Cebu Portland Cement Company, vs. Mun. of Naga, Cebu, et. al.

plaintiff-appellant defendants-appellees
Facts:
1.
The Treasurer of the Mun. of Naga, Cebu collected from Cebu Portland CementComp
any (CPCC) municipal license tax imposed by the Amended Ordinance No.
21 oncement factories located in the same municipality.
2. The demands made by the Treasurer were not entirely successful and resulted to
theremedies provided under Section 2304 of the Revised Administrative Code. TheTr
easurer gave CPCC 10 days to settle the account.
3. The Treasurer also notified the Plant Manager of CPCC that he was distraining
100,000bags of Apo cement in satisfaction of their municipal license tax in the total
amount
of Php 204,300.00. At first the Plant Manager did not agree with the letter butackno
wledged the distraint in the afternoon of the same day he was notified.
4. The Treasurer signed the receipt of the goods under the authority of 2304 of the
RevisedAdministrative Code & shall sell the same at a public auction to the highest
bidder. Theproceeds thereof shall be utilized in part of the satisfaction of the
municipal license tax &penalties CPCC owes to the municipality of Naga, Cebu.
5. The Notice of Sale was posted by the Treasurer & stated that the public sale
shall be onJuly 27, 1962. However, no sale was held on the date specified & in the
appealeddecision, that there was a stipulation by the parties where the auction took
place onJanuary 30, 1962.
WHO WHAT WHERE DECISION
Cebu PortlandCement CompanyPetition (2 separateactions: Validity of thedistraint &
the sale ata public auction of thebags of cement)RTCDeniedCebu PortlandCement
CompanyMotion for ReconsiderationSupreme CourtDeniedIssue1.Whether the
distraint was valid.2.Whether the auction sale was validDecision

Decision of the lower court was affirmed in

toto
. With costs against the plaintiff-appellant.
1. CPCC alleged that the 10-day grace period in the letter of the Municipal
Treasurer did not lapse and therefore, the distrain is invalid. This is not true.

According to
theRevised Administrative Code, the municipal treasurer may seize & distrain anyp
ersonal property belonging to such person or any property subject to the tax lien,
insufficient quantity to satisfy the tax or charge in question xxx. With this, the
lawgives an authority to the municipal treasurer to seize & distrain properties
regardlessof the provisions or conditions stated in the letter. There is only room for
applicationand not for interpretation and what is stated in the letter cannot amend
the law.
2. The auction sale is also valid. Under the Revised Administrative Code, the
salecannot take place less than 20 days after notice to the owner or possessor of
theproperty xxx. Since the first notification for distrait was in July 6, 1961 & the
sale wason January 30, 1962, the requisite for the notification was more than
complied with.The sale was only delayed due to the deferment made by the CPCC.
Even if the salewas made only in January 1962, the Treasurer informed the CPCCs
acting officer that he would again advertise for the public sale of the said bags of
cement. Withthis, the validity of the date of the said auction sale cannot be
contested.

Banco de Oro Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Equitable Banking Corp. [G.R. No.
74917. January 20, 1988]
24MAR
FACTS
Equitable Bank drew six crossed managers check payable to certain member
establishments of Visa Card. Subsequently, the checks were deposited with Banco
De Oro (BDO) to the credit of its depositor. Following normal procedures and after
stamping at the back of the checks the usual endorsements,BDOsent the checks for
clearing through the Philippine Clearing House Corporation (PCHC). Accordingly,
Equitable Banking paid the checks; its clearing account was debited for the value of
the checks and BDOs clearing account was credited for the same amount.
Thereafter, Equitable Banking discovered that the endorsements appearing at the
back of the checks and purporting to be that of the payees were forged and/or
unauthorized or otherwise belong to persons other than the payees.Equitable
Banking presented the checks directly to BDO for the purpose of claiming
reimbursement from the latter. However, BDO refused to accept such direct
presentation and to reimburse Equitable Banking for the value of the checks.
ISSUES
(a) Whether or not BDO is estopped from claiming that checks under consideration
are non-negotiable instruments.

(b) Whether or not BDO can escape liability by reasons of forgery.

(c) Whether or not only negotiable checks are within the jurisdiction of PCHC.

RULING
(a) YES. BDO having stamped its guarantee of all prior endorsements and/or lack of
endorsements is now estopped from claiming that the checks under consideration
are not negotiable instruments. The checks were accepted for deposit by the
petitioner stamping thereon its guarantee, in order that it can clear the said checks
with the respondent bank. By such deliberate and positive attitude of the petitioner
it has for all legal intents and purposes treated the said cheeks as negotiable
instruments and accordingly assumed the warranty of the endorser when it
stamped its guarantee of prior endorsements at the back of the checks. It led the
said respondent to believe that it was acting as endorser of the checks and on the
strength of this guarantee said respondent cleared the checks in question and
credited the account of the petitioner. Petitioner is now barred from taking an
opposite posture by claiming that the disputed checks are not negotiable
instrument.
(b) NO. A commercial bank cannot escape the liability of an endorser of a check and
which may turn out to be a forged endorsement. Whenever any bank treats the
signature at the back of the checks as endorsements and thus logically guarantees
the same as such there can be no doubt said bank has considered the checks
asnegotiable.The collecting bank or last endorser generally suffers the loss because
it has the duty to ascertain the genuineness of all prior endorsements considering
that the act of presenting the check for payment to the drawee is an assertion that
the party making the presentment has done its duty to ascertain the genuineness of
the endorsements.
(c) NO. PCHCs jurisdiction is not limited to negotiable checks only. The term check
as used in the said Articles of Incorporation of PCHC can only connote checks in
general use in commercial and business activities. Thus, no distinction. Ubi lex non
distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus. Checks are used between banks and
bankers and their customers, and are designed to facilitate banking operations. It is
of the essence to be payable on demand, because the contract between the banker
and the customer is that the money is needed on demand.

Songco, et al. vs. National Labor Relations Commission

G.R. Nos. 50999-51000

(March 23, 1990)

FACTS: Zuelig filed an application for clearance to terminate the services of

Songco, and others, on the ground of retrenchment due to financial losses. During
the hearing, the parties agreed that the sole issue to be resolved was the basis of
the separation pay due. The salesmen received monthly salaries of at least P400.00
and commission for every sale they made.

The Collective Bargaining Agreements between Zuelig and the union of which
Songco, et al. were members contained the following provision: "Any employee
who is separated from employment due to old age, sickness, death or permanent
lay-off, not due to the fault of said employee, shall receive from the company a
retirement gratuity in an amount equivalent to one (1) month's salary per year of
service."

The Labor Arbiter ordered Zuelig to pay Songco et al., separation pay equivalent to
their one month salary (exclusive of commissions, allowances, etc.) for every year
of service with the company.

The National Labor Relations Commission sustained the Arbiter.

ISSUE: Whether or not earned sales commissions and allowances should be

included in the monthly salary of Songco, et al. for the purpose of computing their
separation pay.

RULING:

In the computation of backwages and separation pay, account must be taken not
only of the basic salary of the employee, but also of the transportation and
emergency living allowances.

Even if the commissions were in the form of incentives or encouragement, so that

the salesman would be inspired to put a little more industry on jobs particularly
assigned to them, still these commissions are direct remunerations for services
rendered which contributed to the increase of income of the employee. Commission
is the recompense compensation or reward of an agent, salesman, executor,
trustee, receiver, factor, broker or bailee, when the same is calculated as a
percentage on the amount of his transactions or on the profit to the principal. The
nature of the work of a salesman and the reason for such type of remuneration for
services rendered demonstrate that commissions are part of Songco, et al's wage or
salary.

The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that some salesmen do not receive any
basic salary, but depend on commissions and allowances or commissions alone,
although an employer-employee relationships exists.

If the opposite view is adopted, i.e., that commissions do not form part of the wage
or salary, then in effect, we will be saying that this kind of salesmen do not receive
any salary and, therefore, not entitled to separation pay in the event of discharge
from employment. This narrow interpretation is not in accord with the liberal spirit
of the labor laws, and considering the purpose of separation pay which is, to
alleviate the difficulties which confront a dismissed employee thrown to the streets
to face the harsh necessities of life.

In Soriano vs. NLRC (155 SCRA 124), we held that the commissions also claimed by
the employee (override commission plus net deposit incentive) are not properly
includible in such base figure since such commissions must be earned by actual
market transactions attributable to the petitioner [salesman]. Since the
commissions in the present case were earned by actual transactions attributable to
Song, et al., these should be included in their separation pay. In the computation
thereof, what should be taken into account is the average commission earned
during their last year of employment.

(1)[G.R. No. 118712. July 5, 1996]

LBP vs CA

I. FACTS In this agrarian dispute, it is once more imperative that the aforestated
principles be applied in its resolution. Separate petitions for review were filed by
petitioners Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and Land Bank of the following
the adverse ruling by the Court of Appeals. Private respondents are landowners
whose landholdings were acquired by the DAR and subjected to transfer schemes to
qualified beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Aggrieved by
the alleged lapses of the DAR and the Landbank with respect to the valuation and
payment of compensation for their land, they sought to compel the DAR to expedite
the pending summary administrative proceedingsto finally determine the just
compensation of their properties, and the Landbank to deposit in cash and bonds
the amountsrespectively "earmarked", "reserved" and "deposited in trust accounts"
for private respondents, and to allow them towithdraw the same.DAR and Land
Bank filed for petitions but it was dismissed and they filed a Motion for
Reconsideration.II. ISSUESWhether or not
the opening of "trust accounts" is within the coverage of term "deposit.
III. HELDThe provision is very clear and unambiguous, foreclosing any doubt as to
allow an expanded construction that would
include the opening of "trust accounts" within the coverage of term "deposit.
Accordingly, we must adhere to the well
-settled rule that when the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no
reason for interpretation or construction, but only for application. The validity of
constituting trust accounts for the benefit of the rejecting landownersand
withholding immediate payment to them is further premised on the latter's refusal
to accept the offered compensationthereby making it necessary that the amount
remains in the custody of the LBP for safekeeping and in trust for eventualpayment
to the landowners. As an exercise of police power, the expropriation of private
property under the CARP putsthe landowner, and not the government, in a situation
where the odds are already stacked against his favor. He has norecourse but to
allow it. His only consolation is that he can negotiate for the amount of
compensation to be paid for theexpropriated property. Unduly burdening the
property owners from the resulting flaws in the implementation of the CARPwhich
was supposed to have been a carefully crafted legislation is plainly unfair and
unacceptable.(2)G.R. No. L-61388 April 20, 1983