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We do not agree. We find merit in petitioners' contention that the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not destroy petitioners' right and cause
of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention and other violations of their
constitutional rights. The suspension does not render valid an otherwise illegal
arrest or detention. What is suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek
release from detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of
obtaining his liberty.
Firstly, it is wrong to at the plaintiffs' action for damages 5 Section 1, Article 19. to
'acts of alleged physical violence" which constituted delict or wrong. Article 32
clearly specifies as actionable the act of violating or in any manner impeding or
impairing any of the constitutional rights and liberties enumerated therein, among
others
The complaint in this litigation alleges facts showing with abundant clarity and
details, how plaintiffs' constitutional rights and liberties mentioned in Article 32 of
the Civil Code were violated and impaired by defendants. The complaint speaks of,
among others, searches made without search warrants or based on irregularly
issued or substantially defective warrants; seizures and confiscation, without proper
receipts, of cash and personal effects belonging to plaintiffs and other items of
property which were not subversive and illegal nor covered by the search warrants;
arrest and detention of plaintiffs without warrant or under irregular, improper and
illegal circumstances; detention of plaintiffs at several undisclosed places of
'safehouses" where they were kept incommunicado and subjected to physical and
psychological torture and other inhuman, degrading and brutal treatment for the
purpose of extracting incriminatory statements. The complaint contains a detailed
recital of abuses perpetrated upon the plaintiffs violative of their constitutional
rights.
Secondly, neither can it be said that only those shown to have participated
"directly" should be held liable. Article 32 of the Civil Code encompasses within the
ambit of its provisions those directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for its
violation.
The responsibility of the defendants, whether direct or indirect, is amply set forth in
the complaint. It is well established in our law and jurisprudence that a motion to
dismiss on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action must be based
on what appears on the face of the complaint. 6 To determine the sufficiency of the
cause of action, only the facts alleged in the complaint, and no others, should be
considered. 7 For this purpose, the motion to dismiss must hypothetically admit the
truth of the facts alleged in the complaint. 8