysis, oil industry and economic analysis, supply modelling of fossil energy and
its economic impacts. Dr. Tang has published more than 30 peer-reviewed articles in recent years. Tang had been a visiting scholar
in Canadian Energy Research Institute (Oct.2009- Oct.2010), Uppsala University (Jun.2013-Sep.2013). He has been awarded as the
Excellent Doctoral Dissertation in Beijing, Excellent Graduate in Beijing, Outstanding Young Scholars in China University of
Petroleum, Beijing. Benjamin C. McLellan is an Associate Professor the Graduate School of Energy Science, Simon Snowden is the
programme director at the University of Liverpool Simon spent nine years in the private sector as the manager of a vibrant R&D
department of a successful SME based on Merseyside developing innovative solutions in the Health sector. Simon joined the
University of Liverpool in 2000 to manage the Agility Centre, a research centre dedicated to assisting SMEs in developing practical
implementations of Agile Manufacturing Theory, and supporting Merseyside business in this process. This includes leading the
development of a highly structured, yet customisable framework based upon a set of tools aimed at assessing the agility of an
organisation from a number of perspectives, and easing change proficiency within organisations, Baosheng Zhang Technical Leader,
Sr. Mechanical/Thermal FEA Architect, Mobile Platform Development Engineering as well as senior designer and analysis engineer at
Amazon and Hewlett Packward, Mikael Hk is professor in the research group Global Energy at the Department of Earth Sciences
at Upsalla University, Dilemmas for China: Energy, Economy and Environment, Sustainability, 5/6/15, http://www.mdpi.com/20711050/7/5/5508, accessed 7/5/16

Chinas current national policies promote high levels of economic growth,

transforming China into a world factory, but at a high cost in terms of energy and
the environment. At the same time, this growth and transformation also forms the
backbone of Chinas economy, underpinning social stability. China faces a dilemma to
reconcile its economy, energy system and environmental security. Each aspect of this triad
is discussed in this study to illuminate the challenges faced by China, and Chinas dilemma in energy,
economy and environment is analyzed from the perspective of its participation in
current global supply chains. While China must import a significant proportion of its
energy and a large proportion of primary materials, a large share of these imports
are returned to the global market as industrial exports. China is bound by its own
course of action and unable to radically change its position for the
foreseeable future as the road to economic development and employment
stability is through policies built on exports and shifting development
models, presenting a tough socio-economic trade-off. Chinas growth challenges are
discussed as an example of challenges more broadly faced in the developing world. Chinas success or

failure in achieving a sustainable developmental pattern will inevitably have a

significant influence on the global environment.

China is taking steps to change its environmental policy now

but party fracturing and lack of concencus prevents them from
instuting greater emission reductions policies
Keith Johnson 14, a senior reporter covering energy geopolitics for Foreign
Policy. Previously, Johnson worked for more than a decade at the Wall Street Journal
and was based in both Washington, D.C., and Europe. From 2007 to 2010, he
contributed to Environmental Capital, a blog for the Journal that focused on energy
developments and sustainability., Chinas Kinda-Sorta-Oughta Plan to Fight Climate
Change, 6/4/2016, accessed 7/4/16, http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/06/04/chinaskinda-sorta-oughta-plan-to-fight-climate-change/
Just one day after Barack Obamas administration unveiled its tough new climate change rules, China seemingly followed suit,
hinting Tuesday that it would put an absolute cap on greenhouse gas emissions in its next five-year plan, which begins in 2016. But
its not quite so cut and dried: The advisor whose words at a Beijing conference sparked the story, He Jiankun, said he and other
experts merely urged the Chinese government to cap emissions, the Financial Times noted. "This is our experts advice and

"The government has not decided on this policy yet. We

hope to implement this in the 13th five-year plan, but the plan has not been fixed
yet." Not to be overlooked, however, is the real effort China is making to tackle
pollution, both the kind that is only too visible such as the smog that regularly
blankets Chinese cities and the kind that isnt, such as greenhouse gases.
Pollution has become an existential challenge for Chinese leaders. Protests against
the countrys terrible environmental record, whether dirty air, dirty water, dirty
factories, or dead pigs, leave Beijing with uncomfortable flashbacks to the Tiananmen
Square protests, which were 25 years ago this Wednesday, June 4. That explains, in part, Chinas world-leading investments in
suggestion," he told the Financial Times.

renewable energy such as wind and solar power. The Chinese also have an ambitious schedule for nuclear energy deployment, and
some individual provinces have banned coal plants. Although China uses as much coal as the rest of the world combined, Chinese
energy experts increasingly say the end is nigh or rather, that Chinas coal consumption will peak sooner than previously
predicted. At the height of Chinas economic boom, it was building roughly one coal-fired power plant every week. Simultaneously,

China is trying to move away from energy-intensive heavy manufacturing and

embrace a more service-oriented economy, which will require less energy and produce fewer emissions
for each dollar of output. All that promises to have big implications for next years global climate change summit and for domestic
U.S. politics. "China

cannot continue its current trends, either in terms of pollution or in

terms of energy supply," said Wang Tao, an energy and climate expert at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global
Policy. "The government is just trying to make this transition as smooth and soft as
possible." Climate watchers still digesting the Obama administrations biggest step toward tackling greenhouse gas emissions
a plan to cut emissions from the power sector 30 percent by 2030 got pie-eyed when news broke that China apparently would
cap emissions too. Part of their enthusiasm came from the fact that the Chinese move, if fully carried out, could re-energize lagging

China is already the worlds second-largest carbon-trading market, with seven

wants to turn those regional, sometimes troubled, efforts into a national
emissions-trading scheme similar to Europes and the one nixed by the U.S. Congress in 2010. However,
Chinese officials have been racking their brains on how to do so. One problem
facing Chinese climate programs: Theyre meant to make dirty energy
more expensive and cleaner alternatives more attractive. But Chinas
stranglehold on domestic energy prices means the programs dont work as
well as they could. If China does move toward a cap on carbon emissions, that could make it easier for international
efforts to create a global carbon-trading system.
local pilot programs. It

climate negotiators to reach some sort of agreement at next years U.N. climate summit in Paris. Energy analysts say that the
Obama administrations newly announced measures, which target the biggest single source of greenhouse gas emissions, would
likely open the door to more action from other big emitters, including China. And even if formal steps by the Chinese government to
cap emissions are years away from fruition, it will also make it harder for opponents of the presidents climate push to fight his

environmental initiatives. Many Republicans have criticized the administrations climate plans, especially the new rules to clean up
the power sector, because in the absence of any similar action from big emitters such as China, they worry the new rules will poleax
the American economy and provide few global environmental benefits. Sen. David Vitter (R-La.), a prominent voice on the Senate
environment committee, criticized the new power plant rules Monday precisely because they arent binding on countries such as
India and China. Likewise, Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fla.), a prospective 2016 presidential candidate, has derided U.S. efforts to fight
climate change on the grounds that China will continue its environmentally damaging growth path regardless of unilateral U.S.
actions. The apparent trial balloon floated Tuesday could change that conversation, said Ailun Yang, a China climate researcher at
the World Resources Institute, an environmental think tank. "If this happens, it would show that there is shared concern among the
worlds biggest emitters that climate change should be taken more seriously. In general, the whole rhetoric around climate action

however. As Tuesday wore on, the difference between official

Chinese government policy and what Chinese government advisors would like to
see happen became clearer. Still, the mere internal suggestion that China
should embrace firm climate targets reflects a fundamental shift, Yang
said. "Right now, its both technically possible and politically acceptable for China to
be talking about an absolute cap [on emissions]; and thats a very important step forward," she said. He Jiankun
has changed and is evolving." Thats a big if,

chairman of Chinas Advisory Committee on Climate Change got an earful about the new Environmental Protection Agency rules
during a visit to Washington in May. What was especially intriguing about his comments at the conference in Beijing, aside from the

Beijings formal
environmental goals are designed to make the economy relatively cleaner but allow
overall greenhouse gas emissions to keep rising as the economy keeps growing . The
latest official targets, for instance, are meant to cut carbon emissions per unit of
GDP by 2015, rather than cutting carbon emissions outright. China is struggling to
meet even those lower targets. Meeting these potentially more ambitious ones will
be even harder.
timing, is that an absolute cap on pollution would be something of a departure for China.

Without chinese emissions reductions solving warming

becomes impossible disincentivizes other emissions reducing
efforts by other large states
Emily Atkins 14, Degree in political science from the State University of New York
at New Paltz and political reporter for ThinkProgress. Previously, she was a deputy
editor for Climate Progress, and a reporter for the legal newswire Law360. Her work
has appeared in The New Republic, The Daily Beast, The New York Observer, and on
WAMC Northeast Public Radio, Stopping Climate Change Almost Impossible If
China Cant Quit Coal, Report Says, 5/12/14, Think Progress, accessed 7/4/16,
http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2014/05/12/3436673/coal-dependent-china/
If China doesnt begin to limit its coal consumption by 2030, it will be almost
impossible for the world avoid a situation where global warming stays below 2C, a
new study released Monday found. The study, led by the U.K.s Center for Climate Change
Economics and Policy and the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and
the Environment, recommends China put a cap on greenhouse gas emissions from
coal by 2020, and then swiftly reduce its dependency on the fossil fuel. The reductions
would not only increase public health and wellness and decrease climate change, but could also have a major
positive effect on the global dynamics of climate cooperation, the report said. The

actions China
takes in the next decade will be critical for the future of China and the
world, the study said. Whether China moves onto an innovative, sustainable
and low-carbon growth path this decade will more or less determine both
Chinas longer-term economic prospects in a natural resource-constrained
world, and the worlds prospects of cutting greenhouse gas emissions
sufficiently to manage the grave risks of climate change. The general
question surrounding the prevention of climate change is whether the earth can

avoid a 2C situation that is, whether we can reduce greenhouse gas emissions swiftly enough to
keep global average surface temperatures from rising to 2C (3.6F) above preindustrial levels. World leaders, including China, agreed to avoid that 2C situation in 2009 by signing the
Copenhagen Accord in 2009, a three-page nonbinding pledge to fight climate change. In 2011, one-fifth of
the worlds total fossil fuel carbon dioxide emissions came solely from Chinas coal,
and coal was responsible for more than 80 percent of the countrys 8 gigatons of
fossil fuel emissions that year. But despite increasing calls for China to reduce its
coal-burning not only because of climate impacts but because of infamous, choking air pollution it has
been unclear whether the country has made enough effort to actually make a dent
in its consumption. The country has taken steps to replace thousands of small-scale coal mines with large
ones, and its largest cities have pledged to make drastic reductions in emissions. However, a Chinese
government report recently found that only a tiny fraction of Chinese cities fully
complied with pollution standards in 2013, while approving the construction of more than 100
million tonnes of new coal production capacity in 2013, according to a Reuters report. Coal, in absolute terms, is
growing in China, Fergus Green, one of the authors of the study, told ThinkProgress. But its share of
electricity is declining as other sources of electricity take up additional shares of
capacity. So we see absolute growth, but signs of serious moderation. Green, who coauthored the study along with London School of Economics scholar Nicholas Stern, said the effort was less of an
empirical game to try to predict what would happen in China, and more of a recommendation for how the country
could realistically reduce its emissions and how those reductions would benefit the country and the world. The
paper, he said, was a response to indications from Chinas leadership that it is looking to transform growth models
to be more efficient over the coming years. One doesnt just go to China and tell them what they should do, but
there are serious discussions that are happening in China about when their coal consumption will peak, he said.
Really what were saying is that there are strong benefits for China and for the world in terms of greenhouse gas

one of the less obvious

benefits of China peaking its coal production would be the catalyzing effect it would
have on other countries efforts to combat climate change. With China as the
worlds largest emitter of greenhouse gases, politicians in other countries
including the United States have made the argument that nothing they do can
actually stop climate change from happening. If other countries, particularly the United States,
mitigation if China were to peak at the early end of 2020. Green noted that

can see that China is serious about declining its consumption, it could be potentially a tipping point that does
stimulate more ambitious action from other countries, Green said. We could actually get an international

However, if China does not become serious about reducing its coal
consumption soon, the chances of climate change mitigation become
lower and lower. If China goes beyond 15 gigatons of carbon emissions by 2030, then [mitigation] would
agreement.

be almost impossible, Green said. The longer you delay, the more faster the decline has to be, and the more
implausible that becomes.

Warming causes increased risk of conflict its an impact filter

that exacberates underlying social problems
Prof. John Barnett and W. Neil Adger 07,
Professor and Australian Research Council Future Fellow in the School of Geography at Melbourne

University. He is a political geographer who researches the impacts of and responses to environmental change on social systems in Australia, East Asia and the South Pacific. Jon is a Lead Author for the Fifth Assessment Report of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Working Group II, Ch 12), and he is co-editor of Global Environmental Change, Neil Adger is Neil Adger is Professor of Human Geography. He teaches, supervises graduate students, and
researches in the areas of environmental geography, ecological and institutional economics, and global environmental change. Neil is a on the list of social scientists in ISI Highly Cited Researchers, one of the few geogrpahers whose
work is widely cited across the disciplines. He is a member of the Resilience Alliance, a global network of leading scientists and social scientists working on theory and practice of resilience of social-ecological systems for
sustainability. Neil led the chapter on Human Security and was a member of the core writing team for the Summary for Policy Makers for the Integovernmental Panel on Climate Change Fifth Assessment Report Working Group 2
published in final form in 2014. He previously served as a Convening Lead Author for the 2007 Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel of Climate Change and in the Third Assessment Report in 2001. He also served
as a Lead Author in the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment and continues to work extensively on ecosystem services and well-being. In 2015 Neil acted as a Commissioner and author of the Lancet Commission Climate Health
Commission, publishing ''Climate Change and Health 2015: Policy Responses to Protect Public Health' [free to dowload] arguing for urgent action on climate change to maintain and enhance well-being. Neil is on the Board of
Directors of the Beijer Institute of Ecological Econoics at the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences and serves on the International Scientific Advisory Committee of the Basque Centre for Climate Change in Bilbao. He is on the Editorial
Board of Global Environmental Change, having served as Editor from 2004-2013, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers and Ecology and Society, Climate change, human security and violent conflict, Political
Geography Volume 26, Issue 6, August 2007, Pages 639655, Accessed on: 7/5/16, http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S096262980700039X

changes now underway in the earths climate

system have no precedent in the history of human civilization (IPCC, 2007; Stern, 2007). As
a macro-driver of many kinds of environmental changes such as coastal erosion,
declining precipitation and soil moisture, increased storm intensity, and
There is now widespread agreement that the

species migration, climate change poses risks to human security (McCarthy,

Canziani, Leary, Dokken, & White, 2001). In most parts of the world, the impacts of climate
change on socialeecological systems will be experienced through both changes in
mean conditions (such as temperature, sea-level, and annual precipitation) over long-time
scales, but also through increases in the intensity and in some cases frequency of
floods, droughts, storms and cyclones, fires, heatwaves, and epidemics. Outside of these
short- and long-term changes, which are projected to occur with high levels of certainty, there also exist somewhat
more unquantifiable risks of high-impact events. These include melting of glaciers and permafrost which may add

collapse of the thermohaline circulation which may cause

significant regional climate changes in the northern hemisphere, and large scale
shifts in the Asian monsoon and the El Nino Southern Oscillation phenomenon
several meters to global sea-levels,

(Oppenheimer & Alley, 2004; Vellinga & Wood, 2007; Schneider, Semenov, & Patwardhan, 2007). There is every
reason to worry about the impacts of these changes on human systems given that the rate of change is
unprecedented in the past 10,000 years, and that climatic variations have triggered large-scale social disruptions in
the past. The association between El Nino events and famines that killed tens of millions across the tropics in the
late 19th century has been well documented by Davis (2001). Davis (2001) argues that famine was triggered by
drought, but caused by the way political and economic colonisation deprived people of their entitlements to natural

analyses of famines now identify poverty, inequality, market failures,

and policy failures as the deeper causes of what ostensibly seem to be natural
disasters (see Sen, 1981; de Waal, 1997; Webb & von Braun, 1994). Daviss arguments about the
ways climatic variations have combined with stressed socialeecological systems to
result in dramatic social change is reinforced by Diamond (2005), who examines many cases
of catastrophic social change and finds that environmental change was a common
factor in all of them, and climate change in particular was a cause of man y. The
resources. Most

vulnerability (potential for loss) of people to climate change depends on the extent to which they are dependent on
natural resources and ecosystem services, the extent to which the resources and services they rely on are sensitive

the
more people are dependent on climate sensitive forms of natural capital, and the
less they rely on economic or social forms of capital, the more at risk they are from
climate change. Yet environmental change does not undermine human security in isolation from a broader
to climate change, and their capacity to adapt to changes in these resources and services. In other words,

range of social factors. These include, among other things, poverty, the degree of support (or conversely
discrimination) communities receive from the state, their access to economic opportunities, the effectiveness of
decision making processes, and the extent of social cohesion within and surrounding vulnerable groups. These
factors determine people and communities entitlements to economic and social capital that in turn determine their
capacity to adapt to climate change so that the things that they value are not adversely affected .

The way
climate change can and does undermine human security varies across the world
because entitlements to natural resources and services vary across space, and the
social determinants of adaptive capacity are similarly varied. For example, in contrast to
many industrialised countries where agriculture represents 1e2% of the workforce , in East Timor some
85% of the population are dependent on agriculture as their sole or main source of
income, and the majority of the population are engaged in subsistence farming so
that 46% of rural people live below the poverty line of US$0.55 per day (UNDP, 2002).
There is no state-directed system of income support, but there may be customary
and Church-lead processes whereby food (and in some places labour) is shared. There is a
modest public education system and a very basic public health system. Therefore, most rural Timorese have little or
no alternative sources of food beyond their own production. Maize is the most important source of food supply, but
nowhere is it an irrigated crop. Therefore, in times of low rainfall maize production can be reduced by up to one-

If climate
change results in less rainfall in the dry season, then this may negatively affect a
number of resources that rural Timorese value , such as sufficient food and good
health. In Timor, as in most instances of famine risk, climate is an exogenous trigger, but
third, resulting in widespread hunger and child malnutrition (Barnett, Dessai, & Jones, 2007).

underlying social problems are the deeper cause of food crises. This example of East Timor, as well as the
aforementioned analyses of famine, strongly suggests that the risks of climate change to social systems is as much

While the focus

of human security is the individual, the processes that undermine or strengthen
human security are often external to the locality of communities where individuals
reside. In terms of environmental change, for example, upstream users of water, distant atmospheric polluters,
about the characteristics of those systems as it is about changes in environmental systems.

multinational logging and mining companies, regional-scale climatic J. Barnett, W.N. Adger / Political Geography 26
(2007) 639e655 641 processes, and a host of other distant actors and larger scale processes influence the security
of individuals entitlements to natural resources and services. Similarly, in terms of the social determinants of
vulnerability, warfare, corruption, trade dependency, macroeconomic policies, and a host of other larger scale
processes associated with globalisation shape the social and economic entitlements that are necessary to reduce
an individuals vulnerability (or increase their ability to adapt) to environmental changes. Adger and Kelly (1999)
refer to these larger scale processes as comprising the architecture of entitlements. Furthermore, the
determinants of human security are as temporally as they are spatially complex: past processes such as
colonisation and war shape present insecurities, and ongoing processes such as climate change and trade
liberalisation shape future insecurities. These larger scale processes that shape peoples entitlements to natural,

Production sectors may be

at risk; for example, it is not just farmers whose livelihoods are at risk from climate
change, but also those whose livelihoods depend on agricultural production such as
suppliers of inputs, people who work in transporting and processing agricultural
commodities, people who work as extension officers, and people who work in
agricultural lending services. The knock-on effects of the decline of certain sectors and the responses of
economic and social capital may themselves be vulnerable to climate change.

those who depend on them for their livelihoods may in turn impact on other places; for example, rural decline can
cause migration to urban areas, placing increasing demand on urban services and increasing political pressure on
the state, which in itself is an important provider of various entitlements such as education, health care, law and

The extent to which system-wide impacts

transpire will be determined in part by the degree to which any given national
economy is dependent on climate sensitive natural resources, and the robustness and
order, credit, and protective security (see below).

resilience of social institutions to manage change. In both these less direct ways, but also through direct processes
such as territorial losses through rising sea levels, climate change may be a national security issue (Barnett, 2003).

The risk to national security may be both a cause and a consequence of human
insecurity. So, human security is a function of multiple processes operating across space, over time, and at
multiple scales. This makes researching the ways in which climate change may affect human security a daunting
task, which is not helped by the difficulty of ascertaining whether there are indeed any existing environmental
changes that can be attributed to climate change (see Allen & Lord, 2004). Nevertheless, there have been some
investigations of the relationship between climate change and human security. These have focussed on the local
dynamics that limit individuals and groups access to environmental, financial, and social resources necessary to
respond to climate variability and change (e.g., Adger, 1999; Bohle, Downing, & Watts, 1994; Liechenko & OBrien,
2002). As well as these climate specific applications, a similar social vulnerability approach has been applied in
anthropology (e.g., Minnegal & Dwyer, 2000), development (e.g., Chambers, 1989) and disasters research (e.g.,

In the field of environmental security many case

studies, for example from Northern Pakistan (Matthew, 2001), South Asia (Najam, 2003), the Niger Delta
(Mochizuki, 2004), the Pacific Islands (Cocklin & Keen, 2000) and Ethiopia (Haile, 2004) show that
environmental change can be a significant factor that undermines human security.
This research demonstrates that marginalised people are vulnerable to
environmental change, and it all helps substantiate the argument that climate
change poses significant risks to human security in many parts of the world. What is
less clear, however, are the ways in which human insecurity lead to violent conflict. This is important to
consider since violent conflict is itself a powerful cause of human insecurity and
vulnerability to climate change (Barnett, 2006).
Blaikie, Cannon, Davies, & Wisner, 1994).

Uniqueness

CCP Fragile
CCP elite fighting now about new economic policy, economic
engagement accelerates that conflict to cause party and
economic collapse
Zack Beauchamp, 8-25-2015, writer for Vox News, "The politics of China's
market decline are much more worrying than the economics," Vox,
http://www.vox.com/2015/8/25/9201737/china-stock-market-politics
China's economic slowdown, which reflects a fundamental change in the
Chinese economy. For years, China's economy has been driven by two things: cheap exports and
government-driven investment in things like infrastructure. But if China wants to become a
European-style upper-income country (and it does), this model isn't sustainable. Rich countries can't
What you're seeing is

manufacture goods as cheaply as poorer ones, and there are only so many bridges and roads a government can

It needs regular
Chinese consumers to buy Chinese-made stuff and fuel the economy that way. That
requires major structural reforms, such as freeing up private industry and raising wages. The reforms
necessary to make that happen are critical to maintaining long-run growth , but according to Ma, the
build. To fix this problem, China needs to switch to a consumption-driven growth model:

cost of getting there has been somewhat slower growth in the short term. And China still needs to do a lot more to
really shift (or "rebalance") over to a consumption-driven economy. That's why the stock market crash is really

The Chinese
political system is full of political and economic elites who have a vested interest in
keeping the status quo and not changing the economy. For example, China's energy sector is
dominated by three major oligopolies, which have used their political connections to block
reforms designed to introduce competition (and thus fuel growth) in the field. These elites are
struggling against the pro-reform factions in the Communist Party leadership , tooth
and nail, to try to block reforms. The nature of China's authoritarian political system, which depends
heavily on rule by elite, gives those elites a lot of power. The elites could exploit the stock
market crash by blaming the crash on the economic reforms China has made so far, Ma
warned, and thus make further reform more politically difficult. "The concern is whether [the crash]
opens up room for people who are already not so pleased with the reform agenda to
kind of push back on it. This is where the political issue gets more testy." Ma says. "You have seen several
interesting op-eds in official Chinese papers, like People's Daily, that make the case that there is still a lot of
internal resistance to the reform agenda." And the timing isn't great: The Chinese
Politburo is holding a plenum in October, which will focus on China's five-year economic
plan and the future of the reform agenda. "That discussion is where a lot of the politics will play out [focus on] how
worrying: because it could make those reforms more politically difficult than they are already.

much they will continue to reform," according to Ma.

Balance of the party is fragile over Jingpings leadership

anonymous letter calling for resignation
Chris Buckley 3/29, writer for the new york time, 3-29-2016, "Anonymous Call
for Xi to Quit Rattles Party Leaders in China," New York Times,
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/30/world/asia/china-xi-jinping-resign-letter.html
An anonymous letter calling on President Xi Jinping to resign for the good of China
and his own safety seemed to be digital rumor-mongering when it appeared on the

Internet

this month. It spread by email and lingered on a small domestic Chinese news site before it was

the response from Beijing has been anything but dismissive. Surprising
even some hardened critics, Mr. Xis security forces have overseen a far-reaching inquisition to root out
the culprits behind the letter, resorting to measures that have drawn more attention than the letter itself . They
have detained at least 11 people, including relatives in China of two exiled writers
accused of spreading or promoting the letter. Mr. Xis handlers have sought to give him an aura of
unshakable dominance. But the unusually severe response to what might be nothing more
than an outlandish Internet ruse suggests some anxiety about his hold on power,
removed. But

including among security officials keen to show their loyalty and avoid any hint of exposing him to danger, experts
said. The

response has shown how jittery they are, said Kerry Brown, professor of Chinese politics
at Kings College, London. The fear seems to be that these views might be taken as
representative of real elite figures. Xiao Qiang, an adjunct professor at the University of California,
Berkeley, who monitors Chinese media for the website China Digital Times, attributed the response in part to the
letters unusual phrasing. Bluff or true, this tone sounds more like coup plotters talking to the leader they want to
depose, rather than an open letter with dissenting political views, he said. There is no evidence that any coup plot
could be in the works. Mr. Xi appears firmly in control; this week he has been visiting the Czech Republic, and he is

the governments
alarmed reaction has highlighted the alternating pulls of swaggering confidence
projected outward and internal anxiety about political control driving Mr. Xi to stamp
down harder on critics, said several people embroiled in or closely watching the inquiry. China Is Said to Be
scheduled to arrive in Washington on Thursday for a nuclear security meeting. But

Holding Jia Jia, a Journalist, Over Xi Jinping Letter Xi Jinping wants full control, and for the letter to appear on a
domestic website marked a loss of control, said Zhang Ping, a Chinese journalist and rights advocate living in
Germany, whose siblings have been detained in southwest China as part of the investigation. Mr. Zhang, who writes
under the pen name Chang Ping, said two younger brothers were held by the police in Sichuan Province after his
immediate family and even distant relatives were told to tell him to remove from the Internet an essay he wrote
condemning the detention of a Chinese journalist, Jia Jia, possibly over the letter. Mr. Zhang said his younger sister
was also missing, almost certainly detained. Mr. Zhang said it would be impossible to take down the essay, which
was published on a Chinese-language website of Deutsche Welle, the German news service. Mr. Jia has since been
released. The police initially said Mr. Zhangs brothers were suspected of illegally starting a fire by burning joss
sticks and paper at ancestral graves. On Tuesday, the Sichuan police also issued a letter, purporting to be from one
of Mr. Zhangs detained brothers, Zhang Wei, in which Zhang Wei said that the family had urged Zhang Ping to stop
criticizing the party and that they were very angry with him for saying his siblings had been detained for political
reasons. If my brother were free, he would not have said that, Mr. Zhang said in response to the statement. The
police are using my brothers as hostages to first blackmail me and then attack me. Wen Yunchao, a Chinese writer
and rights activist living in New York, has said that his parents and younger brother in southern China were also
detained by the police after being pressed to tell him to admit to spreading the letter online. He has refused,
adamantly denying disseminating the letter. The letter appeared online on March 4, just before Chinas national

It lays out accusations against Mr. Xi from loyal

Communist Party members, using a mix of old-school party jargon and liberal
criticisms that makes its true authorship difficult to discern. Mr. Xi has amassed too much power, betraying the
partys recent traditions of collective decision-making, it says. He has abandoned the calibrated
foreign policy of Deng Xiaoping for dangerous adventurism, it continues, and has
turned the news media into servile tools for promoting his own image . Comrade Xi
Jinping, you do not possess the abilities to lead the party and the country into the
future, it says. This is not the first time that an anonymous online message has rattled party leaders. In 2011,
legislature started its annual session.

the government of Hu Jintao, Mr. Xis predecessor, ordered a sweeping crackdown and tightened Internet censorship
after anonymous messages spread online calling on citizens to join a peaceful Jasmine Revolution inspired by
uprisings across the Middle East. But the hunt for the letters authors suggests Mr. Xi is taking security controls to
greater lengths. Theyre extending their hands abroad, Su Yutong, a Chinese journalist and rights advocate based
in Bonn, Germany, said by telephone. We were receiving attention before, but now even more. The security
authorities appear to be using the investigation into the letter to target young exiled activists adept at using the
Internet to spread news and stay in touch with people and events in China, she said. For a town police station in an
isolated part of China to demand that German media, Deutsche Welle, remove an article of mine, thats absurd,
said Mr. Zhang, the writer in Germany. It wouldnt have happened before. Chinese officials were probably most
upset by the letters suggestion that Mr. Xi and his family faced personal peril, said Mr. Xiao, the Chinese media

expert. The letter demands that Mr. Xi resign out of concern for the partys endeavors, out of concern for the future
of the country and its people, and also out of concern for the personal safety of you and your family. It was first
published online by Canyu, or Participation, a Chinese-language website based in the United States that specializes
in news about human rights cases and commentary critical of the Chinese Communist Party. Cai Chu, the chief
editor at Canyu, said he and colleagues received the anonymous letter by email on March 3. Mr. Cai declined to
describe the email address it came from, citing the need to protect the safety of those who submitted the letter. To
judge from the contents of the open letter, it may be the work of an elderly gentleman, Mr. Cai said in emailed
answers to questions. Whether it was possibly written by old party members can only be guessed at, not
determined. The letter appeared next on the website of Wujie, a domestic Chinese news website. Wujie quickly
removed it. But editors and technicians there have vanished, possibly detained, and precedent suggests the site
will be shut down. The investigators are probably trying to figure out what technological loophole allowed the letter
to appear on Wujie, and they want to figure out if the loophole was deliberate, said Zhao Hui, a writer in southern

Mr. Cai said he received

a new letter on Monday claiming to be a petition of 171 loyal party members urging Mr.
China who uses the pen name Mo Zhixu. I guess they suspect a conspiracy here.

Xi to quit. He said he chose not to publish that one. He said: As it was also anonymous, it lacks credibility.

Balance of the CCP is fragile now collapse is possible but not

inevitable
Hung et al 15. Ho-fung Hung is an associate professor of sociology at Johns
Hopkins University, Arthur R. Kroeber is managing director of GaveKal Dragonomics,
an independent global economic research firm, and editor of its journal, China
Economic Quarterly, Howard W. French is the author of China's Second Continent:
How a Million Migrants are Building a New Empire in Africa. An associate professor
at the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism, he is working on a book
about the future of Chinese power, Suisheng Zhao is Professor and Director of the
Center for China-U.S. Cooperation at Josef Korbel School of International Studies,
University of Denver, 3-13-2015, "When Will Chinas Government Collapse?,"
Foreign Policy,
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/03/13/china_communist_party_collapse_downfall/
I agree with Shambaugh that there are serious cracks in the CCP regime, not only because of his arguments and
evidence but also because of his deep knowledge about and long-time access to the partys elite. Whether these
cracks will lead to the end of CCP rule, nevertheless, is difficult to predict. The prediction about a CCP endgame this
time might end up like the many unrealized predictions before. It may also be like the story of boy crying wolf: The
wolf didnt come the first two times, but it finally came when nobody believed it would come. The bottom line is,

the CCP is facing very tough challenges. Whether and how it can weather them is
uncertain. Xi is a leader who came to power with very few sources of legitimacy.
Mao and Deng were among the founding fathers of the Peoples Republic of China. Deng handpicked his
successors Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao both of whom got the backing of party elders when
they came to power. Xi, despite his princeling background, is the first leader chosen out of a
delicate compromise among party factions. Amidst Xis rise to power, the mysterious Wang
Lijun incident occurred, followed by the unusual downfalls of former top leaders Bo Xilai
and Zhou Yongkang. What Wang actually told the American diplomats during his sleepover in the U.S.
Consulate in Chengdu, and what sensitive information he eventually conveyed to Beijing is still unknown. But the
rumor that he revealed a plot by other princelings to get rid of Xi through a coup does not sound too crazy. If this is
true, then Xis frenetic purge of other factions in his anti-corruption campaign makes sense as a desperate move to

Xis purges surely

make new enemies and make most of the Party elite feel deeply anxious about their fortunes.
It wont be so surprising if some of those anxious elite conspire to depose Xi. Such
whip the disrespectful elite to submission through creating a culture of terror within the Party.

internal coup against unpopular leaders is not alien to the CCP it happened with the downfall of the Gang of Four

Second, the partys internal rift is

unfolding at the worst possible time, as far as the economy is concerned. Yes, a 7.4
percent annual growth rate is an enviable number to many other emerging economies. But with the soaring
in 1976, and former party chairman Hua Guofeng a few years later.

indebtedness of the Chinese economy and the ever aggravating unemployment

problem, the Chinese economy needs higher-speed growth to stay above water. The
debt hangover of the 2008-09 stimulus is worrying . Chinas debt to GDP ratio jumped
from 147 percent in 2008 to 282 percent now, and is still growing. It is at a dangerously high level
compared to other emerging economies. The economic slowdown will lead to profit decline for
companies and revenue shortfall for local governments, increasing their difficulty in
servicing and repaying debts. A vicious cycle of defaults and further growth deceleration could turn a
slowdown into something uglier.A vicious cycle of defaults and further growth deceleration could turn a slowdown
into something uglier. It is possible that the CCP elite, no matter how much they dislike Xi and his anti-corruption
campaign, will still prefer not to rock the boat. They are aware that they are nobody without the protection of the
party-state, and their privileges will be under far greater threat in the wake of a regime collapse. It is also possible
that in the years of pacification and domestication following the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown, Chinas civil
society and dissidents have become so timid and cornered that they are incapable of taking advantage of any
cracks in the regime. Is Xi successfully increasing his grip of power through the anti-corruption campaign, or does
his rule still suffer from inadequate legitimacy behind the mask of invincibility? Only time can tell. But besides the
endgame of CCP rule, we should also ponder another possible scenario: the rise of a hysteric and suffocating
dictatorial regime which maintains its draconian control over a society gradually losing its dynamism. Perhaps we
can call this hypothetical regime North Korea lite. Neither China nor its Communist Party is cracking up. I have three
reasons for this judgment. First, none of the factors Shambaugh cites strongly supports the crackup case. Second,
the balance of evidence suggests that Xis government is not weak and desperate, but forceful and adaptable.
Third, the forces that might push for systemic political change are far weaker than the party. Shambaugh thinks the
system is on its last legs because rich people are moving assets abroad, Xi is cracking down on the media and
academia, officials look bored in meetings, corruption is rife, and the economy is at an impasse. This is not a
persuasive case. True, many rich Chinese are moving money abroad, both to find safe havens and to diversify their
portfolios as Chinas growth slows. But in aggregate, capital outflows are modest, and plenty of rich Chinese are still
investing in their own economy. Following an easing of rules, new private business registrations rose 45 percent in

The crackdown on free

expression and civil society is deeply distressing, but not necessarily a sign of
weakness. It could equally be seen as an assertion of confidence in the success of
Chinas authoritarian-capitalist model, and a rejection of the idea that China needs to make
2014 scarcely a sign that the entrepreneurial class has given up hope.

concessions to liberal-democratic ideas to keep on going. It is also related to the crackdown on corruption, which
Shambaugh wrongly dismisses as a cynical power play. Corruption at the end of the era of Xis predecessor Hu
Jintao had got out of control, and posed a real risk of bringing down the regime .

corruption was essential to stabilize the system

A relentless drive to limit

, and this is precisely what Xi has delivered.A relentless drive to limit corruption was essential to stabilize the system, and this is

precisely what Xi has delivered. It cannot work unless Xi can demonstrate complete control over all aspects of the political system, including ideology. As for the economy and the reform program, it is first worth pointing out that despite its severe slowdown, Chinas economy continues to grow faster than that
of any other major country in the world. And claims that the reform program is sputtering simply do not square with the facts. 2014 saw the start of a crucial program to revamp the fiscal system, which led to the start of restructuring local government debt; first steps to liberalize the one-child policy and the
hukou, or household registration system (discussed for years but never achieved by previous governments); important changes in energy pricing; and linkage of the Shanghai and Hong Kong stock markets. News reports suggest that we will soon see a program to reorganize big SOEs under Temasek-like
holding companies that will focus on improving their flagging financial returns. These are all material achievements and compare favorably to, for instance, the utter failure of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to progress on any of the reform agenda he outlined for his country two years ago. Finally, there is
no evidence that the biggest and most important political constituency in China the rising urban bourgeoisie has much interest in changing the system. In my conversations with members of this class, I hear many complaints, but more generally a satisfaction with the material progress China has made in
the last two decades. Except for a tiny group of brave dissidents, this group in general displays little interest in political reform and none in democracy. One reason may be that they find uninspiring the record of democratic governance in other big Asian countries, such as India. More important is probably the
fear that in a representative system, the interests of the urban bourgeoisie (at most 25 percent of the population) would lose out to those of the rural masses. The party may well be somewhat insecure, but the only force that might plausibly unseat it is more insecure still.The party may well be somewhat
insecure, but the only force that might plausibly unseat it is more insecure still. Predictions of Chinese political collapse have a long and futile history. Their persistent failure stems from a basic conceptual fault. Instead of facing the Chinese system on its own terms and understanding why it works which
could create insights into why it might stop working critics judge the system against what they would like it to be, and find it wanting. This embeds an assumption of fragility that makes every societal problem look like an existential crisis. As a long-term resident of China, I would love the government to
become more open, pluralistic and tolerant of creativity. That it refuses to do so is disappointing to me and many others, but offers no grounds for a judgment of its weakness. Seven years ago, in his excellent book Chinas Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation, Shambaugh described the Party as a
reasonably strong and resilient institution. To be sure, it has its problems and challenges, but none present the real possibility of systemic collapse. That was a good judgment then, and it remains a good judgment now. Howard French, Associate Professor, Columbia Journalism School: With respect to
Shambaugh, what has interested me most in this matter is the response to what amounts to a carefully hedged prognostication, rather than his specific arguments in and of themselves. It has been fascinating to watch what strikes this observer, at least, as a certain betrayal of anxiety in the efforts of some of
those who have rushed to take Shambaugh down, or at least refute and discredit his arguments. The notes have ranged from how dare he? to who does this person think he is? to, in some of the more breathless reactions, attacks on his motives: he is a pawn or at least an unwitting agent of this or that
occult force. Along the way, Shambaughs good faith has been questioned; he becomes an actor on behalf of America, or the West, which is said to be always trying bring China down, or cast its political and economic model in doubt. (This extends, of course, to the limited Chinese responses we have seen so
far, such as that of the Global Times, which has responded with vilification, forgetting perhaps that for decades a cherished recurrent theme in Chinese propaganda has been the fundamentally flawed nature of Western democracy or capitalism, and, of course, its inevitable demise.) Before getting down to
details, perhaps the first thing to be said is that it is impossible to appreciate Shambaughs perspective without understanding where he comes from. Few among the first wave of critics credited him for his scholarship, other than to note that he is prominent or respected within the academy. Few have explored
the actual nature of his work over the years, or the findings he has made in previous writings, such as the 2008 book Chinas Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation, a careful study of how the party responded to the shock of the fall of the Soviet Union and began reinventing itself. Shambaugh gives
enormous credit to the CCP for these efforts, but it is clear that by the time he published his 2013 book, China Goes Global: The Partial Power, he had concluded that we have overestimated Chinas strengths and underestimated its weaknesses. This is all worth spelling out because even if Shambaughs

no one knows
where China (or the world) is heading 20, or even 10, years down the road. Mao oversaw
rapprochement with the United States in order to counter the Soviet Union, and this can be
crackup theory surprised you, it has clearly not come out of thin air; rather, it is the latest wrinkle in the evolving views of an earnest scholar. Perhaps the next most important point to be made and it has not been heard enough in this discussion is that

said to have brought capitalism to his country, which was clearly not his aim. Former paramount leader Deng
Xiaoping embraced capitalism, and that can be said to have led to a near existential crisis for the party around the

The United States embraced China also in order to balance the

Soviet Union, as well as, a bit later, to seek markets. This ended up creating what now appears
ever more like a peer rival, after a brief period of unipolarity. Unintended, even undesirable consequences
issue of democratization.

are the name of the game in matters of state and in international affairs, and however assertive and determined Xi
may appear to us in the early phases of his rule, it is a safe bet that his drive to realize a Chinese dream will

Xis
remarkable apparent confidence is a kind of compensation for deep
anxiety at the top in China: a recognition that the country is walking a
tightrope. I defer to others on the specifics of Chinas known challenges, but a few points seem fairly obvious.
produce many things he could never have dreamed ofor desired. It is also at least plausible that

The early, and one might say easy, phase of Chinas takeoff is over.The early, and one might say easy, phase of

Chinas takeoff is over. That period consisted in large measure of stopping doing stupid things and inflicting damage
on oneself. Moving forward now from here becomes exponentially more difficult. This means finding a way to
sustain relatively high growth rates, when almost everything points to a natural, secular slowdown. It means coping
with environmental challenges on a scale never seen before. It means dealing with the emergence of a middle
class, and everything that political science suggests about the difficulties that this poses for authoritarian regimes.
It means finding a way through the middle-income trap. It means restraining corruption that is, if anything, even
worse, meaning more systemic, than commonly recognized. It means coping with the accelerating balancing of
nervous neighbors. It means coping with issues of ethnic and regional tensions and stark inequality. It means drastic
and mostly unfavorable changes in demography. And it means doing all of these things, and facing any number of
other serious challenges that space doesnt allow one to detail here, without the benefit of a coherent or appealing
ideology other than nationalism and, tentatively, budding personality cult-style leadership. W e

dont know
how this is going to turn out. For every success one can point to involving China, it
is easy to point to at least one stark and serious problem, or potential failing . I dont
share Shambaughs confidence in predicting the demise of the party, but it does not strike this reader as a reckless
prediction. It should not surprise us, and neither should its opposite, Chinas continued relative success. Such is the

the CCP
regime is in crisis. But it has muddled through one crisis after another, including the catastrophes of the
degree of uncertainty we must all live with. Suisheng Zhao, Professor, University of Denver: Yes,

chaotic, decade-long Cultural Revolution and the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown, by tackling its symptoms. It is too

This current crisis comes after more

than three decades of market-oriented economic reform under one-party rule, which
has produced a corruptive brand of state capitalism in which power and money ally.
difficult to predict the arrival of the cracking up moment now.

The government officials and senior managers in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have formed strong and exclusive

China ranks among the countries of the highest

income inequality in the world at a time when China has dismantled its social
welfare state, leaving hundreds of millions of citizens without any or adequate
provision of healthcare, unemployment insurance, and a variety of other social
services. Meanwhile, China has become one of the worlds most polluted countries. The crisis has worsened as
Chinas economic growth is slowing. As the worsening economic, social, and environmental
problems cause deep discontent across society and lead many people to take to the
streets in protest, China has entered a period of deepening social tensions. Apparently,
interest groups to pursue economic gains.

Beijing is frightened and has relied more and more on coercive forces. The cracking up moment could come when
economic growth has significantly slowed, and Beijing is unable to sustain the regimes legitimacy with its economic

Jinping is likely
aware of the danger of possible collapse and has been trying to prevent it from
happening. Opposite from the prescription by liberal scholars and Western leaders, Xi has seen that the key to
performance. While scholars such as Shambaugh are warning of this cracking up, President Xi

keeping the CCP in power is to further empower the authoritarian state led by the Communist Party, reflecting the
long struggle of the Chinese political elites in building and maintaining a powerful state to lead Chinas

that China suffered a crisis of

authority a deep craving for the decisive power of effective authority ever since
the 19th-century collapse of the Chinese empire. Chinese elite attributed Chinas modern decline
modernization. China scholar Lucian Pye famously observed

partially to the weakening of the state authority. The authority crisis called for the creation of an authoritarian state
through revolution and nationalism.The authority crisis called for the creation of an authoritarian state through
revolution and nationalism. The Chinese communist revolution was a collective assertion for the new form of
authority and a strong state to build a prosperous Chinese nation. The very essence of CCP legitimacy was partly
based upon its ability to establish a powerful state as an organizing and mobilizing force to defend the national

To rectify his predecessors overemphasis on

the transformation of China through reforms that weakened the states authority
and the CCP central leadership, Xi has made concentrated efforts to over-empower
the authoritarian state. Repeatedly warning against Westernization, Xi emphasizes a unified national
independence and launch modernization programs.

ideal of the China Dream and has allowed the security/propaganda axis to tighten up controls on expression of
different political ideologies and opinions. Taking strong measures to strengthen central Party and government
authority, he set up new and powerful small leadership groups, such as the Central National Security Commission
and the Comprehensive Deepening Economic Reform Small Group, with himself as the head. Looking to Mao for
inspiration to manage the country, he launched the largest rectification and mass line campaigns in decades to

fight corruption. Describing Mao as a great figure who changed the face of the nation and led the Chinese people
to a new destiny, Xi has emerged as a champion of the party-state power, with himself at the top as a strongman.

CCP is divided heavily now Banned Books prove

Zheping Huang et. al 1/17, Zheping Huang is a reporter covering China for Quartz. He graduated from the University of Hong
Kong with a master's degree in journalism, Heather Timmons is the Asia Correspondent for Quartz, based in Hong Kong, where she writes about everything
from ramen to derivatives to censorship. Previously she spent 10 years with The New York Times in London and New Delhi, where she covered finance and
markets and the Indian economy. She co-founded and ran India Ink, the NYT's first-ever country specific news journal, which provides in-depth news and
analysis of the worlds largest democracy and of Indias global diaspora. Before the Times, Heather was the banking editor at BusinessWeek in New York,
where she covered the perils of the big bank business model and the danger of banks expansion into risky lending, corruption on Wall Street, and a post9/11 city. Echo Huang Yinyin is a writer for Quarts News. A crackdown on Hong Kong booksellers reflects the deep divides in Chinas Communist Party,
1/17/16, Quarts News, http://qz.com/588511/a-crackdown-on-hong-kong-booksellers-reflects-the-deep-divides-in-chinas-communist-party/

Because of his dictatorial style, Chinas president Xi Jinping has lost all of his allies
within the Communist Party. As public anger grows over the countrys economic slowdown, its an
opportune time for Xis political opponents to take him downand former presidents Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao are
ready to do so. So claims 2016: Collapse of the Communist Party of China, a book written in Chinese under the
pseudonym Dongfang Liang, or Bright East. It was the best-selling political title at Causeway Bay Bookstore,
before the store closed down last month after five employees, including owner Gui Minhai, went missing. Gui
mysteriously resurfaced this weekend, to make a tearful public confession to an 12-year-old crimea confession

disappearance of Gui and his

colleagues, who many believe were abducted by mainland Chinese officials, has
sparked international concern about the future of freedom of speech in Hong Kong, and
about Beijings willingness to violate the law signed when the city was handed over from Britain to
China. These are certainly valid concerns. But the crackdown on publishers in Hong Kong is
also a sign that the Chinese Communist Party continues to be deeply
divided, academics and publishers in Hong Kong believe, and signals the latest brutal
attempt by Xi to silence dissenters within. Thats because Hong Kongs banned books
widely believed to have been coerced by Chinese authorities. The

market serves as a place for the 85 million member strong party, one of the worlds largest and most powerful, to

Xi has eliminated some of his most powerful rivals since

taking power in 2013, but warring factions inside the party remain, and
Hong Kong is serving as their battle ground. In recent years, the Hong Kong book market
air its dirty laundry.

has become an extension of the infighting within the party, Ching Cheong, a former vice-editorial manager with
the Communist Partys official newspaper, Wen Wei Po, told Quartz. Since Hu Jintao became president in 2002,
different factions within the party have begun using Hong Kong publishers to disseminate information and earn
political favors, or smear their opponents, Ching said. Since Xi took office in 2013, the trend has only increased, to
the point where half of the books published in Hong Kong seem to be criticizing Xi, while the other half praise him,

The recent crackdown on Hong Kong booksellers show the ruling

party elite will no longer tolerate the political instability these books stir
up, Ching said.
Ching said.

Factions
Factions in the chinese government have emerged within the
CCP that could challenge the legitimacy of the regime.
Kyle Hutzler 15, member of yale 2017 schwartzman scholars and writer for the
world post, 4-9-2015, "," Huffington Post, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/kylehutzler/a-divided-china_b_7013154.html
Factions as understood today are based on a complex mix of individuals, shared
backgrounds, and institutional support bases. They have placed the princeling and
Shanghai factions (personified by Xi Jinping and Jiang Zemin) and Youth League
(epitomized by former president Hu Jintao and current premier Li Keqiang) factions
at the forefront. But as Miller writes, potential membership in these groups is often overlapping or
contradictory and yields little insight into what a faction will do. Then there are the lesser factions, or
gangs as they are often referred to in the Chinese media. The secretaries gang,
petroleum gang, and Shanxi gang have all been targets of Xi Jinpings anticorruption campaign. Miller asserts that there are three primary types of factions:
ideological factions whose adherents modeled themselves as statements working
for the good of China; power-seeking factions of patron-client ties; and bureaucratic
factions which supported policy that best support the interests of their
bureaucracies. These definitions offer a better framework for understanding the actors at play and the
outcomes they support. But even this framework has its limits. An alternative perspective would argue that last
two of three factions that Miller articulates are not factions at all, but interest groups. The
distinction is more than merely definitional. The Communist Party claims and by all measures
has earned broad-based legitimacy as Chinas leaders. Unlike governments that have
earned that legitimacy through the ballot box, China has earned its legitimacy through its performance in delivering
sustained improvements in the quality of life of the Chinese people and Chinas international standing .

A faction
worthy of the name, then, must compete on the basis of a claim to that legitimacy. A
mere interest group or gang is far narrower, adopting ideological or policy positions as no more
than a screen for advancing the interests of the members and minimizing the
accretion of power by other groups. Unchecked, interest groups can become cancers
on any political system and, in China, have succeeded in blocking needed reforms
that threatened their monopoly on rent-seeking. These are the very groups that are in the targets
of Xi Jinpings anti-corruption campaign. His aim is not just to mitigate the legitimacy risks caused by corruption or
concentrate his personal power, but to make real reform possible. How best, then, to define and identify what

Were China to move

towards some form of more transparent intra-party competition, on what basis
would Party members organize themselves? These factions would need to have some claim to
genuine factions exist within China? There is potentially a simple, yet revealing test:

representational legitimacy beyond their own self-interest. Moreover, they would need to have meaningful
ideological or identity differences related to the different constituencies they would claim represent. By this test,

The only real

schism that could meaningfully pass this test would be one between interests
representing urban and rural China . Addressing this divide was a constant rhetorical focus of Xi
most of the current groupings that pass as factions in most analyses would disintegrate.

Jinpings predecessor, Hu Jintao, and his premier, Wen Jiabao. Progress beyond efforts at land reform however
were limited. In the meantime, inequality has soared

Link Work

Laundry List
Laundry list of issues prevent US-Sino cooperation and cause
mistrust personal opinions and actions of Jingping puts him
at odds with the US and his own government
Wei Pu 15, a U.S.-based economist and a regular contributor to RFA's Cantonese
Service, Strategic Mistrust Deepens Between China And The US, Radio Free Asia,
09/23/15, http://www.rfa.org/english/commentaries/mistrust-09232015110426.html
Relations between China and the United States took a turn for the worse this year.
In a climate of mutual suspicion and doubt, the two countries are now in danger of
entering a phase of mutual strategic suspicion, a state of affairs that looks unlikely to be eased by
... President Xi Jinping's visit to the United States. And there are signs that the major issues in the
China-U.S. relationship will ensure that the mutual mistrust continues. These
issues include Chinese cyberattacks on U.S. targets, China's islandbuilding in the South China Sea, and Chinese technological requirements
for U.S. companies doing business there, as well as China's human rights
record and so on. As far as the cyberattacks are concerned, President Obama, who has
usually taken a softer approach to China, has issued stern warnings that Chinese cyberattacks
are unacceptable, and has demanded that China cease all cyber espionage activities, or the U.S. will take
action. For its part, China has repeatedly denied any involvement in cyberattack s. A former
Singapore foreign ministry official told me that China will continue its cyberattacks on U.S.
targets, because Xi Jinping has no reason at all to stop. On the matter of the islandbuilding in the South China Sea, the U.S. has repeatedly and solemnly called on China to
stop its construction activities, but China maintains that it has sovereignty over 80
percent of the waters of the South China Sea. China's construction of islands ... isn't just contributing to
regional tensions by making its neighbors nervous; it constitutes a direct threat to any U.S. naval presence in the

attitude But Xi Jinping has made no concessions in the face of

U.S. demands, and it doesn't look as if he will in future, either. Xi Jinping has also taken
a hard-line attitude to the question of U.S. companies doing business in China.
South China Sea. Hard-line

According to a report from Chris Buckley of The New York Times, internal problems and external interference don't
preclude a successful Xi visit to the U.S., adding that when U.S. officials expressed their unhappiness over new
national security legislation at a closed-doors meeting between Xi Jinping and U.S. business leaders in Beijing last

the Chinese government

will require U.S. companies entering the China market to hand over large amounts
of data and intellectual property rights . Human rights is an issue that Xi Jinping won't be able to
week, Xi stuck to his guns, saying that these laws were totally necessary. So,

skirt around on his trip to America. Guo Yushan may have been recently released, but there has been no sign of any
let-up from Xi in the cases of [jailed Nobel peace laureate] Liu Xiaobo, [veteran journalist] Gao Yu or [human rights

seems to be no end in sight to the

large-scale persecution of lawyers. Saber-rattling The recent military parade held by the Chinese
lawyer] Pu Zhiqiang, who has yet to be sentenced. And there

government will further intensify the strategic mistrust between the two sides. Not only was the parade a way for
China to flex its military muscle, it also rattled more sabers by sending a number of its warships close to Alaska,
where Obama was visiting at the time, to discuss global warming, completing the sense of military threat and

It is likely that the deepening of mistrust

between the U.S. and China has much to do with Xi Jinping's personal
style. Xi seems far more interested in friction, competition, and
confrontation than he does in compromise, consultation, or cooperation.
ruffling the feathers of the U.S. military.

But putting such a personality in charge of Sino-U.S. relations seems a bit of a gamble, as indeed this U.S. visit is a
gamble.

It looks as if Xi has no plans to reach a state of mutual understanding and

trust with the U.S. on issues of any strategic importance. That's why the culmination of his trip
is the United Nations.

South China Seas

South china seas arbitration causes domestic backlash which
collapses CCP legitimacy perception of a weakening
government promps rebellion
Nicholas WU 5/6, Student of international relations at princeton university and
congressional legislative intern with a BA in East Asian Studies, Fighting History:
Domestic Politics in the South China Sea, 5/06/2016, The Huffington Post,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/china-hands/fighting-historydomestic_b_9856776.html
In the eyes of many Chinese citizens, the issues at hand in the South China Sea are
critical. According to Bonnie Wang, a Chinese national currently living in North Carolina, the advocacy of
national sovereignty is very important to an ordinary Chinese citizen. According to
Professor Jessica Weiss, Associate Professor of Government at Cornell University, Perceptions of foreign
humiliation and encroachment on Chinese sovereignty and interests are easily
reawakened by new slights and perceived insults. In the absence of tough words
and actions, many among the Chinese public particularly netizenswill accuse
the Chinese government of being too soft in standing up for Chinese interests.
Indeed, after the first FONOP, netizens posted on sites like Weibo that China needed to resolutely defend itself
against foreign incursions to prove that the nations defenses were not merely paper tigers.

Furthermore, there is a precedent for large-scale grassroots

demonstrations in China in response to perceptions of Chinese foreign
policy weakness, as with the anti-American protests after the accidental bombing
of the Sarajevo Chinese Embassy in 1999 or the large-scale anti-Japanese protests
in 2012 after the Japanese government purchased the Diaoyu/Senakau Islands from
private owners. The threat of domestic backlash can have large consequences for the Chinese governments
foreign policy-making and diplomacy. As the government of the PRC moves away from its
traditional ideology-based legitimacy and as the governments economic
performance-based legitimacy flags amidst economic difficulty, nationalism
becomes an increasingly important tool. Perhaps surprisingly, no major protests have occurred yet
over the South China Sea, be they government-organized or grassroots protests. Professor Weiss explains, The
Chinese government has held the upper hand so far in its territorial disputes with Vietnam and the Philippines, so
Beijing has not needed protests to convey its resolve. But the situation could change with further US involvement

China is attempting to expand its physical

presence in the region without provoking severe regional backlash. The illiberal nature of
and the international ruling on the nine-dashed line.

an authoritarian system allows it to frame, organize, or suppress domestic protests in a way conducive to diplomacy
as a form of providing credible signals in negotiations. The governments position could be contingent upon the cost
of suppressing protest.

If the cost of suppressing protest would be too high, as in the case of the

2012 anti-Japanese protests, then the government will permit them. But in cases regarding smaller
countries like Vietnam that lack historical animus with China, the cost of suppressing protest is significantly lower.
Yet, the United Statess involvement threatens to change that dynamic, as belligerent action from the US might

As the government of the PRC

moves away from its traditional ideology-based legitimacy and as the
governments economic performance-based legitimacy flags amidst
economic difficulty, nationalism becomes an increasingly important tool.
Nationalist causes can provide a rally around the flag effect that
increase support for the government. Alternatively, if the government is seen
make it more difficult for China to mitigate domestic backlash.

as too weak on issues related to nationalism, it could endanger the legitimacy of the
CCP. According to Dalton Lin, a research fellow at Princeton University, Chinese nationalism can be built upon two
ideological tenets: one is anti-imperialism; the other is the drive to move China away from colonialism. With the
decline of the former colonial powers, however, what used to be anti-colonialism has become blurred with antiimperialism. Taiwan and the United States are very much linked to the anti-imperialism issue because of historical
animosity, but smaller countries like Vietnam and other claimants in the South China Sea are not as much of a part
of Chinas anti-imperialist narrative. Nationalist fervor in China is much stronger than most outside observers

a perceived weak
foreign policy remains a central political concern. American planners need to be wary of Chinas
realize. As evidenced by conversations with Chinese citizen s and the posts of the netizens,

domestic political conditions and of Chinas effort to avoid another century of humiliation regarding foreign
incursions on its territory. No major protests have yet occurred against the United States, but the possibility
remains. If

China does see protests, the cost of suppressing them will only rise for the
Communist Party because of the way that the United States could be tied into the
historical anti-colonialist narrative. In other words, more aggressive Freedom of Navigation actions
could provoke a huge anti-colonialist backlash in China because of the perceived slight against Chinese territorial
integrity. This could even lead to the Communist Party being forced to adopt a more aggressive foreign policy
stance in order to placate domestic opposition. American planners neglect this domestic element of the crisis at
their peril.

Beijing is divided and uncertain about current South China

Seas Military Posture 3 competing ideologies
Feng Zhang 6/23, Feng Zhang is a Fellow in the Department of International
Relations at the Australian National Universitys Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific
Affairs and an adjunct professor at the National Institute of South China Sea studies
in China. He is the author of Chinese Hegemony: Grand Strategy and International
Institutions in East Asian History., 6-23-2016, "The Fight Inside China Over the South
China Sea," Foreign Policy, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/06/23/the-fight-insidechina-over-the-south-china-sea-beijing-divided-three-camps/
With a decision from an international ad hoc tribunal tasked with reviewing Chinas
maritime claims in the South China Sea looming, regional tensions are running high. A
key problem is that no nation involved in the current round of tension not even China itself has a crystal-clear

three different
schools of thought are each struggling for dominance in Chinese analytical and
policy-making circles. A look at the debate within China helps explain the lack of effective communication
view of what exactly Beijing is trying to achieve in the South China Sea. Thats because

and the rise of strategic distrust between China, Southeast Asian nations with competing claims, and the United

Chinas leaders from President Xi Jinping to Foreign Minister Wang Yi to military

leaders like Admiral Sun Jianguo repeat the well-worn lines that the South China Sea islands
have always been Chinese territory, Chinas actions are legitimate measures to safeguard
its own sovereignty, China will not pursue expansive policies beyond legitimate territorial claims, and limited
military installations on newly built islands are for defensive purposes. Some countries in ASEAN (the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations), however, find these explanations unconvincing, feel threatened by
States.

Chinas island-building, and therefore want the United States to check Chinese power. Some U.S. officials have
claimed that China is seeking militarization in the region, or even hegemony. But in reality, its not at all clear

there are
three schools of thought among Chinese analysts about optimal policies
toward the region: lets call them realists, hardliners, and moderates.
that China itself really knows what it wants to achieve in the South China Sea. Broadly speaking,

Chinese academic publications, media reports, and online opinions offer a glimpse into these different views. Since
last year, I have also talked to a large number of Chinese scholars, government officials, and ordinary citizens.
These three camps are representative

of the diversity of Chinese views , although they are certainly

not exhaustive of all the different views. Because of the intensity of current tensions, Chinese analysts are under
pressure to reflect vague government talking points, and sharp criticisms are rarely aired. This may explain why the
outside world has commonly missed those debates. But in fact, Chinas domestic debates about the South China

realists
believe that the fundamentals of Chinas current South China Sea policy
are sound, with no adjustment needed.Chinas realists believe that the fundamentals of
Chinas current South China Sea policy are sound, with no adjustment needed. They recognize the
diplomatic and reputational costs incurred, but tend to slight them
because they value Chinas physical presence and material capability
much more highly than its image abroad. Their belief is underpinned by a crude realist
Sea are of major importance for understanding the future directions of Chinese policy. Chinas

understanding of international politics: material power and not ephemeral (and in any case un-measurable)
factors such as reputation, image, or international law is the decisive factor in international politics. They thus
think time is on Chinas side, as long as China can manage its rise. This kind of realpolitik thinking now dominates

Realists think they are safeguarding Chinas

national interests by enhancing its material presence in the South China
Sea. But they are uncertain about what to do with the newly constructed
islands. Should Beijing push for a new round of military installations including
placing offensive weapons systems, or are defensive equipments really sufficient for
the status quo? Realists want power in the South China Sea, yet are unsure how much power is enough. A
second school of thought the hardliners provides alarming answers to the
questions realists havent yet answered. Not only do they think China should
present the seven new islands constructed out of existing features,
including Fiery Cross Reef, Subi Reef, and Mischief Reef as faits accompli to the outside world, but China
should further expand its territorial and military reach in the South China
Sea. Such expansion could include: building the islands into mini-bases,
conquering some if not all of the features currently under other countries
control, or turning the Nine-Dash Line map, first published in 1947 and which now serves as
Beijings legal basis for its claims in the South China Sea, into a territorial demarcation line, thus
claiming most of the South China Seas territorial waters for China.
Hardliners have no regard for the concerns and anxieties of the outside world; they
wish only to maximize Chinas self-interest. It is clear that some international media reports about
Chinas South China Sea decision-making.

China claiming 90 percent of the South China Sea are actually describing this, and only this, school of thought

The good news is that this view does not yet dominate high-level decisionmaking. Hardliners within government are usually found in the military and law
enforcement agencies. A maximalist policy toward the South China Sea would certainly serve their
parochial bureaucratic interests. But hardliners also reside in the Chinese general public, the
vast majority of which only has a superficial and impressionistic view of the South
China Sea situation. Grassroots hardliner calls for assertiveness are based on emotional nationalism, not a
studied consideration of Chinas interests. The difference between the hardliners and the realists
is that, while the hardliners views are also based on realpolitik, there is an
additional underpinning of hyper-nationalism, making accommodation with other
countries especially difficult. Although the hardliners are not dominating current policy, the leadership
inside China.

cannot easily ignore or dismiss them for fear of stoking popular nationalism, a grassroots force which can easily

The third group, the moderates, believe its time for China to
adjust its policy to clarify, if only gradually, its goals in the South China Sea. Moderates
recognize that Beijings current ambiguity about its territorial claims and strategic
design is feeding the outside worlds fear and distrust . They fault the
government for failing to provide a compelling strategic narrative and
promote effective communication with the outside world. Chinas habitual
spin out of control.

just-do-it approach when it comes to major strategic decisions such as island

building is actually harmful to its own self-interest. By forgoing any attempt to
legitimize island-building, it ensures international suspicion of rather than sympathy
for Chinas actions. Moderates argue that China needs to gradually clarify
the Nine-Dash Line. Maintaining deliberate ambiguity would simply make
the map a historical burden and an unnecessary obstacle to reaching
diplomatic compromise. In their view, it is counterproductive to interpret the map as
a territorial demarcation line, because doing so would make China an adversary of
most Southeast Asian states as well as the United States. Were China to go down this path,
they argue, it would eventually face the ominous danger of strategic over-stretch. The biggest problem for China,
the moderates observe, is that it lacks a clear and effective strategy for the South China Sea.

China Rise
A more aggressive china rise only provokes internal discussion
and opposition and puts the US and china on an inevitable
course to war.
Zhiqun Zhu 15, Zhiqun Zhu is Director of the China Institute and an Associate
Professor of Political Science and International Relations at Bucknell University. He is
the author and editor of 7 books including Chinas New Diplomacy: Rationale,
Strategies and Significance (Ashgate, 2013); and U.S.-China Relations in the 21st
Century: Power Transition and Peace (Routledge, 2006). He was a visiting senior
research fellow at East Asian Institute of National University of Singapore, and a
POSCO fellow at the East-West Center in Hawaii. In the early 1990s, he was Chief
Assistant to the Public Affairs Officer at the U.S. Consulate General in Shanghai.
Dispel Distrust: Start from North Korea, International Affairs Reviewi VOLUME
XXIII, NUMBER 3, Summer 2015,
The way China goes about pursuing a greater role in international affairs
can also either exacerbate or alleviate the United States distrust of China.
Inside China, some scholars have argued that the government should abandon Deng
Xiaopings dictum of keeping a low profile in foreign affairs .11 Their rationale is that
China is powerful enough now to demand a greater degree of symmetry in its relations
with the United States. Military and nationalist scholars are especially strong in making
these calls. 12 Rising nationalism at home drives Chinas high-handed behaviors
externally, and China tends to blame others for creating tensions in bilateral relations without sufficiently
reflecting upon its own conduct. As an emerging global power, China has not always acted
humbly and responsibly. Chinese foreign policy since 2010 has become a hotly-debated topic.
Recently, a surge of scholarly publications has focused on analyzing why
and how Chinas foreign policy became more assertive after 2010, even though
there is no consensus on such assertiveness.13 In 2014, as the world marked the centennial anniversary of World

many analysts penned articles and commentaries asserting that contemporary

China resembled pre-WWI Germany. The implication of these articles was that
the rise of China would destabilize and even lead to war in Asia. Indeed,
War I,

according to the Organskian power transition theory, tensions between a rising power and the dominant power

Defensive realists such as John Mearsheimer also

believe that Chinas rise will automatically challenge the United States,
and that conflict is inevitable.15
almost always ended in war.14

Political Reform
Political reform controversial among different political leaders,
causes fighting
Macabe Keliher and Hsinchao Wu 15, MACABE KELIHER is a doctoral candidate
in History and East Asian Languages at Harvard University. HSINCHAO WU is a
sociologist who recently received her doctorate from Harvard University., 4-7-2015,
"How to Discipline 90 Million People," Atlantic,
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/04/xi-jinping-chinacorruption-political-culture/389787/
Many China-watchers and even some
within the party see the current government as doomed without the latter. The most
progressive calls are for an independent judiciary and making officials more
accountable to the people by, for instance giving individuals the ability to sue the
state or introducing democratic electionstwo scenarios that pose a direct threat to
the authority and legitimacy of the Communist Party . Given the leaderships apparent
determination to maintain the partys dominance, however, it is not surprising that Xi has placed the
burden of reform on the officials themselves rather than the political structure they
inhabit. Some in the party, such as former premier Wen Jiabao, have
expressed support for (albeit minor) political reform, but the current leadership
has made clear that changing Chinas political or legal institutions is out
of the question. This crop of leaders has pursued what they seem to view
as the safer alternative: the imposition of a new set of practices and
standards to make people better adhere to existing institutions.
Can cultural reforms substitute for institutional reforms?

Political change is unlikely competing beliefs and hesitance

to reform by some people forcing reform causes conflict
Roger Baker 15, Rodger Baker leads Stratfor's analysis of Asia Pacific and South Asia and guides the company's
forecasting process. A Stratfor analyst since 1997, he has played a pivotal role in developing and refining the company's analytical
process, internal training programs and geopolitical framework. Mr. Baker develops custom reports for clients and frequently delivers
executive briefings to investors, businesses and universities across the globe, from the National Defense University in Beijing to
financial institutions in New York. He is regularly invited to participate in dialogues and panel discussions in China, Japan, Thailand,
Mongolia and South Korea. Mr. Baker often appears as an expert in major media including The Economist, The New York Times,
CNBC, CBS's The Early Show, The Chosun Ilbo, China Daily, Reuters, The Associated Press, Investors Business Daily and The Globe
and Mail. Stratfor was one of the first organizations to identify the growing problems with the Chinese economy, with Mr. Baker
spearheading the company's assessment. Before joining Stratfor, Mr. Baker studied and worked in South Korea and graduated with
honors from Southampton College, Long Island University. He also has a master's degree in military history from Norwich University,
the oldest private military university in the United States., A Delicate Balance in Beijing, Stratfor Enterprises, 11/7/15,
https://www.stratfor.com/weekly/delicate-balance-beijing

The consolidation of power under President and Party General Secretary Xi Jinping is in part a
move to overcome the legacy of institutional inertia left by the consensus-based politics that Deng
Xiaoping established to mitigate the vagaries of a Mao Zedong-type leadership. Consensus eliminated the
ability of even the paramount leader, Deng, to take a route that led China too far off
the rails. Consensus rule worked well in times of economic growth and prosperity,
but it has not worked so well when tough decisions need to be made and rapid
actions need to be taken. The overall tendency of the consensus-based leadership was to
avoid social instability to ease off on any reforms or initiatives that were
triggering a social backlash. The "one step forward, two steps back" sort of economic reform

China's leaders have long known of the

need to significantly change the country's internal economic structures
but have been reticent to do so, kicking the can of reform down the road
or producing minimally effective reforms that pleased no one and created
unforeseen socio-economic consequences. Although some leaders' personal
economic self-interests played some role in this, so did a concern that reforms
would lead to unemployment and social dislocation something best avoided. The idea of a
of the late 1990s and early 2000s was a case in point.

centralized leadership is that the tough decisions can not only be made but also enforced. Xi's widespread anticorruption campaign is part of this equation, because it breaks apart the networks of relationships within the Party
that officials counted on for security and promotion. This is supposed to reverse local governments' resistance to
central government mandates, with Beijing effectively accepting greater social dislocation in the short term and
confident it can largely manage any instability. Internal media controls and the promotion of a stronger sense of
nationalism are both tools of management, but they serve less to quell social instability than to keep it constrained.
Beijing's concern is not social unrest itself; that is a common phenomenon, and in a country where there is no other
legal outlet to express frustration or disagreement, a certain number of protests can serve as a relief valve. The
bigger concern is social instability that crosses regional and socio-economic barriers. Hundreds of disconnected
protests can each be dealt with as local incidents, and although a few may strain local security forces, they are for
the most part manageable. But protest movements with a central coordination, spreading across regions and
preaching about goals that do not support the sacredness of the Party, become a more acute threat to the Party.

Government officials are resistant to change and reform

internal anti-corruption campaign proves
Roger Baker 15, Rodger Baker leads Stratfor's analysis of Asia Pacific and South Asia and guides the company's
forecasting process. A Stratfor analyst since 1997, he has played a pivotal role in developing and refining the company's analytical
process, internal training programs and geopolitical framework. Mr. Baker develops custom reports for clients and frequently delivers
executive briefings to investors, businesses and universities across the globe, from the National Defense University in Beijing to
financial institutions in New York. He is regularly invited to participate in dialogues and panel discussions in China, Japan, Thailand,
Mongolia and South Korea. Mr. Baker often appears as an expert in major media including The Economist, The New York Times,
CNBC, CBS's The Early Show, The Chosun Ilbo, China Daily, Reuters, The Associated Press, Investors Business Daily and The Globe
and Mail. Stratfor was one of the first organizations to identify the growing problems with the Chinese economy, with Mr. Baker
spearheading the company's assessment. Before joining Stratfor, Mr. Baker studied and worked in South Korea and graduated with
honors from Southampton College, Long Island University. He also has a master's degree in military history from Norwich University,
the oldest private military university in the United States., A Delicate Balance in Beijing, Stratfor Enterprises, 11/7/15,
https://www.stratfor.com/weekly/delicate-balance-beijing

the central government is much less

is much more interested in ensuring that all
protests remain local. This difference in views is adding to the existing friction
between the central and local governments overall. One of the problems with the center's
anti-corruption campaign is that, at a certain point, it becomes counterproductive. The anticorruption campaign was supposed to compel local officials to obey central dictates or face
removal. Central policies have been ignored or countered too many times for Beijing's
liking. For example, at one point attempts to consolidate the steel industry by shutting all factories producing
below a certain threshold led to an increase in steel production rather than the closure of factories. But there are
reports that now the anti-corruption drive is having the opposite effect. Rather than
openly defying Beijing to protect local industry and avoid localized unemployment,
officials are delaying the implementation of projects to keep Beijing from noticing
that their local area is perhaps growing too fast, and thus these officials are being
targeted in the anti-corruption campaigns. The coordination between the center and the periphery
continues to fray. But perhaps more troubling for Beijing is that the longer and deeper the anticorruption campaign goes, the more likely that fear and uncertainty
among Party cadre will lead to the re-formation of true factions to protect
common interests. The rumors and leaks surrounding the case of Bo Xilai and Zhou
Yongkang, including purported plans to usurp power from Xi, highlight the extent of the
Although local governments are concerned about local protests,
worried about the scope or even scale of instability; it

risk. A cult of personality around Xi, and the consolidation of decision-making, could give Beijing space for more
rapid responses and a higher tolerance for risk, but it also leaves Xi vulnerable to accusations that
he is the only one to blame for failure, or at least as a scapegoat for those whose
interests are being usurped by Xi's initiatives.

Proliferation
Debates over nuclear policy causes infighting in the
government
Nicola Horsburgh 15, British Academy Postdoctoral Fellow, University of Oxford Nicola
Horsburgh is a British Academy Postdoctoral Fellow based at the Oxford Institute for Ethics, Law and
Armed Conflict in the Department of Politics and International Relations at Oxford University. She is
also affiliated to the Asian Studies Centre at St. Antony's College. Her BA project 'China and Nuclear
Responsibility in the Global Nuclear Order' explores what it means to be a responsible nuclear armed
state, with a special emphasis on China. Nicola holds a DPhil in International Relations and an MPhil in
Modern Chinese Studies (Oxon), an MSc in International Relations (LSE), and a BScEcon (Hons) in
International Politics and Strategic Studies (Aberystwyth). China and Global Nuclear

Order: From Estrangement to Active Engagement, Book, 2015

the nuclear order debate faces three challenges. First, the
idea remains inadequately defined, rendering the term vague and open to contradictory definitions.
More generally, beyond Walker,

Most analysis is descriptive and centered on the NPT. Realist analysis is particularly limiting since it is focused on
the major powers and a critique of the NPT, excluding from analysis not just norms and institutions but also the
concerns and influence of non-nuclear states as well as the role of justice, legitimacy, and morality within nuclear

In addition, nuclear order is poorly grounded in history, confining itself to US,

Soviet/Russian, and occasionally Western European narratives of global nuclear history. Wider theoretical
discussions are also absent from the debate, such as those related to order, regimes, and
order.

institutions in international relations. For instance, the emerging literature on international regime complexity
theory is helpful in determining how systems and sub-orders within nuclear order might undercut or underpin one
another.54

In addition, with the exception of a few Indian and Chinese scholars,

academic interest does not extend beyond the Western sphere. Second, studies of
nuclear behaviour have centered almost exclusively on explaining proliferation and
non-proliferation, leading to a one-sided analy- sis of nuclear behaviour and an
obsession with the NPT. Third, the debate suffers from infighting between what
Ruhle labels, rather confusingly, liberal arms controllers (in which he includes
Walker) and strategic analysts. This infighting has been compounded by fears that
the actual nuclear order is in decline, a subject touched upon here but discussed in greater detail in
Chapter 5. These two tendenciesintellectual infighting and an overfixation on the end of
nuclear orderhave stifled the debate by oversimplifying the concept, as well as
injecting an alarmist approach to analysis. With these challenges in mind, and contra Brad Roberts,
this book argues that a useful starting point in defining nuclear order is to begin with a study of its main
characteristics: namely the purpose, history, and structure of nuclear order.

Counter-Terror
US and china at odds over new counter-terrorism laws on their
restrictions of freedom of speech and liberty
Ben Blanchard 15, writer for Reuters News with primary areas of coverage are
China's relations with Southeast Asia and Taiwan, the development of China's
military, and ethnic minority issues in China. China passes controversial counterterrorism law, 12/28/15, Reuters News, accessed 7/4/16,
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-security-idUSKBN0UA07220151228
China passed a controversial new anti-terrorism law on Sunday that requires
technology firms to help decrypt information, but not install security "backdoors" as
initially planned, and allows the military to venture overseas on counter-terror
operations. Chinese officials say their country faces a growing threat from militants and separatists, especially
in its unruly Western region of Xinjiang, where hundreds have died in violence in the past few years. The law
has attracted deep concern in Western capitals, not only because of
worries it could violate human rights such as freedom of speech, but
because of the cyber provisions. U.S. President Barack Obama has said
that he had raised concerns about the law directly with Chinese President
Xi Jinping. While a provision in an initial draft that would require companies to keep servers and user data
within China was removed from the final law, technology companies will still have to provide help
with sensitive encryption information if law enforcement authorities demand it.
Speaking after China's largely rubber-stamp parliament passed the law, Li Shouwei, deputy head of the
parliament's criminal law division under the legislative affairs committee, said China was simply doing
what other Western nations already do in asking technology firms to help fight terror. " This rule accords
with the actual work need of fighting terrorism and is basically the same as what
other major countries in the world do," Li told reporters. This will not affect the normal operation of
tech companies and they have nothing to fear in terms of having "backdoors" installed or losing intellectual

The installing of security "backdoors" was also initially mooted

by China for the law. Officials in Washington have argued the law, combined
with new draft banking and insurance rules and a slew of anti-trust
investigations, amounts to unfair regulatory pressure targeting foreign
companies. China's national security law adopted in July requires all key network infrastructure and
property rights, he added.

information systems to be "secure and controllable". The anti-terrorism law also permits the People's Liberation
Army to get involved in anti-terrorism operations overseas, though experts have said China faces big practical and
diplomatic problems if it ever wants to do this. An Weixing, head of the Public Security Ministry's counter-terrorism
division, said China faced a serious threat from terrorists, especially "East Turkestan" forces, China's general term
for Islamists separatists it says operate in Xinjiang. " Terrorism

is the public enemy of mankind, and

the Chinese government will oppose all forms of terrorism," An said. Rights groups, though,
doubt the existence of a cohesive militant group in Xinjiang and say the unrest mostly stems from anger among the

The new law also restricts

the right of media to report on details of terror attacks, including a provision that
media and social media cannot report on details of terror activities that might lead
to imitation, nor show scenes that are "cruel and inhuman".
region's Muslim Uighur people over restrictions on their religion and culture.

Cyber
Engagement causes China to continue hacking the U.S.- gives
chinas government leverage and more likely to continue
James Lewis 13, Director and Senior Fellow, Technology and Public Policy Program
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), CYBER ESPIONAGE AND THE
THEFT OF U.S. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TECHNOLOGY, Center for strategic
and international studies Statement before the House Energy and Commerce
Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 7/9/2013, accessed
7/5/16, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fspublic/legacy_files/files/attachments/ts130709_lewis.pdf
There may
be general guidelines issued by Beijing, but hackers from the PLA or other
Ministries seem to have a great deal of freedom in targeting and in responding to requests for
favored companies or research institutions. There are collection targets set by Chinas military
strategy or economic plans, collections to support specific company or military
acquisition projects, and targets of opportunity, where Chinese hackers penetrate a
system, come across IP they think is valuable and then transfer or sell it to a
favored company. Chinese claims that the U.S. also engages in economic espionage are ridiculous, if for no
The tasking of Chinese espionage and the identification of targets appears to be a diffuse process.

other reason that there is little Chinese technology worth stealing. To argue that the U.S. should not object to
espionage by China as we did this to Britain is inane the scale is in no way comparable. The U.S. government did
not steal (and does not steal) commercial technology to give to its companies. In addition, the U.S. was a net
contributor to the global stock of knowledge in the 19th century, with its citizens creating steamboats, the
telegraph, the cotton gin, and countless other inventions that other nations copied freely. The current perpetrators
of economic espionage have made no such contribution.Cyber

espionage provides, if nothing

knowledge of potential targets and training for potential attackers. There is a link
between cyber espionage directed at commercial targets and cyber espionage targeted on
military technology. It is often the same actors pursuing a collection plan that targets both military and
else,

commercial sources the penetration of RSA was commercial espionage undertaken to enable the penetration of
military industrial targets. This report was not tasked with estimating the effect of cyber espionage on U.S. military
superiority but a strong case could be made that there has been extensive damage to the U.S. lead in stealth,
submarine, missile and nuclear capabilities. We cannot accurately assess the dollar value of the loss in military
technology but cyber espionage, including commercial espionage, shifts the terms of engagement in Chinas

The most troubling aspect of this espionage is that State actors in China, such as the
PLA, engage in espionage for reasons of profit. PLA units find commercially valuable
information in their quest for military technology and then sell it to Chinese
companies. State Owned enterprises can request help from PLA units to hack into a
target companys network and then compensate. Many of these activities are outside of Beijings
control, sponsored by politically powerful regional party officials or commanders. This raises the political
cost to President Xi of any effort to clamp down. It will be difficult to change Chinese
behavior because if President Xi asks the PLA to stop hacking, he is essentially asking
them to stop making money through an activity that many Chinese see as
justified. National strategies, politics, and business all combine to make hacking
foreign companies to steal technology an attractive proposition.
favor.

US-Sino mistrust is high now due to inflated cyber threat by US

politicians
Jon R. Lindsay 15, Assistant Professor, University of Toronto Munk School of
Global Affairs, Inflated Cybersecurity Threat Escalates US-China Mistrust, The
Huffington Post, 5/18/15, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jon-r-lindsay/cybersecuritythreat-escalates-us-china-mistrust_b_7302282.html
Policymakers in the United States often portray China as posing a serious
cybersecurity threat. In 2013 U.S. National Security Adviser Tom Donilon stated that Chinese cyber
intrusions not only endanger national security but also threaten U.S. firms with the
loss of competitive advantage. One U.S. member of Congress has asserted that China
has laced the U.S. infrastructure with logic bombs . Chinese critics, meanwhile,
denounce Western allegations of Chinese espionage and decry National
Security Agency (NSA) activities revealed by Edward Snowden. The Peoples Daily
newspaper has described the United States as a thief crying stop thief. Chinese commentators
increasingly call for the exclusion of U.S. internet firms from the Chinese
market, citing concerns about collusion with the NSA, and argue that the
institutions of internet governance give the United States an unfair
advantage. Chinese cyber operators face underappreciated organizational challenges, including information
overload and bureaucratic compartmentalization, which hinder the weaponization of cyberspace or absorption of
stolen intellectual property.

Heg
Strategic mistrust between the US and China now makes the
risk of fighting higher cause the CCP doesnt want to work with
the US
Dingding Chen 3/10, an assistant professor of Government and Public Administration at the University of Macau,
Non-Resident Fellow at the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) Berlin, Germany. He is also the Founding Director of
Intellisia Institute) , a newly established independent think tank focusing on international affairs in China. His research interests
include: Chinese foreign policy, Asian security, Chinese politics, and human rights. Cooperation Is the Only Way Ahead for US-China
Relations, The Diplomat, 3/10/16, http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/cooperation-is-the-only-way-ahead-for-us-china-relations/

Indeed, Nius new essay sheds some light on U.S.-China relations from a Chinese perspective. It is particularly

both countries are increasingly suspicious of each others intentions in

East Asia and beyond. The United States is suspicious of a rising China that tries to
push U.S. influence out of Asia and, in the process, becomes a regional hegemon.
China, on the other hand, suspects that the United States wants to block its rise for
fear of losing its hegemonic status in world politics. Such a deep level of distrust
was already evident as early as 2012, when Chinas Wang Jisi and Kenneth Lieberthal in the United
States co-wrote a report on strategic distrust between the two powers. Unfortunately, tensions between
the two powers have only increased due to disputes in cybersecurity, the South
China Sea issue, and trade competition. Niu, however, believes that the best term to characterize
timely given that

U.S.-China relations is competitive interdependence, meaning that the two countries are competing in Asia, but
also are constrained by their economically interdependent relationship. Furthermore, he points out that the
deterioration of U.S.-China relations in the last few years should not be blamed on the U.S. side alone, as some in
China would suggest. Many favor a U.S. conspiracy theory, but such a view is not only intellectually lazy, but also
unsupported by empirical facts. The U.S. side certainly has its own share of the blame, but perhaps more important
is what has changed within China. That change, according to Niu, is more fundamental to explaining Chinas new

Questions that we should be asking ourselves include: 1) Is

Chinas central foreign policy changing? 2) How does Chinas leadership define the
nature of U.S.-China relations? 3) Is Chinese public opinion moving to the left? All
foreign policy approach.

these questions are very important if our goal is to stabilize and improve U.S.-China relations in the future.
Unfortunately again, we have not seen many good-quality studies addressing these questions in either the Chinese
and English academic literatures.

Strategic mistrust high now both sides feel threatened by the

other to become the regional hegemon
Dingding Chen 3/10, an assistant professor of Government and Public
Administration at the University of Macau, Non-Resident Fellow at the Global Public
Policy Institute (GPPi) Berlin, Germany. He is also the Founding Director of
Intellisia Institute) , a newly established independent think tank focusing on
international affairs in China. His research interests include: Chinese foreign policy,
Asian security, Chinese politics, and human rights. Relax, China Won't Challenge
US Hegemony, The Diplomat, 3/10/16, http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/relax-chinawont-challenge-us-hegemony/
the Sino-U.S. relationship is one of the most important yet complicated
bilateral relationships in the world today. This explains why Chinese Vice Premier Wang
Yangs recent comments on Sino-U.S. relations have stirred up a debate online (here and
here). Wang Yang stated that China [has] neither the ability nor the intent to challenge
the United States. Partly because it is rare for a senior Chinese leader to make such soft remarks with
Needless to say,

Wangs remarks are seemingly inconsistent with

Chinas recent assertive foreign policies, there has been a fierce debate about the true meaning of
Wangs remarks in the United States. Most American analysts, however, are skeptical toward
Wangs conciliatory remarks and continue to believe that Chinas ultimate aim is to
establish a China-centric order in Asia at the expense of the U.S. influence in Asia . In
other words, China seeks to replace the U.S. as the new global hegemon. The reactions from the U.S.
side, again, reveal the deep mistrust with regard to Chinas long term
goals. But such skepticism is misguided and even dangerous to Asias peace
and stability if left uncorrected. Why? Because Wang Yang was sincere
when he said that China does not have the capabilities and desires to
challenge the United States. The evidence of his sincerity is apparent.
regard to Sino-U.S. relations and partly because

QPQS
QPQs cant solve tensions and in many instances only make
them worse too many variables and obstacles to be overcome
by a simple QPQ
Simon Montlake 15, deputy world editor at the Monitor in Boston. He's a former
Monitor correspondent in Jakarta, Bangkok, and Beijing, where he covered political
upheavals, civil wars, economic crises, natural disasters, and the Beijing Olympics.
In addition to the Monitor, he has worked for The Economist and Forbes. Born in
London, he was educated at the University of Manchester, The US and China: Will it
be collision or cooperation?, 9/13/15, Christian Science Monitor,
http://m.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2015/0913/The-US-and-China-Will-it-becollision-or-cooperation
Critics say Rudds [Kevin] engagement strategy finding common ground and solving
non-core problems wont defuse the deeper divisions. Sino-American tensions arent
simply about a lack of goodwill or diplomatic mechanisms, says Ashley Tellis, a senior
associate at Carnegie and coauthor of a report published in April that advocates a hawkish US stance on China.
These

are fundamental clashes of interest. Theres nothing in Kevins report that tells me how to
circumnavigate these clashes. Rudd [Kevin] argues that Xi may be open to a grand strategic bargain with the US
on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Other analysts have proposed that a parallel formula be found for

Bader,
Obamas principal adviser on Asia from 2009 to 2011, is skeptical of
sweeping quid pro quo deals. They dont happen. Every issue is unique and
disaggregated and has its own set of bureaucratic actors involved , he says. Professor
Nathan discounts the likelihood of any great- power accommodation, too, which he likens to the 1815 Congress
of Vienna. I think there will be a long period of friction over these particular issues. I
dont think they can be settled upfront by some kind of compromise. Rudd doesnt linger
Taiwan, whereby the US stops selling weapons in return for a Chinese pledge not to force reunification. Mr.
who was

on the consequences of the US ceding ground to China in Asia. Yet even a gradual rebalancing would mark a major

He says Rudd
trying to say you

shift, says White, author of a 2013 book, The China Choice: Why America Should Share Power.
needs to be frank about what it means to the US to begin to treat China as a peer. Kevin is

can do this and its not going to hurt. But this is going to hurt .

Environment

General
New environmental policy is impossible and debates divide the
party institutional and social obstacles
Lotus Yang Ruan 15, Formally a journalist and news editor based in China, Lotus
Yang Ruan is pursuing her Masters degree in Asia Pacific policy studies at the
University of British Columbia with her main research interest the Greater China
Region, Why China Cant Fix Its Environment, 3/16/15,
http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/why-china-cant-fix-its-environment/ Accessed on:
7/4/16
In early March, a debate over Chinas action (or inaction) on the environment gripped both Chinese and

While air pollution and other environmental degradation have long

been widely acknowledged, it was not until Chai Jing, one of Chinas best known journalists, unveiled
her self-financed 104-minute documentary Under The Dome, which features Chinas catastrophic air
pollution, that the governments position on the environment became a nationwide, policyoriented debate among intellectuals, policymakers, bureaucrats, and the Chinese public. Chai Jing managed to at
international media.

least influence policy by releasing the documentary just before Chinas two sessions the Chinese Peoples
Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), which is the countrys top national advisory body, and the meeting of the
National Peoples Congress (NPC), the top legislative body. She attributed the air pollution to the countrys outdated
energy structure, state-owned companies monopolistic controls over natural resources, and lack of individual effort

However, the heated debate was cut short when Chinese authorities
ordered the film to be removed from Chinese websites . This decision further reinforces the
popular perception that because of economic rents and vested interests, ruling
parties in undemocratic countries like China will block any changes to existing
systems, even though the changes are good for the public. Yet that argument ignores the fact
and oversight.

that the Chinese government has become increasingly active both domestically and internationally on
environmental protection. So why cant it come up with a definitive solution to this widespread social problem?

First, on an individual level, lies the classic free-rider problem. Clean air, a public good, is
often sacrificed in what Garrett Hardin called the tragedy of the commons. Namely,
individuals acting rationally in their own self-interest collectively produce dirty air.
There is a tendency to assume that everyone is eager to tackle environmental pollution, especially air pollution as
severe as that in many parts of China, which after all affects everyone. This is simply not the case. Soon after Chais
video, one commentator wrote on Sina Weibo (Chinas Twitter), Chai Jing and her fellows are standing under the
dome, but millions of average people and children are standing on the ground. They also hate haze, but what they

Only when Chinas economy keeps

developing and flourishing can they gradually raise their qualify of life or even catch
up and compete with Chai Jing and her fellows on a equal front. Like Chais video, that post was widely
shared and received almost 100,000 likes. Then there are the institutional obstacles, arguably the
cant stand more is backwardness, poverty, and employment.

most intractable obstacles to any substantial action on environmental protection in China. In her documentary,

Chai attributes Chinas air pollution to coal consumption and low-quality oil. China
National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), Chinas largest integrated energy company, controls a large
percentage of Chinas untapped oil and gas but refuses to introduce innovative
technologies to extract such resources. Chai implies that China needs a
marketization approach and structural changes to energy consumption.
Many Chinese commentators see this proposal as impractical. For one, China is
cautious when it comes to developing natural resources, which have long been considered key
to national security and social stability. Second, the government has formed a entrenched
coalition with giant state-owned companies such as CNPC, such that it is very
difficult for it to put pressure on them. These commentators predict that the efforts

of Chai and other civil organizations to encourage reform are destined to fail.

It is true
that to protect their economic rents, existing powerful interest groups such CNPC may block marketization of the
industry and the introduction of new but costly green technologies. Yet ultimately it is the Party that matters. And
the Party fears above all the erosion of its political power. Facing mounting public outrage over air pollution, Chinas
central government has in fact introduced a number of legislative measures on the environment. In September
2013, the central government unveiled the Airborne Pollution Action Plan, which aims at limiting coal use and
reducing air pollution in the northern region surrounding Beijing by 25 percent, and by 20 percent in the Yangtze
River Delta. Last year, China announced that it will no longer approve new coal mining projects below 300,000
metric tons; meanwhile, by the end of 2015, it will close more than 2,000 small, unregulated mines. The NPC also
approved major amendments to Chinas Environmental Protection Law, first enacted 25 years ago. Starting from
January 1, 2015, local governments are required to make public data about regional polluters and impose stiffer
penalties for polluting. Most recently, Chinas newly appointed Minister of Environmental Protection Chen Jining
showed his personal support for Chais documentary and vowed at a press conference during the ongoing 12th NPC
that tougher legal enforcement and innovation will be put in place. So the argument that authoritarian countries like
China lack the motivation to introduce laws, adopt innovative technologies, and make the necessary structural

the problem for China appears to lie in the system of

oversight. This issue was described by McCubbins and Schwartz in their 1984 paper, Congressional Oversight
Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms. For China, a country that emphasizes centralized power, topdown police-patrol oversight would seem the natural choice. Under this system, the central
government examines a sample of executive-agency actions, with the aim of
detecting and remedying any violations of legislative goals, and by its surveillance,
discouraging such violations. However, more often than not, the police in this context, Chinas
local governments and supervisory bodies are themselves among the beneficiaries
of environmental exploitation. Perhaps that is why the central government, despite
its tight control on civil society, has decided to introduce fire-alarm oversight. The
adjustments appears too arbitrary. Rather,

Chinese government has made public surveillance possible by setting up hotlines and websites to enable citizens to
report local governments misconduct and corporate polluting. Unfortunately, this doesnt appear to be helping
much, either. Last year, local authorities in Shenzhen, the commercial hub in southern China, refused to publish an
environmental impact assessment report on a local landfill. The landfill reportedly handles nearly 30 percent of
Shenzhens household garbage and has not acquired the legal permission for its second phase, which nonetheless
started operation in 2012. Two years on, and local residents are suffering from the stink the landfill has created.

Jinping vowed
on March 6 that he will punish, with an iron hand, any violators who destroy ecology or
environment, with no exceptions. The rhetoric is certainly impressive, and is very likely genuine,
but the Chinese government first needs to tackle its own entrenched
institutional weakness.
Adding to Minister Chen Jinings promise to tackle environmental pollutions, Chinese President Xi

Policy over pollution and energy reduction causes massive

chinese infighting expanding corporate influence.
Edward Wong, 3-21-2013, "As Pollution Worsens in China, Solutions Succumb to
Infighting," New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/22/world/asia/aschinas-environmental-woes-worsen-infighting-emerges-as-biggest-obstacle.html
Chinas state leadership transition has taken place this month against an ominous backdrop. More than 16,000
dead pigs have been found floating in rivers that provide drinking water to Shanghai. A haze akin to volcanic fumes
cloaked the capital, causing convulsive coughing and obscuring the portrait of Mao Zedong on the gate to the

So severe are Chinas environmental woes, especially the noxious air,

that top government officials have been forced to openly acknowledge them. Fu Ying,
Forbidden City.

the spokeswoman for the National Peoples Congress, said she checked for smog every morning after opening her

prime minister, said

the air pollution had made him quite upset and vowed to show even greater
resolve and make more vigorous efforts to clean it up. What the leaders neglect to say is that
infighting within the government bureaucracy is one of the biggest obstacles to
curtains and kept at home face masks for her daughter and herself. Li Keqiang, the new

enacting stronger environmental policies. Even as some officials push for tighter
restrictions on pollutants, state-owned enterprises especially Chinas oil and power
companies have been putting profits ahead of health in working to outflank new
rules, according to government data and interviews with people involved in policy negotiations. For instance,
even though trucks and buses crisscrossing China are far worse for the environment
than any other vehicles, the oil companies have delayed for years an improvement
in the diesel fuel those vehicles burn. As a result, the sulfur levels of diesel in China are at least 23
times that of the United States. As for power companies, the three biggest ones in the
country are all repeat violators of government restrictions on emissions from coalburning plants; offending power plants are found across the country, from Inner Mongolia
to the southwest metropolis of Chongqing. The state-owned enterprises are given critical roles in policy-making on

The committees that determine fuel standards, for example, are

housed in the buildings of an oil company. Whether the enterprises can be forced to follow, rather
than impede, environmental restrictions will be a critical test of the commitment of Mr. Li
andXi Jinping, the new party chief and president , to curbing the influence of vested interests in
the economy. Last month, after deadly air pollution hit record levels in northern China, officials led byWen
environmental standards.

Jiabao, then the prime minister, put forward strict new fuel standards that the oil companies had blocked for years.

But there are doubts about whether the oil companies will comply, especially since
oil officials resisted a similar government order for higher-grade fuel four years ago.
State-owned power companies have been similarly resistant. The companies regularly ignore
government orders to upgrade coal-burning electricity plants, according to ministry data.
And as with the oil companies, the power companies exert an outsize influence over environmental policy debates.
In 2011, during a round of discussions over stricter emissions standards, the China Electricity Council, which
represents the companies, pushed back hard against the proposals, saying that the costs of upgrading the plants

During the procedure of setting the standard, the companies or the

industry councils have a lot of influence , said Zhou Rong, a campaign manager on energy issues for
would be too high.

Greenpeace East Asia. My personal opinion is even if we have the most stringent standards for every sector, the
companies will violate those. On Feb. 28, Deutsche Bank released an analysts note saying that Chinas current
economic policies would result in an enormous surge in coal consumption and automobile sales over the next
decade. Chinas air pollution will become a lot worse from the already unbearable level, the analysts said, calling
for drastic policy changes and a strong government will to overcome the opposition from interest groups. The
report estimated that the number of passenger cars in China was on track to hit 400 million by 2030, up from 90
million now. For the most part, Chinese automakers have supported upgrading cars with cleaner technology, which
makes them more marketable worldwide, environmental advocates say. But better technology cannot operate
properly without high-quality fuel, and this is where the bottleneck occurs. The system of forging fuel standards has
led to fierce bureaucratic infighting. The Ministry of Environmental Protection is the main government advocate for
both higher fuel standards and better automobile technology. It has the power to force automakers to use new
technology by issuing stricter tailpipe emissions standards, but it cannot unilaterally impose new fuel standards or
enforce compliance from the oil companies. Instead, it can merely lobby other relevant ministries or agencies to
take action. When fuel standards do not keep pace with vehicle technology, the environmental ministry has to delay
issuing new tailpipe emissions standards, and so cars do not get upgraded. Fuel standards are issued by the
Standardization Administration of China, which convenes a committee and a subcommittee to research standards.
They each have 30 to 40 members, almost all of whom are from oil companies, said Yue Xin, a scientist who sits on
one of the groups on behalf of the Ministry of Environmental Protection. The members from the oil companies will
represent more of the companys interests, Mr. Yue said. Sinopec and PetroChina, two of the biggest oil
companies, have insisted that consumers or the government pay to upgrade their refineries to produce cleaner fuel,
and they

have delayed approving higher standards unless there is consensus on who

pays. Sinopec for years has never argued against the need to improve Chinas standards, said David Vance
Wagner, a senior researcher at the International Council on Clean Transportation who used to work under the
Chinese Ministry of Environmental Protection. Theyve just

argued about the finance of it. In late

Fu Chengyu, chairman of Sinopec, acknowledged that the oil companies bore some
responsibility for air pollution, but he also argued that the governments fuel
standards were not high enough, according to Xinhua, the state news agency. What Mr. Fu failed
January,

to explain was that oil company representatives on the committees researching fuel
standards have been the main impediment to pushing through better standards. Mr.
Yue and others say that because of constant haggling by the oil companies, the
government for years delayed issuing upgraded China IV diesel standards that are on par
with European standards. On Feb. 6, after the uproar over record-breaking air pollution, the State Council,
Chinas cabinet, smashed the gridlock by putting out guidelines that called for a nationwide adoption of the new
China IV diesel standards by the end of 2014.

Nuclear Power
Chinese government deeply divided over Nuclear energy policy
Gregory Kulacki 12, A Respected Expert On The People'S Republic Of China,
Focuses On Cross-Cultural Communication Between The United States and China.,
6-4-2012, "Chinese Government Divided on Long-Term Future of Nuclear Power," No
Publication, http://allthingsnuclear.org/gkulacki/chinese-government-divided-onlong-term-future-of
Chinas State Council met to discuss a report on the long-term future of
nuclear energy in China. The meeting ended without an agreement, although tentative
On May 31

recommendations are being circulated for further review and discussion. Before the nuclear accident in Fukushima

planners were bullish on the future of nuclear power. Concerns about

carbon emissions, the need for economic stimulus, deregulation in the energy sector, and a
voracious appetite for electric power combined to push the Chinese government to approve plans for a
Japan, Chinese

rapid expansion of nuclear energy. In 2007, before the global financial crisis, national plans called for an installed
capacity of 40 GWe by 2020. By the end of 2010, when Chinese government stimulus plans reached a peak, that

China currently has only 16 operating

nuclear reactors with a capacity to produce approximately 11 GWe . (By comparison, the
US has 104 operating reactors with a capacity of about 100 GWe.) Immediately following the accident at
Fukushima, Premier Wen Jiabao announced a suspension of Chinas expansion plans,
ordered a comprehensive safety review of all existing plants and those under construction, as well
as a freeze on new construction and applications for new plants. In February of this year, the
Standing Committee of the State Council heard a report on the 9-month long safety review that
looked at human, geological, hydrological and other safety factors at 41 nuclear sites,
number had more than doubled to 100 GWe by 2020.

including operating reactors, plants under construction, three sites about to begin construction, civilian research
reactors, and nuclear fuel production facilities. The report concluded that Chinas currently operating nuclear

There were,
however, problems with the ability of some facilities to cope with floods,
earthquakes and other major natural disasters, as well as irregularities with accident
preparedness procedures and equipment, which plant operators were required to
address. Chinese nuclear industry representatives interviewed after the May 31 meeting said
they were hoping for a 2020 planning target of 80 GWe but were told that was excessive, given the
state of the political leaderships concerns about the safety of nuclear energy at this
time. It also appears possible that no new nuclear plants will be constructed before 2020
in the less developed interior regions of China. One Chinese nuclear energy official
estimated the possibility as close to zero. All new nuclear plant construction will be
facilities fundamentally satisfy IAEA and Chinese domestic standards for safe operation.

confined to the more highly developed coastal areas. If true, this would be a major change in Chinese nuclear
energy policy.

Human Rights
US-china are divided now on human rights policy backlash to
report on chinese human rights abuses proves
ERIC BACULINAO 4/14, writer for NBC news, China on U.S. Criticism on Human
Rights: 'Hold Up a Mirror', NBC News, 4/14/16,
http://www.nbcnews.com/news/china/china-u-s-criticism-human-rights-hold-mirrorn555826
China condemned America's human-rights record on Thursday, alluding to the White
House campaign and suggesting that "money politics and family politics went from
bad to worse." The broadside came amid heightening tensions in the South China
Sea where the U.S. is conducting war games with the Philippines to counter China's maritime claims. China's
document was prepared by a Cabinet office and was released by the state-run Xinhua News Agency. It was a
response to a global human-rights survey issued Wednesday by the State Department
which criticized China and other countries. The U.S. report cited China's "particularly
severe" crackdown on the legal community and "extralegal measures" of enforced
disappearances and house arrest against government critics. "The United States
made comments on the human-rights situation in many countries while
being tight-lipped about its own terrible human-rights record and showing
not a bit of intention to reflect on it," Xinhua said. "Since the U.S. government refused
to hold up a mirror to look at itself, it has to be done with other people's help." China alleged the "wanton
infringement" of civil rights and "rampant gun-related crimes" in the United States,
citing a toll of 13,136 killed and 26,493 injured by gun violence last year. Xinhua said 965 people had shot dead by
U.S. police. "The

frequent occurrence of shooting incidents was the deepest impression

left to the world concerning the United States in 2015," the news agency said. It added that 560,000
people were homeless and said that 33 million Americans didn't have
health insurance. The report has tallied more than 6,000 airstrikes in Syria and Iraq, allegedly causing
"between 1,695 and 2,239" civilian deaths. Xinhua's report attracted attention on China's Twitter-like Weibo social
network. "China and the U.S. quarrel about human rights every year which makes them look like little kids," one
user wrote. "If America has no human rights, why are rich Chinese going there?" another asked.

Cooperation and trust over human rights low chinese

counter-report on US human rights
Wall Street Journal 15, China Issues Report on Terrible U.S. Human Rights
Record, Wall Street Journal, 6/26/16,
http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2015/06/26/china-issues-report-on-terrible-u-shuman-rights-record/
U.S. and Chinese officials may have struck conciliatory tones at high-level talks this
week amid festering mutual mistrust, but their annual bickering over human rights
has resumed unabated. A day after the U.S. State Department issued global
human-rights scorecards that included criticism of China, Beijing offered a
scathing rejoinder that accused Washington of showing not a bit of
regret for or intention to improve its own terrible human rights record.
Plenty of facts show that, in 2014, the U.S., a self-proclaimed human rights defender, saw no improvements in its

the Chinese report, published

Friday by the information office of Chinas State Council, the countrys Cabinet. While its own human
existent human rights issues, but reported numerous new problems, said

rights situation was increasingly grave, the U.S. violated human rights in other
countries in a more brazen manner. Americas record remained blotted by rampant gun crime, racial
discrimination, the pernicious influence of money in politics, widening income and social inequality, and state

By Beijings
reckoning, the U.S. also violated human rights abroad through the use of torture,
mass electronic surveillance of foreign governments and citizens, and frequent
military drone attacks that have inflicted civilian casualties.China has issued annual
infringements of individual privacy, according to the State Councils latest yearly assessment.

scorecards on human rights in the U.S. since the late 1990s, typically within days of the State Departments yearly
rights reports. According to Washingtons latest appraisal, repression and coercion were routine against civil and
political rights advocates in China while discrimination against minorities remained widespread, as authorities
continue to place tight curbs on freedom of speech, assembly and religious practice, among other civil liberties.

The two reports bookended the annual U.S.-China Strategic and Economic
Dialogue in Washington, where top officials parleyed for 2 days on
cybersecurity, maritime tensions and bilateral economic ties. Clashes on
these issues have strained U.S.-China ties over the past year, though officials from both
governments said they hope the latest talks could soothe discord ahead of Chinese President Xi Jinpings state visit

Chinas human rights record is a longstanding bugbear in

bilateral relations, though officials and rights advocates in the U.S. have expressed
growing concern over Beijings diminishing tolerance for activism and dissent since
Mr. Xi took power more than two years ago. For its part, China has long defended its human-rights record by
to the U.S. in September.

arguing that individual rights sometimes need to be sacrificed for the more immediate needs of social stability and

Beijing issued a white paper on its human rights record,

touting its burgeoning television and film industry, legal reforms and expanding
access to public services, among other markers of economic and social progress.
China has also been quick to point out what it describes as U.S. hypocrisy on human
rights. In its latest assessment, the State Council took particular aim at institutional discrimination against ethnic
economic growth. Just this month,

minorities in the U.S., citing recent high-profile police killings of black citizens that have stirred racial tensions, as
well as reports of disenfranchisement of minority voters in the 2014 mid-term elections. The U.S. Embassy in Beijing
declined immediate comment on Chinas allegations, but referred to remarks made Thursday by Secretary of State
John Kerry, who acknowledged U.S. shortcomings on human rights. We

couldnt help but have

humility when we have seen what we have seen in the last year in terms of racial
discord and unrest. So we approach this with great self-awareness, Mr. Kerry said. But we
also understand that when human rights is the issue, every country, including the United States, has room to
improve.

Environment Trades off with

Economics
Economic policies trade off with environmental work as
economics grow the enviromment gets worse
European comission 04, The European Commission is the EU's executive
body. It represents the interests of the European Union as a whole (not the interests
of individual countries). The term 'Commission' refers to both the College of
Commissioners and to the institution itself, PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT AND
ECONOMIC GROWTH: TRADE-OFF OR GROWTH-ENHANCING STRUCTURAL
ADJUSTMENT?, 2004, European Comission 2004 review EU economy, accessed
7/4/16, http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication7726_en.pdf
Normally, rising scarcity tends to move goods up a property-rights hierarchy,

that is, free

goods are first made subject to a common-property regime, and then, eventually, turned into private goods Environmental policy aims at putting environmental resources such as land, water, air, the atmosphere and specific
habitats under a commonproperty regime, with clear and enforceable rules. The tools at the environmental policymakers disposal are various forms of restriction on activity: access to these resources may be limited (for example, by
placing limit values on emissions), or their use may be limited (by restricting the kind of activities allowed in natural habitats or drinking-water reservoirs) or made subject to specific conditions (such as paying a tax or an
environmental levy or the obligation to clean or recycle them after use). The theory of the property-rights hierarchy has been borne out in practice. Rising incomes and rising pollution have brought with them a rising demand for
environmental protection (policies). Market forces themselves have led to a reduction in the pollution intensity of economic activity in Europe, both because of the dynamic growth of the cleaner services sector, and because the

However, strong policy action has

nevertheless been needed to decouple economic activity and emission levels.
These policies have been most successful in the context of ambient air
pollution and acidification, while progress still needs to be made on
cutting back greenhouse gas emissions. There is no evidence to support
the assertion that this decoupling has been achieved by exporting
pollution through large scale delocalisation, as this process tends to be determined by
factors other than environmental legislation. Moreover, the environmental ambitions of
emerging market economies such as China are also rising, and standards seem to
be converging globally, suggesting that pollution havens are at most a temporary
phenomenon. While demand for environmental protection is growing, it
comes at a cost. The costs and benefits of taking action or not must
therefore be estimated when environmental legislation is being drafted.
However, it is rare for the costs and benefits particularly the benefits that actually
materialise to be assessed after the policy has been implemented. Where they are, it
private rates of return for local and regional pollution are closer to social rates than for global commons

appears that costs tend to be overestimated, possibly owing to both asymmetric information and a tendency to

spending on
environmental protection estimated by Eurostat at about 1.5 per cent of GDP in the late 1990s
does divert the resources of regulated industries from their core business.
Typically, it makes their production more capital intensive and more
expensive, with a negative knock-on effect on the productivity of other
production factors, and on demand. If competitors do not have to comply with
similar policy constraints, this spending also worsens the (international) competitiveness
of the industries affected. On the plus side, gradual but credible long-term tightening of environmental
underestimate innovation and progress in abatement technologies. That said,

standards and ambitions helps to establish new markets for environmental technologies - both abatement and
clean technologies. It is estimated that spending on environmental protection accounts for 2 million jobs in the
EU15, or about 1.2 per cent of total employment.

Economics
Chinense officials are slow and unsure of market regulation
policies recent financial company crackdowns
Daniel Ren 4/22, writer for the South China morning post, "China suspends new
registrations of finance companies," http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policiespolitics/article/1937636/china-suspends-new-registrations-finance-companies
authorities are stepping up their crackdown on illicit financing by suspending
new registrations of finance companies. Applicants with finance-related names or business would not
Mainland

be able to register via local branches of the State Administration for Industry and Commerce, financial news portal

companies first need to get approvals from financial

regulators. In Shanghai, the citys administration for industry and commerce has stopped approving
new investment firms or businesses whose company names include words such as
financial, wealth management and fund management, according to registration agents
and lawyers. Business registration authorities in the city have also tightened rules on
setting up new companies and increased policing of business activities, targeting all
Caixin reported yesterday. The

investment, financial consulting and asset management firms amid a nationwide campaign to clean up the sector.

targeting financial companies involved in illegal

activities such as illicit public fundraising, loan sharking schemes and defrauding investors via online peer-toThe administration has also started

peer platforms. Law enforcement authorities, including police, have already teamed up with business-registration

officials believe the administration for

industry and commerce failed to effectively regulate the market, said a source with
knowledge of the local governments thinking. The suspension of business approvals is an
administrative measure rather than a rule or regulation. The industry administration is
authorities to raid some of the illegal operations. [Shanghai}

responsible for overseeing companies to ensure their operations are legal. Certain business descriptions such as
asset management in corporate names are legal to register .

The decision to suspend approvals

comes after a string of failures of P2P operators and asset management firms since
late last year. The firms were alleged to have illegally taken deposits or defrauded investors. The authorities
have reason to tighten control on all financial businesses now, but they have to
keep their policies consistent. Victims of the biggest scam so far, run by a P2P platform called Ezubao,
took to the streets and protested, saying the authorities turned a blind eye to the schemes until state financial
regulators and law enforcement authorities became aware of the risks from the business failures. Mainland police
are expecting a large number of defaults from the illegal private lending and wealth management sector in the
middle of this year as due dates for payments fall. The authorities have reason to tighten control on all financial
businesses now, but they have to keep their policies consistent, Shanghai Ronghe law firm partner Gong Zhenhua
said. Unethical businesses have long taken advantage of capricious policymaking and inefficient law enforcement
on the mainland. In 2011, dozens of underground banking operators or borrowers either committed suicide or fled
the mainland after running illegal businesses for years. It was only then that Beijing stepped in to police the grey
financing market.

Chinse economic policies are slow and undirected, resulting is

massive delays and controversy
Mark Magnier 15 writer who is based in the Wall Street Journals Beijing bureau where he covers Chinas economy
and its broader implications for the world and the Middle Kingdoms growing global ambitions. Before joining the Journal in early
2014, he was bureau chief in New Delhi, Beijing and Tokyo for the Los Angeles Times. In addition to his coverage of these Asian
economic and political giants, hes done extensive crisis reporting, camping out under Saddam Hussains bridges, covering suicide
bombings in Israel, Pakistan and Afghanistan, suffering through bad soju in North Korea and sleeping in abandoned nunneries in East
Timor. 4-17-2015, "Chinas Levels of Bureaucracy Have Gotten Ridiculous, Premier Says," WSJ,
http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2015/04/17/chinas-levels-of-bureaucracy-have-gotten-ridiculous-premier-says/

Local resistance to central government directives is hardly a new problem in China. A

well-known phrase that sums up this long tradition of defiance the mountains are high and the emperor is far

fighting against
local intransigence has taken on new urgency as economic growth swoons and an
ambitious slate of reforms goes nowhere fast, frustrating efforts to pivot the worlds
second-largest economy from its tired, state-led model to more vital growth engines
such as private consumption and services. China reported Wednesday that economic growth slipped
away is said to date back to the Yuan dynasty, which lasted from 1206 to 1368. But

to 7% year on year in the first quarter, its weakest pace in six years, amid little evidence of a turnaround anytime
soon. According to the official Xinhua News Agency, which didnt say how long the meeting lasted, Mr. Li expressed

In some cases after

the senior leaders study an issue for over a year it takes another year to get the
implementation procedures settled. Isnt this ridiculous? Mr. Li was quoted as saying. Before we can
his displeasure by interrupting subordinates and at times speaking in a harsh tone.

simplify administrative procedures and delegate authority to lower levels of government, we really need a

The premier called for simpler procedures

and greater delegation of responsibility to lower levels, a theme he has repeated for months,
revolution in our own thinking, he reportedly added.

the State Council reported. More than 10,000 companies are registered every day, he reportedly said, but added
that rules must be simplified further to encourage more startups. According to a 2014 World Bank ranking on ease
of doing business in 189 economies, China ranked 90. By comparison, Hong Kong is ranked No. 3, the U.S. No. 7,

Behind the bureaucratic foot-dragging are various political

and structural impediments, analysts said. Chinas bureaucratic structure and
systems are at times outdated and sclerotic, requiring time-consuming and even
redundant approvals, reflecting deep-rooted Communist and once-imperial DNA in
Chinese officialdom. Many officials also strongly oppose the administrations reform policies and aggressive
two-year anticorruption campaign, analysts said. No one is absolutely clean in the system and
theres lots of dirty laundry, said Jing Huang, a professor at the National University of Singapore. If you
dont know whether to go east or west, the best option is to go nowhere. Even without corruption,
analysts say, a system that has relied for centuries on favors, horse trading and gift
giving is now freezing up in the face of the near-evangelical antigraft campaign.
Theyre taking away the levers of power, said David Kelly, research director with China Policy, a
Japan No. 29 and India No. 142.

research and advisory firm. Theres policy gridlock, he added. Mr. Li directed much of his ire toward officials at the

In the
shadow play of Chinese politics, however, analysts said the intended
target for his message may in fact have been higher-ups suspected of
quietly encouraging resistance among division chiefs. Users of Chinas vibrant social
division chief rank, according to the State Council account, a middling step on the bureaucratic ladder.

media, meanwhile, offered their own views. It seems that section chiefs are at a higher level than Premier Li,
wrote one user identified as Qing Feng on Chinas Weibo social-media service. Reformation and anticorruption
should begin at the lower levels of government since there are so many local despots, adding another Weibo
writing under the name Jian Wang.

Financial markets put the US and china at odds because its

seen as chinese impingement on a US-dominated system
Zhiqun Zhu 15, Zhiqun Zhu is Director of the China Institute and an Associate
Professor of Political Science and International Relations at Bucknell University. He is
the author and editor of 7 books including Chinas New Diplomacy: Rationale,
Strategies and Significance (Ashgate, 2013); and U.S.-China Relations in the 21st
Century: Power Transition and Peace (Routledge, 2006). He was a visiting senior
research fellow at East Asian Institute of National University of Singapore, and a
POSCO fellow at the East-West Center in Hawaii. In the early 1990s, he was Chief
Assistant to the Public Affairs Officer at the U.S. Consulate General in Shanghai.

Dispel Distrust: Start from North Korea, International Affairs Reviewi VOLUME
XXIII, NUMBER 3, Summer 2015,
The United States also seems to distrust and has blocked Chinas attempts to become a
more responsible stakeholder in international organizations. Disagreement exists, for
example, over Chinas intentions regarding the international financial system. U.S.
officials consider Chinas leadership role in setting up new multilateral institutions,
such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the BRICS Bank (the bank formed by leading
emerging economies of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), to be a direct challenge to
the U.S.-dominated international financial system. Though the United States has
reservations about Chinas new initiatives, others, including major U.S. allies such as the UK, South Korea, Australia,
France and Germany, are optimistic that these new institutions can complement existing ones and assist much of

According to some scholars, Chinas policy does not seek to

demolish or exit from current international organizations and multilateral regimes; instead,
China is constructing channels for shaping the international order beyond Western
claims to leadership.7
the developing world.

North Korea
China unsure of a more aggressive policy towards North Korea
- US pressure only casues divided betwee the party and the
two nations diplomatic meetings prove
Felicia Schwartz 1/27, a reporter in the Washington, D.C. bureau and wall street
journal where she writes about national security. She is a graduate of Dartmouth
College. 1-27-2016, "U.S., China Divided Over Response to North Koreas Nuclear
Program," WSJ, http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-china-divided-over-response-tonorth-koreas-nuclear-program-1453884250
Kerry said the U.S. and China havent agreed on substantive steps
to confront North Koreas nuclear program, as hostile moves from the reclusive nation put it back into the
Secretary of State John

diplomatic spotlight. Mr. Kerry and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said after more than four hours of meetings
they were committed to denuclearizing North Korea and would work together at the United Nations on a resolution.

werent in agreement over how to achieve that goal, and over how much to
press Pyongyang. Mr. Kerry met later with Chinese President Xi Jinping and Chinese State Councilor Yang
But they

Jiechi. The United States and China are united in our opposition to North Koreas nuclear-weapons program, Mr.
Kerry said. The diplomats spoke to reporters at Chinas foreign ministry Wednesday, three weeks after North Korea
said it successfully conducted a hydrogen-bomb test. The announcement has rattled relations between North Korea
and its neighbor. Beijing has voiced its opposition to Pyongyangs nuclear program, but must also tread delicately in
its dealings with North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un, for fear that instability would spill over into Chinas northeast
provinces. Mr. Kerry said North Korea is a declared threat to the world that the U.S. takes extremely seriously.
Messrs.

Kerry and Wang said they agreed to accelerate efforts on drawing up a U.N.
resolution on North Koreas most recent test but havent yet decided what should be
in it. Mr. Kerry said goods and services flowing to North Korea could be one area for U.N. sanctions, as well as
shipping and aviation. But Mr. Wang signaled that China isnt prepared to pressure
Pyongyang economically in the manner that the U.S. is seeking. Sanctions
are not an end in themselves, he said, saying the goal should be to bring the nuclear issue on
the Korean Peninsula back to the track of negotiation. He said any U.N. resolution shouldnt provoke new tension
or destabilize the peninsula. The United States believes very strongly that China has a particular ability, because of
its special role, its connections to North Koreato be able to help us significantly to resolve this challenge, Mr.
Kerry said. While China remains North Koreas closest trading partner, relations between the two communist nations
have grown increasingly strained as the latter has ratcheted up its nuclear activities against Beijings wishes. Since
Mr. Xi took office, for example, he has yet to meet with Kim Jong Un, though the Chinese president has
strengthened ties with South Korea, Pyongyangs rival. Sanctions are not an end in themselves. Chinese Foreign
Minister Wang Yi The news conference was tense at times, reflecting the broader strain in relations as both
diplomats pointed to distance between them on key issues, including North Korea and the South China Sea. Mr.
Kerry compared the challenge of addressing Pyongyangs nuclear program with Irans, adding that the U.S. and
China cooperated on sanctions in that case to bring about negotiations. With all due respect, more significant and
impactful sanctions were put in place against Iran, which did not have a nuclear weapon, than against North Korea,
which does, Mr. Kerry said. The U.S., China and four other world powers reached an agreement with Iran to curb its
nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief last summer, which formally took effect this month. Mr. Kerry
pledged to work with China to confront North Korea but said the U.S. wouldnt shy away from going out on its own.
The United States will take all necessary steps to defend the American people and honor our security

Kerrys comments were an apparent reference

to an advanced missile-defense system U.S. officials have considered deploying to
South Korea and possible secondary sanctions on North Korea, both of which would be
irritants to China. Mr. Xi, in comments as he greeted the delegation from Washington, said U.S.-Chinese
commitments to allies in the region, he said. Mr.

cooperation make good things happen for the world, although he did not address the details of discussions about
North Korea and other issues. Also high on the agenda were territorial disputes in the South China Sea, where

Chinas increasing assertiveness has further strained relations between the two
major powers. Beijing has embarked upon ambitious reclamation projects in the disputed waters to bolster its

territorial claims in the region, and recently concluded multiple test flights at an airstrip it constructed in the hotly
contested Spratlys, where several countries including Vietnam and the Philippines have overlapping claims. Mr.
Wang said the construction of such facilities in the region was intended as a public service, adding that such
facilities could also be used for self-defense. Mr. Kerry said the U.S. supported Chinas right to protect its
sovereignty there, but wanted to see disputes resolved peacefully, urging that all countries involved avoid a cycle
of mistrust or escalation. He said he suggested beginning a diplomatic process with China and other claimants on
this, and said Mr. Wang agreed to explore it. While Mr. Wang didnt mention it specifically, he said China wanted to
resolve disputes peacefully and through dialogue. Jin Canrong, international relations professor at Renmin
University, said tensions stemming from the South China Sea wouldnt likely factor into Beijings decision-making
process on North Korea. Rather, he said, Beijing was more concerned that its own interests might be blighted if it
took too aggressive a stance against Pyongyangs nuclear activities. For example, he said, broad trade sanctions
wouldnt likely meet with support from Beijing, given the number of companies in China that have dealings with
North Korea. There are economic considerations hereif sanctions are too severe, Chinese companies will face
losses, he said. China would be taking the biggest hit here, he said. Not just economically, but politically.

Despite clear objectives the US and china still have a

strategic mistrust that prevents meaningful cooperation
despite statements condemning North Korea China still funds
aid to the kim regime putting them at odds with the US.
Zhiqun Zhu 15, Zhiqun Zhu is Director of the China Institute and an Associate
Professor of Political Science and International Relations at Bucknell University. He is
the author and editor of 7 books including Chinas New Diplomacy: Rationale,
Strategies and Significance (Ashgate, 2013); and U.S.-China Relations in the 21st
Century: Power Transition and Peace (Routledge, 2006). He was a visiting senior
research fellow at East Asian Institute of National University of Singapore, and a
POSCO fellow at the East-West Center in Hawaii. In the early 1990s, he was Chief
Assistant to the Public Affairs Officer at the U.S. Consulate General in Shanghai.
Dispel Distrust: Start from North Korea, International Affairs Review VOLUME XXIII,
NUMBER 3, Summer 2015,
Despite the willingness of China and the United States to cooperate and
avoid confrontation, the two countries still lack political trust. They can start
with their shared objective of a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. North Korea presents a
security challenge for both the United States and China, which is the very reason the two powers share a common
interest in the issue and can help alleviate each others concerns about the future. Compared with other
controversial issues such as Taiwan, historical and territorial disputes in East Asia, and piracy, over which the two
countries are sharply separated, the United States and China share a goal of denuclearizing North Korea, and
Beijing and Washington have a history of cooperating on the issue. In addition, with North Koreas tests of nuclear
devices and improved nuclear and missile technology over the past few years, the issue is increasingly urgent. A
mutually acceptable solution to the North Korea issue could not only avoid the potentially calamitous consequences
of a nuclear-armed North Korea triggering military conflict on the Korean Peninsula, but also provide a litmus test for
whether the United States and China can work together more broadly to build trust between them and to promote

Many blame Pyongyang for developing nuclear weapons and posing

a dire security challenge in East Asia; few admit that North Korea did not create the
problem alone. The unfinished Korean War was a proxy war between the United States, China, and the Soviet
Union, and it has defined the East Asian security landscape for decades. During the
Cold War, North Korea was skillful at playing China and the Soviet Union
against each other and succeeded in squeezing aid from both powers.
After the Soviet Unions disintegration, China became North Koreas only
reliable provider of food and aid, while the United States and Japan
refused to recognize North Korea diplomatically. Feeling insecure and isolated, North
security in East Asia.

Korea aims to build a kangsong taeguk (strong and prosperous state) with a powerful military and advanced
economy, and after three successful nuclear tests in 2006, 2009

and 2013 it has declared itself a

nuclear state, a status the international community has not formally recognized .
Relations between China and North Korea have markedly deteriorated since Kim
Jong-un came to power in 2011, and North Koreas behaviors have hurt Chinas
interest in maintaining a peaceful regional environment . The 1994 Agreed Framework between
the United States and North Korea represented a rare opportunity to terminate North Koreas nuclear program.

The Six-Party Talks that started in

2003 have been stalemated since 2009; though China and the United
States are interested in resuming the talks, they have been unable to
work jointly and persuade North Korea to return to the negotiation table.
With security, economic, and other challenges to deal with elsewhere, neither China nor the United States
has treated North Korea as a priority issue since the Six-Party Talks broke down . In
Unfortunately, neither side held to its end of the bargain.

short, the current challenge posed by North Korea is the outcome of a series of events involving many actors, and

The United States

and China firmly oppose Pyongyangs nuclearization, yet both seem
unmotivated to take immediate and new action and instead have
continued the same approaches they have used in the past. The North Korean
the solution to the problem is not possible without cooperation from both major powers.

nuclear issue has demanded enormous diplomatic resources from the United States and China; it is a major

China has grown increasingly tired of

Pyongyangs recalcitrant behaviors, yet it continues to provide aid to
Pyongyang, which implies that North Korea remains strategically valuable
and serves Chinas security interest as a buffer state.22 Meanwhile, the United States
diplomatic and security headache in both capitals.

keeps a wary eye on North Korea by maintaining a formidable level of force in the region and routinely holding joint
military exercises with South Korea and Japan. It considers North Korea a direct threat to its national interests and
those of its allies. As a result of the two powers lack of coordination and joint action, North Korea has refined its
nuclear technology, and gross human rights violations persist. To permit the current situation in North Korea to
continue is both dangerous and the United States and China have not started to work together again on the North
Korea issue when international talks, of which both the United States and China are part, are making significant
progress on the issue of Irans nuclear program.23

Internal Link

CCP Collapse
Chinese factionalism makes power struggle and party collapse
uniquely likely.
Dr. Cheng Li 13, master's in Asian studies from the University of California,
Berkeley and a doctorate in political science from Princeton University. director of
the John L. Thornton China Center and a senior fellow in the Foreign Policy program
at Brookings, From 1993 to 1995, he worked in China as a fellow with the U.S.-based
Institute of Current World Affairs , Chinas Third Plenum: Reform And Opening Up
2.0?, 10/31/13, Brookings Institute,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2013/10/31-chinas-third-plenum-reformand-opening-up/103113_cpc_transcript_ia.pdf
the third pessimistic view about the lack of consensus within the leadership
and the factional in-fighting, it is true that we cannot understand Chinese politics
without a grasp of factional tensions. And after past months, no one understands the importance of
factional tension better than we do in Washington. Do you agree? Well, Chinese leaders in the past
Deng era, are generally divided into two coalitions -- the Jiang Zemin camp currently
led by President Xi Jinping, and the Hu Jintao camp, currently led by Premier Li
Keqiang. President Xi Jinping now holds a six to one majority on the Politburo Standing
Committee. Premier Li seemed to have had the cooperative partnership thus far. For example, publicly,
Premier Li has been seen as the leader, pushing for the establishment of the
Shanghai free trade zone, although the real driving force is, in fact, the Jiang Zemin
camp, whose power base is in Shanghai. But the strong influence of President Xi and his
protg in Chinas economic and financial circles may make Premier Li uneasy. Also, a
majority of senior officials, one or two levels below the Politburo Standing Committee actually belong
to Hu Jintaos camp, particularly 376 Central Committee members. The majority of them belong
Finally,

to Hu Jintaos camp. I just did a study about over 90 of them belong to the so-called tuanpai, the Communist Youth

They are surely interested in gaining

more seats in the top leadership or having someone occupy the top driver seat in
the years to come. Their policy agenda and the regional priority may differ from
President Xis. In four years, China will have another round of leadership in-fighting as five out of the seven
Politburo Standing Committee members will retire. This means that a new run of vicious fighting for
seats on this superior leadership body now occurs on a fiveyear cycle rather than its
general 10-year cycle. Now, it is possible that a vicious power struggle may get
out of control leading to a Chinese style government shutdown . Luckily, for the
League. These are the protgs of Hu Jintao and Li Keqiang.

Chinese, if such a shutdown occurs, they can still watch the American panda cam. No, we cannot see during the
shutdown. But all of these observations will actually encourage Xi Jinping and his coalition to more forcefully carry
out their market reform agenda. Failure to deliver will significantly undermine Xi Jinpings credibility, reduce middle
class support, further alienate the liberal intellectuals, marginalize China from important international economic
integration, like the potential TPP. And most importantly, make accountable Chinas strategic condition to a
consumption-driven economy.

Policy disputes result in conflict and great internal power

struggles collapses chinese regimes
Jin Huang 2k, Associate professor of political science at Utah state unviersity and
Research associate at the John King fairbank center for East Asian Research at
Harvard University, Factionalism in Chinese communist politics, 2000, pg. 31-32

Leaders in other counties, the chinese leaders might propound views of the bureaucracy over which they preside,

elite contentions over policy and/or power might be a manifestation of

bureaucratic conflict."22 Thus, a conflict in CCP politics, caused by either a policy
dispute or power struggles, is rooted essentially in the institutional structure of
policy making whereby interests of the involved institutions clash; the leaders act as
representatives of the institutions over which they preside; and their behavior and
policy choices are subject to the constraints imposed by this structure. Such a
conflict, however, can become very complicated because of the segmented
and stratified system of authority in China. As a result, its outcomes are difficult to
predict, and, more often than not, unintended outcomes result, which cause policy
inconsistency and destabilize leadership relations.23 Thus, the three predominant
models vary greatly in the explanations of conflicts in CCP politics, although all three highlight
the decisive role of the supreme leader, Mao or Deng, in political affairs. The differences among the three
models are seen not only in their identification of the causes of conflicts - that is, policy disputes,
power struggles, or conflicts of institutional interests - but also in the ways the leaders interact in a
conflict. The policy-choice model focuses on the achievement of consensus in the solution of a policy dispute. Its
analyses of the'process through which the consensus was achieved often reveal the
constraints this process exerted on the supreme leader , Mao or Deng, despite his dominance
and that

in policy making, for a consensus usually resulted from a compromise of various policy preferences presented by

The power-struggle analysis focuses

on leadership relations in a conflict, and how the changes in these relations affect
the final outcomes. Given that a conflict, provoked by either a policy dispute or
personality clashes, will eventually be solved in a power struggle, the powerstruggle analysts tend to treat the policy issues as means, rather than ends, in a
conflict, for what matters in the end is not who has the right idea but who prevails in
the power struggle. Thus, a policy choice prevails not necessarily because it is right
but essentially because it is the preference of those who dominate in politics. Cases in
the involved leade'rs, including the supreme leader himself.24

point are numerous: the revival of the GLF after the 1959 Lushan Conference,25 the criticism of ultra-rightism after
Lin Biao's fall in 1971,M the halt of "emancipation of mind" with the "four cardinal principles" in 1979 (see Chapter
7), and the crackdown on the student movement in 1989. The power-struggle analysis is most supportive to the
grand model of Mao-in-command or, later, Deng-in-command. The structure analysts see conflict as routine in

Its solution does not necessarily result from a rational debate

because it is difficult to distinguish right from wrong, given different perspectives
from which the involved leaders are competing for their institutional interests; nor is
it necessarily determined by those who appear more powerful because the
bureaucratic structure exerts indiscriminating constraints on everyone involved in
the process. Those who prevail may not be the most powerful or righteous leaders,
but they happened to be in the most advantageous position in the structure of
policy making. The more complicated the bureaucratic structure is, the
harder it is for the leaders to control the interactions among the involved
agencies, and hence more difficult to predict the final outcomes.28 Thus, while the power-struggle approach
bureaucratic politics.

reinforces the Mao-in-command model, the analyses of the policy-choice and structure models actually depart from
this grand model. The most significant contribution of the two models is perhaps their discovery that, like his
colleagues, the supreme leader is also subject to the'constraints of the adopted process

Instability and Corruption Bad

Continued chinese factioning and corruption of officials causes
legitimacy crisis, threatenss CCP stability and causes a laundry
list of impacts, the aff exacerbates it
MINXIN PEI 07, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
Corruption Threatens Chinas Future, Carnegie endowment for international
peace, Policy brief 55 October, 2007,
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/pb55_pei_china_corruption_final.pdf
, the total costs of corruption in
China are huge. The direct economic loss owing to corruption represents a large
transfer of wealthat least 3 percent of GDP per yearto a tiny group of elites. This
annual transfer, from the poorer to the richer, is fueling Chinas rapid increase in
socioeconomic inequality and the publics perception of social injustice. Second, the
indirect costs of corruptionefficiency losses; waste; and damage to the environment, public health, education, the credibility of key
public institutions, and the morale of the civil serviceare incalculable. The high price China is already paying
is ample evidence that the toll of corruption is not theoretical. For example, the bill for
bailing out Chinas state-owned banks, prime victims of corruption in the financial sector, is close to $500 billion.
Corruption at the local level sparks tens of thousands of riots and violent collective
protests each year, undermining social stability and necessitating extra spending on
internal security. Corruption has also contributed to Chinas massive environmental
degradation, deterioration in social services, and the rising costs of housing, health
care, and education. So far, high savings, strong trade performance, and favorable demographics have enabled Beijing to offset the direct
costs of corruption and maintain growth. But corruption has lowered the quality of Chinas
economic growth because its economic expansion has been accompanied
by assorted social ills, many of which will require heavy investment to
correct. With a lower level of corruption, China would have achieved
growth of a higher quality, with much less damage to the environment,
economic efficiency, public health, and social stability . High-quality growth is more sustainable
than low-quality growth. Finally, it is worth noting that Chinas neighbors, ranging from Japan to
South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and Indonesia, have all paid a steep price for corrupt
crony capitalism. South Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia experienced spectacular
financial collapses during the Asian financial crisis a decade ago, in no small part
because of the massive corruption in their financial and corporate sectors. Japans
economy stagnated for a decade, also because of systemic corruption in its
corporate sector and political process. Taiwans growth performance has lost its
momentum in the past decade, and corruption scandals have caused financial
strains in the banking sector and tainted almost the entire political establishment. It
Unfortunately, such views do not correspond with either Chinese reality or historical fact. First

is small comfort to argue that China is not as corrupt as Russia, Suhartos Indonesia, or Mobutus Zaire and that it has prospered in spite of corruption.

corruption has not yet derailed Chinas economic rise, sparked a social
revolution, or deterred Western investors. But it would be foolish to conclude that
the Chinese system has an infinite capacity to absorb the mounting costs of
corruption. Economically, runaway corruption stifles commerce, investment, and
innovation, as recent academic research has established. Eventually, growth will falter. Politically, corrupt ruling elites pay dearly for their
True,

misrule at times of crisis. True, everyday corruption does not cause revolutions. But ruling elites perceived by the population as irredeemably rapacious
and self-serving enjoy little popular legitimacy and would more likely get overthrown when a major crisis hits, as shown by the fall of Marcos in the
Philippines in 1986 and the collapse of Suhartos dictatorship in Indonesia in 1998. The Chinese government itself is well aware of these political perils. In

the Tiananmen crisis of 1989, public anger at offi- cial corruption was one of the factors that led millions of people throughout China to take to the streets
in support of the prodemocracy student movement. The most dangerous threat of corruption is actually invisible. Endemic corruption steadily increases a
countrys systemic risks. As a result, its financial system is fragile, its environment degraded and vulnerable, its law enforcement establishment tainted
and ineffective, its infrastructure insecure, its public health system irresponsive, and its regulatory system creaky. The list goes on. Obviously, the
accumulation of systemic risks caused by corruption only increases the likelihood of a major crisis.

Trade Wars
Chinese stock market collapse causes Trade wars
Chris Matthews 1/7 , writer for trotune.com, 1-7-2016, "Why China's Stock
Market Crash Could Spark a Trade War," Fortune,
http://fortune.com/2016/01/07/china-stock-market-crash-2/
a cheaper renminbi
will send ripple effects through the global economy. And thats likely why stocks in
the U.S. and elsewhere plunged on Thursday. The biggest fear is a deepening of a trade war
that is being fought between the worlds economies over a very limited supply of
global demand. One of Chinas main competitors in the region, Vietnam, has moved three
separate times this year to devalue its currency, with the last coming in August. The policy
action today is positive in its promptness in response to Chinas devaluation, Eugenia
But wherever you come down on Chinas motivations for its devaluation, its clear that

Fabon Victorino and Irene Cheung, analysts at Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd., said in a research note

big exporters like Japan and Korea, have been watching the
moves in the renminbi closely. Koreas won hit a three year low earlier this year,
while the Japanese central bank has been engaged in massive monetary stimulus in
recent years. The Japanese government argues that this is purely to stimulate domestic demand, but
at the time. Meanwhile, other

economists like Robert Scott of the Economic Policy Institute have argued that Japans tactics are different than, for
instance, the Federal Reserves quantitative easing, and that currency manipulation on the part of Japan has cost
the U.S. hundreds of thousands of jobs per year. As economist and China expert Michael Pettis has argued, what

There are virtually no

economies on earth today that are growing quickly as the result of rising incomes. Instead
Chinas rapid growth, until recently, has mostly been the product of a government policy
that encourages excessive investment and keeps wages low in order to boost exports
and employment. The few large economies that run trade deficits, though, like the
United States and the U.K., dont have the capacity to buy everything that China
and the rest of the worlds exporters are trying to sell. And therefore, its likely well
continue to see exporters fighting for every scrap of slow growing demand. Only
time will tell whether China can ween itself off its dependency on exports. But what
is certain is that the longer China waits to make the necessary reforms, the less
stable the worlds second largest economy will be in the long run.
Chinas troubles today underscore is the dearth of demand in the global economy.

Japan Economy
Chinese market collapse crushes Japanese Economy
Paul Nadeau 1/15, independent writer for The Diplomat, Should Japan Fear
China's Stock Market Crash This Time?, The Diplomat, 1/15,
http://thediplomat.com/2016/01/should-japan-fear-chinas-stock-market-crash-thistime/
When Chinas economy started shaking in August, I imagined that it might lead the Japanese
government to face the following scenario. Investors turn to the yen in the search of safer
holdings, leading the yen to rise and offset the devalued yen via the Central Banks quantitative easing and
postponing the goal of two percent inflation even further. Firms remain reluctant to put profits into
the Japanese economy, compounded by the stronger yen making Japanese exports
less competitive than they were before. Wages stagnate and already-frugal household budgets adjust
to the recent (and, for now, forthcoming) consumption tax hike. Japanese voters, frustrated with the stalled
economy and with the cabinets focus on security legislation relative to economic concerns, let their displeasure
show in approval polls, which eventually fall far enough for the government to wonder whether its time for a
change at the top. The opposition, meanwhile, begins to wonder if its time to strike. While I dismissed that scenario
as unlikely, the past two weeks have played out almost as described above, with the yen rising and Japanese firms
expressing even more reluctance to reinvest their earnings in wage hikes. Does that mean that the rest of the

there are
plenty of reasons to believe things might get worse. Japans trade balance has
returned to deficit, led by a 3.3 percent drop in exports, the worst since 2012, and
the export drop was itself led shipments to China which dropped by 8.1 percent. As
emerging economies continue to slow down along with China, its difficult to
imagine exports rebounding significantly. And thats before taking into account the
appreciated yen, which will make Japanese exports more expensive for foreign
markets with less purchasing power than before. Adding premonitions of another 2008 financial
scenario will play out? And should Japan now fear Chinas stock market crash? On the economic side,

crisis from prominent financiers and speculations about a cataclysmic year for the global economy from large
banks and it seems like the darkest scenarios from last year may have been overly optimistic.

Collapse of Japense economy threatens global market stability

Martin Hutchinson 15 For 27 years, Martin Hutchinson was an international merchant banker in London, New York, and Zagreb.
He ran derivatives platforms for two European banks before serving as director of a Spanish venture capital company, advisor to the Korean company
Sunkyong, and chairman of a U.S. modular building company. In Zagreb, he established the Croatian debt capital markets, set up the corporate finance
operations of Privredna Banka Zagreb, and arranged for the monetization of 800,000 frozen Macedonian foreign currency savings accounts. He has been a
financial journalist for over 14 years, and is the author of Great Conservatives and co-author of Alchemists of Loss, which details the causes and
consequences of the 2008 financial crash. He currently publishes a weekly column called The Bears Lair, in which he comments on the economy and
market. He is also a correspondent for Reuters BreakingViews. Martin has a first class Honors Degree from Trinity College Cambridge and an MBA from
Harvard Business School. 8-31-2015, "Japan: Collapse of Abenomics Threatens Global Stability," Wall Street Daily,
http://www.wallstreetdaily.com/2015/08/31/japan-gross-domestic-product-gdp/

Japan reported this week that gross domestic product (GDP) contracted by 0.4%, or 1.6% on an annualized basis,

Japan is carrying out the most aggressive money

printing program in the world right now, and its budget deficit is also the largest
among the worlds rich countries. Oh, and its public debt is also the worlds highest in
terms of GDP. All of which suggests that something is seriously wrong in the Land of the
Rising Sun. Indeed, its Japans and not Chinas economic policies that are most likely to
collapse in ruin. When Prime Minister Shinzo Abe took office in 2012, he vowed to get the Japanese economy
during the second quarter. Meanwhile,

moving back toward the 2% annual growth rate that was thought to be its natural speed limit. One of his first
steps was to appoint a new governor for the Bank of Japan, Haruhiko Kuroda. Kuroda instituted a bond-buying
program that, relative to the countrys economy, was about three times larger than Ben Bernankes quantitative

easing at its peak. Abe also promised a program of reforms, including an overhaul of the labor market. A

few

reforms have been implemented, and others such as the partial privatization of the gigantic,
government-owned Japan Post are at least underway . But the real problem is the third leg of Abes
program, a series of fiscal stimulus spending initiatives that have given Japan the
largest budget deficit in the rich world. For 2015, The Economists team of forecasters projects a
deficit of 6.8% of GDP. To reduce the deficit, Japan sought to increase its sales tax but
the first increase, from 5% to 8%, caused the economy to relapse into recession.
The second hike, to 10%, has been postponed from 2015 to 2017.The United States, by
comparison, runs a budget deficit equivalent to 2.6% of GDP . The figure is 4.4% in the
United Kingdom and 2.7% in China . Approaching the Tipping Point Before 1990, Japan had a
conventionally cautious fiscal policy with surpluses in some years, spending below 30% of GDP, and debt below

1990s, Japans Ministry of Finance was

caught in the grip of Keynesian bureaucrats. Wasteful spending spiraled to around
43% of GDP, deficits soared to as much as 8% of GDP, and debt began its long rise
to more than 200% of GDP. Junichiro Koizumi, Japans prime minister from 2001 to 2006, partially cut
60% of GDP. However, during the prolonged recession of the

spending and trimmed the deficit, but the recession of 2008-09 saw both spiral out of control. The current Prime

The result
is that Japanese spending consistently exceeds the tax base, with net bond issuance
currently 38% of spending and debt around 230% of GDP. If Abenomics had worked, GDP
would have increased and at least slowed the increase in debt. But Abenomics is producing neither
real growth nor inflation. The current forecast from The Economist is for growth of 0.9% in 2015
and inflation of 0.7%. Both estimates each of them probably too high would still see the debt-toGDP ratio increasing at a rapid clip. Now, there are two mitigating factors at work currently. First,
Japanese savers hold the great majority of the debt though this is of little help, as a
Minister, Shinzo Abe, was originally a disciple of Koizumi but he hasnt followed Koizumis policies.

government default would merely translate into national insolvency, and thats not much of an improvement.
Second, markets are liquid, confidence in Japan remains strong, and the Bank of Japan is covering the government

the debt-to-GDP ratio is nearing a tipping point . The

highest ratios that have ever been brought down successfully without default were
about 250%, by the United Kingdom at the end of world wars in 1815 and 1945. The first time, it was achieved
debt with its bond purchases. Still,

through economic growth (the Industrial Revolution) and massive government austerity without inflation (the United
Kingdom went back on the gold standard in 1819). The second time, it was done by suppressing interest rates and
allowing inflation to erode the savings of the holders of government bonds mostly the British middle class. If
Japanese bureaucrats give up Keynesianism and embark on a massive program of government austerity, without
major tax increases, the problem might still be solved. But were close to the point at which it will become
impossible, not just (to the Japanese political class) unthinkable. At that point, confidence will erode rapidly, and a

The yens value would likely collapse,

perhaps halving to JPY250-to-USD1, impoverishing the Japanese people
and causing hyperinflation but reducing the debt burden (since almost all the debt is
yen-denominated at a low fixed interest rate). If the Japanese economy has stopped
growing, collapse has become not only unavoidable, but also imminent
and its effect on world markets wont be pretty.
crisis will ensue. What form this crisis will take is unclear.

Impact/Turns Case

Human Rights
Economic collapse causes CCP crackdown on individual
liberties and free speech
Minxin Pei 15, Tom and Margot Pritzker 72 Professor of Government at Claremont
McKenna College and a non-resident senior fellow of the German Marshall Fund of
the United States. His latest book, Chinas Crony Capitalism: Dynamics of Regime
Decay, will be published by Harvard University Press in 2016. This article is drawn
from a larger research project on Chinas likely regime transition that has received
financial support from the Smith Richardson Foundation, the Carnegie Corporation
of New York, and the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation., 11-12-2015,
"The Twilight of Communist Party Rule in China," American Interest, http://www.theamerican-interest.com/2015/11/12/the-twilight-of-communist-party-rule-in-china/
If long-term economic stagnation were to set in, the Chinese middle classs support
for the status quo will erode. Co-optation of the fast-growing middle-classanother key pillar of
the CPCs post-Tiananmen survival strategyhas been enabled by the past quarter centurys
economic boom. Chinas secular economic slowdown will undoubtedly reduce opportunities,
curtail expectations, and limit upward mobility for members of this critical social group, whose
acquiescence to the CPCs rule has been contingent upon its ability to deliver satisfactory and continuous economic
performance. With the evaporation of elite unity, looming economic stagnation, and likely alienation of the middle-

the post-Tiananmen model is left with only two pillars: repression and
nationalism. Contemporary authoritarian regimes, lacking popular legitimacy endowed by a
competitive political process, have essentially three means to hold on their power. One is
bribing their populations with material benefits, a second one is to repress them with
violence and fear, and the third is to appeal to their nationalist sentiments. In more
sophisticated and successful autocracies, rulers rely more on performance-based legitimacy
(bribing) than on fear or jingoism mainly because repression is costly while
nationalism can be dangerous. In the post-Tiananmen era, to be sure, the CPC has
employed all three instruments, but it has depended mainly on economic
performance and has resorted to (selective) repression and nationalism only as a
secondary means of rule. However, trends since Xi Jinping came to power in late 2012 suggest that
class,

repression and nationalism are assuming an increasingly prominent role in the CPCs survival strategy. An obvious

faltering economic growth is creating social tensions and

eroding public support for the CPC, thus forcing the regime to deter potential
societal challenge with force and divert public attention with nationalism . There is,
explanation is that Chinas

however, an equally valid explanation that many observers have overlooked. A survival strategy that depends on
delivering economic growth to maintain legitimacy is inherently unsustainable not only because economic growth
cannot be guaranteed and ever-rising popular expectations will be impossible to meet, but also because

sustained economic growth produces structural socioeconomic changes that, as

demonstrated by social science research and histories of democratic transitions, fatally threaten the
durability of autocratic rule. Autocracies forced to strike a Faustian bargain with
performance-based legitimacy are destined to lose the wager because the socioeconomic changes resulting
from economic growth strengthen the autonomous capabilities of urban-based social forces, such as private

workers through higher levels

of literacy, greater access to information, accumulation of private wealth, and
improved capacity to organize collective action. Academic research has established a strong
entrepreneurs, intellectuals, professionals, religious believers, and ordinary

correlation between the level of economic development and the existence of democracy and also between rising
income and probabilities of the fall of autocracies.8 In the contemporary world, the positive relationship between

wealth (measured in per capita income) and democracy can be seen in the chart below, which shows that the
percentage of democracies (classified as free by Freedom House) rises steadily as income level increases. Partly
free countries decline as income rises as well. The distribution of non-democracies, or authoritarian regimes,
resembles a U-shape. While more dictatorships can survive in poorer countries (the bottom two-fifths of the
countries in terms of per capita income), their presence in the top two-fifths of the countries seems to reject the
notion that wealth is positively correlated with democracy. A closer look at the data, however, shows that nearly all
the wealthy countries ruled by dictatorships are oil-producing states, where the ruling elites have the financial
capacity to bribe their people into accepting autocratic rule.9

War
Global economic collapse causes escalation to nuclear war
Russia and china independent scenarios for escalation
Paul Craig Roberts 15, academic appointments at Virginia Tech, Tulane University, University of New Mexico,
Stanford University where he was Senior Research Fellow in the Hoover Institution, George Mason University where he had a joint
appointment as professor of economics and professor of business administration, and Georgetown University where he held the
William E. Simon Chair in Political Economy in the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He has testified before committees
of Congress on 30 occasions. Dr. Roberts was associate editor and columnist for The Wall Street Journal and columnist for Business
Week and the Scripps Howard News Service. He was a nationally syndicated columnist for Creators Syndicate in Los Angeles. In
1992 he received the Warren Brookes Award for Excellence in Journalism. In 1993 the Forbes Media Guide ranked him as one of the
top seven journalists in the United States. President Reagan appointed Dr. Roberts Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Economic
Policy and he was confirmed in office by the U.S. Senate. Dr. Roberts was awarded the Treasury Departments Meritorious Service
Award for his outstanding contributions to the formulation of United States economic policy. In 1987 the French government
recognized him as the artisan of a renewal in economic science and policy after half a century of state interventionism and
inducted him into the Legion of Honor. 6-14-2016, "War Threat Rises As Economy Declines," No Publication,
http://www.paulcraigroberts.org/2015/05/11/war-threat-rises-economy-declines-paul-craig-roberts/

To restore the economy requires that offshoring be reversed and the jobs brought back to the US. This could be
done by changing the way corporations are taxed. The tax rate on corporate profit could be determined by the
geographic location at which corporations add value to the products that they market in the US. If the goods and
services are produced offshore, the tax rate would be high. If the goods and services are produced domestically, the
tax rate could be low. The tax rates could be set to offset the lower costs of producing abroad. Considering the
lobbying power of transnational corporations and Wall Street, this is an unlikely reform. My conclusion is that the US

the hubris and arrogance of Americas

self-image as the exceptional, indispensable country with hegemonic rights over
other countries means that the world is primed for war. Neither Russia nor China will
accept the vassalage status accepted by the UK, Germany, France and the rest of
Europe, Canada, Japan and Australia. The Wolfowitz Doctrine makes it clear that the
price of world peace is the worlds acceptance of Washingtons hegemony. Therefore,
economy will continue its decline. On the foreign policy front,

unless the dollar and with it US power collapses or Europe

finds the courage to break with Washington and to pursue an
independent foreign policy, saying good-bye to NATO, nuclear
war is our likely future. Washingtons aggression and blatant propaganda
have convinced Russia and China that Washington intends war, and this realization
has drawn the two countries into a strategic alliance. Russias May 9 Victory Day celebration of
the defeat of Hitler is a historical turning point. Western governments boycotted the celebration, and the Chinese
were there in their place. For the first time Chinese soldiers marched in the parade with Russian soldiers, and the
president of China sat next to the president of Russia. The Sakers report on the Moscow celebration is interesting.
Especially note the chart of World War II casualties. Russian casualties compared to the combined casualties of the
US, UK, and France make it completely clear that it was Russia that defeated Hitler. In the Orwellian West, the latest
rewriting of history leaves out of the story the Red Armys destruction of the Wehrmacht. In line with the rewritten
history, Obamas remarks on the 70th anniversary of Germanys surrender mentioned only US forces. In contrast
Putin expressed gratitude to the peoples of Great Britain, France and the United States of America for their

For many years now the President of Russia has made the point
publicly that the West does not listen to Russia. Washington and its vassal states in
Europe, Canada, Australia, and Japan do not hear when Russia says dont push us
this hard, we are not your enemy. We want to be your partners. As the years have passed
without Washington hearing, Russia and China have finally realized that their choice
is vassalage or war. Had there been any intelligent, qualified people in the National
Security Council, the State Department, or the Pentagon, Washington would have
been warned away from the neocon policy of sowing distrust. But with only neocon
hubris present in the government, Washington made the mistake that could be
fateful for humanity.
contribution to the victory.

Warming = Impact Filter For Soft

Left Affs
Warming is the root cause of inter-personal social conflict
Solomon Hsiang and Marshall Burke 15, Solomon Hsiang is the chancellor's
associate professor of public policy at UC Berkeley. Marshall Burke is assistant
professor of earth system science at Stanford University, Climate change is indeed
a cause of social conflict12/17/15, Los Angeles Times,
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-1217-hsiang-burke-climate-changeviolence-20151217-story.html accessed on: 7/5/16
First Bernie Sanders said climate change was directly related to the growth of terrorism. Then Prince Charles said
drought was the root cause of the Syrian conflict and current refugee crisis. Pundits everywhere leaped at the
opportunity to say both claims were wrong. Who is right? We have been studying the possible link between climate
and violence for years, and we'd like to clarify what the most up-to-date science can and cannot say on this topic. In
general,

conflicts are complex events the result of many instigating factors, not just

one. When we notice that violence occurs at the same time as a major climatic event, like the war in Syria
erupting at the same time as a drought, we don't ask, Was the climactic event the cause of the conflict? Rather,
we ask Was the climatic event a cause of the conflict? It might be that you need both ethnic rivalries and a
drought to create a conflict, and missing either key ingredient might lead to a more peaceful outcome. Another

We can't predict that a particular conflict will or will not happen. Instead, we
can assess the risk that violence might occur in response to changes in the climate.
The situation is similar to assessing the risk of a car accident. Nobody ever says If you
drive to the store now, you will get into an accident. Instead, we might say If you drive
to the store during this rainstorm, you are more likely to get into an accident than if
you wait until the rain stops. We have studied many types of violence including sports
violence, murder, gang violence, riots and civil wars. What we find time and again, around the world and
throughout human history, is that climatic events are a cause of social conflict. They
are not the only cause, but in places where there is a risk of violence because of
non-climate factors, climate changes can amplify this risk. Data from multiple
countries show that high temperatures make small-scale personal conflicts
more likely, probably because heat affects individuals' propensity for
aggressive behavior. For instance, research shows that hot days are
associated with more rape and murder in the United States and more
domestic violence in Australia. Similarly, high temperatures and, in agrarian
populations, extreme rainfall (either too much or too little) amplify the risk of large-scale
conflict between groups of people probably because the economic impact of these
events alters the political landscape. Multiple studies have shown that hotter than average
caveat:

temperatures substantially increase the likelihood of both local-level group violence and full-blown civil war in SubSaharan Africa. These findings are controversial. Some researchers have claimed that our conclusions are biased.
Further studies, however, have verified our work .

The link between climatic change and violence

is remarkably consistent and reproducible.

SCS - Tensions High Now

International Tribune
SCS escalation is likely international tribune decision over 9dash line
Jeremy Koh 6/06, China Correspondent at Channel NewsAsia, South China Sea
tensions likely to rise after international tribunal ruling: Experts, ChannelNewsAsia,
6/06/2016, http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asiapacific/south-china-seatensions/2849492.html
As an international tribunal prepares to deliver a ruling on a maritime dispute
brought by the Philippines against Beijing, some experts in China say tensions in the
South China Sea could escalate even further after the ruling is delivered, possibly in the
next few weeks. China claims nearly the entire South China Sea based on the "nine-dash
line", which Beijing says is based on ancient maps. Its claims overlap not only with
that of the Philippines, but also Brunei, Malaysia and Vietnam. Tensions have risen in
recent years, as Beijing moved to assert its control over the area. And it rose even higher, when the
Philippines brought its claim against China to the Permanent Court of Arbitration .
Beijing has rejected the move, and it has vowed to ignore the ruling,
regardless of the outcome. After the ruling is delivered, the relevant
countries - particularly the United States - will certainly use the ruling,
which may be against China, to engage in political activities, such as
provocative actions in the South China Sea, said Dr Su Hao from the Department of
Diplomacy at the China Foreign Affairs University. The US has, under the guise of freedom of navigation, tried to
agitate the situation there. The aim is to cause tension between the countries in the South China Sea, so that the

Beyond the
ruling, the dispute is also seen as an extension of the rivalry between the US and
China, and China has said it will defend itself if necessary. Said Victor Gao, director of the
China National Association of International Studies: Fundamentally, whats going to dictate the
future course of development in the South China Sea is not this illegal arbitration.
Its going to be what the United States is going to do and what China is going to do,
US has an excuse to intervene to maintain its leading position there and in the Western Pacific.

what President Obama is going to do, and I dont think Ashton Carter matters. Mr Carter is Defense Secretary of

He has criticised China for erecting what he called a Great Wall of

self-isolation, with its increasingly provocative moves against its neighbours. China,
the United States.

on its part, has accused him of harbouring a Cold War mentality. However, with the arbitration ruling expected in
the coming weeks, the Philippines response will probably be left to President-elect Rodrigo Duterte, who takes
office at the end of June. In contrast to his predecessor Benigno Aquino, Mr Duterte has said hes willing to engage
China in bilateral talks on the issue - a proposal which China has welcomed. Meanwhile, China has ramped up its
diplomatic offensive ahead of the ruling. It has garnered the backing of more than 50 countries for its position on
the dispute.

Vietnam Arms Ban = Conflict Likely

SCS tensions likely to escalate US lifting Vietnam arms ban
Garey Corsi 5/23, freelance writer for CNN news, Will U.S. lifting Vietnam arms
ban raise South China Sea tensions?, 5/23/16, Fox 5 News San Diego,
http://fox5sandiego.com/2016/05/23/will-u-s-lifting-vietnam-arms-ban-raise-southchina-sea-tensions/
The U.S. says it is lifting its ban on sales of lethal arms to Vietnam a move that is
likely ruffle Beijings feathers and lead to an escalation in tensions between China
and its neighbors in the South China Sea, according to defense and regional experts. The move,
announced by U.S. President Barack Obama during his visit to Hanoi Monday, would open the way for
Vietnam to import a variety of U.S. defense technology, especially maritime
capabilities and hardware. Scholars believe Beijing would react negatively to
any situation that improved Vietnams ability to resist Chinese ambitions
in the South China Sea. They likely will view this possible move by the U.S. to
bolster Vietnams maritime domain awareness in the South China Sea as an effort to
stand up to Chinas more assertive ambitions in the disputed waters, said Murray Hiebert,
a senior advisor and deputy director of the Southeast Asia program for the Center for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS) in Washington D.C, ahead of President Obamas visit. Tensions have ratcheted up in the region as
China has reclaimed land in massive dredging operations, turning sandbars into islands equipped with airfields,

Beijing has also warned U.S. warships and military aircraft to stay
away from these islands. Orville Schell, Arthur Ross Director at the Asia Society Center for U.S.-China
Relations, said a lifting of the arms embargo on Hanoi would present Chinese Premier
Xi Jinping with a significant symbol of just how far his aggressive policies in the
South China Sea have alienated Chinas neighbors. If he was smart Xi would go on a charm
ports and lighthouses.

offensive and moderate Chinas posture, said Schell. However, that seems unlikely given his past unwillingness to
seek compromise on matters of sovereignty. When asked about President Obama potentially lifting the ban on

China has downplayed the issue. China and Vietnam have

become the main protagonists in the row over the South China Sea, which China
claims almost in its entirety through its nine-dash line.
lethal weapons sales in the past,

Airplane Interception
Tensions uniquely high now airplane interception
Thomson Reuters 5/18, Information Technology and Services corporation, U.S.
aircraft intercepted, South China Sea tensions rise again CBC News, 5/18/2016,
http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/south-china-sea-us-jets-1.3588725
Two Chinese fighter jets carried out an "unsafe" intercept of a U.S. military
reconnaissance aircraft over the South China Sea, the Pentagon said on Wednesday, a further
escalation of tensions in and around the contested waterway. The incident took
place in international airspace on Tuesday as the U.S. maritime patrol aircraft
carried out "a routine U.S. patrol," a Pentagon statement said. China's Foreign Ministry early
Thursday called on the U.S. to stop close reconnaissance activities. Foreign Ministry
spokesman Hong Lei told reporters at a regular briefing that the Chinese aircraft kept a safe distance from the U.S.

The incident comes a week after

China scrambled fighter jets as a U.S. Navy ship sailed close to a disputed reef in
the South China Sea. Another Chinese intercept took place in 2014 when a Chinese fighter pilot flew
plane, which was flying close to China's island province of Hainan.

acrobatic manoeuvres around a U.S. spy plane. The intercept is also days before President Barack Obama travels to
parts of Asia from May 21-28, which will include a Group of Seven summit in Japan and his first trip to Vietnam.

China claims most of the South China Sea, through which $5 trillion in ship-borne
trade passes every year. The Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Taiwan and Brunei
have overlapping claims. Washington has accused Beijing of militarizing the South
China Sea after creating artificial islands while Beijing, in turn, has criticized
increased U.S. naval patrols and exercises in Asia. The Pentagon statement said the Department
of Defense was addressing the issue through military and diplomatic channels. "Over the past year, DoD has seen
improvements in PRC actions, flying in a safe and professional manner," the Pentagon statement said, using an

In 2015, the United States and China announced

agreements on a military hotline and rules of behaviour to govern air-to-air
encounters called the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES). "This is
exactly the type of irresponsible and dangerous intercepts that the air-to-air annex
to CUES is supposed to prevent," said Greg Poling, director of the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative
acronym for the People's Republic of China.

at Washington's Center for Strategic and International Studies think tank.

Environment
Chinese infighting prevents successful environment policy to
combat warming and ecosystem destruction
Edward Wong 13, an American journalist and a foreign correspondent for The
New York Times. Wong served as one of the Times' main correspondents covering
the Iraq War from November 2003 through June 2007 and writer for the
International Herald Tribune, Infighting in China Impedes Stronger Environmental
Policies, 3/22/13, International Herald Tribune,
https://www.questia.com/newspaper/1P2-36300201/infighting-in-china-impedesstronger-environmental
State-owned enterprises have put profits ahead of health in working to outflank new
environmental rules, according to government data and people involved in policy negotiations. China's state leadership
transition took place this month against an apocalyptic backdrop. More than 13,000 dead pigs were found floating in a river that
provides drinking water to Shanghai. A haze akin to volcanic fumes cloaked the capital, causing convulsive coughing and obscuring

So severe are China's environmental woes,

especially the noxious air, that top government officials have been forced to
acknowledge them openly. Fu Ying, spokeswoman for the National People's Congress, said she checks for smog every
Mao Zedong's portrait on the gate to the Forbidden City.

morning, wears a face mask when it looks bad and straps one on her daughter, too. Saying the air pollution had him "quite upset," Li
Keqiang, the new prime minister, vowed to "show even greater resolve and make more vigorous efforts" to clean it up. What the

infighting within government bureaucracy is a major

obstacle to enacting stronger environmental policies. Even as some
officials push for tighter restrictions on pollutants, state-owned
enterprises -- especially China's oil and power companies -- have put
profits ahead of health in working to outflank new rules, according to government data
and interviews with people involved in policy negotiations. For instance, even though trucks and buses
crisscrossing China are far worse for the environment than any other vehicles, the
oil companies have delayed for years an improvement in the diesel fuel those
vehicles burn. As a result, sulfur levels of diesel in China are generally 23 to 33 times those in the United States. As for
leaders neglect to say is that

power companies, the three biggest ones in China are all repeat violators of government restrictions on emissions from coal- burning

The stateowned enterprises are given critical roles on environmental standards.

The committees that determine fuel standards, for example, are housed in
the buildings of an oil company. Whether the enterprises can be forced to
follow, rather than impede, environmental restrictions will be a critical test of Mr. Li
and Xi Jinping, the new party chief, in curbing the influence of vested interests in the political economy. Environmental
plants; offending power plants are found from Inner Mongolia to the southwest metropolis of Chongqing.

degradation is now a primary concern of ordinary Chinese. Last month, after deadly air pollution hit record levels in northern China,
officials led by Wen Jiabao, then prime minister, put forward strict new fuel standards that the oil companies had blocked for years.
But there are doubts about whether the oil companies will comply, especially since oil officials resisted a similar government order
for higher-grade fuel four years ago. State-owned power companies have been similarly resistant. The companies regularly ignore
government orders to upgrade coal- burning electricity plants, according to ministry data. And as with the oil companies, the power

In 2011, during a round of

discussions over stricter emissions standards, the China Electricity Council, which
represents the companies, pushed back hard against proposed limits, saying that
the costs of upgrading plants would be too high. The head of the council, Wang
Zhixuan, wrote in an editorial that government plans for environmental oversight
would make it a "laughingstock."
companies exert an outsized influence over internal environmental policy debates.

Multiple reasons continued climate change risks extinction

the rate of change is the fastest in the earths history *THIS IS
THE SAME CARD AS THE IMPACT IN THE WARMING 1NC*
Snow and Hannam, 14 Deborah Snow, Senior Writer for the Sydney Morning
Herald, Peter Hannam, Sydney Morning Herald writer who covers broad
environmental issues, Climate change could make humans extinct, warns health
expert, March 31, 2014, Sydney Morning Herald,
http://www.smh.com.au/environment/climate-change/climate-change-could-makehumans-extinct-warns-health-expert-20140330-35rus.html, AW)
The Earth is warming so rapidly that unless humans can arrest the trend, we risk
becoming ''extinct'' as a species, a leading Australian health academic has warned. Helen Berry,
associate dean in the faculty of health at the University of Canberra, said while the Earth has been
warmer and colder at different points in the planet's history, the rate of change has
never been as fast as it is today. ''What is remarkable, and alarming, is the speed of
the change since the 1970s, when we started burning a lot of fossil fuels in a
massive way,'' she said. ''We can't possibly evolve to match this rate [of warming] and,
unless we get control of it, it will mean our extinction eventually.'' Professor Berry is one of
three leading academics who have contributed to the health chapter of a Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) report due on Monday. She and co-authors Tony McMichael, of the Australian National University, and
Colin Butler, of the University of Canberra, have outlined the health risks of rapid global warming in a companion
piece for The Conversation, also published on Monday. The three warn that the adverse effects on population health

''Human-driven climate
change poses a great threat, unprecedented in type and scale, to wellbeing, health
and perhaps even to human survival,'' they write. They predict that the greatest challenges
will come from undernutrition and impaired child development from reduced food
yields; hospitalizations and deaths due to intense heatwaves, fires and other
weather-related disasters; and the spread of infectious diseases. They warn the
''largest impacts'' will be on poorer and vulnerable populations, winding back recent
hard-won gains of social development programs. Projecting to an average global warming of 4
degrees by 2100, they say ''people won't be able to cope, let alone work productively, in
the hottest parts of the year''. They say that action on climate change would produce ''extremely large
and social stability have been ''missing from the discussion'' on climate change.

health benefits'', which would greatly outweigh the costs of curbing emission growth. A leaked draft of the IPCC
report notes that a warming climate would lead to fewer cold weather-related deaths but the benefits would be

Under a high emissions scenario,

some land regions will experience temperatures four to seven degrees higher than
pre-industrial times, the report said. While some adaptive measures are possible, limits
to humans' ability to regulate heat will affect health and potentially cut global
productivity in the warmest months by 40 percent by 2100. Body temperatures rising
above 38 degrees impair physical and cognitive functions, while risks of organ
damage, loss of consciousness and death increase sharply above 40.6 degrees, the
draft report said. Farm crops and livestock will also struggle with thermal and water stress. Staple
crops such as corn, rice, wheat and soybeans are assumed to face a temperature
limit of 40-45 degrees, with temperature thresholds for key sowing stages near or
below 35 degrees, the report said.
''greatly'' outweighed by the impacts of more frequent heat extremes.

AT: Impact Defense

AT: Economic Interdependence

Trade relations and interdependence wont stop chinese
agression from escalating
Hunter Marston 6/14, Research Assistant & Communications Coordinator at The
Brookings Institution And previous researcher for the National Defense University,
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Ira Shapiro, President, Ira
Shapiro Global Strategies LLC And a degree in international relations from the Evans
School of Public Policy and Governance, University of Washington, More Trade
Won't Stop China's Aggression, National Interest, 6/14/16,
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/more-trade-wont-stop-chinas-aggression-16587
The past has repeatedly proved wrong those who assume that a rising powers
economic connectivity obviates the inevitability of great power military conflict.
Peacenik theorists of the preWorld War I era opined that the level of
interconnectivity in global markets had rendered obsolete the great-power warfare
of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries . Likewise, in the interbellum period before
the breakout of World War II, advocates of appeasement wagered that a militarizing
Germany would not threaten continental peace due to its deep economic ties with the
rest of Europe. Obviously, both schools of thought overestimated the ability of global
economic connectivity to deter military aggression . What makes scholars think
China is different today? Of course, the scale of interpenetration of global markets
has risen and bound major powers such as China and the United States, as well as
regional groupings like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), ever more tightly together. But just
as proponents of peace were proven wrong in the twentieth century, echoes of the
past are perceivable in Asia and Europe today. Despite its dependence on the EU for
revenue from gas exports, Russia invaded Crimea and eastern Ukraine in 2014. Likewise,
European dependence on Russian gas has not prevented the EU from leveling heavy
sanctions against Russia for its bellicosity. Nationalist impulses often trump
economic considerations that would otherwise impel autocrats toward
moderation. Just as the Communist Party in Beijing is beholden to a public whose education hammered home
the lessons of a century of humiliation at the hands of Western imperialists, Russias Vladimir Putins legitimacy
and mythosflows from a narrative of western domination that has prevented Russia from attaining the greater
world power that Russians feel their nation deserves. Similarly, though Beijing is investing in massive infrastructure
projects across Southeast Asia and pursuant to the sixteen-member Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
free-trade agreement, Beijings behavior indicates that it will prioritize security interests over regional economic

Material facts dictate that Chinas increasing economic

wealth and concordant military might will allow Beijing to exercise greater power in
its backyard and on the world stage. These factors afford the CCP a greater
ability to risk reputational and economic costs to achieve its national
security goals. China has shown its capability to drive a wedge in ASEAN to suit its
purposes. In 2012, with Cambodia chairing ASEAN, tensions in the South China Sea became so acute that the
integration, peace and stability.

regional grouping failed to deliver a joint statement for the first time in history since its 1967 founding. Facing a
barrage of diplomatic pressure from Beijing, the ten member states were unable to agree on whether to mention
even the location of a Philippines-China standoff at the Scarborough Shoal, claimed by both sides and occupied by
the Philippines until Chinese ships seized it in 2012.

AT: Intervening Actors Check

Intervening actors and multilateral institutions wont check
conflict chinese nationalism and goals overwhelm pressure
by the international community
Hunter Marston 6/14, Research Assistant & Communications Coordinator at The
Brookings Institution And previous researcher for the National Defense University,
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Ira Shapiro, President, Ira
Shapiro Global Strategies LLC And a degree in international relations from the Evans
School of Public Policy and Governance, University of Washington, More Trade
Won't Stop China's Aggression, National Interest, 6/14/16,
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/more-trade-wont-stop-chinas-aggression-16587
China has shown its capability to drive a wedge in ASEAN to suit its purposes. In
2012, with Cambodia chairing ASEAN, tensions in the South China Sea became so
acute that the regional grouping failed to deliver a joint statement for the first time
in history since its 1967 founding. Facing a barrage of diplomatic pressure from
Beijing, the ten member states were unable to agree on whether to mention even
the location of a Philippines-China standoff at the Scarborough Shoal, claimed by both
sides and occupied by the Philippines until Chinese ships seized it in 2012. Beijing similarly undermined
ASEAN unity in April when it announced that it had come to an agreement with
Cambodia, Brunei and Laosto the surprise of othersthat the South China Sea
dispute should not jeopardize relations between China and ASEAN. The United
States supports ASEAN centrality as a strategic bulwark against Chinas attempts to
impose unilateral faits accomplis. For its own reasons, Beijing prefers to deal with
ASEAN claimants one-on-one so as to reduce the capacity of the group to stand with
a unified voice contra its security interests. Satu Limaye, director of the East-West Center in
Washington, has written, Instead of serving as a platform to manage bilateral and
multilateral cooperation among member states, ASEAN may become an arena
where bilateral and multilateral cooperation are contested. As the two superpowers
battle for influence within ASEAN, China has demonstrated its ability to use both
charm and threats to advance its interests. Moreover, as Nick Bisley of La Trobe University writes,
despite a U.S. China policy that blends containment with moral suasion, it is far from clear that China can be
contained or cowed into submission. Ultimately, the regions two major powers have irreconcilable visions for
Asias future. If that is the case, expect rocky times ahead as differences of interest not only manifest in further
naval and air confrontations, but also introduce further friction into competing visions of the economic and security
architecture of Asia. The result is a net loss for all countries concerned.

***Aff***

Fighting and Leadership

Development Good
Transitions between government and party members is key to
prevent legitimization of the CCP and authoritarian rule
Jinghan Zeng 15, researcher for the Department of Politics and International
Studies, Social Sciences Building, University of Warwick, Coventry, The Chinese
Communist Party's Capacity to Rule: Ideology, Legitimacy and Party Cohesion,
2015
transferring power at the top and preventing a
leadership split during this process has always been extremely challenging. During Mao
For an authoritarian regime, successfully

Zedongs rule, an un-institutionalized power system caused endless, fierce power struggles within the party, which

the
CCP has made great efforts to settle disputes of leadership succession through
institutional channels. Thirty years of institutionalization has made leadership
transitions in China more stable, transparent, predictable, and smoother now than
ever before. A US congressional report called the CCPs leadership transition in 2012 one
of the very few examples of an authoritarian state successfully engineering a
peaceful, institutionalized political succession (Dotson, 2012: 4). Dickson (2011: 212) argues that
indirectly led to economic stagnation and social unrest. Afraid of elite divisions and brutal power struggles,

Chinas routinized process for replacing ruling elites is a remarkably rare practice among authoritarian regimes.

Arguably, this institutional development is important not only to the internal

stability of the CCP but also to its legitimacy. It is obvious important to the CCPs capacity to
rule and this capacity is considered as a fundamental inner cause of its legitimacy in
the CCPs discourse, as I explain below. This book shows how the institutionalization of
leadership succession helps to maintain regime stability and legitimacy. So, this book
establishes that the institutionalization of leadership succession is a key for maintaining the CCPs internal stability
and its ruling capacity to maintain legitimacy.

Link Inevitable
Strategic mistrust inevitable Clinton Presidential victory
Shannon Tiezzi 2/10, Shannon Tiezzi is Editor at The Diplomat. Her main focus is
on China, and she writes on Chinas foreign relations, domestic politics, and
economy. Shannon previously served as a research associate at the U.S.-China
Policy Foundation, where she hosted the weekly television show China Forum. She
received her A.M. from Harvard University and her B.A. from The College of William
and Mary. Shannon has also studied at Tsinghua University in Beijing, Why China
Dreads a Hillary Clinton Presidency, 2/10/16, The Diplomat,
http://thediplomat.com/2016/02/why-china-dreads-a-hillary-clinton-presidency/
its not only her stance on human rights that irked China . Clinton was seen as the
point person on the rebalance strategy. Her 2011 Foreign Policy article, Americas Pacific Century
But

largely laid out of the contours of the rebalance, and her extensive travel in and personal attention to the Asia-

Beijing finds the rebalance inherently threatening,

believing it is a thinly-veiled gambit to contain China. Thus Clinton, the supposed
architect of the rebalance, is viewed with deep suspicion in Beijing. Clinton only cemented
Chinas suspicion in 2010, when she waded into the South China Sea disputes at the ASEAN
Regional Forum in Hanoi. While emphasizing that Washington had no stake in the territorial disputes, she
laid out U.S. interests in the South China Sea: a national interest in freedom of
navigation, open access to Asias maritime commons, and respect for international
law in the South China Sea. In addition, Clinton said that legitimate claims
to maritime space in the South China Sea should be derived solely from
legitimate claims to land features a comment read by many to mean
Chinas nine-dash line, which encircles almost all of the South China Sea,
is not a legitimate claim. Chinas then-Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi was
reportedly angry enough to walk out on the meeting. When he returned, his defense of
Pacific made her the strategys public face. Yet

Chinas position was far from reassuring to the ASEAN members: China is a big country and other countries are

Clintons vocal stance on the South China Sea led many

Chinese analysts Ive spoken with to conclude that she not Obama was the
mastermind behind U.S. interference in this realm. Her remarks also set a precedent
for the South China Sea being raised at each and every ASEAN meeting a change China
small countries, and thats just a fact.

abhors (it has repeatedly stated ASEAN forums are not the proper venue for raising the disputes). Meanwhile,
Clinton never seemed to miss a chance to snipe at China while visiting third party countries, whether it was
accusing China of new colonialism in Africa or warning, from just across the Chinese border in Mongolia, that

Such was
the Chinese dislike for Clinton that the state-run China Daily took a moment to crow
about her departure as secretary of state: Clinton always spoke with a unipolar voice and never
countries cannot, over the long run, have economic liberalization without political liberalization.

appeared interested in the answers she got. China Daily had more faith in her replacement, saying that Kerry

Distrust between the United States

and China is deep-seated, and it would be difficult to find any presidential candidate
that Beijing would look favorably on (especially given the race to get tough on various Chinarelated issues during each U.S. presidential campaig n). Trump, for example, has
promised to place a 45 percent tariff on Chinese goods , and crowed in his New Hampshire
understands the true multipolar nature of the 21st century world.

victory speech that were going to beat China.

Factionalism will inevitably cause party breakdown and

infighting flawed government model this card is way old idk
if I would read this cause its more relevant to the idea of
factions in the CCP in general and not current party
configuration
Andrew Nathan 73, Andrew J. Nathan is a professor of political science at
Columbia University. He specializes in Chinese politics, foreign policy, human rights
and political culture. A Factionalism Model for CCP Politics, The China Quarterly,
No. 53 (Jan. - Mar., 1973), pp. 34-66
1. Since the impulse to crush one's rivals decisively is stymied by the limited nature of power, a code of civility
arises which circumscribes the nature of political conflict.35 Factions relatively seldom kill, jail or even confiscate
the property of their opponents within the system (the killing and jailing of persons felt to present a threat to the
system is another matter; see point 12). Indeed, factional systems require punctiliously polite face-to-face conduct
between politicians. As Leites has written with respect to the French Assembly of the Third and Fourth Republics,
"the vicissitudes of political life exacerbate one's feelings, but it is imperative that rage be channelled into entirely

Since factions are incapable of

building sufficient power to rid the political system of rival factions, they have little
incentive to try to do so. For any given faction, the most important and
usually most immediate concern is to protect its own base of power while
opposing accretions of power to rival factions, while initiatives to increase its
own power and position are of secondary importance. Defensive political strategies
therefore predominate over political initiatives in frequency and importance . 3. When
a faction does take a political initiative (which it does only on those rare occasions when it feels that
its power base is secure and its rivals are relatively off balance ), it relies upon secret preparation and
surprise offensive. This minimizes the ability of rivals to prepare their
defensive moves in advance and provides the aggressive faction a
momentum which carries it further than would otherwise be the case
before the defensive moves of rivals stop its progress. 4. In the face of such an
initiative, the defensive orientation of the other factions in the system tends to
encourage them to unite against the initiative. Thus factional political systems
tend to block the emergence of strong leaders. The strong leader constitutes a
threat to the other factions' opportunities for power, and they band together long
enough to topple him from power. (In many political systems this leads to governmental instability. In
appropriate expressions so as not to endanger one's career." 3" 2.

France under the Third and Fourth Republics, for example, where the Government was dependent for its office upon
an alignment of parliamentary factions, the very fact that a politician was able to organize a Cabinet set in motion
the jealousy and opposition that soon led to its fall. Where the titular government leader is supra-factional and
enjoys little power, however, the formal governmental leadership of a factional system may remain stable for long
periods.) 5. Since

the political life of a factional system consists of occasional initiatives

by constituent factions, followed by defensive alliances against the initiator, any
given faction is obliged to enter into a series of constantly shifting defensive
alliances. Factional alliances cannot remain stable. Today's enemy may have to be tomorrow's
ally. 6. It is therefore impossible for factions to make ideological agreement a primary condition for alliance with
other factions. As I argue below,

factions operate within a broad ideological consensus (point

while exaggerating the small differences that remain among them (point 10). The
struggle for office and influence is unremitting, immediate, and never
decisively resolved. In order to stay in the game, factions must often cooperate with those with whom they have recently disagreed. Although
factional alignments do not cross major ideological boun- daries, within those
13)

boundaries they are not determined by doctrinal differences.87 7. When decisions

(resolutions of conflict, policy decisions) are made by the factional system as a whole, they are made by consensus

In the Chinese context, for example, factional alignments did not cross the
ideological boundaries between the late Ch'ing conservatives on the one hand and
the constitutionalists and revolutionaries on the other, or between the Kuomintang
and the CCP. But within each major ideological current factional alignments were not (how could they be?)
determined by pure, a priori ideological compatibilities. Ideological stands were developed and
revised in the course of politics. For a case study of the process by which ideological
standpoint becomes defined in the course of political conflict, as rivals force one
another to delineate and clarify their positions. To attempt to take action without
first achieving such a consensus would take the ruling coalition beyond the limits of
its power: the decision could never be enforced . Furthermore, the effort to enforce a
decision would hasten the formation of an opposition coalition to topple the ruling
group from power. Decision by consensus also has the advantage that action is taken in the company of
among 37.

one's rivals, so that responsibility cannot be pinned on any single faction

No CCP Collapse

2ac
The CCP is stable no collapse coming lack of an alternative,
repressive politics, and economic effectiveness
Timothy Heath 15, Tim Heath is a Senior Defense and International Analyst at the
RAND Corporation. Mr. Heath has over fifteen years of experience as a China analyst
in the US government. He is the author of the book, Chinas New Governing Party
Paradigm: Political Renewal and the Pursuit of National Rejuvenation, published by
Ashgate (2014). The Diplomat, 3-13-2015, "No, Chinas Not About to Collapse,"
Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/no-chinas-not-about-to-collapse/
The partys advantages are less often discussed, but these bear reviewing if one is to evaluate the viability of CCP

One of the most overlooked, but important, assets is a lack of any credible
alternative. The partys repressive politics prevent the formation of potential
candidates, so the alternative to CCP rule for now is anarchy. For a country still traumatized
by its historic experience with national breakdown, this grants the party no small advantage. To truly imperil
its authority, the CCP would need to behave in so damaging a manner as to make
the certainty of political chaos and economic collapse preferable to the continuation
of CCP rule. A party that attempted to return to extreme Mao-era policies such as the catastrophic Great Leap
rule.

Forward could perhaps meet that threshold. But despite the numerous superficial comparisons in Western media,

second major political

lies in improvements to the partys effectiveness in recent years. In a major
paradigm shift, the CCP redefined itself as a governing party whose primary
responsibility rests in addressing the myriad economic, political, cultural, ecological,
and social welfare demands of the people. It has carried out ideological and political
reforms to improve its competence and effectiveness accordingly. The Xi administration
has refined, but upheld, the focus on increasing the nations standard of living and
realizing national revitalization, objectives embodied in the vision of the Chinese dream. Although the
little about the current administration policy agenda resembles classic Maoism. The
advantage

party has rightly come in for criticism for moving slowly and inadequately on these issues, the policy agenda
nevertheless appears to resonate with the majority of Chinese citizens. Independent polls consistently show that
the party has in recent years enjoyed surprisingly strong public support. When weighing the partys political

evidence suggests that the CCP faces little danger of

imminent collapse. Improvements to its cohesion, competence, and responsiveness,
combined with a policy agenda that resonates with most Chinese and the lack of a
compelling alternative outweigh the persistent political liabilities. The partys overall
liabilities against its assets, therefore, the

political stability throughout the 2000s, despite massive political unrest generated by breakneck economic growth,
underscores this point. If the party does indeed a measure of political support and security, why does it behave in
so insecure a manner? This is perhaps the most puzzling aspect of CCP behavior today and a major driver of
speculation about the possibilities of political exhaustion and collapse. There is no question that China is
experiencing tumult of a degree unusual even for a country habituated to pervasive discontent. Amid the
unrelenting anti-corruption drive, officials throughout the country appear to be operating in an atmosphere of
pervasive fear and distrust. The intensifying political crackdown against critics, liberal thinkers, and supposedly
pernicious, malignant Western influences evoke the paranoid witch-hunts of the Mao era. The oppressive
atmosphere and political insecurity (not to mention choking pollution and problems such as toxic water and food)
have motivated an astonishing number of Chinas elite to seek a way out of the country. While it is tempting to read
such behavior as symptomatic of a desperate regime fending off the inevitable, there are reasons to doubt such an
interpretation. For one, signs of systemic breakdown are hard to find. There is little evidence of the open political
warfare that has typified previous periods of political weakness and disarray. For now, at least, the central
leadership appears united behind Xis policy agenda. The economy continues to grow, with PRC officials anticipating
an annual rate at a slowing, but still healthy, 7 percent. Government policy and operations continue without the
kinds of abnormal interruptions or breakdowns that one would expect of a nation in serious crisis. A more plausible
reading is that Chinas

leadership is determined to do whatever it takes to achieve

national development and establish the conditions for long-term rule. The CCP aims
to do this primarily by undertaking political reforms to improve the effectiveness
and competence of government administration and by overseeing the sustained
growth that can enable a steady increase in the standard of living. These objectives are so
important to the partys long-term survival that the Xi administration has shown a willingness to crush whomever
gets in the way, regardless of political party affiliation.

No collapse people to dependent on the economy to revolt

against the party
David Martin Jones 14, Reader in the School of Political Science and
International Studies at the University of Queensland and a fellow of the Australian
Institute for Progress and the Institute of Public Affairs, Managing the China Dream:
Communist Party politics after the Tiananmen incident, Australian Journal of
Political Science, 2014 Vol. 49, No. 1, 122132,
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10361146.2013.878897
New Chinese companies, such as Huawei, the telecoms giant, Pingan, one of Chinas largest financial institutions,
and Haier, the whitegoods manufacturer, describe themselves as collectives (minyang, meaning run by the people),

The bigger a company becomes, the more important are

strong ties to the party and the greater the benefits that flow from a good political
relationship (McGregor: 219). Modern China is very much, therefore, a political, or
managed, economy. Despite the influence exerted from the centre, the model is sufficiently flexible to
permit local initiative. China, as Jacques observes, has adopted many features from other models of Asian
economic success. Yet, it is also driven by a distinctively Chinese feature of Darwinian
internal competition that pits localities against each other (McGregor: 175). McGregor shows
that Chinese cities, provinces, counties and villages compete fiercely for economic
advantage. At the heart of the China model, as Jacques concludes, is a hyperactive
and omnipresent state, which enjoys a close relationship with a powerful body of
State Owned Enterprises, a web of connections with the major firms in the private
sector, [and which] has masterminded Chinas economic transformation (615). Moreover,
the partys successful creation of a middle class that is dependent on the
state ensures that despite the lack of representative democratic
structures, it enjoys a high level of support. Jacques argues, citing a survey conducted by
Harvard sinologist Tony Saich in 2009, that 95.9 percent of Chinese were relatively or highly
satisfied with the central government (617). A 2008 Pew Centre survey, cited by
Brady, found that 86 per cent of Chinese people were satisfied with their countrys
development, while in 2004, only 42 percent had agreed with this sentiment. Brady
rather than privately run (siyang).

notes that Despite facing multiple troubles, Chinas party-in-power, the CCP, has regained public support for its
continued rule (29). Jacques states that this high level of satisfaction demonstrates that the legitimacy or
otherwise of the ruling party cannot be reduced to the absence of democracy (617). Indeed, he claims that the
Chinese state enjoys greater legitimacy than any Western state even though Western-style democracy is entirely
absent (618). This view may have some validity, but it does not reflect the full picture. As Brady, Callick and
McGregor show, there is also a darker side to the new China model.

AT: Shambaugh ev.

No imminent CCP collapse shambaughs assumptions are
wrong
Chen Dingding 15, Dingding Chen is an assistant professor of Government and
Public Administration at the University of Macau and Non-Resident Fellow at the
Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) Berlin, Germany. His research interests include:
Chinese foreign policy, Asian security, Chinese politics, and human rights, 3-102015, "Sorry, America: China Is NOT Going to Collapse," National Interest,
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/sorry-america-china-not-going-collapse-12389?
page=3
In a recent piece published in the Wall Street Journal , The Coming Chinese Crackup, China
scholar and George Washington University professor David Shambaugh boldly predicts that the
Communist Party of China (CCP)s endgame has begun. Although, in the past, such brave predictions of
the CCPs collapse have been proven wrong, the fact that such a prediction has come from Shambaugh, a leading
China expert, makes it all the more interesting. In a report from Chinas Foreign Affairs University, Shambaugh was
named the second most influential China expert in the United States. As such, Chinese scholars and officials will

Professor Shambaugh listed five indicators that point to Chinas

coming collapse. However, a closer analysis of these five points reveals that
Shambaughs conclusion is based on incorrect facts and flawed interpretations of
Chinas recent socioeconomic and political developments. First, he asserts that
wealthy Chinese are fleeing China. Actually, this is only half true. While a large number of wealthy
Chinese have migrated to countries like Canada, most of them still do business in China, meaning
that they are still have a positive outlook on Chinas future. In any case, a good number
of these wealthy people move their assets out of China to avoid corruption charges,
which has nothing to do with Chinas future development. Moreover, in recent years an
take his opinions seriously.

increasing number of overseas students have chosen to come back to China because they have confidence in

second indicator is increasing political repression and CCP insecurity. Actually,

not much has changed in this area, compared to the Hu Jintao presidency. The party
insecurity thesis is an old argument and one can say that the CCP has always been insecure,
especially since 1989. So what is so special about the present that signals the Partys endgame? Indeed, one can
argue that the Partys endgame is soon, no matter what it does . If the Party opens
up, then civil society will rise up and overthrow the regime; if the Party
continues to be repressive, it will breed insecurity, which will cause its
collapse. Third, Shambaugh argues that Chinese officials come across as wooden and
bored. But many Chinese officials were always like that, so there is nothing new in
this observation. It is definitely not something that can support Shambaughs China collapsing argument.
Fourth, Shambaugh points out there is massive corruption in China. Shambaugh is
right about the seriousness of the corruption issue in China. But he neglects to mention that the
anti-corruption campaign has been very successful so far, and the main
reason for this is because it has the public's support. Corrupt officials
know this too, which is why they are unable to fight back. Shambaughs final
argument is that the Chinese economy is slowing. Arguably, this fifth factor is the only new point
Chinas future. The

in Shambaughs argument, as the previous four factors have been features of Chinas political culture for quite
some time. As such, this argument deserves serious consideration. Shambaugh seems to believe that a slowing
economy will lead to widespread grievances, which in turn will lead to civil unrest. This will lead to the collapse of
the regime. Arguably, this is what fueled the Arab Spring and may be applied to China today.

However, there

are several problems with this argument. First, Chinas economic slowdown is not an
economic meltdown. It is true that compared to Chinas past sensational growth rate, a six to seven
percent growth rate is a slowdown. But which other major economy can grow at this
rate? Chinas economic growth must be viewed in a relative sense. Second, would a
slowdown, or even a massive financial meltdown lead to widespread disruption in Chinese society? The
answer actually depends on how the effects of the slowdown are distributed throughout society. As Confucius
pointed out long ago, Chinese people tend to get riled up more about inequality than scarcity(), which is

Most ordinary Chinese hate a high level of inequality , especially if such

While a severe crisis would lead to
a massive loss of jobs and lower incomes, if the U.S. economy survived the 2008
global financial crisis, there is no reason to believe the Chinese economy cannot
overcome a similar one. Third, even if a severe economic crisis hits China and causes
greater social grievances, why does this mean that social unrest will automatically lead to
an uprising against the regime? In other words,, this claim is premised on the belief that the Chinese
governments legitimacy relies solely on economic performance. Unfortunately this assumption,
though widely held among scholars, is no longer true. Economic growth is certainly
important for most Chinese people, but education, the environment,
corruption, and legal justice matter just as much as growth. As long as the
Chinese government seriously tackles problems in those areas, support
for the CCP will remain high. This explains why the Xi administration has initiated bold reforms in all
these areas. Finally, even if there is political unrest will it necessarily topple the regime?
This depends on the balance of power between the government and the dissenters. Where is the political
opposition in China today? Does the political opposition enjoy the widespread support of
ordinary Chinese people? Is there any leader who might want to play the role of Gorbachev? None of
these factors exist in China. In sum, in order to make the argument that an economic
slowdown would lead to regime change , one would have to make the argument that
all of the above factors would come into play. Yet, Shambaughs argument does not
demonstrate this. Indeed, a slowing economy is actually bringing several benefits to China. A slower but
stable growth rate would mean less pollution, fewer land-grabbing incidents, less
corruption, less energy consumption, and lower socioeconomic expectations, all of
which lead to reduced social tensions in China, decreasing the possibility of a
regime collapse. Implicit in Shambaugh's argument is the claim that China
and the CCP will collapse unless they adopt Western-style liberal
democracy. But he never attempts to answer a simple question: is
Western-style liberal democracy what most ordinary Chinese people want?
just as true today.

inequality is a result of corruption rather than legitimate hard work.

Shambaugh is wrong too many things would have to go

wrong for collapse to occur their author changed his mind
and wrote a new book about how stable the party actually is
Xie Tao 15, XIE Tao is a professor of political science at the School of English and
International Studies, Beijing Foreign Studies University. He holds a PhD in political
science from Northwestern University (2007). His current research focuses on
Chinese foreign policy and U.S.-China relations. He is the author of U.S.-China
Relations: China Policy on Capitol Hill (Routledge 2009) and Living with the Dragon:
How the American Public Views the Rise of China (with Benjamin I. Page, Columbia
University Press, 2010). He has also published several articles in the Journal of
Contemporary China, including What Affects Chinas National Image? A Cross-

national Study of Public Opinion (September 2013). He is a frequent guest at CCTV

News, BBC, CNN, Al Jazeera, and China Radio International. The Diplomat, 3-202015, "Why Do People Keep Predicting China's Collapse?," Diplomat,
http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/why-do-people-keep-predicting-chinas-collapse/
Gordon Chang may be dismissed as an opportunist who tries to make a fortune political and/or economic out

Shambaugh, a well-respected China scholar at

George Washington University who heretofore has been rather cautious in his assessment of
China. In a March 6 Wall Street Journal article, he portrayed the Chinese party-state as
struggling for its last breath. The endgame of Chinese communist rule has now begun, I believe, and it
of sensational rhetoric about China. But not so with David

has progressed further than many think, he wrote. We cannot predict when Chinese communism will collapse, but

Shambaughs article was

nothing less than a supersize bombshell in the China field, especially in
light of the fact that the Chinese Communist Party under Xi Jinpings
leadership seems to be revitalizing itself through a series of important
measures. And these measures particularly the anti-corruption campaign and the drive
for the rule of law appear to have significantly bolstered popular support for the
new leadership. Shambaugh actually published a book in 2008 that offers a
rather favorable assessment of the party-states abilities to adapt to new
challenges in the first decade of the 21st century. It is unclear what caused
Shambaughs sudden about-face. Some speculate that he was merely trying to get a foreign
policy position in the post-Barack Obama administration. Others contend that he is
the Chinese version of a mugged liberal converted to a conservative, t hat Shambaugh
it is hard not to conclude that we are witnessing its final phase.

is deeply upset by Chinese leaders intransigence on fundamental reforms. Whatever the motives behind
Shambaughs nirvana, there is no denying that China is facing myriad daunting challenges. China is sick but so is
every other country in the world, though each country is sick with different symptoms, for different reasons, and of
different degrees. Take the United State as an example. The worlds oldest democracy may also strike one as
terminally ill: appalling inequality, dilapidated infrastructure, declining public education, astronomical deficits, rising
political apathy, and a government that can hardly get anything done. In his bestseller Political Order and Political

Fukuyama described the American body politic as being

repatrimonialized, ruled by courts and political parties, and gridlocked by too many
veto points. Across the Atlantic, many European democracies are facing similar
problems, particularly financial insolvency. Yet nobody has declared the coming
collapse of American democracy or European democracy. Why? Because many Western
Decay, Francis

analysts (dating back at least to Seymour Martin Lipset) subscribe to the view that as long as political institutions
are viewed as legitimate, a crisis in effectiveness (e.g., economic performance) does not pose fatal threat to a

Thus even in the darkest days of the Great Depression, according to this view,
Americas democratic institutions remained unchallenged. By contrast, if a regime is
already deficient in political legitimacy, a crisis of effectiveness (such as an economic
slowdown, rising inequality, or rampant corruption) would only exacerbate the legitimacy crisis .
regime.

China is widely believed to be a prominent case that fits into this line argument. China might be facing a
performance crisis, but whether it is also facing a legitimacy crisis is debatable. Beauty is in the eyes of beholder;

If the Chinese party-state could survive the riotous years of the

Cultural Revolution and the existential crisis of 1989, why couldnt it
manage to survival another crisis? In fact, a more important question for
Western observers is why the Chinese Communist Party has managed to
stay in power for so long and to produce an indisputably impressive record
of economic development.
so is legitimacy.

1AR Culture checks

No Collapse chinese culture supports authoritarianism
Chen Dingding 15, Dingding Chen is an assistant professor of Government and
Public Administration at the University of Macau and Non-Resident Fellow at the
Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) Berlin, Germany. His research interests include:
Chinese foreign policy, Asian security, Chinese politics, and human rights, 3-102015, "Sorry, America: China Is NOT Going to Collapse," National Interest,
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/sorry-america-china-not-going-collapse-12389?
page=3
Research done by late professor Shi Tianjian also shows that Chinese culture still
favors authoritarianism even as people also desire democracy. Through this
context, we can understand that Xi Jinping has become so popular among the
Chinese masses because of his bold reform measures, which range from soccerreform to overhauling state-owned enterprises. Even in the area of political reform,
Xi is proceeding steadily as consultative democratic mechanisms will soon be
implemented at various governmental levels. Thus, it is no exaggeration to say
that Xi has been the most creative leader in the last three decades. If
anything, the level of support for the CCP is higher now than it was in the
last decade. Ignoring this reality seriously misreads Chinese politics today.

Link Defense

Cyber
US-China improving trust and cooperation now diplomatic
talks
Gerry Shih 6/14, writer for AP News 6-14-2016, "China, US hold talks to bridge
cybersecurity differences," Big Story,
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/a493922899424ecf988f5a917cd63458/china-us-meetcybersecurity-talks-beijing
Chinese and American officials said Tuesday they're committed to bridging their
differences on cybersecurity and moving to implement recent agreements, as they
held talks amid complaints over China-based hacking operations that the U.S. says
may have already cost U.S. companies tens of billions of dollars. Repeated meetings
between the sides on cybersecurity indicate the seriousness with which the Obama
administration regards the issue, the U.S. ambassador to China, Max Baucus, said at
the start of the two-day talks in western Beijing. U.S. officials have been particularly
eager to build on an agreement forged during Chinese President Xi Jinping's visit to
the White House in September that says neither government will support
commercial cyber-theft. The deal was viewed by Washington as a diplomatic
breakthrough, although U.S. officials have not conclusively determined that it has
led to a decline in hacks against U.S. companies. "We're here today to ensure
implementation of agreements made by the two presidents, commitments that
illustrate that we can work through areas of differences to reach areas of
cooperation," Baucus said, referring to the agreement, which he called a "major
advancement." Cyber issues are "an important element in our bilateral
relationship," the ambassador said. "Each step that we take enables us to
have greater trust. We're prepared to work hard with you to narrow our
differences." Chinese Minister of Public Security Guo Shengkun said China wants to
"bring the discussions from policies on paper to actual implementation." "Both sides
will continue to cooperate on cyber cases," Guo said. "I believe the leadership on
both sides places emphasis on the issue and values participation. Xi Jinping has
personally been involved." U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson and
Attorney General Loretta Lynch were scheduled to attend the meetings, but
withdrew following the mass shooting in Orlando, Florida. In a meeting with Suzanne
Spaulding, an undersecretary at the Department of Homeland Security, Meng
Jianzhu, secretary of the Communist Party's Central Political and Legal Affairs
Commission, said China wants to make progress on talks in the final half year of the
Obama administration. "We hope that both sides can work to enrich our cooperation
in the remaining six months and leave more of a political legacy for President
Obama, and lay a strong foundation for our cooperation for the next
administration," said Meng, who as China's de facto security chief has been closely
involved in cybersecurity discussions. Although China denies sponsoring or
permitting hacking attacks, a U.S. congressional advisory body said last year that
China's increasing use of cyber espionage has already cost U.S. companies tens of
billions of dollars in lost sales and expenses in repairing the damage from hacking. It
said that in many cases, stolen trade secrets had been turned over to Chinese

government-owned companies. That body, the U.S.-China Economic and Security

Review Commission, is typically very critical of Beijing, and said the U.S. response to
the threat has been "inadequate." It said China has also infiltrated a wide swath of
U.S. government computer networks. Among the most serious breaches in which
China is suspected was one last year against the Office of Personnel Management.
Hackers gained access to the personal information of more than 22 million U.S.
federal employees, retirees, contractors and others. China describes itself as a
victim of hacking and says it is combating cybercrimes. Along with cybersecurity,
the two days of talks are also expected to deal with global supply chain security,
combating transnational crime, illegal immigration, counterterrorism and maritime
law enforcement.

US and china making substantial progress on Cyber

regulations and trust now white house agreements
David P. Fidler 15, Adjunct Senior Fellow for Cybersecurity at the Council on Foreign Relations and is the James Louis
Calamaras Professor of Law and a Senior Fellow at the Center for Applied Cybersecurity Research at Indiana University and an
Associate Fellow with the Centre on Global Health Security at Chatham House. He is an expert in international law, cybersecurity,
national security, counterinsurgency, biosecurity, and global health. Professor Fidler has been a visiting scholar at the University of
Oxford and the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine and a Fulbright New Century Scholar. He holds a BCL from the
University of Oxford, a JD from Harvard Law School, an MPhil in International Relations from the University of Oxford, and a BA from
the University of Kansas. He was a Truman Scholar from Kansas. He lives in Bloomington, Indiana. 9-28-2015, "Net Politics U.S.China Cyber Deal Takes Norm Against Economic Espionage Global," Council on Foreign Relations - Net Politics,
http://blogs.cfr.org/cyber/2015/09/28/u-s-china-cyber-deal-takes-norm-against-economic-espionage-global/

For years, the United States has argued that economic espionage by governments is
wrong and should stop. The U.S. government became more vocal about this position
as the Internet provided means for governments to engage in economic espionage
on an unprecedented scale. But, among allies and adversaries, the United States made no headway on
its international normuntil last Friday, when the White House announced the U.S. and
Chinese governments agreed not to engage in or support economic espionage and
to cooperate in implementing this commitment. As CFRs Rob Knake and others have said, this
gobsmacking development is important, particularly as a breakthrough in SinoAmerican cyber relations. Even thoughtful skepticism underscores the need to come to grips with its
implications. Appropriately, attention has focused on the deals impact on the U.S.-China
relationship, but it also has significance because it gives the U.S.-supported norm
against economic espionage global potential it never had before. To grasp this change,
recall the difficulties the United States had as evidence of economic cyber espionage by China mounted during the
Obama administration. The Mandiant report released in February 2013 on Chinese economic cyber espionage
galvanized concerns previously expressed by executive branch and congressional officials and led quickly to a new
strategy on the theft of U.S. trade secrets. However, U.S. efforts to advance an international norm against economic

At this time, the normative case

against economic espionage confronted the problem that neither binding
international law nor soft law contained indications that states recognized this
norm. International law contained no serious restrictions on espionage and did not
distinguish between traditional and economic espionage. This problem led to attempts to find
espionage did not produce much, if any, support from other countries.

footholds in other areas of international law, such as the principle of non-intervention and World Trade Organization

Part of
the new U.S. strategy on protecting trade secrets included advancing the norm
against economic espionage in U.S. diplomacy, including in negotiations for trade
agreements, but these effortswhatever the merits of their legal analysesdid not change state practice.

agreements. Snowdens disclosures, which started in June 2013, damaged this project. The disclosures tarnished
U.S. credibility, revealed U.S. intelligence collection against foreign companies and commercial sectors to inform
diplomatic and trade negotiations, and gave China ammunition against U.S. complaints about its cyber behavior.

The U.S. effort to distinguish between permitted and prohibited types of espionage
became more difficult, even while the U.S. government and private cybersecurity
companies believed Chinese economic cyber espionage continued unabated, if not
actually intensified. Continued U.S. attempts to emphasize its norm, such as through
indicting Chinese military personnel in May 2014, failed to gain international traction. This background illuminates
why the agreement on economic espionage announced last week is politically surprising and normatively important.
Initial reactions often focused on why China seemed to accept the U.S. position despite not previously recognizing
the validity of the U.S. stance on economic espionage. Experts frequently commented on the potential impact of the
U.S. decision to impose sanctions on Chinese companies that benefit from economic espionage. The release of more
information and further analysis might reveal a more complex explanation. But what happened is equally important

Now, the United States is no longer the lone normative voice in the
economic espionage wilderness. The leaders of the worlds two biggest political and
economic powers have agreed to act together against economic espionage. The
agreement is not binding international law, but it opens space for advancing the norm against
economic espionage globally that the United States, even before Snowden, did not
create on its own. This development gives the United States leverage in raising the
norm against economic espionage in other diplomatic contexts, including trade
negotiations, regional and bilateral cooperation on cybersecurity , and further UN talks
as why it happened.

about norms of state behavior in cyberspace. This leverage gives the United States an opportunity to push more
credibly for countries to accept this norm and anchor it in international law, which potentially creates a rare
moment in which international legal restrictions on espionage are even conceivable.

Nuclear Energy
Chinese-US trust and cooperation over nuclear power high now
and returning tangible benefits
Xinhua News 3/26, Independent chinese news source, U.S.-China
cooperation on nuclear energy helps build trust in relations: expert 3/26/16, Xinhua
News, accessed: 7/4/16, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/201603/26/c_135225329.htm
Nuclear energy cooperation between the United States and China has yielded
tremendous benefits for both countries and can contribute to trust in the larger
bilateral relationship, a U.S. nuclear energy expert told Xinhua. The United States and China
could further enhance cooperation on nuclear energy as there are vast commercial
opportunities for both countries and the world, Daniel Lipman, vice president of Washington-based
Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), said in an interview ahead of the Nuclear Security Summit to be held in Washington

Bilateral nuclear energy cooperation "requires a strong

foundation of mutual respect and trust that shared technologies will be used only
for peaceful purposes," Lipman said, adding that it is "not something the United States enters into lightly."
Through extensive person-to-person and institutional contacts, commercial nuclear
trade can also share best practices on nuclear safety, security and nonproliferation,
the expert said. In 2015, a new agreement formalizing civil nuclear cooperation between
China and the United States entered into force. The U.S. nuclear energy industry, led by the NEI,
played an instrumental role in securing congressional approval for the new deal. The agreement is "critical for
American nuclear suppliers and U.S. foreign policy priorities," said an NEI report before the
from March 31 to April 1.

pact was approved. "Nuclear cooperation with China advances economic interests, safety culture and climate
goals." Besides nuclear energy cooperation, China and the United States also share an interest in nuclear nonproliferation. Earlier this month, the two countries agreed to broaden an established program on combating illicit
movements and smuggling of nuclear materials.

Proliferation
Chinese-US trust and cooperation over non-proliferation efforts
high now
Xinhua News 3/26, Independent chinese news source, U.S.-China
cooperation on nuclear energy helps build trust in relations: expert 3/26/16, Xinhua
News, accessed: 7/4/16, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/201603/26/c_135225329.htm
Besides nuclear energy cooperation, China and the United States also share an
interest in nuclear non-proliferation. Earlier this month, the two countries agreed to
broaden an established program on combating illicit movements and smuggling of
nuclear materials. "In the past few decades, China has made huge strides in
nonproliferation and the U.S. nuclear energy industry certainly hopes that
China will continue this progress," Lipman said. "From an industry perspective, we are
counting on China's leadership in this area," he said, adding that U.S. laws and
international norms permit nuclear commerce only on the basis of successful
cooperation in nuclear security and nonproliferation. China adopts a "rational,
coordinated and balanced" approach to nuclear security. In January, the Chinese
government issued a nuclear white paper, assuring the world that China has "the
most advanced technology and most stringent standards" to ensure safe and
efficient development of nuclear power. "China's decision to develop nuclear energy looks wiser than
ever," Lipman said, "In certain ways, China offers a model for other countries around the world." By deploying
advanced nuclear power plants safely, on schedule and on budget, China can demonstrate that expanding nuclear
energy is a practical option, said Lipman. "As China gains experience in developing and safely operating nuclear
power plants at home, it will play a larger role in the global nuclear energy supply chain," he added.

Political Reform*
Chinese corruption CCP legitimacy, CCP stability and causes a
laundry list of impacts political reform is a necessity This
card could be read either way it is included as an internal link
card because you could make an argument that continued
corruption and what not for the squo stability causes many
bad things
MINXIN PEI 07, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
Corruption Threatens Chinas Future, Carnegie endowment for international
peace, Policy brief 55 October, 2007,
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/pb55_pei_china_corruption_final.pdf
Unfortunately, such views do not correspond with either Chinese reality or historical fact. First ,

the total costs

of corruption in China are huge. The direct economic loss owing to corruption
represents a large transfer of wealthat least 3 percent of GDP per yearto a tiny
group of elites. This annual transfer, from the poorer to the richer, is fueling Chinas
rapid increase in socioeconomic inequality and the publics perception of social
injustice. Second, the indirect costs of corruptionefficiency losses; waste; and damage to the
environment, public health, education, the credibility of key public institutions, and the morale of the civil service

are incalculable. The high price China is already paying is ample evidence that the
toll of corruption is not theoretical. For example, the bill for bailing out Chinas state-owned
banks, prime victims of corruption in the financial sector, is close to $500 billion. Corruption at the
local level sparks tens of thousands of riots and violent collective protests each
year, undermining social stability and necessitating extra spending on internal
security. Corruption has also contributed to Chinas massive environmental
degradation, deterioration in social services, and the rising costs of housing, health
care, and education. So far, high savings, strong trade performance, and favorable demographics have
enabled Beijing to offset the direct costs of corruption and maintain growth. But corruption has lowered the quality
of Chinas economic growth because its economic expansion has been accompanied by assorted social ills, many of
which will require heavy investment to correct. With a lower level of corruption, China would have achieved growth
of a higher quality, with much less damage to the environment, economic efficiency, public health, and social

Finally, it is worth noting that

Chinas neighbors, ranging from Japan to South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and
Indonesia, have all paid a steep price for corrupt crony capitalism. South Korea,
Thailand, and Indonesia experienced spectacular financial collapses during the
Asian financial crisis a decade ago, in no small part because of the massive
corruption in their financial and corporate sectors. Japans economy stagnated for a
decade, also because of systemic corruption in its corporate sector and political
process. Taiwans growth performance has lost its momentum in the past decade,
and corruption scandals have caused financial strains in the banking sector and
tainted almost the entire political establishment. It is small comfort to argue that China is not as
stability. High-quality growth is more sustainable than low-quality growth.

corrupt as Russia, Suhartos Indonesia, or Mobutus Zaire and that it has prospered in spite of corruption. True,

corruption has not yet derailed Chinas economic rise, sparked a social revolution, or
deterred Western investors. But it would be foolish to conclude that the Chinese
system has an infinite capacity to absorb the mounting costs of corruption.
Economically, runaway corruption stifles commerce, investment, and innovation, as

recent academic research has established. Eventually, growth will falter. Politically,
corrupt ruling elites pay dearly for their misrule at times of crisis. True, everyday
corruption does not cause revolutions. But ruling elites perceived by the population
as irredeemably rapacious and self-serving enjoy little popular legitimacy and would
more likely get overthrown when a major crisis hits, as shown by the fall of Marcos
in the Philippines in 1986 and the collapse of Suhartos dictatorship in Indonesia in
1998. The Chinese government itself is well aware of these political perils. In the Tiananmen crisis of 1989, public
anger at offi- cial corruption was one of the factors that led millions of people throughout China to take to the
streets in support of the prodemocracy student movement. The most dangerous threat of corruption is actually
invisible. Endemic corruption steadily increases a countrys systemic risks. As a result, its financial system is fragile,
its environment degraded and vulnerable, its law enforcement establishment tainted and ineffective, its
infrastructure insecure, its public health system irresponsive, and its regulatory system creaky. The list goes on.
Obviously, the accumulation of systemic risks caused by corruption only increases the likelihood of a major crisis.

Link Turns

Economics = Political Reform

Economic and political reforms are key to the chinese economy
- reform is necesarry to maintain stability
Xin Zhiming & Wang Yanfei 5/17, writers for the China daily news, Supplyside reform 'needs a big push', china daily news, 5/17/16,
http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2016-05/17/content_25310956.htm
President Xi Jinping urged on Monday to "resolutely push forward supply-side structural
reform" as the world's second-largest economy still faces strong headwinds,
reflected by its easing economic indicators for April. The reform is the key to the
overall and long-term well-being of the Chinese economy, he told a
meeting of the Central Leading Group on Financial and Economic Affairs .
The Chinese economy faces cyclical problems as well as challenges of scale, but the
structural and supply-side problems are the most serious, he was quoted by China Central
Television as saying. "The main direction (of the reform) is to reduce ineffective supply, increase
effective supply, and make the supply structure more fitting to the demand
structure," he said. The core of the reform is to push the reform of State-owned enterprises, accelerate the
transformation of government functions, and deepen fundamental reforms, such as those in the pricing, fiscal and

The market and government should both

better play their roles to balance the reforms, he said. Xi made the comments following publication
taxation, financial and pension fields, the president added.

of an article by People's Daily on May 9 citing an "authoritative figure" who analyzed the causes of China's
economic woes and offered the prescription of supply-side reform. On May 10, People's Daily published the text of a
speech that Xi delivered to principal ministerial and provincial officials in January, when he had said that China's
economic future will hinge on supply-side structural reforms. "Xi's reiteration of supply-side structural reform
reflects policymakers' judgment of the current situation," said Dong Yuping, an economist at the Chinese Academy
of Social Sciences. "Supply-side

structural reform is the key to solving the problems

facing the economy," he told China Daily. Supply-side reform, which should focus on "allowing
the market to play a decisive role", must be pushed to add to the long-term vitality
of the Chinese economy, said Dong. Niu Fengrui, director of the Institute for Urban and
Environmental Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences , said China has yet
to effectively implement the supply-side reform agenda. "That's why Xi has
repeatedly called for strengthening of efforts to push the reform ," Niu said. China's
economic growth dipped to 6.9 percent last year, the slowest in 25 years. Although economic indicators showed a
mild rebound in the first quarter, the April data show the momentum of recovery has eased.

Warming Policy = Reform

Warming and environmental policy is good used to push
through domestic reforms and continue economic growth
The economist 15, Raise the green lanterns: China is using climate policy to
push through domestic reforms, 12/5/15, accessed 7/4/16, The Economist,
http://www.economist.com/news/china/21679500-china-using-climate-policy-pushthrough-domestic-reforms-raise-green-lanterns
Where once China viewed
international climate talks as a conspiracy to constrain its economy, it now
sees a global agreement as helpful to its own development. China accounts for
Yet a marked change has taken place in Chinas official thinking.

two-thirds of the worlds increase in the carbon dioxide emitted since 2000. It has come a long way in recognising
the problem.

When China first joined international climate talks, the environment was
just a minor branch of foreign policy. The ministry for environmental protection had no policymaking
powers until 2008. Only in 2012 did public pressure force cities to publish air-pollution
data. Yet today China pledges to cap carbon emissions by 2030 (reversing its former position that, as a developing
power, it should not be bound to an absolute reduction); and it says it will cut its carbon intensity (that is, emissions
per unit of GDP) by a fifth, as well as increase by the same amount the electricity generated from sources other

The latest five-year plan, a blueprint for the Communist Partys

intentions that was unveiled last month, contains clear policy prescriptions for
making economic development more environmentally friendly. Right after the Paris summit,
than fossil fuels.

however it ends, China is expected to make more promises in a new document, co-written by international experts,
that presents a far-reaching programme of how China should clean up its act. It is based on models that account for
both economic and political viability. On top of existing plans, such as launching a national emissions-trading
scheme in 2017, the government may even outline proposals for a carbon tax, something that has eluded many

The big question is why China is now so serious

about climate change. The answer is not that Communist leaders are
newly converted econuts. Rather, they want to use environmental
concerns to rally domestic support for difficult reforms that would sustain
growth in the coming decades. Since a global slowdown in 2008 it has become clear that
to continue growing, China must move its economy away from construction and
energy-intensive industry towards services. At the same time, China faces an energy crunch. For
prosperous countries in the West.

instance, in recent years China has been a net importer of coal, which generates two-thirds of Chinas electricity. It

signing international accords, such

as the one hoped for in Paris, come in, for they will help the government fight entrenched
interests at home. Observers see a parallel with Chinas joining the World Trade Organisation in 2001 . It
allowed leaders to push through internal economic reform against fierce
domestic opposition. In the same way, a global climate treaty should help
it take tough measures for restructuring the economy. It will not be easy. Provincial
all argues for growth plans that involve less carbon. This is where

party bosses and state-owned enterprises hate to shut factories, particularly in those parts of the country, such as
Shanxi and Inner Mongolia in the north, where coal is a big employer. Cutting demand for energy is even harder.
Even if the amount of electricity used by state industry falls, that used by private firms and households is bound to
increase. What is more, environmental regulations and laws laid down by the centre are routinely flouted. But

cleaning up Chinas act has, for the central government, become a political
necessity too. Environmental issues have been major public concerns for over a decade, says Anthony Saich of
Harvard University, which has conducted polls. True, rural people fret most (and with good reason) about water

But those in the cities gripe about their toxic air. Both represent a reproach
to the government over its neglect of peoples lives and health. That is why national
pollution.

economic goals, political goals, public opinion and international pressure all point towards trying to cut emissions,
pollutants included. In particular, says Zhang Zhongxiang of Tianjin University, now that dealing with climate

change is a pillar of Chinas diplomacy, the government must show it can keep its promises. It has some tools at its
disposal. Across the country, the environmental record of government officials has become a crucial part of their
evaluation by the Communist Party; and cadres will be held accountable for their actions even after leaving their
position. Several provinces have already punished officials But there are obstacles to real change. The electricity
grid and national power market are ill-equipped to increase renewable generation by much. Corruption in industrial
procurement remains widespread, which does nothing to promote long-term efficiency or reductions in emissions.
Competing incentives are also in play: earlier this year, the authorities forced a big Chinese investment company to
buy back shares it had sold in old-fashioned industrial fields, for fear that it might depress share prices (which
crashed anyway in a more general stockmarket meltdown). The government will not trust market mechanisms

Nor are leaders yet

pushing for change on all fronts. For instance, government efforts to cut emissions
of carbon dioxide and nitrous oxide are greater than for many other greenhouse
gases. Scarce and polluted water, one of Chinas most severe environmental challenges, is almost entirely
alone, says Yang Fuqiang of the Natural Resources Defense Council, an activist group.

beyond the scope of the current raft of reforms. And China refuses to publish its estimate of the environmental toll
of economic growth.

Util Link Turn?

Utilitarianism is best for government stability Deng and Mao
prove This card is kinda trashy in my opinion but everyything
I cut is kinda trashy
Dr. Baogang Guo 03, is Associate Professor of political science at Dalton State
College. He is President-elect for the Association of Chinese Political Studies (ACPS).
He holds a Ph.D. degree from Brandeis University and a Masters degree from
Zhengzhou University. He is a member of the Asia Council of the University System
of Georgia, and associate editor of the Journal of Chinese Political Science, Political
Legitimacy and Chinas Transition, Journal of Chinese Political Science, vol. 8, nos. 1
& 2, Fall 2003,
https://www.academia.edu/165448/Political_Legitimacy_and_China_s_Transition
The utilitarian approach is an affirmative action that effectively curtailed Maos
legacy of class struggle and politics-first mentality. It depoliticizes the society,
helps heal the deep-rooted factionalism, and restores the economic
vitality of China. While the profound market reform might strengthen the party-states utilitarian
justification, it also further weakened the CCPs moral capital. Soon after the reform began, intellectuals started

Deng quickly denounced the movement as bourgeoisie

liberalization and came up with the so-called four cardinal principles to set limits on political changes.53 To
maintain political and social stability, he moved away from Maos
totalitarianism, and established a rational, authoritarian order. In this new
order, the intellectuals enjoyed a limited freedom as long as it was
confined in the big cage of four cardinal principles. The legal system was also
restored. The lawlessness of the Mao era and the experience of the Cultural
Revolution helped foster a consensus that a socialist legal system must be
established. The Constitution of 1982 was a major breakthrough in PRCs legal history. It recognized the
demanding more political freedom.

principle of popular sovereignty, re-established the principle of the supremacy of laws, and restored a system of
limited separation of powers and checks and balances. 54 A large number of statutory and administrative laws were
enacted during this period. The system of administrative supervision was established to monitor state agencies and
personnel. A law passed in 1989 allowed citizens to sue administrative agencies and to hold public officials
accountable for their actions.

Internal Link Defense

Economics Legitmacy
CCP legitmacy is not tied to economics party has flourished
independent of economic progress
Ankit Panda 15, writer for the Diplomat with expertise in on security, politics,
economics, and culture. The Diplomat, 6-18-2015, "Where Does the CCP's
Legitimacy Come From? (Hint: It's Not Economic Performance)," Diplomat,
http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/where-does-the-ccps-legitimacy-come-from-hint-itsnot-economic-performance/
conventional wisdom in conversations about Chinas political stability that is often
presented as a truism: the Chinese Communist Partys (CCP) legitimacy stems from
its ability to deliver high economic growth; if economic growth disappears, so will its
legitimacy; this in turn will lead to the beginning of the end of the CCP. The a priori
appeal is evident since the reason stands the test of common sense. After all, assuming a broad definition of
legitimacy, it would make sense that keeping citizens happy through high economic growth would prevent social
unrest or calls for a new form of government. How do you keep citizens happy? Well, you can expand the economic
pie, ensuring that everyone gets a larger slicemore per capita GDP leads to more per capita happiness leads to
less revolution and upheaval. For CCP elites, mass upheaval over economic outcomes is best avoided by keeping

New research challenges this conventional

wisdom with evidence. A new Global Working Paper (PDF warning) from the Brookings Institution
inverts the reasoning I outlined above. Measuring legitimacy is of course a tricky endeavor, so the
paper instead measures well-beingroughly how happy citizens areagainst Chinas economic
performance (the word legitimacy does not appear in the paper). The paper additionally looks at the
prevalence of mental health disorders in China. The finding of interest, distilled in a Brookings blog
post, is as follows: We find that the standard determinants of well-being are the same for
China as they are for most countries around the world. At the same time, China stands
out in that unhappiness and reported mental health problems are highest among
the cohorts who either have or are positioned to benefit from the transition and
related growtha clear progress paradox . These are urban residents, the more
educated, those who work in the private sector, and those who report to have
insufficient leisure time and rest. The papers finding has already drawn intelligent commentary from a
few commentators (political scientist Jay Ulfelder and blogger T. Greer have posted important reactions). The
finding that well-being, particularly among Chinese economic elites, is
decoupledand even inversely correlatedwith Chinas overall economic
growth would suggest that the CCPs survival might be independent of
Chinas overall economic performance. Thus, the CCP thrives not because
it makes Chinese elites happy, but despite Chinese elites unhappiness. As
Ulfelder summarizes: These survey results contradict the performance legitimacy story
that many observers use to explain how the Chinese Communist Party has managed
to avoid significant revolutionary threats since 1989 (see here, for example). In that story,
Chinas year-on-year growth rates as high as possible.

Chinese citizens choose not to demand political liberalization because they are satisfied with the governments

The decline in overall

well-being among elites does present a serious challenge to the conventional
explanation of the CCPs legitimacy. The authors of the Brookings report also highlight previous
studies of well-being and life satisfaction in China that measured a large decline in happiness among the
lowest-income and least-educated segments of the population . In previous studies, Chinas
upper socioeconomic strata exhibited a rise in happiness, somewhat confirming the conventional
economic performance. In effect, they accept material gains in lieu of political voice.

wisdom explanation. Additionally, the authors note numerous independent variables that affect happiness, including
rural/urban status, internal migration status (urban households and migrant households report lower happiness
levels than their rural, non-migrant counterparts). Where does the CCPs legitimacy come from then? As Greer

looking at the per capita distribution of wealth in China has been the
wrong measure all alongits unnecessarily reductive and dismissive of the
opinions of actual Chinese people. Instead, Chinese people would attribute the
legitimacy of the CCP to specific policy initiatives (i.e., fighting corruption, delivering
justice to wrong-doers within the countrys power apparatus) as well as more
diffuse, nation-level factors (i.e., the CCPs role in helping China, as a country and a
nation, become wealthy, powerful, and respected on the international stage).
notes, maybe

No link between economic development and party

reform/stability
Dr. Cheng Li 13, master's in Asian studies from the University of California,
Berkeley and a doctorate in political science from Princeton University. director of
the John L. Thornton China Center and a senior fellow in the Foreign Policy program
at Brookings, From 1993 to 1995, he worked in China as a fellow with the U.S.-based
Institute of Current World Affairs , Chinas Third Plenum: Reform And Opening Up
2.0?, 10/31/13, Brookings Institute,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2013/10/31-chinas-third-plenum-reformand-opening-up/103113_cpc_transcript_ia.pdf
the second pessimistic view is the valid argument that economic development and the
political change are closely linked. According to this view, Xi Jinpings governing strategy, which can be
Now,

characterized as politically conservative and economically liberal, will not be sustainable. While I agree with this

predict is unlikely to happen for two

reasons. First, it overlooks the importance of implementing reforms in a
sustainable sequence. Second, given the close linkage between economic
development and the political changes, some of the deeper market reform
will not only pave the way for political changes but will also provide the
necessity or necessary political capital for Xi Jinping and his team to
pursue political reform in the near future. Now, let me very briefly explain these points. It is
appropriate to identify Xi Jinping and his leadership as politically conservative and
economically liberal. None of the seven members of the Politburo Standing
Committee, the superior decision-making body in the country, are famous for being
strongly interested in pursuing political reforms. The politically conservative nature
of the top leadership became evident early this year when instructions were sent to
Chinese university think tanks and other research institutions ordering public
intellectuals to avoid speaking about seven sensitive issues, including universal values,
assessment, I believe that the pessimistic outcome that they

freedom of speech, civil society, citizens rights, past mistakes made by the party, state capitalism, and judicial

Now, this directive has resonated very poorly with

Chinese public intellectuals. In addition, media censorship has undoubtedly
tightened under the new leadership. Liberal legal scholars and human rights
lawyers are often among the primary targets for harsh treatment, including
imprisonment. Now, for the top leadership, tight political control is much easier than
to pursue political reform. The recent scandals and most noticeably, the Bo Xilai case, have led the largest
independence or constitutionalism.

legitimate crisis of the party since the 1989 Tiananmen. The trial for Bo Xilai made it crystal clear to the Chinese
public that the inner circle of the high-ranking party leaders have decadent lifestyles filled with drugs, sex, money
laundering, and even murder

AT: Factionalism Bad

CCP officials share common goal of party stability uniting them
regardless of ideological differencess no impact to
factionalism
Dr. Willy Wo-Lap Lam 15, Senior Fellow at The Jamestown Foundation. He is an
Adjunct Professor at the Center for China Studies, the History Department and the
Program of Masters in Global Political Economy at the Chinese University of Hong
Kong. Chinese Politics in the Era of Xi Jinping, 2015,
https://books.google.com/books?
id=vsgqBwAAQBAJ&pg=PT8&source=gbs_selected_pages&cad=3#v=onepage&q&f
=false
Like all large political parties in the world, the CCP has been riven with factions or
what Mao used to call mountain strongholds since the days when the guerrilla leaders
schemed and plotted in the eaves ofYanan. Shaanxi Province. Factionalism almost led to the ruin of the Partyand

Until Dengs death in 1997,

rivalry among the CCPs disparate camarillas was in large measure predicated upon
ideological differences. There was the struggle between two lines between Chairman Mao. on the one
Chinaduring the violent clashes of the Cultural Revolution (1966-76).

hand, and capitalist roaders" such as State President Liu Shaoqi and Deng, on the other. For much of the 1980s
and 1990s. Deng fought numerous battles with the conservative patriarch Chen Yuna keen advocate of reform

After the Tiananmen

Square crisis in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet and East European Communist
parties in the early 1990s, however, a solid consensus has emerged among all CCP
factions that they must preserve a high degree of unity on a range of
core interests in the ideological and policy arenas, including
maintaining the Parlys monopoly on power; cracking down on dissent and
foreign conspiracies" to turn China into a capitalist country: taking tough
measures against secessionist or anti-Beijing" activities in Tibet. Xinjiang.
Hong Kong, and Taiwan; maintaining economic growth of at least 7 percent a year, which is
seen as essential for preventing social instability; and. equally importantly,
preserving the vested interests of existing power blocs and stakeholders, which
include the major clans of the Party."2 Thus, until about the time of the Tiananmen Square incident in
within a birdcage"over the pace and orientation of economic liberalization."1

1989. the question of whether or not to reform belonged in the realm of ideology and world-views. But alter the

after the collapse of the Soviet Union, holders of vested

interestsincluding the heads of major Party factionscame to an agreement that
preserving the status quo was of the utmost priority. An unprecedented number of spouses and
June 4. 1989. massacre, and especially

children of top cadres of different political stripes have gone into business. Some have become senior managers of
SOE conglomerates. Even more have used their sterling political connections to start private firms in lucrative areas
such as finance and real estate. Critics of the government do not seem to be exaggerating when they say that 1(X)
or so of the biggest clans within the countrys red aristocracy control the largest chunk of economic pic. According
to the China Daily, the top 1 percent of Chinese families control 41.4 percent of the countrys wealth. Other official
media reported in the late 2000s that 91 percent of Chinese citizens who owned more than RMB 100 million came
from high-cadre families.

Impact Defense

No Impact - SCS
No risk of conflict escalation with Japan high risk of chinese
causualties prevents provocate action by Beijing answers
their three scenarios for escalation.
Allen Carlson 15, Associate Professor in Cornell Universitys Government Department. His work mainly
focuses on issues related to Chinese politics and foreign policy and Asian security. In 2005 hisUnifying China,
Integrating with the World: Securing Chinese Sovereignty in the Reform Era was published by Stanford University
Press. He has also written in the Journal of Contemporary China, Pacific Affairs, Asia Policy, Nations and Nationalism
and The China Quarterly (forthcoming). His most recent books are the co-editedContemporary Chinese Politics: New
Sources, Methods and Field Strategies (Cambridge University Press, 2010) and New Frontiers in Chinas Foreign
Relations (Lexington, 2011). In 2014 Carlson was the Class of 1955 Visiting Professor of International Studies at
Williams College, and he was named a recipient of an East Asia Institute Fellowship, Why Chinese Nationalism
Could Impact the East and South China Seas VERY Differently, 9/24/15, National Interest,
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-chinese-nationalism-could-impact-the-east-south-china-13922

There is a great deal at stake in both the East and South China Seas, not only for
those competing over these spaces, but also for the United States. It is crucial to
understand why the situation there has become so fraught: In both cases it is widely recognized that
the key driver for conflict is the rise of nationalism, particularly in China. But, such a
view is incomplete, and as a result misleading. Chinese nationalism is not a singular
entity. The way it is framed with reference to Chinas Asian neighbors varies significantly. Within such variations
lie important, but largely overlooked, implications for the how Beijing is handling its maritime disputes, and by
extension for the degree of volatility within such conflicts. Paradoxically, Chinese nationalism towards Japan is so
pointed that it has an ossifying effect on Beijings approach to the East China Sea. In contrast, in the South China
Sea there is somewhat less at stake for Chinese nationalists and the situation is much more fluid and potentially

Opposing Japan is a foundational anchor for contemporary Chinese

nationalismand it is difficult to understate the depth of antagonism toward Japan in China. It is readily
visible in everyday life within China, both in casual conversations and in the stream
of shows on Chinese television that repeatedly re-create scenes of past Japanese
aggression. Such belligerence was most recently on public display during Beijings September 3
dangerous.

commemoration of the 70th anniversary of Japans surrender that ended WWII. One might think that such a
vilification of Japan would tend to make the conflict between Beijing and Tokyo over ownership of the
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea all the more explosive. It did appear to fuel confrontation in 2012

Chinas leaders
stopped short of direct military engagement with Japan, because domestic
ramifications of a battlefield death would have been wide-ranging and potentially
impossible to manage. In other words, Chinese nationalist sentiment toward
Japan was so toxic that Beijing appears to have come to the realization
that bluntly engaging Tokyo on disputed territory carried too much risk.
The subsequent period of extended dtente, albeit a frosty one, between the two
East Asian nations, is a natural extension of such a push. Beijing is being deterred in
the East China Sea by the depth of anti-Japanese sentiment in China. Such a
collective identity makes the prospects for peace over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands
exceedingly remote, but it also has a calcifying effect on the conflict itself. It leaves
it frozen in place, unlikely to be resolved, but equally unlikely to devolve into an
armed confrontation. Thus, unexpectedly, Chinese nationalism, at least in this case,
is a cause for something that resembles stability within the region . The South
when the two sides last escalated their dispute over this territory. However, at that time,

China Sea: Troubled Waters Chinese nationalists have also set their sights on the South China Sea and reclaiming
contested territory there. However, Chinese sensitivities here are less raw, less pronounced, than they are in the
East China Sea. As much resentment as there is in China of perceived Vietnamese and Filipino infringements upon

Chinese sovereignty here, Vietnam and the Philippines are bit players within the story of Chinese nationalism in
comparison to Japan. Perversely, the absence of such pointed animosity makes for a more fluid, and potentially

A Chinese death in the South China Sea, whether at the hands

of Vietnam or the Philippines, would raise the ire of Chinese nationalists, but it
would not enflame nationalist sentiments in the way that a similar event would if it
involved Japan. As a result, Chinas leaders can bolster their nationalist credentials at home in these disputes
dangerous, security dynamic.

by exerting greater pressure on Hanoi and Manila, without running as great a risk that should things go astray they
might result in upheaval at home. By extension the situation in the South China Sea is less stable, and more
dangerous, than is the case in and around the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands

Standoff wont escalate not in the best interest of either

coutry
Dr. Xue Li and Xu Yanzhuo 15, Dr. Xue Li is Director of the Department of
International Strategy at the Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences. Xu Yanzhuo received her doctorate from Durham
University (UK) in December 2014 and studies international responsibility, South
China Sea disputes, and Chinese foreign policy. The US and China Won't See
Military Conflict Over the South China Sea, 6/19/15, The Diplomat, accessed on
7/4/16, http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/the-us-and-china-wont-see-military-conflictover-the-south-china-sea/
In a recent piece on the South China Sea disputes, I argued that the ASEAN claimants are largely staying behind

on the South China

Sea issue, it seems the U.S. will not only be a director but an actor . We saw this clearly
on May 20, when the U.S. military sent surveillance aircraft over three islands controlled by Beijing. However,
this does not necessary mean the South China Sea will spark a U.S.-China
military conflict. As a global hegemon, the United States main interest lies in
maintaining the current international order as well as peace and stability. Regarding the
South China Sea, U.S. interests include ensuring peace and stability, freedom of
commercial navigation, and military activities in exclusive economic zones.
Maintaining the current balance of power is considered to be a key condition for
securing these interestsand a rising China determined to strengthen its hold on South China Sea
territory is viewed as a threat to the current balance of power . In response, the U.S.
launched its rebalance to Asia strategy. In practice, the U.S. has on the one hand strengthened its
the scenes while external powers take center stage. Based on recent developments

military presence in Asia-Pacific, while on the other hand supporting ASEAN countries, particularly ASEAN claimants
to South China Sea territories.

This position has included high-profile rhetoric by U.S.

officials. In 2010, then-U.S. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton spoke at the ASEAN Regional Forum in Hanoi about
the South China Sea, remarks that aligned the U.S. with Southeast Asias approach to the disputes. At the 2012
Shangri-La Dialogue, then-Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta explained how the United States will rebalance its
force posture as part of playing a deeper and more enduring partnership role in the Asia-Pacific region. In 2014,
then-Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel called out Chinas destabilizing, unilateral activities asserting its claims in
the South China Sea. His remarks also came at the Shangri-La dialogue, while Chinas HY-981 oil rig was deployed

In 2015, U.S. officials have openly pressured China to

scale back its construction work in the Spratly islands and have sent aircraft to
patrol over islands in the Spratly that are controlled by China . These measures have brought
global attention to the South China Sea. However, if we look at the practical significance of the
remarks, there are several limiting factors . The interests at stake in the South
China Sea are not core national interests for the United States. Meanwhile,
the U.S.-Philippine alliance is not as important as the U.S.-Japan alliance,
and U.S. ties with other ASEAN countries are even weaker. Given U.S.-China
in the waters around the Paracel Islands.

mutual economic dependence and Chinas comprehensive national strength, the

United States is unlikely to go so far as having a military confrontation with China
over the South China Sea. Barack Obama, the peace president who withdrew the U.S. military from Iraq
and Afghanistan, is even less likely to fight with China for the South China Sea. As for the U.S. interests in the

Washington is surely aware that China has not affected the freedom
of commercial navigation in these waters so far. And as I noted in my earlier piece,
Beijing is developing its stance and could eventually recognize the legality of
military activities in another countrys EEZ (see, for example, the China-Russia joint military
region,

exercise in the Mediterranean). Yet when it comes to Chinas large-scale land reclamation in the Spratly Islands (and
on Woody Island in the Paracel Islands), Washington worries that Beijing will conduct a series of activities to
strengthen its claims on the South China Sea, such as establishing an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) or

the 2014 oil rig

incident taught Washington that ASEAN claimants and even ASEAN as a whole could
hardly play any effective role in dealing with Chinas land reclamation . Hence, the U.S.
has no better choice than to become directly involved in this issue. At the beginning, the United States tried
to stop China through private diplomatic mediation , yet it soon realized that this
approach was not effective in persuading China. So Washington started to tackle the
issue in a more aggressive way, such as encouraging India, Japan, ASEAN, the G7,
and the European Union to pressure Beijing internationally. Domestically, U.S. officials from
advocating that others respect a 200-nautical mile (370 km) EEZ from its islands. Meanwhile,

different departments and different levels have opposed Chinas changing the status quo in this area. Since 2015,
Washington has increased its pressure on China. It sent the USS Fort Worth, a littoral combat ship, to sail in waters
near the Spratly area controlled by Vietnam in early May. U.S. official are also considering sending naval and air

Washington has recognized

that it could hardly stop Chinas construction in Spratly Islands. Therefore, it has
opted to portray Beijing as a challenger to the status quo, at the same time moving to
patrols within 12 nautical miles of the Spratly Islands controlled by China.

prevent China from establishing a South China Sea ADIZ and an EEZ of 200 nautical miles around its artificial
islands. This was the logic behind the U.S. sending a P-8A surveillance plane with reporters on board to approach
three artificial island built by China. China issued eight warnings to the plane; the U.S. responded by saying the
plane was flying through international airspace. Afterwards, U.S. Defense Department spokesman, Army Col. Steve
Warren, said there could be a potential freedom of navigation exercise within 12 nautical miles of the artificial
islands. If this approach were adopted, it would back China into a corner; hence its a unlikely the Obama
administration will make that move. As the U.S. involvement in the South China Sea becomes more aggressive and
high-profile, the dynamic relationship between China and the United States comes to affect other layers of the

To some
extent, the South China Sea dispute has developed into a balance of
power tug-of-war between the U.S. and China, yet both sides will not take
the risk of military confrontation. As Foreign Minister Wang Yi put it in a recent meeting with U.S.
dispute (for example, relations between China and ASEAN claimants or China and ASEAN in general).

Secretary of State John Kerry, as for the differences, our attitude is it is okay to have differences as long as we
could avoid misunderstanding, and even more importantly, avoid miscalculation.

Cooperation Now
US and China working on cooperation now 2016 RIMPAC
exercises
Carlo Muoz 6/29, military correspondent for The Washington Times focusing on
U.S. defense and national security policy, programs and operations. He was most
recently a foreign correspondent with the Stars and Stripes Mideast bureau, based
in Kabul, Afghanistan. Mr. Muoz also reported on U.S. and foreign military
operations in South America, Cuba and the Asia-Pacific region. His work has
appeared in The Guardian, United Press International, Atlantic Media, Air Force
Magazine, USNI News and elsewhere, China joins U.S. in navy exercises amid rising
tensions, 6/29/16, The Washington Times,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/jun/29/china-joins-us-in-rimpac-2016navy-exercises-amid-/
The Chinese navy will be participating in the biennial Rim of the Pacific naval war
games for only the second time ever. Some see the move in what U.S. defense
officials call RimPac 2016 as a long-awaited olive branch by Beijing to the
U.S. and its regional allies, and others fear it is a calculated gesture to further reinforce aggressively
sought gains in the South China Sea and elsewhere in the Pacific. Adding to the political overtones of Chinas
participation will be a July 12 ruling, right in the middle of the exercises, by an international tribunal on a closely
watched Philippine complaint about Beijings broad claims of sovereignty in the South China Sea, one of the worlds

China will join the United States and 25 other nations in the Rim
of the Pacific naval war games, which are designed to improve combat coordination
and cooperation among the Asia-Pacifics maritime powers. They also have become the
most strategic waterways.

largest showcase of American naval power in the region. The exercises, to be held off the coast of California and

The China
invitation has raised eyebrows on Capitol Hill and criticism from some
private analysts, but U.S. military leaders have lauded RimPac 2016 as an
opportunity to engage with Beijing and perhaps encourage it to take a
softer line on regional maritime clashes. While we have disagreements
with China, especially over its destabilizing behavior in the South China
Sea, we are committed to working with them and to persuade them to
avoid self-isolation, Defense Secretary Ashton Carter said in a speech last
near the Hawaiian Islands, will be the 25th since 1971. China has participated only in 2014.

week to the Center for a New American Security. Adm. John Richardson, chief of naval operations, is slated to travel
to Beijing for the first face-to-face meeting with his Chinese counterpart, Adm. Wu Shengli, since taking the top
Navy job. Chinese naval forces participated in the Rim of the Pacific drills in 2014 at the behest of the Pentagon, but
their role involved only a handful of top Chinese naval officials and a single ship. This year, the Chinese navy is
expected to field five ships, including two guided missile warships and a submarine rescue ship, along with a
complement of nearly 1,500 sailors, according to reports of Beijings plans. Chinas role in the Pacific drills
represents a new type of major power relationship between Washington and Beijing, Chinese Deputy Navy
Commander Wang Hei told the official Xinhua News Agency. That participation could put U.S. interests in the Pacific
at a major disadvantage, said Dean Cheng, a senior Pacific security analyst with The Heritage Foundation.

Extending the offer to China to take part in the Pacific Rim exercises is tantamount
to rewarding the countrys military belligerence , particularly in places like the South China Sea, by
granting China access to American naval strategy, Mr. Cheng said. The invitation to the Pacific
Rim exercises makes it very clear that the United States feels incumbent
to [reach out] to China while turning a blind eye to its military
transgressions, he said.

AT: Warming = Root cause of conflict

Trying to explain global warming as the root of conflict is
incorrect and glosses over many other key human factors that
cause war in the first place
Amy Westervelt 15, a California-based freelance reporter who covers the
environment, business and health, regularly contributing to the Guardian and Wall
Street Journal. She is also a co-founder of Climate Confidential, Does climate
change really cause conflict?, 3/9/15, The Guardian,
https://www.theguardian.com/vital-signs/2015/mar/09/climate-change-conflict-syriaglobal-warming accessed on 7/5/16
Humans have fought over resources for millennia, so recent studies indicating a link
between severe drought and the civil war in Syria shouldnt come as a complete
surprise. That said, some researchers warn we might be jumping to conclusions
too quickly. Any attempt by scholars over the past several years to link climate
change with conflict has been hotly contested , and not just by climate deniers. Many
respected conflict researchers believe that climate change is happening,
that humans are contributing to it, and that its a big problem, but that
focusing on it as a cause of war may be wrongheaded. The problem is both
scientific and social. If you want to show that climate change has contributed to an
increase in civil violence, then you need to control for other factors, explains Andrew
Solow, senior scientist at the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute in Massachusetts. This is a fundamental
scientific principle. But it is difficult to do. Half a dozen or so researchers have attempted to do this,
and a few have come close. In 2013, Stanford researchers Sol Hsiang and Marshall Burke, for example, conducted a
meta analysis of 50 studies on conflict and climate change and found that higher temperatures and extreme
precipitation tend to correlate with greater incidence of conflict. I sometimes have the feeling that some people only
care about human suffering if it can be traced to climate change. Andrew Solow But dig into any particular case and
the connection is less clear-cut. The factors influencing civil violence can be quite complicated and vary in
complicated ways from situation to situation, Solow says. Its like what [Tolstoy] said about unhappy families: they

In many cases, the researchers themselves are

appropriately cautious when making any claims about the connection
between climate and conflict. In a statement that accompanied Hsiang and
Burkes study, for example, Hsiang wrote: Theres no conflict that we
think should be wholly attributed to some specific climatic event. Every
conflict has roots in interpersonal and intergroup relations. What were trying to
are all unhappy in different ways.

point out is that climate is one of the critical factors [that] affect how things escalate, and if they escalate to the
point of violence. Although some have criticized the pairs attempts to quantify how climate change impacts the
risk of conflict, the bulk of the criticism both of the Stanford study and the more recent study linking climate
change with the conflict in Syria has been of the medias oversimplified take on the research. Each time a study
on this connection is released, the majority of headlines tend to be along the lines of War Linked to Global

Newspapers might be excused for using such headlines as opposed to the

more accurate but unwieldy: Global Warming Might Exacerbate Some of the Factors that Can Lead to
Warming.

Conflict. But scientists warn that when discussing these issues, nuance is important. I have tremendous respect
for the authors of the recent study of violence in Syria, Solow says. But given the history of Syria and the region
generally, I find it hard to believe that, but for the drought, this violence would not have occurred. Edward Carr, a
University of South Carolina geography professor, has been a particularly vocal opponent of such reductive takes on
climate change and conflict. When Hsiang and Burkes paper came out, Carr explained his criticism of work
connecting climate change and conflict as being driven by a deep concern that
(which remains preliminary)

work on this subject

might disproportionately influence policy decisions in

unproductive or even problematic directions (such as by contributing to the unnecessary

militarization of development aid and humanitarian assistance). Climate as threat multiplier It might be more
accurate to consider climate change in the way that the Pentagon has come to think of it: as a threat multiplier.
Rising global temperatures, changing precipitation patterns, climbing sea levels and more extreme weather events
will intensify the challenges of global instability, hunger, poverty and conflict, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel said
in a statement announcing the US defense departments 2014 Climate Change Adaptation Roadmap. As a precursor
to conflict, lack of access to basic human needs is a major driver and its only getting worse. Pete Newell Pete
Newell, a retired army colonel and a consultant to the defense department and other government agencies, says he
has seen the impacts of water and energy scarcity firsthand in conflict zones. In my personal opinion, that
underlies a lot of the issues and conflict, Newell says. I saw it a few years ago, watching tribes along the Iraq-Iran
border going to war over water rights. And its becoming worse as populations migrate to urban coastal centers and
those areas ability to provide services are overwhelmed .

As a precursor to conflict, lack of access

to basic human needs is a major driver and its only getting worse.

Warming Defense

Generic
New IPCC studies show not extinction from global warming
Michael Bastasch 14, Reporter and investigative researcher at The Daily Caller
News Foundation and former Government Relations Intern at The Heritage
Foundation and B.A in political science from the University of Portland, IPCC runs
from claims that global warming will cause mass extinctions, Daily Caller, 3/24/14,
Accessed: 7/8/16, http://dailycaller.com/2014/03/24/ipcc-runs-from-claims-thatglobal-warming-will-cause-mass-extinctions/
The United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change is distancing itself
from past claims that global warming could cause mass extinctions. A leaked IPCC
draft report says that there is very little confidence that the models currently
predict accurately the risk of extinction. The leaked report, obtained by Germanys Der Spiegel
newspaper, says that an acute lack of data have added to doubts over past claims
made by climate scientists of mass extinctions in the future. [B]iological findings
have increased doubt over the expected species extinction, says the IPCC. In its 2007
climate assessment, the IPCC said that there was a medium confidence that 20 to 30 percent of plant and animal
species were at risk of going extinct if global temperatures rose between 1.5 and 2.5 degrees Celsius this century. If
temperatures rose by 3.5 degrees Celsius the IPCC predicted significant extinctions would occur between 40
and 70 percent of species.Environmental groups have also warned of mass extinctions due to global warming. The
Nature Conservancy says that one-fourth of Earths species will be headed for extinction by 2050 if the warming
trend continues at its current rate. The group adds that polar bears may be gone from the planet in as little as
100 years and that several U.S. states may even lose their official birds as they head for cooler climates
including the Baltimore oriole of Maryland, black-capped chickadee of Massachusetts, and the American goldfinch of
Iowa.

But Der Spiegel reports that the IPCC is shying away from such claims and
gives no concrete numbers for how many plant and animal species could be at risk
if global temperatures increased. While the IPCC does say that the pace of global
warming is making it hard for some species to adapt, the lack of basic data makes it
impossible for there to be any hard evidence to back up this claim.

No extinction too many problems with climate change models

Patrick J. Michaels 04, senior fellow in environmental studies at the Cato
Institute, A Massive Extinction of Logic, Cato Institute,1/13/2004, Accessed 7/8/16,
http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/massive-extinction-logic
Theres a convenient reality check available. Thats because surface temperatures indeed have risen this amount in

there is absolutely NO evidence for massive climate-related

extinctions. (One would think the reviewers at Nature would have picked that up!) There are several
other major problems: Global climate models, in general, predict a warmer surface and
an increased rate of rainfall. As long as there is adequate moisture, the most diverse ecosystems on
earth are in the warmest regions, the tropical rainforest being the prime example. Consequently, the
general character of future climate is one which is more, not less hospitable for
biodiversity. Temperatures have been bouncing up and down a lot more than 0.8C
during the past several hundred thousand years. The published methodology implies that there
the last 100 years. But

are large extinctions for each and every increment of equivalent change, whether the temperature goes up or

Applying this method to all those changes would extinct just about every
species on earth! Species often thrive well outside their gross climatic envelope.
The U.S. Department of Agriculture has mapped the distribution of all major tree
species in North America. For almost every species, there are separate disjunct
down.

populations far away from the main climatic distribution. A fine example is the Balsam fir,
Abies balsamea, whose main distribution is across Canada. But there is a tiny fir forest, a relic of the ice age, still
standing in eastern Iowa, hundreds of miles south (and about 10 degrees warmer) than the climatic envelope that

These disjuncts are the rule, not the

exception, in nature, and are one reason why the most diverse ecosystem on earth
the tropical rainforest managed to survive the ice age. Perhaps most egregious, this
people normally assume to circumscribe its distribution.

work makes what the famed agronomist Paul Waggoner has called the dumb people assumption: that people
wont adapt to changing conditions.

In fact, we have been preserving diversity artificially, in

parks and zoos, for centuries. In addition, the amount of artificial genetic diversity
is rising dramatically with the technology of modern genetics. It is difficult to
imagine, decades from now, that these technologies would not be applied to
ameliorate a prospective massive extinction.

AT: Coral Bleaching

Coral bleaching theories of extinction are wrong
Craig D. Idso 4/13, the founder and former President of the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global
Change and currently serves as Chairman of the Centers board of directors. Dr. Idso has been involved in the global warming
debate for many years and has published peer-reviewed scientific articles on issues related to data quality, the growing season, the
seasonal cycle of atmospheric CO2, world food supplies, coral reefs, and urban CO2 concentrations, the latter of which he
investigated via a National Science Foundation grant as a faculty researcher in the Office of Climatology at Arizona State University.
Since 1998, he has been the editor and a chief contributor to the online magazine CO2 Science. Dr. Idso is a member of the
American Association for the Advancement of Science, American Geophysical Union, American Meteorological Society, Association of
American Geographers, Ecological Society of America, The Geological Society of America, and The Honor Society of Phi Kappa Phi.
He also serves as co-editor of the Nongovernmental International Panel on Climate Change (NIPCC) and he is the former Director of
Environmental Science at Peabody Energy in St. Louis, Missouri. Dr. Idso received his B.S. in Geography from Arizona State
University, his M.S. in Agronomy from the University of Nebraska - Lincoln, and his Ph.D. in Geography from Arizona State University,
where he studied as one of a small group of University Graduate Scholars. Coral Bleaching Is Not a Tell-Tale Sign of Imminent
Extinction, Cato Institute, 4/13/16, accessed 7/8/16, http://www.cato.org/blog/coral-bleaching-not-tell-tale-sign-imminent-extinction

Coral bleaching is one of the most frequently cited negative consequences

projected to result from CO2-induced global warming. It is a characterized by a loss of
color in certain reef-building corals that occurs when algal symbionts, or
zooxanthellae, living within the host corals are subjected to various stresses (usually
higher than normal ocean temperatures) and expelled, resulting in a loss of photosynthetic
pigments from the coral colony. If the stress is mild, or short in duration, the affected corals often
recover and regain their normal complement of zooxanthellae. However, if the stress is prolonged, or extreme, the
corals eventually die, being deprived of their primary food source. In her article, Innis reports that corals bleached
at many locations this year as a result of warmer ocean temperatures associated with El Nio, so therefore if
something isnt done to stop global warming (note to the author: that is impossible), these incredible underwater
species will go extinct. As noted above,

theres a substantial literature showing that corals are

pretty resilient. Consider the recently published work of Guest et al. (2016), who reported on the status of a
coral community on a highly disturbed reef site south of mainland Singapore before, during and after a major
warming event that occurred throughout the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia in 2010, leaving in its wake many

First of all, the

13 scientists note that approximately two thirds of the coral colonies bleached; but
that post-bleaching recovery was quite rapid and, importantly, that coral taxa that
are usually highly susceptible were relatively unaffected. Secondly, they note that
there was no significant change in coral taxonomic community structure as a
result of the bleaching. Third on their list of discoveries was the fact that several
factors may have contributed to the overall high resistance of corals at this site,
including Symbiodinium affiliation, turbidity and heterotrophy. Taken together, all
of these observations led the thirteen researchers to ultimately conclude that
turbid shallow reef communities may be remarkably resilient to acute thermal
stress. And they conclude that their results (1) suggest an under-appreciated resilience in disturbed impacted
severely bleached coral reefs. And in so doing, they discovered the following intriguing facts.

reef systems and that (2) corals that have been classified as losers in the face of climate change may have a
greater capacity for adaptation and/or acclimatization than previously supposed.