Extinguishment of Easement

Tanedo v. Bernad, 165 SCRA 86

FACTS: Cardenas was the original owner of Lot A and B on which he constructed an
apartment, a house, a bodega and a septic tank for common use of the occupants
of the two lots. Later, he sold Lot A and mortgaged Lot B to Taedo with the
agreement that Cardenas would sell Lot B only to Taedo in case he should decide
to sell it. However, Cardenas sold Lot B to the spouses Sim who blocked the sewage
pipe connecting the building on Lot A to the septic tank, and asked Taedo to
remove that portion of his building enroaching on Lot B. Taedo filed an action for
legal redemption and damages. The spouses Sim claimed that Taedo has no right
to redeem the land because it is much bigger than the land owned by Taedo. On
the other hand, Cardenas admitted that he had agreed to sell Lot B to Taedo and
claimed by way of cross-claim against the spouses that the Deed of Sale executed
was only intended as an equitable mortgage. The respondent judge Bernad of the
RTC dismissed the complaint and cross-claim. As a result, Taedo filed a petition for
review on certiorari.
ISSUE: WON Taedos right to continue to use the septic tank ceased upon the
subdivision of the land and its subsequent sale to different owners.
RULING: No. The finding of the RTC that Taedos right to continue to use the septic
tank erected on Lot B, ceased upon the subdivision of the land and its subsequent
sale to different owners who do not have the same interest appears to be contrary
to law. The alienation of the dominant and servient estates to different persons is
not one of the grounds for the extinguishment of an easement which is provided for
in Article 631 of the Civil Code. On the contrary, use of the easement is continued
by operation of law. In the instant case, no statement abolishing or extinguishing
the easement of drainage was mentioned in the deed of sale of Lot A to Taedo. Nor
did Cardenas stop the use of the drain pipe and septic tank by the occupants of Lot
A before he sold said lot to Taedo. Hence, the use of the septic tank is continued by
operation of law. Accordingly, the spouses Sim, the new owners of the servient
estate (Lot B), cannot impair, in any manner whatsoever, the use of the servitude.
Right of way
La Vista Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 278 SCRA 498
FACTS: Mangyan Road is a 15-meter wide thoroughfare in Quezon City abutting
Katipunan Avenue on the west, traversing the edges of La Vista Subdivision on the
north and of the Ateneo and Maryknoll (now Miriam) College on the south. The
roadway was originally owned by the Tuasons who sold a portion of their land to
Philippine Building Corporation. Included in such sale was half or 7.5 meters width of
the Mangyan road. With the consent of the Tuasons, PBC assigned its rights to
Ateneo through a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Mortgage. Then, the
Tuasons developed a part of the estate adjoining the portion sold to PBC into La
Vista Subdivision while Ateneo sold the western portion of the land to Maryknoll.
Ateneo and La Vista acknowledged the voluntary easement or a mutual right of way
wherein the parties would allow each other to use their half portion of the Manyan
road. Later, Ateneo sold the property to Solid Homes Inc., who subsequently
developed it into Loyola Grand Villas subdivision. Ateneo also transferred the right
1

to negotiate the easement on the road. However, La Vista refused to recognize the
said easement (right-of-way). La Vista constructed one-meter high cylindrical
concrete posts chained together at the middle of and along the entire length of
Mangyan Road which prevented the residents of Loyola from passing through. Solid
Homes Inc. filed for injunction and La vista in turn filed a third party complaint
against Ateneo. La Vista asserted that PBC and Ateneo never complied with their
obligation of providing the Tuasons with a right-of-way and that Solid Homes, Inc.
was no longer entitled to the right-of-way since it was exclusively for Ateneo. La
Vista also argued that there are other routes to Loyola from Mangyan Road.
ISSUE:

Is

there

an

easement

of

right-of-way

over

Mangyan

Road?

RULING: Yes. The Court distinguished a legal or compulsory easement of a right-ofway from a voluntary easement. It explained that a legal or compulsory easement is
that which is constituted by law for public use or for private interest. By express
provisions of Arts. 649 and 650 of the New Civil Code, the owner of an estate may
claim a legal or compulsory right-of-way only after he has established the existence
of four (4) requisites, namely, (a) the estate is surrounded by other immovables and
is without adequate outlet to a public highway; (b) after payment of the proper
indemnity; (c) the isolation was not due to the proprietors own acts; and, (d) the
right-of-way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and insofar
as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public
highway may be the shortest. A voluntary easement on the other hand is
constituted simply by will or agreement of the parties.
From the facts of the instant case it is very apparent that the parties and their
respective predecessors-in-interest intended to establish an easement of right-ofway over Mangyan Road for their mutual benefit, both as dominant and servient
estates. This agreement, like any other contract, could be extinguished only by
mutual agreement or by renunciation of the owner of the dominant estate. The
court explained that there is no such thing as a judicial easement. In the instant
case, the court merely declared the existence of an easement created by the
parties. The argument of petitioner LA VISTA that there are other routes to LOYOLA
from Mangyan Road is likewise meritless, to say the least. The opening of an
adequate outlet to a highway can extinguish only legal or compulsory easements,
not voluntary easements like in the case at bar. The predecessors-in-interest of both
LA VISTA and Solid Homes, Inc., i.e., the Tuasons and the Philippine Building
Corporation, respectively, clearly established a contractual easement of right-of-way
over Mangyan Road when the PBC transferred its rights and obligations to ATENEO
to which the Tuasons expressly consented and agreed to. Meanwhile, the Tuasons
themselves developed their property into what is now known as LA VISTA. On the
other hand, ATENEO sold the hillside portions of its property to Solid Homes, Inc.,
including the right over the easement of right-of-way. In sum, when the easement in
this case was established by contract, the parties unequivocally made provisions for
its observance by all who in the future might succeed them in dominion.
Note: There was a voluntary easement of right of way which was acknowledged by the
Tuasons and Ateneo, therefore, the 4 requisites for a compulsory easement need not be
met. And like any other contractual stipulation, the same cannot be extinguished except by
voluntary recession of the contract establishing the servitude or renunciation by the owner

of the dominant lots. In the case at bar, all the predecessors-in-interest of both parties
recognized the existence of such easement and there was no agreement yet to revoke the
same. The free ingress and egress along Mangyan Road created by the voluntary agreement
is thus demandable. The Court also emphasized that they are not creating an easement but
merely declaring one for there is no such thing as a judicial easement.