1

Siari Valley Estates Inc. vs. defendantappellant Filemon Lucasan

GR No. L-7046, 31 August 1955, 97 Phil 987
Facts: In 1921, plaintiff-appellee and dulyorganized agricultural corporation Siari Valley
Estate Inc. started raising livestock on its 950hectare ranch with 7 native cattle. It acquired in
1923 thirty (30) native cattle and two Indian bulls.
Through a native black bull, native stock was
introduced into its herd and the male offspring of
that bull were castrated. Prior to Japanese
occupation, the fence enclosing Siari Valley's
pasture was well kept. But in 1943, a portion of
that fence was destroyed, causing some of the
cattle straying into defendant-appellant Filemon
Lucasan's
adjoining
unfenced
range
in
Sindangan, Zamboanga. Several men employed
under him took advantage of the situation and
willfully, deliberately rounding up and driving
many animals from Siari pasture towards his
grazing land. In December 1948, Siari Valley
Estate Inc. filed an action to recover about 200
head of cattle that were driven or wandered from
its pasture lands into defendant's adjoining ranch.
It asked for return of its animals with their
offspring or for payment of those disposed of by
defendant, plus damages. Lucasan denied in his
answer that he appropriated or retained any
cattle belonging to Siari Valley and alleged on the
contrary that the plaintiff took away from his
pasture 105 heads of cattle through force and
intimidation.
He
also
demanded
suitable
compensation.
Farmer Jesus Pandi testified that during
the war he saw Lucasan's men Angel Galimon,
Francisco Ramos and Bilingan Subane driving 30
heads of cattle from Siari Valley Estate to
defendant's ranch, and his testimony remained
uncontradicted. Galimon, Ramos and Bilingan
were available during the trial, but Lucasan did
not place them on the witness stand to contradict
Pandi's testimony.
After submission of several motion and
petitions by both parties, a trial was held, and the

Court of First Instance (CFI) Zamboanga on 30

June 1952 (via Hon. Judge Patricio Ceniza) decided
in favor of Siari Valley Estate, affirming its right to
recover the (alleged) strayed animals and its
offspring. The said trial court also ordered Filemon
Lucasan to deliver all the cattle in his ranch,
especially the 323 animals and its offspring
demanded by Siari Valley. He was also found
guilty of contempt proceedings and he is hereby
sentenced to pay a fine of P500.00 pursuant to
Section 6, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court or suffer
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency at
the rate of one day, for every PhP2.50 that he
fails to pay.
Issues: Defendant Filemon Lucasan appealed CFI
Zamboanga's decision raising the issue whether
Siari Valley Estate's cattle were commingled with
his cattle, and was such mix-up (commixtion) was
made in bad faith?
Legal Provisions: Articles 472-473 of RA 386
(The New Civil Code) states:
Art. 472 - If by the will of their owners
two things of the same or different kinds are
mixed, or if the mixture occurs by chance, and in
the latter case the things are not separable
without injury, each owner shall acquire a right
proportional to the part belonging to him, bearing
in mind the value of the things mixed or
confused. (381)
Art. 473 - If by the will of only one owner,
but in good faith, two things of the same or
different kinds are mixed or confused, the rights
of the owners shall be determined by the
provisions of the preceding article. If the one who
caused the mixture or confusion acted in bad
faith, he shall lose the thing belonging to him thus
mixed or confused, besides being obliged to pay
indemnity for the damages caused to the owner
of the other thing with which his own was mixed.
(382)
Held by the Supreme Court: The Supreme
Court denied Lucasan's appeal and affirmed CFI
Zamboanga's decision that held him guilty of
appropriating or retaining Siari Valley's Cattle and
its offspring. The Supreme Court also applied

Article 473 of the New Civil Code in the present

case and it held that Lucasan acted in bad faith:
Lucasan's cowboys and even his sons Rafael and
Vicente rounded up and drove Siari Valley's cattle
into his pasture. He knew that he had the
plaintiff's cattle, but refused to return them
despite plaintiff's demands. He even threatened
Siari Valley's men when it tried to retrieve the
animals.
He
harassed
them
with
false
prosecutions for their attempts to get the said
animals back. He would not allow plaintiff' s
cowboys to get into his pasture to identify its
flock. Lastly, he rebranded several Siari Valley
cattle with his own brand and sold those cattle
without registering the sales. Also, after some
cattle impounded were entrusted to his custody
as trustee, he disposed of not less than 5 head of
cattle among those he received as such trustee.
He disposed of much more cattle than he had a
right to.

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Manacop vs. CA
GR No. 104875, November 13, 1992
FACTS: Florante Manacop and his wife Euaceli
purchased on March 1972, a residential lot with a
bungalow located in Quezon City. The petitioner
failed to pay the sub-contract cost pursuant to a
deed of assignment signed between petitioners
corporation and private respondent herein (FF
Cruz & Co). The latter filed a complaint for the
recovery for the sum of money with a prayer for
preliminary attachment against the former.
Consequently, the corresponding writ for the
provisional remedy was issued which triggered
the attachment of a parcel of land in Quezon City
owned by the Manacop Construction President,
the petitioner. The latter insists that the attached
property is a family home having been occupied
by him and his family since 1972 and is therefore
exempt from attachment.
ISSUE: WON the subject property is indeed
exempted from attachment.
HELD: The residential house and lot of petitioner
became a family home by operation of law under
Article 153 of the Family Code. Such provision
does not mean that said article has a retroactive
effect such that all existing family residences,
petitioners included, are deemed to have been
constituted as family homes at the time of their
occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code and henceforth, are exempt from execution
for the payment of obligations incurred before the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988.
Since petitioner incurred debt in 1987, it preceded
the effectivity of the Code and his property is
therefore not exempt form attachment.
The petition was dismissed by SC.
VILMA G. ARRIOLA and ANTHONY RONALD G.
ARRIOLA, Petitioners, vs. JOHN NABOR C.
ARRIOLA, Respondent.
G.R. No. 177703, January 28, 2008]
Facts: Fidel Arriola died and is survived by his
legal heirs: John Nabor Arriola (respondent) ,his
son with his first wife , and Vilma G. Arriola, his

second wife and his other son, Anthony Ronald

Arriola (petitioners).
On Feb. 16, 2004, the RTC rendered a decision
ordering the partition of the parcel of land
covered by TCT No 383714 (84191) left by the
decedent Fidel S. Arriola by and among his heirs
John Nabor C. Arriola, Vilma G. Arriola and
Anthony Ronald G. Arriola in equal shares of onethird (1/3) each without prejudice to the rights of
creditors or mortgagees thereon, if any.
However, the parties failed to agree on
how to divide the above mentioned property and
so the respondent proposed to sell it though
public auction. The petitioners initially agreed but
refused to include in the auction the house
standing on the subject land. The respondent then
filed an Urgent Manifestation and Motion for
Contempt of Court but was denied by the RTC for
lack of merit.
When a motion of reconsideration was
still denied by the RTC, the respondent elevated
the case to the CA with a petition for certiorari
and prayed that he be allowed to push through
with the auction of the subject land including the
house built on it. The CA granted the petition and
ordered the public auction sale of the subject lot
including the house built on it. Petitioners filed a
motion for reconsideration but the CA denied the
said motion. Hence this petition for review on
Certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not the subject house is
covered by the judgement of partition
Ruling:
The Supreme Court agree that the subject
house is covered by the judgment of partition but
in view of the suspended proscription imposed
under Article 159 of the family code, the subject
house immediately partitioned to the heirs.
Article 152. The family home, constituted
jointly by the husband and the wife or by an
unmarried head of a family, is the dwelling house
where they and their family reside, and the land
on
which
it
is
situated.
Article 153. The family home is deemed
constituted on a house and lot from the

time it is occupied as a family residence.

From the time of its constitution and so long as
any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein,
the family home continues to be such and is
exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment
except as hereinafter provided and to the extent
of the value allowed by law. (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, applying these concepts, the
subject house as well as the specific portion of the
subject land on which it stands are deemed
constituted as a family home by the deceased and
petitioner Vilma from the moment they began
occupying the same as a family residence 20
years back.
Article 159. The family home shall continue
despite the death of one or both spouses or of the
unmarried head of the family for a period of ten
years or for as long as there is a minor
beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the
same unless the court finds compelling
reasons therefor. This rule shall apply
regardless of whoever owns the property or
constituted the family home. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Patricio vs Dario
G.R. No. 170829
The family home is a sacred symbol of family
love and is the repository of cherished memories
that last during one's lifetime
Facts:

Marcelino V. Dario died intestate. He was

survived by his wife, petitioner Perla G.
Patricio and their two sons, Marcelino
Marc Dario and private respondent
Marcelino G. Dario III.

He left a residential house and a preschool building situated at Cubao,

Quezon City.

Petitioner, Marcelino Marc and private

respondent, extra judicially settled the
estate of Marcelino V. Dario.

Petitioner and Marcelino Marc formally

advised private respondent of their

3
intention to partition the subject property
and terminate the co-ownership.
o
Private responded refused to
partition the property.
o
Petitioner and Marcelino Marc
filed an action for partition before
RTC Quezon City

Trial court ordered the partition of the

property.
o
Private respondents motion for
reconsideration denied.

Appeal to the Court of Appeals denied:

o
Upon motion for reconsideration,
CA dismissed the petitioners
motion for partition.

It held that family home

should continue despite
the death of one or both
spouses as long as there
is a minor beneficiary
thereof. The heirs could
not
partition
the
property unless the court
found
compelling
reasons
to
rule
otherwise. [Son of the
private respondent was
a minor beneficiary of
the family home]
Issue: Whether partition of the family home is
proper where one of the co-owners refuse to
accede to such partition on the ground that a
minor beneficiary still resides in the said home.
Held: Petition granted as the minor son does not
satisfy all the requisites to be considered as a
beneficiary of the family home.
Ratio: Three requisites must concur before a
minor beneficiary is entitled to the benefits of Art.
159: (1) the relationship enumerated in Art. 154
of the Family Code; (2) they live in the family
home, and (3) they are dependent for legal
support upon the head of the family.
On the first requisite:
o
The beneficiaries of the family home are:

(1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person

who is the head of a family
(2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants,
brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be
legitimate or illegitimate.
o
Descendantscontemplate
all
descendants of the person or persons
who constituted the family home without
distinction. It includes the grandchildren
and great grandchildren of the spouses
who constitute a family home
On the second requisite:
o
The grand son has been living in the
family home since 1994, or within 10
years from the death of the decedent
On the third requisite [fail! Did not satisfy!]:
o
Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot
demand support from his paternal
grandmother if he has parents who are
capable of supporting him.
o
Marcelino IV is dependent on the legal
support of his father and not his
grandmother.
o
Hence, no legal impediment in
partitioning the property.
*No co-owner ought to be compelled to stay in a
co-ownership indefinitely, and may insist on
partition on the common property at any time. An
action to demand partition is imprescriptible or
cannot be barred by laches. Each co-owner may
demand at any time the partition of the common
property.
RAMOS VS PANGILINAN
G.R. No. 185920
Facts: Respondents filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal against E.M. Ramos Electric, Inc., a
company owned by Ernesto M. Ramos, the
patriarch of herein petitioners. The labor arbiter
ordered Ramos and the company to pay the
respondents back-wages, separation pay, 13th
month pay & service incentive leave pay. The
decision became final and executory so a writ of
execution was issued which the Deputy Sheriff of

the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)

implemented by levying a property in Ramos
name situated in Pandacan.
Alleging that the Pandacan property was the
family home, hence, exempt from execution to
satisfy the judgment award, Ramos and the
company moved to quash the writ of execution.
Respondents argued that it is not the family home
there being another one in Antipolo and that the
Pandacan address is actually the business
address. The motion was denied and the appeal
was likewise denied by the NLRC.
Issue: Whether or not the levy upon the
Pandacan property was valid.
Ruling: Yes. For the family home to be exempt
from execution, distinction must be made as to
what law applies based on when it was
constituted and what requirements must be
complied with by the judgment debtor or his
successors claiming such privilege. Hence, two
sets of rules are applicable. If the family home
was constructed before the effectivity of the
Family Code or before August 3, 1988, then it
must have been constituted either judicially or
extra-judicially as provided under Articles 225,
229-231 and 233 of the Civil Code. Meanwhile,
Articles 240 to 242 governs extrajudicial
constitution.
On the other hand, for family homes
constructed after the effectivity of the Family
Code on August 3, 1988, there is no need to
constitute extra judicially or judicially, and the
exemption is effective from the time it was
constituted and lasts as long as any of its
beneficiaries under Art. 154 actually reside
therein. Moreover, the family home should belong
to
the
absolute
community
or
conjugal
partnership, or if exclusively by one spouse, its
constitution must have been with consent of the
other, and its value must not exceed certain
amounts depending upon the area where it is
located. Further, the debts incurred for which the
exemption does not apply as provided under Art.
155 for which the family home is made
answerable must have been incurred after August

4
3, 1988. In both instances, the claim for
exemption must be proved.
In the present case, since petitioners claim
that the family home was constituted prior to
August 3, 1988, or as early as 1944, they must
comply with the procedure mandated by the Civil
Code. There being absolutely no proof that the
Pandacan property was judicially or extra
judicially constituted as the Ramos family home,
the law protecting the family home cannot apply
thereby making the levy upon the Pandacan
property valid.

Cabatania vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 124814 October 21, 2004FACTS:
Facts: Florencias version was that she was the
mother of private respondent who was born on
September 9,1982 and that she was the one
supporting the child. She recounted that after her
husband left her in the early part of 1981, she
went to Escalante, Negros Occidental to look for
work and was eventually hired as petitioners
household help. It was while working there as a
maid that, on January 2, 1982, petitioner brought
her to Bacolod City where they checked in at the
Visayan Motel and had sexual intercourse.
Petitioner promised to support her if she got
pregnant. Florencia claimed she discovered she
was
carrying
petitioners
child 27 days
after their sexual
encounter.
The
sexual
intercourse was repeated in March 1982 in San
Carlos City. Later, on suspicion that Florencia was
pregnant,
petitioners
wife
sent
her home. But petitioner instead brought her to
Singcang, Bacolod City where he rented a house
for her. On September 9, 1982, assisted by a hilot
in
her aunts house
in Tiglawigan, Cadiz City, she gavebirth to her chil
d, private respondent Camelo Regodos.

Petitioner Camelo Cabatanias version

was that he was a sugar planter and a
businessman. Sometime in December, 1981, he
hired Florencia as a servant at home. During the
course
of
her
employment,
she
would often go home to her husband in the
afternoon and return to work the following
morning. This displeased petitioners wife, hence
she was told to look for another job. In the
meantime, Florencia asked permission from
petitioner to go home and spend New Years Eve
in Cadiz City. Petitioner met her on board the
Ceres
bus
bound
for
San
CarlosCity and invited her to dinner. While they w
ere eating, she confided that she was hard up and
petitioner offered to lend her save money. Later,
they spent the night in San Carlos City and had
sexual intercourse. While doing it, he felt
something jerking and when he asked her about
it, she told him she was pregnant with the child of
her husband. They went home the following day.
In March 1982, Florencia, then already working in
another household, went to petitioners house
hoping to be re-employed as a servant there.
Since petitioners wife was in need of one, she
was
re-hired.
However petitioners wife noticed that her stomac
h was bulging and inquired about the father of the
unborn child. She told petitioners wife that the
baby was by her husband. Because of her
condition, she was again told to go home and they
did not see each other anymore. Petitioner was
therefore surprised when summons was served on
him by Florencias counsel. She was demanding
support for private
respondent Camelo Regodos. Petitioner refused,
denying the alleged paternity. He insisted she was
already pregnant when they had sex. He denied
going to Bacolod City with her and checking in at
the Visayan Motel. He vehemently denied having
sex with her on January 2, 1982 and renting a
house
for her
in
Singcang, Bacolod
City.
The trial court gave probative weight to the
testimony of Florencia despite its discovery that
she misrepresented herself as a widow when, in

reality, her husband was alive. On appeal, the

Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial
court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Camelo should be entitled
to support as Camelo Cabatanias child.
HELD: No. Clearly, this petition calls for a review
of the factual findings of the two lower courts. As
a general rule, factual issues are not within the
province of this Court. Factual findings of the trial
court,
when
adopted and confirmed by the Court of
Appeals,
become final and conclusive and may not be
reviewed
on appeal.
However, the Court isconvinced that this case fall
s within one of the
exceptions.
Time
and
again, this Court has ruled that a high
standard of proof is required to establish paternity
and filiation. An order for recognition and
support may
create an unwholesome situation or may be an
irritant to the family or the lives of the parties so
that it must be issued only if paternity
or filiation is established by clear and convincing
evidence. The applicable provisions of the law
are Articles 172 and 175 of the Civil Code which
states that: the filiation of legitimate children is
establishedby any of the following: (1) The record
of birthappearing in the civil register or a final
judgment; or (2) An admission of legitimate
filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned. In the absence of the foregoing
evidence,
the
legitimate
filiation
shall
be proved by: (1)
The open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws; Illegitimate children may
establish their illegitimate filiation in the same
way and on the same evidence as legitimate
children. Private respondents copy of his birth
and baptismal certificates, the preparation of
which was without the knowledge or consent of
petitioner. A certificate of live birth purportedly
identifying the putative father is not competent
evidence of paternity when there is no showing

5
that the putative father had a hand in the
preparation of said certificate. The local civil
registrar has no authority to record the paternity
of an illegitimate child on the information of a
third
person. Also, while a baptismal certificate may be
considered a public document, it can only serve
as evidence of the administration of the
sacrament on the date specified but not the
veracity of the entries with respect to the childs
paternity. Thus, certificates issued by the local
civil registrar and baptismal certificates are per se
inadmissible in evidence as proof of filiation and
they
cannot
be admitted
indirectly
as circumstantial evidence to prove the same.
Private respondent failed to present
sufficient proof of voluntary recognition. On the
other hand, the fact that Florencias husband is
living and there is a valid subsisting marriage
between them gives rise to the presumption that
a child born within that marriage is legitimate
even though the mother may have declared
against its legitimacy or may have been
sentenced as an adulteress. The presumption of
legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration
in the statute but is based on the broad principles
of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the
mother. The presumption is grounded on the
policy to protect innocent offspring from the
odium of illegitimacy.
In this age of genetic profiling and
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis, the
extremely subjective test of physical resemblance
or
similarity
of features will not
suffice as evidence to prove paternity and filiation
before the courts of law
Concepcion vs. CA
GR No. 123450, August 31, 2005
Facts: Petitioner Gerardo B. Concepcion and Ma.
Theresa Almonte were married on December 29,
1989. They lived in Fairview, Quezon City and a
year later on December 8, 1990, Ma. Theresa
gave birth to Jose Gerardo.

On December 19, 1991, Gerardo filed a petition to

have his marriage to Ma. Theresa annulled on the
ground of bigamy, alleging that her marriage with
Mario Gopiao on December 10, 198- was never
annulled. Although Ma. Theresa did not deny
marrying Mario, she averred that the marriage
was a sham and that she have never lived with
Mario at all.
The trial court said otherwise, and ruled
that Ma. Theresas marriage to Mario was valid
and subsisting, thus declaring her marriage to
Gerardo as void ab initio. It deemed Jose Gerardo
to be an illegitimate child and the custody was
awarded to Ma. Theresa while Gerardo was
granted visitation rights. Also, it allowed the child
to use the surname of his father.
Ma. Theresa appealed and pleaded for
the reverse of the courts decisions. The Court of
Appeals ruled that Jose Gerardo was not the son
of Ma. Theresa by Gerardo but by Mario during
her first marriage considering the fact that the
second marriage was void from the beginning.
Therefore, the child Jose Gerardo under the law
is the child of the legal and subsisting marriage
between Ma. Theresa and Mario Gopiao. Gerardo
Concepcion moved for the reconsideration of the
decision.
Issue: Whether the child is the legitimate child of
Ma. Theresa and Gopiao or the illegimate child of
Ma. Theresa and Gerardo.
Held: The child, Jose Gerardo, is the legitimate
child of Ma. Theresa and Mario Gopiao.
The status and filiation of a child cannot
be compromised as per Art. 164 of the Family
Code which states, A child who is conceived or
born during the marriage of his parents is
legitimate. It is fully supported by Art. 167 of the
Family Code which states, The child shall be
considered legitimate although the mother may
have declared against its legitimacy or may have
been sentenced as an adulteress.. The law
requires that every reasonable presumption be
made in favor of the legitimacy. It is grounded on
the policy to protect the innocent offspring from
the odium of illegitimacy.

Since the marriage of Gerardo and Ma.

Theresa was void from the very beginning, he
never became her husband and thus never
acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of her
child. The minor cannot be deprived of his/her
legitimate status on the bare declaration of the
mother and/or even much less, the supposed
father. In fine, the law and only the law
determines who are the legitimate or illegitimate
children for ones legitimacy or illegitimacy cannot
ever be compromised. It should be what the law
says and not what a parent says it is. Additionally,
public policy demands that there be no
compromise on the status and filiation of a child.
Otherwise, the child will be at the mercy of those
who may be so minded to exploit his
defenselessness.
As a legitimate child, Jose Gerardo shall
have the right to bear the surnames of his father
Mario and mother Ma. Theresa, in conformity with
the provisions of the Civil Code on surnames.
Also, there being no such parent-child relationship
between the child and Gerardo, Gerardo has no
legally demandable right to visit the child.
The State as parens patriae affords
special protection to children from abuse,
exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to
their development. It is mandated to provide
protection to those of tender years. Through its
laws, the State safeguards them from everyone,
even their own parents, to the end that their
eventual development as responsible citizens and
members of society shall not be impeded,
distracted or impaired by family acrimony. This is
especially significant where, as in this case, the
issue concerns their filiation as it strikes at their
very identity and lineage. The child, by reason of
his mental and physical immaturity, needs special
safeguard and care, including appropriate legal
protection before as well as after birth. In case of
assault on his rights by those who take advantage
of his innocence and vulnerability, the law will rise
in his defense with the single-minded purpose of
upholding only his best interests.

6
WHEREFORE, the petition of Gerardo is hereby
DENIED. The resolution of the Court of Appeals in
favor of respondents is AFFIRMED.
Liyao, Jr. vs. Tanhoti-Liyao
378 SCRA 563
Facts: Corazon G. Garcia is legally married but
has been living separately from Ramon Yulo for
more than 10 years. She cohabited with William
Liyao from 1965 up to his death. Some witnesses,
however, testified that Corazon and her husband
were seen in each others company during the
supposed time Corazon cohabited with William
Liyao.
On June 9, 1975, Corazon gave birth to William
Liyao Jr. Since birth, William Jr, also known as Billy,
had been in continuous possession and enjoyment
of the status of are cognized and/ or acknowledge
child of William Liyao by the latters direct and
overt act. During William Liyao birthday he was
carrying Billy and told everybody present,
including his daughters, Look, this is my son,
very guapo and healty. He talked about
engrande plans for the baptism of Billy.
Unfortunately, it did not happen due to his
untimely death on December 2, 1975.
On November 29, 1976, William Liyao, Jr,
represented by his mother Corazon G. Garcia filed
a civil action for compulsory recognition as the
illegitimate son the late William Liyao. The
Regional Trial Court granted his petition, however
the Court of Appeals reversed the decision saying
that the law favors the legitimacy rather than the
illegitimacy of the child. The petition was filed for
review on certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner may impugn
his own legitimacy to be able to claim from the
estate of his supposed father William Liyao.
Held: No. Under the New Civil Code, a child born
and conceived during a valid marriage is
presumed to be legitimate. Impugning the
legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right
of the husband, or in exceptional cases, his heirs
for the simple reason that he is the one directly
confronted with the scandal. Only in exceptional

cases may his heirs allowed to contest such

legitimacy. There is nothing on the records to
indicate that Ramon Yulo has already passed
away at the time of the birth of the petitioner nor
at the time of the initiation of proceedings. The
Court held that it is settle that a child born within
a valid marriage is presumed legitimate even
though the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an
adulteress; the child himself cannot choose his
own affiliation if the husband, presumed to be
the father does not impugn the legitimacy of the
child, then the status of the child if fixed, and the
latter cannot choose to be the child of his
mothers paramour.
TEOFISTA
BABIERA
VS
CATOTAL
G.R. No. 138493 June 15 2000

PRESENTACION

FACTS:
Presentacion questioned the authenticity of the
entry of birth of Teofista. She asserted that the
birth certificate is void ab initio, as it was totally a
simulated birth, the signature of informant forged,
and contained false entries, to wit:

That Teofista is the legitimate child of the

late spouses Eugenio Babiera and
Hermogena Cariosa;

Signature of the mother, Hermogena, is

falsified;

Teofista's correct family name is GUINTO,

not Babiera;

Her real mother was Flora Guinto, and her

status is an illegitimate child;

It was clinically and medically impossible

for Hermogena to bore a child at 54 years
of age; her last child birth was when
Presentacion was born.
Presentacion ask the court to declare
Teofista's certificate of birth void and ineffective,
and to order the City Civil Registrar to cancel the
same as it affect the hereditary rights of
Presentacion who inherited the estate.

Teofista
countered
that
she
and
Presentacion are full-blooded sisters, as showed
therein her certificate of birth, Certificate of
Baptism, and her School Report Card. She also
filed a motion on the grounds that: the petition
states no cause of action, being an attack on her
legitimacy as the child of Hermogena and
Eugenio; that Presentacion has no legal capacity
to file the petition pursuant to Art. 171 of the
Family Code; and that the petition was barred
from prescription in accordance with Art. 170 of
the Family Code.
The trial court ruled in favor of Presentacion. CA
affirmed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Presentacion has legal capacity
to file the special proceedings pursuant to Art.
171;
2. Whether or not the special proceedings is
improper and barred by the statute of limitation;
3. Whether or not the public record of Teofista's
birth is superior to the oral testimony of
Presentacion.
RULING: Petition is not meritorious.
1. Article 171 is not applicable in this case. Article
171 of the Family Code shows that it applies to
instances which the father impugns the legitimacy
of his wife's child. The provision, however,
presupposes that the child was the undisputed
child of the mother. Present case alleges and
shows that Hermogena did not give birth to
Teofista. The present action does not impugn
Teofista's filiation to Eugenio and Hermogena, be
there is no blood relation to impugn in the first
place. The reason why Presentacion took interest
on Teofista's status is to protect the former's
successional rights.
2. Article 170 of the FC does not apply. The
provision provides a prescriptive period for action
to impugn the legitimacy of the child. The present
action involves the cancellation of Teofista's Birth
Certificate, it does not impugn her legitimacy. The
action to nullify the birth certificate does not
prescribe because it was allegedly declared void
ab initio.

7
3. The specific attendant in the case at bar and
the totality of the evidence presented during trial,
sufficiently negates the presumption of regularity
in the issuance of birth certificate.
First, the birth certificate was not signed
by the local civil registrar, and the mother's
signature was different from other signatures.
Second,
no medical records or doctor's
prescription that provide as evidence of
Hermogena's pregnancy. It was impossible for her
to have given birth at 54 years of age. Third, the
disposition of Hermogena which states that she
did not give birth to Teofista and that the latter
was not hers of Eugenio.

Benitez-Badua vs. CA
GR No. 105625, January 24, 1994
FACTS: Spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel
Chipongian were owners of various properties
located in Laguna. Isabel died in 1982 while his
husband died in 1989. Vicentes sister and
nephew filed a complaint for the issuance of
letters of administration of Vicentes estate in
favor of the nephew, herein private respondent.
The petitioner, Marissa Benitez-Badua, was raised
and cared by the deceased spouses since
childhood, though not related to them by blood,
nor legally adopted. The latter to prove that she
is the only legitimate child of the spouses
submitted documents such as her certificate of
live birth where the spouses name were reflected
as her parents. She even testified that said
spouses continuously treated her as their
legitimate daughter. On the other hand, the
relatives of Vicente declared that said spouses
were unable to physically procreate hence the
petitioner cannot be the biological child. Trial
court decided in favor of the petitioner as the
legitimate daughter and sole heir of the spouses.

ISSUE: WON petitioners certificate of live birth

will suffice to establish her legitimacy.
HELD: The Court dismissed the case for lack of
merit. The mere registration of a child in his or
her birth certificate as the child of the supposed
parents is not a valid adoption. It does not confer
upon the child the status of an adopted child and
her legal rights. Such act amounts to simulation
of the child's birth or falsification of his or her
birth certificate, which is a public document.
It is worthy to note that Vicente and
brother of the deceased wife executed a Deed of
Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the
latter. In the notarized document, they stated
that they were the sole heirs of the deceased
because she died without descendants and
ascendants. In executing such deed, Vicente
effectively repudiated the Certificate of Live Birth
of the petitioner where it appeared that he was
the petitioners father.
CABATBAT LIM vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court
G.R. No. 69679. October 18, 1988
CIVIL LAW; PATERNITY AND FILIATION; ARTICLE
263,
CIVIL
CODE;
ACTION
TO
IMPUGN
LEGITIMACY; INAPPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
Petitioners' recourse to Article 263 of the New
Civil Code is not well-taken. This legal provision
refers to an action to impugn legitimacy. It is
inapplicable to this case because this is not an
action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, but an
action of the private respondents to claim their
inheritance
as legal heirs of their childless deceased aunt.
They do not claim that petitioner Violeta Cabatbat
Lim is an illegitimate child of the deceased, but
that she is not the decedent's child at all. Being
neither a legally adopted child, nor an
acknowledged natural child, nor a child by legal
fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a
legal heir of the deceased.
DECISION

This case involves a contest over the

estate of the late Dra. Esperanza Cabatbat
wherein the protagonists are her sisters and the
children of her deceased brothers on one hand,
and the petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim who
claims to be her only child. Petitioners Violeta
Cabatbat Lim, her husband Lim Biak Chiao, and
the Calasiao Bijon Factory assail the decision
dated October 25, 1984 of the Intermediate
Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals (AC-G.R.
No. CV-67055), which affirmed the trial court's
decision finding that petitioner Violeta Cabatbat
Lim is not the offspring, hence, not a legal heir of
the late Esperanza Cabatbat.
The private
respondents, sisters of the late Esperanza
Frianeza-Cabatbat, filed a complaint in the Court
of First Instance of Pangasinan (Civil Case No. D3841), praying for the partition of the estate of
Esperanza Frianeza Cabatbat, who died without
issue on April 23, 1977. Part of her estate was
her interest in the business partnership known as
Calasiao Bijon Factory, now in the possession of
Violeta Cabatbat Lim who claims to be the child of
the spouses Esperanza and Proceso Cabatbat.
Esperanza Frianeza-Cabatbat was survived by her
husband,
Proceso
Cabatbat,
her
sisters,
Consorcia, Maria, Benedicta, Bonifacia, all
surnamed Frianeza and the children of her
deceased brothers Daniel and Domingo. In their
complaint, the private respondents alleged that
Violeta Cabatbat Lim is not a child of Esperanza,
but was only a ward (ampon) of the spouses
Esperanza and Proceso Cabatbat who sheltered
and supported her from childhood, without benefit
of formal adoption proceedings.
Private respondents' evidence on the non-filiation
of Violeta to Esperanza Cabatbat were:
1) the absence of any record that
Esperanza Cabatbat was admitted in the hospital
where Violeta was born and that she gave birth
to Violeta on the day the latter was born;
2) the absence of the birth certificate of
Violeta Cabatbat in the files of certificates of live
births of the
Pangasinan Provincial Hospital for

8
the years 1947 and 1948, when Violeta was
supposedly born;
3) certification dated March 9, 1977, of
the Civil Registry coordinator Eugenio Venal of the
Office of the Civil
Registrar General, that
his office has no birth record of Violeta Cabatbat
alleged to have been born on May
26,
1948 or 1949 in Calasiao, Pangasinan;
4) Certification dated June 16, 1977 of
Romeo Gabriana, Principal II, that when Violeta
studied in the
Calasiao Pilot Central School,
Proceso Cabatbat and Esperanza Cabatbat were
listed as her guardians only,
not
as
her
parents;
5) testimony of Amparo Reside that she
was in the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital on May
21, 1948 to
watch a cousin who delivered a
child there and that she became acquainted with
a patient named Benita Lastimosa
who
gave
birth on May 26, 1948 to a baby girl who grew up
to be known as Violeta Cabatbat.
Pitted against the evidence of the plaintiffs are
the evidence of herein petitioners consisting of:
1) Violeta Cabatbat's birth record which
was filed on June 15, 1948 showing that she was
born on May 26, 1948
at
the
Pangasinan
Provincial Hospital and that she is a legitimate
child of the spouses Proceso and Esperanza
Cabatbat;
2) testimony of Proceso Cabatbat that
Violeta is his child with the deceased Esperanza
Frianeza;
3) testimony of Benita Lastimosa denying
that she delivered a child in the Pangasinan
Provincial Hospital
and that Violeta Cabatbat Lim is that
child;
4) the marriage contract of Violeta and
Lim Biak Chiao where Esperanza appeared as the
mother of
the
bride;
5) Deed of Sale dated May 14, 1960,
wherein the vendee Violeta Cabatbat, then a
minor, was represented and assisted by her
"mother," Dra. Esperanza Cabatbat; and

6) another Deed of Absolute Sale dated

April 21, 1961, wherein Violeta Cabatbat was
assisted and
represented by her "father,"
Proceso Cabatbat. Upon the evidence, the trial
court held on August 10, 1979
that
Violeta
Cabatbat is not a child by nature of the spouses
Esperanza and Proceso Cabatbat and that
hence, she is not a legal heir of the
deceased Esperanza Cabatbat. The dispositive
portion of the trial court's
decision reads:
"WHEREFORE,
judgment
is
hereby
rendered as follows: "(1) Finding that defendant
VIOLETA CABATBAT
LIM is not a child by
nature of the spouses, decedent Esperanza
Frianeza and defendant Proceso Cabatbat,
and not a compulsory heir of the said
decedent;
"(2) Declaring that the heirs of the
decedent are her surviving husband, defendant
Proceso Cabatbat and
her
sisters,
plaintiffs
CONSORCIA, MARIA, BENEDICTA alias JOVITA, and
BONIFACIA alias ANASTACIA, all surnamed
FRIANEZA, her brothers deceased DANIEL
FRIANEZA represented by his surviving spouse,
Adela Vda. de Frianeza, and their
children, Darlene, Daniel, Jr., Dussel and Daisy
Glen, all surnamed
FRIANEZA, and deceased
DOMINGO FRIANEZA, represented by his surviving
spouse Desideria Q. Vda. de
Frianeza
and
their children, Francisco, Dona, Vilma and
Decideria, all surnamed FRIANEZA; "(3) Finding
that the estate left by the decedent are
the thirty properties enumerated and described at
pages 13 to 19 supra and an equity in the
Calasiao Bijon Factory in the sum of P37,961.69 of
which P13,221.69 remains
after advances
obtained by the deceased during her lifetime and
lawful deductions made after her death; "(4)
That of the real properties adverted to above,
three-fourths (3/4) pro-indiviso is the share of
defendant Proceso Cabatbat, as the
surviving spouse, one half (1/2) as his share of the
conjugal estate and
one-half (1/2) of the
remaining one-half as share as heir from his wife
(decedent's) estate, while the
remaining one-

half (1/2) of the other half is the group share of

the heirs of the brothers and sisters of his
wife and of the children of the latter if
deceased, whose names are already enumerated
hereinbefore in the
following
proportions:
one-sixth (1/6) each pro-indiviso to Consorcia,
Maria,
Benedicta
alias
Jovita,
and
Bonifacia alias Anastacia; one-sixth (1/6)
to Adela B. Vda. de Fraineza, Darlene, Daniel, Jr.,
Dussel and Daisy
Glen, as a group in
representation of deceased brother DANIEL
FRIANEZA, and one-sixth (1/6) to Decideria
Q. Vda. de Frianeza, Francisco, Dona,
Vilma and Decideria as a group in representation
of deceased brother
DOMINGO
FRIANEZA;
"(5) That of the balance of the equity of the
deceased in the CALASIAO BIJON FACTORY in the
sum of P13,221.69, three-fourths (3/4) or
P9,916.29 is the share of Proceso Cabatbat as
surviving spouse and as heir of his
deceased wife, and the remaining one-fourth (1/4)
to the plaintiffs under the sharing already stated
in the preceding paragraph; (a) but because
defendant Proceso Cabatbat
has overdrawn
his share he is ordered to return to the estate the
sum of P796.34 by depositing the same with the
Clerk of Court; and (b) defendant Violeta Cabatbat
Lim, not being an heir, is ordered to return to
the estate the sum of P2,931.13 half of
what she and her co-defendant Proceso Cabatbat
withdrew from the
equity of the deceased
under Exhibit 29, receipt dated April 30, 1977;
"(6) Ordering jointly defendants Proceso
Cabatbat and Violeta Cabatbat Lim to pay
attorney's fees in the sum of P5,000.00, the sum
of
P4,000.00
from
defendant
Proceso
Cabatbat and P1,000.00 from defendant Violeta
Cabatbat Lim, and
litigation expenses in the
sum of P1,000.00 from defendant Proceso
Cabatbat and P200.00 from defendant
Violeta
Cabatbat Lim, to the plaintiffs, and to pay the
costs.
"SO ORDERED." (pp. 236-239, Record on
Appeal.)

9
Petitioners appealed to the Intermediate Appellate
Court which affirmed the decision of the trial court
on October 25, 1984.
A motion for reconsideration filed by the
petitioners was denied by the Intermediate
Appellate Court.
Petitioners have elevated the decision to us for
review on certiorari, alleging that the
Intermediate Appellate Court erred:
1. In finding that petitioner is not the child of
Prospero and Esperanza Cabatbat;
2. In ignoring the provisions of Section 22 of Rule
132, Rules of Court;
3. In not considering the provision of Article 263 of
the New Civil Code;
4. In disregarding Exhibits 8,9,10, and 11 of
petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim.
Petitioners' first and fourth assignments
of error raise factual issues. The finding of the trial
court and the Court of Appeals that Violeta
Cabatbat was not born of Esperanza Cabatbat is a
factual finding based on the evidence presented
at the trial, hence, it is conclusive upon Us. Well
entrenched is the rule that "factual findings of the
trial court and the Court of Appeals are entitled to
great respect" (Vda. de Roxas vs. IAC, 143 SCRA
77;
Republic vs. IAC, 144 SCRA 705).
Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
which provides that: "Where a private writing is
more than thirty years old, is produced from a
custody in which it would naturally be found if
genuine, and is unblemished by any alterations or
circumstances of suspicion, no other evidence of
its execution and authenticity need be given"
does not apply to petitioners'
Exhibit "5," the supposed birth registry
record of defendant Violeta Cabatbat showing that
she was born on May 26, 1948, at the Pangasinan
Provincial Hospital in Dagupan City, and that her
father and mother are Proceso Cabatbat and
Esperanza Frianeza, respectively. In rejecting that
document, the trial court pointedly observed:
"This is very strange and odd because the
Registry Book of admission of the hospital does

not show that Esperanza Frianeza was ever a

patient on May 26, 1948. Indeed, Esperanza
Frianeza was never admitted in the hospital as an
obstetrics case before or after May 26, 1948, that
is from December 1, 1947 to June 15, 1948
(Stipulation of Facts, Pre-Trial Order of May 23,
1977, Record on Appeal, p. 117). "On May 26,
1948, the day defendant Violeta Cabatbat was
alleged to have been delivered by Esperanza
Frianeza in the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital, the
records of the hospital show that only one woman
by the name of the Benita Lastimosa of Tagudin,
Ilocos Sur, not Esperanza Frianeza, gave birth to
an illegitimate child who was named by her
mother Benita Lastimosa as Baby Girl Lastimosa
(Exhibit S. Plaintiffs' Folder of Exhibits, p. 39,
Record on Appeal, pp.
117-118).
Furthermore,
the
record
of
birth
certificates of Pangasinan Provincial Hospital for
the years 1947 and 1948 does not carry the birth
certificate of defendant Violeta Cabatbat and the
only birth certificate in the file of birth certificates
of the hospital for May 26, 1948 is that of Baby
Girl Lastimosa whose mother's name is Benita
Lastimosa." (pp. 3-4, CA Decision, pp. 13-14,
Record on Appeal.)
Furthermore, the absence of a record of
the birth of petitioner Violeta Cabatbat in the
Office of the Civil Registrar General, puts a cloud
on the genuineness of her Exhibit 5. Petitioners'
recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code is
not well-taken. This legal provision refers to an
action to impugn legitimacy. It is inapplicable to
this case because this is not an action to impugn
the legitimacy of a child, but an action of the
private respondents to claim their inheritance as
legal heirs of their childless deceased aunt. They
do not claim that petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim
is an illegitimate child of the deceased, but that
she is not the decedent's child at all. Being
neither a legally adopted child, nor an
acknowledged natural child, nor a child by legal
fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta isnot a legal
heir of the deceased.

WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for

lack of merit. The appealed decision is affirmed,
but with modification of paragraphs 2 and 4 of the
dispositive portion thereof, by excluding the
widows Adela B. Vda. de Frianeza and Decideria
Q. Vda. de Frianeza, who are not legal heirs of
Esperanza Frianeza Cabatbat from participating
with their children and the surviving sisters of the
deceased in the one-fourth share of the estate
pertaining to the latter under Article 1001 of the
Civil Code.
SO ORDERED.
TISON and petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and TEODORA DOMINGO
G.R. No. 121027. July 31, 1997
Facts: The petitioners Corazon Tison and Rene
Dezoller
are
niece
and
nephew
of the
deceased Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, who appears
to be the sister of their father Hermogenes
Dezoller. Teodora Dezoller Guerrero died on March
5, 1983 without any ascendant or descendant,
and was survived only by her husband, Martin
Guerrero, and herein petitioners. Petitioners'
father, Hermogenes, died on October 3, 1973,
hence they seek to inherit from Teodora Dezoller
Guerrero by right of representation.
The records reveal that upon the death of
Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, her surviving spouse
executed an Affidavit of Extrajudicial Settlement
adjudicating unto himself, allegedly as sole heir,
the land in dispute. Martin sold the lot to herein
private
respondent
Teodora
Domingo
and thereafter, a TCT was issued in the latters
name.
Martin Guerrero died. Subsequently, herein
petitioners filed an action for reconveyance
claiming that they are entitled to inherit one-half
of the property in question by right of
representation.
Teodora
Domingo
however,
attacks the legitimacy of Hermogenes.
During the hearing, petitioner Corazon
Dezoller Tison was presented as the lone witness,
with documentary evidences offered to prove
petitioners filiation to their father and their

10
aunt. Petitioners thereafter rested their case and
submitted a written offer of the exhibits.
Subsequently, private respondent filed a
Demurrer to Plaintiffs Evidence on the ground
that petitioners failed to prove their legitimate
filiation with the deceased Teodora Guerrero.
The trial court dismissed the complaint
for reconveyance. Respondent Court of Appeals
upheld the dismissal, declaring that the
documentary evidence presented by herein
petitioners, such as the baptismal certificates,
family picture, and joint affidavits are all
inadmissible and insufficient to prove and
establish filiation. Hence, this appeal.
Issues:
1. Whether or not a third person (private
respondent), not the father nor an heir, may
attack the legitimacy of the petitioners.
2. Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to
inherit one-half of the property in question by
right of representation.

Ruling:
1. The private respondent is not the proper
party to impugn the legitimacy of herein
petitioners.
There is no presumption of the law more firmly
established and founded on sounder morality and
more convincing reason than the presumption
that children born in wedlock are legitimate. And
well settled is the rule that the issue of legitimacy
cannot be attacked collaterally.
Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a
child born to his wife. He is the one directly
confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the
infidelity of his wife produces; and he should
decide whether to conceal that infidelity or
expose it, in view of the moral and economic
interest involved. It is only in exceptional cases
that his heirs are allowed to contest such
legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none even
his heirs can impugn legitimacy; that would
amount to an insult to his memory.

The necessity of an independent action directly

impugning the legitimacy is more clearly
expressed in the Mexican Code (Article 335)
which provides: The contest of the legitimacy of
a child by the husband or his heirs must be made
by proper complaint before the competent court;
any contest made in any other way is void. This
principle applies under our Family Code. Articles
170 and 171 of the code confirm this view,
because they refer to the action to impugn the
legitimacy. This action can be brought only by
the husband or his heirs and within the periods
fixed by law.
Upon the expiration of the periods provided in
Article 170, the action to impugn the legitimacy of
a child can no longer be brought. The status
conferred by the
presumption, therefore,
becomes fixed, and can no longer be
questioned. The obvious intention of the law is to
prevent the status of a child born in wedlock from
being in a state of uncertainty for a long time. It
also aims to force early action to settle any doubt
as to the paternity of such child, so that the
evidence material to the matter, which must
necessarily be facts occurring during the period of
the conception of the child, may still be easily
available.
2. The following provisions of the Civil Code
provide for the manner by which the estate of
the decedent shall be divided in this case, to
wit:
Art. 975. When children of one or more
brothers or sisters of the deceased survive,
they shall inherit from the latter by
representation, if they survive with their
uncles or aunts. But if they alone survive,
they shall inherit in equal portions.
Art. 995. In the absence of legitimate
descendants
and
ascendants,
and
illegitimate children and their descendants,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, the
surviving spouse shall inherit the entire
estate, without prejudice to the rights of
brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces,
should there be any, under Article 1001.

Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or

their children survive with the widow or
widower, the latter shall be entitled to onehalf of the inheritance and the brothers and
sisters or their children to the other half.
Upon the death of Teodora Dezoller
Guerrero, one-half of the subject property was
automatically reserved to the surviving spouse,
Martin Guerrero, as his share in the conjugal
partnership. Applying the aforequoted statutory
provisions, the remaining half shall be equally
divided between the widower and herein
petitioners who are entitled to jointly inherit in
their own right. Hence, Martin Guerrero could
only validly alienate his total undivided threefourths (3/4) share in the entire property to herein
private respondent. Resultantly, petitioners and
private respondent are deemed co-owners of the
property covered by the Transfer Certificate of
Title in the proportion of an undivided one-fourth
(1/4) and three-fourths (3/4) share thereof,
respectively.
Corito Ocampo Tayag vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 95229 June 9, 1992
FACTS: Private respondent is the mother and
legal guardian of her minor son, Chad Cuyugan,
by the father of the petitioner, the late Atty.
Ricardo Ocampo. Petitioner is the known
administratrix of the real and personal properties
left by her deceased father, said Atty.Ocampo,
who died intestate in Angeles City on September
28, 1983. Private respondent has been estranged
from her husband, Jose Cuyugan, for several years
now and during which time, she and Atty. Ricardo
Ocampo had illicit amorous relationship with each
other that, as a consequence thereof, they begot
a child who was christened Chad Cuyugan in
accordance with the ardent desire and behest of
said Atty. Ocampo. Chad, the son of private
respondent by the late Atty. Ricardo Ocampo, who
was born in Angeles City on October 5, 1980 had
been sired, showered with exceptional affection,
fervent love and care by his putative father for

11
being his only son as can be gleaned from
indubitable letters and documents of the late Atty.
Ocampo to herein private respondent. The minor,
Chad D. Cuyugan, although illegitimate is
nevertheless entitled to a share in the intestate
estate left by his deceased father, Atty. Ricardo
Ocampo as one of the surviving heirs. The
deceased Atty. Ricardo Ocampo, at the time of his
death was the owner of real and personal
property, located in Baguio City, Angeles City and
in the Province of Pampanga with approximate
value of several millions of pesos. The estate of
the late Atty. Ocampo has not as yet been
inventoried by the petitioner and the inheritance
of the surviving heirs including that of said Chad
has not likewise been ascertained. The only
known surviving heirs of the deceased Atty.
Ricardo Ocampo are his children, namely: Corito
O. Tayag, Rivina O. Tayag, Evita O. Florendo, Felina
Ocampo, and said minor Chad, for and in whose
behalf this instant complaint is filed. Private
respondent has no means of livelihood and she
only depends on the charity of friends and
relatives for the sustenance of her son, Chad,
such that it is urgent, necessary and imperative
that said child be extended financial support from
the estate of his putative father, Atty.Ricardo
Ocampo. Several demands, verbal and written,
have been made for petitioner to grant Chad's
lawful inheritance, but despite said demands, the
latter failed and refused and still fails and refuses
to satisfy the claim for inheritance against the
estate of the late Atty. Ocampo.
ISSUE: Whether or not Chad is entitled to inherit
from Atty. Ocampos estate as his illegitimate
child.
HELD: Yes. Although petitioner contends that the
complaint filed by herein private respondent
merely alleges that the minor Chad Cuyugan is an
illegitimate child of the deceased and is actually a
claim for inheritance, from the allegations therein
the same may be considered as one to compel
recognition. Further that the two causes of action,
one to compel recognition and the other to claim
inheritance, maybe joined in one complaint is not

new in our jurisprudence. Also, the action has not

yet prescribed. The applicable law is Article 285 of
the Civil Code which states that the action for the
recognition of natural children may be brought
only during the lifetime of the presumed parents,
except in the following cases: (1) If the father or
mother died during the minority of the child, in
which case the latter may file the action before
the expiration of four years from the attainment
of his majority. The Court holds that the right of
action of the minor child has been vested by the
filing of the complaint in court under the regime
of the Civil Code and prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code. We herein adopt our ruling in the
recent case of Republic of the Philippines vs.
Court of Appeals, et al. where we held that the
fact of filing of the petition already vested in the
petitioner her right to file it and to have the same
proceed to final adjudication in accordance with
the law in force at the time, and such right can no
longer be prejudiced or impaired by the
enactment of a new law.
FRANCISCO L. JISON vs. COURT OF APPEALS
and MONINA JISON
G.R. No.124853 February 24, 1998
FACTS: This is a case filed by one Monina Jison
for recognition as an illegitimate child of Francisco
Jison who is married to Lilia Lopez Jison. MONINA
alleged that she is the daughter of FRANCISCO
who impregnated her mother Esperanza F.
Amolar, who was then employed as the nanny of
FRANCISCO's daughter. She claims that she has
openly and continuously possessed the status of
an illegitimate child of Francisco and that
Francisco had also openly and continuously
recognized her as such. The trial court
categorized Moninas many evidences as hearsay
evidence, incredulous evidence, or self-serving
evidence and ruled against Monina while the
Court of Appeals decided in favor of Monina and
declared her to be the illegitimate daughter of
Francisco. The Court of Appeals ruled that the

testimonies of Moninas witnesses were sufficient

to establish MONINA's filiation.
ISSUE: Did Monina successfully establish her
filiation under Article 172 par. 2 of the Family
Code (open and continuous possession of the
status)?HELD: Yes. Under Article 175 of the Family
Code, illegitimate filiation, such as MONINA's, may
be established in the same way and on the same
evidence as that of legitimate children. The
Supreme Court sustained the findings of the CA
that Moninawas able to prove her illegitimate
filiation. For the success of an action to establish
illegitimate filiation under Article 172 par. 2, a
"high standard of proof" is required. To prove open
and continuous possession of the status of an
illegitimate child, there must be evidence of the
manifestation of the permanent intention of the
supposed father to consider the child as his, by
continuous and clear manifestations of parental
affection and care, which cannot be attributed to
pure charity. Such acts must be of such a nature
that they reveal not only the conviction of
paternity, but also the apparent desire to have
and treat the child as such in all relations in
society and in life, not accidentally, but
continuously.
By "continuous" is meant uninterrupted
and consistent, but does not require any
particular length of time.
In deciding paternity suits, the issue of
whether sexual intercourse actually occurred
inevitably redounds to the victim's or mother's
word, as against the accused's or putative father's
protestations. In the instant case, MONINA's
mother could no longer testify as to the fact of
intercourse, as she had already passed away. But
the fact of Moninas birth and her parentage may
be established by evidence other than the
testimony of her mother.
The testimonial evidence offered by
MONINA, woven by her narration of circumstances
and events that occurred through the years,
concerning her relationship with FRANCISCO,
coupled with the testimonies of her witnesses,
overwhelmingly established that the following:

12
1) FRANCISCO is MONINA's father and she
was conceived at the time when her mother was
in the employ of the former;
2) FRANCISCO recognized MONINA as his
child through his overt acts and conduct like
sending her to school, paying for her tuition fees,
school uniforms, books, board and lodging at the
Colegio del Sagrado de Jesus, defraying for her
hospitalization expenses, providing her with
monthly allowance, paying for the funeral
expenses of her mother, acknowledging her
paternal greetings and calling appellant his "Hija"
or child, instructing his office personnel to give
appellant's monthly allowance, recommending her
to use his house in Bacolod and paying for her
long distance telephone calls, having her spend
her long distance telephone calls, having her
spend her vacation in his apartment in Manila and
also at his Forbes residence, allowing her to use
his surname in her scholastic and other records.
3) Such recognition has been consistently
shown and manifested throughout the years
publicly, spontaneously, continuously and in an
uninterrupted manner.
The totality of the evidence on record established
Moninas filiation. Appeal filed by Francisco Jison
was dismissed.
TONOG v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 122906
Facts: In 1989, Dinah B. Tonog gave birth to
Gardin Faith Belarde Tonog, her illegitimate
daughter with Edgar V. Daguimol. A year after the
birth of Gardin, Dinah left for the USA where she
found a work as a registered nurse. Gardin was
left in the care of her father and paternal
grandparents.
Edgar filed a petition for guardianship
over Gardin in the RTC of Quezon City. In March
1992, the court granted the petition and
appointed Edgar as legal guardian of Gardin.
In May 1992, Dinah filed a petition for
relief from judgment. She averred that she
learned of the judgment only on April 1, 1992. The

trial court set aside its original judgment and

allowed Dinah to file her opposition to Edgar's
petition. Edgar, in turn, filed a motion for
reconsideration.
In 1993, Dinah filed a motion to remand
custody of Gardin to her.
In 1994, the trial court issued a resolution
denying Edgar's motion for reconsideration and
granting Dinah's motion for custody of Gardin.
Dinah moved for the immediate execution of the
resolution.
Edgar, thus, filed a petition for certiorari
before the Court of Appeals. The CA dismissed the
petition for lack of merit. Upon motion for
reconsideration, CA modified its decision and let
Gardin remain in the custody of Edgar until
otherwise adjudged.
Dinah appealed to the Supreme Court,
contending that she is entitled to the custody of
the minor, Gardin, as a matter of law. First, as the
mother of Gardin Faith, the law confers parental
authority upon her as the mother of the
illegitimate minor. Second, Gardin cannot be
separated from her since she had not, as of then,
attained the age of seven. Employing simple
arithmetic however, it appears that Gardin Faith is
now twelve years old.
Issue: Who is entitled to the temporary custody
of the child pending the guardianship proceeding?
Held: In custody disputes, it is axiomatic that the
paramount criterion is the welfare and well-being
of the child.
Statute sets certain rules to assist the
court in making an informed decision. Insofar as
illegitimate children are concerned, Article 176 of
the Family Code provides that illegitimate children
shall be under the parental authority of their
mother. Likewise, Article 213 of the Family Code
provides that [n]o child under seven years of age
shall be separated from the mother, unless the
court finds compelling reasons to order
otherwise. It will be observed that in both
provisions, a strong bias is created in favor of the
mother. This is specially evident in Article 213
where it may be said that the law presumes that

the mother is the best custodian. As explained by

the Code Commission:
The general rule is recommended in order
to avoid many a tragedy where a mother has seen
her baby torn away from her. No man can sound
the deep sorrows of a mother who is deprived of
her child of tender age. The exception allowed by
the rule has to be for compelling reasons for the
good of the child.
For these reasons, even a mother may be
deprived of the custody of her child who is below
seven years of age for compelling reasons.
Instances
of
unsuitability
are
neglect,
abandonment, unemployment and immorality,
habitual
drunkenness,
drug
addiction,
maltreatment of the child, insanity, and affliction
with a communicable illness. If older than seven
years of age, a child is allowed to state his
preference, but the court is not bound by that
choice. The court may exercise its discretion by
disregarding the childs preference should the
parent chosen be found to be unfit, in which
instance, custody may be given to the other
parent, or even to a third person.
In the case at bar, we are being asked to
rule on the temporary custody of the minor,
Gardin Faith, since it appears that the proceedings
for guardianship before the trial court have not
been terminated, and no pronouncement has
been made as to who should have final custody of
the minor. Bearing in mind that the welfare of the
said minor as the controlling factor, we find that
the appellate court did not err in allowing her
father to retain in the meantime parental custody
over her. Meanwhile, the child should not be
wrenched from her familiar surroundings, and
thrust into a strange environment away from the
people and places to which she had apparently
formed an attachment.
Moreover, whether a mother is a fit
parent for her child is a question of fact to be
properly entertained in the special proceedings
before the trial court. It should be recalled that in
a petition for review on certiorari, we rule only on
questions of law. We are not in the best position

13
to assess the parties respective merits vis-vis their opposing claims for custody. Yet another
sound reason is that inasmuch as the age of the
minor, Gardin Faith, has now exceeded the
statutory bar of seven years, a fortiori, her
preference and opinion must first be sought in the
choice of which parent should have the custody
over her person.
For the present and until finally adjudged,
temporary custody of the subject minor should
remain with her father, the private respondent
herein pending final judgment of the trial court.
Reyes vs. Mauricio
G.R. No. 175080
FACTS:
1.Eugenio owns a parcel of land in Turo, Bocaue,
Bulacan (4,527 square meters, more or less, and
covered by a TCT --- property was adjudicated to
Eugenio by virtue of an extrajudicial settlement
among the heirs following the death of his
parents).
2. Librada F. Mauricio (Librada, DECEASED) and
her daughter Leonida F. Mauricio (Leonida) filed a
complaint before the DARAB of Malolos, Bulacan
alleging that theyre the legal heirs of Godofredo
Mauricio who was the lawful and registered tenant
of Eugenio through his predecessors-in-interest to
the subject land( that from 1936 until his death in
May 1994,Godofredo had been working on the
subject land and introduced improvements
consisting of fruit-bearing trees, seasonal crops, a
residential
house
and
other
permanent
improvements; that through fraud, deceit,
strategy and other unlawful means, Eugenio
caused
the
preparation
of
a
document
denominated as Kasunduan dated 28 September
1994 to eject respondents from the subject
property, and had the same notarized by Notary
Public Ma. Sarah G. Nicolas in Pasig, Metro Manila;
that Librada never appeared before the Notary
Public; that Librada was illiterate and the contents
of the Kasunduan were not read nor explained to
her; that Eugenio took undue advantage of the

weakness, age, illiteracy, ignorance, indigence

and other handicaps of Librada in the execution of
the Kasunduan rendering it void for lack of
consent; and that Eugenio had been employing all
illegal means to eject respondents from the
subject property).
3. Leonida and Librada prayed for the declaration
of nullity of the Kasunduan and for an order
for Eugenio to maintain and place them in
peaceful possession and cultivation of the
subject property.
4. According to Eugenio: Godofredos occupation
of the subject premises was based on the formers
mere
tolerance
and accommodation. Eugenio
denied
signing
a tenancy
agreement,
nor authorizing any person to sign such an
agreement. He
maintained
that
Librada,
accompanied by a relative, voluntarily affixed her
signature to the Kasunduan and that she was fully
aware of the contents of the document. Moreover,
Librada received P50,000.00 from Eugenio on the
same day
of
the
execution
of
the Kasunduan. Eugenio
also
questioned
the jurisdiction of the DARAB since the principal
relief sought by respondents is the annulment of
the contract, over which jurisdiction is vested on
the
regular
courts.
Provincial
Adjudicator Godofredo was the tenant of
Eugenio, and Librada, being the surviving spouse,
should have peaceful possession of the land.
DARAB - Mauricios are former tenants of Spouses
Reyes.CA - affirmed the decision and resolution of
the DARAB.
ON APPEAL, Leonidas legal standing as a
party was also assailed by Eugenio. Eugenio
submitted that the complaint was rendered moot
with the death of Librada, Godofredos sole
compulsory heir. Eugenio contended that Leonida
is a mere ward of Godofredo and Librada, thus,
not a legal heir.
ISSUE: WON Eugenio can question the filiation of
Leonida in a case regarding land dispute.
HELD: NO.
RATIO: We are in full accord with the Court of
Appeals when it ruled that Eugenio cannot

collaterally attack the status of Leonida in the

instant petition. It is settled law that filiation
cannot
be collaterally
attacked. Well-known
civilista Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino, in his book Civil
Code of the Philippines, Commentaries and
Jurisprudence, noted that the aforecited doctrine
is rooted from the provisions of the Civil Code of
the Philippines. He explained thus: The legitimacy
of the child cannot be contested by way of
defense or as a collateral issue in another action
for a different purpose. The necessity of an
independent action directly impugning the
legitimacy is more clearly expressed in the
Mexican code (article 335) which provides: The
contest of the legitimacy of a child by the
husband or his heirs must be made by proper
complaint before the competent court; any
contest made in any other way is void. This
principle applies under our Family Code. Articles
170 and 171 of the code confirm this view,
because they refer to the action to impugn the
legitimacy. This action can be brought only by
the husband or his heirs and within the periods
fixed in the present articles. In Braza v. City Civil
Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental,
the Court stated that legitimacy and filiation can
be questioned only in a direct action seasonably
filed by the proper party, and not through
collateral attack. The same rule is applied to
adoption such that it cannot also be made subject
to a collateral attack. In Reyes v. Sotero, this
Court reiterated that adoption cannot be assailed
collaterally in a proceeding for the settlement of a
decedents estate. Furthermore, in Austria v.
Reyes, the Court declared that the legality of the
adoption by the testatrix can be assailed only in a
separate
action
brought
for
that purpose
and cannot be subject to collateral attack.

14
JESSE U. LUCAS V. JESUS S. LUCAS
G.R. No. 190710, June 6, 2011
FACTS: Petitioner, Jesse Lucas filed a Petition to
Establish Filiation with a Motion for the
Submission of Parties to DNA Testing before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC). Jesse alleged that he is
the son of his mother Elsie who got acquainted
with respondent, Jesus S. Lucas in Manila. He also
submitted
documents
which
include
(a)
petitioners certificate of live birth; (b) petitioners
baptismal certificate; (c) petitioners college
diploma, showing that he graduated from Saint
Louis University in Baguio City with a degree in
Psychology; (d) his Certificate of Graduation from
the same school; (e) Certificate of Recognition
from the University of the Philippines, College of
Music; and (f) clippings of several articles from
different newspapers about petitioner, as a
musical prodigy.
Jesus learned of this and he filed a
Special Appearance and Comment manifesting
that the petition was adversarial in nature and
therefore summons should be served on him.
Meanwhile, Jesse filed a Very Urgent Motion to Try
and Hear the Case which the RTC found to be
sufficient in form and hence set the case for
hearing. Jesus filed a Motion for Reconsideration
arguing that DNA testing cannot be had on the
basis of a mere allegation pointing to him as
Jesses father.
Acting
on
Jesus
Motion
for
Reconsideration, the RTC dismissed the case and
held that Jesse failed to establish compliance with
the four procedural aspects for a paternity action
enumerated in the case of Herrera v. Alba namely,
a prima
faciecase,
affirmative
defenses,
presumption
of
legitimacy,
and
physical
resemblance between the putative father and the
child.
This prompted Jesse to file a Motion for
Reconsideration which the RTC granted. A new
hearing was scheduled where the RTC held that
ruling on the grounds relied upon by Jesse for
filing the instant petition is premature considering

that a full-blown trial has not yet taken place.

Jesus filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was
denied by the RTC. He then filed a petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA
ruled in favor of Jesus, it noted that Jesse failed to
show that the four significant aspects of a
traditional paternity action had been met and held
that DNA testing should not be allowed when the
petitioner has failed to establish a prima facie
case.
ISSUE:
Whether
aprima
facie showing
is
necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing
order
HELD: Yes, but it is not yet time to discuss the
lack of a prima facie case vis--vis the motion for
DNA testing since no evidence has, as yet, been
presented by petitioner.
RATIO: Misapplication of Herrera v. Alba by the
Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals. The
statement in Herrera v. Alba that there are four
significant procedural aspects in a traditional
paternity case which parties have to face has
been widely misunderstood and misapplied in this
case. A party is confronted by these so-called
procedural aspects during trial, when the
parties have presented their respective evidence.
They are matters of evidence that cannot be
determined at this initial stage of the proceedings,
when only the petition to establish filiation has
been filed. The CAs observation that petitioner
failed to establish a prima facie case is herefore
misplaced. A prima facie case is built by a partys
evidence and not by mere allegations in the
initiatory pleading.
Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence
merely provides for conditions that are aimed to
safeguard the accuracy and integrity of the DNA
testing. It states that the appropriate court may,
at any time, either motu proprio or on application
of any person, who has a legal interest in the
matter in litigation, order a DNA testing. Such
order shall issue after due hearing and notice to
the parties upon a showing of the following: (a) A
biological sample exists that is relevant to the
case;(b) The biological sample: (i) was not

previously subjected to the type of DNA testing

now requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to
DNA testing, but the results may require
confirmation for good reasons; (c) The DNA
testing uses a scientifically valid technique; (d)
The DNA testing has the scientific potential to
produce new information that is relevant to the
proper resolution of the case; and (e) The
existence of other factors, if any, which the court
may consider as potentially affecting the accuracy
or integrity of the DNA testing. This Rule shall not
preclude a DNA testing, without need of a prior
court order, at the behest of any party, including
law enforcement agencies, before a suit or
proceeding is commenced. This does not mean,
however, that a DNA testing order will be issued
as a matter of right if, during the hearing, the said
conditions are established.
In some states, to warrant the issuance of
the DNA testing order, there must be a show
cause hearing wherein the applicant must first
present sufficient evidence to establish a prima
facie case or a reasonable possibility of paternity
or good cause for the holding of the test. In
these states, a court order for blood testing is
considered a search, which, under their
Constitutions (as in ours), must be preceded by a
finding of probable cause in order to be valid.
Hence, the requirement of a prima facie case, or
reasonable possibility, was imposed in civil
actions as a counterpart of a finding of probable
cause. Courts in various jurisdictions have differed
regarding the kind of procedures which are
required, but those jurisdictions have almost
universally found that a preliminary showing must
be made before a court can constitutionally order
compulsory blood testing in paternity cases. We
agree, and find that, as a preliminary matter,
before the court may issue an order for
compulsory blood testing, the moving party must
show that there is a reasonable possibility of
paternity. As explained hereafter, in cases in
which paternity is contested and a party to the
action refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood test,
a show cause hearing must be held in which the

15
court can determine whether there is sufficient
evidence to establish a prima facie case which
warrants issuance of a court order for blood
testing The same condition precedent should be
applied in our jurisdiction to protect the putative
father from mere harassment suits. Thus, during
the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the
petitioner must present prima facie evidence or
establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.
De Jesus vs. Dizon
G.R. No. 142877
Facts: The case involves two illegitimate children
who having been born in a lawful wedlock; claim
to be the illegitimate children of the decedent,
Juan G. Dizon in order to enforce their respective
shares in the latters estate under the rules on
succession. Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves
de Jesus got married on August 23, 1964 and
during
this
marriage,
herein
petitioners,
Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie Christie A. de
Jesus were born. However, in a notarized
document dated June 07, 1991, Juan G. Dizon
acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as
being his own illegitimate children by Carolina
Aves de Jesus. Subsequently, on the following
year, Juan G. Dizon died intestate leaving behind
a considerable amount of assets.
Thus, on the strength of his notarized
acknowledgment, herein petitioners filed a
complaint for Partition with Inventory and
accounting of the Dizon estate. On the other
hand, herein respondents, the surviving spouse
and legitimate children of the decedent Juan G.
Dizon, including the corporations of which the
deceased was a stockholder, sought the dismissal
of the case. They argued that the complaint, even
while denominated as being one for partition,
would nevertheless call for altering the status of
petitioners from being the legitimate children of
the spouses Danilo de Jesus and Carolina de Jesus
to instead be the illegitimate children of Carolina
de Jesus and deceased Juan Dizon. But, the trial
court denied their motion to dismiss as well as

their motion for reconsideration, which prompted

the respondents to elevate the issue before the
Court of Appeals but still the latter upheld the
decision of the lower court and ordered that case
be remanded for further proceedings. Years later,
respondents,
notwithstanding
with
their
submission of their answers and several motions,
they filed an omnibus motion for the dismissal of
the complaint.
They contend that the action instituted
was, in fact, made to compel the recognition of
petitioners as being the illegitimate children of
decedent Juan G. Dizon and that the partition
sought was merely an ulterior relief once
petitioners would have been able to establish
their status as such heirs. They also asserted that
an action for partition was not an appropriate
forum to ascertain the question of paternity and
filiation because the same could only be taken up
in an independent suit or proceeding. And at this
instance, the trial court favored with the
respondents
and
therefore
dismissed
the
complaint of the petitioners for lack of cause of
action and being improper.
Issue: Whether petitioners are indeed the
acknowledged illegitimate offsprings of the
decedent.

Ruling: The filiation of illegitimate children, like

legitimate children, is established by
(1) the record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final judgment; or
(2)an admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument
and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by
(1) the open and continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate child; or
(2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court
and special laws.
The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a
record of birth, a will, a statement before a court
of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a
consummated act of acknowledgment of the

child, and no further court action is required. In

fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a
ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a
voluntary recognition that does not require a
separate action for judicial approval. Where,
instead, a claim for recognition is predicated on
other evidence merely tending to prove paternity,
i.e., outside of a record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record or an authentic
writing, judicial action within the applicable
statute of limitations is essential in order to
establish the childs acknowledgment.
However,
based
on
the
records
presented, they showed that petitioners were
born during the marriage of their parents. The
certificates of live birth would also identify Danilo
de Jesus as being their father. There is perhaps no
presumption of the law more firmly established
and founded on sounder morality and more
convincing reason than the presumption that
children born in wedlock are legitimate.
This
presumption
indeed
becomes
conclusive in the absence of proof that there is
physical impossibility of access between the
spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days
which immediately precedes the birth of the child
due to
(a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have
sexual intercourse with his wife;
(b) the fact that the husband and wife are living
separately in such a way that sexual intercourse
is not possible; or (c)serious illness of the
husband, which absolutely prevents sexual
intercourse.
Quite remarkably, upon the expiration of
the periods set forth in Article 170, and in proper
cases Article 171, of the Family Code (which took
effect on 03 August 1988), the action to impugn
the legitimacy of a child would no longer be
legally feasible and the status conferred by the
presumption becomes fixed and unassailable. In
an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation
to the late Juan G. Dizon, petitioners, in effect,
would impugn their legitimate status as being
children of Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves de

16
Jesus. This step cannot be aptly done because the
law itself establishes the legitimacy of children
conceived or born during the marriage of the
parents. Jurisprudence is strongly settled that the
paramount declaration of legitimacy by law
cannot be attacked collaterally, one that can only
be repudiated or contested in a direct suit
specifically brought for that purpose. Indeed, a
child so born in such wedlock shall be considered
legitimate although the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have been
sentenced as having been an adulteress.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing disquisitions
considered, the instant petition is DENIED.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. TRINIDAD
R.A. CAPOTE
G.R. No. 157043 February 2, 2007
Facts: In 1998, respondent Trinidad R. A.
Capote (guardian ad litem) filed a petition for
change of name of her ward from Giovanni
Nadores Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores. The
petition alleged that: Giovanni is the illegitimate
natural child of Corazon P. Nadores and Diosdado
Gallamaso; he was born on July 9, 1982, prior to
the effectivity of the New Family Code; his mother
made him use the surname of the natural father
despite the absence of marriage between them;
from the time Giovanni was born and up to the
present, his father failed to take up his
responsibilities [to him] on matters of financial,
physical,
emotional
and
spiritual
concerns; Giovanni is now fully aware of how he
stands with his father and he desires to have his
surname changed to that of his mothers
surname; Giovannis mother might eventually
petition him to join her in the United States and
his continued use of the surname Gallamaso, the
surname of his natural father, may complicate his
status as natural child; and the change of name
will be for the benefit of the minor.
Having found respondents petition
sufficient in form and substance, the trial court
gave due course to the petition. Publication of the

petition was ordered and the local civil registrar

and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was
notified. Since there was no opposition to the
petition, respondent moved for leave of court to
present her evidence ex parte before a courtappointed commissioner. The OSG, acting through
the Provincial Prosecutor, did not object; hence,
the lower court granted the motion. After the
reception of evidence, the trial court rendered a
decision ordering the change of name from
Giovanni N. Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines,
through the OSG, filed an appeal with a lone
assignment of error: the court a quo erred in
granting
the
petition
in
a
summary
proceeding. Ruling that the proceedings were
sufficiently adversarial in nature as required, the
CA affirmed the RTC decision ordering the change
of name.
Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court
contending that the CA erred in affirming the trial
courts decision which granted the petition for
change of name despite the non-joinder of
indispensable parties. The purported parents and
all other persons who may be adversely affected
by the childs change of name should have been
made respondents to make the proceeding
adversarial.
Issues: 1. Whether or not the petition for change
of name should be granted.
2. Is a proceeding for change of name
adversarial?
3. Did Capote
comply
with
the
requirement for an adversarial proceeding?
4. When is a proceeding considered
adversarial?
Held: 1. Yes. The law and facts obtaining here
favor Giovannis petition. Giovanni availed of the
proper remedy, a petition for change of name
under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, and
complied with all the procedural requirements.
After hearing, the trial court found (and the
appellate court affirmed) that the evidence
presented during the hearing of Giovannis
petition sufficiently established that, under Art.

176 of the Civil Code, Giovanni is entitled to

change his name as he was never recognized by
his father while his mother has always recognized
him as her child. A change of name will erase the
impression that he was ever recognized by his
father. It is also to his best interest as it will
facilitate his mothers intended petition to have
him join her in the United States. This Court will
not stand in the way of the reunification of mother
and son.
2. The OSG is correct in stating that a
petition for change of name must be heard in an
adversarial proceeding. Unlike petitions for the
cancellation or correction of clerical errors in
entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court, a petition for change of name
under Rule 103 cannot be decided through a
summary proceeding. There is no doubt that this
petition does not fall under Rule 108 for it is not
alleged that the entry in the civil registry suffers
from clerical or typographical errors. The relief
sought clearly goes beyond correcting erroneous
entries in the civil registry, although by granting
the petition, the result is the same in that a
corresponding change in the entry is also required
to reflect the change in name.
3. Capote complied with the requirement
for an adversarial proceeding by posting in a
newspaper of general circulation notice of the
filing of the petition. The lower court also
furnished the OSG a copy thereof. Despite the
notice, no one came forward to oppose the
petition including the OSG. The fact that no one
opposed the petition did not deprive the court of
its jurisdiction to hear the same nor does it make
the proceeding less adversarial in nature. The
lower court is still expected to exercise its
judgment to determine whether the petition is
meritorious or not and not merely accept as true
the arguments propounded. Considering that the
OSG neither opposed the petition nor the motion
to present its evidence ex parte when it had the
opportunity to do so, it cannot now complain that
the proceedings in the lower court were not
adversarial enough.

17
4. A proceeding is adversarial where the
party seeking relief has given legal warning to the
other party and afforded the latter an opportunity
to contest it. Respondent gave notice of the
petition through publication as required by the
rules. With this, all interested parties were
deemed notified and the whole world considered
bound by the judgment therein. In addition, the
trial court gave due notice to the OSG by serving
a copy of the petition on it. Thus, all the
requirements to make a proceeding adversarial
were satisfied when all interested parties,
including petitioner as represented by the OSG,
were afforded the opportunity to contest the
petition
DAISIE T. DAVID vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
RAMON R. VILLAR
G.R. No. 111180
FACTS: Petitioner Daisie T. David worked as
secretary of private respondent Ramon R. Villar, a
businessman in Angeles City. Private respondent
is a married man and the father of four children,
all grown-up. After a while, the relationship
between petitioner and private respondent
developed into an intimate one, as a result of
which a son, Christopher J., was born on March 9,
1985 to them. Christopher J. was followed by two
more children. The relationship became known to
private respondent's wife when Daisie took
Christopher J, to Villar's house at Villa Teresa in
Angeles City. After this, the children of Daisie were
freely brought by Villar to his house as they were
eventually accepted by his legal family.
In the summer of 1991, Villar asked
Daisie to allow Christopher J., then six years of
age, to go with his family to Boracay. Daisie
agreed, but after the trip, Villar refused to give
back the child. Villar said he had enrolled
Christopher J. at the Holy Family Academy for the
next school year.
On July 30, 1991, Daisie filed a petition
for habeas corpus on behalf of Christopher J. The
RTC rendered justice in favor of Daisie, stating

that the rightful custody of the minor Christopher

J. T. David is hereby given to the natural mother.
The CA reversed on appeal holding that Habeas
Corpus was not proper and that the question of
custody of a minor child may be decided in a
Habeas Corpus case contemplates a situation
where the parents are married to each other but
are separated.
ISSUE: Whether or not the remedy of Habeas
Corpus proper
DECISION: It is indeed true, as the Court of
Appeals observed, that the determination of the
right to the custody of minor children is relevant
in cases where the parents, who are married to
each other, are for some reason separated from
each other. It does not follow, however, that it
cannot arise in any other situation. In the case at
bar, Christopher J. is an illegitimate child since at
the time of his conception, his father, private
respondent Ramon R. Villar, was married to
another woman other than the child's mother. As
such, pursuant to Art. 176 of the Family Code,
Christopher J. is under the parental authority of
his mother, the herein petitioner, who, as a
consequence of such authority, is entitled to have
custody of him. Since, admittedly, petitioner has
been deprived of her rightful custody of her child
by private respondent, she is entitled to issuance
of the writ of habeas corpus.
The fact that private respondent has
recognized the minor child may be a ground for
ordering him to give support to the latter, but not
for giving him custody of the child. Under Art. 213
of the Family Code, "no child under seven years of
age shall be separated from the mother unless
the court finds compelling reasons to order
otherwise." Nor is the fact that private respondent
is well-off a reason for depriving petitioner of the
custody of her children, especially considering
that she has been able to rear and support them
on her own since they were born. That she
receives help from her parents and sister for the
support of the three children is not a point against
her. Cooperation, compassion, love and concern
for every member of the family are characteristics

of the close family ties that bind the Filipino family

and have made it what it is.
RATIONALE: Article 213 of the Family Code
provides that In case of separation of the
parents, parental authority shall be exercised by
the parent designated by the Court. The Court
shall take into account all relevant considerations,
especially the choice of the child over seven years
of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit. Also,
the first sentence of Article 176 of the Family
Code applies to this case, which provides that
Illegitimate children shall use the surname and
shall be under the parental authority of their
mother, and shall be entitled to support in
conformity with this Code.

Fernandez vs. Fernandez

G.R. No. 143256
Facts: The late Spouses Dr. Jose K. Fernandez and
Generosa A. de Venecia were the registered
owners of a parcel of land located at Dagupan
City covered and the two-storey building
constructed thereon covered by Tax Declaration
22-592-1. It is undisputed that Generosa gave
birth to a baby boy named Rogelio who died when
he was only twelve years old as paralytic. In the
testimony of Romeo Fernandez it was revealed
that the late Spouses being childless by the death
of their son, purchased from a certain Miliang for
P20.00 a one month baby boy. The boy being
referred to was later on identified as Rodolfo
Fernandez, the herein appellant. Appellant was
taken care of by the couple and was sent to
school and became a dental technician. He lived
with the couple until they became old and
disabled. On July 20, 1982, Jose K. Fernandez died
thereby leaving his wife Generosa A. de Venecia
and Rodolfo Fernandez and an estate consisting of
a parcel of land situated in the Barrio of Pantal,

18
City of Dagupan, and a two storey residential
building made of concrete and wood. Rodolfo
Fernandez and Generosa executed a deed of
extra-judicial partition dividing and allocating to
themselves the properties of Dr. Fernandez. On
the same day, Generosa de Venecia executed a
Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Eddie Fernandez,
appellant's son over some partitions of a land
which belonged to Dr. Fernandez as well. After
learning of the transaction, Dr. Fernandezs
nephews and nieces filed an action to declare the
Extra- Judicial Partition of Estate and Deed of Sale
void ab initio. They alleged that the defendants
(appellants)deprived the plaintiff and other heirs
(appellees) of the deceased spouses, without
basis of heirship or anyiota (jot, or small amount)
of rights to succession or inheritance, they took
advantage of the total physical and mental
incapacity of the deceased Generosa de Venecia.
Appellees thus prayed that the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, Deed of Absolute Sale and
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 54641 be declared
void from the beginning. In their answer, the
defendants alleged that the deceased spouses
was blessed with one child, herein defendant
Rodolfo, whom they acknowledged during their
lifetime. The contracts executed by the late
Generosa and defendant Rodolfo were made with
the full knowledge, consent and approval of the
parties. Regional Trial Court rendered a decision in
favor of the plaintiffs.
The TC found that Rodolfo was not a legitimate
nor a legally adopted child of the spouses, hence
he could not inherit from them. His claim was
negated by the fact that
(1) he only reached HS and was told to stop
studying so that he could help in Dr.Fernandezs
clinic.
(2) he failed to present any birth certificate.
(3) the book Fercolla clan which was compiled
and edited by respected people showed the
genealogy of the family of the spouses without a
child,
(4) the certification issued by the Records
Management and Archives Office that there was

no available information about the birth of

petitioner Rodolfo to the spouses,
(5) the application of Dr. Jose Fernandez for back
pay certificate naming petitioner Rodolfo as his
son was doubtful considering that there were
blemishes or alteration in the original copy;
(6) that Rodolfo's baptismal certificate was
spurious and falsified since there were no
available records of baptism with the parish from
June 7, 1930 to August 8,1936, while Rodolfo's
baptismal certificate which was issued in 1989
showed that he was baptized on November 24,
1934. The court found that the extra-judicial
partition and the deed of absolute sale were
prepared and executed under abnormal, unusual
and irregular circumstances which rendered the
documents null and void.
Defendants Rodolfo Fernandez et. al
appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals
which affirmed the trial court's judgment.
Appellants Rodolfo Fernandez et al filed their
motion for reconsideration which was denied in a
resolution dated May 17, 2000.
Issue: W/N THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THE
PETITIONERRODOLFO FERNANDEZ WAS NOT THE
CHILD OF SPOUSES DR. JOSE K. FERNANDEZ AND
GENEROSA DEVENECIA.
Held: The principal issue for resolution in this
case concerns the rights of the parties to the
conjugal property of the deceased spouses
Fernandez. Although respondents' principal action
was for the declaration of absolute nullity of two
documents, namely: deed of extra-judicial
partition and deed of absolute sale, and not an
action to impugn one's legitimacy. It is necessary
to pass upon the relationship of petitioner Rodolfo
Fernandez to the deceased spouses Fernandez for
the purpose of determining what legal right
Rodolfo has in the property subject of the extrajudicial partition.
We agree with the respondent court when
it found that petitioner Rodolfo failed to prove his
filiation with the deceased spouses Fernandez.
Such is a factual issue which has been thoroughly

passed upon and settled both by the trial court

and the appellate court. The respondent court
presented that The Records Management and
Archives Office lacks any proof of the birth
certificate of Rodolfo V. Fernandez alleged to have
been born on November 24, 1934 to the spouses
Jose. K. Fernandez and Generosa de Venecia. They
also contend that the Application for Recognition
of Back Pay Rights is a public document and a
conclusive proof of the legitimate filiation
between him and the deceases spouses; however
this document was not executed to admit the
filiation of Jose Fernandez with Rodolfo V.
Fernandez. Article 172 of the FC refers to the
written admission of filiation embodied in a public
document purposely executed as an admission of
filiation and not as obtaining, in this case, as an
application for the recognition of rights to back
pays. Rodolfo also claims that he enjoyed and
possessed the status of being a legitimate child of
the spouses openly and continually until they
died. However, possession of status of a child
does not in itself constitute acknowledgement; it
is only a ground for a child to compel recognition
by his assumed parent.
Rodolfo also presented a birth certificate
to further substantiate his claim as a legitimate
child of the spouses.
However, it may be argued that a
baptismal certificate is one of the other means
allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws of
proving filiation but in this case, the authenticity
of the baptismal certificated was doubtful
because a certificated was issued attesting that
the records were all damaged. Neither do family
portraits constitute proof of filiation. The appellant
did not acquire evidentiary weight to prove his
filiation.
As an effect, the extra-judicial partition
executed by him and Generosa de Venecia is null
and void.
In Re: Petition for change of name of Julian
Wang vs. Cebu City Civil Registrar
G.R. No. 155966

19
Facts: Petitioner Julian Lin Carulasan Wang, a
minor, represented by his mother Anna Lisa
Wang, filed a petition dated 19 September 2002
for change of name and/or correction/cancellation
of entry in the Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan
Wang. Petitioner sought to drop his middle name
and have his registered name changed from Julian
Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang. Petitioner
theorizes that it would be for his best interest to
drop his middle name as this would help him to
adjust more easily to and integrate himself into
Singaporean society.
Issue: Does the law allow one to drop the middle
name from his registered name on the cause
mentioned?
Ruling: The touchstone for the grant of a change
of name is that there be proper and reasonable
cause for which the change is sought. To justify a
request for change of name, petitioner must show
not only some proper or compelling reason
therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by
the use of his true and official name. Among the
grounds for change of name which have been
held valid are:
(a) when the name is ridiculous,
dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or
pronounce;
(b) when the change results as a legal
consequence, as in legitimation;
(c) when the change will avoid confusion;

(d) when one has continuously used and

been known since childhood by a Filipino name,
and was unaware
of alien parentage;
(e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino
name to erase signs of former alienage, all in
good faith and without prejudicing
anybody;
and
(f)
when
the
surname
causes
embarrassment and there is no showing that the
desired change of name
was
for
a
fraudulent purpose or that the change of name
would prejudice public interest.
In Re: In the matter of the adoption of
Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia, Honorato
Catindig
G.R. No. 148311
Facts: Honorato B. Catindig filed a petition to
adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie
Astorga Garcia. He averred that Stephanie was
born on June 26, 1994; that Stephanie had been
using her mothers middle name and surname;
and that he is now a widower and qualified to be
her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanies
middle name be changed to Garcia, her mothers
surname, and that her surname Garcia be
changed to Catindig his surname.
The RTC granted the petition for adoption,
and ordered that pursuant to article 189 of the

Family Code, the minor shall be known as

Stephanie Nathy Catindig.
Honorato filed a motion for classification
and/or reconsideration praying that Stephanie be
allowed to use the surname of her natural mother
(Garcia) as her middle name. The lower court
denied petitioners motion for reconsideration
holding that there is no law or jurisprudence
allowing an adopted child to use the surname of
his biological mother as his middle name.
Issue: Whether or not an illegitimate child may
use the surname of her mother as her middle
name when she is subsequently adopted by her
natural father.
Held: One of the effects of adoption is that the
adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of the
adapter for all intents and purposes pursuant to
Article 189 of the Family Code and Section 17 of
Article V of RA 8557.
Being a legitimate by virtue of her
adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all
the rights provided by law to a legitimate child
without discrimination of any kind, including the
right to bear the surname of her father and her
mother. This is consistent with the intention of the
members of the Civil Code and Family Law
Committees. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the
initial or surname of the mother should
immediately precede the surname of the father.