Chi Ming Tsoivs.CA GRNo, 119190, January 16,1997 FACTS: Chi Ming Tsai and Gina Lao Tsai was marriedin 1988. After the celebration of their wedding, they proceed tothe house of defendant's mother. There was no sexual intercourse between them during their first night andsame thing happened until theirFourth night. In aneffortto have their honeymoon in a private place, they went to Baguio but Gina's relatives went withthem. Again, there was nosexual intercourse since the defendant avoided by taking a long walk during siesta or sleeping ona rocking chair atthe living room. Since May 1968 until March 1969 they slept together n the same bed but no attempt of sexual intercourse betweenthem. Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinationtoa urologist in Chinese General Hospital in 1989. The result ofthe physical examination of Gina was disclosed, while that of the husband was kept confidential even the medicine prescribed. There were allegations that the reason why Chi Ming Tsai married her is to maintainhis residency status here in the country. Gina does not want toreconcile with Chi Ming Tsoi and ‘want their marriage dectared void on the ground of psychological incapacity. Onthe other hand, the latter does not want to have their marriage annulled because he loves her very much, he has no defect on his part and is physicallyand psychologically capable and since their relationshipis still young, they can still overcome their differences. Chi Ming Tsai. submitted himself toanother physical examination and the result was there is not evidence of impotency and heis capable of erection. ISSUE: Whether Chi Ming Tsai’'s refusal to have sexual intercourse with his wife constitutes psychologicaliincapacity. HELD: ‘The abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder vihichto the mind of the Supreme Court clearly demonstrates an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance tof the marriage within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code. Ifa spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses toperform hs or her essential marital obligations andthe refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Furthermore, one ofthe essential marital obligations under the Family Codes toprocreate children thus constant] non-fulfU meng ofthis obligation wil finaly destroy he integrityand wholeness of the marriage.SIAYNGCO v. SIAYNGCO {_-_AAAaAaaaa_rctorer , 2009 FACTS: Petitioner uarita Carating-Siayngco and respondent Manuel were married at cil rites on 27 J une 1973 and before the Catholic Church on August 11 1973. After discovering that they coud not have a child of their own, the couple decided to adopta baby boyin 1977, who they named J ererry. On 25 Septerrber 1997, or after twenty-four (24) years of mantied life together, respondent Manuel fied for the deciaration ofits nulity on the ground of psychological incapacity of petitioner J uarita. He alleged thatall throughout their marriage, his wife extibited an over dorrineering and seffish attitude towards him In her Answer, petitioner] arita alleged thatrespondent Manuel is stil living with her attheir corjugal home in Malolos, Bulacan; thathe inverted malicious stories against her so thathe coud be free to many his paramour. The trial cout-deried respondent Manue!’s petition for declaration of nulty of his Imartiage to petitioner) uarita. The Courtof Appeals reversed the RTC decision relying mainly on the psychiatric evaluation of Dr. Garcia finding both Manvel and J uarita psychologically incapacitated. Hence, this petition for review Issul HELD: The presumptions always in favor of the validity of mariage. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. inthe case at bar, respondent Mante! failed to prove thats wife’s lack of respect for him, her jealousies and obsession with cleanliness, her outbursts and her controling nature, and her inability to endear herself to his parents are grave psychological maladies that paralyze her from complying with the essential obligations of marriage. Neither is there [any showing that these “defects” were already present.at the inception of the mariage or that they are incurable. In act, the psychiatrist reported that petitioner was psychologically capacitated to comply with the basic and essential lobiiaations of mariaae. ‘The psychological report of respondent Manuel's witness, Dr. Garcia, showed that the root cause of petitioner | varita’s behaviors traceable - not fromthe inception of their mariage as required by law- but from her experiences (during the marriage, e.g,, her in-laws’ disapproval of her as they warted their son to enter the priesthood, her husband's ofilanderina, admitted no less by him. and her inabilitv to conceive. Anursatisfactory mariage, however, is nota null and void mariage. Mere showing of imeconcilable citferences” and ‘corficting personaiities”in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. As we stated in Marcos v. Marcos: Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused witha divorce law that cus the rrarital bond atthe time the causes therefore manifests themselves. itrefers to a serious psychological illness afficting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. Itis a malady so grave and so permanentas to deprive one of awareness of |the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. Petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Reaioral Trial Coutis reinstated and aiven full force and effectREPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA February 13, 1997 FACTS: ‘On April 14, 1985, plaintiffRoridel O. Molina married Reynaldo Molina which union bore a son. Aftera year of mamiage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and imesporsibility’ as a husband and a father as he preferred to ISpend more time with his peers and friends, depended on tis parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them. The RTC granted Roridel petition e ofn e a avthe CA “There is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is incapacity. Itappears to us to be more lof “difficuty.” if not outriaht "refusal" or “nealect’ in the performance of some rrarital obliaations: Mere showing of imeconcilable differences" and "corficting personalities" inno wise constitutes psychological incapacity. itis not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their resporsibilities and duties as married persons; itis essential that they mustbe shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (not prysical)iliness.. {The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could not get along with each other. There had benno showing of the gravity of the problenr neither its juridical artecedence nor its incurabilty The following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Farnily Code are hereby handed |down for the auidance of the benchand the bar: (1) The burden of proof to show the nulity of the mariage belongs to the plaintif Any doubtshoudd be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the mariage and aaainstits dissolution and nullity. (2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity mustbe (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the Icomplaint, (c) sufftcertly proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Farrily Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be phvsical (3)The incapacitv must be proven to be existina at 'the time of the celebration’ of the mariage. (4) Suchincapacitv mustalso be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. ISuchincurability mavbe absolute or even relative onivin reaard to the other spouse. not necessarily absolutely aaainst evervone of the same sex (5) Suchillness mustbe grave enougho bring about the disability ofthe party to assure the essertial obligations lof mariage. Thus, "rrild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be Jaccented as root causes. (6) The essential marital obliaations must be those embraced bv Articles 68 un to 71 of the Family Code as reaards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same |Code in reaard to parents and their children. Such non-comolied marital obliaation(s) must also be stated in the petition. proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision. (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimorial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, }while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. itis clear that Article 36 was taken by the F arrily Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983. (8) The tial cout mustorder the prosecuting attomev or fiscal and the Solicitor General to [appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification. which will be auoted in the decision. briefly statina therein his reasons for his aareemert or opposition as the case mavbe. to the petition. |____The assailed Decisionis REVERSED andSETASIDE,NOEL BUENAVENTURA v. Court of Appeals GRR. No. 127358, March 31, 2005. FACTS: J uy 12 1992, Noel Buenaventura fied a petition for the declaration of nulity of mariage on the ground thathe land his wife were psychologically incapacitated, The Regional Trial Couttinits decision declared the rramiage lertered irto between petitioner and respondertis void ab initio. The court ordered the liquidation of the assets of the conjugal partnership property; ordered petitioner a reguiar support in favor of his sonin the amountof 15,000 monthly, Isubject to modification as the necessity arises, and awarded the care and custody of the rrinor to his mother. Petitioner appealed before the Courtof Appeals and while the appeal was pending, the Court of Appeals, upon respondent's motion issued a resolution increasing the support pendarts like to P20, 000. The Couttof Appeals disrrissal petitioner appeal for lack of merit and affimed into the RTC decision. Petitioner motion for reconsideration }was denied, hence this petition, ISSUE: Whether or not co-ownershio is applicable to valid mariage, HELD: ‘The general rule applies, whichis incase a maniage is declared void ab initio, the property regime applicable to be liquidated, partitioned and distributed is that of equal co-ownership. Since the properties ordered to be distibuted by the court were there, both by the Regional Trial Courtand the Court of Appeals, to have been acquired during the lurion of he parties, the same would be covered by the co-ownership. No fruits of a separate property of one of theBOBIS VS. BOBIS GR. No. 138509. July 31, 2000. IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS, petitioner, vs. ISAGANI D. BOBIS, respondent. TOPIC AS PER OUTLINE G. Void Marriages > 1. Kinds of Void Marriages > (a) Bigamous and Polygamous Marriages FACTS * Isagani Bobis contracted a second marriage in 1996 and allegedly, a third one without annulling, nullifying, or terminating his first marriage in 1985. * Information for bigamy was filed against Isagani Bobis by his second wife, Imelda Marbella-Bobis (petitioner) in 1998. *Aiter which, Isagani initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage on the ground thet it was celebrated without a marriage license. * Isagani then filed a motion to suspend the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy invoking the pending civil case for nullity of the first marriage as a prejudicial question ***2 to the criminal case of bigamy, to which the trial court had granted. Imelda filed a motion for reconsideration, but was denied; thus, her petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court. ISSUE WON the subsequent filing for a declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is a prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy. HELD NO, the subsequent filing for a declaration of nullity of a previous marriage |S. ‘NOT a prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy. RATIO. > Article 40 of the Family Code, which was effective at the time of celebration of the second marriage, requires 2 prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage before a party may remarry. > In light of Article 40 of the Family Code, Isegeni, without first having obtained the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage, can not be said to have validly entered into the second marriage. » As-ruled in Landicho v. Relova, he who contracts 2 second mariage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first mariage assumes the risk of beng prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case the criminal case may not be suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity. > Ina recent case for concubinage, the SC held that the pendency of a civil case for dedieration of nullity of marriage is not a prejudicial question. The ruling applies to this case by analogy since both crimes presuppose the subsistence of marrage. > In the case at bar, respondent's clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage and thereafter to invoke that very same judgment to prevent his prosecution for bigamy.GOMEZ vs, LIPANA ‘The defendant-appellant, Joaquin P.Lipana, contracted two marriages: the rst with aria Loreto Andi in 1930 and the second with Isidra Gomez y Aquing in 1935, At the UUme ofthe second mariage the frst was stil subsisting, which fac, tiowevar,Lipana concealed from the second wife (on December 17, 1943 the spouses ofthe second marriage acquired by purchase apiece of land in Cubao, Quezon City forthe price of P3,000,00. The Torens tt for the property (Transfer Certifcate No. 25289 of the Reuister of Deeds for Quezon City) was Iksued on February 2, 1944, In the name of "Joaquin Lipana marled to isidra Gomez." On uly 20, 1958 Isdra Gomer died intestate and childless, and survived only by her sisters as the nearest relatives. On August 7, 1961 Ofela Gomer, judicial administratrix of her estate, commenced the present sut, praying forthe frfeitue ofthe husband's share in the Cubao property in favor ofthe sald estat. Reliance is placed on tid 1417 ofthe old CCl Code, the Spanish text of which provides: ts sociedad de ganancialesconcluye al disclverse el matrimonio o al ser dedarado mula, El conjuge que por su mals fe hubiere sido causa dela nulided, no tendra parte en los blones ganandales. ‘The society of fint property concludes after the marriage dissolves or on having been declared void. The conjuge that for his bad faith wil hve Daen a cause of the nullty, wil not have pat in the community properties. “The trial court, rullng thatthe second marslage was vold ab into and thatthe husband was the one who gave cause for is nulity, epplled the aforequated provision and declares his interest n the disputed property foreited in favor ofthe estate ofthe deceased second if, In the present zppea by the defendant he atrbutes two errors to the tral court: (2) in allowing a collateral attack onthe validly ofthe second mariage and in holding it to be bigamous and void 26 io; and (2) In holding that artide 1417 ofthe Spanish Chi Code is applicable in this case, ISSUE: WON a colateral attack on the validity on the second mariage in hong itto be bigamous and void ab inl, WON that Article 1417 ofthe Spanish Chil Code Is applicable in ths case, HELD: Yes. The party who challenges the vallity ofthe second mariage can be challenged colatorally. There fs no suggeston here that the defendants 1930 mariage to Marla Loreto ancino had been annulled o dissolved when he marred 1sidra Gomez in 1935, and there iso proof that he did 39 under the conditions envisioned in sub-section (b). the burden ison the party invoking the exception to prove that he comes under it; and the defendant has not discharged that burdan at al, no evidence whatsoover having been ‘adduced by him atthe tal. Indeed, he contracted the second marriage less than seven years after the frst, and he has not shown that his frst wife vas then generally Considered dead or was believed by him to beso, (on the second issus, the conjugsl partnership formed by the second martiage was dissolved by the death of the second wife; and there has been no judicial dedaration of rnullty except possibly In this very action, fled ate dssolution by death had taken place and when Aticle 1417 of the Spanish Ciil Cade was na longer in force, Even though the said provision was no longer in force its stil presumed, with respect to the spouse who acted in bad falth, that nelther the marriage nor the confugal partnership ever existed, and hence such spouse has no right to share inthe conjugal properties; but this legal etfectof such presumption derives from the premise that article 1427 ie stilin feces, and in any events of doubtful application if it would be in derogation of and tothe proludice of the right of the other spouse ofthe frst marrage inthe conjugal partnership formed thereby, which Inckides properties acquired by the husband during its existence. ‘The only just and equitable solution in this case would be to recognize the right ofthe second wife to her husband, and consider the other half as pertaining tothe conjugal partnership ofthe frst mariage ‘The decision appealed from is reversed and the complaint Is dismissed, without pronouncement as t costs.Villanuevav. CA, 505 SCRA 564 FACTS: In 1988, Ory married Lika, In.1892, Orly filed an annulment case of thair marriage on the ground that he was forced to. marry Lilia 2ecaue he received phone calls from a certain Ka Celso, a member of NPA, who threatenedhim ta be killad if he \won’tmarry Lilia. He also claimed that he was defrauded by Lilia by making him believe that he was pregnant. Lila denied these allegations, claiming Orly freely cohabitated wither and showed 14 letters as proof of Orly's affection andcare towards her. ISSUE: Whetheror not there really was fraud in obtaining Orly’s consenttomarry Lila HELD: No. Itis obviousthat Orly seeks toannul his marriage because of a pending bigamy case filed by Lila. Also, Or’'s contentions were notconcretely established, taki8ngin consideration that he is a security guard whois knowledgeable of self-defense, Hisallegations thet ne neverhad an erection during thelr sexual intercourse is alle. Also, it took him four years to file an action, which only supports Lila’s contention that he freely cohabitated withher.LEQUEL SANTOS v. COURT OF APPEALS and SANTOS FACTS: Lt Leouel Santos mariied private respondert} ia Bedia on Sept 20, 1986 in lloilo MTC. and later by churc Iwedding. They lived with the latter's parents and eventually gave birth to Leouel Santos, Jr. on J uy 18, 1987. The| relationship tumed sour when they began quarreling over frequertiinterference of) uia's parents and the issue of ving) independertiv from the in-laws. On May 18, 1988, J uia left for the United States (US) to work as nurse despite Leoue''s protestations. Seven Imorths thereafter or on j anuary 1, 1989, she called up from the US with the promise of returing home soon, but she! never did. Given the chance, Leouel went to the US for a taining program sponsored by the Armed Forces of the| Philippines (AFP) from Anril to August 1990, He desperatelv tried to locate her there but failed He then filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for the nullification of their mamiage under Article 36 of the| Farrily Code, on the ground of psychological incapacity. Summons was served by publication in a newspaper {general circulation in Negros Orierfal. In her answer, J uia claimed that it was Leouel who was imesporsible and! incompetent. The RTC in Noverrber 1991 disrrissed the case for lack of merit. On appeal, the Courtof Appeals (CA)) ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage may be declared a nulity pursuantto Article 36 of the Farrily Code. HELD: Article 36 cannot be taken and construed independently, but must stand in corjunction with existing precepts laws on mariage. Ths correlated, “psychological incapacity” shoud refer no less than a mertal (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truy in cogritive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be! lassumed and discharged by the parties to the mariage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Farrily Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There! is hardly any doubt that the intendmert of the law has been to confine the mearing of psychological incapacity to the! Imost serious cases of personality disorders clearly demorstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning| land significance to the mariage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the mariage is celebrated. The| law does not evidently envision an inability of the spouse to have sex.al relations wity for copuiation and to submit, within ten (10) days from the receipt of the order, a medical certificate on the resut thereof. ‘The welkconsidered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists and persons with expertise in psychological Idisciolines rriahtbe heloful or even desirable in establishina the parameters of psvcholoaical incanacity. ‘Mantage is not just and adventure but a lifetime commitment. We shoud continue to be reminded that innate in| lour society, then enshrined in the Civil Code, and even now still indelible in Section 1 of the Farrily Code...the|| _LUCITAESTRELLAHERNANDEZ v. COURT OF APPEALS and MARIO C.HERNANDEZ {oo GR No, 126010 December. 999 FACTS: Lucita Estrella married Mario Hemandez on J anuary 1, 1981 and they begot three (3) children, On J uly 10, 1992, Lucita lied before the RTC of Tagaytay City, a petition for annuiment of marriage under Article 36 alleging that from the time of their Imarriage, Mario failed to perform his obligation to support the family, devoting most of this time drinking, had affairs with many |women and cohabiting with another wornen with whom he had an illegitimate child, and fnally abandoning her and the farrily. HSSUE; |__Whether there was nsycholasical incanacitvunder Article 3g | fen, ‘No. Habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment do not by thernselves constitute grounds for |declaring a marriage void based on psychological incapacity. it must be shown that these facts are manifestations of a {discolored personaity which make private respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital [state, and not merely due to private respondents youth and self-conscious feeling of being handsome, as the appellate court {helt Expert testimony should be presented to establish the precise cause of the psychological incapacity to show that it jexisted at the time of the marriage. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests upon petitioner. The Courts Iminaful ofthe policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution |and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.DAVID B. DEDEL v. COURT OF APPEALS and SHARON L. CORPUZ-DEDEL January 29, 2004 FACTS: David Dedel and Sharon Corpuz were married on September 28, 1996 and May 20,1967 ina civil and church wedding, respectively. They had four children. David instituted a case for the nulty of their marriage on account of [Sharon's psychological incapacity to perform basic marital obligations. He claimed that Sharon had extra-rmarital affairs with several men including a dertistin the AFP, a lieutenantin the P residertial Security Command, and a |) ordarian national. Despite the treatment bya clinical psychiatrist, Sharon did not stop her illicit relationship with the |) ordarian, whomshe married and with whom she had two children. When the J ordanian national left the country, [Sharon retumed to David bringing along her two children by the J ordarian national. David accepted her back and even considered the illegitimate children as Fis own, However, Sharon abandoned David to join the J ordanian national with her two children. Since then, Sharon woud only retum to the county on special occasions. Dra, Natividad Dayan testified thatshe conducted a psychological evaluation of David and found himto be conscientious, hardworking, dligert, a perfectiorist who warts all tasks and projects completed up to the final detail land who exerts his bestin whatever he does. On the other hand, Dre, Dayan declared that Sharon was suffering from Anti-Social Personality Disorder extibited by her biatantdisplay of infidelity; that she committed several indiscretions [and had no capacity for remorse even bringing with her the two children of the J ordanian to live with David. Such irrmratuity and irresponsibility in handling the marriage like her repeated acts of infidelity and abandonment of her farrly are indications of the said disorder ammourting to psychological incapacity to performthe essertial obligations of maniaae. ‘The trial court declared their marriage null and void on the ground of the psychological incapacity of Sharon to performthe essential obligations of marriage. While the Courtof Appeals setaside the tial court's judgment and lordered the disrrissal of the petition. David's motion for reconsideration was deried. Hence, he appealed to the }Supreme Court. Issul HELD: No. Sharon's infidelity is not equivalent to psychologically incapacity. As held in Santos ws. Court of Appeals, psychological incapacity” should refer to no less than a mental, not physical, incapacity that causes a party to be truly in cognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly mustbe assumed and discharged by the parties to the Imaiage whichas so expressed in Article 68 of the Farily Code, include their muiual obligations to live together, lobserve love, respectand fidelity and render help and support. The law intended to corfine the mearing of ‘psychological incapacity’ to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivitv of inabiltv to Give mearina and sianificance to the marriage, Sharon's sex.al infidelity or perversion and abandonment do notby themselves constitute psychological incapacity within the corterrplation of the Farvily Code. Neither couid her emotional immaturity and imesponsibilty be lequated with psychological incapacity. Itrrustbe shown that these acts are manifestations ofa disordered personality, which make the respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her vouth. immaturity or seal promiscuity. ‘At best, the circumstances relied upon by David are grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Farvily ICode not for declaring a marriage void. The grounds for legal separation, which need not be rooted in psychological incapacity, include physical violence, moral pressure, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, seal infidelity, abandonment and the lke. Decision affimed. Petition denied,CASE ISSUE: + Nature of Judgment for Support FACTS: + J&A were married and had one son, P. + A petitioned the court for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to J, based on psychological incapacity. There was no prayer for support of P, but the court granted the same. The case was submitted for decision. + Thereafter, A filed an urgent motion to re-open which was granted by the Pasay RTC. She presented two marriage licenses of previous marriages of J as additional evidence. + The court then declared the marriage of J & A as void for being bigamous and ordered J to contribute monthly support to P amounting to 20,000 pesos. J contested this order on the basis that there was already a Compromise Agreement Previously approved by the Makati RTC which stipulated the specific contributions of both spouses with regard to the support of the child. 1 LESSONS: + “,.Judgment for support DOES NOT become final. The right to support is of such nature that its allowance is provisional...it cannot be regarded as subject to final determination...." + Since support is provisional, meaning it is “always subject to modification, depending upon the needs of the child and capabilities of the parents to give support...” RES JUDICATA should not apply.Mallion v. Alcantara GRNo. 141528 October 31, 2006 Facts: Oscar Mallion filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court seeking a declaration of nullity of his mariage with Editha Alcantara due to psychological incapacity. The RTC denied the petition. Asthe decision attained finalit licn filed ancther petition for a declaration of nullity of marriage, this time alleging that his marriage was null and void due to the fact that it was celebrated without a valid marriage license. Issue: Does a previous final judgment denying a petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity bar a subsequent petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of lack of marriage license? Held: Res judicata’ applies. Mallion is simply invoking different grounds for the same cause of action which is the nullity of marriage. When the second case was filed based on another ground, there is a splitting of a cause of action which is prohibited. He is estopped from asserting that the first marriage had no marriage because in the first case he impliedly admitted the same when he cid not question the absence of a marriage licanse.NARCISO S. NAVARRO, J R. v. CYNTHIA CECILIO-NAVARRO GR. No. 162049 April 13, 2007 FACTS: On| anuary 8, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 65677, reversing the Regional Trial Coutts declaration of nuliy of the mariage of petitioner and respondert. Likewise assailed is the Court of Appeals’ Resolution dated Febnary 4, 2004 derying reconsideration. Narciso Navaro, Jr. withthe Regional Trial Coutof Marila, Branch 37, he soughtthe declaration of nulty of his manage to respondent. Petitioner and respondent were colege sweethearts. Atthe time they got married, both in civil and church ceremories, they were awaiting their first ctild. Since petitioner was stilla medical stuclent, while respondert was a stuclent of pharmacy, they lived with petitioner's parents, on whomthey were financially dependent. E vertually, their union bore four children. He filed the petition for nuliication of their mariage when he found out their eldest daughter had been made pregnantby a ran |whom respondent hired to follow him. She concluded that respondent was also psychologically incapacitated to performthe marital obligations because she knew, fromthe start, thather husband was going to be a doctor, yet she did not give himthe supportand understanding that was expected of a doctor's wife. For the respondent's part, respondent refused to subrritto the psychiatric exarrination asked by the petitioner, butsaid she would do so only when her defense requires it She averred that she had no marital problerrs, not until petitioner had an ilicitaftair with a certain Dr. Lucila Posadas. Petitioner deried the affair. Respondent narrated that early 1984, she caught petitioner ‘and Lucila inside the Harana Motel inSta. Mesa where a corffortation ensued. After the incident, petitioner seldom |werthorme until he perrranentiylefthis farily sometime in 1986. On August 21, 1998, the trial courtheld that petitioner [and respondent were both psychologically incapacitated to perform their marital obligations. The marriage between the parties is (sic) dated J une 2, 1973 is hereby declared null and void. ISSUES: 1) the conclsion of the Court of Appeals - that the lower court (RTC) erred in finding the parties (petitioner land respondent) both nsvcholoaicallvincapacitated under Article 36 of The Family Code - corrector not? 2)! the conclusion of the Honorable Court of Appeals - thatthe evidence failed to show thatthe parties (petitioner and respondent) were completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of mamiage - corrector not? HELD: 1) The Honorable Courtof Appeals is correct, Article 36 of the Farvily Code states that, a mamiage contracted by any party who, atthe time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essertial marital lobiigatiors of mariage, shall iikewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solerrrization. Psychological incapacity required by Art. 36 must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical artecedence, and (c) incurability. Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truyin cogritive of the basic marital covenants that concorritantly rust be assumed and discharged by the parties to the manage. These include the obligations to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual helo and support. 2) The Honorable Coutt of Appeals is correct, petitioner failed to show that grave and incurable incapacity, on the part of both spouses, existed at the time of the celebration of the mariage. Their bickering and arguments even before their marriage and respondent's scandalous outbursts in public, at most, show their immaturity, and immaturity Idoes not corstitute psychological incapacity. Thus so far, both petitioner and respondent have not shown proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor, an adverse integral elemertin their personality structure thateffectively incaoacitates them from acceotina and comolvina with the obiiaations essertial to mariage.ANTONIO v. REYES -—_——_________ GR No. 155800 March 10, 2005 0 FACTS: ‘On December 6, 1990 Leorilo Antonio and Marie Reyes mamied each other. On March8, 1993 petitioner fied for declaration of nulity based on Art. 36 alleging that the respondents pathological lying aboutalmost anything were Imarifestations of her psychological incapacity. Petitioner presented two doctors who corroborated each other in declaring the respondentto be psychologically incapacitated to comply with marital obligations. Respondent denied being a pathological iar, presented another doctor who conducted a test and found her not to be psychologically incapacitated. One doctor preserted by the petitioner assailed the finding of respondent's doctor stating that the test is inconclusive due to its unreliability. The RTC found the evidences presented by the petitioner to warrant the grant of the decree. On responderts appeal to the CA, the church annulled the marriage due to lack of discretion of both pares. Notwithstanding the findings ofthe RTC andthe annuimentby the church the CA reversed the RTC's decision a ply with 1L bs the patholocical lina of a spouse manifestations of psvcholoaical incapacity? |__2, Were the auidelines inthe Molina case sufftientivsatisfied? HELD: 1. Yes. Psychological incapacity refers to an ‘Inability to understand the obligations of mariage” such actions of the wife are manifestations ofttis inability. 2. Yes. Inunderstanding Article 36, ‘the preference of the revision comrrittee was for the judge to interpret the provision ona case-to-case basis, guided by experience, inthe findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law:" Also, ‘Molina is notsetiin stone... the interpretation fArticle 36 i16. Republic of the Philippines vs. vs. Hamano 428 SCRA 735 - FACTS: Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint in 1996 for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of psychological incapacity. She and Toshio started a common-law relationship in japan and livedin tha Philippinas for a month. ‘Thereafter, Toshio went oack to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. Lolita then gave birth on November 16, 1987. In 1988, Lolita and Toshio got married in MTC-Bacoor, Cavite. After a month of their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his ‘amily. Toshio sent money for two months and after that he stopped giving financial support. She wrote him several times but never respondent. in 1991, she learned from her friend that Toshio visited the country but cid not bother to see her nor their child, Toshio was no longer residing at his given address thus summons issued to him remained unserved. Consequently, in 1996, Lolita filed an ex parte motion for leave to effect service of summons by publication. The motion was granted and the summons, accompanied by a copy of the petitin, was published in a newspaper of general circulation giving Toshio 15 days to file his answer. Toshio filed to respond after the lapse of 60 days from publication, thus, Lolita filed a motion to refer the case to the prosecutor for investigation. ISSUE: Whether Toshio wes psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligation. HELD: ‘The Court is mindful of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. Toshio’s act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to sorre kind of psychological illness. Although as rule, actual medical examinations are not neaded, it would have greatly helped Lolita had she presented evidence that medically or clinically identified Toshio’s illness. This could have been done through an expert witness. It is essential that a person show incapability of doing marital obligation due to Some psychological, not physical iiness. Hence, Toshio was not considered as psychologically incapacitated.LANDICHO VS RELOVA Case Digest LANDICHO V. RELOVA Facts: On February 27, 1963, petitioner was charged before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch |, presided over by respondent Judge, with the offense, of bigamy. It was alleged in the information that petitioner "being then lawfully marriedto Elvira Makatangay. which marriage has not been legally dissolved, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with Fe Lourdes Pasi" On March 15, 1963, an action was filed before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, likewise presided plaintiff respondent Judge Fe Lourdes Pasia, seeking to declare her marriage to petitioner as null and void ab initio because of the alleged use of force, threats and intimidation allegedy employed by petitioner and because of its allegedly bigamous character. On June 15, 1963, petitioner as defendant in said case, filed a third-party complaint, against the third-party defendant Elvira Makatangay, the first s pouse, praying that his marriage with the saidthird-party defendant be declared null and void, on the ground that by means of threats, force and intimidation, she compelled him to appear and contract marriage with her before the Justice of the Peace of Makati, Rizal. Issue: Whether or not the civil case filed is a prejudicial question Rulin ‘Where the first wife fileda criminal action for bigamy against the husband, and later the second wife filed a civil case for annulment of the marriage on the ground of force and intimidation, andthe husbandlater files a civil case for annulment of marriage against the firstwife, the civil cases are not prejudicial questions in the determination of his ‘criminal liability for bigamy, since his consent to the second marriage is not in issue. “The mere fact that there are actions to annul the marriages enteredinto by accusediin a bigamy case doesnot mean that "prejudicial questions” are automatically raised in civil actions as to warrant the suspension of the criminal case. In order that the case of annulment of marriage be considered prejudicial question tothe bigamy case against the accused, it must be shown that petitioner's consent to such mariage must be the one that was obtained by means of duress, force and intimidation to show that his act in the second marriage must be involuntary and cannot be the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy. The situation in the present case is markedly different. Atthe time the petitioner was indicted for bigamy, the fact that two marriage ceremonies had been contracted appearedto be indisputable. And itwas the second spouse, not the petitioner who filedthe action for nullity on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. And it was only later that petitioner as defendant in the civil action, filed third party complaint against the first spouse alleging that his mariage with her should be declared null and void on the ground of force, threats and intimidation, Assuming the first mariage was null and void on the groundalleged by petitioner, that fact would not be material to the outcome of the criminal case. Parties tothe marriage shouldnot be permittedto judge for themselves its nullity, forthe same must be submited to the judgment ofa competent court and only when the nullity ofthe marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration, the presumption is that the mammiage exists. “Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first mariage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.”TITLE: Donato vs. Luna CITATION: GR No. 53642, April 15, 1988 FACTS: An information for bigamy against petitioner Leonilo Donate was filed on January 23, 1979 with the lower court in Manila. This was based on the complaint of private respondent Paz Abayan. Before the petitioner's arraignment on September 28, 1979, Paz filed with Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila, a civil action for declaration of nullity of her marriage with petitioner contracted on September 26, 1978. Said civil case was based onthe ground that Paz consented to entering into the marriage which was Donato's second since she had no previous knowledge that Donate was already married to a certain Rosalinda Maluping on June 30, 1978. Donato defensed that his second marriage was void since it was solemnized without a marriage license and that force, violence, intimidation and undue influence were employed by private respondent to obtain petitioner's consent to the marriage. Prior to the solemnization of the second marriage, Paz and Donate had lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of wedlock for 5 years proven by a joint affidavit executed by them on September 26, 1978 for which reason, the requisite marriage license was dispensed with pursuant to Article 76 of the Civil Code. Donato continued to live with Paz until November 1978 where Paz left their home upon learning that Donato already previously married. ISSUE: Whether or not a criminal case for bigamy pending before the lower court be suspended in view of a civil case for annulment of marriage pending before the juvenile and domestic relations court on the ground that latter constitutes a prejudicial question. HELD: Petitioner Leonilo Donato can’t apply rule on prejudicial question since a case for annulment of marriage can only be considered as a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused if it was proved that petitioners consent to such marriage and was obtained by means of duress violence and intimidation to show that his act in the second marriage must be involuntary and cannot be the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy. ccordingly, there being no prejudicial question shown to exit the order of denial issued by the respondent judge dated April 14, 1980 shouldbe sustained. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. We make no pronouncement as to costs.Wiegel vs. Sempio-Dy 143 SCRA 449 FACTS: Karl Wiegel was married to Lilia Wiegel on July 1978. Lilia was married with a certain Eduardo Maxion in 1972. Karl then filed a petition in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lilia on the ground of latter’s former marriage. Havingbeen allegedly force to enter into a marital union, she contents that the first marriage is null and void. Lilia Ukewise alleged that Karl was married to another woman before their marriage. ISSUE: Whether Karl's marriage with Lilia Is void. HELD: Jt was not necessary for Lilia to prove that her first marriage was vitiated with force because it will not be void but merely voidable. Such marriage is valid until annulled. Since no annulmenthas yet been made, it is clear that when she married Karl, she is still validly married to her first husband. Consequently, her marriage to Karl is void. Likewise, there is no need of introducing evidence on the priormarriage of Karl for then such marriage though vold still needs a judicial declaration before he can remarry. Accordingly, Karl and Lilia’s marriage are regarded void under the law.Domingo vs. CA 226 SCRA 572 FACTS: Soledad Domingo, married with Roberto Domingo in 1976, filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of property. She did not know that Domingo had been previously married to Emerlinda dela Paz in 1969. She came to know the previous marriage when the latter filed a suit of bigamy against her. Furthermore, when she came home from Saudi during her one-month leave from work, she discovered that Roberto cohabited with another woman and had been disposing some of her properties which is administered by Roberto. The latter claims that because their marriage was void ab initio, the declaration of such voidance is unnecessary and superfluous. On the other hand, Soledad insists the declaration of the nullity of marriage not for the purpose of remarriage, but in order to provide a basis for the separation and distribution of properties acquired during the marriage. ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration should only be filed for purposes of remarriage. HELD: The declaration of the nullity of marriage is indeed required for purposed of remarriage. However, it is also necessary for the protection of the subsequent spouse who believed in good faith that his or her partner was not lawfully married marries the same. With this, the said person is freed from being charged with bigamy. When a marriage is declared void ab initio, law states that final judgment shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings. Soledad’s prayer for separation of property will simply be the necessary consequence of the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage. Hence, the petitioner’s suggestion that for their properties be separated, an ordinary civil action has to be instituted for that purpose is baseless. The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of property according to the regime of prbperty relations governing them.