SERAFIN TIJAM, ET AL. VS. MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY, ET AL. G.R.

NO. L-21603. APRIL 15, 1968

FACTS: Tijam
Sibongahanoy.

filed for recovery

Defendants
filed

of
a

P1,908 + legal
counter
bond

interest from
with
Manila

Surety and Fidelity Co (Surety). Judgement was in favour of the plaintiffs, a

writ of execution was issued against the defendant. Defendants moved for
writ of execution against surety which was granted. Surety moved to quash
the writ but was denied, appealed to CA without raising the issue on lack of
jurisdiction.
CA affirmed the appealed decision. Surety then filed Motion to Dismiss on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction against CFI Cebu in view of the effectivity of
Judiciary Act of 1948 a month before the filing of the petition for recovery.
Act placed original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil actions for
demands not exceeding 2,000 exclusive of interest. CA set aside its earlier
decision and referred the case to SC since it has exclusive jurisdiction over
"all cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue.
ISSUE: WON Surety bond is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the
CFI
Cebu
for
the
first
time
upon
appeal.
YES
RATIO: SC believes that that the Surety is now barred by laches from
invoking this plea after almost fifteen years before the Surety filed its motion
to dismiss raising the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first time - A
party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways
and for different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by
deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches. Laches, in a general sense is
failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do
that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done
earlier - Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a
cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for
the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court -"undesirable
practice" of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the
judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when
adverse.
: Other merits on the appeal : The surety insists that the lower court should
have granted its motion to quash the writ of execution because the same
was issued without the summary hearing - Summary hearing is "not intended
to be carried on in the formal manner in which ordinary actions are
prosecuted" (83 C.J.S. 792). It is, rather, a procedure by which a question is
resolved "with dispatch, with the least possible delay, and in preference to
ordinary legal and regular judicial proceedings" (Ibid, p. 790). What is

essential is that "the defendant is notified or summoned to appear and is

given an opportunity to hear what is urged upon him, and to interpose a
defense, after which follows an adjudication of the rights of the parties - In
the case at bar, the surety had been notified of the plaintiffs' motion for
execution and of the date when the same would be submitted for
consideration. In fact, the surety's counsel was present in court when the
motion was called, and it was upon his request that the court a quo gave him
a period of four days within which to file an answer. Yet he allowed that
period to lapse without filing an answer or objection. The surety cannot now,
therefore, complain that it was deprived of its day in court.
The orders appealed from are affirmed.
REPUBLIC V BATINGUE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
Facts:
Respondent Bantigue Point Development Corporation filed with the RTC
an application for original registration of title over a parcel of land. Petitioner
Republic filed its Opposition. Thereafter, the RTC Clerk of Court transmitted
motu proprio the records of the case to the MTC because the assessed value
of the property was allegedly less than 100,000. The MTC awarded the land
to respondent. On appeal, the CA ruled that since the former had actively
participated in the proceedings before the lower court, but failed to raise the
jurisdictional challenge therein, petitioner is thereby estopped from
questioning the jurisdiction of the lower court on appeal. Petitioner Republic
filed a petition for review under rule 45 with the SC.
Issues:
1. WON the Republic is estopped from questioning the courts jurisdiction
2. WON the MTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the application for
original registration of land title.
Held
1. NO. The rule is settled that lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. Jurisdiction
over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or the law. It
cannot be acquired through a waiver or enlarged by the omission of the
parties or conferred by the acquiescence of the court. Consequently,
questions of jurisdiction may be cognizable even if raised for the first time on
appeal.
TIJAM DOCTRINE IS NOT APPLICABLE. The facts are starkly different in
this case, making the exceptional rule in Tijam inapplicable. Here, petitioner
Republic filed its Opposition to the application for registration when the
records were still with the RTC. At that point, petitioner could not have
questioned the delegated jurisdiction of the MTC, simply because the case

was not yet with that court. When the records were transferred to the MTC,
petitioner neither filed pleadings nor requested affirmative relief from that
court. On appeal, petitioner immediately raised the jurisdictional question in
its Brief. Clearly, the exceptional doctrine of estoppel by laches is
inapplicable to the instant appeal.
LACHES has been defined as the "failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence,
could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert
a right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the party
entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it."
In this case, petitioner Republic has not displayed such unreasonable
failure or neglect that would lead us to conclude that it has
abandoned or declined to assert its right to question the lower
court's jurisdiction.
2. YES. In assailing the jurisdiction of the lower courts, petitioner Republic
raised two points of contention: (a) the period for setting the date and hour
of the initial hearing; and (b) the value of the land to be registered.
Sub-Issues:
WON lower court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the application,
because the RTC set the date and hour of the initial hearing beyond
the 90-day period provided under the Property Registration Decree.
- NO
The Property Registration Decree provides:
Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. - The court shall, within five
days from filing of the application, issue an order setting the date and hour
of the initial hearing which shall not be earlier than forty-five days nor later
than ninety days from the date of the order. x x x.
In this case, the application for original registration was filed on 17 July
1997. On 18 July 1997, or a day after the filing of the application, the RTC
immediately issued an Order setting the case for initial hearing on 22
October 1997, which was 96 days from the Order. While the date set by the
RTC was beyond the 90-day period provided for in Section 23, this fact did
not affect the jurisdiction of the trial court.
The RTCs failure to issue the Order setting the date and hour of the initial
hearing within five days from the filing of the application for registration, as

provided in the Property Registration Decree, did not affect the courts its
jurisdiction. Observance of the five-day period was merely directory,
and failure to issue the Order within that period did not deprive the
RTC of its jurisdiction over the case. To rule that compliance with the
five-day period is mandatory would make jurisdiction over the subject matter
dependent upon the trial court. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is
conferred only by the Constitution or the law. It cannot be contingent upon
the action or inaction of the court.
WON lower court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the application,
because the value of the land does not fall under MTC - NO
Petitioner contended that since the selling price of the property based
on the Deed of Sale was 160,000,the MTC did not have jurisdiction
over the case. Under Section 34 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act, as
amended,the MTCs delegated jurisdiction to try cadastral and land
registration cases is limited to lands, the value of which should not
exceed 100,000.
Ruling: Pursuant to the Judiciary Reorganization Act, the MTC has
delegated jurisdiction in cadastral and land registration cases in two
instances: first, where there is no controversy or opposition;
or, second, over contested lots, the value of which does not exceed
100,000.
The case at bar does not fall under the first instance, because petitioner
opposed respondent Corporations application for registration on 8 January
1998. However, the MTC had jurisdiction under the second instance, because
the value of the lot in this case does not exceed 100,000.
WON the value of the land should be determined from its selling
price NO
Contrary to petitioners contention, the value of the land should not be
determined with reference to its selling price. Rather, Section 34 of the
Judiciary Reorganization Act provides that the value of the property sought to
be registered may be ascertained in three ways: first, by the affidavit of
the claimant; second, by agreement of the respective claimants, if
there are more than one; or, third, from the corresponding tax declaration
of the real property.
In this case, the value of the property cannot be determined using the first
method, because the records are bereft of any affidavit executed by

respondent as to the value of the property. Likewise, valuation cannot be

done through the second method, because this method finds application only
where there are multiple claimants who agree on and make a joint
submission as to the value of the property. Here, only respondent Bantigue
Point Development Corporation claims the property.
The value of the property must therefore be ascertained with reference to
the corresponding Tax Declarations submitted by respondent Corporation
together with its application for registration. From the records, we find that
the assessed value of the property is 4,330, 1,920 and 8,670, or a total
assessed value of 14,920 for the entire property.Based on these Tax
Declarations, it is evident that the total value of the land in question does not
exceed 100,000. Clearly, the MTC may exercise its delegated
jurisdiction under the Judiciary Reorganization Act, as amended.

ENERIO v HON. ALAMPAY

FACTS:
On May 27, 1914, petitioners as plaintiffs filed with respondent court
of first instance of Negros Occidental presided by respondent Judge
Nestor B. Alampay a complaint for the recovery of actual, moral and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees and costs of litigation
totalling close to P30,000.00 against private respondents Sonetran
Co., Inc., Ernesto Kho and Max Villegas y Yanson as defendants as a
result of the physical injuries caused petitioner-minor, Russel Enerio,
eight years of age (herein represented by his parents, the co-petitioners)
when bumped on the road on January 15, 1974 by a passenger bus of
respondents driven allegedly "in a very reckless, negligent and
imprudent manner" by respondent Max Villegas.
Respondents filed in due course their answer with counterclaim for
P20,000.-moral damages and P2,000.-attorney's fees.
Pre-trial was held by respondent court on November 27, 1974 and on said
date, without its jurisdiction having been questioned or placed in issue by
respondents, it issued moto proprio an order dismissing the complaint on the
ground that "without the claims for moral and exemplary damages,
this case will not fall within the jurisdiction of the court of first
instance,"
Petitioners filed petition for review on certiorari of the dismissal order.
ISSUE: WON CFI has jurisdiction over the case
HELD: YES

It is well settled and beyond question that the jurisdiction of a court over
a case, is determined by the allegations of the complaint, and since
petitioners' complaint asserted a total demand, exclusive of interest
of over P10,000.00 (and sought recovery of damages of close to
P30,000.00) the case clearly falls within the original jurisdiction of
respondent court of first instance as provided by section 44 of the
Judiciary Act, Republic Act 296 as amended.
The totality of the demand in suits for recovery of sums of money
between the same parties, i.e. the total or aggregate amount
demanded in the complaint constitutes the basis of jurisdiction and
for determining the jurisdictional amount in civil cases.
Here,
petitioners' total claim of P978.00 for actual damages, P10,000.-moral
damages, P15,000.-exemplary damages and P3,000.-attorney's fees, etc.,
was clearly in excess of P10,000.00 and therefore properly fell
within the jurisdiction of respondent court of first instance.
Respondent court could not arbitrarily isolate petitioners lesser claim for
actual damages and without hearing and proofs rule out petitioners other
claims for moral and exemplary damages as "bloated" and summarily
dismiss motu proprio the case as not falling within its jurisdiction contrary to
the very allegations on the face of the complaint.
Respondents contention in their comment that "since the award of said
amount (of moral and exemplary damages) is discretionary on its
(respondent court) part, it believed that plaintiffs cannot recover a total
amount in excess of P10,000.00, hence, there is basis for the court in
dismissing the complaint on ground of lack of jurisdiction" is manifestly
erroneous. If such were the case, respondent court should have narrowed
down the issue at the pre-trial to the question and amount of recoverable
damages, if any, and proceeded to receive the parties proofs thereon and
thereafter rendered judgment on the merits, even utterly refusing any award
of moral or exemplary damages to petitioners if this were its determination.
This simply means that it should have properly assumed and exercised its
jurisdiction and disposed of the case on the merits rather than erroneously
dismissed the complaint for alleged lack of jurisdiction with all the attendant
delay caused thereby and the remand of the case back to it.
DOCTRINES:
1. COURTS; JURISDICTION; DETERMINED BY ALLEGATIONS OF COMPLAINT.
It is well settled and beyond question that the jurisdiction of a court over a
case
is
determined
by
the
allegations
of
the
complaint.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. Since petitioners complaint asserted a total
demand, exclusive of interest of over P10,000 (and sought recovery of

damages of close to P30,000) the case clearly falls within the original
jurisdiction of respondent court of first instance as provided by Section 44 of
the
Judiciary
Act,
Republic
Act
296
as
amended.
3. ACTIONS; RECOVERY OF SUMS OF MONEY; TOTALITY OF DEMAND IS THE
BASIS OF JURISDICTION. The totality of the demand in suits for recovery of
sums of money between the same parties, i.e. the total or aggregate amount
demanded in the complaint constitutes the basis of jurisdiction and
determines
the
jurisdictional
amount
in
civil
cases.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ACTUAL DAMAGES CANNOT BE ISOLATED FROM MORAL AND
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES. Respondent court could not arbitrarily isolate
petitioners lesser claim for actual damages and without hearing and proofs
rule out their other claims for moral and exemplary damages as "bloated"
and summarily dismiss motu propio the case as not falling within its
jurisdiction.
FLORES V MALLARE-PHILLIPS
Facts:
Flores sued the respondents for refusing to pay him certain amount of money
as alleged in the complaint:
-first cause of action alleged in the complaint was against respondent
Ignacio Binongcal for refusing to pay the amount of P11,643.00 representing
cost of truck tires which he purchased on credit from petitioner on various
occasions from August to October, 1981;
-second cause of action was against respondent Fernando Calion for
allegedly refusing to pay the amount of P10,212.00 representing cost of
truck tires which he purchased on credit from petitioner on several occasions
from March, 1981 to January, 1982.
The action was opposed by an action to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
Under Sec 19 of BP 129, the regional trial court had exclusive original
jurisdiction if the amount of the demand is more than P20,000. That
although, the other respondent was indebted in the amount of P10, 212.00,
his obligation was separate and distinct from that of the other respondent.
The trial court by Judge Mallare (one of the respondents) dismissed the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
Plaintiff appealed by certiorari in Supreme Court.
Issue: WON the trial court correctly ruled on the application of the
permissive joinder of parties under the Rules of Court.
Ruling:

In cases of permissive joinder of parties, whether as plaintiffs or as

defendants, under Section 6 of Rule 3, the total of all the claims shall now
furnish the jurisdictional test. Needless to state also, if instead of joining or
being joined in one complaint separate actions are filed by or against the
parties, the amount demanded in each complaint shall furnish the
jurisdictional test.
In the case at bar, the lower court correctly held that the jurisdictional test
is subject to the rules on joinder of parties pursuant to Section 5 of
Rule 2 and Section 6 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and that, after a
careful scrutiny of the complaint, it appears that there is a misjoinder of
parties for the reason that the claims against respondents Binongcal and
Calion are separate and distinct and neither of which falls within its
jurisdiction.
Section 6 of Rule 3 which provides as follows:
Permissive joinder of parties.-All persons in whom or against
whom any right to relief in respect to or arising out of the same
transaction or series of transactions is alleged to exist, whether
jointly, severally, or in the alternative, may, except as otherwise
provided in these rules, join as plaintiffs or be joined as
defendants in one complaint, where any question of law or fact
common to all such plaintiffs or to all such defendants may arise
in the action; but the court may make such orders as may be just
to prevent any plaintiff or defendant from being embarrassed or
put to expense in connection with any proceedings in which he
may have no interest.
OTHERS:
Brillo vs. Buklatan (former rule):
Separate claims against several defendants of different amounts
each of which is not more than P2,000 and falls under the jurisdiction of
the justice of the peace court. The several claims do not arise from the
same transaction or series of transactions and there seem to be no
questions of law or of fact common to all the defendants as may
warrant their joinder under Rule 3, section 6.
The difference between the former and present rules in cases of permissive
joinder of parties may be illustrated by the two cases which were cited in the

case of Vda. de Rosario vs. Justice of the Peace as exceptions to the

totality rule.
Soriano y Cia vs. Jose 29 dismissed employees joined in a complaint
against the defendant to collect their respective claims, each of which was
within the jurisdiction of the municipal court although the total exceeded
the jurisdictional amount, this Court held that under the law then
the municipal court had jurisdiction. Although the plaintiffs' demands
were separate, distinct and independent of one another, their joint suit was
authorized under Section 6 of Rule 3 and each separate claim
furnished the jurisdictional test.
International Colleges, Inc. vs. Argonza, 25 dismissed teachers jointly
sued for unpaid salaries, the MC had jurisdiction because the amount
of each claim was within, although the total exceeded, its
jurisdiction and it was a case of permissive joinder of parties plaintiff
under Section 6 of Rule 3.
Under the present law, the two cases would be under the jurisdiction of
the RTC. Similarly, Brillo vs. Buklatan and Gacula vs. Martinez, if the
separate claims against the several defendants arose out of the same
transaction or series of transactions and there is a common question of law
or fact, they would now be under the jurisdiction of the RTC.
COMPARISON OF RULES
PRESENT
Where a plaintiff sues a
defendant on two or more
separate causes of action

FORMER

Totality of the claims in all

the
causes
of
action
irrespective of whether the
COA arose out of the same
or diff transactions. If the
total demand exceeds P20K
RTC has jurisdiction

Totality of the claims in all

the
causes
of
action
irrespective of whether the
COA arose out of the same
or diff transactions. If the
total demand exceeds P20K
RTC has jurisdiction

If the causes of action are

separate and independent,
their
joinder
in
one
complaint is permissive and
not mandatory, and any
cause of action where the
amount of the demand is
20K or less may be the
subject
of
a
separate
complaint filed with a
metropolitan or MTC.

If the causes of action are

separate and independent,
their
joinder
in
one
complaint is permissive and
not mandatory, and any
cause of action where the
amount of the demand is
20K or less may be the
subject
of
a
separate
complaint filed with a
metropolitan or MTC.

Two
or
more
plaintiffs
having a separate causes of
action against a defendant
join in a single complaint

Where the claims or causes

of action joined in a single
complaint are separately
owned by or due to different
parties, each
separate
claim shall furnish the
jurisdictional test
The former rule applied only
to cases of permissive
joinder of parties plaintiff.
However,
it
was
also
applicable to cases of
permissive joinder of parties
defendant.

The causes of action in

favor of the two or more
plaintiffs or against the two
or more defendants should
arise out of the same
transaction or series of
transactions
and
there
should
be
a
common
question of law or fact, as
provided in Section 6 of
Rule 3.

MANCHESTER DEVELOPMENT VS COURT OF APPEALS

149 SCRA 562 Remedial Law Civil Procedure Payment of Docket Fees
Claimed Damages must be Stated in the BODY and PRAYER of pleadings
FACTS:
A complaint for specific performance was filed by Manchester Development
Corporation against City Land Development Corporation to compel the latter
to execute a deed of sale in favor Manchester. Manchester also alleged that
City Land forfeited the formers tender of payment for a certain transaction
thereby causing damages to Manchester amounting to P78,750,000.00. This
amount was alleged in the BODY of their Complaint but it was not reiterated
in the PRAYER of same complaint. Manchester paid a docket fee of P410.00
only. Said docket fee is premised on the allegation of Manchester that their
action is primarily for specific performance hence it is incapable of pecuniary
estimation. The court ruled that there is an under assessment of docket fees
hence it ordered Manchester to amend its complaint. Manchester complied
but what it did was to lower the amount of claim for damages to P10M. Said
amount was however again not stated in the PRAYER.
ISSUE: Whether or not the amended complaint should be admitted.
HELD: No. The docket fee, its computation, should be based on the original
complaint. A case is deemed filed only upon payment of the appropriate
docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing in court. Here, since the
proper docket fee was not paid for the original complaint, its as if there is no
complaint to speak of. As a consequence, there is no original complaint duly
filed which can be amended. So, any subsequent proceeding taken in
consideration of the amended complaint is void.
Manchesters defense that this case is primarily an action for specific
performance is not merited. The Supreme Court ruled that based on the
allegations and the prayer of the complaint, this case is an action for

damages and for specific performance. Hence, it is capable of pecuniary

estimation.
Further, the amount for damages in the original complaint was already
provided in the body of the complaint. Its omission in the PRAYER clearly
constitutes an attempt to evade the payment of the proper filing fees. To
stop the happenstance of similar irregularities in the future, the Supreme
Court ruled that from this case on, all complaints, petitions, answers and
other similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed
for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said
damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case.
Any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall not bib accepted
nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record.