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not Prozac
thoroughly
and
repeatedly
misrepresented.
Even
if
there
is
some
disagreement
over
certain
classifications,
we
cannot
possibly
consider
Plato
"the
foremost
naturalist"
[sic!
on
page
186].
After
reading
what
follows
this
disturbing
statement,
it
is
obvious
that
Marinoff
does
not
distinguish
reality
from
nature;
Plato
does
--
therefore
he
is
a
realist,
not
a
naturalist!
It
gets
worse:
"And
religions,
too
are
naturalistic,
for
they
attribute
Goodness
to
God,
who
presumably
confers
it
on
us"
[page
187].
Even
G.E.
Moore,
characterized
by
Marinoff
as
an
"important
antinaturalist,"
who
formulated
the
naturalistic
fallacy,
emphasized
that
something
can
be
good,
although
nothing
found
in
nature
is
Good
itself
--
but
Marinoff
again
fails
to
see
the
distinction
(something
can
be
good
by
participation,
that
is
koinna,
"communion,"
as
Plato
would
say,
and
nothing
is
Good
except
God
Himself,
who
is
supernatural).
In
another
section
[page
65],
Marinoff
writes:
"The
eighteenth
century
rationalists,
headed
by
Immanuel
Kant..."
Kant
considered
himself
a
"transcendental
idealist,"
standing
apart
from
rationalism
and
empiricism.
His
detailed
criticism
of
Descartes,
Leibniz,
Wolff
and
Baumgarten,
or
just
the
simple
fact
that
Kant's
Magnum
Opus
is
called
Critique
of
Pure
Reason
shows
clearly
that
he
is
not,
strictly
speaking,
a
rationalist
(strangely
enough,
no
other
rationalists
are
mentioned
in
that
section,
called
"The
Rationalists",
not
"Rationalism"...).
Marinoff's
exposition
of
Kant's
concept
of
the
noumenon
will
surely
raise
a
few
eyebrows
[page
65-66]:
...Kant
held
that
things
are
one
certain,
particular
way
but
that
all
we
can
know
are
appearances.
Whether
you're
looking
at
atoms,
rocks,
relationships,
or
societies,
you
can
observe
things
in
many
ways.
For
example,
look
out
your
window
at
a
tree.
Now
do
the
same
in
the
middle
of
the
night.
Try
it
on
a
rainy
day.
Then
use
an
infrared
device
to
look
at
it.
Imagine
what
it
looks
like
to
a
bat,
an
elephant,
or
to
someone
who
is
color-blind.
What
does
the
tree
really
look
like?
One
of
these
ways?
None
of
these
ways?
Kant
would
argue
for
the
sum
of
all
possible
ways
plus
all
unperceivable
ways
as
being
the
noumenal
way.
Marinoff
uses
the
word
"way"
in
an
equivocal
manner,
which
betrays
his
confusion
over
the
noumenon,
which
is
not
a
way
of
"really
look"-ing
(appearing),
but
a
mode
of
being.
That's
why,
after
Kant,
the
noumenon
cannot
be
known
by
us,
because
existence
is
"in
itself,"
while
our
cognition
is
strictly
synthetic,
a
synthesis
of
intuitions
(sensations)
and
the
categorial
forms
of
the
understanding.
Therefore,
the
presupposed
thing
in
itself
cannot
be
an
aggregation
of
perceptions
and
"all
unperceivable
ways",
whatever
Marinoff
means
by
that;
the
noumenon
is
used
by
Kant
in
a
hypothetical
and
scrupulously
negative
manner.
The
consequences
Marinoff
draws
from
his
interpretation
of
Kant
are
predictably
wrong.
On
the
same
page,
where
he
also
mentions
Kant's
deontology,
Marinoff
conflates
teleology
and
consequentialism
--
he
makes
this
confusion
again
later,
on
page
192,
where,
more
specifically,
teleology
is
identified
with
philosophical
utilitarianism.
This
is
impossible
to
accept
unless,
for
example,
one
confuses
the
good
with
the
useful!
Teleology
is
a
theory
of
ideal
final
causes
and
values
which
cannot
be
reduced
to
their
outcomes.
Even
in
Marinoff's
context
all
these
are
important
theories
which
have
a
strong
impact
on
the
result
of
any
philosophical
undertaking,
and
one
has
to
ask
what
can
be
the
result
of
any
investigation
if
the
most
basic
characterizations
are
so
hopelessly
confused.
This
book
contains
a
lot
of
sloppy
writing
(or
editing?)
and
too
many
matter-of-fact
statements
which
are
plainly
wrong.
I
was
quite
surprised
to
read,
on
page
183:
In
the
Republic,
Plato
posits
a
dialogue
in
which
Socrates
asks
him
to
define
the
Good
'Is
it
knowledge,
or
pleasure,
or
something
else?'
He'd
already
pinned
down
several
virtues,
including
temperance
and
justice,
but
faced
with
this
challenge,
Socrates
replies,
'I
am
afraid
it
is
beyond
my
powers'
Plato
is
not
a
character
in
the
Republic,
but
even
if
the
reader
was
not
aware
of
this,
it
is
not
clear
at
all
who
asks
whom;
the
quote
above
would
make
sense
if
"asks
him"
was
replaced
by
"is
asked."
Marinoff
also
seems
convinced
that
the
only
source
for
Socrates
and
his
philosophy
is
Plato,
when
even
a
superficial
search
could
turn
up
references
from
Diogenes
Laertios
or
Xenophon,
Libanius,
if
not
Aristophanes
or
even
Aristotle.
Of
course,
not
all
these
sources
are
as
reliable
as
Plato,
whose
philosophical
and
literary
genius
gave
us
the
opportunity
to
understand
such
a
unique
intellectual
and
moral
personality
as
his
teacher.
In
all
fairness,
I
have
to
mention
that
there
is
more
to
"Philosophical
Practice"
than
counseling.
Marinoff
also
describes
various
forms
of
"group
practice,"
such
as
"Philosophical
Cafes,"
Philosophical
Forums"
and
"Socratic
Dialogues."
The
latter
presents
us
with
issues
that
have
to
be
analyzed
very
carefully.
Marinoff
misunderstands
the
Socratic
Method
and
what
he
emphatically
calls
"Nelson's
Socratic
Dialogue."
Leonard
Nelson
sees
Kant's
critical
philosophy
and
her
Friesian
heir
as
the
fulfillment
of
the
Socratic
inquiry
in
a
rigorous,
scientific
method
which
relies
on
a
series
of
empirical
judgments
followed
by
a
corresponding
operation
that
consists
in
an
abstract,
logical
regressive
analysis
(of
the
"quid
facti"
of
reason)
and
a
psychological
deduction
(of
the
"quid
juris"
of
conscious
thinking)
--
and
finally,
the
subsequent
verification.
Contrasting
the
so-called
"Socratic
Dialogue,"
which
he
attributes
to
Nelson,
with
Socrates'
negative
elenchus,
Marinoff
states:
Note
that
it
reveals
only
what
something
isn't,
not
what
it
is.
At
the
end
of
the
day,
this
method
will
reveal
any
number
of
unserviceable
definitions
of
justice
(or
whatever's
on
the
table)
but
not
one
serviceable
one.
By
contrast,
Socratic
Dialogue
aims
directly
at
what
a
thing
is"
[page
262]
also
[on
page
284]:
When
properly
applied,
Nelsonian
Socratic
Dialogue
provides
definitive
answers
to
such
universal
questions
as
'What
is
liberty?'
'What
is
integrity?'
and
'What
is
love?'
However,
revelation
is
not
conceptual.
Socrates'
elenchus
only
eliminates
what
a
"universal"
is
not,
in
order
to
make
possible
the
ultimate
revelation
of
forms.
This
was
the
purpose
of
Socrates'
philosophical
life,
which
explains
his
dignified
composure,
even
his
eager
enthusiasm
before
dying.
Socrates
was
a
sculptor,
and
the
"definitions"
were
just
like
his
material
to
be
used
and
wasted,
if
necessary,
for
the
purpose
of
preparation,
which
is
learning
through
anamnesis.
Marinoff
misses
the
forest
for
the
trees;
to
use
an
analogy,
how
"serviceable"
could
be
one's
"definition"
of
a
uniquely
sublime
work
of
art
in
a
circle
of
friends
who
have
seen
it
together
when
they
were
five
years
old?
It
could
only
prepare
them
for
contemplation
when
they
go
to
the
museum.
In
contrast
with
Marinoff,
Nelson
is
interested
in
the
constitutive
principles
of
philosophical
knowledge,
which
in
his
view
are
to
be
grounded
in
the
pre-conscious
immediate
knowledge,
in
the
anthropological
experience
of
pure
reason
which
"reaches
our
consciousness
only
through
reflection"...
[Nelson,
"The
Critical
Method
and
the
Relation
of
Psychology
to
Philosophy",
in
Socratic
Method
and
Critical
Philosophy,
Yale
University
Press,
1949
p.
153].
We
have
discovered
philosophy
to
be
the
sum
total
of
those
universal
rational
truths
that
become
clear
only
through
reflection.
To
philosophize,
then,
is
simply
to
isolate
these
rational
truths
with
our
intellect
and
to
express
them
in
general
judgments.
["The
Socratic
Method,"
translated
in
Socratic
Method
and
Critical
Philosophy,
p.
10]
This
is
the
proper
justification
of
what
Marinoff
thinks
are
"definitions"
(which,
as
we
see,
are
really
judgments,
and
not
just
analytical
judgments
which
are
properly
called
definitions
--
for
these
must
also
be
grounded
in
the
synthetic,
non-conceptual
knowledge
that
the
Socratic
Method
is
searching
for;
if
the
result
were
to
be
only
a
definition,
then
the
Socratic
Method
would
have
no
value
for
knowledge,
and
the
much-touted
dialogue
would
be
akin
to
socializing).
The
ultimate
purpose
of
Socratic
Method
must
be,
in
Nelson's
view,
grasping
the
universal
ground
of
the
judgment
-
the
overall
insight,
not
the
crafting
of
a
particular,
robust,
"world-class
definition"
[Marinoff,
page
266]
that
would
aim
at
expressing
exactly
what
"something
is."
Nelson
points
out
that
only
the
accompanying
tacit,
non-
discursive
reason
contains
the
truth
that
we
can
bring
into
awareness,
awakened
by
experience.
He
believes
this
can
be
reached
through
the
Socratic
Method
only
by
the
careful
exercise
of
our
will
(in
my
opinion,
this
is
a
very
important
conclusion),
and
that
it
can
be
objectively
guaranteed
by
criticism
in
the
Kantian
sense.
Even
if
Marinoff
mentions
the
"philosophical
understanding"
that
could
be
taken
to
mean
the
result
of
this
insight,
he
is
much
too
concerned
with
things
and
definitions.
After
all,
anyone
who
is
in
the
business
of
selling
must
pretend
to
offer
something
that
seems
tangible...
Another
explanation
for
Lou
Marinoff's
lapses
may
be
an
exclusive
reliance
on
secondary
sources.
Anyway,
after
noticing
such
obvious
carelessness
that
results
in
numerous
misconceptions,
it
is
difficult
to
take
too
seriously
his
poised
casuistry,
which
features
the
typical
"five-step
PEACE
(Problem,
Emotions,
Analysis,
Contemplation,
Equilibrium)
process,"
applied
to
countless
case
studies.
Marinoff's
mannerisms
and
vulgar
comparisons
("the
'Great
Leap
Forward
of
Hellenic
Culture'
"
on
page
59,
or
"Philosophical
Practice
is
an
ancient
idea
--
perhaps
the
world's
second
oldest
profession"
--
whose
time
has
come
again",
page
79,
also
paraphrased
on
the
back
flap
by
the
publisher)
don't
help
practical
philosophy,
and
it
really
looks
like
Lou
Marinoff
is
trying
very
hard
to
dress
down
a
goddess
and
sell
her
to
the
first
buyer.