Vera vs Avelino

Facts of the Case:

The Commission on Elections submitted last May 1946 to the President and the

Congress a report regarding the national elections held in 1946. It stated that by reason
of certain specified acts of terrorism and violence in certain provinces, namely
Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan and Tarlac, the voting in said region did not reflect the
accurate feedback of the local electorate.
During the session on May 25, 1946, a pendatum resolution was approved referring to
the report ordering that Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose E. Romero who had
been included among the 16 candidates for senator receiving the highest number of
votes and as proclaimed by the Commissions on Elections shall not be sworn, nor
seated, as members of the chamber, pending the termination of the protest filed against
their election.
Petitioners then immediately instituted an action against their colleagues who instituted
the resolution, praying for its annulment and allowing them to occupy their seats and to
exercise their senatorial duties. Respondents assert the validity of the pendatum
resolution.
Issues of the Case:
Whether or Not the Commission on Elections has the jurisdiction to determine whether
or not votes cast in the said provinces are valid.
Held:
The Supreme Court refused to intervene, under the concept of separation of powers,
holding that the case was not a contest, and affirmed that it is the inherent right of the
legislature to determine who shall be admitted to its membership. Following the powers
assigned by the Constitution, the question raised was political in nature and therefore
not under the juridical review of the courts
The case is therefore dismissed

Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator vs. LRC

(J. Felix; 20 December 1957)
Facts
Rodis executed a deed of sale over a parcel of land in favor of the Roman
Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao, a corporation sole, with Msgr. Thibault,
a Canadian Citizen, as the actual incumbent. When the Roman Catholic
Administrator presented the deed of sale for registration at the Register of Deeds
of Davao, the latter required that the corporation sole to prepare an affidavit
declaring that 60% of the members were Filipino citizens.
In spite of assurance by the corporation sole that the totality of the
Catholic population of Davao would become the owner of the property, the
Register of Deeds still had some doubts as to the registerability of the document,
and referred the matter to the Land Registration Commissioner.
The Land Registration Commissioner found that the corporation sole was
not qualified to acquire private lands in the Philippines because of the
requirement of 60% of the corporation was actually owned or controlled by

Filipino citizens; as the present incumbent of the corporation was a Canadian

citizen, the LRC found that the corporation sole was not compliant.
Consequently the corporation sole instituted an action for mandamus with
the Supreme Court alleging that the sale in favor is in favor of the Catholic
Church, which is qualified to acquire private agricultural lands for the
establishment and maintenance of places of worship, and prayed that the
registration be recognized.
Issue
Whether or not the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao Inc.
is entitled to acquire private properties
Held
Yes
Ratio
In a corporation sole, the bishops or archbishops who sit as the incumbent
are merely administrators of the church properties, and they only hold these in
trust for the church. Consequently, upon the death of the incumbent of the
corporation sole, the church properties acquired will pass on to his successor in
office.
The Court also finds that here is no provision of law that confers
ownership of the church properties on to the Pope, or even to the corporation
sole or heads of the corporation sole who are mere administrators of said
properties; rather, ownership of these properties fall and develop upon the
congregation.
While the Catholic congregation does follow the guidance of the Pope,
there cannot be said to be a merger of personalities between the Pope and the
Catholic Church, and it cannot be said that the political and civil rights of the
Catholics are affected by their relationship with the Pope; the fact that the clergy
derive their authorities from the Vatican does not mean that the Pope bestows his
own citizenship to each priest. To allow the theory that all of the Churches around
the world would follow the citizenship of the Pope would lead to the absurdity that
each member of the Catholic Church would be a citizen of the Vatican or of Italy.
As such, it cannot be said that the citizenship of the corporation sole, as created
under Philippine laws, is altered by the citizenship of whoever is the incumbent
head.
The Corporation Law recognized that corporation soles as those which are
organized and composed of a single individual for the administration of the
properties not used exclusively for religious worship of the church. The successor
in office will become the corporation on ascension to office. Furthermore, the
Corporation Law also recognized that the corporation sole can purchase real
property, although there are restrictions as to the power to sell or mortgage
depending on the rules, regulations and discipline of the church concerned. As
such, the Court finds it absurd that the corporation sole can purchase properties
but would not be able to register properties in its name.

While the Constitution prohibits foreigners from taking, acquiring,

exploiting or developing the natural resources of the country, the Court finds that
the provisions relating to these are not applicable to corporation soles because
they are merely administrators of the properties titled in their name. Furthermore,
the administration of these properties is for the benefit of the members of the
congregation, which is overwhelmingly comprised of Filipinos.

the expropriation of the Tatalon Estate was authorized by Congress rA

2616 (the first statute to be specifically tailored to expropriate land), was
decided unconstitutional by the lower court, in favor of the petitioner JM
Tuason & Co.

Issue: Is RA 2616 (rightfully amended) unconstitutional because it violates

the petitioners rights to due process and equal protection of law?
statute is valid and therefore, constitutional because:

(1) It gives protection and opportunity to bona fide land owners

(notwithstanding procedural mistakes made) in recognizing their right to
expropriation proceedings and just compensationa barrier to
arbitrariness.
.

(2) The statute jives with the vision of dynamism and public welfare, as
intended by the framers of the Constitution.

(3) There is nothing to prevent Congress to follow a system of priorities. It

could determine which lands would be the first subject of expropriation for
valid reasons.

ctions of mandamus instituted by the same petitioners against the respondents General
Court-Martials composed each of different members or officers of the Philippine Army, in
which it is alleged that the respondents Military Tribunals excluded unlawfully the petitioners
from the enjoyment of their right to appear as counsel for the accused prosecuted before
said tribunals, to which the petitioners are entitled because they are attorneys duly admitted
to practice law in the Philippine Courts, on the ground that they are disqualified or inhibited
by section 17, Article 17 of the Constitution to appear as counsel for said defendants

Marcos v. Chief of Staf ======================

ISSUES:

the meaning or scope of the words any court in Section 17 Article 17 of

the 1935 Constitution
RULING: Section 17 of Article 17 prohibits any members of the
Congress from appearing as counsel in any criminal case x x x. This is not
limited to civil but also to a military court or court martial since the latter
is also a court of law and justice as is any civil tribunal.

Inferior courts are meant to be construed in its restricted sense and accordingly do
not include court martials or military courts for they are agencies of executive
character and do not belong to the judicial branch unlike the term inferior court is.
Another RULE: words used in one part are to receive the same interpretation when
used in other parts unless the contrary is applied/specified.

Filoteo Jr. v. Sandiganbayan

G.R. 79543
Ponente: Panganiban, J.
Petition for certiorari or review on certiorari of Sandiganbayan decision
Facts:

Petitioner Jose Filoteo Jr., a police investigator of the Western Police

District, was accused of being the mastermind of the armed hijacking
of a postal delivery van.
o 3 May 1982 in Meycauayan, Bulacan, the Postal Delivery Truck of
the Bureau of Postal (driven by Miranda, Bautista and Tagudar)
was stopped, and the suspects (later identified as Frias,
Liwanag, Mendoza and Saguindel) took with them the truck, SSS
Medicare checks and vouchers, SSS Pension checks and
vouchers, treasury warrants, and several mail matters from
abroad.
o The van was recovered at La Loma, Quezon City the following
day, although some checks and warrants were missing.
The Special Operations Group (SOG) of the Philippine Constabulary
received a tip from a civilian that two persons were looking for buyers
of stolen checks. The SOG, led by Capt. Ferrer and Lt. Pagdilao
arranged a meeting with the persons and confronted them regarding
the investigation, assuring Frias that his penalty will be mitigated if he
cooperated. He then led Ferrer to Perez and Mendoza, who also pointed
to Liwanag and Mateo. Liwanag, Mateo, Perez and Mendoza all pointed
to the petitioner as mastermind.
Filoteo admitted involvement in the crime and pointed to three other
soldiers as confederates (Saguindel, Relator and Miravalles). The
petitioner executed 2 documents on May 30, 1982, (1) that he was
apprised of his constitutional rights under Section 20, Article IV of the
1973 Constitution, and his waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code (including his right to counsel) and (2) that he
voluntarily surrendered the checks and vouchers to the SOG. In a

sworn statement in Tagalog (without any counsel), he admitted to full

knowledge and participation in the crime.
However, in his own defense, he stated that he only knew Mateo (and
not the others) because Mateo was an informer who was paid from
time to time by the police intelligence. He said he was in Lakan Beer
House for a friends birthday on May 3, 1982 from 3:30-5 and then 6-8
(the friend and beer house owner also testified seeing him there). He
also said that the SOG refused to give any reason when they arrested
him on May 29, and that nobody apprised him of his constitutional
rights. He claimed that he was repeatedly coaxed to admit his
participation in the hijacking and was made to sign the sworn
statement under duress (he was allegedly electrocuted and water
cured).
The Respondent Court found Filoteo guilty for brigandage (PD 532) and
sentenced to twelve years and one day to thirteen years, one month
and eleven days of reclusion temporal. He filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied. He made an instant alternative
petition for certiorari charging the Sandiganbayan with having abused
its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and with
reversible error.

Issues:

Whether the SC is appropriate for this matter, which is technically over

a QUESTION OF FACT rather than a QUESTION OF LAW (since what is
being contested is Sandiganbayans misapprehension of facts in
arriving at its decision).
Whether the written statements, particularly the extrajudicial
confession executed by the accused without the presence of his
lawyer, admissible in evidence against him because it was done
without counsel.
o The 1973 Constitution, Art. IV Section 20 allows for rights to be
waived whereas the 1987 Constitution, Art. III Section 12 does
not allow any right to be waived except in the presence of
counsel
Whether the petitioners arrest was illegal.
Whether Art III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution can be applied
retroactively.

Held:

Yes. Although under Rule 45 in Rules of Court, the SC will only review
Sandiganbayan decisions that raise pure questions of law, under
exceptional circumstances the Court will also recognize questions of
fact in order to resolve legal issues if it seems like grave errors were
committed by the lower court. And in all criminal cases, a persons life
and liberty are at stake
Yes. It is admissible in evidence because his sworn statement and
waiver was made on May 20, 1982 when the 1973 Constitution was
still in effect. Also, the petitioners claim of being tortured to sign the
statement was invalid because it was negated by the medical reports

and that his consistency in handwriting showed that his signatures

were written voluntarily or not under torture. His alibi (birthday in
Lakan Beer House) did not prove anything as Lakan Beer House was a
30 minute drive to the scene of the crime and he could easily have
moved from one place to the other.
No. The claim was belatedly made. He should have questioned the
validity of his arrest before he entered his plea in the trial court,
otherwise his objection is deemed waived.
No. Article 4 of the Civil Code (laws shall have no retroactive effect
unless the contrary is provided) and Article 22 of the RPC (penal laws
shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of
a felony who is not a habitual criminal) cannot be applied in this case
because Article III, Section 12 is not a penal statute.

PENAFRANCIA
Peafrancia Sugar Mill, Inc. (PENSUMIL) ngaged in the business of milling sugar, spondent Sugar
Regulatory Administration (SRA) ,TASKED to promote the growth and development of the sugar
industry through greater and significant participation of the private sector. a lien of P2.00 per LKGBag shall be imposed on all raw sugar quedan-permis, in order to fund the Philippine Sugar
Research Institute, Inc.

Questioning the validity of the Assailed Sugar Orders,

alleged that the Assailed Sugar Orders are unconstitutional in that: (a) they were issued beyond the
powers and authority granted to the SRA by EO 18, s. 1986; and (b) the amount levied by virtue of
the Assailed Sugar Orders constitutes public funds
s whether or not PENSUMIL committed forum-shopping in filing the case a quo.

be dismissed for having become moot and academic.

A case or issue is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy
by virtue of supervening events, so that an adjudication of the case or a declaration on the issue
would be of no practical value or use
no actual substantial relief, udgment will not serve any useful purpose
ssuance of Sugar Order No. 5, s. 2013-2014 which revoked the effectivity of the Assailed Sugar
Orders

Mendoza v. Familara
G.R. No. 191017; November 15, 2011
CONSTANCIO F. MENDOZA, Petitioner, v. SENEN C. FAMILARA
and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondents.
FACTS:

This petition questions the constitutionality of Section 2[1] of

Republic Act No. 9164 (entitled "An Act Providing for Synchronized
Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections, amending RA No.
7160, as amended, otherwise known as the Local Government Code
of 1991"). As other barangay officials had done in previous cases,
petitioner Constancio F. Mendoza (Mendoza) likewise questions the
retroactive application of the three-consecutive term limit imposed
on barangay elective officials beginning from the 1994 barangay
elections.
Mendoza was a candidate for Barangay Captain of Barangay
Balatasan, Oriental Mindoro in the 29 October 2007 Barangay
Elections. As required by law, Mendoza filed a certificate of
candidacy. Prior thereto, Mendoza had been elected as Barangay
Captain of Barangay Balatasan for three (3) consecutive terms.
On 26 October 2007, respondent Senen C. Familara (Familara) filed
a Petition to Disqualify Mendoza averring that Mendoza, under
Section 2 of RA No. 9164, is ineligible to run again for Barangay
Captain of Barangay Balatasan, having been elected and having
served, in the same position for three (3) consecutive terms
immediately prior to the 2007 Barangay Elections.
ISSUE:
I. Whether or not Section 2 [1] of RA No. 9164 is
constitutional
II. Whether or not Section 2 [1] of RA No. 9164 may be
applied retroactively
HELD:
In COMELEC v. Cruz settles, the Court ruled that the constitutionality
of the three-consecutive term limit rule no retroactive application
was made because the three-term limit has been there all along as
early as the second barangay law (RA No. 6679) after the 1987
Constitution took effect; it was continued under the Local
Government Code and can still be found in the current law. We find
this obvious from a reading of the historical development of the law.
The first law that provided a term limitation for barangay officials
was RA No. 6653 (1988); it imposed a two-consecutive term limit.
After only six months, Congress, under RA No. 6679 (1988), changed

the two-term limit by providing for a three-consecutive term limit.

This consistent imposition of the term limit gives no hint of any
equivocation in the congressional intent to provide a term limitation.
Thereafter, RA No. 7160 - the LGC - followed, bringing with it the
issue of whether it provided, as originally worded, for a three-term
limit for barangay officials. We differ with the RTC analysis of this
issue.
Section 43 is a provision under Title II of the LGC on Elective
Officials. Title II is divided into several chapters dealing with a wide
range of subject matters, all relating to local elective officials, as
follows: a. Qualifications and Election (Chapter I); b. Vacancies and
Succession (Chapter II); c. Disciplinary Actions (Chapter IV) and d.
Recall (Chapter V). Title II likewise contains a chapter on Local
Legislation (Chapter III).
These Title II provisions are intended to apply to all local elective
officials, unless the contrary is clearly provided. A contrary
application is provided with respect to the length of the term of
office under Section 43(a); while it applies to all local elective
officials, it does not apply to barangay officials whose length of term
is specifically provided by Section 43(c). In contrast to this clear
case of an exception to a general rule, the three-term limit under
Section 43(b) does not contain any exception; it applies to all local
elective officials who must perforce include barangay officials.
An alternative perspective is to view [Section] 43(a), (b) and (c)
separately from one another as independently standing and selfcontained provisions, except to the extent that they expressly relate
to one another. Thus, [Section] 43(a) relates to the term of local
elective officials, except barangay officials whose term of office is
separately provided under Sec. 43(c). [Section] 43(b), by its express
terms, relates to all local elective officials without any exception.
Thus, the term limitation applies to all local elective officials without
any exclusion or qualification.
All these inevitably lead to the conclusion that the challenged
proviso has been there all along and does not simply retroact the
application of the three-term limit to the barangay elections of
1994. Congress merely integrated the past statutory changes into a
seamless whole by coming up with the challenged proviso.
With this conclusion, the respondents constitutional challenge to
the proviso based on retroactivity must fail.

Rodriguez vs gella

Eulogio Rodriguez et al seek to invalidate Executive Orders 545 and 546

issued in 1952, the first appropriating the sum of P37,850,500 for urgent
and essential public works, and the second setting aside the sum of
P11,367,600 for relief in the provinces and cities visited by typhoons,
floods, droughts, earthquakes, volcanic action and other calamities. They
sought to have Vicente Gella, then National Treasurer, be enjoined from
releasing funds pursuant to said EOs. These EOs were pursuant to
Commonwealth Act 671. Note that prior to Araneta vs Dinglasan,
Congress passed House Bill 727 intending to revoke CA 671 but the same
was vetoed by the President due to the Korean War and his perception
that war is still subsisting as a fact. Note also that CA 671 was already
declared inoperative by the Supreme Court in the same case of Araneta
vs Dinglasan.
ISSUE: Whether or not the EOs are valid.
HELD: No. As similarly decided in the Araneta case, the EOs issued in
pursuant to CA 671 shall be rendered ineffective. The president did not
invoke any actual emergencies or calamities emanating from the last
world war for which CA 671 has been intended. Without such invocation,
the veto of the president cannot be of merit for the emergency he feared
cannot be attributed to the war contemplated in CA 671. Even if the
president vetoed the repealing bill the intent of Congress must be given
due weight. For it would be absurd to contend otherwise. For while
Congress might delegate its power by a simple majority, it might not be
able to recall them except by two-third vote. In other words, it would be
easier for Congress to delegate its powers than to take them back. This is
not right and is not, and ought not to be the law. Act No. 671 may be
likened to an ordinary contract of agency, whereby the consent of the
agent is necessary only in the sense that he cannot be compelled to
accept the trust, in the same way that the principal cannot be forced to
keep the relation in eternity or at the will of the agent. Neither can it be
suggested that the agency created under the Act is coupled with interest.

Estrada vs. Escritor , 492 SCRA 1 ; 22 JUN 2006

FACTS: Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City.
She has been living with Quilapio, a man who is not her husband, for more than

twenty five yearsand had a son with him as well. Respondents husband died a
year before she entered into the judiciary while Quilapio is still legally married to
another
woman.
Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate
respondent. According to complainant, respondent should not be allowed to
remain employed therein for it will appear as if the court allows such act.
Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her religion
the Jehovahs Witnesses and the Watch Tower and the Bible Trace Society. They
allegedly have a Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness under the approval of their
congregation. Such a declaration is effective when legal impediments render it
impossible for a couple to legalize their union.
ISSUE: Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for such conjugal
arrangement.
RULING: No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her
right tofreedom of religion. The free exercise of religion is specifically articulated
as one of the fundamental rights in our Constitution. As Jefferson put it, it is the
most inalienable and sacred of human rights. The States interest in enforcing its
prohibition cannot be merely abstract or symbolic in order to be sufficiently
compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim. In the case at bar, the State has not
evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges
against respondent or her partner. Thus the States interest only amounts to the
symbolic preservation of an unenforced prohibition.
Furthermore, a distinction between public and secular morality and religious
morality should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to
public and secular morality.
The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality
approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required
by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow for
accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend
compelling state interests. Assuming arguendo that the OSG has proved a
compelling state interest, it has to further demonstrate that the state has used the
least intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more
than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state. Thus the conjugal
arrangement cannot be penalized for it constitutes an exemption to the law
based on her right to freedom of religion.

Manosca vs. CA
G.R. NO. 106440, January 29, 1996

Facts: Petitioners inherited a piece of land when the parcel was

ascertained by the NHI to have been the birth site of Felix Y.
Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed Resolution No.
1, declaring the land to be a national historical landmark.
Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the main thesis
that the intended expropriation was not for a public purpose and,
incidentally, that the act would constitute an application of public
funds, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of
Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity, contrary to the provision of
Section 29(2), Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not the expropriation of the land whereat
Manalo was born is valid and constitutional.
Held: Yes. The taking to be valid must be for public use. There
was a time when it was felt that a literal meaning should be
attached to such a requirement.w Whatever project is undertaken
must be for the public to enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks.
Otherwise, expropriation is not allowable. It is not so any more.
As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of
eminent domain comes into play. As just noted, the constitution
in at least two cases, to remove any doubt, determines what
public use is. One is the expropriation of lands to be subdivided
into small lots for resale at cost to individuals. The other is the
transfer, through the exercise of this power, of utilities and other
private enterprise to the government. It is accurate to state then
that at present whatever may be beneficially employed for the
general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use.
April 8, 2014
G.R. Nos. 204819, 204934, 204957, 204988, 205003, 205043, 205138,
205478, 205491, 205720, 206355, 207111, 207172 & 207563
JAMES M. IMBONG, ET AL., Petitioners, v. HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA,
JR., ET AL., Respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
FACTS:

Nothing has polarized the nation more in recent years than the issues of
population growth control, abortion and contraception. As in every democratic
society, diametrically opposed views on the subjects and their perceived
consequences freely circulate in various media. From television debates to
sticker campaigns, from rallies by socio-political activists to mass gatherings
organized by members of the clergy -the clash between the seemingly
antithetical ideologies of the religious conservatives and progressive liberals
has caused a deep division in every level of the society. Despite calls to
withhold support thereto, however, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise
known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012
(RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.
Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers
from various sectors of society came knocking on the doors of the Court,
beckoning it to wield the sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience.
Aware of the profound and lasting impact that its decision may produce, the
Court now faces the iuris controversy, as presented in fourteen petitions and 2
petitions-in-intervention.
A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing
the constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds: The RH Law violates
the right to life of the unborn, the right to health and the right to protection
against hazardous products, and to religious freedom, equal protection
clause, involuntary servitude, among others.
It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious objectors of
criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of punishment, as it
compels medical practitioners 1] to refer patients who seek advice on
reproductive health programs to other doctors; and 2] to provide full and
correct information on reproductive health programs and service, although it is
against their religious beliefs and convictions.
It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the formulation of mandatory
sex education in schools should not be allowed as it is an affront to their
religious beliefs.
While the petitioners recognize that the guarantee of religious freedom is not
absolute, they argue that the RH Law fails to satisfy the "clear and present
danger test" and the "compelling state interest test" to justify the regulation of
the right to free exercise of religion and the right to free speech.
In this connection, it is claimed that "Section 7 of the RH Law violates the right
to due process by removing from them (the people) the right to manage their
own affairs and to decide what kind of health facility they shall be and what
kind of services they shall offer." It ignores the management perogative

inherent in corporations for employers to conduct their affairs in accordance

with their own discretion and judgment.
The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of the
petitioners, pray for the dismissal of the petitions for the principal reasons that
1] there is no actual case or controversy and, therefore, the issues are not yet
ripe for judicial determination.; 2] some petitioners lack standing to question
the RH Law; and 3] the petitions are essentially petitions for declaratory relief
over which the Court has no original jurisdiction.
Meanwhile, on March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the
assailed legislation took effect.
On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and arguments raised, the
Court issued the Status Quo Ante Order (SQAO), enjoining the effects and
implementation of the assailed legislation for a period of one hundred and
twenty (120) days, or until July 17, 2013.
The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared
unconstitutional. Petitioner ALFI, in particular, argues that the government
sponsored contraception program, the very essence of the RH Law, violates
the right to health of women and the sanctity of life, which the State is
mandated to protect and promote.
POLITICAL LAW: right to life
It is a universally accepted principle that every human being enjoys the right
to life. Even if not formally established, the right to life, being grounded on
natural law, is inherent and, therefore, not a creation of, or dependent upon a
particular law, custom, or belief. It precedes and transcends any authority or
the laws of men.
In this jurisdiction, the right to life is given more than ample protection. Section
1, Article III of the Constitution provides: Section 1. No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
As expounded earlier, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods
in the Philippines is not of recent vintage. From the enactment of R.A. No.
4729, entitled "An Act To Regulate The Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution
of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices "on June 18, 1966, prescribing rules on
contraceptive drugs and devices which prevent fertilization, to the promotion
of male vasectomy and tubal ligation, and the ratification of numerous
international agreements, the country has long recognized the need to

promote population control through the use of contraceptives in order to

achieve long-term economic development.
Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and other family
planning methods evolved from being a component of demographic
management, to one centered on the promotion of public health, particularly,
reproductive health.
\
POLITICAL LAW: when life begins
Majority of the Members of the Court are of the position that the question of
when life begins is a scientific and medical issue that should not be decided,
at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence. During the deliberation,
however, it was agreed upon that the individual members of the Court could
express their own views on this matter.
In this regard, the ponente, is of the strong view that life begins at fertilization.
In answering the question of when life begins, focus should be made on the
particular phrase of Section 12 which reads:
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect
and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall
equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from
conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of
the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall
receive the support of the Government.
Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the unborn from conception.
This is undisputable because before conception, there is no unborn to speak
of. For said reason, it is no surprise that the Constitution is mute as to any
proscription prior to conception or when life begins. The problem has arisen
because, amazingly, there are quarters who have conveniently disregarded
the scientific fact that conception is reckoned from fertilization. They are
waving the view that life begins at implantation. Hence, the issue of when life
begins.
In a nutshell, those opposing the RH Law contend that conception is
synonymous with "fertilization" of the female ovum by the male sperm. On the
other side of the spectrum are those who assert that conception refers to the
"implantation" of the fertilized ovum in the uterus.
EPZA vs Commission of Human Rights, G.R. No. 101476 case brief summary

April 14, 1992

Facts: EPZA purchased land from Filoil Refinery Corp. and before petitioner could take
possession of lands, several individuals had entered the premises and planted agricultural
products therein without permission from EPZA or its predecessor, Filoil. EPZA paid a P10,000financial-assistance to those who accepted the same and signed quitclaims, amongst them
private respondents(Valles, Aledia). Ten years later, private respondents filed in the CHR
complaints for violation of Human Rights. CHR issued an injunction commanding EPZA to desist
from committing such acts. EPZA filed in SC this petition for certiorari and prohibition.
Issue: Does CHR have the authority to issue an injuction order?
Ruling: CHR does not have the authority to issue an injunction order. It is limited only to
investigation and not to try and resolve merits. The "preventive measures and legal aid services"
mentioned in the Constitution refer to extrajudicial and judicial remedies which the CHR may seek
from the proper courts on behalf of the victims of human rights violations.
Petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. The orders of injunction by Commission of
Human Rights are annulled and set aside.

GARCIA VS DRILON
Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of Bacolod City a Temporary
Protection Order against her husband, Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled An Act
Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective
Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes. She
claimed to be a victim of physical, emotional, psychological and economic violence,
being threatened of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support
and also a victim of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner.
The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply with the conditions
set forth by the said TPO, private-respondent filed another application for the
issuance of a TPO ex parte. The trial court issued a modified TPO and extended the
same when petitioner failed to comment on why the TPO should not be modified.
After the given time allowance to answer, the petitioner no longer submitted the
required comment as it would be an axercise in futility.
Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and
TRO on, questioning the constitutionality of the RA 9262 for violating the due process
and equal protection clauses, and the validity of the modified TPO for being an
unwanted product of an invalid law.
The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however, denied the petition
for failure to raise the issue of constitutionality in his pleadings before the trial court
and the petition for prohibition to annul protection orders issued by the trial court
constituted collateral attack on said law.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, this petition is
filed.

Issues: WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the theory that the issue of
constitutionality was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the petition
constitutes a collateral attack on the validity of the law.
WON the CA committed serious error in failing to conclude that RA 9262 is
discriminatory, unjust and violative of the equal protection clause.
WON the CA committed grave mistake in not finding that RA 9262 runs counter to the
due process clause of the Constitution
WON the CA erred in not finding that the law does violence to the policy of the state
to protect the family as a basic social institution
WON the CA seriously erredin declaring RA 9262 as invalid and unconstitutional
because it allows an undue delegation of judicial power to Brgy. Officials.
Decision:
1. Petitioner contends that the RTC has limited authority and
jurisdiction, inadequate to tackle the complex issue of constitutionality. Family Courts
have authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute. The
question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible time so that if not
raised in the pleadings, it may not be raised in the trial and if not raised in the trial
court, it may not be considered in appeal.
2. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws. Equal
protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. In Victoriano v.
Elizalde Rope Workerkers Union, the Court ruled that all that is required of a valid
classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be
based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be
germane to the purpose of the law; not limited to existing conditions only; and apply
equally to each member of the class. Therefore, RA9262 is based on a valid
classification and did not violate the equal protection clause by favouring women
over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the Senate extends its
protection.
3. RA 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the Constitution. The essence
of due process is in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence
one may have in support of ones defense. The grant of the TPO exparte cannot be
impugned as violative of the right to due process.
4. The non-referral of a VAWC case to a mediator is justified. Petitioners contention
that by not allowing mediation, the law violated the policy of the State to protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution cannot be sustained.
In a memorandum of the Court, it ruled that the court shall not refer the case or any
issue therof to a mediator. This is so because violence is not a subject for
compromise.
5. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to Barangay officials. Judicial power
includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
any part of any branch of the Government while executive power is the power to
enforce and administer the laws. The preliminary investigation conducted by the

prosecutor is an executive, not a judicial, function. The same holds true with the
issuance of BPO. Assistance by Brgy. Officials and other law enforcement agencies is
consistent with their duty executive function.

Tuesday, March 6, 2012

ISAE v Quisimbing G.R. No. 128845. June 1, 2000

J. Kapunan
Facts:
The ISM, under Presidential Decree 732, is a domestic educational institution established
primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents.
The local-hires union of the ISM were crying foul over the disparity in wages that they got
compared to that of their foreign teaching counterparts.
These questions are asked to qualify a teacher into a local or foreign hire.
a.....What is one's domicile?
b.....Where is one's home economy?
c.....To which country does one owe economic allegiance?
d.....Was the individual hired abroad specifically to work in the School and was the School
responsible for bringing that individual to the Philippines?
Should any answer point to Philippines, the person is a local hire. The School grants foreignhires certain benefits to the foreign hires such as housing, transportation, and 25% more pay
than locals under the theory of (a) the "dislocation factor" and (b) limited tenure. The first was
grounded on leaving his home country, the second was on the lack of tenure when he
returns home.
The negotiations between the school and the union caused a deadlock between the parties.
The DOLE resolved in favor of the school, while Dole Secretary Quisimbing denied the
unions mfr.
He said, The Union cannot also invoke the equal protection clause to justify its claim of
parity. It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guarantee of equal protection
of the laws is not violated by legislation or private covenants based on reasonable
classification. A classification is reasonable if it is based on substantial distinctions and apply
to all members of the same class. Verily, there is a substantial distinction between foreign
hires and local hires, the former enjoying only a limited tenure, having no amenities of their
own in the Philippines and have to be given a good compensation package in order to attract
them to join the teaching faculty of the School.
The union appealed to the Supreme Court.
The petitioner called the hiring system discriminatory and racist.
The school alleged that some local hires were in fact of foreign origin. They were paid local
salaries.
Issue:
Whether or not the hiring system is violative of the equal protection clause
Held: Yes, Petition granted
Ratio:
Public policy abhors discrimination. The Article on Social Justice and Human Rights exhorts
Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance
the right of all people to human dignity

The very broad Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person, "in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith."
International law prohibits discrimination, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. The latter
promises Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of
any kind.
In the workplace, where the relations between capital and labor are often skewed in favor of
capital, inequality and discrimination by the employer are all the more reprehensible.
The Constitution also directs the State to promote "equality of employment opportunities for
all." Similarly, the Labor Code provides that the State shall "ensure equal work opportunities
regardless of sex, race or creed. Article 248 declares it an unfair labor practice for an
employer to discriminate in regard to wages in order to encourage or
discourage membership in any labor organization.
In this jurisdiction, there is the term equal pay for equal work, pertaining to persons being
paid with equal salaries and have similar skills and similar conditions. There was no
evidence here that foreign-hires perform 25% more efficiently or effectively than the localhires.
The State, therefore, has the right and duty to regulate the relations between labor and
capital. These relations are not merely contractual but are so impressed with public interest
that labor contracts, collective bargaining agreements included, must yield to
the common good.[
For the same reason, the "dislocation factor" and the foreign-hires' limited tenure also cannot
serve as valid bases for the distinction in salary rates. The dislocation factor and limited
tenure affecting foreign-hires are adequately compensated by certain benefits accorded
them which are not enjoyed by local-hires, such as housing, transportation, shipping costs,
taxes and home leave travel allowances.
In this case, we find the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to justify
the distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid
classification. There is no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreignhires and local-hires.
Garcia vs. Board of Investments (BOI)
191 SCRA 288
November 1990
FACTS:
Former Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC), now Luzon Petrochemical Corporation,
formed by a group of Taiwanese investors, was granted by the BOI its have its plant site for the
products naphta cracker and naphta to based in Bataan. In February 1989, one year after
the BPC began its production in Bataan, the corporation applied to the BOI to have its plant
site transferred from Bataan to Batangas. Despite vigorous opposition from petitioner Cong.
Enrique Garcia and others, the BOI granted private respondent BPCs application, stating that
the investors have the final choice as to where to have their plant site because they are the
ones who risk capital for the project.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the BOI committed a grave abuse of discretion in yielding to the application of
the investors without considering the national interest
COURT RULING:

The Supreme Court found the BOI to have committed grave abuse of discretion in this case, and
ordered the original application of the BPC to have its plant site in Bataan and the product
naphta as feedstock maintained.
The ponente, Justice Gutierrez, Jr., first stated the Courts judicial power to settle actual
controversies as provided for by Section 1 of Article VIII in our 1987 Constitution before he
wrote the reasons as to how the Court arrived to its conclusion. He mentioned that nothing is
shown to justify the BOIs action in letting the investors decide on an issue which, if handled by
our own government, could have been very beneficial to the State, as he remembered the
word of a great Filipino leader, to wit: .. he would not mind having a government run like hell
by Filipinos than one subservient to foreign dictation

Gamboa v. Teves etal., GR No. 176579, October 9, 2012

Facts:
The issue started when petitioner Gamboa questioned the indirect sale of shares involving almost
12 million shares of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) owned by PTIC to
First Pacific. Thus, First Pacifics common shareholdings in PLDT increased from 30.7 percent to
37 percent, thereby increasing the total common shareholdings of foreigners in PLDT to about
81.47%. The petitioner contends that it violates the Constitutional provision on filipinazation of
public utility, stated in Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, which limits
foreign ownership of the capital of a public utility to not more than 40%. Then, in 2011, the court
ruled the case in favor of the petitioner, hence this new case, resolving the motion for
reconsideration for the 2011 decision filed by the respondents.
Issue: Whether or not the Court made an erroneous interpretation of the term capital in its 2011
decision?
Held/Reason: The Court said that the Constitution is clear in expressing its State policy of
developing an economyeffectively controlled by Filipinos. Asserting the ideals that our
Constitutions Preamble want to achieve, that is to conserve and develop our patrimony ,
hence, the State should fortify a Filipino-controlled economy. In the 2011 decision, the Court finds
no wrong in the construction of the term capital which refers to the shares with voting rights, as
well as with full beneficial ownership (Art. 12, sec. 10) which implies that the right to vote in the
election of directors, coupled with benefits, is tantamount to an effective control. Therefore, the
Courts interpretation of the term capital was not erroneous. Thus, the motion for reconsideration
is denied.

ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS V.

SECRETARY OF DAR, G.R. No. 78742 (175 SCRA
343), July 14, 1989
hese are consolidated cases involving common legal questions
including serious challenges to the constitutionality of R.A.
No. 6657 ir carp also known as the "Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988"

In G.R. No. 79777, the petitioners are questioning the P.D No.
27 and E.O Nos. 228 and 229 on the grounds inter alia of
separation of powers, due process, equal protection and the
constitutional limitation that no private property shall be
taken for public use without just compensation.
In G.R. No. 79310, the petitioners in this case claim that the
power to provide for a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
as decreed by the Constitution belongs to the Congress and not
to the President, the also allege that Proclamation No. 131
and E.O No. 229 should be annulled for violation of the
constitutional provisions on just compensation, due process
and equal protection. They contended that the taking must be
simultaneous with payment of just compensation which such
payment is not contemplated in Section 5 of the E.O No. 229.
In G.R. No. 79744, the petitioner argues that E.O Nos. 228 and
229 were invalidly issued by the President and that the said
executive orders violate the constitutional provision that no
private property shall be taken without due process or just
compensation which was denied to the petitioners.
In G.R. No 78742 the petitioners claim that they cannot eject
their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right
of retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so
far not issued the implementing rules of the decree. They
therefore ask the Honorable Court for a writ of mandamus to
compel the respondents to issue the said rules.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the laws being challenged is a valid exercise
of Police power or Power of Eminent Domain.

RULING:
Police Power through the Power of Eminent Domain, though there
are traditional distinction between the police power and the
power of eminent domain, property condemned under police power
is noxious or intended for noxious purpose, the compensation
for
the
taking
of
such
property
is
not
subject
to
compensation, unlike the taking of the property in Eminent
Domain or the power of expropriation which requires the
payment of just compensation to the owner of the property
expropriated.

Facts: PCGG and Marcos siblings agreed to General and Supplemental Agreements
with regards to the ill-gotten wealth cases against their family. The same was filed
with Sandiganbayan. Chavez then filed petition with SC to enforce a constitutional
right against the PCGG and to determine whether the latter has been acting within
the bounds of its authority. SC decided the case on 09 December 1998. However, the
siblings did not file motion for reconsideration until the deadline for such lapsed.
They instead filed 1) a Motion for Leave to Intervene with Motion for Leave to File
the Attached Partial Motion for Reconsideration . . . and (2) Partial Motion for
Reconsideration, contending that their exclusion from the case violated their
constitutional rights to due process and equal protection. Movants pray that the
proceedings before the anti-graft court be allowed to take their due course,
consistent with the principle of the hierarchical administration of justice.
Issue: Whether or not equal protection was observed in the (principle of
hierarchical) administration of justice?
Decision: Motion denied. The movants are merely incidental parties to the instant
case. Being contractors to the General and Supplemental Agreements involving their
supposed properties, they claim that their interests are affected by the petition.
However, the Agreements undeniably contain terms an condition that are clearly
contrary to the Constitution and the laws and are not subject to compromise. Such
terms and conditions cannot be granted by the PCGG to anyone. The principle of the
hierarchy of the courts generally applies to cases involving factual question. The oftrepeated justification for invoking it is that such cases do not only impose upon the
precious time of the Court but, more important, inevitably result in their delayed
adjudication. Often, such cases have to be remanded or referred to the lower court
as the proper forum or as better equipped to resolve to the issues, since the
Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. Inasmuch as the petition at bar involves only
constitutional and legal questions concerning public interest, the Court resolved to
exercise primary jurisdiction on the matter.

Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC, October 6,

2000.

digested by Mr. Sid

Facts: On May 11, 1998, the party-list election was held simultaneously with

the national election. A total of 123 parties, organizations and coalitions participated
but only 13 party-list representatives from 12 parties and organizations which
obtained at least two percent of the total number of votes cast for the party-list
system were proclaimed. The COMELEC enbanc determined that COCOFED
(Philippine Coconut Planters Federation Inc.), was entitled to one party-list seat for
having garnered 2.04% of the total votes cast for the part-list system. Thereafter,
several party-list organization filed a petition to the COMELEC to proclaim the said
winner under the Constitution which was later on granted by the COMELEC in
division and affirmed by COMELEC en banc. Consequently, several petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with prayers for the issuance of the
temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction were filed to the
Supreme Court by the parties who also obtained at least two percent votes cast for
party-list
system.

Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC commit grave abused of discretion in

ruling that 38 parties, organizations, and coalitions are entitled to a party-list seat.

Held: The COMELEC committed a grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the
38 herein respondents are each entitled to a party-list seat because it glaringly
violated two requirements of RA7941 which is the two percent threshold and
proportional representation.

G.R. No. 147589

June 26, 2001
ANG BAGONG BAYANI vs. Comelec
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 147613 June 26, 2001
BAYAN MUNA vs. Comelec

Facts
Petitioners challenged the Comelecs Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 , which approved the
participation of 154 organizations and parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001
party-list elections. Petitioners sought the disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly
that the party-list system was intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not the
mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or overrepresented. Unsatisfied with the pace
by which Comelec acted on their petition, petitioners elevated the issue to the Supreme Court.

Issue:
1. Whether or not petitioners recourse to the Court was proper.
2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party list elections.
3. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus
Resolution No. 3785.

1. The Court may take cognizance of an issue notwithstanding the availability of other remedies
"where the issue raised is one purely of law, where public interest is involved, and in case of
urgency." Tha facts attendant to the case rendered it justiciable.
2. Political Parties -- even the major ones -- may participate in the party-list elections subject to the
requirements laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941, which is the statutory law pertinent to
the Party List System.
Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list
elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution provides that members of the House of Representative may be elected through a
party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. It is
however, incumbent upon the Comelec to determine proportional representation of the
marginalized and underrepresented, the criteria for participation in relation to the cause of the
party lsit applicants so as to avoid desecration of the noble purpose of the party-list system.
3. The Court acknowledged that to determine the propriety of the inclusion of respondents in the
Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, a study of the factual allegations was necessary which was
beyond the pale of the Court. The Court not being a trier of facts.
However, seeing that the Comelec failed to appreciate fully the clear policy of the law and the
Consitution, the Court decided to set some guidelines culled from the law and the Consitution, to
assist the Comelec in its work. The Court ordered that the petition be remanded in the Comelec
to determine compliance by the party lists.

Bantay vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 177271
May 4, 2007
FACTS: Before the Court are two consolidated petitions for certiorari and mandamus to nullify and
set aside certain issuances of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) respecting party-list groups
which have manifested their intention to participate in the party-list elections on May 14, 2007.
A number of organized groups filed the necessary manifestations and subsequently were accredited
by the Comelec to participate in the 2007 elections. Bantay Republic Act (BA-RA 7941) and the
Urban Poor for Legal Reforms (UP-LR) filed with the Comelec an Urgent Petition to Disqualify,
seeking to disqualify the nominees of certain party-list organizations. Docketed in the Comelec as
SPA Case No 07-026, this urgent petition has yet to be resolved.
Meanwhile petitioner Rosales, in G.R. No. 177314, addressed 2 letters to the Director of the
Comelecs Law Department requesting a list of that groups nominees. Evidently unbeknownst then
to Ms. Rosales, et al., was the issuance of Comelec en banc Resolution 07-0724 under date April 3,
2007 virtually declaring the nominees names confidential and in net effect denying petitioner
Rosales basic disclosure request. Comelecs reason for keeping the names of the party list nominees
away from the public is deducible from the excerpts of the news report appearing in the April 13,
2007 issue of the Manila Bulletin, is that there is nothing in R.A. 7941 that requires the Comelec to
disclose the names of nominees, and that party list elections must not be personality oriented
according to Chairman Abalos.
In the first petition (G.R. No. 177271), BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR assail the Comelec resolutions
accrediting private respondents Biyaheng Pinoy et al., to participate in the forthcoming party-list
elections without simultaneously determining whether or not their respective nominees possess the
requisite qualifications defined in R.A. No. 7941, or the "Party-List System Act" and belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented sector each seeks to.
In the second petition (G.R. No. 177314), petitioners Loreta Ann P. Rosales, Kilosbayan Foundation
and Bantay Katarungan Foundation impugn Comelec Resolution dated April 3, 2007.

While both petitions commonly seek to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the names of the
nominees of the various party-list groups named in the petitions, BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR have the
additional prayers that the 33 private respondents named therein be "declare[d] as unqualified to
participate in the party-list elections and that the Comelec be enjoined from allowing respondent
groups from participating in the elections.

1. Can the Court cancel the accreditation accorded by the Comelec to the respondent party-list
groups named in their petition on the ground that these groups and their respective nominees do not
appear to be qualified.
The Court is unable to grant the desired plea of petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR for cancellation
of accreditation on the grounds thus advanced in their petition. The exercise would require the
Court to make a factual determination, a matter which is outside the office of judicial review by
way of special civil action for certiorari. In certiorari proceedings, the Court is not called upon to
decide factual issues and the case must be decided on the undisputed facts on record. The sole
function of a writ of certiorari is to address issues of want of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion and does not include a review of the tribunals evaluation of the evidence. (note that
nowhere in R.A. No. 7941 is there a requirement that the qualification of a party-list nominee be
determined simultaneously with the accreditation of an organization. )

FRIVALDO VS. COMELEC (1996)

G.R. No. 120295, June 28 1996, 257 SCRA 727
FACTS:
Juan G. Frivaldo ran for Governor of Sorsogon again and won. Raul R. Lee questioned his
citizenship. He then petitioned for repatriation under Presidential Decree No. 725 and was
able to take his oath of allegiance as a Philippine citizen.
However, on the day that he got his citizenship, the Court had already ruled based on his
previous attempts to run as governor and acquire citizenship, and had proclaimed Lee,
who got the second highest number of votes, as the newly elect Governor of Sorsogon.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Frivaldos repatriation was valid.
HELD:
The Court ruled his repatriation was valid and legal and because of the curative nature of
Presidential Decree No. 725, his repatriation retroacted to the date of the filing of
his application to run for governor. The steps to reacquire Philippine Citizenship by
repatriation under Presidential Decree No. 725 are: (1) filing the application; (2) action by
the committee; and (3) taking of the oath of allegiance if the application is approved. It is
only upon taking the oath of allegiance that the applicant is deemed ipso jure to have
reacquired Philippine citizenship. If the decree had intended the oath taking to retroact to
the date of the filing of the application, then it should not have explicitly provided
otherwise. He is therefore qualified to be proclaimed governor of Sorsogon.

ntero J. Pobre vs. Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago

Antero J. Pobre vs. Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, A.C. No. 7399
August 25, 2009
i.e., Miriam Baliw vs. Supreme Court of Idiots
Facts: Sa kanyang privilege speech sa Senado, sinabi ni Senador
Miriam Defensor-Santiago ang:
I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am
suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like
throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am
nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his
cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief
Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another
environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots.
Iniinvoke naman ng aking paboritong senador ang kanyang
constitutional
rights
bilang
isang
miyembro
ng
Kongreso
(parliamentary immunity). May mga nakatala (tulad ni Pobre) na ang
pahayag na ito ng senadorang may kaunting tililing ay bunga ng hindi
pag-a-appoint sa kanya bilang Chief Justice.
Issue: Kung si Miriam Baliw ba ay administratively liable dahil sa
pahayag niyang ito, at kung abuso ba ito ng kanyang mga karapatan
bilang isang senador.
Held: Baliw si Miriam at talagang baliw siya; bitter na bitter rin siya
nang hindi siya naging Chief Justice. Lol.
Eto
seryoso
na.
Isinaad ng Korte Suprema na ang Senadora ay indeed, may
constitutional rights na makikita sa Article VI, Section 11 of the
Constitution, which provides: A Senator or Member of the House of
Representative shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six
years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in
session. No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in
any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in
any committee thereof. Ika ng Korte Suprema, isa ang free speech
sa
mga
pundasyon
ng
demokrasya.

Ngunit kahit may parliamentary rights siya na naka-mandate sa

Konstitusyon, pinagalitan pa rin ng Korte Suprema ang senadora.
The Court wishes to express its deep concern about the language
Senator Santiago, a member of the Bar, used in her speech and its
effect on the administration of justice. To the Court, the lady senator
has undoubtedly crossed the limits of decency and good professional
conduct. It is at once apparent that her statements in question were
intemperate and highly improper in substance.
Adaza v. Pacana
135 SCRA 431
FACTS:
Adaza is the governor of Misamis Oriental and Pacana is the vice-governor. Their respective term
of office expires on March 3, 1986. Both parties ran in the Batasang Pambansa (BP) elections in
1984 and respondent lost to petitioner. On July 23, 1984, Pacana took his oath of office as the
governor. Petitioner has brought this petition to exclude respondent therefrom, claiming to be the
lawful occupant of the position.
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not a provincial governor who was elected as Mababatas Pambansa (MP) can
exercise the functions of both simultaneously; and 2) whether or not a vice-governor who ran for
the position of MP but lost, can continue serving as vice governor and subsequently succeed to
the office of governor if said office is vacated.
HELD:
Section 10, Article VIII of the Constitution is clear and unambiguous. A member of the BP may not
hold any other office in the government. A public office is a public trust. A holder thereof is subject
to regulations and conditions as the law may impose and he cannot complain of any restrictions
on his holding of more than one office. The contention that Pacana, as a mere private citizen,
runs afoul of BP Blg. 697 which provides that governors, or members of sangguniang or
barangay officials, upon filing a certificate of candidacy be considered on forced leave of absence
from office. When respondent reassumed the position of vice-governor after the BP elections, he
was acting within the law. Thus, the instant petition is denied.

Avelino vs. Cuenco

GR

L-2821,

March

1949

FACTS: Senator Taada and Senator Sanidad filed a resolution enumerating

charges against the then Senate President Jose Avelino and ordering the
investigation thereof. Before Senator Taada could deliver his privilege speech to
formulate charges against the incumbent Senate President, the petitioner, motu
propio adjourned the session of the Senate and walked out with his followers,
leaving twelve other members who continued meeting and elected the

respondent, Marciano Jesus Cuenco, as Acting President. Avelino thereupon

filed quo warranto proceedings against Cuenco, contending that the latter had
not been validly elected because twelve members did not constitute a quorum
the
majority
required
of
the
24-member
Senate.
ISSUES:
(1) Does the Court have jurisdiction over the subject-matter?
(2) If it has, were resolution Nos. 68 and 67 validly

approved?

HELD: The Supreme Court dismissed the petition on the ground that it involved a
political question. In view of the separation of powers, the judiciary should not
interfere nor take over a political nature of the controversy and the constitutional
grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president.
Supposing that the Court has jurisdiction, there is unanimity in the view that the
minority of ten senators who left the Hall may not prevent the other twelve
senators from passing a resolution that met with their unanimous endorsement.
The answer might be different had the resolution been approved only by ten or
less. Hence, the Court ruled inter alia that there was a constitutional majority of
the Senate for the purpose of a quorum required by the Constitution for the
transaction of the business of the Senate. Firstly because the minute say so,
secondly, because at the beginning of such session there were at least fourteen
senators including Senators Pendatun and Lopez, and thirdly because in view of
the absence from the country of Senator Tomas Confesor twelve senators
constitute a majority of twenty-three senators. When the Constitution declares
that a majority of "each House" shall constitute a quorum, "the House: does not
mean "all" the members. A majority of all the members constitute "the House".
Thus, the Court found it injudicious to declare the petitioner as the rightful
President of the Senate, since the office depends exclusively upon the will of the
majority of the senators, the rule of the Senate about tenure of the President of
that body being amenable at any time by that majority.

Arroyo vs De Venecia GR No
127255 14 August 1997
Facts: RA 8240 which amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue
Code by imposing so-called sin taxes on the manufacture and sale of beer and
cigarettes were challenged by Representative Joker Arroyo. The bicameral committee
after submitting its report to the House, the chairman of the committee proceeded to
deliver his sponsorship speech and was interpellated. Arroyo also interrupted to

move to adjourn for lack of quorum. His motion was defeated and put to a vote. The
interpellation of the sponsor proceeded and the bill was approved on its third
reading.
Issue: Whether or not Arroyo should have been heard for his call to adjourn for lack
of quorum?
Decision: Petition dismissed. It is unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a
coequal department of the Court either to set aside a legislative action as void
because the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own rules of procedure or to
allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum
when the petitioners can find their remedy in their own department.

G.R. No. 128055, April 18, 2001

o

Power of Sandiganbayan to suspend members of Congress vis-avis Congress' prerogative to discipline its own members: the former is
not punitive, the latter is
FACTS:
A group of employees of the Commission of Immigration and
Deportation (CID) filed a complaint for violation of Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act against then CID Commissioner Miriam DefensorSantiago. It was alleged that petitioner, with evident bad faith and
manifest partiality in the exercise of her official functions, approved the
application for legalization of the stay of several disqualified aliens.
The Sandiganbayan then issued an order for her suspension effective
for 90 days.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has authority to

decree a 90-day preventive suspension against a Senator of
the Republic of the Philippines
RULING:

The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension

of an incumbent public official charged with violation of the provisions
of Republic Act No. 3019 has both legal and jurisprudential support.
xxx
It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the court to issue
an order of suspension upon determination of the validity of the
information filed before it. Once the information is found to be
sufficient in form and substance, the court is bound to issue an order of
suspension as a matter of course, and there seems to be no ifs and
buts about it.
De Venecia v Sandiganbayan GR 130240, 5 February 2002
7/29/2010
0 Comments

Facts: On 12 March 1993, an Information (docketed as Criminal Case 18857)

was filed with the Sandiganbayan (First Division) against then Congressman
Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr., of Agusan del Sur for violation of Section 3 (e) of
Republic Act 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended). After
the accused pleaded not guilty, the prosecution filed a Motion To Suspend The
Accused Pendente Lite. In its Resolution dated 6 June 1997, the
Sandiganbayan granted the motion and ordered the Speaker to suspend the
accused. But the Speaker did not comply. Thus, on 12 August 1997, the
Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution requiring him to appear before it, on 18
August 1997 at 8:00 a.m., to show cause why he should not be held in
contempt of court. Unrelenting, the Speaker filed, through counsel, a motion for
reconsideration, invoking the rule on separation of powers and claiming that
he can only act as may be dictated by the House as a body pursuant to House
Resolution 116 adopted on 13 August 1997. On 29 August 1997, the
Sandiganbayan rendered a Resolution declaring Speaker Jose C. de Venecia, Jr.
in contempt of court and ordering him to pay a fine of P10,000.00 within 10
days from notice. Jose de Venecia, Jr., in his capacity as Speaker of the House
of Representatives; Roberto P. Nazareno, in his capacity as Secretary-General of
the House of Representatives; Jose Ma. Antonio B. Tuao, Cashier, House of
Representatives; Antonio M. Chan, Chief, Property Division, House of
Representatives,
filed
the
petition
for
certiorari.
Issue: Whether the suspension provided in the Anti-Graft law is a penalty or a
precautionary
measure;
and
Whether the doctrine of separation of powers exclude the members of Congress
from
the
mandate
of
R.A.
3019.
Held: As held in Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan (GR 118354, 8

August 1995), the suspension provided for in the Anti-Graft law is mandatory
and is of different nature and purpose. It is imposed by the court, not as a
penalty, but as a precautionary measure resorted to upon the filing of valid
Information.
As held in Miriam Defensor Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, et al., the doctrine of
separation of powers does not exclude the members of Congress from the
mandate of RA 3019. The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act 3019
is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the
Constitution. The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision
is a punitive measure that is imposed upon a determination by the Senate or the
House of Representatives, as the case may be, upon an erring member.