11.0 Berkenkotter v CA | G.R. No.

L-36629 | September 28, 1973

FACTS: Petitioner herein filed on June 13, 1972, (within the 30-day reglementary period) his
notice of appeal, appeal bond and an ex parte motion for extension of five days from June 13th to
file the record on appeal. Before the expiration of the time asked, or on June 15, 1972, he filed
his record on appeal which was approved by the Court after defendant's objection and hearing
thereof on November 14, 1972. Admittedly the court neither approved nor denied the ex parte
motion for extension of time to file record on appeal.
ISSUE: Whether the delay in filing the record on appeal warrant its disapproval and the
consequent denial of his appeal.
RULING: In the case at bar, petitioner filed his record on appeal within the period of time
requested and although no order of approval nor denial of the ex parte motion for extension was
issued, the Order of the Court on November 14, 1972, approving the notice of appeal, appeal
bond and record on appeal amounts to and should be construed as a ratification or approval of
the motion for extension. It has always been the view of this Court that the period within which
the record on appeal and appeal bond should be perfected and filed, may, however, be extended
by order of the court, upon application made, prior to the expiration of the original period. What
decisively matters is that the motion for extension of time to file the record on appeal is filed
before the expiration of the 30-day period prescribed by the rules.
The mere absence of a formal order granting the motion for extension of time to file the
record on appeal should not be fatal to the petitioner if the record on appeal filed within the
requested extension period was approved by the Court a quo. As previously stated, the approval
thereof carries with it the approval of the motion for extension and the mere failure of the record
on appeal to show such approval should not defeat the right to appeal. No trial Judge in his right
mind and who is aware of the serious responsibilities of his office, would approve a record on
appeal that was not timely filed. There every reason, therefore, to apply the principle of
substantial justice to the instant case for the following consideration first, the court is given the
discretion to extend the period for filing the record on appeal, notice of appeal and appeal bond,
provided the notice for extension of time is filed within the 30-day reglementary period; second,
there is every reason to assume that the record on appeal was "filed on time" because it was
approved after due hearing by the Court in its Order dated November 14, 1972; and last, but not
the least, considering the merits of the case, to dismiss petitioners appeal would not serve the
ends of justice.

11.1 Ruby Shelter Builders v Formaran | G.R. No. 175914 | February 10, 2009
FACTS: Petitioner obtained a loan from respondents Tan and Obiedo, secured by real estate
mortgages over five parcels of land in the name of petitioner. When petitioner was unable to pay
the loan when it became due and demandable, respondents Tan and Obiedo agreed to an
extension of the same.
Without payment having been made by petitioner in the extended time, respondents Tan
and Obiedo presented the Deeds of Absolute Sale before the Register of Deeds.
Later on, petitioner filed before the RTC a Complaint against respondents Tan, Obiedo,
and Atty. Reyes (one who notarized the Deed of Sale), for declaration of nullity of deeds of sales
and damages.
Upon filing its Complaint with the RTC, petitioner paid the sum of P13,644.25 for docket
and other legal fees, as assessed by the Office of the Clerk of Court. The Clerk of Court initially
considered the Civil Case as an action incapable of pecuniary estimation and computed the
docket and other legal fees due thereon according to Section 7(b)(1), Rule 141 of the Rules of
Court.
Tan filed before the RTC an Omnibus Motion in which he contended that the civil case
involved real properties, the docket fees for which should be computed in accordance with
Section 7(a), not Section 7(b)(1), of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended. Since petitioner
did not pay the appropriate docket fees for the civil case, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction
over the said case. Hence, respondent Tan asked the RTC to issue an order requiring RSB to pay
the correct and accurate docket fees and should RSB fail to do so, to deny and dismiss the case.
RTC ordered RSB to pay additional filing fee and Tan was also ordered to pay docket and
filing fees on his counterclaim.
CA upheld RTC.
ISSUE: For the purposes of paying the correct amount of docket fees, whether or not the
annulment of deed of sale involving a real property is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
RULING: No. Case is a real action. No matter how fastidiously RSB attempts to conceal them,
the allegations and reliefs it sought in its Complaint appears to be ultimately a real action,
involving as they do the recovery by RSM of its title to and possession of the five parcels of land
from Tan and Obiedo.
Considering that the complaint is a real action, the Rule requires that "the assessed value
of the property, or if there is none, the estimated value thereof shall be alleged by the claimant
and shall be the basis in computing the fees.
A real action indisputably involves real property. The docket fees for a real action would
still be determined in accordance with the value of the real property involved therein; the only
difference is in what constitutes the acceptable value. In computing the docket fees for cases
involving real properties, the courts, instead of relying on the assessed or estimated value, would
now be using the fair market value of the real properties (as stated in the Tax Declaration or the
Zonal Valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, whichever is higher) or, in the absence
thereof, the stated value of the same.