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Waters Treaty has once again come into the focus of national and
international attention. It is for quite some time that the Indus Waters
Treaty, which was signed by India and Pakistan in September 1960 after
more than eight years of negotiations to resolve the dispute over the
usage for irrigation and hydel power of the waters of the Indus water
system, has been publicly denounced by the Jammu and Kashmir
government for being "discriminatory" to the Indian State of Jammu and
Kashmir.1
On 3 April 2002, the Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly, cutting across party affiliations,
called for a review of the Treaty. Speakers who denounced the Treaty ranged from the National
Conference's G. M. Bawan to the Bhartiya Janata Party's Shiv Charan Gupta and Communist
Party of India Marxist leader Mohammad Yusuf Tarigami.2 The State government has been
contending that in spite of having an untapped hydro-electric potential of 15,000 MW, the State
has been suffering from acute power deficiency due to restrictions put on the use of its rivers by
the Indus Treaty. And when the State Chief Minister, or his officials point to the losses accrued
to the State by virtue of this Treaty, they are not indulging in any rhetoric. In fact their views that
the requirements of the J&K State were not taken into account while negotiating the Treaty with
Pakistan are shared largely by the intellectual, media and public circles in Jammu and Kashmir.
Not only that, some people even stretch it further suggesting that the central government has
been insensitive to the State's problems. Pakistan's action is seen to be obstructing the agroeconomic development of Jammu and Kashmir State. The State Chief Minister Mufti
Mohammad Syed and other political leaders have appealed to Pakistan to facilitate the economic
growth of Jammu and Kashmir by not raising objections to hydro power projects in the state
under the Indus Treaty provisions.
It is against this background that this paper seeks to have a relook at the Indus Waters Treaty.
That the Treaty has been in force for nearly 45 years is a considerable period for making an
appraisal whether the Treaty really served the larger purpose of bringing India-Pakistan amity
and cooperation on other fronts.
formally offered its good offices to both India and Pakistan to work out a solution of the Indus
waters issue on the basis of Lilienthal proposals. The World Bank offer was conditioned by the
'essential principle' that "the problem of development and use of Indus Basin water resources
should be solved on a functional and not a political plan without relations to past negotiations
and past claims, and independently of political issues".25
Both countries accepted the suggestion after the World Bank President, Eugene Black personally
net both the Indian and Pakistani Prime Ministers. By May 1952 the first of the long series of
conferences opened at Washington which were continued at Karachi and Delhi. But it soon
became clear that Lilienthal's proposal of a joint Indus Engineering Corporation could not be
realised. Instead it was found necessary to replace the existing supplies from alternative
sources. So in February 1954 the World Bank officals proposed to India and Pakistan, the
division of rivers. "The three eastern rivers Ravi, Beas and Sutlej would be available for the
exclusive use and benefit of India, after a specified transitionary period. The Western rivers
Indus, Jhelum and Chenab would be available for the exclusive use and benefit of Pakistan,
except for the insignificant volume of Jhelum flow presently used in Kashmir... Each country
would construct the works located on its own territories which are planned for the development
of the supplies. The costs of such works would be borne by the country to be benefitted
thereby".26 Whereas India accepted the World Bank proposals, inspite of its sacrifices, Pakistan
vacillated and accepted 'in principle' only after the Bank pressed her for a reply. In his letter of
22 March 1954 to the World Bank President, Prime Minister of India while conveying his
general acceptance to the principles governing the Bank proposals as the basis of agreement
stressed that : "the actual agreement which would be worked out with the assistance of the Bank
authorities will naturally deal with number of details including the question of the small
requirements of Jammu and Kashmir."27 On the other hand, Pakistan continued to ask for
clarification of details and further technical studies, thereby taking several years in the
negotiations.
India's acceptance of the World bank proposals was based on the hope that in five years' time
India would be able to make use of the waters of the eastern rivers. This was, however,
frustrated by Pakistani procrastination. Pakistan was seeking a comprehensive replacementcum-development programme in Pakistan involving high investment of about 1.12 billion US
dollars.28 And in 1959 the World Bank USA and certain western countries became ready to foot
the bill for this huge construction programme in Pakistan, so that the vexed canal waters dispute
between India and Pakistan could be solved. It was on 1 March 1960 that the World Bank made
a public announcement of the financial plan it had evolved for the replacement and development
works of the Indus system. It was estimated to cost about 1000 million dollars partly in foreign
exchange and partly in local currencies. The Bank announced that the requisite expenditure
would be contributed by Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Germany, United Kingdom, United
States, the World Bank besides the contributions by India and Pakistan. Ironically as it may
sound, the bulk of this financial plan was meant to be spent in Pakistan 691 million dollars out of
747 millions of grants and loans with India getting only 56 million dollars as loan for the Beas
Dam, as against Pakistan getting all her development underwritten by the Bank's financial
plan.29 Besides, the World Bank press release did not mention about the additional U.S. grant of
235 million dollars in local currency. 30 Yet, India stuck to its commitment to conclude the Indus
Waters Treaty based on the World Bank proposals. And the Treaty was duly signed on 19
September 1960 at Karachi by Jawaharlal Nehru, the Prime Minister of India, President Ayub
The Treaty
The main features of the Treaty are as follows
(i) The waters of the three eastern rivers - the Ravi, the Beas and the Sutlej - would be
available for unrestricted use by India, after a transition period.
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(ii) The waters of the three western rivers-the Indus, the Jhelum and the Chenab - would
be allowed to flow for unrestricted use by Pakistan except for some limited use such as a
domestic use, b non-consumptive use, c agricultural use, d generation of hydro-electric
power run-of-river-plants in Kashmir.
(iii) During the transition period of ten years, India would continue to give Pakistan some
supplies from the eastern rivers, in accordance with detailed regulation set out in the
Treaty. The period may be extended at Pakistan's request up to a maximum of another
three years. If so extended, India would deduct from its contribution Rs. 4.16 crores for
one year's extension and Rs. 8.54 crores for two years' extension and Rs. 13.13 crores if the
extension is sought for three years.
(iv) Pakistan would build works in the transition period to replace, from the western rivers
and other sources, waters she used to get in her canals from the eastern rivers.
(v) Non-consumptive use, domestic use etc. would be permitted in all the rivers by both the
countries, but such use should not in any way affect the flow of rivers and channels, to be
used by the other party.
(vi) India would contribute in ten equal annual instalments the fixed sum pf Pounds
Sterling 62,060,000 to the Indus Basin Development Fund towards the cost of replacement
works in Pakistan.
(vii) Both countries have recognised their common interest in the optimum development of
the rivers, and declared their intention to co - operate by mutual agreement to the fullest
possible extent.
(viii) The two countries would regularly exchange data regarding the flow in and utilisation
of waters of the rivers.
ix Permanent Indus Commission would be constituted with the Commissioners for Indus
Waters of the two countries- a post which should be filled by a high-ranking engineer
competent in the field of hydrology and water use. Each Commissioner will be the
representative of his Government of consideration of all matters arising out of the Treaty.
The purpose and functions of the Indus Commission would by "to establish and maintain
cooperative arrangements for the implementation of this Treaty and to promote
cooperation in the matter of development of the rivers".
(x) If the Indus Commission fails to reach agreement on any matter pertaining to the
Treaty it would be referred to a Neutral Expert. If the difference is in the nature of a
dispute and the Netural Expert certifies it to be so, the matter would be dealt with by the
two Governments and might be referred to a Court of Arbitration.
(xi) Nothing contained in the Treaty, and nothing arising out of the execution thereof shall
be construed as constituting a recognition or waiver whether tacit, by implication or
otherwise of any rights or claims whatsoever of either of the parties.
Critical Review
The Indus Treaty was signed by Nehru in the fervent hope of ushering all round improvement in
India-Pakistan relations and resolution of all outstanding problems including Kashmir. Perhaps
Nehru was impressed by Ayub's offer of joint defence with India made in early 1959 in the wake
of deteriorating India-China relations.32 Ayub's offer, however, needed to be viewed in the light of
Pakistan being a member of SEATO and CENTO, which made him susceptible to western
prescriptions for regional peace and cooperation. At that time the U.S. and its friendly western
nations viewed the Communist Block - USSR and China, as a greater threat. Although India did
not accept the concept of joint defence, it sought to improve relations with Pakistan by agreeing
to substantially pay for the cost of irrigation programme in Pakistan, besides surrendering the use
of three western rivers. India treated the Indus waters issue as a technical and engineering
problem. On the other hand Pakistan exploited it as a political weapon in her cold war against
India. At the same time Pakistan succeeded in extracting huge financial assistance of about one
billion dollars from the World Bank, USA and other western countries, using the geopolitical
environment in the region to its advantage.
Nehru went to Karachi on 19 September 1960 to sign the Treaty hoping to begin a new chapter in
the history of Indo-Pak relations. Though the joint communique issued at the end of Nehru-Ayub
talks on 23 September 1960, revealed little progress on Kashmir, both sides agreed to work for
promotion of friendly and cooperative relations and resolve the outstanding differences.
However, Pakistan did not hide its disappointment that there was no progress over Kashmir. The
Pakistani press continued to harp on the theme of "free and impartial plebiscite to determine the
choice of the people of Kashmir."33 On the other hand, Indian press highlighted the positive
aspects of the joint communique. Times of India even suggested that, "in the interests of a lasting
settlement this country may be prepared eventually to accept the status quo in the State and agree
to slight changes in the present ceasefire line to make it a viable international frontier."34 Hardly
a month had lapsed after Nehru's visit to Karachi, and President Ayub of Pakistan speaking at a
public meeting in Muzaffrabad Pak occupied Kashmir in early October 1960 declared that
"Pakistan could not trust India until the Kashmir question was settled and that the Pak army
could never afford to leave the Kashmir issue unsolved for an indefinite period."35 In this way
Indian hopes of building up mutual trust and confidence with Pakistan were belied. What
followed is too well known to be repeated. Pakistan launched Operation Gibralter in 1965 to
wrest Kashmir. There was yet another war in 1971 and ever since 1989 Pakistan has been
engaged in deadly proxy war against India in Kashmir and elsewhere. And in 1999 India had to
encounter the Pakistani armed intrusion in Kargil.
As such Nehru's assertion in the Lok Sabha on 30 November 1960 that "we purchased a
settlement, if you like; we purchased peace to that extent and it is good for both countries",36 was
not borne out by the subsequent events. Members of Parliament belonging to both the Congress,
PSP and Jana Sangh pointed to the glaring mistakes committed in conclusion of this Treaty.
Congress MPs from Pubjab and Rajasthan, Iqbal Singh and H.C. Mathur called the treaty
disadvantageous to India stating that both their home states "had been badly let down". 37 Ashok
Guha, another Congress Mp lamented that "interests of India had been sacrificed to placate
Pakistan". Ashok Mehta, leader of the PSP in the Lok Sabha described it as a "peculiar treaty
under which Pakistan, already a surplus area, would be unable to make full use of her share of
the Indus Water and would have to allow it to flow into the sea. On the contrary, India after the
fullest development of the water resources, would still be short of supplies".38 But Nehru's efforts
of creating goodwill and understanding with Pakistan by giving concessions through the Indus
Treaty, did not bear fruit. That Nehru himself had realised this soon after, is confirmed by N.D.
Gulhati, who led the Indian delegation during the negotiations over Indus. Gulhati recalls :
"When I called on the Prime Minister on 28th February 1961, my last day in office, in a sad tone
he said, 'Gulhati, I had hoped that this agreement would open the way to settlement on other
problems, but we are where we were".39
In retrospect, it can he stated that India was too generous to Pakistan, both in terms of allowing
use of waters of western rivers and by making payment of more than 62 million Pounds
Sterlingi.e. about 430 crores of rupees in current value to Pakistan. It is also surprising as to why
World Bank advanced such disproportionate proposals to India,"particularly when the eastern
rivers given to India carried 20 to 25 percent of the total flow of the Indus Basin as against the 75
to 80 percent in the three western rivers allocated to Pakistan".40 Out of the total annual flow of
168.4 million acre feet m.a.f of water in the Indus system of rivers, the total requirement for
irrigation water was 96.36 m.a.f. for the entire cultivable area of the Indus basin, thereby leaving
a surplus of 72.02 m.a.f. of water which would be going to the sea. Since the cultivable area on
the three eastern rivers was 22.856 million acres, little less than on the western rivers 25.100
million acres, the mean annual supplies made available by the eastern rivers was only 32.8
m.a.f., that is 13.57 m.a.f. less than the actual water requirement of 46.37 m.a.f. In quite contrast
to this, the mean annual flow in western rivers was 135.6 m.a.f., i.e. 85.59 m.a.f. more than its
requirement of only 50.01 m.a.f. of water. It is quite intriguing as to why the Indian government
delegation involved in the prolonged negotiations over Indus waters, agreed to much lower share
of water available in the eastern rivers, particularly when the concerned officials were in know of
the facts. 41 However, it appears that the Jammu and Kashmir government, particularly its
irrigation and power development departments, had not done their homework to study and
quantify the existing and future water requirements for irrigation, hydel power generation and
other uses inside Jammu and Kashmir. As such the Indian delegation failed to secure the
necessary safeguards in the Treaty for future consumption of water for hydel power purposes,
excepting by run-of-the-river methods. Gulhati himself admits that "since no study had ever
been made until then, of the development locally possible, above the rim stations, none of us had,
at that time, any real idea of the quantum of future developments in the upper reaches of the
Western Rivers. Nor did we have any idea of the irrigation from the Indus in Ladakh. As regards
hydro-electric development we felt that, being a non-consumptive use, it was not covered by the
Bank proposal which dealt only with irrigation uses".42 Moreover, it is not the number of rivers
but quantum of water which was to be distributed. Besides, the World Bank did not include the
Kabul river while dividing the six rivers among the two countries.
If we consider the internationally accepted Helsinki Rules framed by the International Law
Association which postulate the equitable utilisation of waters of an international drainage basin
taking into consideration various factors such as the extent of the drainage area, hydrology of the
basin, economic and social needs of each basin state, population dependent on the waters of the
basin, then India did not get a fair deal. According to S.K. Garg, who has computed the
respective entitlement of India and Pakistan on the basis of the population, drainage areas, length
of rivers and culturable area, India should have been given 42.8% share in the waters of the
Indus Basin, as against the actual allocation of 20 to 25%, flowing in the three eastern rivers.43
It may be worthwhile to mention that post-Soviet Central Asia has also been faced with the
problem of water distribution. Upstream countries- Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, argue that "the
long term projections of water usage need to take into account the dynamics of population
growth and the resultant necessity to increased water use to meet drinking water, agricultural,
industrial and other needs."44 Kyrgyzstan has been insisting on its right to increased water use for
hydropower generation and has been demanding compensation from the downstream countries
for the water resources provided for irrigation.45 In fact, Kyrgystan adopted in June 2001 the law
on inter-State use of water bodies, water resources and water management facilities in
Kyrgyzstan, which declared "the foreign policy of Kyrgyzstan based on the principle of paid
water use in water relations with other countries."46 An Inter State Commission for Water
Coordination ICWC representing the five Central Asian Republics, which was established in
1992-93 following an agreement signed in Almaty on 18 February 1992, has been regulating the
allocation consumption and exchange of water for natural gas, coal, oil for their monetary
equivalent. For instance, as per existing agreements, Kyrgyzstan released from Toktogul
reservoir to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan 3.25 ckm of water for each country in exchange of 1.1
billion kWh of power either electricity or coal valued at 22 million dollars from Kazakhstan and
400 million kWh of power electricity plus 500 million cubic meters of natural gas valued at 48.5
million dollars per year from Uzbekistan.47 Besides, agreements were worked out of supporting
the operation of Toktogul reservoir in Kyrgyzstan in the irrigation mode out of compensation
payable to Kyrgyzstan. All Parties were agreed to be a guarantor for compensation and monetary
exchanges.
It becomes clear that the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir in spite of being the upstream area,
has suffered due to restrictions placed by the Treaty on the unhindered usage of its river waters of
Jhelum Chenab and Indus. The irony of the matter is that the State being rich in its hydel
resources has been facing a perennial problem of shortage of hydro-electric power, more
particularly during winter months and due to the dry spell in the valley. Though the State
government's official estimates put the total hydel power potential of the State at 15,000 MW, the
Center for Monitoring Indian Economy CMIE has reported it to be at 7487 MW which
constitutes about 9 per cent of the total hydel power potential of the country.48 Since the Treaty
has placed curbs on the construction of storage reservoirs which could ensure the provision of
requisite water flow, all power projects in the State are to be run-of-the-river type. This not only
raises the construction cost of the projects but also affects adversely the cost-effectiveness of
power generation from these projects. Cost of run-of-the-river projects using small head fall is
reported to be about 75 per cent higher than hydel projects using high head fall.49 Thus "the
generating capacity of all run-of-the-river projects falls by about 65 to 75 per cent during winter
because the water level in different rivers gets depleted substantially."50 These high cost hydel
projects generate electricity much below their installed capacity. For instance, run-of-the-river
Uri Hydel Project built at a cost of more than 800 million US dollars has been producing
maximum of only 200 MW in winter as against the 480 MW installed capacity.51 As such the
J&K State is unable to meet its demand of about 700 MWs, even after it has been importing 230
MWs of power from the northern grid.52 The State accounts for only 0.9 per cent of the hydel
power generated in the country.53 The shortage of power in the State has not only been causing
problems for domestic consumption, but has also been inhibiting the growth of industry and
agriculture. During the past forty years, since the Indus Treaty was signed, there has been
sizeable increase in the State's population and standards of living. Simultaneously, the State has
witnessed a big leap in demand for electricity. As such there have been fundamental changes in
the ground situation, so far as the actual power requirement of the State for domestic, agricultural
and industrial uses, is concerned.
Similarly, work on the construction of Tulbul Navigation Project started by the J&K government
in 1984 in order to raise the level of water in the Wullar lake for facilitating transport on the river
Jhelum, was stopped in 1988 after India accepted Benazir Bhutto's demands and stopped
construction work at the Tulbul project.54 Despite several rounds of talks held with Pakistan
during the past 17 years, the issue remains unresolved. Whereas the Tulbul Project would not
diminish or change the flow of water to Pakistan, it would keep the Jhelum river navigable for a
considerable stretch thereby bringing economic benefits to the people in the valley. This project
could provide a cheap mode of transport to the fruit growers in north Kashmir and thus transform
the region's economy. The existing dam in the Salal project is full of silt upto three fourths of its
400 feet height, which needs to flushed out urgently in order to let the project run. India had
earlier agreed to Pakistan-dictated terms on the Salal project, which led to very high siltation
levels affecting power generation sharply.
Given its success in forcing India to abandon the construction work on Tulbul Navigation Project
in 1987 and also in obstructing the construction of anti-siltation sluices at the Salal Hydel
Project, Pakistan has now created a controversy over the construction of the Baglihar Dam on the
Chenab river. The Rs.4000 crore Baglihar Dam project is being constructed by the Jammu and
Kashmir government since the year 2000, and over Rs. 2500 crore have already been spent. This
hydel project which has an installed capacity of 450 MW and is expected to be completed by the
year 2007 55,will go a long way in alleviating the problem of power shortage in Jammu and
Kashmir. Though the Baglihar project is "run-of-the river project as provided under the Indus
Waters Treaty, Pakistan sought to scuttle this project by creating a controversy over its design,
pondage, height of the dam and spillways,."56
The authorities of J&K Power Development Corporation JKPDC, responsible for executing this
project, point out the Pakistan is making unnecessary noises without "concretizing its objections
or making them specific".57 Ghulam Hassan Rather, Managing Director and Abdul Ahad Malik,
Chief Engineer of a JKPDC revealed that the basic data of the Project was sent to Pakistan as
early as in 1992 and work on the project was started in January 2000 after making modification
in the design. "They want us to provide a low weir instead of a dam, but that would go against
the basic design. And if the spillways were kept ungated, as Pakistan wants, the silt load would
block the functioning of the machine. In about 18 or 20 years the project will become
redundant."58 Baglihar engineers point out that spillways with channels are constructed to
remove the silt deposited i the dam and have nothing to do with controlling the Chenab
waters. 59 Indian contention is that building of a 470 ft. high dam with fully equipped gated
spillway will not affect the flow of the river into Pakistan. Besides, in the light of its experience
in Salal Project, which is suffering due to deposition of large amount of silt, India can not afford
to repeat the same mistake in Baglihar.
It is, therefore, understandable that there has been growing concern and anger in Jammu and
Kashmir over the negative consequences of the Indus Treaty for the State. Both the official and
public circles in J&K State have been pleading for a review of this Treaty, so that the legitimate
water requirements of J&K State for hydel power generation, deepening of rivers for navigation
purposes, erecting protective bunds for floods and building adequate water reserves for irrigation
are fulfilled. Environmental considerations also demand that the locally available hydel
resources be utilised to the optimum to preserve and to maintain the deteriorating ecosystem in
the State. Already, various water bodies particularly the famous Dal lake, Wullar lake and other
aquatic systems have shrunk, thereby causing alarm.
Yet another associated problem has been the revenue loss of millions of rupees to the J&K State,
as a result of the floating of timber logs from Jhelum and Chenab across the LoC into Pakoccupied Kashmir. This author learnt from some responsible officials of some insurance
companies operating in J&K State, that the local timber merchants have been claiming millions
of rupees of insurance compensation on lieu their timber losses on this account.
And in Pakistan itself, experience has shown that its portion of Indus basin has been suffering
form acute problem of water logging and salinity due to excess availability of Indus waters and
consequent canal seepage and percolation of excess amount of water. According to a study, in
Punjab alone, "5 million ha have already gone out of cultivation due to salinity caused by water
logging, 690,000 ha are affected to a lesser degree."60 Pakistani experts point out that Pakistan
has made heavy investment in gigantic projects like Tarbela and Mangle dams, barrages, link
canals etc. whereas projects of small irrigation, drainage, soil and water conservation remained
on low priority. They believe that "rational use of water on three crops - wheat, cotton and
sugarcane alone would save Pakistan about 5.6 MAF."61 Experts in Pakistan are forthright in
ascribing the so called problem of water shortage in Pakistan to inefficient usage of water and
distortions in its socio-economic policies. According to them, "with more than 1300 cubic metres
per person available annually, Pakistan is by hydrological definitions, not a water stressed
country."62They argue that the water balance in the Indus Basin was massively destabilized due to
addition of "more water to the eco-system than its natural drainage potential", which resulted in
desertification through water logging and salinity. 63 Besides, there is the unresolved issue of
inter-provincial discord over distribution of water.
To conclude, Indian efforts to buy peace from Pakistan by giving concessions through the Indus
Waters Treaty failed miserably. Indus water dispute was and is sought to be used by Pakistan as
a political tool in the Indo-Pak dual over Kashmir. All along Pakistan's policy has been to avoid
any direct bilateral settlement with India and to seek third party intervention. The manner in
which the Treaty was negotiated and concluded, lends and impression of external pressure group
network exerting their influence since huge investments were involved in the construction of big
dams and canals. It is a reflection on the functioning of the World Bank which was influenced
by the Cold War politics in the region and by the interested construction lobbies. It also reminds
that outside mediation or arbitration in bilateral disputes between India and Pakistan, as was
done by the World Bank in this case, would not lead to a lasting and positive solution based on
principles of equitability and just distribution of resources. The Treaty which has been in force
for more than 45 years, has added to the economic woes of the people of upstream Jammu and
Kashmir State by depriving them of the legitimate right to full usage of Jhelum, Chenab and
Indus waters for hydro-electric generation, irrigation, navigation and other purposes. As such
there is sufficient ground for reviewing the Indus Treaty, so that it is turned into a resilient one
after making necessary modifications and adjustments, which can take care of the substantial
changes in the ground situation in Jammu and Kashmir.
That Pakistan has secured third party intervention the World Bank to resolve its dispute with
India over the Baglihar hydro project is part of its strategy to internationalize and politicize the
issue. It marks a complete deviation from the path of the "Composite Dialogue" process agreed
to by both India and Pakistan to resolve all outstanding issue including Kashmir. Pakistan's
objections to the construction of Baglihar dam are more political than a technical one .
Pakistan's contention that this dam can inflict damage to Pakistan controlled territory
downstream by withholding water or flooding does not hold good, as in that event two mega
projects-Salal and Sawalkot, which are built downside within the Indian territory, would get
flooded and damaged. Baglihar project is situated about 120 kms. inside of the LOC in Jammu
and Kashmir. Indian Water Resources Minister, Priyaranjan Dasmunsi soon after his visit to
Baglihar project site in June 2005, affirmed that "the project design fully conforms to the
provisions of the treaty."64
Interestingly, Pakistan is raising the height of Manala dam by another 40 feet to ensure more
power and water for Punjab at the cost of the people of Mirpur in Pakistan occupied Kashmir
PoK. Similarly, Islamabad is planning to build the Skardu dam in 'Northern Areas' of PoK, to
ensure added water supply and electricity to Punjab in spite of the protests from the people of
Giligt and Baltistan. Yet, Pakistan is not acceding to the water and electricity requirements of
that part of Kashmir. Pakistan, which is never tired of talking of human rights of Kashmiris, is
thus denying the people of Jammu and Kashmir, their legitimate right to use water from their
own rivers.
In nutshell
"
Jammu and Kashmir in spite of being the upstream area has been effected due to restrictions placed by
the Indus water Treaty (IWT). The water resources, the backbone of J&Ks economy, have been snatched
by the instrumentality of IWT. Also the treaty has haunted all economical activities of the state. J&K has
20000 MWs of hydro electric potential. J&K has so far been able to harness just 10% of the total potential
because of IWT. This results into shortage of power. Thus the state is forced to purchase power
continuously from outside the state resulting in outflow of money which hinders overall growth of J & Ks
economy. Therefore India & Pakistan must give people of J&K their birth right to use their water resources
because of the following reasons:1. The State of Jammu and Kashmir is being affected at the benefits of the two countries. Indus, Jhelum
and Chenab are rivers which flow from J&K and it is our birth right to use our water. Under the treaty, J&K
can use only a quantum of waters of the Indus, Chenab and Jhelum for power generation and lift irrigation
so that Pakistan gets uninterrupted water from these rivers and in return India gets exclusive use of Sutlej,
Beas and Ravi. While as people of J&K gets losses and fiscal deficits and are labeled as beggars.
2. In last 50 years losses caused by the Indus Water Treaty to J&Ks economy in terms of development of
industry, power and agriculture is nearly equal to US$ 4.5 billion. The annual energy loss suffered by J&K
is 60,000 million units valuing Rs. 12,000 Crores at Rs. 2.00 per unit per year, which is substantially less
than the market rate. India and Pakistan are making profits using our water and are denying us the right to
use our own water. Why must J&K suffer these looses?
3. J&K government purchases power from the northern grid of central government. The power which J&K
buys from the centre is the same power which is produced using J&Ks water from three power projects
under Central Sector. This means the electricity produced form our water at a cost of few pennies is again
sold back to us for millions.
4. J&K because of its abundant water resources could have been able to generate surplus electricity
which it could have exported to neighboring states, resulting in additional revenue to J&K and this revenue
would have been many folds more than the annual budget given to J&K by Indian Union but sadly
because of the Indus Water Treaty J&K is helpless. If this treaty is abolished J&K wont need the annual
budget from the India Union which will result in J&Ks economic independence.
5. J&K produces 2500 MWs of electricity and its own power requirement is equal to 2450 MWs
but out of these 2500 MWs state only gets 758.70 MWs from 20 power projects owned by J&Ks
State Sector and the rest 1680 MWs from three power projects under Central Sector i.e. 690
MWs from Salal Hydel Electric Project, 480 MWs from Uri-I Hydel Electric Project, from
Dulhasti 390 MWs goes directly to the northern grid of the central government and the central
government sells back this power to J&K and gives J&K a mere discount of 12% on the total
bill. Why should be J&K billed and discounted on account of the power which J&K itself
produces?
Indus Water Treaty is an inhuman instrumentality signed between India and Pakistan which
provides India and Pakistan bilateral benefits and on the other hand is imposing economic
sanctions on the people of J&K and is ultimately denying the people of J&K their basic human
right, the right to use their water for their own benefit.