Magallona v.

Ermita
G.R No. 187167

August 16, 2011

Facts:
Republic Act 3046s purpose is to demarcate the maritime baselines of the
Philippines as it was deemed to be an archipelago. until 2009, it was
unchallenged, but the Congress amended it and passed RA 9522, w/c
shortened one baseline and determined new base points of the archipelago. it
has identified the Kalayaan Island Group and the Scarborough Shoal, as
"regimes of islands".
Petitioner argued that the law has reduced the maritime territory of the
country, art 1 being violated for it will allow for foreign aircrafts and vessels to
traverse the Philippine territory freely.
The Congress insisted that in no way will the amendments affect any
pertinent power of the state., the Congress believes that in the perspective of
international law, it did not see any binding obligation to honor it. Thus, this
case of prayer for writs of certiorari and prohibition is filed before the court,
assailing the constitutionality of RA 9522.
Issues:
1. Preliminarily
1. Whether petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit; and

2. Whether the writs of certiorari and prohibition are the proper

remedies to assail the constitutionality of RA 9522.
2. On the merits, whether RA 9522 is unconstitutional.
Ruling:
We hold that (1) petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit as citizens
and (2) the writs of certiorari and prohibition are proper remedies to test the
constitutionality of RA 9522. On the merits, we find no basis to declare RA
9522 unconstitutional.
The Court dismissed the case. It upheld the constitutionality of the law and
made it clear that it has merely demarcated the countrys maritime zones and
continental shelves in accordance to UNCLOS III.

Secondly, the Court found that the framework of the regime of islands
suggested by the law is not incongruent with the Philippines enjoyment of
territorial sovereignty over the areas of Kalayaan Group of Islands and the
Scarborough.
Third, the court reiterated that the claims over Sabah remained even with the
adoption of the amendments. Further, the Court importantly stressed that the
baseline laws are mere mechanisms for the UNCLOS III to precisely describe
the delimitations. It serves as a notice to the international family of states and
it is in no way affecting or producing any effect like enlargement or diminution
of territories.
With regard to the petitioners assertion that RA 9522 has converted the
internal waters into archipelagic waters, the Court did not appear to be
persuaded. Instead, the Court suggested that the political branches of
Government can pass domestic laws that will aid in the competent security
measures and policies that will regulate innocent passage.
Since the Court emphasized innocent passage as a right based on customary
law, it also believes that no state can validly invoke sovereignty to deny a right
acknowledged by modern states.
In the case of archipelagic states such as ours, UNCLOS III required the
imposition of innocent passage as a concession in lieu of their right to claim
the entire waters landward baseline. It also made it possible for archipelagic
states to be recognized as a cohesive entity under the UNCLOS III

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiffappellee, vs. EL MONTE DE PIEDAD Y CAJA DE AHORROS DE
MANILA, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-11524

October 12, 1916

Facts:
This is a petition to recover internal revenue taxes assessed on the monthly
deposits and the capital employed by the defendant bank in the business of
banking from the first day of August, 1904, to June 30, 1914, together with the
statutory penalties for refusing to pay the taxes as required by law.

Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros de Manila is an institution organized in

accordance with the canon law, having been created by the the royal order of
the King of Spain of July 8, 1880, made under the royal patronate powers then
existing in the Crown of Spain.
GPI argues that section 110 of Act No. 1189, known as the Internal Revenue
Law, and that, as such, it is subject to a tax of one-eighteenth of one per
centum each month upon the average amount of deposits of money, subject to
payment by check or draft, or represented by certificates of deposit or
otherwise, whether payable on demand or at some future day, imposed by
section 111 of said Act, and to a further tax of one-twenty-fourth of one per
centum each month upon the capital employed by the defendant in the
business of banking, imposed by paragraph 2 of said section 111.
The defendant seeks to escape the payment of the tax on its deposits by a claim
that it is a savings bank as denied by the exception contained in paragraph 4 of
section 111 which provides that:
The deposits in associations or companies known as provident institutions,
savings banks, savings funds, or savings institutions, having no capital
stock and which do no other business than receiving deposits to be loaned
or invested for the sole benefit of the parties making such deposits and
without profit or compensation to the association or company, shall be
exempt from this tax on so much of their deposits as such institutions have
invested in securities satisfactory to the Insular Treasurer, and on all
deposits, not exceeding four thousand pesos, made in the name of any
person.

Issues:
Whether MONTE DE PIEDAD is exempted from paying tax

Ruling:
The judgement appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the
appellant. So ordered.
The finding of the trial court that it did not fall within the exception
of the statute was correct.

It is undisputed in this case that the defendant is a profit making

institution, although it may not have been designed as such, and
that the profits derived from the investment or the deposits go and
belong to the institution itself. The only participation of the
depositors in the results of the business of the institution is the
right to a return of the deposits with interest at 4 per cent. In this
particular respect the defendant is not different from any other
banking institution.

Co Kim Cham v. Valdez

September 17, 1945
G.R. No. L-5
FERIA, J.
FACTS
Imperial Japanese Forces occupied the City of Manila. The Japanese Commander in Chief
proclaimed "the Military Administration under law over the districts occupied by the Army. It
was provided that "so far as the Military Administration permits, all the laws now in force in
the Commonwealth, as well as executive and judicial institutions, shall continue to be
effective for the time being as in the past," and "all public officials shall remain in their
present posts and carry on faithfully their duties as before."
A civil government or central administration organization under the name of "Philippine
Executive Commission was organized by Order No. 1 issued on January 23, 1942, by the
Commander in Chief of the Japanese Forces.
The Chairman of the Executive Commission issued Executive Orders Nos. 1 and 4, in which
the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Courts of First Instance, and the justices of the peace
and municipal courts under the Commonwealth were continued with the same jurisdiction.
On October 14, 1943, the so-called Republic of the Philippines was inaugurated, but no
substantial change was effected thereby in the organization and jurisdiction of the different
courts
On October 14, 1943, the so-called Republic of the Philippines was inaugurated, but no
substantial change was effected thereby in the organization and jurisdiction of the different
courts:
That the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines is, subject to the
supreme authority of the Government of the United States (areas of the Philippines
free of enemy occupation and control)
Laws now existing on the statute books of the Commonwealth of the Philippines and
the regulations promulgated pursuant thereto are in full force and effect and legally
binding upon the people in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and
control
Laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that
of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the
Philippines free of enemy occupation and control

City of Manila was partially liberated and on February 27, 1945, General MacArthur, on
behalf of the Government of the United States, solemnly declared "the full powers and
responsibilities under the Constitution restored to the Commonwealth whose seat is here
established as provided by law

ISSUES
1) Whether the judicial acts and proceedings of the court existing in the Philippines under the
Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines were good and valid
and remained so even after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the United
States and Filipino forces.
2) Whether the proclamation issued on October 23, 1944, by General Douglas MacArthur,
Commander in Chief of the United States Army, in which he declared "that all laws,
regulations and processes of any of the government in the Philippines than that of the said
Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of
enemy occupation and control," has invalidated all judgements and judicial acts and
proceedings of the said courts.
3) If the said judicial acts and proceedings have not been invalidated by said proclamation,
whether the present courts of the Commonwealth, which were the same court existing prior
to, and continued during, the Japanese military occupation of the Philippines, may continue
those proceedings pending in said courts at the time the Philippines were reoccupied and
liberated by the United States and Filipino forces, and the Commonwealth of the Philippines
were reestablished in the Islands.
RULING
First Issue (De Facto Governments)
It is a legal truism in political and international law that all acts and proceedings of the
legislative, executive, and judicial departments of a de facto government are good and valid.
The question to be determined is whether or not the governments established in these
Islands under the names of the Philippine Executive Commission and Republic of the
Philippines during the Japanese military occupation or regime were de facto governments. If
they were, the judicial acts and proceedings of those governments remain good and valid
even after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino
forces.
There are several kinds of de facto governments.
The first, or government de facto in a proper legal sense, is that government that
gets possession and control of, or usurps, by force or by the voice of the majority, the
rightful legal governments and maintains itself against the will of the latter, such as
the government of England under the Commonwealth, first by Parliament and later
by Cromwell as Protector.
The second is that which is established and maintained by military forces who invade
and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war, and which is denominated a
government of paramount force, as the cases of Castine, in Maine, which was
reduced to British possession in the war of 1812, and Tampico, Mexico, occupied
during the war with Mexico, by the troops of the United States.
And the third is that established as an independent government by the inhabitants of
a country who rise in insurrection against the parent state of such as the government
of the Southern Confederacy in revolt not concerned in the present case with the first
kind, but only with the second and third kinds of de facto governments.
Philippine Executive Commission, which was organized by Order No. 1, issued on January
23, 1942, by the Commander of the Japanese forces, was a civil government established by
the military forces of occupation and therefore a de facto government of the second kind. It

was not different from the government established by the British in Castine, Maine, or by the
United States in Tampico, Mexico.
According to the US case Thorington v. Smith, the second kind of government
de facto has distinguishing characteristics: Its distinguishing characteristics
are (1), that its existence is maintained by active military power with the
territories, and against the rightful authority of an established and lawful
government; and (2), that while it exists it necessarily be obeyed in civil
matters by private citizens who, by acts of obedience rendered in submission
to such force, do not become responsible, or wrongdoers, for those acts,
though not warranted by the laws of the rightful government.
The powers and duties of de facto governments of this description are regulated in Section III
of the Hague Conventions of 1907, which is a revision of the provisions of the Hague
Conventions of 1899 on the same subject of said Section III provides "the authority of the
legislative power having actually passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take
steps in his power to reestablish and insure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while
respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country."
According to the precepts of the Hague Conventions, as the belligerent occupant has the right and is
burdened with the duty to insure public order and safety during his military occupation, he possesses
all the powers of a de facto government, and he can suspended the old laws and promulgate new
ones and make such changes in the old as he may see fit

PEOPLE VS. VERA

G.R. No. L-45685, November 16 1937, 65 Phil. 56
FACTS:
Petitioners, People of the Philippines and Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC) are
respectively the plaintiff and the offended party, and Mariano Cu Unjieng is one of
the defendants, in the criminal case. Hon. Jose O. Vera, is the Judge ad interim of the seventh
branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila, who heard the application of Cu Unjieng
for probation. HSBC intervened in the case as private prosecutor. After a protracted trial, the
Court of First Instance rendered a judgment of conviction sentencing Cu Unjieng to indeterminate
penalty ranging from 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional to 8 years of prision mayor,
to pay the costs and with reservation of civil action to the offended party, HSBC.
Upon appeal, the court, on 26 March 1935, modified the sentence to an indeterminate penalty of
from 5 years and 6 months of prision correccional to 7 years, 6 months and 27 days of
prision mayor, but affirmed the judgment in all other respects. Cu Unjieng filed a motion for
reconsideration and four successive motions for new trial which were denied on 17 December
1935, and final judgment was accordingly entered on 18 December 1935. Cu Unjieng thereupon
sought to have the case elevated on certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States but the
latter denied the petition for certiorari in November, 1936. The Supreme Court, on 24 November
1936, denied the petition subsequently filed by Cu Unjieng for leave to file a second alternative
motion for reconsideration or new trial and thereafter remanded the case to the court of origin
for execution of the judgment.
FACTS:
Cu-Unjieng was convicted of criminal charges by the trial court of Manila. He filed a motion for
reconsideration and four motions for new trial but all were denied. He then elevated to the Supreme Court

of United States for review, which was also denied. The SC denied the petition subsequently filed by CuUnjieng for a motion for new trial and thereafter remanded the case to the court of origin for execution of
the judgment. CFI of Manila referred the application for probation of the Insular Probation Office which
recommended denial of the same. Later, 7th branch of CFI Manila set the petition for hearing. The Fiscal
filed an opposition to the granting of probation to Cu Unjieng, alleging, among other things, that Act No.
4221, assuming that it has not been repealed by section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution, is
nevertheless violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article III of the Constitution guaranteeing equal
protection of the laws. The private prosecution also filed a supplementary opposition, elaborating on the
alleged unconstitutionality on Act No. 4221, as an undue delegation of legislative power to the provincial
boards of several provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI, Constitution).
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is undue delegation of powers.
RULING:
Yes. SC conclude that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation of
legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for this reason, unconstitutional and void.
The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: "This Act shall apply only in
those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation
officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be
appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office."
The provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the Probation
Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and application of the Probation Act are
entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial board does not wish to have the Act
applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount for the salary of
a probation officer.
The clear policy of the law, as may be gleaned from a careful examination of the whole context, is to make
the application of the system dependent entirely upon the affirmative action of the different provincial
boards through appropriation of the salaries for probation officers at rates not lower than those provided
for provincial fiscals. Without such action on the part of the various boards, no probation officers would be
appointed by the Secretary of Justice to act in the provinces. The Philippines is divided or subdivided into
provinces and it needs no argument to show that if not one of the provinces and this is the actual
situation now appropriate the necessary fund for the salary of a probation officer, probation under Act
No. 4221 would be illusory. There can be no probation without a probation officer. Neither can there be a
probation officer without the probation system.

PHARMACEUTICAL AND HEALTH CARE ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINESvs.

HEALTH SECRETARY FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III
FACTS: On October 28, 1986, Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by
President Corazon Aquino by virtue of the legislative powers granted to the president
under the Freedom Constitution. The Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect to
Article 112 of the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a
code adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From 1982 to 2006, the
WHA adopted several Resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be supported,

promoted and protected, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims
are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes. the Philippines ratified the International
Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 24 of said instrument provides that State
Parties should take appropriate measures to diminish infant and child mortality, and
ensure that all segments of society, specially parents and children, are informed of the
advantages of breastfeeding. the DOH issued RIRR which was to take effect on July 7,
2006. a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify
Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of The Milk Code, assailing that the
RIRR was going beyond the provisions of the Milk Code, thereby amending and
expanding the coverage of said law.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents officers of the DOH acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and in violation of the provisions of the Constitution in promulgating the
RIRR
RULING:
The Supreme Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the petition. Sections 4(f), 11 and 46 of
Administrative Order No. 2006-0012 dated May 12, 2006 are declared NULL and VOID
for being ultra vires. The Department of Health and respondents are PROHIBITED
from implementing said provisions. The international instruments pointed out by the
respondents, UNRC, ICESR, CEDAW, are deemed part of the law of the land and
therefore the DOH may implement them through the RIRR. Customary international
law is deemed incorporated into our domestic system. Custom or customary
international law means a general and consistent practice of states followed by them
from a sense of legal obligation (opinio juris). Under the 1987 Constitution,
international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by
transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an
international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional
mechanism such as local legislation. Generally accepted principles of international law
refers to norms of general or customary international law which are binding on all
states. The Milk Code is a verbatim reproduction of the (ICMBS), but it did not prohibit
advertising or other forms of promotion to the general public of products. Instead, the
Milk Code expressly provides that advertising, promotion, or other marketing materials
may be allowed if such materials are duly authorized and approved by the Inter-Agency
Committee (IAC). In this regard, the WHA Resolutions adopting the ICMBS are merely
recommendatory and legally non-binding. This may constitute soft law or non-binding
norms, principles and practices that influence state behavior. Respondents have not
presented any evidence to prove that the WHA Resolutions, although signed by most of
the member states, were in fact enforced or practiced by at least a majority of the
member states and obligatory in nature. The provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot
be considered as part of the law of the land that can be implemented by executive
agencies without the need of a law enacted by the legislature. On the other hand, the
petitioners also failed to explain and prove by competent evidence just exactly how such
protective regulation would result in the restraint of trade. Since all the regulatory
provisions under the Milk Code apply equally to both manufacturers and distributors,
the Court sees no harm in the RIRR. Except Sections 4(f), 11 and 46, the rest of the
provisions of the RIRR are in consonance with the objective, purpose and intent of the
Milk Code.

BAYAN vs. ZAMORA

Facts:
The Philippines and the United States entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty on August 30, 1951, Under the
treaty, the parties agreed to respond to any external armed attack on their territory, armed forces, public
vessels, and aircraft.
On September 16, 1991, the Philippine Senate rejected the proposed RP-US Treaty of Friendship,
Cooperation and Security Thereafter, President Fidel Ramos approved the VFA, signed by Secretary Siazon
and United States Ambassador
On October 5, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada, ratified the VFA. On October 6, 1998, the President, acting
through respondent Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, officially transmitted to the Senate of the
Philippines,the ratification, for concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
Petitionerss fassail the constitutionality of the VFA that under they provision cited, the foreign military
bases, troops, or facilities may be allowed in the Philippines unless the following conditions are sufficiently
met: a) it must be a treaty,b) it must be duly concurred in by the senate, ratified by a majority of the votes
cast in a national referendum held for that purpose if so required by congress, and c) recognized as such by
the other contracting state.
Respondents, argue that Section 21 Article VII is applicable so that, what is requires for such treaty to be
valid and effective is the concurrence in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the senate.

Issue:
Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Section 21, Art VII or of Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution?

Ruling:
Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign military bases, troops or
facilities should apply in the instant case.
The 1987 Philippine Constitution contains two provisions requiring the concurrence of the Senate on treaties
or international agreements. Sec. 21 Art. VII, which respondent invokes, reads: No treaty or international
agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least 2/3 of all the Members of the Senate.
Sec. 25 Art. XVIII provides : After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the RP and the US
concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines
except under a treaty duly concurred in and when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of votes
cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the Senate
by the other contracting state.
The first cited provision applies to any form of treaties and international agreements in general with a wide
variety of subject matter. All treaties and international agreements entered into by the Philippines,
regardless of subject matter, coverage or particular designation requires the concurrence of the Senate to be
valid and effective.
In contrast, the second cited provision applies to treaties which involve presence of foreign military bases,
troops and facilities in the Philippines. Both constitutional provisions share some common ground. The fact
that the President referred the VFA to the Senate under Sec. 21 Art. VII, and that Senate extended its
concurrence under the same provision is immaterial.

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE v. LANTION

FACTS:
Secretary Of Justice Franklin Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines,
signed in Manila the extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Philippines and the
Government of the U.S.A. The Philippine Senate ratified the said Treaty.
On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S Note
Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jiminez to the
United States.
On the same day petitioner designate and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge of and to
handle the case. Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, Mark Jiminez through
counsel, wrote a letter to Justice Secretary requesting copies of the official extradition request from the
U.S Government and that he be given ample time to comment on the request after he shall have
received copies of the requested papers but the petitioner denied the request for the consistency of
Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty stated in Article 7 that the Philippine Government must
present the interests of the United States in any proceedings arising out of a request for extradition.
ISSUE: Whether or not to uphold a citizens basic due process rights or the governments ironclad duties
under a treaty.

RULING: Petition dismissed.

The human rights of person, whether citizen or alien , and the rights of the accused guaranteed in our
Constitution should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting state. The duties of
the government to the individual deserve preferential consideration when they collide with its treaty
obligations to the government of another state. This is so although we recognize treaties as a source of
binding obligations under generally accepted principles of international law incorporated in our
Constitution as part of the law of the land.
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situation in
which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provision of the
constitution or statute of the local state.
Petitioner (Secretary of Justice) is ordered to furnish Mark Jimenez copies of the extradition request and
its supporting papers, and to grant him (Mark Jimenez) a reasonable period within which to file his
comment with supporting evidence.
Under the Doctrine of Incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of the land and no
further legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable in the domestic sphere.
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situations in
which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the
constitution or statute of the local state.
Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be
presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted principles of
international law in observance of the incorporation clause in the above cited constitutional provision.
In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a
rule of international law and a municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be
upheld by the municipal courts, for the reason that such courts are organs of municipal law and are
accordingly bound by it in all circumstances.
The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply
the primacy of international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of

incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal
standing with, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex
posterior derogate priori takes effect a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty.
In states where the Constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines,
both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution

HE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST

REV. BISHOPVICENTE M. NAVARRA and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS
PERSONAL CAPACITY, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF
BACOLOD CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V. MAJARUCON, Respondents.
G.R. No. 205728

January 21, 2015

FACTS:
On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private
compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was
approximately six feet (6) by ten feet (10) in size. They were posted on the front walls
of the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the message IBASURA
RH Law referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354.
The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This tarpaulin contains the
heading Conscience Vote and lists candidates as either (Anti-RH) Team Buhay with
a check mark, or (Pro-RH) Team Patay with an X mark. The electoral candidates
were classified according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354,
otherwise known as the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were
classified by petitioners as comprising Team Patay, while those who voted against it
form Team Buhay.
Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by
any candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin contains names ofcandidates
for the 2013 elections, but not of politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law
but were not candidates for that election.
1.

Whether or not the tarpaulin and its message are considered religious speech.
No.
The Court held that the church doctrines relied upon by petitioners are
not binding upon this court. The position of the Catholic religion in the

Philippines as regards the RH Law does not suffice to qualify the posting by one
of its members of a tarpaulin as religious speech solely on such basis. The
enumeration of candidates on the face of the tarpaulin precludes any doubt as to
its nature as speech with political consequences and not religious speech.
Doctrine of benevolent neutrality
With religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility, benevolent
neutrality allows accommodation of religion under certain circumstances.
Accommodations are government policies that take religion specifically into account not
to promote the governments favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and
groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. Their purpose or effect therefore is
to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a persons or institutions religion.
Lemon test
2. It has a secular legislative purpose;
3. It neither advances nor inhibits religion; and
4. It does not foster an excessive entanglement with religion.

Mejoff vs Director of Prisons 90 Phil 70

Facts
Boris Mejoff, a Russian, was captured as a Japanese spy by the US Army Counter Intelligence Corps on March
18, 1948. He was turned over to the Phil Commonwealth Government for appropriate disposition, wc was
decided on by the Board of Commissioners of Immigration who declared him as an illegal alien and ordered his
immediate deportation. In the meantime, he was placed in prison awaiting the ship that will take him back home
Two years passed and Mejoff is still under detention awaiting the ship that will take him home.
This case is a petition for habeas corpus. However, the respondent held that the Mejoff should stay in
temporary detention as it is a necessary step in the process of exclusion or expulsion of undesirable aliens. It
further states that is has the right to do so for a reasonable length of time.

Issue
Whether or not Mejoff should be released from prison awaiting his deportation.

Ruling
The Supreme Court decided that Mejoff be released from custody but be placed under reasonable surveillance
of the immigration authorities to insure that he keep peace and be available when the Government is ready to
deport him. In the doctrine of incorporation, the Philippines in its constitution adops the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of Nations. Also, the Philippines has joined the United Nations
in its Resolution entitled Universal Declaration of Human Rights in proclaiming that life and liberty and all
other fundamental rights shall be applied to all human beings. The contention that he remains a threat of to the
security of the country is unfounded as Japan and the US or the Phils are no longer at war.

Gov. of Hongkong Special Administrative Region vs. Hon. Felixberto Olalia

G.R. No. 153675
Gov. of Hongkong Special Administrative Region vs. Hon. Felixberto Olalia
FACTS:
Juan Antonio Munoz, who was charged before the Hongkong Court with three (3) counts of the offense of
accepting an advantage as an agent, conspiracy to defraud, was penalized by a common law of
Hongkong. A warrant of arrest was issued and if convicted, he may face jail terms.
He was arrested and detained then, Hongkong Special Administrative Region filed with the RTC of Manila
a petition for his extradition.
Juan Antonio Munoz filed a petition for bail, which Judge Felixberto Olalia granted.
Petitioner (Hongkong Administrative), filed a petition to vacate such order, but it was denied by the same
judge.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Juan Antonio Munoz has the right to post bail when there is nothing in the Constitution or
Statutory law providing a potential extradite a right to bail.
HELD:
The Philippines committed to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity
of every person (Sec. 2 Art II 1987 Constitution) have the obligation to make available to every person
under detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty.
The right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail must be viewed in the light of the various treaty
obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights. Under
these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty.
While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extradite, however, there is no
provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, aright to due process under the Constitution.
The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines honor its obligations
under the Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hongkong Special Administrative Region. Failure to
comply with these obligations is a setback in our foreign relations and defeats the purpose of extradition.

SC's first Amparo case

FACTS:
Brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were abducted by military men belonging to the CAFGU on the
suspicion that they were members and supporters of the NPA. After 18 months of detention and torture,
the brothers escaped on August 13, 2007.
Ten days after their escape, they filed a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining
Order to stop the military officers and agents from depriving them of their right to liberty and other
basic rights. While the said case was pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect on October 24,
2007. The Manalos subsequently filed a manifestation and omnibus motion to treat their existing
petition as amparo petition.
On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals granted the privilege of the writ of amparo. The CA
ordered the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP to furnish the Manalos and
the court with all official and unofficial investigation reports as to the Manalos custody, confirm the
present places of official assignment of two military officials involved, and produce all medical reports
and records of the Manalo brothers while under military custody. The Secretary of National Defense and
the Chief of Staff of the AFP appealed to the SC seeking to reverse and set aside the decision
promulgated by the CA.
HELD:
In upholding the CA decision, the Supreme Court ruled that there is a continuing violation of the Manalos
right to security. xxx The Writ of Amparo is the most potent remedy available to any person whose right to
life, liberty, and security has been violated or is threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission by
public officials or employees and by private individuals or entities. xxx Understandably, since their escape,
the Manalos have been under concealment and protection by private citizens because of the threat to their
life, liberty, and security. The circumstances of respondents abduction, detention, torture and escape
reasonably support a conclusion that there is an apparent threat that they will again be abducted, tortured,
and this time, even executed. These constitute threats to their liberty, security, and life, actionable through
a petition for a writ of amparo, the Court explained. (GR No. 180906, The Secretary of National Defense v.
Manalo, October 7, 2008)

Cario v. CHR, 204 SCRA 483 (1991)

FACTS: On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school teacher, among
them the 8 herein private respondents who were members of the Manila Public School Teachers
Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook mass concerted actions to
dramatize and highlight their plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon
grievances that had time and again been brought to the latters attention.
The respondents were preventively suspended by the Secretary of Education. They complained to CHR.
ISSUE: WON CHR has the power to adjudicate alleged human rights violations

SSUE:
Whether or not CHR has the power to try and decide and determine certain specific
cases such as the alleged human rights violation involving civil and political rights.
HELD:
The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that
it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in
this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is

that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards
claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not
adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a
quasi-judicial agency or official. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence
and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority
of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be
decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or
modes of review as may be provided by law.

ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., represented by its President, Mr. Alan Igot,

Petitioner,
v.
COMMISSION
ON
ELECTIONS,
Respondent.
CARPIO,

J.:

FACTS:
52 party-list groups and organizations filed separate petitions totaling 54
with the Supreme Court (SC) in an effort to reverse various resolutions by the
Commission on Elections (Comelec) disqualifying them from the May 2013
party-list race. The Comelec, in its assailed resolutions issued in October,
November and December of 2012, ruled, among others, that these party-list
groups and organizations failed to represent a marginalized and
underrepresented sector, their nominees do not come from a marginalized
and underrepresented sector, and/or some of the organizations or groups are
not truly representative of the sector they intend to represent in Congress.
Petitioners argued that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from
participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their
new petitions for registration under the party-list system, or by cancellation
of their existing registration and accreditation as party-list organizations;
andsecond, whether the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid
down inAng Bagong Bayani and Barangay Association for National
Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on Elections(BANAT) should
be applied by the COMELEC in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
HELD: No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the
cases of Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT. However, the Supreme
Court remanded the cases back to the COMELEC as the Supreme
Court now provides for new guidelines which abandoned some
principles
established
in
the
two
aforestated
cases.

BANAT VS COMELEC

586 SCRA 210 Political Law Constitutional Law Legislative Department Party
List System; Proportional Representation; Proper Computation
Statutory Construction Rule in Interpreting the Constitution Intent of the Framers vs
Intent of the People
NOTE: This case is consolidated with BAYAN Muna vs COMELEC (G.R. No. 179295).
In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers,
made a partial proclamation of the winners in the party-list elections which was held in
May 2007.
In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the COMELEC considered the
following rules:
1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative districts, while the
remaining 20% shall come from party-list representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987
Constitution);
2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list which
garners at least 2% of the total votes cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled to
one seat;
3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it garners at least 6%,
then it is entitled to 3 seats this is pursuant to the 2-4-6 rule or thePanganiban
Formula from the case of Veterans Federation Party vs COMELEC.
4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if if garners more than
6% of the votes cast for the party-list election (3 seat cap rule, same case).
The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), a
party-list candidate, questioned the proclamation as well as the formula being used.
BANAT averred that the 2% threshold is invalid; Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is void because its
provision that a party-list, to qualify for a congressional seat, must garner at least 2% of
the votes cast in the party-list election, is not supported by the Constitution. Further, the
2% rule creates a mathematical impossibility to meet the 20% party-list seat prescribed
by the Constitution.
BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it mandatory. If it is
mandatory, then with the 2% qualifying vote, there would be instances when it would be

impossible to fill the prescribed 20% share of party-lists in the lower house. BANAT also
proposes a new computation (which shall be discussed in the HELD portion of this
digest).
On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions the validity of
the 3 seat rule (Section 11a of RA 7941). It also raised the issue of whether or not major
political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections or is the said
elections limited to sectoral parties.
ISSUES:
I. How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the seats in the lower house?
II. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mandatory or a mere
ceiling.
III. Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat valid.
IV. How are party-list seats allocated?
V. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list
elections.
VI. Whether or not the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule) is valid.
HELD:
I. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for every 5 seats allotted for
legislative districts, there shall be one seat allotted for a party-list representative.
Originally, the 1987 Constitution provides that there shall be not more than 250
members of the lower house. Using the 80-20 rule, 200 of that will be from legislative
districts, and 50 would be from party-list representatives. However, the Constitution also
allowed Congress to fix the number of the membership of the lower house as in fact, it
can create additional legislative districts as it may deem appropriate. As can be seen in
the May 2007 elections, there were 220 district representatives, hence applying the 8020 rule or the 5:1 ratio, there should be 55 seats allotted for party-list representatives.
How did the Supreme Court arrive at 55? This is the formula:
(Current Number of Legislative DistrictRepresentatives 0.80) x (0.20) = Number of
Seats Available to Party-List Representatives
Hence,

(220 0.80) x (0.20) = 55

II. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling meaning, the
number of party-list representatives shall not exceed 20% of the total number of the
members of the lower house. However, it is not mandatory that the 20% shall be filled.
III. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no constitutional basis to
allow that only party-lists which garnered 2% of the votes cast are qualified for a seat
and those which garnered less than 2% are disqualified. Further, the 2% threshold
creates a mathematical impossibility to attain the ideal 80-20 apportionment

V. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list garners 2% of the

votes cast, then it is guaranteed a seat, and not qualified. This allows
those party-lists garnering less than 2% to also get a seat.

ANG LADLAD VS. COMELEC

Facts:
Petitioner is a national organization which represents the lgbt community. lesbians,
gays, bisexuals, and trans-genders. It filed a petition for accreditation as a party-list
organization to public respondent. However, due to moral grounds, comelec denied the
said petition. To buttress their denial, COMELEC cited certain biblical and quranic
passages in their decision. It also stated that since their ways are immoral and contrary
to public policy, they are considered nuissance. In fact, their acts are even punishable
under the Revised Penal Code in its Article 201.
A motion for reconsideration being denied, Petitioner filed this instant Petition on
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the ROC.
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by
using religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment
of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions contravened its
constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of
laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines international obligations against
discrimination based on sexual orientation.
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and
genuine national political agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly
dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is not
among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner

made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national existence contrary
to actual verification reports by COMELECs field personnel.
Issue:
WON Respondent violated the Non-establishment clause of the Constitution;
WON Respondent erred in denying Petitioners application on moral and legal grounds.
Held:
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the
proposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said
sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be
registered under the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong BayaniOFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, the enumeration of marginalized and
under-represented sectors is not exclusive. The crucial element is not whether a sector
is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the
requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that [n]o law shall be made respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. At bottom, what
our non-establishment clause calls for is government neutrality in religious matters.
Clearly, governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of
neutrality. We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for
the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.
Be it noted that government action must have a secular purpose.
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why
special protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended
to justify its position that petitioners admission into the party-list system would be so
harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society.
We also find the COMELECs reference to purported violations of our penal and civil
laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a
nuisance as any act, omission, establishment, condition of property, or anything else
which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or morality, the remedies for which are a
prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or
abatement without judicial proceedings. A violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal
Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal
conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation of laws is
not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution
of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or culpability.

As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental
interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system.
The denial of Ang Ladlads registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a
statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any
substantial public interest.

PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC. (PGBI) represented by its Secretary

General George FGBF George Duldulao, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent
[G.R. No. 190529. April 29, 2010]
FACTS:
Respondent delisted petitioner, a party list organization, from the roster of registered
national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list
system through its resolution, denying also the latters motion for reconsideration, in
accordance with Section 6(8) of Republic Act No. 7941 (RA 7941), otherwise known as
the Party-List System Act, which provides:
Section 6. Removal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The COMELEC may motu
proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due
notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party,
organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:
x x x x
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least
two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2)
preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.[Emphasis supplied.]
Petitioner was delisted because it failed to get 2% of the votes cast in 2004 and it did
not participate in the 2007 elections. Petitioner filed its opposition to the resolution
citing among others the misapplication in the ruling of MINERO v. COMELEC, but was

denied for lack of merit. Petitioner elevated the matter to SC showing the excerpts from
the records of Senate Bill No. 1913 before it became the law in question.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the doctrine of judicial precedent applies in this case.

RULINGS:
Political Law
(1) No. The MINERO ruling is an erroneous application of Section 6(8) of RA 7941;
hence, it cannot sustain PGBIs delisting from the roster of registered national, regional
or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system. First, the law
is in the plain, clear and unmistakable language of the law which provides for two (2)
separate reasons for delisting. Second, MINERO is diametrically opposed to the
legislative intent of Section 6(8) of RA 7941, as PGBIs cited congressional deliberations
clearly show. MINERO therefore simply cannot stand.
ROMUALDEZ VS C
Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her domicile in
Tacloban, Leyte where she studied and graduated high school in the Holy Infant
Academy from 1938 to 1949. She then pursued her college degree, education,
in St. Pauls College now Divine Word University also in Tacloban. Subsequently,
she taught in Leyte Chinese School still in Tacloban. She went to manila during
1952 to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Romualdez in his office in
the House of Representatives. In 1954, she married late President Ferdinand
Marcos when he was still a Congressman of Ilocos Norte and was registered
there as a voter. When Pres. Marcos was elected as Senator in 1959, they lived
together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when
Marcos won presidency, they lived in Malacanang Palace and registered as a
voter in San Miguel Manila. She served as member of the Batasang Pambansa
and Governor of Metro Manila during 1978.
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of the
First District of Leyte for the 1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent
Representative of the First District of Leyte and also a candidate for the same

position, filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" with the

Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional
requirement for residency. The petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation, wrote
seven months under residency, which she sought to rectify by adding the words
"since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy filed on
March 29, 1995 and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her
domicile or residence. She arrived at the seven months residency due to the
fact that she became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa in said months.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement to be
eligible in running as representative of the First District of Leyte.
HELD:
Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The court
are in favor of a conclusion supporting petitoners claim of legal residence or
domicile in the First District of Leyte despite her own declaration of 7 months
residency in the district for the following reasons:
1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imeldas domicile
of origin by operation of law when her father brought them to Leyte;
2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of
domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and
establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose. In the
absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin should be deemed to
continue.
3. A wife does not automatically gain the husbands domicile because the term
residence in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law. When
Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin
and merely gained a new home and not domicilium necessarium.
4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired
right to choose a new one only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon
returning to the country clearly indicated that she chose Tacloban, her domicile
of origin, as her domicile of choice. To add, petitioner even obtained her
residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while living in her brothers
house, an act, which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested. She
even kept close ties by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her
birthdays and other important milestones.
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary
residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the
First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May
7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is
hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim
petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.

GARCILLANO vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, et.al G.R. No. 170338

December 23, 2008

Facts:
Tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped conversation purportedly between the
President of the Philippines and a high-ranking official of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) surfaced. The tapes, notoriously referred to as the "Hello
Garci" tapes, allegedly contained the Presidents instructions to COMELEC
Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to manipulate in her favor results of the 2004
presidential elections. These recordings were to become the subject of heated
legislative hearings conducted separately by committees of both Houses of
Congress.
Intervenor Sagge alleges violation of his right to due process considering that
he is summoned to attend the Senate hearings without being apprised not only
of his rights therein through the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, but also of the intended legislation
which underpins the investigation. He further intervenes as a taxpayer
bewailing the useless and wasteful expenditure of public funds involved in the
conduct of the questioned hearings.
The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on oral
argument that the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation had been published in newspapers of general circulation only in
1995 and in 2006. With respect to the present Senate of the 14th Congress,
however, of which the term of half of its members commenced on June 30,
2007, no effort was undertaken for the publication of these rules when they
first opened their session.
Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated
publication by arguing that the rules have never been amended since 1995
and, despite that, they are published in booklet form available to anyone for
free, and accessible to the public at the Senates internet web page.
Issue:

Whether or not publication of the Rules of Procedures Governing Inquiries in

Aid of Legislation through the Senates website, satisfies the due process
requirement of law.
Held:
The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of the Senate, or in
pamphlet form available at the Senate, is not sufficient under the Taada v.
Tuvera ruling which requires publication either in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation. The Rules of Procedure even provide that the
rules "shall take effect seven (7) days after publication in two (2) newspapers of
general circulation," precluding any other form of publication. Publication in
accordance with Taada is mandatory to comply with the due process
requirement because the Rules of Procedure put a persons liberty at risk. A
person who violates the Rules of Procedure could be arrested and detained by
the Senate.
The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792, otherwise
known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid
publication through the internet is all the more incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers
an electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional
equivalent of a written document only for evidentiary purposes. In other words,
the law merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being the
original) of electronic data messages and/or electronic documents. It does not
make the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations.
Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not,
in violation of the Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative
inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of
legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have caused the
publication of the rules, because it can do so only "in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure."

Senate v. Ermita
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has
abused power by issuing E.O. 464 regarding the Ensuring Observance of the
Principles of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege
and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries

in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and for Other Purposes.

Petitioners pray for its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional.
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its
various Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of
legislation which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and employees of
the executive department, bureaus, and offices including those employed in
Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).
The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the
Executive Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public
hearing on the railway project, others on the issues of massive election fraud in
the Philippine elections, wire tapping, and the role of military in the so-called
Gloriagate Scandal.
Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President
as provided by E.O. 464, Section 3 which requires all the public officials
enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to
appearing before either house of Congress.
ISSUE:
Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in
Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before
either house of Congress, valid and constitutional?
RULING:
No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the
executive privilege. The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact
that certain information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in
pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption
from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the
necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in
enforcing that obligation in a particular case.
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch
whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds
such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and
state the reason therefor and why it must be respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade
congressional requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right
to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of
invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation is frustrated.

G.R. No. 144104, June 29, 2004 [Constitutional Law - Article VI: Legislative
Department; Taxation ]
FACTS:
Petitioner is a non-stock, non-profit entity established by virtue of PD No. 1823,
seeks exemption from real property taxes when the City Assessor issued Tax
Declarations for the land and the hospital building. Petitioner predicted on its
claim that it is a charitable institution. The request was denied, and a petition
hereafter filed before the Local Board of Assessment Appeals of Quezon City
(QC-LBAA) for reversal of the resolution of the City Assessor. Petitioner alleged
that as a charitable institution, is exempted from real property taxes under Sec
28(3) Art VI of the Constitution. QC-LBAA dismissed the petition and the
decision was likewise affirmed on appeal by the Central Board of Assessment
Appeals of Quezon City. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the
CBAA.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not petitioner is a charitable institution within the context of PD
1823 and the 1973 and 1987 Constitution and Section 234(b) of RA 7160.
2. Whether or not petitioner is exempted from real property taxes.
RULING:
1. Yes. The Court hold that the petitioner is a charitable institution within the
context of the 1973 and 1987 Constitution. Under PD 1823, the petitioner is a
non-profit and non-stock corporation which, subject to the provisions of the
decree, is to be administered by the Office of the President with the Ministry of
Health and the Ministry of Human Settlements. The purpose for which it was
created was to render medical services to the public in general including those
who are poor and also the rich, and become a subject of charity. Under PD
1823, petitioner is entitled to receive donations, even if the gift or donation is in
the form of subsidies granted by the government.
2. Partly No. Under PD 1823, the lung center does not enjoy any property tax
exemption privileges for its real properties as well as the building constructed
thereon.
The property tax exemption under Sec. 28(3), Art. VI of the Constitution of the
property taxes only. This provision was implanted by Sec.243 (b) of RA
7160.which provides that in order to be entitled to the exemption, the lung
center must be able to prove that: it is a charitable institution and; its real

properties are actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable purpose.
Accordingly, the portions occupied by the hospital used for its patients are
exempt from real property taxes while those leased to private entities are not
exempt from such taxes.

Abra Valley College vs Aquino (G.R. No. L-39086)

FACTS: Petitioner, an educational corporation and institution of higher
learning duly incorporated with the Securities and Exchange Commission in
1948, filed a complaint to annul and declare void the Notice of Seizure and the
Notice of Sale of its lot and building located at Bangued, Abra, for nonpayment of real estate taxes and penalties amounting to P5,140.31. Said
Notice of Seizure by respondents Municipal Treasurer and Provincial
Treasurer, defendants below, was issued for the satisfaction of the said taxes
thereon.
The parties entered into a stipulation of facts adopted and embodied by the
trial court in its questioned decision. The trial court ruled for the government,
holding that the second floor of the building is being used by the director for
residential purposes and that the ground floor used and rented by Northern
Marketing Corporation, a commercial establishment, and thus the property is
not being used exclusively for educational purposes. Instead of perfecting an
appeal, petitioner availed of the instant petition for review on certiorari with
prayer for preliminary injunction before the Supreme Court, by filing said
petition on 17 August 1974.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lot and building are used exclusively for educational
purposes.
HELD: Section 22, paragraph 3, Article VI, of the then 1935 Philippine
Constitution, expressly grants exemption from realty taxes for cemeteries,
churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, and all lands,
buildings, and improvements used exclusively for religious, charitable or
educational purposes. Reasonable emphasis has always been made that the
exemption extends to facilities which are incidental to and reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the main purposes. The use of the school
building or lot for commercial purposes is neither contemplated by law, nor by
jurisprudence. In the case at bar, the lease of the first floor of the building to
the Northern Marketing Corporation cannot by any stretch of the imagination

be considered incidental to the purpose of education. The test of exemption

from taxation is the use of the property for purposes mentioned in the
Constitution.
The decision of the CFI Abra (Branch I) is affirmed subject to the modification
that half of the assessed tax be returned to the petitioner. The modification is
derived from the fact that the ground floor is being used for commercial
purposes (leased) and the second floor being used as incidental to education
(residence of the director).

First Lepanto Ceramics vs. CA [G.R. No. 110571, March

10, 1994]
Post under case digests, Political Law at Thursday, February 23, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind

Facts: The Omnibus Investments Code of 1981 as amended provided that appeals from
decisions of the Board of Investments (BOI) shall be the exclusive jurisdiction of the CA. Just a
few months after the 1987 Constitution took effect (July 17, 1987), the Omnibus Investments
Code of 1987 (EO 226) was promulgated which provided in Art 82 thereof that such appeals be
directly filed with the SC. The SC later promulgated, under its rule-making power, Circular No. 191 which confirmed that jurisdiction of the CA over appeals from the decisions of the BOI. SCs
Second Division, relying on said Circular, accordingly sustained the appellate jurisdiction of the
CA in this present case. Petitioner now move to reconsider and question the Second Divisions
ruling which provided:

.although the right to appeal granted by Art 82 of EO 226 is a substantive right which cannot
be modified by a rule of procedure, nonetheless, questions concerning where and in what
manner the appeal can be brought are only matters of procedure which this Court hast he
power to regulate.
They contend that Circular No. 191 (a rule of procedure) cannot be deemed to have superseded
Art 82 of EO 226 (a legislation).

Issue: Was the Court correct in sustaining the appellate jurisdictionof the CA in decisions from
the Board of Investments?
Held: Yes. EO 226 was promulgated after the 1987 Constitution took effect February 2, 1987.
Thus, Art 82 of EO 226, which provides for increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the SC, is
invalid and therefore never became effective for the concurrence of the Court was no sought in
its enactment. Thus, the Omnibus Investments Code of 1981 as amended still stands. The
exclusive jurisdiction on appeals from decisions of the BOI belongs to the CA.

Brillantes vs. Comelec

, GR 163193, June 15, 2004
FACTS: Congress enacted RA 8436 authorizing COMELEC to use an automated election system
for the process of voting, counting of votes and canvassing/consolidation the results of national
and local elections. COMELEC subsequently approved Resolution 6712 adopting the policy that
the precinct election results of each city and municipality shall be immediately transmitted
electronically in advance to the COMELEC in Manila.
Petitioners in this case questioned, among others, the Constitutionality of the quickcount as
being pre-emptive of the authority vested in Congress to canvass the votes for the President and
Vice-President under Article VII, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE: Can the COMELEC conduct unofficial tabulation of presidential election results based
on a copy of the election returns?
RULING: No. The assailed resolution usurps, under the guise of an unofficial tabulation of
election results based on a copy of the election returns, the sole and exclusive authority of
Congress to canvass the votes for the election of President and Vice-President.
The contention of the COMELEC that its tabulation of votes is not prohibited by the
Constitution and Rep. Act No. 8436 as such tabulation is unofficial, is puerile and totally
unacceptable. If the COMELEC is proscribed from conducting an official canvass of the votes
cast for the President and Vice-President, the COMELEC is, with more reason, prohibited from
making an unofficial canvass of said votes

ESTRADA VS DESIERTO; ARROYO

Posted by kaye lee on 2:48 AM

Estrada vs Desierto G.R. No. 146710-15; Estrada vs Arroyo G.R. No. 146738, March
2 2001

[Immunity from Suit; Resignation of the President; Justiciable controversy]

FACTS:
It began in October 2000 when allegations of wrong doings involving bribe-taking,
illegal gambling, and other forms of corruption were made against Estrada before
the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. On November 13, 2000, Estrada was
impeached by the Hor and, on December 7, impeachment proceedings were begun
in the Senate during which more serious allegations of graft and corruption against
Estrada were made and were only stopped on January 16, 2001 when 11 senators,
sympathetic to the President, succeeded in suppressing damaging evidence against
Estrada. As a result, the impeachment trial was thrown into an uproar as the entire
prosecution panel walked out and Senate President Pimentel resigned after casting
his vote against Estrada.

On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their support for Estrada and joined
the crowd at EDSA Shrine. Estrada called for a snap presidential election to be held
concurrently with congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that
he will not run in this election. On January 20, SC declared that the seat of
presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada constructively resigned his post. At
noon, Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA as the
14th President. Estrada and his family later left Malacaang Palace. Erap, after his
fall, filed petition for prohibition with prayer for WPI. It sought to enjoin the
respondent Ombudsman from conducting any further proceedings in cases filed
against him not until his term as president ends. He also prayed for judgment
confirming Estrada to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the
Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office.

ISSUE(S):
1. WoN the petition presents a justiciable controversy.
2. WoN Estrada resigned as President.
3. WoN Arroyo is only an acting President.
4. WoN the President enjoys immunity from suit.
5. WoN the prosecution of Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity.

RULING:

1. Political questions- "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of

the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
legality of a particular measure."
Legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power II:
EDSA I

EDSA II

exercise of the people power

of revolution which overthrew
the whole government.

exercise of people power of

freedom of speech and
freedom of assemblyto
petition the government for
redress of grievances which
only affected the office of the
President.

extra constitutional and the

legitimacy of the new
government that resulted from
it cannot be the subject of
judicial review

presented a political
question;

intra constitutional and the

resignation of the sitting
President that it caused and
the succession of the Vice
President as President are
subject to judicial review.
involves legal questions.

The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for
resolution require the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987
Constitution: Sec 1 of Art II, and Sec 8 of Art VII, and the allocation of governmental
powers under Sec 11 of Art VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of
presidential immunity from suit. They also involve the correct calibration of the right
of petitioner against prejudicial publicity.

2. Elements of valid resignation: (a)an intent to resign and (b) acts of

relinquishment. Both were present when President Estrada left the Palace.
Totality of prior contemporaneous posterior facts and circumstantial evidence
bearing material relevant issuesPresident Estrada is deemed to have resigned
constructive resignation.
SC declared that the resignation of President Estrada could not be doubted as
confirmed by his leaving Malacaan Palace. In the press release containing his final
statement:
1. He acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President;
2. He emphasized he was leaving the Palace for the sake of peace and in order to
begin the healing process (he did not say that he was leaving due to any kind of
disability and that he was going to reassume the Presidency as soon as the
disability disappears);

3. He expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them as
President (without doubt referring to the past opportunity);
4. He assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come in the
same service of the country;
5. He called on his supporters to join him in promotion of a constructive national
spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
Intent to resignmust be accompanied by act of relinquishmentact or omission
before, during and after January 20, 2001.

3. The Congress passed House Resolution No. 176 expressly stating its support to
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines and
subsequently passed H.R. 178 confirms the nomination of Teofisto T. Guingona Jr. As
Vice President. Senate passed HR No. 83 declaring the Impeachment Courts as
Functius Officio and has been terminated. It is clear is that both houses of Congress
recognized Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise
that the inability of Estrada is no longer temporary as the Congress has clearly
rejected his claim of inability.
The Court therefore cannot exercise its judicial power for this is political in nature
and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. In fine, even if Estrada can
prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President
on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim
has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that Arroyo is the de jure,
president made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this
Court.

4. The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder,
bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes,
especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged
mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. He cannot cite any decision of this
Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with posttenure immunity from liability. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are
not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but
stands in the same footing as any trespasser.

5. No. Case law will tell us that a right to a fair trial and the free press are
incompatible. Also, since our justice system does not use the jury system, the judge,
who is a learned and legally enlightened individual, cannot be easily manipulated by
mere publicity. The Court also said that Estrada did not present enough evidence to
show that the publicity given the trial has influenced the judge so as to render the
judge unable to perform. Finally, the Court said that the cases against Estrada were
still undergoing preliminary investigation, so the publicity of the case would really

have no permanent effect on the judge and that the prosecutor should be more
concerned with justice and less with prosecution.

VILLENA VS SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR

Posted by kaye lee on 10:39 PM
G.R. No. L-46570 April 21 1939

FACTS:
Division of Investigation of the DOJ, upon the request of the Secretary of the
Interior, conducted an inquiry into the conduct of the Villena, mayor of Makati, Rizal,
as a result of which the latter was found to have committed bribery, extortion,
malicious abuse of authority ad unauthorized practice of the law profession. The
respondent recommended the suspension of Villena to the President of the
Philippines, in which it was verbally granted. The Secretary then suspended Villena
from office. Villena filed a petition for preliminary injunction against the Sec. to
restrain him and his agents from proceeding with the investigation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Secretary of the Interior has jurisdiction or authority to suspend
and order investigation over Villena.

RULING:
The Secretary of Interior has the power to order investigation and to suspend Mayor
Villena. As to the power to order investigation, it was provided in Section 79 (C) of
RAC that Department of Interior was given the authority to supervise bureaus and
offices under its jurisdiction. This was interpreted in relation to Section 86 of the
same Code which granted the said Department of executive supervision over
administration of provinces, municipalities and other political subdivisions. This
supervision covers the power to order investigation because supervision implies
authority to inquire into facts and conditions in order to render power real and
effective.However, unlike this power to order investigation, the power to suspend a
mayor was not provided in any law. There was no express grant of authority to the
Secretary of Interior to suspend a Mayor. Nevertheless, Section 2188 of the
Administrative Code granted the provincial governor the power of suspension. Yet
this did not mean that the grant precluded the Secretary of Interior.

The Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency which provides that the acts of the
department secretaries, performed and promulgated in the regular course of
business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the President, presumptively the
acts of the President. The power to suspend may be exercised by the President. It
follows that the heads of the Department under her may also exercise the same,
unless the law required the President to act personally or that situation demanded
him so, because the heads of the departments are assistants and agents of the President.

Sanlakas vs. Reyes

G.R. No. 159085, Feb. 3, 2004
FACTS:
In the wake of the Oakwood Incident, the President issued Proc. 427 and G.O.
4, both declaring a state of rebellion and calling out the AFP to suppress
the rebellion. After hours-long negotiations, the Oakwood occupation ended
and the president lifted the declaration of a state of rebellion.
ISSUE:
o

Whether or not the declaration of a state of rebellion is

constitutional
RULING:
Presidents Commander-in-Chief Powers
The above provision grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a
sequence of graduated power[s]. From the most to the least benign,
these are: the calling out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare martial law. In the exercise
of the latter two powers, the Constitution requires the concurrence of two
conditions, namely, an actual invasion or rebellion, and that public safety
requires the exercise of such power. However, as we observed in Integrated
Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, [t]hese conditions are not required in the
exercise of the calling out power. The only criterion is that whenever it
becomes necessary, the President may call the armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
Nevertheless, it is equally true that Section 18, Article VII does not expressly
prohibit the President from declaring a state of rebellion. Note that the

Constitution vests the President not only with Commander-in-Chief powers

but, first and foremost, with Executive powers.

Gudani vs. Senga G.R. 170165 (2006)

Facts of the Case:

Senator Biazon invited senior officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)
including General Gudani to appear before a public hearing in the Senate Committee on
National Defense and Security wherein Hello Garci controversy of President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo emerged. Upon the discretion of the President, AFP Chief of Staff Senga
issued a memorandum prohibiting General Gudani and company from appearing before the
Senate Committee without Presidential approval. However, General Gudani and Colonel
Batulan still attended the said committee in compliance with Senator Biazon.

Issue:

Can the President can prevent military officers from testifying a legislative inquiry?

Court Ruling:

YES. By virtue of her power as a commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of the

Philippines, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo has the constitutional authority to prohibit
members
of
the
AFP
from
attending
a
Senate
hearing.
This is also under her prerogative as the highest official of the AFP. Note that it is not an
invocation of her executive privilege, but on the Chief Executive's power to control the
actions and speech of the members of the AFP. Non-compliance of the military
subordinates would violate the principle that 'the civilian authority is supreme over the
military authority'.

BELGICA VS OCHOA

710 SCRA 1 Political Law Constitutional Law Local Government Invalid

Delegation
Legislative Department Invalid Delegation of Legislative Power
This case is consolidated with G.R. No. 208493 and G.R. No. 209251.
The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the Philippines since about
1922. Pork Barrel is commonly known as the lump-sum, discretionary funds of
the members of the Congress. It underwent several legal designations from
Congressional Pork Barrel to the latest Priority Development Assistance
Fund orPDAF. The allocation for the pork barrel is integrated in the
annual General Appropriations Act (GAA).
Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in the following manner:
a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken down to P40
million for hard projects (infrastructure projects like roads, buildings, schools,
etc.), and P30 million for soft projects (scholarship grants, medical assistance,
livelihood programs, IT development, etc.);
b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to P100 million for hard
projects, P100 million for soft projects;
c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to P100 million for hard
projects, P100 million for soft projects.
The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of funds whereby
certain cabinet members may request for the realignment of funds into their
department provided that the request for realignment is approved or concurred
by the legislator concerned.
Presidential Pork Barrel
The president does have his own source of fund albeit not included in the GAA.
The so-called presidential pork barrel comes from two sources: (a)
the Malampaya Funds, from the Malampaya Gas Project this has been around
since 1976, and (b) the Presidential Social Fund which is derived from the
earnings of PAGCOR this has been around since about 1983.
Pork Barrel Scam Controversy
Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations of
corruption. In July 2013, six whistle blowers, headed by Benhur Luy, exposed
that for the last decade, the corruption in the pork barrel system had been

facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles had been helping lawmakers in

funneling their pork barrel funds into about 20 bogus NGOs (non-government
organizations) which would make it appear that government funds are being
used in legit existing projects but are in fact going to ghost projects. An audit
was then conducted by the Commission on Audit and the results thereof
concurred with the exposes of Luy et al.
Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed various
petitions before the Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of the pork
barrel system.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is constitutional.
II. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is constitutional.
HELD:
I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional.
unconstitutional because it violates the following principles:

It

is

a. Separation of Powers
As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the release of funds
(power of the purse). The executive, on the other hand, implements the laws
this includes the GAA to which the PDAF is a part of. Only the executive may
implement the law but under the pork barrel system, whats happening was
that, after the GAA, itself a law, was enacted, the legislators themselves dictate
as to which projects their PDAF funds should be allocated to a clear act of
implementing the law they enacted a violation of the principle of separation of
powers. (Note in the older case of PHILCONSA vs Enriquez, it was ruled that pork
barrel, then called as CDF or the Countrywide Development Fund, was
constitutional insofar as the legislators only recommend where their pork barrel
funds go).
This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the PDAF, the executive will
still have to get the concurrence of the legislator concerned.
b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power
As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in Congress alone. (The
Constitution does grant the people legislative power but only insofar as the
processes of referendum and initiative are concerned). That being, legislative

power cannot be delegated by Congress for it cannot delegate further that

which was delegated to it by the Constitution.
Exceptions to the rule are:
(i) delegated legislative power to local government units but this shall involve
purely local matters;
(ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper
to carry out a declared national policy in times of war or other national
emergency, or fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and
restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas,
tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework
of the national development program of the Government.
In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator to identify the
projects to which his PDAF money should go to is a violation of the rule on nondelegability of legislative power. The power to appropriate funds is solely lodged
in Congress (in the two houses comprising it) collectively and not lodged in the
individual members. Further, nowhere in the exceptions does it state that the
Congress can delegate the power to the individual member of Congress.
c. Principle of Checks and Balances
One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the power of the president
to veto items in the GAA which he may deem to be inappropriate. But this power
is already being undermined because of the fact that once the GAA is approved,
the legislator can now identify the project to which he will appropriate his PDAF.
Under such system, how can the president veto the appropriation made by the
legislator if the appropriation is made after the approval of the GAA
again, Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting which effectively renders
the constitutionally-given power of the President useless.
d. Local Autonomy
As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage their local affairs.
Through their Local Development Councils (LDCs), the LGUs can develop their
own programs and policies concerning their localities. But with the PDAF,
particularly on the part of the members of the house of representatives, whats
happening is that a congressman can either bypass or duplicate a project by the
LDC and later on claim it as his own. This is an instance where the national
government (note, a congressman is a national officer) meddles with the affairs
of the local government and this is contrary to the State policy embodied in
the Constitution on local autonomy. Its good if thats all that is happening under

the pork barrel system but worse, the PDAF becomes more of a personal fund on
the part of legislators.
II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid.
The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the presidential pork barrel is that
it is unconstitutional because it violates Section 29 (1), Article VI of the
Constitution which provides:
No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of
an appropriation made by law.
Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes from the earnings of
the Malampaya and PAGCOR and not from any appropriation from a particular
legislation.
The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created the
Malampaya Fund, as well as PD 1869 (as amended by PD 1993), which
amended PAGCORs charter, provided for the appropriation, to wit:
(i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others, collected from
certain energy-related ventures shall form part of a special fund (the Malampaya
Fund) which shall be used to further finance energy resource development and
for other purposes which the President may direct;
(ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a part of PAGCORs
earnings shall be allocated to a General Fund (the Presidential Social Fund)
which shall be used in government infrastructure projects.
These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of Section 29, Article VI of
the Constitution. The appropriation contemplated therein does not have to be a
particular appropriation as it can be a general appropriation as in the case of PD
910 and PD 1869.

DE CASTRO VS JBC

Maria Carolina Araullo vs

Benigno Aquino III

hen President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed

the sluggish growth of the economy. The World Bank advised that the economy
needed a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary Florencio Butch Abad then came up
with a program called the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP).
The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects.
DAP enables the Executive to realign funds from slow moving projects to priority
projects instead of waiting for next years appropriation. So what happens under
the DAP was that if a certain government project is being undertaken slowly by a
certain executive agency, the funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the
Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds are declared as savings by the
Executive and said funds will then be reallotted to other priority projects. The
DAP program did work to stimulate the economy as economic growth was in fact
reported and portion of such growth was attributed to the DAP (as noted by the
Supreme Court).
Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the General
Appropriations Act (GAA). Unprogrammed funds are standby appropriations
made by Congress in the GAA.
Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an expos
claiming that he, and other Senators, received Php50M from the President as an
incentive for voting in favor of the impeachment of then Chief Justice Renato
Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that the money was taken from the DAP but
was disbursed upon the request of the Senators.
This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not
only realign funds within the Executive. It turns out that some non-Executive
projects were also funded; to name a few: Php1.5B for the CPLA (Cordillera
Peoples Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro National Liberation
Front), P700M for the Quezon Province, P50-P100M for certain Senators each,
P10B for Relocation Projects, etc.
This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang
Makabayan, and several other concerned citizens to file various petitions with
the Supreme Court questioning the validity of the DAP. Among their contentions
was:
DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which provides
that no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law.

Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly the
GAA (savings and augmentation provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the
Constitution (power of the President to augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of Executive
Order 292 (power of the President to suspend expenditures and authority to use
savings, respectively).
Issues:
I. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle no money shall be paid out of
the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law (Sec. 29(1),
Art. VI, Constitution).
II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as impoundments by
the executive.
III. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.
IV. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is
constitutional.
V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.
HELD:
I. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was
merely a program by the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It
is a program for prioritizing government spending. As such, it did not violate the
Constitutional provision cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. In DAP
no additional funds were withdrawn from the Treasury otherwise, an
appropriation made by law would have been required. Funds, which were
already appropriated for by the GAA, were merely being realigned via the DAP.
II. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of funds
refers to the Presidents power to refuse to spend appropriations or to retain or
deduct appropriations for whatever reason. Impoundment is actually prohibited
by the GAA unless there will be an unmanageable national government budget
deficit (which did not happen). Nevertheless, theres no impoundment in the
case at bar because whats involved in the DAP was the transfer of funds.
III. No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that
the President (and even the heads of the other branches of the government) are
allowed by the Constitution to make realignment of funds, however, such
transfer or realignment should only be made within their respective offices.
Thus, no cross-border transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under the
DAP, this was violated because funds appropriated by the GAA for the Executive
were being transferred to the Legislative and other non-Executive agencies.
Further, transfers within their respective offices also contemplate realignment
of funds to an existing project in the GAA. Under the DAP, even though some
projects were within the Executive, these projects are non-existent insofar as the
GAA is concerned because no funds were appropriated to them in the GAA.
Although some of these projects may be legitimate, they are still non-existent
under the GAA because they were not provided for by the GAA. As such, transfer
to such projects is unconstitutional and is without legal basis.

On the issue of what are savings

These DAP transfers are not savings contrary to what was being declared by
the Executive. Under the definition of savings in the GAA, savings only occur,
among other instances, when there is an excess in the funding of a certain
project once it is completed, finally discontinued, or finally abandoned. The GAA
does not refer to savings as funds withdrawn from a slow moving project.
Thus, since the statutory definition of savings was not complied with under the
DAP, there is no basis at all for the transfers. Further, savings should only be
declared at the end of the fiscal year. But under the DAP, funds are already
being withdrawn from certain projects in the middle of the year and then being
declared as savings by the Executive particularly by the DBM.
IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money source for
the DAP because under the law, such funds may only be used if there is a
certification from the National Treasurer to the effect that the revenue
collections have exceeded the revenue targets. In this case, no such certification
was secured before unprogrammed funds were used.
V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects of an
act prior to it being declared as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is
applicable. The DAP has definitely helped stimulate the economy. It has funded
numerous projects. If the Executive is ordered to reverse all actions under the
DAP, then it may cause more harm than good. The DAP effects can no longer be
undone. The beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked to return what they
received especially so that they relied on the validity of the DAP. However, the
Doctrine of Operative Fact may not be applicable to the authors, implementers,
and proponents of the DAP if it is so found in the appropriate tribunals (civil,
criminal, or administrative) that they have not acted in good faith.

Bengzon vs Drilon (G.R. No. 103524)

Posted: July 25, 2011 in Case Digests

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Veto Power of the President

FACTS: On 15 Jan 1992, some provisions of the Special Provision for the Supreme Court and the Lower
Courts General Appropriations were vetoed by the President because a resolution by the Court
providing for appropriations for retired justices has been enacted. The vetoed bill provided for the
increase of the pensions of the retired justices of the Supreme Court, and the Court of Appeals as well
as members of the Constitutional Commission.

ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion of the General Appropriations bill is
constitutional.

HELD: The Justices of the Court have vested rights to the accrued pension that is due to them in
accordance to Republic Act 1797. The president has no power to set aside and override the decision of
the Supreme Court neither does the president have the power to enact or amend statutes promulgated
by her predecessors much less to the repeal of existing laws. The veto is unconstitutional since the
power of the president to disapprove any item or items in the appropriations bill does not grant the
authority to veto part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of said item.

NOTES: Pocket Veto Not Allowed

Under the Constitution, the President does not have the so-called pocket-veto power, i.e., disapproval
of a bill by inaction on his part. The failure of the President to communicate his veto of any bill
represented to him within 30 days after the receipt thereof automatically causes the bill to become a
law.
This rule corrects the Presidential practice under the 1935 Constitution of releasing veto messages
long after he should have acted on the bill. It also avoids uncertainty as to what new laws are in force.