Devin Stauffer The Unity of Platos Gorgias Rhetoric, Justice, and The Philosophic Life 2006 PDF

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THE UNITY OF PLATOS GORGIAS

This book brings out the complex unity of Platos Gorgias. Through a careful analysis of the dialogues three main sections, including Socrates famous
quarrel with his archrival Callicles, Devin Stauffer shows how the seemingly disparate themes of rhetoric, justice, and the philosophic life are woven
together into a coherent whole. His interpretation of the Gorgias sheds new
light on Platos thought, showing that Plato and Socrates had a more favorable
view of rhetoric than is usually supposed. Stauffer also challenges common
assumptions concerning the character and purpose of some of Socrates most
famous claims about justice. Written as a close study of the Gorgias, The Unity
of Platos Gorgias treats broad questions concerning Platos moral and political
psychology and uncovers the view of the relationship between philosophy and
rhetoric that guided Plato as he wrote his dialogues.
Devin Stauffer is Assistant Professor of Government at The University of Texas
at Austin. He is the author of Platos Introduction to the Question of Justice and
coauthor and cotranslator of Empire and the Ends of Politics: Platos Menexenus
and Pericles Funeral Oration.
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The Unity of Platos

Gorgias
RHETORIC, JUSTICE, AND THE PHILOSOPHIC
LIFE
Devin Stauffer
The University of Texas at Austin
iii
cambridge university press

Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, So Paulo
Cambridge University Press
The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge cb2 2ru, UK
Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York
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Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521858472
Cambridge University Press 2006
This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provision of
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First published in print format
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Contents
Acknowledgments
page vii
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1
Examining the Master of Rhetoric . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

The Prelude
20
The Ensnaring of Gorgias, Part Two
29
Polus and the Dispute about Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

Socrates Description of Rhetoric
17
The Ensnaring of Gorgias, Part One
43
Are Rhetoricians Powerful?
50
The Turn to Justice and the Socratic Thesis
55
Polus Refutation of Socrates
58
Socrates Refutation of Polus
64
The Confrontation between Socrates and Callicles . . . . . . . . 82

Callicles Opening Speech
85
Socrates Examination of Callicles View of Justice
92
Moderation versus Immoderation, and the Question

of Hedonism
102
Socrates Situation and the Rehabilitation of Rhetoric . . . . 123

Noble Rhetoric, the Order of the Soul, and
the Socratic Thesis
127
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Contents
Socrates Situation, the Question of Assimilation,
and the Issue of Self-Protection
140
Callicles and His Heroes, True Rhetoric, and Socrates

True Political Art
The Logos about the Afterlife
149
167
Conclusion: A Final Reflection on Noble Rhetoric . . . . . . . . . . . 177

Bibliography
183
Index
189
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Acknowledgments
For their financial support while I was working on this book, I would
like to thank the Mrs. Giles Whiting Foundation, the Lynde and Harry
Bradley Foundation, Kenyon College, and The University of Texas at
Austin. I would also like to thank the readers for Cambridge University Press and the colleagues and friends who helped me in various
ways during the years I spent working on this book. In particular,
I am grateful to Fred Baumann, Christopher Bruell, Kirk Emmert,
Robert Faulkner, Pam Jensen, Lorraine Pangle, Thomas Pangle, and
Tim Spiekerman. An earlier version of a section of Chapter 3 appeared
in the Review of Politics in the Fall of 2002.
vii
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Introduction
ew philosophers have endured more criticism and abuse in modern times than Plato. As one of the great figures of the classical
tradition, Plato was subjected to powerful attacks by the founders of

modern philosophy and their followers, who set out to succeed where
they thought the nave and utopian ancients had failed. And the attacks
on Plato continue unabated today, as postmodernists look back to his
works to find the source of the faith in reason that they want to root out
of the West. Yet, for all that, Plato has not lost his power to attract and
enchant. Those who first sought to overthrow the intellectual authority
of classical philosophy, men such as Machiavelli and Hobbes, would
be amazed to learn that their foe continues to attract partisans and
even devotees. And more recent critics, such as Derrida and Rorty, are
similarly dismayed that their efforts finally to put Plato to rest have not
succeeded. Is it not a strange feature of our late modern or postmodern
age that there still remains serious interest in Plato?
Yet perhaps the very difference between Plato and his critics, from
the early moderns to those of our time, can help us to understand

why his works have not lost their appeal. For one of the most powerful things drawing readers back to Plato today is their sense that his
works contain a richer and truer account of human life, of the soul and
its deepest concerns, than one can find even in the greatest works of
modern philosophy. In particular, many sense that the modern philosophers, by emphasizing mans undeniable fear, self-interest, and desire
for power, fail to do justice to the loftier aspects of our humanity and
1
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Introduction
to the highest aspirations that are, if not always the most effective,
perhaps the most revealing expressions of human nature. And more
simply, readers are drawn to Plato by what has always drawn readers
to him, but now is made all the more appealing by its absence from
modern thought: an answer to the question of the best life, conveyed
by a moving portrait of a noble figure who lived that life.
Of course, to feel an initial attraction to a thinker is not yet to understand his thought, to say nothing of judging its adequacy. Especially
for those of us who are drawn to Plato by an enchantment with his
vision of the philosophic life as it was lived by Socrates, that initial
attraction, if it is to be more than the idle dreaming that his modern
critics claim Plato encourages, must transform itself into a more serious encounter with his work. What precisely is Platos account of the
philosophic life? How is it related, for instance, to his understanding
of virtue, his estimation of political life, and his analysis of human
nature and human concerns? When we probe questions such as these,
we are likely to find ourselves before long in a state that Plato would
have called aporia a state of perplexity, or, translated more literally,
a state of being without a path. The primary source of our aporia
is the apparently chaotic, strikingly foreign, and undeniably daunting
world that one enters in reading Platos dialogues. Platos dialogues, for
all of their immediate attractiveness, are extremely complex and difficult, perhaps especially so on basic questions such as those I have just
posed. It is true and part of their appeal that Platos works address
some of the simplest questions of human life. But they treat those
questions in ways that are anything but simple or straightforward.
They certainly were not written for readers with the habits formed by
our modern embrace of convenience and efficiency. The experience of
reading Plato, then, is likely for many of us to be a mixture of attraction and frustration, or of initial attraction followed by a sense of the
great difficulty of understanding Platos treatment of the issues under
discussion in the dialogues.
This mixed experience in reading Plato is provoked by no dialogue
more than by the Gorgias. On the one hand, Plato presents Socrates
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in the Gorgias as the noble figure whose intransigent defense of moral

principle and the philosophic life draws so many admirers. Especially
in his dispute with Callicles, the most outspoken critic of the philosophic life that we find in Platos corpus, Socrates comes to sight as a
hero. In this most memorable part of the dialogue, Socrates confronts
and responds to an attack that has been called, in a famous remark by
Paul Shorey, the most eloquent statement of the immoralists case in
European literature.1 The tension and gravity of the conflict between
Socrates and Callicles have led commentators to speak of the unforgettable intensity, the moral fervor and splendor, the vast scope
and profundity, and the peculiar emotional power of the Gorgias.2
If a story attributed by Themistius to a lost dialogue of Aristotle is
to be believed, they are probably also what led a Corinthian farmer,
after reading the Gorgias, to abandon his farm and devote his life to
Platonic philosophy.3 More broadly, the conflict between Socrates and
Callicles especially the heroic role that Socrates plays in that conflict
makes it easy to understand why the Gorgias has always been regarded
as one of Platos greatest works, and why it has been popular in every
age in which Plato has been read, including his own.
On the other hand, the conflict between Socrates and Callicles
occupies, roughly speaking, only half of the dialogue. And when one
surveys the dialogue as a whole, it quickly becomes a bewildering
maze without any clear unifying theme. Largely for this reason, most
1. Shorey, What Plato Said, 154; Shorey is quoted by Dodds, Gorgias, 266,
Newell, Ruling Passion, 1011, and Kahn, Plato and the Socratic Dialogue,
126. See also Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, 22: Once at least
in the history of philosophy the amoralist has been correctly represented as
an alarming figure, in the character of Callicles. So powerful is Callicles
attack on Socrates that several commentators have expressed the view that
Plato must have felt considerable sympathy with it. See Dodds, Gorgias,
1314; Jaeger, Paideia, 2:1378; Kagan, The Great Dialogue, 161.
2. These phrases are from Kahn, Plato and the Socratic Dialogue, 125; Taylor,
Plato, 103; Jaeger, Paideia, 2:126; Dodds, Gorgias, 31.
3. The passage from Themistius can be found in Grote, Plato, and the Other
Companions of Sokrates, 2:317n.
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Introduction
interpretations of the Gorgias have focused almost entirely on the second half of the dialogue, especially in their general pronouncements of
what the dialogue is about. We are told, for instance, that the dialogue
is about the challenge of defending the basic principles of Socratic
morality against attack from spokesmen for its most drastic alternative;4 that its purpose is to put a typical life of devotion to the suprapersonal good against the typical theory of the will to power at its best
such that life and the way it should be lived . . . is the real theme;5 and
that in the Gorgias Plato sets out to defend the Socratic belief about
justice especially by compelling even a highly critical interlocutor to
accept the Socratic belief.6 These claims reflect the most widely held
view of the dialogue. Broadly speaking, the Gorgias is most often read
as a crucial part of Platos presentation of or, according to some,
a crucial stage in his development of a moral position capable of
overcoming the arguments and attractions of even the most radical
immoralism.7 Yet this view of the dialogue takes its bearings primarily by the section of the dialogue in which Socrates confronts Callicles.
The claims I have quoted display the common but questionable tendency to begin from the second half of the Gorgias in trying to make
sense of the whole. Admittedly gripping and important as the Callicles section is, it is doubtful that the unity of the dialogue and its true
theme can be understood without an adequate consideration of the
entire dialogue. Attempts to treat the dialogue as a whole, however,
4.
5.
6.
7.
Kahn, Plato and the Socratic Dialogue, 127.

Taylor, Plato, 106.
Irwin, Platos Ethics, 95.
Allowing for considerable differences of nuance and emphasis, this view
is especially common in works that treat the Gorgias in broader studies of
Platos thought or that discuss the development of classical philosophy as a
whole. For a sense of the very wide range of sources in which a version of
this view can be found, see, in addition to the sources from which I have
quoted above, Jaeger, Paideia, 2:13659; Shorey, What Plato Said, 14150;
Voegelin, Plato, 2445; Santas, Socrates, 21821; Seung, Plato Rediscovered,
17; Romilly, The Great Sophists in Periclean Athens, 15660; MacIntyre,
After Virtue, 1401.
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are rare, and, in my view, none has successfully explained how its
different parts fit together.8
To be sure, the temptation to move quickly to the conflict between
Socrates and Callicles is great. Not only are the intensity and gravity
of that section attractive, but even a brief overview of the movement of
the dialogue can show how complex and apparently disorganized it is.
Before the battle between Socrates and Callicles, the dialogue opens
with Socrates arrival at a site in Athens where the famous rhetorician
Gorgias has just finished giving a display of his rhetorical powers.
8. While there have been many discussions of the Gorgias in broad studies of
Platos thought, these discussions generally make only cursory mention of
large sections of the dialogue, often virtually ignoring the first half. This
is true also of the many articles that have been written on the Gorgias.
Of the few book-length works devoted entirely to the Gorgias, two are the
well-known commentaries of Terence Irwin and E. R. Dodds. Since these
are written as commentaries accompanying editions of the Greek text, however, they provide many interpretive remarks without offering a complete or
unified interpretation of the dialogue as a whole. Beyond the works of Irwin
and Dodds, Ilham Dilmans Morality and the Inner Life is subtitled A Study in
Platos Gorgias. Dilman himself stresses, however, that his book is intended
less as a close textual interpretation of the dialogue than as a wide-ranging
reflection on a cluster of questions presented in the Gorgias approached
as having a life independent of the dialogue (vii). Dilmans study, in any
case, proceeds in a very different way from my own, and it leads to very
different conclusions. The same is true of George Plochmann and Franklin
Robinsons A Friendly Companion to Platos Gorgias. While Plochmann and
Robinson search, as I do, for the unity of the dialogue, they end up, in their
final attempt to provide an intuitive awareness of the unity that binds
together the dialogue, listing nine conclusions that have more to do with
unity in the cosmos as a whole than with unity in the sense of the coherence of the parts of the Gorgias itself (see 3501). Finally, one of the most
interesting and impressive interpretations of the Gorgias is Seth Benardetes
The Rhetoric of Morality and Philosophy, half of which is devoted to the
Gorgias. Although I have benefited from Benardetes study, his many fascinating observations are pieced together in a cryptic fashion that seems
intended more to point the reader down intriguing roads of reflection than
to present a clear path that leads from the surface of the text to a unified
interpretation of the dialogue.
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Introduction
Socrates speaks first with Gorgias and then with a young admirer of
Gorgias named Polus. A summary of the main themes discussed in
these conversations and then in the Callicles section can suffice to
bring out the difficulty of grasping their unity. After discussing with
Gorgias the character of the art of rhetoric and its relationship to justice, Socrates argues with Polus about the nobility of rhetoric, and then
engages him in a longer argument about the temptations of tyranny
and about whether it is worse to do injustice or to suffer it. The conclusion of Socrates argument with Polus in particular, the conclusion they reach that doing injustice is indeed worse than suffering
it prompts Callicles entry into the conversation. Callicles responds
to a brief provocation from Socrates by delivering a long, vehement
attack both on the position Socrates took in his argument with Polus
and on Socrates way of life as a whole. But following Callicles attack,
which seems initially to bring a measure of clarity to the dialogue by
directing the conversation to the question of the best life, Socrates
returns first to the question of justice, then abruptly turns away from
that question to discuss moderation and self-control. The discussion
of moderation and self-control is followed by a critique of hedonism,
after which Socrates returns to the theme of rhetoric, turns for some
time to the issues of virtue and the proper aims of politics, and then
finally comes back again to rhetoric and to the contest between the
philosophic life and the political life. This is an oversimplified summary of the dialogue that does not include, among other things, the
theme of punishment, the issue of self-protection, or the account of
the afterlife at the end of the dialogue. What could possibly tie this
apparent chaos of a dialogue together?
The unity of the Gorgias can be brought out only by a careful study of
the dialogue as a whole, one that follows its every twist and turn, constantly examining the connections between its various parts. Beyond
even what is typical of Platos dialogues, the Gorgias is full of strange
passages, questionable arguments, and confusing transitions. Only a
reading of the dialogue that begins from the surface and works through
the complexities that appear even or especially on the surface can
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reasonably hope to uncover what the dialogue is really about. Such a

reading is what I have attempted in what follows. I have tried to avoid
imposing an order on the dialogue that is not its own. Rather than
defending from the outset a thesis about the dialogues meaning or
ultimate aim, I have attempted to follow the path of the dialogue itself,
raising and wrestling with questions as they come up in the course of
thinking ones way through the text, and allowing the themes of the
dialogue and the connections between them to disclose themselves
gradually. In short, I have tried in my writing to reproduce something
close to my own experience of reading and reflecting on the dialogue.
Admittedly, my approach requires some departure from the most
common modes of analysis and presentation, which have advantages
in terms of clarity and structure of argument. Yet it seems to me that
Platos own art of writing requires a mode of reading and writing that
cannot be tightly bound by conventional practices. Without entering
deeply here into the complex arguments over the significance of Platos
dialogue form, let me state my basic view.9 Because Platos dialogues
are written as unfolding dramas, full of puzzles, perplexities, and even
intentionally flawed arguments, they require readers to do more than
take in information and arguments as they read. They require readers
to wonder, to question, even to speculate and then test speculations
against later passages, and, above all, to think about the issues under
discussion in a way that at once leads beyond the text and also returns
continually to the details and movement of the conversations Plato
presents. In my view, what more conventional approaches to reading
and writing on Plato gain in clarity and orderliness of presentation,
9. There are a number of excellent discussions of the character of Platos dialogues and how they should be read. Those that I have found most valuable
are Klein, A Commentary on Platos Meno, 331; Strauss, The City and Man,
5062, On a New Interpretation of Platos Political Philosophy, 34852;
Alfarabi, Platos Laws, 8485; Schleiermacher, Introductions to the Dialogues of Plato, 1718; Bolotin, The Life of Philosophy and the Immortality
of the Soul, 3941, Platos Dialogue on Friendship, 1213; Sallis, Being and
Logos, 16; Ahrensdorf, The Death of Socrates and the Life of Philosophy, 37.
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Introduction
they lose in arbitrariness of interpretation, which is the result of taking

passages out of context and imposing on Platos writings a structure
that is not their own. For these reasons, too, I think it is counterproductive to give at the outset of an interpretation a full description of
where one is headed. The journey through a Platonic dialogue should
be a journey of gradual discovery, and that process is distorted if the
destination is announced before one begins.
Nevertheless, let me try to provide some orientation by saying a
word about the issues in the Gorgias and the place of the dialogue
in Platos corpus. In the following study, as I have indicated, I try to
follow the movement of the Gorgias on its own terms or as it comes to
sight by following the movement of the text. Yet it is important to keep
in the back of ones mind the relationship of any particular dialogue
to the broader whole composed of all of Platos dialogues. But what
does that mean? Since there are many ways of viewing Platos corpus
many ways of looking at its overall purpose, many ways of ordering
the dialogues, many ways of dividing them into groups, and so forth
any attempt to consider the place of a single dialogue would seem to
cast one into a sea of difficult questions that have been the subject of
long-running controversies. As with the question of the significance of
Platos dialogue form, these controversies are too vast to be considered
in detail here.10 I would submit, however, that it makes the most sense
to approach Platos corpus in the way that is suggested by a sweeping
look at the most obvious theme of the dialogues as a whole. That
theme is the life of Socrates. Accordingly, Plato himself would seem to
recommend an approach that focuses, in the first place, on his account
of Socrates life, and that follows the indications the dialogues provide
about the contribution each of them makes to understanding that life.
10. The most helpful discussion of these controversies, and especially of their
roots in the nineteenth century, divide between Friedrich Schleiermacher
and Karl Friedrich Hermann, is Kahn, Plato and the Socratic Dialogue, 36
48. For two discussions that approach the same issues from a perspective
different from Kahns, see Irwin, Platos Ethics, 316, and Vlastos, Socrates,
Ironist and Moral Philosopher, 45106.
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Unlike the common efforts to uncover the development of Platos own

thought as it purportedly moved away from its Socratic origins, this
approach is in accord not only with the surface of the dialogues but
also with Platos claim that there are no writings of Plato but that those
that bear his name belong to a Socrates who has become beautiful
and young.11
If one takes this approach to Platos dialogues, the dialogue that
most immediately suggests itself as the proper starting point, and as a
guide to the others, is the Apology of Socrates. Although this dialogue
occurs near the end of Socrates life, it contains the most direct portrait of that life. Socrates defense speech at his trial, as it is reported in
the Apology, even includes a kind of Socratic autobiography. According to this autobiography, the most important event in Socrates life
the event that gave his life its distinctive character was a report he
received of a pronouncement by the priestess who spoke for the god
at Delphi that no one surpassed him in wisdom.12 Socrates responded
to this report by devoting much of the rest of his life to the examination of his fellow citizens as a way of testing the gods claim, and
thus was born his distinctive form of philosophizing.13 Now, whatever
one makes of Socrates response to the pronouncement of the Delphic
Oracle whether one admires it as a model of piety, or raises an eyebrow at Socrates unwillingness simply to bow to the authority of the
god one of its outcomes, as Socrates stresses, was to arouse the ire
of many of Socrates fellow citizens. This outcome would have been
11. Second Letter 314c24. While Platos remark points to the central importance of his portrait of Socrates, it also suggests that that portrait may be
an embellishment of the historical Socrates. This remark from the Second
Letter should be considered together with Seventh Letter 341b7342a1,
another important statement by Plato on his own writings that is in harmony with the statement in the Second Letter. Although the authenticity of
Platos letters has been challenged, a strong defense of their authenticity
is Morrow, Platos Epistles, 316. See also Caskey, Again Platos Seventh
Letter, 22027; Rosen, Platos Symposium, xiiixviii.
12. Apology 20c421b5.
13. Apology 21b823c1.
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Introduction
predictable, for Socrates examinations of the claims to wisdom made

by some of his fellow citizens not only led to the humiliation of a
number of prominent Athenians, but also implied a refusal on his part
to accept the conventional or orthodox views of justice, nobility, and
other important matters.14 To make matters worse, Socrates did not
confine this refusal to himself but spread it to at least some of the young
Athenians who became his followers.15 Even in Athens, which was far
from the strictest of the ancient cities, such heterodoxy did more than
make one an outcast from the comfortable circle of communal belief.
We must not forget the simple fact that Socrates was on trial for his
life on charges of not believing in the gods of the city and corrupting
the young. If the fury of the Athenians is hard for us to grasp, that is
a reflection of the great difference between our own modern liberal
political orders and earlier ones that were not shaped by the modern
efforts to do away with the conflict that led to Socrates execution. In
short, the picture of Socrates life that emerges from the Apology is
one that confirms and goes a considerable way toward explaining the
conflict between that life and the city. The Apology teaches us never
to forget Socrates activity of relentless questioning, nor the ultimate
response to that activity by the city of Athens.
The picture of Socrates life that emerges from the Apology should
remain in our minds as we approach Platos other dialogues. This is
especially true of the Gorgias, for the Gorgias and the Apology are linked
in both minor and major ways. One of the minor links comes at the very
beginning of the Gorgias, where Socrates arrives on the scene together
with his friend Chaerephon, the same man whom he credits with asking the crucial question of the Delphic Oracle in the Apology. Of the
connections of more obvious significance, the clearest is the prominence of rhetoric as a theme in both dialogues. In the Apology, Socrates
denies that he either practices or teaches rhetoric, and he traces the
citys hostility toward him, in part, to the fact that he was slandered
14. See especially Apology 21c323a7.
15. See Apology 23c2d1, 33b9c4.
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11
for many years while no one spoke up on his behalf.16 Socrates suggests, then, that rhetoric might have helped to protect him, had he
been more willing to practice it himself or had someone practiced it
on his behalf. And this is tied to another broad issue that also links
the Gorgias to the Apology, the issue of what may be called, in broad
terms, the defensibility and the nobility of Socrates life. In a section
of the Apology that follows Socrates Delphic autobiography and his
direct response to the official charges against him, Socrates raises an
objection that sounds very similar to an objection Callicles raises in the
Gorgias. Perhaps someone would say, says Socrates, conjuring up a
potential critic of his life, Arent you ashamed of engaging in a pursuit
from which you now run the risk of dying?17 Not only does this objection sound as if it could have come from the mouth of Callicles, but
Socrates response in the Apology bears many similarities to positions
he takes in the Gorgias. Most important, he argues in both dialogues
that considerations of reputation and safety should be subordinated
to considerations of justice.18 At least in the Apology, however, the fact
that Socrates offers this argument as a response to an objection he
himself raised, and by doing so presents himself as a hero resembling
the great Achilles,19 should give us some pause. Moreover, while he
suggests that his life resembled that of Achilles in his willingness to
put justice above all other considerations, especially his concern to
protect his own life, Socrates goes on to respond to the understandable question of why his devotion to justice did not lead him into
politics by pointing to the risks to his life that political activity would
have entailed.20 The context, character, and seeming inconsistency of
Socrates self-presentation in this crucial section of the Apology should
16. See Apology 17a118c8.
17. Apology 28b35.
18. Compare, e.g., Apology 28b530c1 with Gorgias 508c4513d1 and 521b4
522e6.
19. See Apology 28b329b9.
20. Compare Apology 28b531c3 with 31c433a1, especially 32e233a1. Consider also 28d529a2 in light of 21a2c2.
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Introduction
lead us to wonder about its purpose. Might Socrates response to the

Calliclean objection he conjures up belong to an effort on his part
to win for himself a certain reputation in his most public and memorable of all speeches? In other words, it is reasonable to wonder
whether, despite Socrates disavowal of rhetoric, there is not something rhetorical about his speech at his trial. Could it be that Socrates
was more open to rhetoric than he explicitly suggests? To be sure, such
a conclusion would require attributing to Socrates a greater concern
with reputation and with the goods provided by reputation than his
explicit self-presentation suggests he had. But is it not possible that
that very self-presentation was a part, not to say the heart, of a kind of
rhetoric?
If the Apology leaves us wondering about these and related questions, the Gorgias can be of help. For in the Gorgias, we find a much
fuller treatment both of rhetoric and of the question of the defensibility and nobility of Socrates own life. Questions similar to those I
have just raised about the Apology will come up in the course of our
consideration of the Gorgias. For example, we will consider whether
Socrates famous arguments about justice including his striking
claim that doing injustice is always the greatest of all evils, and thus
always worse than suffering injustice should be read as straightforward expressions of his own convictions. What are we to make, for
instance, of Socrates frequently overlooked acknowledgment that, in
defending this claim, he is not defending a view that he knows to
be true but merely taking a position that no one he encounters can
oppose without becoming ridiculous? Might Socrates defense of this
claim serve more to reveal the depth of the human concern for justice,
even within the souls of such seeming cynics as Polus and Callicles,
than it does to uncover Socrates own deepest convictions? And might
Socrates, in defending this view and also in presenting his own life
as one of heroic resistance to Calliclean temptations, be pointing
toward a form of rhetoric that is nobler than the sophistic rhetoric
practiced by Gorgias? On this last point, it is of course well known
that the Gorgias contains a severe critique of rhetoric. In fact, this
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13
critique is second only to Socrates duel with Callicles as the most

memorable feature of the dialogue. But a thorough consideration of
the dialogue as a whole will challenge the common conclusion that
Socrates was simply a critic of rhetoric. Socrates critique of rhetoric,
I will suggest, should be understood as a critique only of a certain
kind of rhetoric, not as a critique of rhetoric as such. This surprising conclusion, together with the unsettling questions that will arise
about the true character and purpose of Socrates claims about justice, will lead to a new view of the lessons of the Gorgias. This new
view of the Gorgias can ultimately help us to see Socrates himself in
a new light, and to better understand the philosophic life he lived.
Finally, given the importance of the themes of rhetoric and the philosophic life in the Gorgias, a new understanding of the dialogue can
also shed light on the aims of Platos own literary-rhetorical project.
For the project through which Plato has given us a Socrates who
has become beautiful and young was guided by his appreciation
of the issues and problems that find their fullest expression in the
Gorgias.
Before concluding this introduction and turning to the body of my
study of the Gorgias, I should say a word about the sources I have
consulted in the course of my work on the dialogue. My interpretation
has been influenced by a consideration of the views of other scholars,
including classicists, philosophers, and political theorists. One of the
challenges of Platonic scholarship is to try somehow to synthesize or
at least to give due consideration to a wide range of interpretations,
produced by a wide range of approaches. I have tried to give a fair
hearing to and to learn from commentators who approach the text
with assumptions and interests very different from my own. I also have
been influenced by transcripts of two courses on the Gorgias taught
by Leo Strauss in 1957 and 1963. These transcripts have shaped my
views of the Gorgias as much as any published work I have read. I have
benefited from E. R. Doddss authoritative edition of the Gorgias and
his excellent commentary. Unless otherwise noted, all references in the
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Introduction
body of my text are to Doddss edition of the Gorgias. The translations

from the Greek are my own, although I have frequently consulted
the recent translation of the dialogue by James Nichols Jr. All other
references to classical texts are in the footnotes; they refer to the most
widely available Greek texts, which for Platos works are the Oxford
editions edited by John Burnet.
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1 Examining the Master of Rhetoric
he Gorgias is divided into three main sections of unequal length.

The shortest of the three sections is Socrates opening conver-
sation with Gorgias, which is followed by a longer conversation with

Polus, and then by Socrates much longer confrontation with Callicles.
This movement from briefer to lengthier conversations would seem to
mirror the dialogues ascent in intensity. That is, the dramatic tension
is greater and the themes are more profound in the Polus section than
in the Gorgias section, and the Polus section is surpassed in turn by
the Callicles section.1 Yet the impression conveyed by this movement,
as I stressed in the introduction, should not lead us to overlook the

crucial question of the unity of the dialogue: What ties the three sections together? Nor should we overlook the fact that the dialogue is
called Gorgias, a title that may be intended to call attention to the special importance of the opening section of the dialogue as somehow
holding the key to its unity.
A more obvious reason that the dialogue is named after Gorgias is
that he is the person to whom Socrates has come to speak as the dialogue opens (447a1c4). He is also by far the most eminent of Socrates
three interlocutors. A man who in his own time and for several generations afterwards would need no introduction, Gorgias was one of
1. Many have stressed this feature of the dialogue. See, e.g., Friedlander,
Plato,
2:244; Taylor, Plato, 11516; Jaeger, Paideia, 2:138; Dodds, Gorgias, 45;
Voegelin, Plato, 28; Kahn, Drama and Dialectic in Platos Gorgias, 76.
15
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Examining the Master of Rhetoric
the ancient worlds most famous rhetoricians and teachers of rhetoric.

Although he came from Sicily, Gorgias was a cosmopolitan man who
spent his life traveling from city to city. His travels were business travels. He was in search of audiences to whom he could display his art of
rhetoric and students to whom he could teach it. Since he accepted pay
for teaching the art of clever speaking, and since he was surely in some
sense a wise man, Gorgias can be loosely classed as a sophist.2 Yet
Gorgias is distinguished from at least many of the sophists, and in particular from Protagoras, the most famous of all sophists, by his denial
that he was a teacher of virtue. Unlike Protagoras and many other
sophists, Gorgias limited his teaching to rhetoric; and he imposed this
limitation on himself not out of humility but out of disdain for those
who claimed to teach virtue.3 Gorgias opinion of himself, if not of the
worth of teaching virtue, was just as high as Protagoras. In fact, it
was so high that, if reports can be trusted, he liked to appear on public
occasions wearing a purple robe styled after the robe worn by the king
of Persia, and when he visited Delphi his offering was a golden statue
of himself.4
Gorgias pride is on full display when we meet him in the Gorgias.
He boasts that he can answer any question put to him (447d6448a2),
laments that no one has asked him anything new for many years
(448a23), and proclaims that he is no ordinary rhetorician but a
good one, if you wish to call me, as Homer says, what I boast that
2. In the Greater Hippias, Socrates refers to Gorgias as the sophist from
Leontini (282b45). The question of whether Gorgias should be regarded
as a sophist has been a matter of considerable debate. The most direct discussion of the issue is Harrison, Was Gorgias a Sophist? 18392; See also
Kerferd, The Sophistic Movement, 26, 4445; Rankin, Sophists, Socratics,
and Cynics, 3545; Romilly, The Great Sophists in Periclean Athens, 2, 6073,
9597; Consigny, Gorgias, Sophist and Artist, 132; Dodds, Gorgias, 610.
3. See Meno 95b9c4; consider also Philebus 58a7b3, Greater Hippias 282b4
c1. Compare Protagoras 316c5320c4.
4. See Dodds, Gorgias, 9; Philostratus, Lives of the Sophists, I.9.16. On Gorgias
pride and wealth, see also Romilly, The Great Sophists of Periclean Athens,
5, 3536; Kerferd, The Sophistic Movement, 26.
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17
I am (449a78). When Socrates arrives at the beginning of the dialogue, Gorgias has recently finished giving a display of his powers. As
he learns from Callicles, with whom Gorgias is staying during his visit
to Athens, Socrates has shown up too late and missed the splendid
feast (447a16).5
THE PRELUDE (447a1449c8)
Socrates blames his late arrival on his companion Chaerephon, who

caused him to miss Gorgias display by compelling him to linger in
the agora (447a78). In greater need of an explanation than his late
arrival, however, would seem to be Socrates desire to come at all. But
the opening of the dialogue encourages us to consider these questions
together: Why was Socrates delayed in the agora? And why was he
eager to leave behind whatever he was doing in the agora in order
to come to see Gorgias? A possible answer to the first of these questions emerges if we consider the man who kept Socrates in the agora:
Chaerephon. For it may be no mere coincidence that this is the same
Chaerephon who, according to Socrates autobiography in the Apology,
asked the famous question of the Delphic Oracle Is there anyone
wiser than Socrates? which set in motion Socrates efforts to examine his fellow citizens in order to test the veracity of the gods answer
5. The precise location of the conversation presented in the Gorgias is left

unclear. While some have suggested that the dialogue takes place at Callicles
house, Dodds has convincingly argued that it is more likely that it occurs
in some unspecified public building in which Gorgias has been speaking.
Dodds suggests that, after an initial encounter between the main participants outside the building, they then move indoors. See Dodds, Gorgias,
188. Consider 447c7, d6. See also Saxonhouse, An Unspoken Theme in
Platos Gorgias, 141; Taylor, Plato, 106.
The date of the conversation is also unclear. The dramatic date of the
Gorgias is impossible to establish due to a series of conflicting indications
within the text itself. On this issue, see Dodds, Gorgias, 1718; Benardete,
The Rhetoric of Morality and Philosophy, 7; Taylor, Plato, 1045; Fussi, Why
Is the Gorgias So Bitter? 42.
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that no one surpassed him in wisdom.6 Since the examinations that

were made necessary by the gods answer to Chaerephons question
took place in public,7 there may be a deeper meaning to Socrates
claim that he was compelled by Chaerephon to linger in the agora.
Whatever the true nature of the compulsion in question,8 Socrates
lingering in the agora may refer to the time he was forced to spend
investigating the claims to knowledge raised by his fellow citizens.
In other words, it may refer to his activity of dialectical crossexamination that at a certain point in his life became central to his
search for wisdom.9 If that is what Socrates is referring to, his interest
in speaking to Gorgias comes to sight as a departure from that activity,
although perhaps one connected to it. Could Socrates activity in the
agora somehow contribute to his eagerness to seek out Gorgias? To
avoid speculating any further, let us limit ourselves for now to observing that Socrates unidentified activity in the agora forms the backdrop
against which the Gorgias unfolds.
Socrates claims that he has come to see Gorgias because he wishes
to learn from him the power of the mans art, and what it is that
he proclaims and teaches (447c23). Now, the most straightforward
way of learning these things would seem to be to watch a display such
as the one Gorgias has just completed before Socrates arrival. But
Socrates rejects the offer of another display by Gorgias. He says that
he wishes instead to converse (dialechthenai) with Gorgias (447b1c4).
Socrates preference for a conversation rather than a display a
6. See Apology 20e621b9. That the role played by Chaerephon at the beginning of the Gorgias establishes a link with the Apology is suggested also by
Saxonhouse, An Unspoken Theme in Platos Gorgias, 1401, and Seung,
Plato Rediscovered, 28.
7. See Apology 21b823d2, 29c631a7.
8. Consider Apology 37e338a8.
9. On Socrates turn to his distinctive dialectical activity, see, in addition
to Apology 20c423d2, Phaedo 96a6102a1. See also Phaedrus 229c6230d5;
Xenophon, Memorablia, I.2.1116. Bruell, On the Socratic Education, 1428,
helps to illuminate the passage from the Apology.
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19
preference for what would seem to be a less direct path to his stated
aims adds to the mystery surrounding his intentions in coming to
see Gorgias. And further adding to that mystery is Socrates decision
not to question Gorgias directly, but to begin by using Chaerephon
as a front man (see 447b8d5). By pushing forward and urging on
Chaerephon, a pale and skinny man nicknamed the bat, who was
perhaps the strangest of Socrates many strange friends,10 Socrates
provokes a skirmish between Chaerephon and Polus, an admirer of
Gorgias who displays the appropriateness of his name, colt, by leaping in to answer in Gorgias place. The bat takes on the colt, or,
alternatively, the poor mans Socrates takes on the poor mans Gorgias,
in what is supposed to be an examination of the identity of Gorgias
art but ends up as a comedy leading to a speech by Polus in praise of
Gorgias art as the noblest of all arts (447d6448c9).
Since Chaerephon proves to be less than a master of crossexamination, Socrates must step in to object to Polus speech. And
we may safely assume that Socrates never intended to let Chaerephon
do all of his work for him. Nor does Socrates want to spend much time
speaking with Polus. He shoves him out of the way so that he can speak
with Gorgias. Socrates does this by complaining to Gorgias about
Polus speech: rather than answering Chaerephons question by identifying Gorgias art that is, by saying what it is Polus instead praised
that art as if someone were blaming it (448d1e4). In other words,
Socrates complains that Polus gave a rhetorical rather than a dialectical answer. With this complaint, together with Socrates further elaboration of it (448e6449a2), an important distinction between rhetoric
and dialectics begins to emerge out of the din of this early bickering
(see especially 448d910). The most obvious difference between the
two, according to Socrates suggestions, is that rhetoric involves giving long speeches, whereas dialectics involves brief questions and brief
answers (449b4c6). But Socrates also points to another, perhaps more
10. Chaerephons peculiarities made him a favorite target of Aristophanes
ridicule. See Clouds 104, 144ff., 5034, 831, 1465; Birds 1296, 1564.
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fundamental, difference through his complaint about Polus speech:

the difference between praising something as if someone were blaming it, on the one hand, and saying what that thing is, on the other (see
again 448e37).11
Socrates thus succeeds, even before beginning his conversation with
Gorgias, in bringing to the surface the difference or, perhaps better,
the issue of the difference between Gorgias art of rhetoric and his
own art of dialectics. To be sure, Socrates early treatment of this issue
would seem to be critical of rhetoric. And yet we must bear in mind
that rhetoric is the art about which Socrates has come to speak with
Gorgias. The dramatic situation, in other words, may shed light on the
conversation. As we have already observed, Socrates has come to one
of the most renowned rhetoricians to inquire about rhetoric, leaving
the agora where, we may surmise, he was practicing dialectics. By the
end of the prelude to their conversation, Socrates has secured Gorgias
commitment to have a dialectical discussion. But it will be a dialectical
discussion about rhetoric and one, we may suspect, that will differ in
its aims from Socrates agora dialectics. In any case, the prelude
we have considered does not solve, but serves only to introduce, the
mystery of Socrates interest in Gorgias.
THE ENSNARING OF GORGIAS, PART ONE (449c9455a7)
If the prelude has already indicated something about the character of

rhetoric, Socrates conveys something further through the analogies he
offers as he begins to question Gorgias about his art. Socrates analogies are the arts of weaving and making music (449d24). Although
he brings up these arts merely to illustrate the sense in which the various arts stand in relation to various beings (e.g., the art of weaving is
11. See Nichols, The Rhetoric of Justice in Platos Gorgias, 1312: According
to Socrates, whereas dialectic seeks to state what a thing is, rhetoric praises
or blames by proclaiming what kind of thing something is. At first sight
rhetoric involves praise and blame, whereas dialectic seeks knowledge that
is more fundamental and, perhaps, dispassionate.
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21
about [peri] the production of cloaks), Socrates choice of these two

arts as his examples heightens our suspicion that his knowledge of
rhetoric runs deeper than he lets on. For couldnt rhetoric be described
as a kind of weaving of speeches rather than threads to create
protective cloaks?12 And doesnt rhetoric move mens passions and
bewitch their souls in a manner similar to music?13 Despite these indications that he is not without some understanding already, Socrates
presents himself as eager to learn about rhetoric from Gorgias. The
question he puts to him to initiate their conversation is, What among
the beings is rhetoric about? (449d12), or, reformulated, About
which of the beings is rhetoric a science? (449d9). Gorgias initial
reply is, about speeches (449e1). But Socrates quickly points out that
rhetoric is surely not about all speeches; it is not about the speeches,
for example, that make clear to the sick by what way of life they would
become healthy (449e14). If we put the suggestion conveyed by this
example together with that conveyed by the preceding analogies, we
are led to the suggestion that rhetoric more closely resembles an art
that provides protection through the creation of cloaks and an art that
sways mens passions than it does an art that might clarify the path to
true health.
The purpose at hand, however, is not to uncover Socrates view of
rhetoric but to learn about the art from Gorgias, the presumed master. Or rather, this is Socrates professed purpose, as we have seen.
Socrates opening question about rhetoric is only the beginning of a
long examination of Gorgias about the nature of his art. Yet this examination will ultimately lead to the ensnaring of Gorgias in a kind of
Socratic trap: Gorgias will be lured into a crucial blunder, which will
then allow Socrates to win a victory over him. Since their conversation
ends in this way, and since we have already been given reason to wonder about Socrates motive in approaching Gorgias and to suspect that
Socrates knows more about rhetoric than he lets on, we should keep
12. Cf. Protagoras 316d3e5.
13. Cf. Gorgias, Encomium of Helen, 811.
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awake our doubts that Socrates professed purpose is the final word
about his true purpose. But it is better to withhold judgment about
Socrates true purpose until we have followed the steps in his examination of Gorgias. Before considering why Socrates ensnares Gorgias,
we need to see precisely how he ensnares him.
Socrates has already given two statements of his guiding question to Gorgias. His second formulation, which speaks of rhetoric
as a science (episteme, 449d9), has the effect of drawing Gorgias
attention more directly to the knowledge possessed by the rhetorician; and Gorgias affirms that he regards the rhetorician as a knower
(see 449e56). Yet this movement makes even more difficult the task
that Socrates sets for Gorgias of distinguishing rhetoric from the
other arts, since many of the other arts can also be said to be about
speeches, namely, about those speeches that concern the subject matter (to pragma) of which each art has knowledge (see especially 450b1
2). For instance, just as the medical art is about speeches (those about
diseases), so the gymnastic art is also about speeches (those about
the good and bad condition of bodies). Are these and other such arts,
Socrates asks, also to be regarded as rhetorical since they are about
speeches (450a3b5)? Gorgias first attempt to escape this difficulty is
not to point to a particular subject matter (a pragma) of which rhetoric
alone among the arts has knowledge, but rather to suggest that rhetoric
is distinctive because it operates entirely through speeches. Unlike the
other arts, each of which involves some handiwork toward which the
artisans knowledge is directed, rhetoric, according to Gorgias, has its
entire action and efficacy through speeches (450b6c2). But this will
not suffice. For while there are indeed many arts that involve a considerable amount of handiwork, Socrates reminds Gorgias that rhetoric is
far from the only art that operates primarily through speeches. Arithmetic, calculation, geometry, draughts-playing, and many other arts
involve just as little handiwork and operate just as exclusively through
speeches as rhetoric does (450d4451a6). Thus, Socrates reasserts the
issue to Gorgias: try to say what rhetoric, which has its power in
speeches, is about (451a67).
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That Socrates goes on at considerable length to explain how various

arts are about various subject matters (see 451a7c9) makes only
more striking the extreme brevity of Gorgias responses throughout
this opening section of their conversation. In fact, this is the most
striking feature of Gorgias early attempts to distinguish rhetoric from
the other arts. Next to Socrates lengthier speeches, Gorgias replies
are so remarkably brief that it becomes increasingly difficult to explain
them merely by Gorgias desire to live up to his playful boast that his
vast rhetorical repertoire includes even an unsurpassable capacity for
brief-speaking (see 449b6c8). A more serious reason that Gorgias is
so unforthcoming suggests itself if we reflect on the topic at hand:
the difference between rhetoric and the other arts. For whereas in the
other arts, as Socrates has indicated, the speeches of any given art are
speeches about the subject matter of which that art has knowledge,
that is, about the pragma of the art (see again especially 450b23), this
can be questioned in the case of rhetoric. Is it really true that what
the rhetorician speaks about is the same thing that he knows? Might
it not be the case, instead, that while the rhetorician gives speeches
about many subjects, and most importantly about justice, injustice,
and other such matters, what he knows is not so much these subjects
themselves as the effects that speeches about them have on peoples
souls?14 If so, then the true subject matter of rhetoric is only in a sense
speeches. In a deeper and more precise sense it is the passions or the
human soul, as opposed to the subjects about which the rhetorician
speaks.
But why would this lead Gorgias to give such brief answers? Why
wouldnt he explain the difference between rhetoric and the other arts
and correct the false impression that the relationship of rhetoric to its
subject matter is as simple as that of the other arts? The reason he
14. Consider Protagoras 312d3e6, Phaedrus 259e1260a4, 267a6b2, 272c10

273c5. See also Gorgias, Encomium of Helen, 811. On Gorgias appreciation
of the psychological impact of rhetorical speeches, see Romilly, The Great
Sophists in Periclean Athens, 6569.
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does not do so, and the explanation of his brevity, is unlikely to be

a lack of understanding on Gorgias part. A more plausible explanation, especially given Gorgias expertise, is that he is aware that the
difference between rhetoric and the other arts is not unproblematic
for rhetoric. For if rhetoric has the character just ascribed to it, a
problem becomes visible: when speaking about justice, injustice, and
other such matters, the rhetorician must give the impression that these
are his primary concerns, although his deepest concerns or the true
objects of his attention are the souls of his listeners and the effects
his speeches will have on them. But doesnt this expose rhetoric to the
charge of deception and manipulation in matters in which honesty
is most demanded?15 And doesnt rhetoric thus appear as the most
morally questionable of all arts? Gorgias brevity, I suggest, reflects an
awareness of this problem and thus of the need to conceal the true
character of his art. To put this suggestion another way, his brevity is
the brevity of reserve or caution, not a sign of slowness or of pride in
his capacity for brief-speaking.
But Socrates gives Gorgias a chance to be more forthcoming about
his art by shifting the central question as he moves forward. Socrates
guiding question to Gorgias has so far been, in short, What is rhetoric
about? (see especially 449d12, d89, 450b35, 451a67). But after
reconfirming Gorgias view that rhetoric operates through speeches,
Socrates now asks: What is this thing among the beings that these
speeches that rhetoric uses are about? (451d16). Although it had
already been stressed that rhetoric operates through speeches, only
now does Socrates ask about the subject of those speeches themselves,
as opposed to the matter of which the art itself has knowledge. This
difference may appear slight, but its significance can be seen by reflecting on the possible divide that I have sketched between what the
rhetorician knows and what he speaks about. Socrates new question, no longer requesting an identification of the deepest object of
15. Compare Apology 17a118a6; see also Romilly, The Great Sophists in
Periclean Athens, 6869.
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the rhetoricians knowledge, allows for a franker and fuller answer.

And Gorgias takes the opening he has been offered, thus confirming
that caution has been the source of his restraint. Although still brief,
Gorgias response is now much bolder: the speeches that rhetoric uses
are about the greatest and best of human affairs (pragmaton)

(451d7
8). With this response, the first glimmers of Gorgias view of rhetoric
become visible. But since Gorgias continues to show some reserve by
clinging to his brief-speaking, Socrates responds to Gorgias bolder
answer with a further maneuver. First, he twists Gorgias answer by
acting as if his claim was not that rhetoric speaks about the greatest
and best of human affairs but rather that rhetoric provides human
beings with the greatest and best benefit (compare 452a45 and c6d4
with 451d58). Socrates is then able to provoke Gorgias by presenting
him with three rivals who would challenge Gorgias (supposed) claim
that rhetoric provides the greatest good for human beings. Reminding
him of a drinking song according to which to be healthy is best, second is to have become beautiful, and third is to get rich without fraud,
Socrates conjures up a doctor, a physical trainer, and a moneymaker
to defend the arts that provide each of these goods and to ask Gorgias
what benefit could possibly justify the supremacy of rhetoric (451d9
452d4). Although he distances himself somewhat from this challenge
by speaking as the voice of these rivals, Socrates not-so-subtle strategy
here hardly rises above the level of taunting. To crack Gorgias reserve,
Socrates uses a blunt weapon to strike at his pride.
While his attack is crude, Socrates proves to have chosen his target
well. Gorgias responds to the demand of his rivals that he identify this
greatest good that rhetoric provides for human beings (see 452c8d4)
by giving a bolder and fuller statement than any he has given thus
far. The good that rhetoric provides, he proclaims, is that which is
truly the greatest good and the cause of freedom for human beings
themselves and at the same time of rule over others in each mans own
city (452d58). Despite its boldness, however, Gorgias statement is
not without ambiguity. For what, according to Gorgias, is the greatest
good? Is it the possession of his art itself or the freedom and rule of
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which the art is the cause? A literal reading of his statement suggests
the former, but that is a more enigmatic answer than the latter.16
To understand the ambiguity of Gorgias reply, we must consider
his own situation as a teacher of rhetoric. Gorgias himself is a rhetorician, but not one who has directed his art to its typical end. Rather than
enter politics himself, he is content to train aspiring politicians in the
art of speaking persuasively. This choice may reflect a kind of respect or
appreciation on his part for knowledge itself, or at least for the expertise that belongs to his art; yet the knowledge or expertise to which
he has devoted himself would seem to be directed toward the service
of other ends.17 Certainly, Gorgias must appeal to these other ends in
order to attract students, who are eager to possess the rhetorical art not
for its own sake but for the sake of those ends, or, stated more bluntly,
he must advertise with a more alluring slogan than learn rhetoric for
its own sake.18 Gorgias advertising becomes clear in his response to
Socrates request that he say more about the great good that rhetoric
provides. No longer speaking as if the art of rhetoric were somehow
itself the greatest good that is, no longer preserving the ambiguity
of his preceding statement Gorgias indicates his interest in potential
students by speaking to them directly:19
I at any rate say that [the good provided by rhetoric] is to be able, by
using speeches, to persuade judges in law courts, councilors in the council,
assemblymen in the assembly, and in any other gathering, whenever there
16. Cf. Benardete, The Rhetoric of Morality and Philosophy, 17.

17. Consider Republic 341c4342e11, 345e5346d8; see also Nichols, The
Rhetoric of Justice in Platos Gorgias, 135.
18. See Dodds, Gorgias, 10: Men like Callicles did not pay high fees to Gorgias because they enjoyed playing tricks with words, but because they were
hungry for power.
19. We can gather from this passage and from others (see, e.g., 455c6d5, 458b4
c5) that an audience is watching the conversation between Socrates and
Gorgias. When Gorgias uses the second person in his following statement,
he is speaking directly to the members of that audience. On this issue, see
Lewis, Refutative Rhetoric as True Rhetoric in the Gorgias, 1989.
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is a political gathering. And in fact with this power you will have the doctor
as your slave, and the trainer as your slave and that moneymaker will
come to sight as a moneymaker for another, not for himself, but for you,
the one with the ability to speak and to persuade multitudes. (452e18)
If Gorgias pride is one spur to frankness, his related desire to expand

his following of students is another. And most important is the character of his bold and frank appeal to potential students. Promising
them power and success, he expresses no qualms at the prospect of
manipulation and exploitation.20
Given the blunt and amoral tone of Gorgias statement, we may
be surprised that Socrates does not respond to this statement with a
condemnation of rhetoric. Instead, he responds by embarking with
Gorgias on a joint effort to clarify further the nature of rhetoric, an
effort that has at least the appearance of elaborating a view they share
(consider 452e9455a7). Among the points acknowledged, the soul
is now mentioned for the first time as the object of the rhetoricians
concern: the rhetorician aims to produce persuasion in the souls of his
listeners (see 453a47). Also, Gorgias now speaks even more openly
about the most important topics of the speeches used by rhetoric.
Perhaps encouraged by the impression that he and Socrates are in
agreement, Gorgias distinguishes rhetoric from the many other arts
that can also be said to produce persuasion by saying that rhetoric
produces persuasion in law courts and in other mobs, and about the
things that are just and unjust (454b57). Rhetoric uses speeches
that are, above all, about justice, and it is further distinguished
20. Kastely, In Defense of Platos Gorgias, 100, is wrong to claim that Gorgias
does not defend rhetoric as a means to increase personal power; he sees
it as an art existing for the benefit of the community. Romilly, The Great
Sophists of Periclean Athens, 6870, and Weiss, Oh, Brother! 2034, present
more nuanced views, but they, too, describe Gorgias as more public-spirited
than he is. More accurate, in my view, are Dodds, Gorgias, 10; Nichols,
The Rhetoric of Justice in Platos Gorgias, 1335; Rankin, Sophists, Socratics, and Cynics, 43; Murray, Plato on Power, Moral Responsibility and the
Alleged Neutrality of Gorgias Art of Rhetoric, 3579.
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from those arts that produce persuasion by teaching people about

their subject matters. Unlike those arts that produce knowledge,
rhetoric produces the persuasion of mere belief, or, as Socrates puts
it, rhetoric is a craftsman of belief-instilling [pisteutikes] rather than
didactic [didaskalikes] persuasion about the just and the unjust
(454e9455a2).
This last point might seem to be a serious criticism of rhetoric. Is it
not a sign of rhetorics inferiority to the didactic arts, and even of its
manipulative character, that rhetoric produces belief (or trust, pistis)
rather than knowledge? Yet Socrates offers a defense of the manner
in which rhetoric operates. His defense of rhetoric is as simple as it is
powerful: the rhetorician must stick to mere belief-instilling persuasion (pisteutikes peithous) because he would not be able in a short time
to teach such a large mob such great matters (455a57).21 That this
argument is offered by Socrates rather than Gorgias strengthens the
impression at this point that Socrates and Gorgias are in agreement.
If their conversation ended here, it would be very hard to see what
might divide them. And the argument that Socrates makes is certainly
not without force. Since political life requires even the wisest speakers
to speak for limited amounts of time before many who do not share
their wisdom, effective political speech must include appeals to mere
opinions or beliefs, appeals that have the necessary effect of strengthening or further instilling those very opinions or beliefs. This necessity preventing political speech from being simply didactic has been
explained best by one of the wisest of all political speakers, Thucydides
Diodotus, who famously described the necessity in the same speech in
which he bowed to it.22 Socrates own acknowledgment of the truth of
the basic Diodotean insight into the nature of political speech should
21. Compare Apology 18e519a7, 37a2b2. See also Benardete, The Rhetoric
of Morality and Philosophy, 2122; Saxonhouse, An Unspoken Theme in
Platos Gorgias, 141.
22. See Thucydides 3.4243. On this passage in Thucydides, see Orwin,
The Humanity of Thucydides, 15862, Democracy and Distrust, 31325;
Bolotin, Thucydides, 2831.
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make us wonder where exactly the difference between Socrates and

Gorgias lies, and whether Socrates is not a more complicated, not to
say less hostile, critic of rhetoric than he is generally taken to be. At any
rate, we should keep this passage in mind when we come to Socrates
later criticisms of rhetoric and as we continue to wonder about the
still unanswered question of Socrates interest in Gorgias.23
THE ENSNARING OF GORGIAS, PART TWO (455a8461b2)
If the impression that he and Socrates are on the same page has encouraged Gorgias to be outspoken about his art, Socrates gives Gorgias a
further push before abandoning him. Socrates gives this further push
by combining another argument meant to ruffle Gorgias pride in his
art with a direct appeal to Gorgias desire to attract students. Socrates
argues, first, that when cities make some of their most important decisions, they turn for counsel, not to rhetoricians, but to experts in the
arts most relevant to the matters at hand; for instance, they turn to doctors or shipwrights when they are choosing doctors or shipwrights, to
architects when they are constructing walls, harbors, or dockyards,
and to skilled generals when they are making battle plans (455b2c2).
Or what do you have to say about these things, Gorgias? (455c23).
23. Most commentators share the views of Barker, Greek Political Theory, 134,
that Socrates and Plato held a severely unfavorable view of rhetoric, and
Romilly, The Great Sophists in Periclean Athens, 71, that one of the aims of
the Gorgias is to reject rhetoric utterly. See, e.g., Jaeger, Paideia, 2:127
32; Friedlander,
Plato, 2:24755; Grote, Plato, and the Other Companions of

Sokrates, 2:3701; Dilman, Morality and the Inner Life, 1424; Irwin, Platos
Ethics, 9597. More nuanced views can be found in Nichols, The Rhetoric of
Justice in Platos Gorgias, 13149; Weiss, Oh, Brother! 195206; Kastely,
In Defense of Platos Gorgias, 96109; Black, Platos View of Rhetoric,
36174. As Black points out, there are a number of passages in other dialogues that support the suggestion that Socrates and Plato held a more
complicated and less negative view of rhetoric than most suppose. In
addition to Phaedrus 259e1279c8, see Republic 414b8415c7, 459c8d2,
493c10494a5; Statesman 303e7304e1; Laws 663a9664c2.
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To make sure that Gorgias will respond to this question or challenge

with the least possible detachment, Socrates then reminds him of his
claim to be a teacher of rhetoric and urges him to bear in mind that
there may be potential students among those listening to their conversation (455c38).24 Socrates even goes so far as to present himself as
a kind of recruiter for Gorgias. Or, more precisely, he presents himself as a go-between who is promoting Gorgias business (see 455c5)
while also speaking up for Gorgias potential students who may be
too ashamed to ask the questions on their minds (see 455c6d1).
The shame that may be holding these potential students back may
extend beyond their hesitancy to question such a prominent man as
Gorgias. For their questions, spoken through the mouth of Socrates,
are blunt and self-interested: What will there be for us, Gorgias, if
we associate with you? About what things will we be able to counsel the city? About only the just and the unjust or also about those
things Socrates just mentioned? (455d2e4). Socrates could not pose
the challenge in a more provocative way: Try, then, to answer them
(455e5).
The temptation that Socrates holds out to Gorgias proves to be more
than he can resist. Socrates has been dangling a piece of bait in front
of Gorgias, and Gorgias quickly seizes it. Announcing his intention to
reveal clearly the whole power of rhetoric, he begins by objecting to
one of the examples in Socrates previous argument. For surely you
know, he protests, that these dockyards and the Athenian walls and
the preparation of the harbors have come about from Themistocles
counsel, and others from Pericles, not from the craftsmen (455d6
e3). Gorgias invocation of Themistocles and Pericles, the greatest of
all Athenian statesmen-rhetoricians and the men most responsible for
endon onton)
at 455c6 refers, as
24. Socrates reference to those inside (ton
Dodds explains, to those who had been listening to Gorgias earlier speech
and are now observing the conversation between Socrates and Gorgias. See
Dodds, Gorgias, 209.
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the rise of the Athenian empire, is only a prelude to his longest speech,
which proclaims and celebrates the power of rhetoric.
In his speech, Gorgias argues that rhetoric is a kind of master ability,
because it is the only art that is able to gather under itself all of the
other arts and to put them into its service or into the service of the man
who possesses it (456a78; see again 452e48). This bold claim is to
some extent obscured by Gorgias first example, in which he describes
his own ability as a rhetorician to help his brother and other doctors
by convincing their patients to submit to painful treatments (456b1
5). Although this example conveys the impression that the rhetorician
is an excellent servant of others, Gorgias is unwilling to leave matters
at that, and he goes on to make a much different argument on behalf
of rhetoric. Rhetoric allows the rhetorician himself, if he wishes, to
triumph in any public contest. For instance, if a rhetorician were to
enter a city to compete with a doctor in a contest that required each of
them to speak in the assembly about why he should be chosen as the
citys doctor, the doctor would get nowhere and the rhetorician would
get the job if he wanted it (455b6c2). And the doctor is just one of
the craftsmen who could easily be defeated by the rhetorician, for
there is nothing about which the rhetorician would not speak more
persuasively than any of the other craftsmen before a crowd (456c6
d5). In short, Gorgias argument is that rhetoric is so powerful that the
rhetorician always wins (see 456c67).
But there is a problem with this argument. For, although it may
be a strong argument for the power of rhetoric, arent the victories
that rhetoric enables the rhetorician to win over the other craftsmen
undeserved? Gorgias argument, in other words, draws attention to
what makes rhetoric so attractive to potential students, but it does
so at the expense of highlighting what is dubious about rhetoric: the
ability to win undeserved victories is an ability that enables one not
only to defeat the other arts but also to triumph over justice itself. This
problem helps to explain the dramatic and sudden turn that occurs
in the middle of Gorgias speech. Immediately after boasting about
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the power rhetoric gives the rhetorician, Gorgias changes course and
argues that rhetoric must not be used unjustly (see 456c6d5; the shift
comes at 456c7).25 According to Gorgias new argument, rhetoric is
like any other powerful skill such as skill in boxing or the ability to
fight with weapons that must not be turned to an unjust use. And if
it is ever turned to an unjust use, he argues, the teacher should not be
blamed or punished, since he imparted the art to be used justly and did
not expect the student to abuse his skill: If someone, having become
a rhetorician, does injustice with this power and art, one should not
hate the teacher and expel him from the cities. For he imparted it for
the sake of a just use, but the student used it differently. It is just, then,
to hate, expel, and kill the one who uses it incorrectly, but not the one
who teaches it (457b5c3).
Now, this remarkable change in Gorgias speech reflects his awareness of the straits in which the dubiousness of rhetoric leaves him as
a teacher of rhetoric who has spoken so openly about the power of
rhetoric. Wanting to trumpet the power of his art in order to attract
students, Gorgias is caught between this desire and his awareness that
the teacher of an unjust art must worry about the wrath of the cities.
This tension governs his speech, explaining its movement (compare
especially 456b6c6 with 457a4c3).26 Yet to say that Gorgias has an
awareness of the problem posed by his boasts about the power of
rhetoric is not to say that his awareness is sufficiently acute or that
his solution to the problem is satisfactory. His solution, to repeat, is to
claim that he imparts the art of rhetoric to be used justly and thus to
try to shift all of the blame to the student whenever it is used unjustly.
But this is hardly convincing, since surely a teacher must bear some
responsibility for the unjust use to which a student puts his lessons,
especially if that teacher attracts students in the first place by holding
25. This shift in Gorgias speech is stressed also by Benardete, The Rhetoric of
Morality and Philosophy, 23; see also Weiss, Oh, Brother! 199202.
26. Compare Protagoras 316b8d3. A similar tension can be found in Protagoras
famous speech, which runs from 320c8 to 328d2 of the Protagoras.
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out a vision of the undeserved victories his students will be able to win
once they possess his art (see again 452e18, 456b6c6). Gorgias has
said much more than he should have. He has crossed a crucial line by
drawing so much attention to the power of rhetoric for accomplishing
unjust ends. Perhaps if his art were indeed all-powerful, he would have
no need to worry about its public reputation. But the power of rhetoric
is not so great that it can overcome the need for concealment.27
Considering the retreat with which his speech ends, Gorgias must
have some sense that he made a mistake in the first part of his speech.
If this leaves him worried after his speech, Socrates immediate reply
cannot be encouraging. For Socrates tells Gorgias that he has spotted an inconsistency in what Gorgias has said (457e15). In other
words, Socrates lets Gorgias know that he now has him on a hook.
And Socrates sets this hook more deeply in Gorgias mouth by giving a long speech about the difference between competitive arguers
who love victory and truth-seekers who would gladly be refuted if they
said something false (457c4458b3). Claiming to belong to the latter
group himself, Socrates gives Gorgias the choice of affirming that he,
too, is such a person and thus continuing the conversation or breaking off the conversation where it stands. This choice, of course, is
no real choice at all, since no one with a sense of pride could well
declare himself a lover of victory who would prefer flight to refutation. Gorgias makes some effort to squirm off the hook by appealing
to the members of the audience, who, he points out, must be tired from
watching the display he gave even before Socrates arrival (458b4c2).
But this feeble attempt at escape backfires when Chaerephon and
Callicles speak for the whole audience in urging Gorgias and Socrates
to continue (458c3d4). As he himself acknowledges, Gorgias is stuck,
27. Gorgias dilemma is discussed also by Kahn, Drama and Dialectic in Platos
Gorgias, 8084; Shorey, What Plato Said, 1367; Nichols, The Rhetoric of
Justice in Platos Gorgias, 1334; Romilly, The Great Sophists in Periclean
Athens, 6870; Benardete, The Rhetoric of Morality and Philosophy, 2425;
Murray, Plato on Power, Moral Responsibility and the Alleged Neutrality
of Gorgias Art of Rhetoric, 35961.
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since it would be shameful to abandon the conversation, especially

for a man who boasts that he can answer any question put to him (see
458d7e2).
Socrates proceeds slowly. He also proceeds in a direction that
comes as a surprise, because he does not expose Gorgias nearly as
harshly as he could. First, Socrates addresses a point that thus far has
been left unclarified. According to the earlier account of rhetoric at
which Socrates and Gorgias had arrived, rhetoric is effective when the
rhetorician is speaking to an audience that does not have knowledge
of the subjects about which the rhetorician speaks. In short, rhetoric is
persuasion of nonknowers. Socrates now repeats this point, but adds
another: not only is rhetoric persuasion of nonknowers, but it is also
persuasion by nonknowers. Or rather, Socrates does not so much assert
this view himself as examine whether it is Gorgias view. Socrates primary example is the contest between the doctor, who is a knower, and
the rhetorician, who is a nonknower of the medical art who nonetheless manages to be more persuasive among other nonknowers (459a1
b6). Although Socrates begins from this medical example, we can see
the true significance of the issue at hand by considering the more
important case: justice. For, according to the account of rhetoric that
Gorgias accepts, at least for a moment, it would seem that the rhetorician need not be a knower of justice either (consider 459b6c5). In
setting forth this account of rhetoric, Socrates, we should note, no
longer refers to rhetoric as an art but calls it a certain device
[mechanen] of persuasion that has been discovered so as to appear
to nonknowers to know more than the knowers (459b8c2; see also
459d5e1). While Gorgias would not agree in depriving rhetoric of its
designation as an art, he expresses no disagreement with this description of rhetoric. In fact, since he even praises rhetoric so understood
(see 459c35), we may reasonably conclude that this is Gorgias true
view of rhetoric.
Yet, especially when it comes to justice, the problem remains at
least the political problem that arises for a teacher of an art with so
much capacity for injustice. And this is the problem we expect Socrates
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to expose as he turns from an account of rhetoric that bears only

implicitly on the question of justice to an explicit consideration of the
relationship between rhetoric and justice (459c8e1). We expect at this
point an exposure of the irresponsibility and danger of teaching an art
that manipulates justice without requiring knowledge of justice. But
instead Socrates offers Gorgias a path by which he can escape this
difficulty. After drawing out the possibility that rhetoric is related to
justice, nobility, and the good as it is to other matters that is, as
a device of nonknowers that enables them to appear to other nonknowers to know more than the knowers Socrates offers Gorgias the
other alternative, namely, that a knowledge of justice, in particular, is
an essential prerequisite to learning rhetoric and that students must
either come to Gorgias with a prior knowledge of justice or be taught
this as their first lesson (459e18). Now, whatever may be Gorgias
true view and we can be fairly certain at this point what that is he
can hardly refuse the escape route Socrates offers him. Even if that
route entails an embarrassing reversal and a blow to his pride, it is
far better than the alternative. Wisely, Gorgias accepts his fate and
affirms that any student who comes to him without a prior knowledge
of justice will learn it from him (460a34).28
According to the account Gorgias thus accepts, if not the one he
really believes, the rhetorician must be a knower of justice. Yet to
leave it at this would be to leave the matter incomplete. For to say
that the rhetorician must be a knower of justice could have different
meanings. It could mean, for instance, that the truly artful rhetorician
must understand the character of justice and of peoples concern with
justice if he is to persuade effectively (consider 459e78 in its possible
difference in meaning from 459e56). Such a rhetorician could be
called just in the limited (and unconventional) sense that he has
28. That Gorgias acceptance of Socrates suggestion here is guided by prudence

rather than conviction is stressed by Kahn, Drama and Dialectic in Platos
Gorgias, 804, and Nichols, The Rhetoric of Justice in Platos Gorgias,
1335. For further confirmation, see Meno 95b9c4.
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learned the just things (consider 460a5b7, which could be taken to

suggest such a view). But would such a man not only know the just
things but also do them? Does knowledge of justice necessarily issue in
just action or at least in the wish or intention to do the just things and
avoid injustice (see 460b8c3)?29 By posing this last question, which
admits of only one answer for a decent man or a prudent one, Socrates
foists on Gorgias an understanding of what it means for the rhetorician
to be a knower of justice that is itself in accordance with justice or
ordinary decency. If this understanding does not reflect Gorgias true
view (consider phainetai, it appears, at 460c2, c6, and e2), and if it
causes him some humiliation to accept it and thereby amend his earlier
presentation of rhetoric (see 460c7461a7), Gorgias must nevertheless
feel grateful to Socrates for offering him this relatively gentle way of
escaping from the dangers into which Socrates has helped him lead
himself.
More generally, if we step back and survey the situation at this point,
we can imagine that his conversation with Socrates must make a powerful impression on Gorgias. By his own description, Gorgias entered
the conversation as a man supremely confident in his ability to handle
all questions and defeat all comers (see 447c58, 449a78). Not having faced a real challenge in years (448a13), the famous rhetorician
has been quickly outmaneuvered by a strange, street-wandering
Athenian who has arrived with his odd friend claiming to be eager
29. Some have objected to Socrates line of argument here by pointing to

the questionable assumption that knowledge of justice will necessary lead
one to act justly. See, for instance, Irwin, Gorgias, 1268; Shorey, What Plato
Said, 136; Mackenzie, Plato on Punishment, 160. What this objection misses,
however, is that Socrates is not so much presenting an argument of his
own as he is putting the question to Gorgias. Also, by focusing on the
logical cogency of Socrates argument, commentators such as Irwin do
not bring out the moral implications of Socrates line of questioning or the
true character of the pressure he is bringing to bear on Gorgias. Better in
this respect are Benardete, The Rhetoric of Morality and Philosophy, 21, 29,
and Kahn, Drama and Dialectic in Platos Gorgias, 7984.
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to learn from him. And to make matters worse or better or at any rate
more impressive, Socrates has not only managed to trap Gorgias by
luring him into the crucial mistake of speaking more openly than his
better judgment would dictate, but he has also shown his superiority
and goodwill by then freeing his captive without inflicting much damage; he has merely humbled Gorgias pride rather than destroying his
precious reputation. Gorgias must at this point be experiencing something akin to awe, an emotion with which he has little familiarity. Certainly, Socrates has managed to gain his attention, and Gorgias must
not know what to make of Socrates concluding statement that the two
of them would need to spend much time together in order adequately
to sort out the matters they have been discussing (see 461a7b2). Is
Socrates proposing some kind of continued association? What is this
mysterious wizard after?
If these are Gorgias thoughts at the end of his conversation with
Socrates, we must admit that they are ours, too. It is clear that Socrates
has won a strategic victory by outmaneuvering Gorgias. But his reasons for doing so are still unclear. We may safely assume that Socrates
wished to make an impression on Gorgias. But to what end? One possible explanation is that Socrates wished to discredit Gorgias in order to
combat his harmful influence as a teacher. Perhaps Socrates conversation with Gorgias is part of a larger Socratic project aimed at exposing
the sophists as teachers of injustice and protecting the young from the
dangers of sophistic education.30 Yet the difficulty with understanding
Socrates conversation with Gorgias as part of such a larger project is
that Socrates is remarkably polite and respectful in his treatment of
Gorgias. Socrates never delivers, in particular, the final blow that one
would expect if he were trying to discredit Gorgias. In fact, Socrates
treatment of Gorgias is so gentle that it appears not as the treatment of
30. For different versions of this common suggestion, see Jaeger, Paideia, 2:127
9; Friedlander,
Plato, 2:246; Dodds, Gorgias, 15; Romilly, The Great Sophists

in Periclean Athens, 15661; Lewis, Refutative Rhetoric as True Rhetoric in
the Gorgias, 200; Kastely, In Defense of Platos Gorgias, 98.
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a rival one wishes to destroy but as the treatment of a friend, or at least

a potential friend.31 This suggests a different explanation of Socrates
intention in making an impression on Gorgias, one that also can better
explain why Socrates concludes his conversation with Gorgias with a
statement that can be taken as an invitation to continue and deepen
their acquaintance. Socrates may be genuinely interested in establishing a friendship with Gorgias, a friendship that could even become an
alliance.32
To better understand why Socrates would have such an interest, we
ought to return for a moment to the scene at the beginning of the dialogue when Socrates first arrived. In that scene, Socrates approached
Gorgias after having been compelled by Chaerephon to linger in the
agora. If my interpretation of that scene was correct that is, that it
was meant to point to Socrates dialectical cross-examinations of his
fellow citizens, which are being temporarily left behind so that he can
come speak with Gorgias then we can now go a step further. Socrates
cross-examinations, as the Apology can help remind us, aroused considerable anger in many of his fellow citizens. Indeed, they were so
inflammatory that we can understand why Socrates would become
interested in the assistance of a man like Gorgias. It makes sense that,
at a time in his life when he was compelled by Chaerephon to spend
much of his time in the agora, Socrates would also gain a newfound
interest in rhetoric. And while Socrates has managed to defeat Gorgias
in a conversation on Socratic terms, he has not denied that Gorgias
possesses great talents as a rhetorician. Can Socrates effort to make
31. Socrates treatment of Gorgias should be contrasted with his much harsher
treatment of Protagoras in the Protagoras. After humiliating Protagoras
before many of his admirers and students, Socrates leaves the scene as
soon as they have finished talking (see Protagoras 362a14). The difference
between Socrates treatment of Gorgias and his treatment of Protagoras is
noted also by Shorey, What Plato Said, 134, and Weiss, Oh, Brother! 200.
See also Fussi, Why Is the Gorgias So Bitter? 4950, 55.
32. Compare the similar suggestions offered by Nichols, The Rhetoric of Justice
in Platos Gorgias, 131, 137, 1489, and Weiss, Oh, Brother! 195206. My
suggestion is closer to that of Nichols.
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an impression on Gorgias, then, be explained as a step in a broader

plan to secure his friendship and assistance?
To be sure, even if Socrates has not denied that Gorgias is a talented
rhetorician, he has brought out a weakness in his understanding of
rhetoric and its relationship to justice, a weakness that is displayed
even or especially in Gorgias rhetorical self-presentation. The suggestion I have just offered is exposed to a difficulty. By bringing out
Gorgias imprudent boastfulness, Socrates has brought out a more
serious flaw in his appreciation of the power and importance of justice. Could a man who sufficiently understood this power and importance flout justice as openly as Gorgias does? Gorgias boasts about the
power of rhetoric to win undeserved victories and his refusal to teach
justice to his students a refusal that he has revoked only under pressure and thus insincerely disclose a certain blindness on Gorgias
part. Socrates, then, has done more than ensnare Gorgias. He also
has brought out a crucial flaw in an otherwise talented and impressive
man. In keeping with this, Socrates will soon go on to criticize Gorgian
rhetoric harshly. He will describe it as a form of flattery whose practitioners do not understand the very passions they flatter. Yet the flaws
of Gorgias and of Gorgian rhetoric do not necessarily belie the suggestion that Socrates is seeking to establish a friendship and an alliance
with Gorgias. For these flaws may be remediable. Perhaps Gorgias
can be brought to a better appreciation of justice, and perhaps his
rhetoric can be reformed. At any rate, Socrates does not depart after
his conversation with Gorgias.33 He stays and speaks first with Polus
and then with Callicles, and the dialogue, far from declining, rises to
a more heated discussion of more important themes, including the
theme of justice. Could the increased intensity and the more direct
discussion of justice have something to do with Socrates effort, now
that he has made an impression on Gorgias, to continue speaking with
him indirectly?
33. Contrast Protagoras 360e6362a4.
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2 Polus and the Dispute about Justice
et me restate the suggestion with which I concluded the last chapter and say a further word about how it can help us understand
the unity of the Gorgias. I have suggested that Socrates is interested

in Gorgias as a potential ally. The reference at the beginning of the
dialogue to Socrates lingering in the agora can help us begin to understand Socrates need for such an ally; later passages, especially in the
Callicles section, will help us expand and deepen our understanding.
But even if Socrates is in need of an ally with outstanding rhetorical
abilities, Gorgias would seem to have proven to be a disappointing
candidate. For the result of Socrates conversation with Gorgias is an
impressive Socratic victory that serves not only to impress Gorgias but
also to bring out Gorgias lack of wisdom on a crucial issue. To repeat,
Gorgias boasts about rhetoric and his (genuine) view of the prerequisites of the rhetorical art reveal that he takes justice too lightly. Yet, as
I observed, Socrates does not abandon the discussion after Gorgias
defeat, even though he no longer continues to speak with him directly.
And I suggested that the continuation of the dialogue may be a continuation of Socrates conversation with Gorgias, henceforth to be
conducted indirectly but nonetheless intended to remedy the flaws
in Gorgias understanding and to continue to lay the foundation for
an alliance. In other words, Socrates may not have given up hope in
Gorgias. He may still be pursuing, in the rest of the dialogue, the goal
that originally led him to leave the agora to come speak with Gorgias.
40
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41
An indirect approach in fact makes sense after Gorgias has been

defeated. The virtues of an indirect approach can be seen if we consider more precisely what Socrates would want to accomplish in the
rest of the dialogue. If my suggestion about Socrates overarching
intention is correct, Socrates would have several tasks that remain
to be completed. First, he has only begun to introduce himself and
his ways to Gorgias. Thus far, Gorgias has seen only an impressive
display of Socrates abilities in argument. He has seen little of the
character of Socrates own activity or the substance of his thought.
Socrates, then, must continue to introduce himself to Gorgias by making him aware of his own situation and activity. But this aim must be
combined as it can be combined with an attempt to remedy the crucial deficiency in Gorgias wisdom. For if a Socrates-Gorgias alliance
is to be an alliance Socrates would desire, Gorgias must be brought to
a better understanding of justice and its power in the human soul.1 In
short, Socrates must try in some manner to teach Gorgias. And if the
heart of the lesson to Gorgias concerns the importance of justice, that
also bears on Socrates third and final task: to sketch at least the outlines of a new, more just form of rhetoric, thereby suggesting a nobler
use to which Gorgias might put his powers.
That these are Socrates aims will be verified, I think, by a study of
the rest of the dialogue. But assuming for now that they are, we can
understand why they are best accomplished indirectly. By watching
Socrates in action and observing what Socrates reveals about himself and others, Gorgias can learn lessons that would carry less force
if conveyed simply by arguments in a direct discussion. In particular, Socrates efforts to teach Gorgias about the power of justice in the
human soul can proceed in no better way than by revealing that power
in the souls of specific human beings, especially those in whom the
concern for justice seems absent. Thus, we should not be surprised that
Socrates will soon make a remark that indicates his continued interest
1. Compare Phaedrus 271c10274b4.
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in Gorgias (see 462e8463b1). But neither should we be surprised that

he now welcomes the opportunity to speak with Polus. Before his
conversation with Gorgias, Socrates had shown no interest in Polus
and had treated him as a mere roadblock on the way to Gorgias;
but now Socrates shows much more willingness to engage him in
a conversation (compare 448d1449a4 with 461c5d4 and 463e1
464a1).
Socrates is given the opportunity to converse with Polus when Polus
bursts into the conversation to protest Socrates treatment of Gorgias.
Polus complains about the great rudeness of Socrates exploitation
of Gorgias sense of shame. According to Polus, Socrates manipulated
Gorgias by forcing him to concede, out of shame rather than conviction, that knowledge of justice is a prerequisite to learning the art of
rhetoric (see 461b3c4). Now, insofar as Polus, an admirer of Gorgias
and himself a teacher of rhetoric, speaks so openly of Gorgias sense of
shame and the reasons for it, he would seem not to share it. Our first
impression of Polus is of a rash and shameless young man who will
boldly go where Gorgias quickly realized he should not tread.2 Yet we
can see from even his opening outburst that apparent shamelessness
is only one aspect of Polus character. After all, when he enters the
conversation, Polus is angry at Socrates, thus betraying a sense of justice, if only of the justice that ought to govern friendly conversations
(consider especially 461c14). Moreover, Polus is very concerned not
only that rhetoric be adequately described but also that its nobility be
vindicated; nobility is a standard of great significance to Polus (see
2. Much less is known of Polus the aptly named colt (see 463e12) than
of the much more famous Gorgias. Polus did, however, produce at least one
writing on rhetoric. See Dodds, Gorgias, 1112. Beyond his appearance in
the Gorgias, Polus is mentioned (mockingly) in the Phaedrus (see 267b10
c3), and Aristotle refers to his view of the relationship between experience
and art (Metaphysics 981a15). For an extensive discussion of Aristotles
reference to Polus, arguing that it pertains to the historical Polus, not to
Polus statement at 448c47 of the Gorgias, see Renehan, Polus, Plato, and
Aristotle, 6872.
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462c10d2, 463d3, 466a910).3 For his part, Socrates shows his new
willingness to engage Polus by proposing that they have a conversation (461c5d4). But that does not mean that Socrates is warm and
welcoming towards Polus. To the contrary, he seems to make every
effort to be as rude and provocative as possible, insulting Polus at
every turn and even suggesting that he could barely endure listening
if Polus should give a long speech (see, e.g., 461e1462a1, 462c10d2,
463d4e2, 466a48). Since Socrates behavior is such a marked departure from the politeness he showed toward Gorgias, we will have to
consider how his harsher tone contributes to his aims in conversing
with Polus.4
SOCRATES DESCRIPTION OF RHETORIC (462b3466a3)
Socrates harshness toward Polus ensures that their conversation will

have the spirit of a battle rather than a friendly discussion. But that is
despite the fact that Polus opening question to Socrates is an honest
and understandable one: What do you think rhetoric is? (462b35;
see also 461b34). Although Polus is angry when he enters the conversation, his desire to know what Socrates thinks about rhetoric seems
genuine. Fairness requires that we acknowledge that it is Socrates who
seems more intent on picking a fight. And Socrates provokes Polus
first with personal insults and then with the answer he gives to Polus
3. We also should recall that, in his brief exchange with Chaerephon at the
beginning of the dialogue, Polus was eager to defend rhetoric as the noblest
of the arts (see again 448c89 and e5). That Socrates opens his present
exchange with Polus by addressing him as noblest Polus and by telling him
you are just (461c5, d2) may be an indication of more than Socratic irony.
Cf. Nichols, The Rhetoric of Justice in Platos Gorgias, 138; Benardete, The
Rhetoric of Morality and Philosophy, 31.
4. On Socrates rudeness towards Polus, see Michelini, Rudeness and Irony
in Platos Gorgias, 5059; see also Arieti, Platos Philosophic Antiope, 204;
Shorey, What Plato Said, 137; Grote, Plato, and the Other Companions of
Sokrates, 2:321.
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question. Socrates description of rhetoric, which takes up most of the

first stage of his conversation with Polus, is one that he can be sure
will elicit a protest from Polus, who repeatedly expresses his desire to
see the nobility of rhetoric recognized.
While Socrates description of rhetoric is colored by his desire to provoke Polus and thereby to draw him into a quarrel, Socrates also shows
a concern not to offend Gorgias too deeply. Before giving his extended
description of rhetoric, Socrates mentions his fear that Gorgias might
take him to be mocking his pursuit (462e68). He also softens the coming blow by remarking that the rhetoric he will describe may not be
the kind of rhetoric that Gorgias pursues (462e8463a1). Yet the more
important purpose of this last remark may be to suggest that Gorgias
ought to change his ways and pursue a different kind of rhetoric. For
the rhetoric that Socrates describes in such critical terms seems to
be exactly the kind of rhetoric that Gorgias pursues. In fact, Socrates
description of rhetoric owes a considerable debt to his conversation
with Gorgias. It is best understood as a serious description of Gorgian
rhetoric, albeit a description tailored both to provoke Polus and to
shake Gorgias satisfaction with his own ways.5
5. It is worth noticing that, when Socrates begins his account of rhetoric, he
addresses it as much to Gorgias as to Polus (463a6), and Gorgias shows
his interest by urging Socrates to explain his initial claims more fully
(463d6e4). Friedlander,
Plato, 2:253, remarks: That Gorgias is drawn anew

into the discussion is not only a device to show, all the more insistently, how
helpless Polus is. It is also a structural symbol indicating that the level of the
first conversation here penetrates the second stage. A suggestion similar to
mine is offered by Black, Platos View of Rhetoric, 3656. Rejecting the
common view that the present passage should be read as a wholesale condemnation of rhetoric, Black suggests that Platos attack is limited only to
a particular practice of rhetoric, namely, that which Gorgias has attempted
to define. Black points to Socrates suggestion that Gorgias might pursue
another kind of rhetoric as evidence that the rhetoric under discussion is
not all rhetoric (the emphasis is Blacks). For a contrasting interpretation,
see Kastely, In Defense of Platos Gorgias, 100. In support of my contention
that the present account of rhetoric owes a debt to Gorgias claims, consider
Laws 937d6938a4.
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The most important point in Socrates description of rhetoric is first

made in an exchange with Polus that precedes the longer account
that Socrates gives to elaborate his basic claims about rhetoric (see
462b3e4, 463a6466a3). After prompting Polus to ask him what art
he thinks rhetoric is, Socrates denies that rhetoric is an art at all
(462b69). This is not entirely new. We noticed earlier that at a certain point in his discussion with Gorgias, Socrates stopped speaking of
rhetoric as an art. But Socrates now makes his refusal to call rhetoric
an art explicit.6 Rather than an art, he now says, rhetoric is a certain experience in the production of grace and pleasure (462b6c7).
Rhetoric, Socrates explains, resembles cookery, since cookery, too,
ought not to be called an art and yet it also produces grace and pleasure. According to Socrates, rhetoric and cookery are two parts of the
same pursuit, a pursuit that rests not on artistic expertise but on the
experience of souls that are skilled at guesswork, courageous, and naturally gifted at associating with human beings (462d8463b5). Since
Socrates identifies the chief aim of this pursuit as flattery, we may refer
to the pursuit itself as flattery (see 463a8b1). In addition to rhetoric
and cookery, Socrates also includes sophistry and cosmetics as parts
of flattery (463b46).
Socrates division of flattery into four parts allows him to sketch a
schema in which the parts of flattery are presented as phantoms of
four corresponding genuine arts. The four genuine arts Socrates identifies are medicine, gymnastics, justice, and legislation. These arts are
paired with the various flattering-phantoms in accordance with the
distinction between the body and the soul: Socrates calls the care of the
soul politics, while leaving the care of the body nameless (464a1b8).
Socrates then makes a division within these two spheres (politics and
care of the body) on the basis of a further principle that distinguishes
6. For a helpful discussion of the meaning of the term art (techne), see Jaeger,
Paideia, 2:1301. The most important aspect of Jaegers discussion is his
emphasis on the importance of knowledge in the Greek conception of techne,
a point that risks obfuscation by the translation art.
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medicine from gymnastics, and justice from legislation. Although

Socrates gives only a vague statement of this further principle they
differ somehow from one another (464c3) we can figure out on our
own that the difference is that between seeking the correction of an ill
condition (medicine/justice) and the pursuit of further development
beyond a basic state of health (gymnastics/legislation). If Socrates
vagueness about this difference is due to his reluctance to call attention to what it implies about justice namely, that justice serves merely
to remedy a flawed situation nevertheless, the difference would seem
to establish a hierarchy in which gymnastics deserves a higher place
than medicine, and legislation a higher place than justice. Socrates
divisions thus produce this schema:
Soul (Politics)
Body (Care of the Body)
Development
Genuine Art:
Phantom:
Legislation
Sophistry
Gymnastics
Cosmetics
Correction
Genuine Art:
Phantom:
Justice
Rhetoric
Medicine
Cookery
The general suggestion conveyed by this schema is clear enough: for

each genuine art, there is a part of flattery that has slipped under it,
pretending to be the genuine art; rhetoric, in particular, is the phantom
of justice (see 464c3d1, 465b1c5, 465d8e1). But the most important questions concern the divisions between the genuine arts and the
phantoms. What does Socrates mean by referring to the parts of flattery as phantoms? And why are they not arts?
The most obvious distinction Socrates draws between the genuine
arts and the phantoms rests on his argument that the genuine arts
are directed to the good of their objects (bodies or souls), whereas the
phantoms hunt only after pleasure (464c3465a2). But the matter is
more complicated than that, since the phantoms, as the name implies
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and as Socrates repeatedly suggests, use deception to convince people

that they are the genuine arts, and they do not openly acknowledge
that their aim is not the good. Moreover, it is not clear why the concern
for pleasure rather than the good should deprive the phantoms of the
status of arts. Couldnt there be arts of pleasure-seeking and pleasureproviding? But Socrates gives a further reason beyond the distinction
between the good and the pleasant for depriving the phantoms of the
designation arts. None of the phantoms, he claims, has an account
(logon) of the things to which it administers or of the things that it
administers (465a35).7 In fact, it is this claim that Socrates most
directly uses to explain his refusal to call the phantoms arts.8 Yet,
while this claim seems to give a better reason for refusing to call the
phantoms arts, it is not clear why the claim should be accepted. Why
couldnt the phantoms possess accounts, even if their aim is merely to
provide pleasure for bodies or souls?
To see what Socrates is driving at, we have to put the pieces of his
presentation together and also return to his conversation with Gorgias. For the crucial evidence for Socrates claim that none of the
phantoms has an account, and thus that rhetoric is not an art, can
be found in Gorgias view that knowledge of justice is not a prerequisite of rhetoric. Only by reflecting on that view together with Socrates
current presentation can we uncover the aspects of Gorgian rhetoric
that justify Socrates criticism of it.
To begin with the most basic point, Gorgias view, especially when
coupled with his bold celebration of the power of rhetoric, revealed
that justice is not of great concern to Gorgias himself or to any other
rhetorician of the Gorgian sort. But that does not mean that such
rhetoricians do not often speak, as they practice their rhetoric, about
prospherei
7. I am following Doddss insertion of the conjunction e between hoi
and ha prospherei in line 465a4. See Dodds, Gorgias, 22930, for a defense
of this reading.
8. Consider all of 464e2465a6, with attention to hoti at 465a3. Cf. Adkins,
Merit and Responsibility, 2723; Jaeger, Paideia, 2:131; Irwin, Platos Moral
Theory, 116.
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justice (see again 451d78, 452e14, 454b57). Indeed, the prevalence

and importance of speech about justice is essential to understanding
why Socrates calls rhetoric a phantom of justice. But what kind of
speech is likely to come from a Gorgian rhetorician? In the first place,
it will be speech coming from someone who has no qualms about
deception and manipulation, and who, more generally, has the sense
that justice is not a matter of the greatest significance. Just as important, however, is the tendency of such speech to convey something
of that sense to the audience. If we follow Socrates suggestions, the
aim of rhetoric is to please, that is, to satisfy the audiences desire
for pleasure. Any appeals to justice, then, will be appeals that seek
to bring justice and pleasure into harmony, or to give justifications
of actions or ends to which the audience is already drawn by their
desires. This tendency can help us to grasp what Socrates has in mind
when he speaks of the deceptive character of rhetoric and of its efforts
to blur the distinction between the pleasant and the good by disguising the pleasant in the garb of the good. It also helps to explain what
Socrates means by comparing rhetoric to cookery and by calling it a
form of flattery: Gorgian rhetoric is flattery in the sense that it convinces people that they can fulfill their desires with a good conscience;
it convinces them that what they want to do coincides with what justice demands, and thus that they can be both satisfied and good. Such
rhetoric, Socrates suggests, depends on nothing more than an acquaintance with human desires and a knack for telling people what they
want to hear (consider again 463a6b1). It does not require, as Gorgias
himself affirmed, any deep reflection on justice. Yet, since appeals
to justice are nonetheless a crucial part of Gorgian rhetoric, such
rhetoric fails to reflect sufficiently on its own doings and on the basis
of its success. Such is the meaning of Socrates claim that it lacks an
account.9
9. Compare Phaedrus 259e1262c3, 266d1274b4, 277a9279c6, Republic
493a6d9. See also Taylor, Plato, 111.
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Of course, this line of criticism would probably be dismissed by a

Gorgian rhetorician, who might respond by pointing to his success as
a reason not to be troubled by his lack of an account (consider again,
e.g., 456a7c7, 459c35). But Socrates might respond in turn by arguing that Gorgian rhetoric is not quite as successful as its practitioners
tend to think. We saw in the Gorgias section, at any rate, that Gorgias
himself could not deny that rhetoric remains suspect in the eyes of
the city. And Socrates may be pointing to the same problem near the
end of his description of rhetoric when, after stressing the similarity
between sophists and rhetoricians, he says that such men dont know
what use to make of themselves, nor do other human beings know
what use to make of them (465c58). While the city can be charmed
and beguiled by a rhetoric that entices people toward pleasure, such
rhetoric, Socrates remark suggests, is not simply welcomed by the
city, which will never lose its sense that it is being manipulated and
corrupted. If this is what Socrates means by his remark, his elaboration of the remark may be intended to offer a further indication
as to why there can never be complete harmony between Gorgian
rhetoric and the city. For Socrates follows his remark about sophists
and rhetoricians by saying that if the soul were not set over the body,
but instead the body measured its own gratifications, Anaxagoras saying all things mixed together a saying that points to a state without any fundamental distinctions would carry much greater weight,
and the division between genuine arts and phantoms would disappear
(465c8d7).10 With this cryptic statement, Socrates may be suggesting
that, given the character of the human soul, especially its capacity to
10. Socrates quotes the same saying, homou panta chremata, in the Phaedo
(72c45). According to Dodds, Gorgias, 2312, this saying can be traced
back to the opening line of a work of Anaxagoras, homou panta chremata
e n, which Anaxagoras used to describe the chaos that existed before the
intervention of nous, but that became proverbial for any state in which
distinctions are obliterated, like Hegels night in which all cows are black.
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contemplate and judge (see 466d1), human beings inevitably draw a

distinction between the pleasant and the good, and thus can never fully
embrace a practice that aims to entice them towards mere pleasure.
This suggestion, at any rate, would be in keeping with Socrates more
straightforward efforts to suggest to Gorgias that his rhetoric rests on
an insufficient appreciation of those human concerns that run deeper
than the hedonistic desires to which his rhetoric caters.
ARE RHETORICIANS POWERFUL? (466a4468e9)
Socrates criticism of rhetoric provokes a protest from Polus, as

Socrates easily could have foreseen and surely intended. After all, if the
deepest purpose of Socrates suggestion that rhetoric lacks an account
and thus does not deserve to be called an art is to point to Gorgias
failings and to shake his self-satisfaction (see especially 463a6b1),
Socrates has also made every effort to make rhetoric appear as ignoble
as possible. These efforts, as he himself indicates, have been directed
primarily at Polus (see especially 464e2465a2). The protest they provoke initiates the extended quarrel between Socrates and Polus that
now takes over the conversation, at first as a dispute over Socrates
suggestion that rhetoricians are lowly flatterers.
Polus objects by pointing to the esteem and power rhetoricians enjoy
in the cities: Are rhetoricians really regarded as mere flatterers? Dont
they have great power in the cities? Rhetoricians are so powerful, Polus
argues, that, like tyrants, they kill whomever they want, seize other
peoples possessions, and expel from the cities whomever it seems good
to them to expel (466a9c2). Far more openly than Gorgias ever did,
Polus calls attention to the capacity of rhetoric for injustice. Whereas
he had earlier suggested that rhetoric is noble because it is able to
gratify human beings (see 462c89), he now makes its capacity for
serving the most tyrannical desires of the rhetorician himself the basis
of its nobility.
We may assume that Socrates wished to push Polus in a direction that will cast the quarrel between them as a dispute over the
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importance of justice. But especially if we make this assumption,

Socrates initial response to Polus celebration of the tyrannical power
of rhetoricians is surprising. For Socrates does not begin with the
moral condemnation of the actions of Polus rhetorician-tyrants that
we are expecting at this point. Rather, he begins by simply denying that
such men are truly powerful. Socrates even goes so far as to claim that
rhetoricians are the least powerful men in any city (466b910, d68). To
defend this paradoxical claim, Socrates argues that, while rhetoricians
and tyrants can do what seems best to them in the cities, they do not do
what they truly wish and thus they are not truly powerful (466c3e2).
Polus is astounded and perplexed by the initial formulation of
Socrates argument. Socrates is thus forced to give a fuller explanation. He does so by beginning from a point Polus is willing to grant:
true power must be good for the one who possesses it (466b68, e48).
Socrates then connects this point with the crucial distinction he has
drawn between doing what seems best and doing what one wishes
(see 466c6e2, 467a1b9). As Socrates explains to Polus, the mere
capacity of a man to do what seems best to him does not yet mean
that he does what he wishes, for the deepest wish of anyone who acts
in a given situation is not simply to perform whatever actions he performs but rather to be benefited by his actions. It follows that actions
that prove harmful to oneself ought to be regarded as failures to do
what one wishes that display ones folly rather than ones power (see
especially 466e911, 467a110).
Since Polus continues to have difficulty grasping this argument,
Socrates spells out at greater length a general view of human actions
according to which every action, or at least every action that is for the
sake of something, should be regarded as a mere means to some end
that is the true object of the actors striving.11 According to the view
11. Socrates introduces the qualification that he is speaking of actions that are
for the sake of something at 467d67. While he leaves open the possibility
that his argument does not apply to all actions, Socrates does not call this
possible limitation to Polus attention, and he at times gives the impression
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Socrates presents, whenever someone acts for the sake of something

(e.g., when a man takes medicine for the sake of health, or labors for
the sake of wealth), he does not act out of a wish to perform the actions
themselves, but rather he acts only because he is seeking some end.
This is true, according to Socrates, of all human actions that have purposes beyond the actions themselves: whenever someone does something for the sake of something, he does not wish for the thing he does,
but for that for the sake of which he does it (467d6e1). By this view,
any particular action be it walking, running, sailing, killing, stealing,
or anything else is neither good nor bad but rather what Socrates
calls an intermediate (metaxu) that gains its value only by its service to various ends (467e1468b1). Furthermore, the various ends
that any given person pursues can be reduced from a multiplicity (wisdom, health, wealth, etc.) to a single end, since what each of us is really
seeking through such ends is the good, or, as Socrates specifies it, the
beneficial, that is, ones own benefit (468b1c5). Accordingly, actions
should be judged not by any intrinsic value they might appear to possess but solely by whether they prove to be beneficial to the actor; any
actions that prove harmful to the actor ought not to be regarded as
actions the actor truly wished to perform or as marks of true power
(468d1e5).
Socrates delivers this argument to support the conclusion that Polus
rhetorician-tyrants, who perform all sorts of spectacular actions such
as killing, stealing, and exiling their enemies, may not do what they
truly wish since they may not be benefited by these actions. The
power of such men may not be true power at all. Of course,
Socrates argument genuinely supports only the conclusion that it
is possible that Polus rhetorician-tyrants fail to do what they wish
and thus lack true power. The argument does not show that this is
necessarily the case. And Socrates acknowledges this limitation of his
argument in his own formulation of the arguments conclusion (see
that he is speaking about all human actions (see, e.g., hekastote at 467c6 and
at 467d6).
d3 and panton
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especially 468d56, e35).12 It is true that Socrates also acts, in the

course of making the argument, as if the burden of proof were on Polus
to show that rhetorician-tyrants who do what seems best to them also
do what they wish (consider especially 466e13467b9). But this is puzzling. Why should the burden of proof be on Polus, who thinks that it
is obvious that such men do both what seems best to them and what
they wish? Polus, as we have seen, has a hard time grasping Socrates
argument because he has a hard time grasping that there could ever be
a divergence between these two principles; hence he remains unpersuaded by Socrates argument even as he is forced to accept the logic of
its movement (see 466e3467b10 together with 468c2e5). Polus resistance, however, should not be attributed to mere obtuseness on his
part. In fact, his resistance reveals the deepest limitation of Socrates
argument. For his resistance shows that Socrates argument could
never be persuasive to someone who thinks that there is rarely a significant gap between what seems best to people that is, the objects of the
most manifest human desires and the true good that people wish for.
And yet, isnt that the view of everyone who thinks that the elements of
the human good are fairly obvious? Polus assumes, as many do, that it
is not hard to discern what is good. Our desires direct us toward ruling
in the city, enjoying wealth, and indulging in various other pleasures.
Polus thinks that one could hardly make a drastic mistake in pursuing
such things; the only mistakes, he assumes, come in failing to attain
the objects of our desires, not in seeking them in the first place. Against
such an assumption one that Socrates will later acknowledge is far
from rare (consider 472a2b3) Socrates argument carries no real
force. Socrates argument leads to a dead end, and Polus revolt at the
end of the argument is hardly surprising (see 468e69).13
12. Socrates acknowledgment of this limitation of his argument is often missed

or at least not reproduced when commentators paraphrase the argument.
See, e.g., Jaeger, Paideia, 2:135; Friedlander,
Plato, 2:255. Better in this

respect is Irwin, Platos Moral Theory, 117.
13. Cf. Grote, Plato, and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 2:3312.
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But if Socrates argument is so poorly designed for convincing Polus

and its failure is so predictable, why does Socrates bother to make this
argument? This question can be answered, I think, by connecting the
failure of the argument with the most striking feature of the argument
as a whole: its complete silence about considerations of justice. We
have already observed that Socrates does not begin with a moral condemnation of Polus rhetorician-tyrants. And not only does Socrates
say nothing in his argument about the injustice of tyrannical actions,
but the argument itself is remarkably amoral: it presents a view of
human actions that looks at actions even such actions as killing and
stealing (see 468b46, d14) as intrinsically neither good nor bad. All
actions, or at least all actions that are for the sake of something, are
presented as mere means that should be measured only by whether
they conduce to the benefit of the actor; in themselves, they have no
more value than rocks or wood (467e6468a3).14 Given such a view
of human actions, with its apparent approval of a hard-boiled concern for self-interest, it could be hard to see why one would question
the wisdom of those who seek to gain enough sway in the city to do
what seems best to them. Although Polus must acknowledge that it
is possible that doing what seems best in such cases may lead to misery rather than happiness, it is not so unreasonable of him, even or
precisely if he accepts the outlook of Socrates argument, to regard
this possibility as a remote one that need not be taken very seriously.
To be more deeply impressed by this possibility, Polus would have
to have genuine doubts that the elements of the human good are as
obvious as he thinks they are. Socrates opening argument about the
power of rhetorician-tyrants can thus be understood in this way: it is
meant more to reveal than truly to shake Polus conviction that the
14. The amoral character of Socrates argument is often obscured in accounts

that too quickly merge this argument with the argument Socrates will make
in the next section of the dialogue. See, e.g., Kahn, Plato and the Socratic Dialogue, 1389, Drama and Dialectic in Platos Gorgias, 11314; Friedlander,
Plato, 2:255; Santas, Socrates, 2237.
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elements of the human good are obvious, and also to show that an
argument that appeals only to prudence could never really shake that
conviction.15
THE TURN TO JUSTICE AND THE SOCRATIC

THESIS (468e6470c3)
The failure of Socrates argument to make any meaningful impression on Polus can help us make sense of what would otherwise be the
perplexing turn the conversation now takes. On the heels of an argument that neglects and even excludes moral considerations, Socrates
turns abruptly to the question of justice. His turn to the question of
justice, moreover, involves a dramatic departure from the view that
the worth of actions should be measured only by their service to other
ends. Socrates now turns to the view that everything, so to speak, is
riding on whether actions are performed justly or unjustly, that is, on
the character of the actions themselves (see 468e10469b6).
The most immediate cause of this turn is Polus effort to reject the
preceding argument by appealing to Socrates own experience: As if
you, Socrates, would not welcome the chance to do whatever seems
best to you in the city, rather than not, or feel envy if you were to see
someone killing whomever it seemed good to him or depriving him
of his possessions or fettering him (468e69). By rebelling against
Socrates argument in this way, Polus forces Socrates to express his
own view. No longer able simply to elicit Polus views through his questioning, Socrates replies by arguing that one must consider the justice of the actions to which Polus points: if the actions are performed
unjustly, they could never be enviable (468e10469b11; consider also
470b9c3). Socrates thus takes a position that unjust actions are
15. For a line of argument bearing some important similarities to the one just
considered, see Second Alcibiades 138b6141b8. On that line of argument
and Alcibiades reaction to it, which resembles Polus reaction here, see
Bruell, On the Socratic Education, 4043.
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never enviable because injustice is the greatest of all evils (see especially 469b89) that he will defend throughout the rest of the dialogue. Indeed, this position will play such a large role in Socrates
arguments from here on that it may be called, for the sake of simplicity, the Socratic thesis.16
Socrates turn to justice and to the Socratic thesis, however, cannot
be explained entirely by the fact that he has now been put on the spot.
It is also important that this turn occurs immediately after the failure
of Socrates preceding argument to move Polus from his conviction
that the elements of the human good are obvious. For it makes sense
that, in the wake of showing that an appeal to prudence carries little
power to shake that conviction, Socrates would turn to justice in order
to reveal that Polus views are more complex than they seem. After all,
isnt it through the concern for justice, or, in other words, through
ones moral experience, that one can first be awakened to the thought
that there are restrictions on the pursuit of goods such as rule, wealth,
and pleasure? And isnt this thought connected to the further thought
that ones truest good may lie in something beyond the enjoyment of
these more obvious goods?17 Socrates turn to justice is the best way
of revealing that Polus is not as simple as his reaction to Socrates
opening argument made him seem. Furthermore, given that Polus
reaction was based on a commonly held view, Socrates can thus teach
through Polus a more general lesson about the complexity of human
concerns and the depth of the human attachment to justice.
16. Another reason for giving it this title is that the same thesis, or at least a
position very similar to it, plays an important role in other dialogues. See,
e.g., Crito 48b349e3, Apology 28b330d5, and Cleitophon 407a5e2. What
I refer to as the Socratic thesis is sometimes referred to by other titles.
For example, McKim, Shame and Truth in Platos Gorgias, 35, calls it the
Socratic Axiom; Kahn, Drama and Dialectic in Platos Gorgias, 8586,
and Santas, Socrates, 18394, refer to it, as many others do, as a Socratic
paradox.
17. Compare Bruell, On the Socratic Education, 4243; see also 2730.
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Of course, if these are Socrates aims, he has a long road ahead of

him. Polus is hardly ready to acknowledge any concern for justice.
His first reaction to Socrates assertion of the Socratic thesis is disbelief that anyone could really think such a thing (see 469b8c3). And
Socrates would seem not to have made matters any easier by choosing to defend such an extreme position. Socrates chooses to defend the
view, to repeat, that doing injustice is the greatest of all evils, greater,
in particular, than suffering injustice. The extremism of this view
is revealed most clearly by an important consequence that Socrates
stresses in the present context: that one ought to pity wrongdoers.
Socrates argues to Polus that, while those who kill justly should not
be regarded as wretched and pitiable, those who kill unjustly should be
pitied for having made themselves wretched (468e10469b6). Socrates
presents this view as a necessary conclusion from the principle that
injustice is the greatest of all evils; the intransigent insistence on that
principle leads to the paradoxical conclusion that wrongdoers have
harmed themselves and thus deserve pity (see especially 469b711).18
Yet this view, paradoxical as it is, is rejected not only by Polus but by
almost all people, including those of more obvious decency than Polus.
Most people hardly regard pity as the fitting response to injustice. The
far more typical response is anger and the desire to punish. Still, we
should not conclude from this that the Socratic thesis and its consequences are so extreme as to express a simple or complete transcendence of the ordinary view. For if the ordinary response to injustice
reveals a rejection of the conclusion Socrates draws and thus some
doubt of the principle that leads to that conclusion, neither does it go
over entirely to the other side; if it did, injustice would elicit, not anger
and the desire to punish, but unambiguous admiration and the desire
to emulate. Anger and the desire to punish reflect ambivalence about
18. Compare Laws 731c1d3, Apology 25c526a7, Cleitophon 407d2e2, Republic 336e2337a2. See also Mackenzie, Plato on Punishment, 2379; Grote,
Plato, and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 2:33637.
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whether the unjust are already suffering from their injustice, but that
by no means amounts to a complete abandonment of the concern for
justice or of the belief that justice is superior to injustice. By thinking
about the difference between the Socratic and the ordinary response
to injustice, then, we are led almost immediately to wonder whether
the extremism of the Socratic thesis is not a result of its more rigorous
attention to the demands of consistency even or especially where the
ordinary view wavers and lacks complete clarity as to its principles.19
Yet, to repeat, Socrates extremism broadens the divide between
himself and Polus, who rejects Socrates argument even more vehemently than most people would. There has been little evidence so far
that Polus has any concern for justice, much less a concern strong
enough to lead him to accept the Socratic thesis. To say that there has
been little evidence, however, is not to say that there has been none
(see again 461b3c4) and Socrates has only begun his discussion of
justice with Polus.
POLUS REFUTATION OF SOCRATES (470c4471e1)
The conversation now concentrates on the question of the truth of the

Socratic thesis, with Socrates defending the thesis and Polus attacking
it. Although Polus has already expressed his admiration of tyranny, he
is willing to admit that it is not always beneficial to kill, steal, and do
other such things; such actions are obviously harmful when one gets
caught and punished (469c8470a8). But if Polus grants this much,
he resists, to put it mildly, Socrates further efforts to draw the line
between beneficial and harmful actions on the basis of whether actions
19. It is worth noticing, in this connection, another difference between Socrates

position in this section and the ordinary view: Socrates does not express any
admiration or envy of those who punish justly. Although he denies that such
men are wretched and pitiable, he also denies that they are enviable (469a9
b2). Here, too, he shows none of the zeal for punishing characteristic of the
ordinary moral outlook and visible in Polus.
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are performed justly or unjustly (see 470b9c3). Polus is unwilling to

agree, in other words, that injustice is always harmful to the one who
does it, or that harm follows necessarily from the fact of injustice. Polus
is so far from accepting this view that he is incredulous that anyone
could hold it, and he declares that even a child could refute it (470c4
5). At Socrates urging, Polus will go first in attempting a refutation of
the Socratic thesis, after which Socrates will try to refute Polus view
that injustice often pays.
Polus refutation if refutation is the appropriate word for it consists simply of an example taken from the political affairs of the day.
To show that many human beings who do injustice are happy, Polus
gives the example of Archelaus, a man who, as Polus reminds Socrates,
has been ruling Macedonia since the death of his father Perdiccas
(470d26).20 Polus thinks that the mere mention of Archelaus name
should suffice to show that it is possible for an unjust man to be happy.
But he is led to describe Archelaus unscrupulous rise to power by
what appears to him as Socrates obstinate refusal to grant the obvious.
While acknowledging that he has heard of Archelaus exploits, Socrates
refuses to pass judgment on his happiness since he has not spent time
with the man (470d9e3). To Polus annoyed reply that by this standard Socrates would not even concede that the king of Persia is happy,
Socrates affirms that that is true: for I dont know how he stands with
respect to education and justice (470e67). Although Polus finds this
response ridiculous and puzzling, we should pay close attention to
the complexity of what Socrates says in this exchange. For one thing,
Socrates statements suggest that he regards justice as something
harder to determine than we ordinarily suppose; it is not sufficient,
according to Socrates, to hear of a mans actions, but one must spend
time with a man to know whether or not he is just. And if this makes the
Socratic thesis seem less straightforward than it first appeared, we also
should note the modification in that thesis as Socrates now presents
20. Archelaus came to power in Macedonia in 413 B.C.
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it: it is not only justice but also education that is essential to the virtue
upon which happiness and misery depend (consider paideias at 470e6
in the context of 470e411). Might Socrates be indicating here that he
thinks that there are elements of virtue other than justice, elements
that might even be higher in the same way that legislation was earlier
presented as a higher art than justice? In any case, this line of thought
is not pursued, because Socrates quickly returns to the view that justice is the sole determinant of happiness. He says that he would regard
Archelaus as unhappy if in fact he is unjust (compare 471a13 with
470e611).
But what about the injustice of Archelaus? Polus thinks, to repeat,
that it is obvious. How could a man who has lived Archelaus life not
be unjust? Growing ever more frustrated and incredulous, Polus delivers his longest speech of the dialogue, describing the injustices that
paved Archelaus path to power (471a4d2). According to Polus vivid
account, delivered with a blend of venom and sarcasm, Archelaus had
no right to the throne of Macedonia. Born of a woman who was a
slave of his uncle Alcetas (Perdiccas brother), Archelaus in accordance with the just should have lived as a slave of Alcetas. While
such a life, Polus says to Socrates, would have made Archelaus happy
according to your argument, he chose instead to make himself miserable by doing the greatest injustices. After the death of his father,
Polus reports, Archelaus began his rise to power by first eliminating
his uncle and his uncles son, his own cousin. Deceiving these men
by promising them that he would help them seize power, he got them
drunk at a feast, threw them into a wagon, dragged them into the
night, and slit their throats. Once Archelaus had committed these
crimes, Polus continues, he failed to notice that he was making himself most wretched, and so, rather than repenting, he next trained
his sights on his seven-year-old brother, the legitimate son of Perdiccas and the rightful heir to the throne. Not wishing to make himself happy by following the just course of rearing this young boy and
then turning power over to him, he chose instead to throw him into
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a well, and, after drowning him, he reported to the childs mother,

the queen Cleopatra, that the boy had fallen into the well and died
while chasing a goose. Since he has done all of these injustices on
his way to power injustices surpassing any done by the rest of the
Macedonians Archelaus, by Socrates standards, should be the most
miserable of all the Macedonians, not the happiest. And perhaps,
Polus concludes with a final swipe at Socrates, there is someone
among the Athenians, beginning with you, who would prefer to be
anyone else among the Macedonians other than Archelaus.
Polus account of the life of Archelaus is meant to establish beyond a
shadow of a doubt that Archelaus is an unjust man, one whose life even
Socrates would have to grant is enviable. Yet, despite Polus intentions,
perhaps the most significant thing about the speech is what it reveals
about Polus own views. It is striking how adamant and unquestioning Polus is about the injustice of Archelaus. Is it really as clear as
Polus insists that Archelaus should be regarded as the paradigm of
an unjust man? Archelaus lineage, after all, was not that of a typical
slave. Nor does Polus provide any evidence to prove a set of accusations that would be hard to verify. Thucydides report of Archelaus
accession, by contrast, makes no mention of the crimes described
by Polus but focuses instead on the great benefits that Archelaus
brought to Macedonia.21 Polus says nothing about the character of
Archelaus rule after his rise to power.22 And only by an unquestioning application of the standards of legal justice, one that refuses to
consider the complex circumstances on which a case to exculpate
21. See Thucydides 2.100.

22. See Saxonhouse, An Unspoken Theme in Platos Gorgias, 147: Polus
ignores those activities of Archelaus which strengthened the status of Mace`
donia vis-a-vis
the cities of Greece, his success in expanding Macedonian
trade, in increasing Macedonias allies, and in Hellenizing the barbarian
state. As part of his effort at Hellenizing the barbarian state, Archelaus
played host to a number of the leading lights of Athenian intellectual life,
including Euripides and Agathon (Dodds, Gorgias, 241).
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Archelaus might be mounted, can Polus claim without further argument that Archelaus is clearly unjust (consider especially 471a48 and
c14).23
That Polus does not entertain any doubts about Archelaus guilt, but
instead describes his actions with so much emphasis on their wickedness, should prompt us to raise a surprising question about Polus
attitude towards Archelaus. Is it free of anger or indignation? Doesnt
Polus reveal that he is disturbed by the spectacle of such blatant and
successful injustice? Against this suggestion, one might object that
Polus clearly envies Archelaus, and, since he says as much himself, to
attribute indignation to him is to ignore the explicit meaning of his
speech. Yet this objection is not as powerful as it might seem, because
envy is not necessarily inconsistent with indignation and may even be
a necessary precondition of it (consider again 468e6469c2). Indeed,
it reveals something of the complexity of Polus and of indignation
itself that Archelaus is both the hero and the villain of Polus speech.
To be sure, it is more obvious that Archelaus is the hero. But his role
as the villain is brought out most simply by the vehemence of Polus
insistence on his injustice.24
23. It is worth noticing that even in Polus own description of Archelaus plot
against his uncle and cousin, Polus speaks of Archelaus using the ruse that
he was intending to give back rule of Macedonia (see 471b2). Although it
may be true that Perdiccas had taken the throne from Alcetas (see 471b23),
the indication that the throne at least in some sense belonged to Archelaus
even before the actions described by Polus suggests that the situation in the
wake of Perdiccas death was more complicated and Archelaus claim to
the throne possibly more legitimate than Polus suggests by insisting that
justice clearly demanded that Archelaus live as a slave of Alcetas. On Polus
simplification of a possibly more complicated situation, see also Benardete,
The Rhetoric of Morality and Philosophy, 44.
24. We should recall here the zeal for punishing that Polus displayed earlier
in his conversation with Socrates (see again 468e6469a10). Nichols, The
Rhetoric of Justice in Platos Gorgias, 139, also suggests that Polus displays anger at the apparent prosperity of the unjust; he describes Polus
account of Archelaus as a prosecutors speech of accusation overlaid with
the cynical intellectuals bitter revelation of the rewards for injustice. See
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Yet Socrates, as we have seen, is unwilling to concede to Polus that

Archelaus is unjust. Once Polus has completed his speech, Socrates
makes an important remark that reaffirms the position he took before
the speech. After striking back at Polus by scoffing at his speech,
Socrates tells Polus that he agrees with him on none of the things
that you are saying (471d89). This remark refers most directly to
Polus claim that the life of Archelaus shows that an unjust man can
be happy (consider 471d78). But if the remark is taken strictly (on
none of the things, ouden), it extends also to the more basic claim
that Archelaus is obviously an unjust man. For the burden of Polus
speech was at least as much to establish the injustice of Archelaus as to
emphasize his happiness. Socrates, then, distances himself once again
from Polus position on the issue of Archelaus injustice. And by doing
so, Socrates also points to the question that would have to be raised
in order to settle this issue. To settle the issue of Archelaus injustice,
one would ultimately have to raise the more fundamental question,
What is justice? Does justice always consist, for instance, in obedience to the law, or are its demands sometimes more complicated?
However, if Socrates remark points to the need to raise this question,
it stops short of raising it explicitly. In fact, we can see here a crucial
limit of the discussion between Socrates and Polus. While Socrates
and Polus have been arguing and will continue to argue about the
goodness of justice, nowhere do they examine what would seem to
be the prior question of what justice is.25 Since this is a violation of
Socrates own principle of dialectics namely, that one must say what
something is before praising or blaming it (see 448d8e4) we must
also Benardete, The Rhetoric of Morality and Philosophy, 44; Saxonhouse,

An Unspoken Theme in Platos Gorgias, 1467. For contrasting interpretations, which stress only Polus admiration of Archelaus and his attraction
to injustice, see Voegelin, Plato, 2628, and Santas, Socrates, 2389.
25. Compare Republic 354a12c3. Benardete, The Rhetoric of Morality and Philosophy, 6, makes a similar observation, calling attention to a limit not just
of Socrater conversation with Polus but of the dialogue as a whole. See also
Newell, Ruling Passion, 38; Santas, Socrates, 21920.
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conclude that Socrates discussion of justice with Polus is not a dialectical examination of justice in the fullest or deepest sense of Socratic
dialectics. To state this another way, although the discussion proceeds
for the most part through conversational exchanges, the purpose of
these exchanges is not to reveal the true character of justice, but rather
to accomplish something more limited.
SOCRATES REFUTATION OF POLUS (471e2481b5)
That Socrates does not engage Polus in an examination of the fundamental question, What is justice? does not mean that his aim in
speaking with him is an unimportant one. Socrates primary aim, I
have suggested, is to reveal that Polus concerns are more complex
than they initially seem and, through this, to show something more
general about the depth of the human concern for justice. Our confidence in attributing this aim to Socrates should be strengthened by the
speech he now delivers a speech that includes both a promise to bring
out Polus agreement with his position and an important statement on
the views most people hold about justice.
These features of Socrates speech emerge in the course of his discussion of the speechs main theme. Serving as a bridge between Polus
attempt at refutation and his own, Socrates speech is a reflection on
the difference between Polus method of refutation and the one he
will soon employ. According to Socrates, Polus has been following the
method typical of those who argue in law courts, since such men make
their cases by bringing in as many witnesses as they can to support
their side (471e2472a2). Now, the witnesses to whom Socrates is
referring in the case of Polus are presumably all of the Athenians,
who Polus insisted would choose the life of Archelaus over that of any
other Macedonian (see again 471c8d1). But if this is fairly straightforward, much more surprising is the step Socrates takes next. He
grants and even bolsters Polus point by affirming that all Athenians
and foreigners, except a few, would say the same things as Polus and
could serve as his witnesses. Socrates even provides names, including
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some of the most respected names in Athens: his list, which spans
the Athenian political spectrum, includes Nicias and his brothers as
well as the whole house of Pericles (472a2b3).26 Socrates acknowledgment that these men could be brought as witnesses by Polus is
surprising because it suggests that the human concern for justice is in
fact not so deep; it suggests that even decent men including the most
pious have grave doubts about whether injustice is always the worst
path. In other words, Socrates seems to place himself, as an advocate
of the Socratic thesis, in a minority, not to say in a minority of one
(consider 472b34, c12).27 And yet his speech is not as simple as this
suggests. For although Socrates grants that these witnesses could be
brought to testify in support of Polus view that the unjust are sometimes happy, he also says that, in offering this testimony, they would
be false witnesses (see 472a12, b46). By this, Socrates means more
than that they would be wrong; he also means that they would be lying
or giving their support to a claim they do not really believe.28 Socrates
thus seems puzzlingly to move within the same speech between
conceding and denying that most people agree with Polus rather than
with him. It is possible, however, to make sense of this wavering. For
26. On Socrates selection of figures from the different political factions in
Athens, see Dodds, Gorgias, 244; Nichols, Gorgias and Phaedrus, 57n. Nicias
was, in the words of Dodds, an old-fashioned conservative; the house
of Pericles refers to the leaders of the democrats. Socrates also mentions
Aristocrates, a member of the oligarchic party.
27. Compare Republic 619b7d3, Laws 660d11662a8. Socrates stresses the
piety of some of the figures mentioned in the present passage by speaking of the offerings to the gods brought by Nicias and his brothers and by
Aristocrates (see 472a5b1). By stressing their piety in this context, Socrates
leads one to wonder whether the very hope for divine support for justice is
not itself an indication of doubts about the intrinsic goodness of justice. On
this question, consider Adeimantus complaint about the typical praises of
justice in his speech in Book Two of the Republic (362e1367e5).
28. This stronger meaning is suggested by Socrates use of the word pseudomarturas (false witnesses or perjurers) and is confirmed by a remark Socrates
will make shortly after this speech (see 474b25). Cf. Brickhouse and Smith,
Platos Socrates, 7680.
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it can be understood as a reflection of a wavering within the souls of

the people Socrates is talking about, that is, within the souls of nearly
everyone. In other words, Socrates is suggesting that nearly everyone
is of two minds about justice: if beneath ordinary decency there lurk
great doubts about whether it is always wise to be just, there also lurks,
beneath those doubts, a deeper belief in the goodness of justice.
Yet, if such dividedness about justice is so common as to be nearly
universal, it is far from obvious. Unless given some display or demonstration, Socrates suggestions in his speech on Polus witnesses cannot be taken for more than assertions. But Socrates does promise to
give a display of the dividedness about justice to which he points in at
least one case. Socrates explains that his form of refutation, unlike
the courtroom-style rhetoric of Polus, aims to make a witness out
of his very opponent; and in the present instance, this means that
he will try to show that even Polus himself can be brought to agree
with the Socratic thesis (see 472b6c6, 472e4473a3, and 474a5b8).
Socrates thus stresses that his method is directed at convincing a single
individual: his interlocutor. But he also calls attention to the broader
significance of what he aims to show in Polus case and suggests that
this case should not be seen as unusual. Socrates indicates the broader
significance of his coming refutation of Polus in a statement that initially seems to point in the opposite direction. Denying that he knows
how to convince large bodies of people, and admitting that he does
not even speak with the many, Socrates says that he will direct his
refutation at Polus alone (473e6474b5). Yet, if Polus is his sole concern, why does Socrates even raise here the issue of the many? One
reason he does so is to call attention to an important limit on what he
can accomplish: Socrates one-on-one refutations are not political in
the sense that they cannot reach large crowds or influence the many
(consider in particular 473e6474b1). Another reason that Socrates
raises the issue of the many, however, is to urge his audience and
we should think here especially of Gorgias to reflect on the broader
implications of his coming refutation of Polus. For Socrates not only
denies that he speaks with the many, but he also goes out of his way
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to make a point about what they believe. Reaffirming what he had

suggested by calling Polus witnesses false witnesses, Socrates concludes his statement about the many by telling Polus: For I suppose
that I and you and the rest of humanity believe that doing injustice is
worse than suffering it, and not paying the just penalty worse than
paying it (474b25, emphasis added; see also the repetition at 474b8,
and consider 475d13).29
This last statement completes the prelude to Socrates refutation of
Polus. In it, we can also see that Socrates has expanded the position he
is defending. No longer arguing only that doing injustice is worse than
suffering it, Socrates has expanded his thesis to include the claim that
those who do injustice are better off if they pay the penalty than if they
escape unpunished. Socrates went out of his way to make this addition in the interlude between his speech on Polus witnesses and his
statement about the many (472d6473e3). After reconfirming Polus
view that it is possible for an unjust man to be happy, and reasserting
his own position that that is impossible, Socrates asked Polus about
punishment: Will the man who does injustice be happy even if he
receives the just penalty and punishment? Polus predictable reply
not at all, since in that case he would be most miserable merely
29. For a similar interpretation of the significance of Socrates statement about

the many, see McKim, Shame and Truth in Platos Gorgias, 3637. McKim
shares my emphasis on Socrates effort to reveal the character of the human
concern for justice. But he presents that concern, in my view, as simpler than
it is by suggesting that, deep down, we are sure that the harm injustice
does to the soul far outweigh[s] any material gains it may bring (4748).
Also, he goes too far in suggesting that Plato believed that Socratic morality
is grounded so deeply within us that its truth is beyond argument (48).
Socrates will go on to make arguments for Socratic morality, both against
Polus and against Callicles; McKim downplays too much the importance of
the question of whether Socrates arguments are sound. My analysis also
should be compared with Brickhouse and Smith, Platos Socrates, 7482.
Although Brickhouse and Smith, too, emphasize Socrates effort to reveal
what people really believe about justice, their analysis is closer to McKims
than to mine.
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reconfirmed a position he took earlier (compare 472d19 with 470a1

8). By eliciting this reply, however, Socrates enabled himself to respond
by asserting the opposed view that unpunished injustice makes one
even more miserable than injustice that receives its due punishment
(472e47). Of course, by extending his position in this way, Socrates
would seem to have made his task in convincing Polus all the more
difficult and this at the very moment that he is promising to try to win
Polus over to his position (see 473a23, 474b2c3). For his part, Polus
can hardly believe his ears: Does Socrates really think that an unjust
man who gets caught, tortured on the rack, castrated, burned, and
is forced to watch his family suffer as he endures further torments,
is a happier man than the one who gets away with his crimes and
becomes a tyrant (473b12d2)? Polus is so incredulous that he breaks
into laughter at Socrates claims. He expresses his amused curiosity
to hear how Socrates will defend his ludicrous position (see 473e25,
474c23).
Yet, for all this, Polus is swayed by Socrates refutation. He is led
to accept, at least in some manner, the very position he mocks so
contemptuously. To understand this remarkable result, and also to
judge the true extent of Socrates success in convincing Polus, we must
turn first to the beginning of the argument by which Socrates refutes
Polus and try to follow the argument in detail.
Socrates argument, which marks a kind of new beginning to the
conversation between Socrates and Polus (consider hosper

an ei ex
arches at 474c4), begins from a set of questions intended to bring
out Polus views on justice, benefit, and nobility. Socrates succeeds in
getting Polus to acknowledge that while he regards doing injustice as
better than suffering it, he also regards it as more shameful. Socrates
accomplishes this in the crucial opening exchange of the argument:
SOCRATES: Tell me . . . which do you believe to be worse, doing injustice
or suffering it?
POLUS: Suffering it at least that is what I think.
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SOCRATES: But what about this? Which is more shameful, doing injustice
or suffering it? Answer !
POLUS: Doing it.
SOCRATES: So, then, is it also worse, if indeed it is more shameful?
POLUS: Far from it.
(474c49)
Polus view, as it emerges from this exchange, grants the shamefulness

of doing injustice without yet conceding far from it that this
speaks decisively to the question of whether injustice is beneficial or
harmful. His view thus implies a divide between the shameful and the
bad, on the one hand, and between the noble and the good, on the
other (see 474c9d2).30 And it is on this divide that Socrates trains his
sights. Having directed Polus attention to considerations of nobility
that is, to a standard for which Polus himself has already displayed a
concern (see again, e.g., 448c89, 462c89, 463d3) Socrates turns to
an analysis of the noble (to kalon) or of the character of all noble or
beautiful things (ta panta kala).31
Socrates asks Polus whether all noble things are not seen as such
because one looks away to something beyond the noble thing itself.
He gives the examples of noble bodies, colors, shapes, sounds, and
practices. Do you call these things noble, he asks, looking away to
nothing? For example, dont you say that noble bodies [ta somata
ta kala] are noble either in reference to some use, that is, with a view
to something for which they are useful, or in reference to some pleasure, if they make those who behold them delight in the beholding?
30. Compare Laws 661d6662a8, 689a1c3, Republic 348a8e9.

31. The crucial Greek term kalos has a broad meaning that no English term fully
captures. Noble-beautiful might be the best translation, if it were not so
awkward. In my treatment of Socrates argument, I will translate kalos as
noble since the purpose of Socrates argument is to apply his analysis of to
kalon to the case of justice. It better captures the moral significance of the
term to speak of the nobility of justice than of its beauty. But it is important
to bear in mind the range of the term Socrates is analyzing, especially since
his analysis will traverse all of that range.
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Or do you have anything beyond these things to say about the nobility of the body? (474d3e1). When Polus says that he does not have
anything beyond use or pleasure to account for the nobility of bodies,
Socrates then applies this view to all other noble things, replacing the
term use with benefit such that nobility appears to rest either on
pleasure or on benefit or on a combination of the two. He mentions
again the examples of shapes, colors, and sounds, and then turns to
laws and practices: Also indeed for things pertaining to laws and practices, that is, the noble ones, surely there isnt anything beyond these
namely, their being either beneficial or pleasant or both (474e17).
Socrates final example is the nobility of learnings or sciences, which
Polus readily agrees should be understood along the same lines
(475a12).
Socrates analysis leads to the view that the noble must always be
understood in terms of pleasure or benefit, and the shameful always
in terms of pain or harm. According to this view, whenever one of two
things is nobler than the other, its greater nobility must be explained
by the greater pleasure it brings or the greater benefit, or by both; and,
similarly, the greater shamefulness of one of two things must be due to
the greater pain it brings or the greater harm, or to both (475a5b2).
It is at this point that Socrates reminds Polus of his position regarding
doing injustice and suffering it. For while Polus has argued that suffering injustice is worse than doing it, he has also conceded that doing
injustice is more shameful. But that concession now means given
the analysis of the noble and the shameful that Polus has accepted
that doing injustice must exceed suffering injustice either in pain or
in harm or in both (475b58). Yet it can hardly be claimed that those
who do injustice endure more pain than those who suffer it; and if
doing injustice does not exceed in pain, it obviously cannot exceed both
in pain and in harm (475b8c5). There remains only one alternative:
doing injustice must exceed suffering injustice in harm (475c68). Yet
what exceeds in harm is more harmful that is to say, worse than
what it exceeds, and no one would choose for himself what is worse
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rather than what is better (475d4e3). Polus, then, did not know what
he was saying when he claimed that suffering injustice is worse than
doing it and when he attributed this view to the vast majority of human
beings. For it turns out that Socrates was right to claim that neither I
nor you nor any other human being would prefer to do injustice than
to suffer it, since it proves to be worse (475e36).
Socrates argument is a remarkable display of his powers. That is
not to say, however, that there are no objections that could be raised
against it. The most important problems concern the central claim of
the argument that the nobility of noble things can be understood only
to some pleasure or some benefit, or
by looking away (apoblepon)
to both. For while it may be true that nobility cannot be understood
without looking away to something (see again 474d35), one could
object to the view that it has to be pleasure or benefit or a combination
of these to which one looks. Couldnt one argue that, when we regard
something as noble, we are looking precisely to its nobility itself, a
quality that has a being of its own that is not reducible to pleasure
or benefit? Or, alternatively, even if one grants that it is necessary to
look to pleasure or benefit, doesnt that still leave open the question
of whose pleasure and benefit must be served? In Socrates own first
example the nobility of bodies the pleasure mentioned was said
to belong to those beholding the noble bodies, not to those possessing
them (see 474d89). Couldnt one suggest something similar about
noble men and their actions, that is, that they come to be regarded as
noble because of the pleasure and benefit they bring to others?32 Or, to
32. This is the objection most frequently discussed by other commentators,

especially after it was raised in a well-known article by Gregory Vlastos.
See Vlastos, Was Polus Refuted? 45460. Vlastoss article should be compared with a number of other accounts, which vary in the extent of their
agreement with Vlastos. See Mackenzie, Plato on Punishment, 2414; Kahn,
Drama and Dialectic in Platos Gorgias, 8892; Santas, Socrates, 233
40; Irwin, Gorgias, 1578; McKim, Shame and Truth in Platos Gorgias,
2414. See also Vlastoss restatement of his argument in Socrates, Ironist
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approach the issue in another way, one might ask whether the nobility
of things such as bodies, colors, shapes, and sounds really provides
a good model for understanding the nobility of human beings and
their actions. Socrates exploits the range of the term noble (kalos) by
suggesting that it means the same thing regardless of what it modifies;
and he makes his case easier by turning to practices and laws, and then
to doing and suffering injustice, only after first establishing a certain
view of nobility through the examples of bodies, colors, shapes, and
sounds. But doesnt the nobility of human beings and their actions
have a special character that makes it more resistant to explanation in
terms of benefit or pleasure?33
These objections are sufficient to cast doubt on Socrates argument.
But Polus does not raise any of them. He goes along with the argument. And we can understand why he does not object by considering
the character of the objections just raised. For they have the tenor of
what one might call moral objections to Socrates analysis of nobility in
terms of pleasure and benefit. That is, they are objections to what one
and Moral Philosopher, 13948. Earlier interpretations tend to be less critical of Socrates argument. See, e.g., Friedlander,
Plato, 2:2567; Taylor,

Plato, 11314; Adkins, Merit and Responsibility, 267. Although Vlastos is
right to criticize such interpretations for their unquestioning acceptance of
Socrates argument, he goes too far in suggesting that no one before him had
raised any doubts about the soundness of Socrates argument (Was Polus
Refuted? 454). See Grote, Plato, and the Other Companions of Sokrates,
2:3345; Dodds, Gorgias, 249.
33. See note 31 above on the range of the term kalos. While I explain in note 31
my reason for translating kalos as noble, the inability of any single English
term to capture the range of kalos can be seen in the strangeness of referring
to such things as bodies, colors, shapes, and sounds as noble. It would have
been more appropriate to use the term beautiful in those cases, although
shifting between two terms would have created inconsistency and obscured
the crucial fact that the term is the same in Greek. Oddly, the difficulty of
finding a single English term to apply to all of Socrates examples can help
one to see the dubiousness of his procedure. It is no accident that practices
comes last on Socrates initial list of examples; the order of that initial list
sets up the order or movement of the argument (see 474d34).
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could well take to be an analysis that tarnishes nobility by reducing it

to the pleasant and the beneficial.34 Such an analysis, however, would
be appealing to Polus, who is eager to present himself as a toughminded realist (consider especially 475a24). Yet, if Polus acceptance
of Socrates analysis of the noble is not hard to explain, his acceptance
of the argument as a whole is much more surprising. More specifically, what is most surprising is that even after Polus agrees to the
view of nobility and shamefulness that makes pleasure or benefit the
basis of nobility, and pain or harm the basis of shamefulness, he does
not retract his agreement that doing injustice is more shameful than
suffering it. In other words, one would have expected Polus to revise his
understanding of what belongs to the classes of the noble and shameful things once he has accepted a view of these classes that insists upon
a necessary connection between nobility and pleasure or benefit, and
between shamefulness and pain or harm (consider 475a2c9 together
with 474c7d2). Such a revision would have allowed him to accept
Socrates hard-boiled view of nobility while easily escaping Socrates
conclusion about the goodness of justice. But Polus never makes this
simple revision.35
34. See, e.g., the protest of Kahn, Drama and Dialectic in Platos Gorgias, 93
94, against Socrates reliance on a superficial analysis of to kalon, which
has the effect of reducing the moral sense [of the term] (the emphasis is
Kahns). See also Friedlander,
Plato, 2:2567.
35. Polus failure to object to Socrates argument is not given sufficient attention by those who emphasize the weaknesses of the argument. See, e.g.,
Vlastos, Was Polus Refuted? 45460, Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher, 13948; Mackenzie, Plato on Punishment, 2414; Santas, Socrates,
23340. Although McKim goes too far, in my view, in the other direction
by downplaying too much the logical problems with Socrates argument,
his analysis has the virtue of stressing the dramatic significance of Polus
agreement and what it reveals about Polus concerns (see especially Shame
and Truth in Platos Gorgias, 4647). Kahn, Drama and Dialectic in Platos
Gorgias, 9495 also discusses Polus agreement, but he explains it merely as
the result of his deference and attachment to public opinion. My own analysis will differ in important ways from McKims, but it is closer to McKims
than to Kahns.
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Perhaps Polus missed his opportunity out of mere slowness. Yet,

even if he is not the sharpest of all interlocutors, neither is Polus a
fool. The more plausible explanation is that Polus failure to deny the
shamefulness of doing injustice reflects an unwillingness to deny it,
an unwillingness that stems from the fact that he truly believes that
doing injustice is shameful. And perhaps we should not be so surprised
that he stands by this belief even when it entails accepting the view
that injustice must be harmful. After all, didnt Polus earlier display
a sense of indignation at Archelaus and his successful injustice?36
Insofar as Polus is angered by injustice and finds it shameful that is,
insofar as he disapproves of it wouldnt he at least yearn for it also
to be harmful? If so, then Socrates argument allows Polus to accept a
view that he already on some level wants to accept and thus in some
sense already does accept. In other words, Socrates argument does
succeed in revealing in Polus a buried concern for justice. To repeat,
Polus commitment to the view that doing injustice is more shameful
than suffering it, a commitment that does not falter when Socrates
suggests that it implies an acceptance of the goodness of justice, is
at least some indication that Polus does in fact care about justice.
Socrates has thus kept his promise to bring out Polus attachment to
justice.37
We must be careful, though, not to overstate the extent of Socrates
success. The most that can reasonably be said is that Socrates has
shown that Polus does in fact have a concern for justice and that he can
be brought to acknowledge that concern by the right kind of argument.
But does such an argument carry the power to move Polus away from
his attraction to injustice and his doubts about the goodness of justice?
Socrates himself poses this same question in another form through an
36. See again 470d5471d2; recall also his earlier anger at Socrates at 461b3c4.
37. Compare McKim, Shame and Truth in Platos Gorgias, 4447. My argument in the present paragraph is similar to McKims. The next paragraph,
however, will bring out my disagreement with McKim who, in my view,
presents Socrates success as more complete than it is.
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analogy he offers as he is stating the conclusion of his argument. By

urging Polus to submit nobly to the argument just as to a doctor
(475d67), Socrates uses an analogy that recalls his earlier schema
of arts and thus leads to the suggestion that his argument should be
seen as an example of that art justice which seeks to return the
soul to a state of basic health. Yet, aside from remembering that such
an art was not presented as the highest (a designation that was given
to legislation), we must ask about the power of this medical art of
the soul. If Polus soul is ailing because he is drawn to injustice out
of doubts about the goodness of justice, how much of a cure does
Socrates argument really offer?38
To be sure, Socrates has some success with Polus. But the limits
of that success become increasingly visible as Socrates goes on to
make a further argument, taking up the second main issue over which
he and Polus are divided: the issue of punishment. Socrates further
argument, in which he contends that unjust men are better off if they
receive punishment than if they escape unpunished, is an extension of
the argument we have just considered. It relies for its crucial premises
on agreements reached in the prior argument (see especially 476e3
477a2), and it completes Socrates refutation of Polus position and
his defense of the Socratic thesis in its fullest form (see especially
479c8e6). Most important for our present purposes, however, is Polus
response. Although Polus goes along with even the most radical claims
that Socrates puts forward in this argument, he does so with something
considerably less than full conviction. Polus reservations are conveyed
most clearly by the frequency with which he replies to Socrates questions asking for his affirmation of various steps with phrases such as it
appears so or it is likely (see, e.g., 477a3, e2, e6, 478b2, e2, e5, 479a4,
d13, d6, e9; and even in the prior argument, see 475c7, d4, e23, e6).
It is true that there are also moments when Polus responses reconfirm the concern for justice revealed by Socrates earlier argument
(see, e.g., 478b35, 476b13, e34). But these moments are fairly rare,
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and so little did even Socrates prior argument stick that at a crucial juncture Polus has to be reminded of its central principle (see
477c45). One gets the sense that Polus is willing to go along with
Socrates argument to the extent that he is willing more because
he is committed to following out a line of reasoning to its conclusion than because he is genuinely persuaded (see especially 475e23,
480e12).39
There are, as it turns out, good reasons not to be persuaded by
Socrates argument about punishment. Without going into the details
of this intricate and lengthy argument, it is possible to give a brief summary of its main steps.40 Socrates argument begins with a defense of
the principle that whenever an action occurs, the one who suffers
that action has an experience, in his suffering, of the same sort or
quality as the experience of the doer, in his doing. Thus, for instance,
if a hard and swift striking occurs, the one who is struck is struck hard
and swiftly, just as the striker strikes hard and swiftly (476b7c3). The
purpose of establishing this principle is that it enables Socrates to
argue that just punishment involves not only the performing of a just
action by the punisher, but also the suffering of one by the person who
is punished (476d5e3). This, in turn, enables Socrates to return to the
agreements already reached in the preceding argument. By recalling
those agreements, he can get Polus to concede that just things are noble
things and hence also good things, and, therefore, that the recipient of
punishment, as a sufferer of just things, must suffer or experience good
things (476e2477a4). Of course, Socrates reliance here on the earlier
39. Contrast McKim, Shame and Truth in Platos Gorgias, 4647. For evaluations of the extent of Socrates success with Polus closer to my own,
see Kastely, In Defense of Platos Gorgias, 97, 106; Arieti, Platos Philosophic Antiope, 205; Benardete, The Rhetoric of Morality and Philosophy,
5051.
40. For a more thorough analysis of this argument and its weaknesses, see
Mackenzie, Plato on Punishment, 1804. Compare also Benardete, The
Rhetoric of Morality and Philosophy, 5357; Santas, Socrates, 2406; Grote,
Plato, and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 2:336.
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agreements depends on the assumptions that all just things are noble
and, as noble, good for everyone involved, assumptions that one might
well question in the case of punishment (see 476b12 together with
476e2477a4).41 But the more important difficulties with Socrates
argument arise as he goes on to try to articulate the great benefit that
one receives from being punished. Socrates argues that punishment
improves the unjust soul by releasing it from the evils that plague it.
And he argues that, just as poverty is the evil of possessions, and sickness is the evil of the body, the evil of the soul is injustice. Or, rather,
Socrates argues this in some places, whereas in others he presents
injustice as just one of a set of evils of the soul that also includes
intemperance, cowardice, and ignorance.42 Socrates mention of these
other evils or vices raises several questions about his argument. Does
punishment release one from all of the evils of the soul? Or does it
release one from only one of them? And for that matter, how exactly
does it release one from any of them? If it is extremely hard to see
how punishment might release one, for example, from ignorance, it
is not obvious how it releases one even from injustice. Yet Socrates
argument depends decisively on the view that punishment releases one
from a great harm and an amazing evil, because only if that is true
would an unjust man be better off seeking out punishment despite
the undeniable pain it entails (see 477d1e6). Socrates, however, does
not make a complete and convincing case that punishment cures the
soul of injustice. Nor does he answer the prior question of exactly why
injustice is such a great harm and an amazing evil to have in the soul
in the first place.43
41. It is worth recalling, in this connection, Socrates own earlier unwillingness

to express any admiration or envy for punishers (see again 469a4b2). See
also Laws 860b17.
42. Compare the formulations at 477b68, c2, c34, c9d1, d45, e46, 478b1,
and d67; for a similar wavering in the case of the body, compare 477b35,
c2, and e8.
43. On this last point, see Benardete, The Rhetoric of Morality and Philosophy,
51; Grote, Plato, and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 2:3368.
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The last of these problems with Socrates argument is the most significant, because it reveals the largest gap in the argument and the
deepest reason for Polus reluctance to embrace it fully. To appreciate the importance of this gap, though, we must first give due weight
to Socrates argument and be careful not to be too dismissive of it.
Since it culminates in strange claims such as that the best way to
get revenge against an enemy is to help him escape the benefits of
being punished (see 480e5481b1), it is tempting to regard this argument as simply ridiculous and ironic.44 But there are several reasons
why that temptation should be resisted. Socrates argument sketches
out what may be called, with some justification, a Socratic theory
of punishment. According to this theory, punishment improves the
unjust soul by releasing it from the evils that plague it. Perhaps most
important in this connection is that Socrates makes no mention of
what are commonly thought to be the two most important aims of
punishment: deterrence and retribution. In fact, it is Socrates silence
about these aims, as much as anything else, that makes his argument
seem so strange and unrealistic. Yet, strange as it is, Socrates argument captures something that may at times be hard to discern but is
no less present in our beliefs about punishment than the concern to
deter future crimes and to get revenge for past ones. Dont we also
believe that punishment can rehabilitate the unjust soul or provide
the path to redemption? While not always on the surface, it is not
entirely foreign to the ordinary outlook on punishment to believe that
the suffering involved in punishment is a suffering that purifies and
restores. And if that belief is at odds with the belief that punishment
should also cause deserved harm, that tension reveals not so much
a flaw in Socrates presentation as a kind of quandary in our beliefs
about punishment a quandary that consists in our belief that punishment should be at once something harmful and something beneficial.
Socrates theory of punishment, then, can have the virtue of awakening us to this quandary and calling attention to the hopes buried even in
44. See Dodds, Gorgias, 2579; Thompson, Gorgias, 70.
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our convictions about punishment. Indeed, the evidence for Socrates

argument, such as it is, consists precisely in the willingness of people to
grant the premises that lead to the extreme conclusions that Socrates
draws out.45
Yet, while Socrates argument may have the power to awaken
thought, its power to convince is more limited. To return to Polus,
although he grants the crucial premise (see again 476e2477a4), he
goes along with the argument half-heartedly at best. Socrates argument may succeed in revealing convictions he never realized he had,
but Polus reluctance to embrace the argument raises doubts about
whether his views have been permanently transformed. His reluctance
itself, furthermore, can be seen as related to the question of punishment and its restorative power. That is, not only is Polus reluctant to
accept Socrates argument about punishment, but his reluctance itself
can be seen as a reluctance to welcome a kind of punishment that he
is receiving. After all, isnt the refutation to which Socrates subjects
Polus a kind of punishment in its own right? We have already considered Socrates comparison of his earlier argument to a doctor. And it
is surely no mere coincidence that the analogy of the medical art also
plays a prominent role in his argument about punishment. Indeed,
Socrates draws out this analogy at length, comparing the effect of punishment on the soul to the effect of medical treatments on the body
(see 477e7479c6). Socrates emphasis on this analogy, especially when
taken together with the earlier analogy between his own argument and
a doctor, encourages us to regard his refutation of Polus as an act of
punishment for the benefit of Polus soul. Yet, even more pointedly
than before, this line of thought compels us to ask whether Polus has
been given more than a temporary remedy. Certainly, it would be overly
optimistic to expect the transformation in his views to endure for long.
Moreover, if Polus should rebel against the position to which he has
been led, as he surely will, his rebellion would not be entirely unjustified. For Socrates has appealed to and relied on Polus attachment
45. Compare Republic 335b2d13.
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to justice to try to restore his commitment to justice, but he has not

backed up these efforts with a truly convincing defense of the goodness
of justice. We cannot avoid the conclusion, it seems, that the problem
lies not just with Polus as the recipient of punishment but also with
Socrates as the deliverer of it. Socrates appears to be like a doctor who
is better at diagnosing an illness and indicating the need for treatment
than he is at providing a genuine cure.
If Socrates refutation of Polus can be seen as an act of punishment, it also can be seen as an act of rhetoric, although not of the
kind of rhetoric that Socrates criticized earlier. At the end of his conversation with Polus, Socrates returns to the issue of rhetoric and
makes a suggestion about the proper uses of rhetoric. He argues that
rhetoric should not be used to make defense speeches in cases of ones
own injustices or those of ones family, friends, or fatherland; rather,
it should be used to accuse oneself and ones family and friends of any
injustices that merit punishment (480a6d7). In other words, Socrates
rejects the most common but morally questionable use of rhetoric and
replaces it with a novel and just use. Now, Socrates surely intends his
concluding remarks about rhetoric for the ears of Gorgias as much as
for those of Polus. And we may thus say that he ends his conversation
with Polus by suggesting to Gorgias a better and more just use for his
powers. Rather than using rhetoric as a tool of exploitation, Gorgias
ought to use it to help himself and others by accusing himself and those
close to him whenever they stray from the path of justice. Such a suggestion, furthermore, is in keeping with what Socrates has done before
Gorgias eyes with Polus. Socrates has brought out Polus temptation
toward injustice, and then he also has shown that, despite this temptation, Polus has a buried concern for justice that could provide the
ground for reform. If Socrates has been unable to fully complete that
reform, might that be a job for Gorgias? Has Socrates been preparing
Gorgias for a new task by revealing to him the true concerns and needs
of men such as Polus?
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These questions must remain open questions for now. For we are
left at the end of Socrates conversation with Polus still wondering
precisely what Socrates is after. And while the suggestion conveyed by
these questions is a plausible one, a couple of considerations should
make us hesitant to take it as the last word. One reason for doubt is
Socrates limited success with Polus, which we have been forced to
acknowledge. Would it be possible for Gorgias to do better? Even if
Socrates can show Gorgias the complexity of Polus concerns, could
even the master rhetorician provide a cure for Polus sickness? Beyond
this, it is also worth noticing that Socrates concluding statement
on rhetoric offers an incomplete enumeration of the uses to which
rhetoric might be put. Socrates rejects the use of rhetoric for selfdefense when one is in the wrong, and he embraces its use for selfaccusation in the same situation. But what about self-defense when
one is not in the wrong, that is, when one is unjustly accused? Didnt
our earlier thoughts about Socrates interest in rhetoric lead us in that
direction? It is true that Socrates silence about this use of rhetoric can
be explained by the fact that he is defending the position that justice
should always be ones foremost concern. It would not be in keeping
with the spirit of this position to express a concern for self-protection,
and Socrates stresses more than once that his statement about rhetoric
is governed by the position he is taking about justice (see 480a14, b3,
and e3). Yet Socrates silence about self-protection is not complete,
since he adds, in a surprising remark, that one must take care not
to suffer injustice at the hands of ones enemies (see 480e67). And
the very connection between the issue of self-protection and Socrates
position on justice leaves us at this point with unresolved questions.
What might Socrates evaluation of the uses of rhetoric be if his position concerning justice should prove to be questionable? Would there
be a stronger case for a rhetoric of self-defense? And what might such
rhetoric look like?
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3 The Confrontation between Socrates

and Callicles
orgias must be impressed by Socrates success in at least taming

Polus and by what Socrates has shown about Polus concerns.
Yet doubts might reasonably linger about whether Socrates success
with Polus, even as limited as it is, could be duplicated with a more

demanding interlocutor. And Gorgias also might wonder whether the
attachment to justice that Socrates has revealed in Polus is really a sign
of a deep concern in the human soul rather than a reflection of Polus
susceptibility to bouts of shame. If these are Gorgias thoughts at this
stage of the dialogue, he will welcome the entry of Callicles. As soon
as Callicles enters the conversation, the tone becomes more serious
and demanding. This change can be felt from the moment Callicles
speaks up to ask whether Socrates is really being serious in defending
the position he has been defending, and then exclaims: For if you
are being serious and these things that you are saying are really true,
wouldnt that mean that our lives as human beings are now turned
upside down, and that everything we do is the opposite of what we
should do? (481c14). Unlike Polus, who displayed a willingness halfheartedly to follow arguments wherever they might lead, Callicles has
a much sharper sense of the gravity of the conclusions of Socrates
arguments. In this respect at least, he first comes to sight as the most
impressive of Socrates interlocutors.
Callicles also will raise the most profound challenge to Socrates.
He will waste little time in delivering an attack on Socrates very way
of life. The divide between Socrates and Callicles will prove to be as
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deep as any in Platos dialogues; nowhere else does Plato allow a critic
of the philosophic life to speak so forcefully.1 Moreover, the divide
between Socrates and Callicles will prove to be unbridgeable. Whereas
Socrates has been able in some manner to come to a meeting of the
minds with Gorgias and Polus, Callicles will remain resistant to the
end both to Socrates charms and to his arguments. The reasons for
Callicles recalcitrance, however, are far from simple and clear; and
while it is easy to observe the divide between Socrates and Callicles, it
is much harder to understand it. Our task, then, is to try to follow the
often confusing twists and turns of the conversation between Socrates
and Callicles in an effort to uncover what truly divides these two very
different men.
Some initial help in understanding the divide between Socrates
and Callicles is given by the opening speech that Socrates delivers in
response to Callicles opening question. Socrates treats Callicles from
the beginning as someone with whom he is already familiar, and it
is Socrates who initiates the hostilities with a long speech describing
both what he and Callicles have in common and what divides them.2
By Socrates account, he and Callicles are both lovers, that is, they
share that intense experience of the soul that is called eros.3 But if
the experience of love is a common ground between them, they differ
1. Many commentators have stressed the depth of the divide between Socrates
and Callicles and the power of Callicles challenge to the Socratic way of life.
See, for example, Taylor, Plato, 106, 122; Jaeger, Paideia, 2:1367; Voegelin,
Plato, 2832; Romilly, The Great Sophists in Periclean Athens, 156; Kahn,
Plato and the Socratic Dialogue, 134; Euben, Corrupting Youth, 217; Newell,
Ruling Passion, 1011.
2. Socrates is now talking to a fellow Athenian, although one of whom nothing
is known beyond his role in the Gorgias. Some have speculated that Callicles
is a fictional character, others that he is a mask for some other figure. But
these are mere speculations, and dubious ones at that, as Dodds, Gorgias,
1213, argues. Consider also Romilly, The Great Sophists in Periclean Athens,
156; Rankin, Sophists, Socratics and Cynics, 69; Taylor, Plato, 116.
3. To better understand the significance of Socrates use of the term eronte at
481d3, see Symposium 205a5209e4. See also Newell, Ruling Passion, 1113.
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in the first place in the objects of their love. Socrates describes himself as a lover of Alcibiades and of philosophy, and he attributes to
Callicles a love of the Athenian demos and of a young man named
Demos (481d25). Now, in light of many things Callicles will go on to
say, we will have to wonder what Socrates has in mind in speaking of
Callicles as a lover of the demos and as an erotic man more generally.
But for now we should merely observe a further difference between
Socrates and Callicles that Socrates calls to our attention. For Socrates
not only points out that he and Callicles love different things, but he
also indicates that he differs from Callicles in his ability to oppose one
of his beloveds. Whereas Callicles, according to Socrates, is forever
turning with the whims and opinions of his beloveds, Socrates claims
to stand firmly with the speeches of philosophy and blames his other
beloved, Alcibiades, for his unsteadiness (481d5482b1).
Socrates greater consistency is due, he claims, to the consistency
of philosophy and its unwavering speeches. Responding to Callicles
question about whether he really believes the Socratic thesis, Socrates
makes the most important statement of his opening reply to Callicles:
Dont be amazed that I say such things, but stop philosophy, my beloved,
from saying them. For, my dear comrade, it always says what you now
hear from me and is not nearly so unsteady as the other beloved. For this
son of Cleinias [Alcibiades] holds different views at different times, but
philosophy always holds the same ones, and it says what you are now
amazed at; and you yourself were present when these things were being
said. Therefore, either refute that one, just as I said a while ago, by showing
that doing injustice and not paying the penalty when one does injustice are
not the most extreme of all evils; or else, if you let this remain unrefuted,
then, by the dog, the god of the Egyptians, Callicles will not agree with
you, Callicles, but will go through all of life in disagreement. (482a3b6)
With this statement, Socrates sets the stage for his quarrel with
Callicles. But he does so in a complicated way. Perhaps most important, he makes here a crucial addition to his presentation of the
Socratic thesis: he now presents this thesis, as he has not done up to
this point, as the view of philosophy. Socrates thus brings philosophy
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to the fore as an issue in the conversation, and he associates the philosophic life with great devotion to justice. But he also sets a kind of
challenge for Callicles: if Callicles is ever to be consistent, he must
refute the view that Socrates here attributes to philosophy. This is a
striking and perhaps surprising thing to say, since it implies that on
some level Callicles himself holds this view. Socrates statement, in
other words, reaffirms in the case of Callicles what he suggested in his
speech on Polus witnesses, namely, that nearly everyone is divided
about the goodness of justice. But what is the basis for Socrates apparent judgment that Callicles even Callicles somehow believes in the
view expressed by the Socratic thesis?
CALLICLES OPENING SPEECH (482c4486d1)
That Callicles views are complicated in the way suggested by Socrates

statement could appear to be belied by Callicles famous attack on
the Socratic thesis. Callicles attack on this view is the primary
purpose of the first part of his long opening speech, a remarkable
speech that also includes his attack on philosophy and on Socrates in
particular.
Callicles begins his speech, however, by complaining about the
demagogic arguments by which Socrates was able to sway Gorgias
and then Polus. After relying on Gorgias shame before the custom
of human beings in order to compel him to claim to be a teacher of
justice and thus to contradict himself, Socrates won a similar victory
over Polus, who ultimately gave in to the very shame for which he
blamed Gorgias (482c4d6). Callicles analysis of the second of these
two victories, the victory over Polus, is longer and more revealing
than his analysis of the first. In Callicles view, Polus was right to take
the step of reducing nobility and shamefulness to considerations of
pleasure and benefit. But if one takes this step, Callicles objects, one
should not continue to hold that doing injustice is more shameful
than suffering it: Polus was too ashamed to break entirely with what
is held to be noble and shameful that is, with the noble and shameful
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by convention and it was by exploiting this shame that Socrates

was able to work his evil in arguments (482d7483a7).
While one could quarrel with Callicles claim that it was mere shame
that led to Polus concession to Socrates, Callicles does correctly pinpoint Polus crucial mistake by locating it in his never-revoked agreement that it is more shameful to do injustice than to suffer it (see especially 482d78). But more important, Callicles explanation of Polus
downfall leads him to give what would appear to be a clear and blunt
statement of his own view. For he insists that one can avoid the contradictions in which Socrates ensnared Polus if one simply abandons
convention and sticks to the straightforward standard of nature: by
nature, everything is more shameful that is also worse, especially suffering injustice, but by convention doing injustice is more shameful (483a78). Judging by this bold statement, Callicles appears to
believe that the only genuine, natural standard is benefit or advantage.
Nobility, if it means anything at all, should be determined entirely by
that prior standard, and justice is not to be taken seriously because it
is not advantageous.
Yet Callicles continues to speak in terms of nobility and even in
terms of justice. As his speech develops, we see that he means not
exactly to argue for the abandonment of all considerations of nobility
and justice on the grounds that the only meaningful standard is
advantage but rather to make the case for a certain understanding of
genuine nobility and justice.4 And while it would seem at first glance
that Callicles view makes nobility in particular entirely derivative from
advantage again, by nature, everything is more shameful that is also
worse a closer look at his speech reveals that he does not consistently
stick to this view.
The most immediate alternative to advantage as the basis of nobility
in Callicles eyes would seem to be manliness, a quality that certainly
includes the strength needed to gain what is advantageous for oneself
4. Cf. Nichols, The Rhetoric of Justice in Platos Gorgias, 142; Dodds, Gorgias,
15, 2667, 390; Taylor, Plato, 11617.
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but whose value may not be limited in Callicles estimation to a mere

means to that end. The issue raised by Callicles emphasis on manliness
can be stated simply. Callicles speech quickly becomes a praise of
real men (see 483a8b2). But is the crucial difference between real
men and others merely the greater ability and success of real men
in securing their own advantage? The answer to this question might
appear at first to be yes. Callicles argues that it is merely by convention,
by a self-serving conspiracy of the weak, that people are taught to
believe that doing injustice is more shameful than suffering it and
to accept that even strong, powerful types real men ought to
respect the laws of the many that tell them to take no more than an
equal share (483b1c9). But nature herself reveals, says Callicles,
that true justice consists in the better having more than the worse and
the more powerful having more than the less powerful (483c9-d2). As
for the basis of this natural justice, Callicles argues that he is merely
describing a situation that prevails throughout the world: the ways of
animals, as well as of cities and tribes of human beings, and especially
of great imperialists like the Persian kings Xerxes and Darius, show
that the strong dominate the weak (483d23). Callicles gives, then,
what may be called a harshly realistic defense of the strong in their
universal oppression of the weak.5
But there are difficulties with this argument that raise doubts as to
whether harsh realism best describes Callicles true view. First, there
is the question of why it should follow from the fact that the strong
oppress the weak that it is just that they do so. The most striking difference between Callicles and others who make similar arguments about
imbalances of power in the world is that Callicles does not draw the
conclusion that such imbalances render justice meaningless; rather,
he insists that they are in accordance with true justice.6 But does such
5. See Jaeger, Paideia, 2:1389; Seung, Plato Rediscovered, 67.

6. Compare 483c7484c3 with Republic 338c1339a4, Laws 888e4890c8, and
Thucydides 5.85105. Unlike most ancient conventionalists, Callicles does
not reject justice altogether but opposes conventional justice with a
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a conclusion make sense simply on realistic grounds? Does it make

sense, in other words, to continue to speak of justice if its only foundation is power? That Callicles does continue to speak of justice suggests
that he is guided by more than a realistic appreciation of the importance of power.
A further difficulty with Callicles argument is that the fact on
which it rests is not as simple as the argument requires. According
to Callicles own account, after all, the stronger do not always win
out. Callicles himself describes a situation in which the weak succeed
in overcoming and subduing the strong: such is the case wherever
conventional justice prevails, as it does in Callicles own democratic
Athens, where the strongest natures have been subdued and reduced
to slavery like tamed lions (see 483b4c6, 483e4484a2). This difficulty
leads to a movement in Callicles speech that can be regarded as both
a retreat and an ascent. For within only a few lines, Callicles moves
from an argument about the prevailing ways of the world based on the
assertion that the domination by the strong is simply an evident fact,
to a beautiful expression of a view that looks forward to the success of
the strong the day when the great man finally throws off his chains
and the justice of nature shines forth with something like hopeful
expectation (484a2b1).7 But this movement suggests that Callicles
admiration of the real men he praises is based not only on their success, which cannot truly be counted on, but also on something else.
doctrine of natural justice. This difference has been discussed by a number of other commentators. See Burnet, Greek Philosophy, 121; Friedlander,
Plato, 2:2601; Taylor, Plato, 116; Barker, Greek Political Theory, 7172;
Dodds, Gorgias, 2668; Romilly, The Great Sophists in Periclean Athens, 120,
124, 1589; Kahn, Drama and Dialectic in Platos Gorgias, 99100; Newell,
Ruling Passion, 11, 16.
7. Cf. Dodds, Gorgias, 2667. Dodds notes that Callicles vision of the great
man overcoming his oppression by the weak even leads him to use words
suggestive of a religious revelation. On the movement in a more idealistic
direction in Callicles speech, see also Kahn, Drama and Dialectic in Platos
Gorgias, 99100; Newell, Ruling Passion, 13; Saxonhouse, An Unspoken
Theme in Platos Gorgias, 157.
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89
In keeping with this, Callicles speaks at several points in his speech of

the men he admires not only as the more powerful or the stronger but
also as the better (see 483d1, e4, 484c2).
There is reason to believe, moreover, that even Callicles vision of the
men who deserve to be tyrants finally breaking through their chains
and overthrowing the weak cannot be taken as the final word about
the true objects of his admiration. The heroes of Callicles speech are
men like Xerxes, Darius, and Heracles, who took what they wanted
by force and imposed their will on the weak (see especially 483d6
e4, 484b1c3). Later in the dialogue, however, Callicles will display a
deeper admiration of Themistocles, Cimon, Miltiades, and Pericles
that is, of famous Athenians who not only asserted their strength but
also served democratic Athens well, at least by Callicles standards
(see 503a2c3, 515c5517b1). And even within his present speech,
Callicles moves from praising the violent overthrow of ones city to
praising political activity within it. This shift comes with the crucial transition in his speech, as Callicles moves from his criticism of
conventional justice to his criticism of philosophy and his exhortation of Socrates to abandon philosophy in favor of a more public life
(484c4486d1).8
Callicles attack on philosophy was all but invited by Socrates challenge to Callicles to refute his beloved (see again 482a4b6). Socrates
familiarity with Callicles, as Socrates will later reveal (487c1d2),
includes an awareness of Callicles hostility to philosophy a hostility he has encouraged him to express. To begin to understand this
hostility, however, we must give due weight to the fact that Callicles
8. The clearest indication of the difference between the view of nobility

expressed in Callicles criticism of philosophy and the view he expressed
when attacking conventional justice is the much higher view of law and
civic life taken in the later section of Callicles speech (compare, e.g., 484d25
and 486a13 with 483b4c9 and 483e4484a2). The shift in Callicles speech
is discussed also by Newell, Ruling Passion, 1415, Benardete, The Rhetoric
of Morality and Philosophy, 6467, and Saxonhouse, An Unspoken Theme
in Platos Gorgias, 15962.
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is not so thoroughly hostile to philosophy as to have turned his back

on it as utterly unworthy of his attention. Just as Socrates has some
familiarity with Callicles, so too is Callicles familiar with Socrates
and his pursuits. He is not witnessing his first Socratic conversation.
Among his several statements that report his impressions at observing
philosophic discussions, Callicles makes a remark that suggests that
he has watched Socrates make one or more of the politicians appear
ridiculous (see 484e13 together with 482e2483a4). Moreover, in his
own account of justice, Callicles himself used a philosophic distinction
in drawing a line between nature and convention: although he accused
Socrates of exploiting that distinction to work his evil in arguments,
Callicles relied on it himself to defend natural justice.9 Yet, even if his
view of natural justice depends on a philosophic distinction, Callicles
suggests that philosophy is somehow incapable of grasping the truth of
that view (see 484c45). And more generally, he argues that philosophy
not only keeps one from grasping the truth about justice but also draws
one away from what is most important in life. Callicles declares that
philosophy is appropriate in measured amounts for developing grace
and sophistication in the young, but it ought to be abandoned when
one is old enough to turn to the affairs of the city and to accomplish
something truly noble and good (484c4485e2). If pursued beyond a
certain age, philosophy ceases to be a means of education and becomes
a source of corruption:
Whenever I see someone who is older still philosophizing and not abandoning it, this man, Socrates, seems to me to need a beating. For, as I
just said, it falls to this man, even if he has a very good nature, to become
unmanly by fleeing the centers of the city and the agora, in which the poet
says men become highly distinguished, and by lowering himself into
spending the rest of his life whispering with three or four boys in a corner,
never to utter anything free, great, or sufficient. (485d1e2)
9. Cf. Jaeger, Paideia, 2:1389; Romilly, The Great Sophists in Periclean Athens,
1559.
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Callicles offers this criticism, addressed to Socrates by name, not only

as a general complaint about philosophers but also as a more pointed
warning. And he goes on to extend the warning by telling Socrates that
his shameful pursuit which keeps him from performing any actions
worthy of respect also makes him vulnerable to attack by anyone who
might wish to accuse or assault him. Socrates could be dragged dizzy
and gaping into court and could even be killed if an accuser should
decide to demand the death penalty (486a6b4).
Callicles claims to be offering this criticism of Socrates as a friendly
warning. Alluding to Euripides Antiope, he casts himself in the role
of a young character named Zethus exhorting his brother Amphion
not to waste his noble soul by spending his time in childish pursuits
to the neglect of politics (see 485e4486a3).10 Callicles even declares
his goodwill towards Socrates (see 485e3, 486a4). And he displays his
sympathy by describing the man who might demand Socrates death
as lowly and vicious (see 486b23). Yet, despite Callicles pretensions to friendliness, which may not be entirely feigned, his attack on
philosophy reveals a hostility that runs deeper than perhaps even he
knows. This hostility can be seen, for instance, in his expression of the
view that philosophy is corruption (484c78), and in his willingness
to say that men who continue on in philosophy not only risk a beating
but even need and deserve one (485c2, d2). Callicles attack on philosophy is at its most impressive because it is at its most honest
when Callicles reports what he experiences when looking at philosophic men and especially at Socrates (see 485b7e2, 486b4d1). Yet,
while these expressions of contempt and hostility belie his claims of
goodwill toward Socrates, they do not fully disclose the grounds of
10. Euripides Antiope has been lost, but from what is known of the play it is
generally agreed that the most important scene depicted a dispute between
the brothers Zethus and Amphion over the best way of life. Zethus argued
for the active political life against his more philosophic brother. For an
extensive and helpful discussion of the Antiope and its role in the Gorgias,
see Nightingale, Platos Gorgias and Euripides Antiope, 12141. See also
Dodds, Gorgias, 2756; Arieti, Platos Philosophic Antiope, 2001.
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Callicles hostility. One reason for the obscurity is that Callicles seems
to waver over the precise character of his objection to philosophy. Or,
perhaps better, he judges philosophy by a standard of nobility that
lacks clarity as to its central principle. Nobility appears, in the section
of Callicles speech in which he attacks philosophy, to consist in the
Periclean ability and willingness to devote oneself to political affairs
and to gain a great reputation through service to the city, thereby making oneself invulnerable to attack by ones inferiors. But this formulation contains a question or an ambiguity. Is Callicles defense of the
active life of involvement in the affairs of the city based on the thought
that only such a life makes possible truly noble action (see 484c8d2,
485c6e2)? Or is it based on the thought that only such a life provides
one with safety and protection from attack (see 486a3c3)? His argument, it seems, is based on both of these grounds, or rather it shifts
between the two grounds. Of course, the two grounds are connected,
since preeminence in the city generally brings with it the power to protect oneself, and Callicles presents self-protection as a responsibility
that it is not only dangerous but also shameful to neglect. Still, the
two grounds are not the same, and they may even at times be at odds.
After all, is stepping to the fore of the turbulent struggle to lead the
city always the least risky course of action? Did Pericles, for example,
lead the safest life in Athens? That Callicles criticism of philosophy
lacks perfect clarity or consistency should make us wonder whether
Callicles himself fully grasps his deepest objection to philosophy. Is it
possible that Callicles feels a hostility whose deepest source he cannot
quite articulate? Does he feel in his bones, in other words, something
that he cannot adequately express in speech?
SOCRATES EXAMINATION OF CALLICLES

VIEW OF JUSTICE (486d2491d4)
The confusions or wavering discernable in Callicles speech will continue throughout his conversation with Socrates. In fact, Socrates
primary aim in the ensuing discussion is to bring out more fully
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and clearly the contradictory strands in Callicles beliefs and to show

which of these strands is most important to him. In doing so, however,
Socrates will allow Callicles attack on philosophy to recede temporarily into the background. That Socrates initially directs the conversation
away from this attack is surprising given his immediate response to
Callicles speech.
Socrates immediate response to Callicles speech is to express his
delight at having found in Callicles a touchstone with which he can
test whether his own soul is golden (486d27). He then elaborates by
telling Callicles that he possesses the qualities necessary for an adequate search for the truth, indeed for such a search as would make further searching unnecessary: Your and my agreement will at last be the
attainment of the truth (486e5488b1, especially 487e67). Socrates
suggests, in other words, that his conversation with Callicles will be
of the greatest importance, since it will aim at settling, once and for
all, the most important question of how one should live (see especially
487e7488a2). But there is an obvious problem with this suggestion,
because Socrates argument that Callicles possesses the qualities or
qualifications necessary for a genuine pursuit of the truth is hardly
convincing. The qualities that Socrates identifies are knowledge, goodwill, and outspokenness. While it may be reasonable to take Callicles
speech as evidence of his outspokenness, Socrates proof that Callicles
possesses knowledge for you have been sufficiently educated, as
many of the Athenians would attest (487b67) is difficult to accept
as much of a proof, especially coming from Socrates. And the weakness
of this proof is matched by Socrates argument that Callicles must be
of goodwill to him because he heard Callicles and three of his friends
giving each other the same advice that Callicles gave Socrates in his
speech (487b7d4). Dont people often say the same things to different
people for very different reasons or out of very different motives? The
flaws in Socrates proof of Callicles qualifications are so clear that
they make one suspect that the true meaning of this supposed proof
is the opposite of its surface meaning. That is, Socrates may mean
to indicate by his proof that Callicles does not possess the qualities
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necessary to pursue the truth to its attainment, and thus that the truth
will not come fully to light in their conversation.11
That Socrates and Callicles will be unable to reach the truth together
in a complete meeting of the minds was to some extent already suggested by Socrates statement that he has found in Callicles a touchstone with which he can test whether his own soul is golden. After
all, while a touchstone may be used to test gold, it is not transformed
into gold in the process.12 But there may be a further meaning of this
analogy, one that can help us better understand the character and limits of the coming discussion. For the analogy suggests that in some
sense Callicles soul will be the guiding standard for the discussion
between Socrates and Callicles, and in particular the standard against
which Socrates soul is to be tested. More precisely, Callicles soul will
be used to test not so much the nature of Socrates soul as whether
Socrates soul has been nobly cared for (kalos tetherapeusthai, 486d5
. . . zos
es, 487a12). Now, since
6) and whether it lives correctly (orthos
the care that Socrates soul has received is above all the care provided
by philosophy, and since the life it lives is the philosophic life, we may
take this suggestion to mean that philosophy and the philosophic life
are somehow going to be brought, in what follows, to the touchstone
of Callicles soul and its concerns.
But hasnt Callicles already given us reason to think that this test is
likely to be failed? Or is Socrates optimistic that it could be passed, that
the philosophic life could come to sight as golden, if the philosophic
life were seen for what it is and not as it appeared in Callicles attack
on it? These thoughts lead us to expect at this point a defense of the
philosophic life against Callicles attack on it. And Socrates further
11. On the irony of Socrates praise of Callicles, see Jaeger, Paideia, 2:140;
Shorey, What Plato Said, 144; Benardete, The Rhetoric of Morality and
Philosophy, 62; McKim, Shame and Truth in Platos Gorgias, 40; Michelini, Rudeness and Irony in Platos Gorgias, 56. Contrast Irwin, Platos
Ethics, 102.
12. Cf. Benardete, The Rhetoric of Morality and Philosophy, 62, 6869.
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95
encourages this expectation by indicating that the true divide between

himself and Callicles is over the question of how one ought to live and
especially over the goodness of Socrates way of life (see 487e7488a2).
Yet, although Socrates encourages the expectation that he will come
to the defense of his way of life, he does not gratify this expectation
right away. Instead of turning immediately to a defense of philosophy, he turns, as we have already noted, to a further examination
of Callicles views. Moreover, he turns not, as he again encourages
us for a moment to expect, to that aspect of Callicles position that
speaks directly against the philosophic life in favor of a different life
(see 488a2b1), but to an examination of Callicles view of justice (see
488b26). Socrates procedure here first pointing to what he calls the
noblest question that lies at the heart of his dispute with Callicles, only
then to turn to what could seem a secondary matter is strange.13 But
perhaps this strange procedure can be explained by the following considerations. First, if Callicles soul is the touchstone against which philosophy is to be tested, it would seem to be necessary that his soul and
its concerns be adequately understood. And perhaps Socrates thinks
that one can best understand the concerns of Callicles soul by beginning, not from Callicles direct attack on philosophy, but from what we
may call his moral views. Indeed, Callicles speech has already given us
reason to believe that there is a connection between Callicles moral
views and his hostility to philosophy. Given this connection, moreover, Socrates procedure may have the further advantage of allowing
the grounds of Callicles hostility to philosophy to be brought to light
while keeping the target of that hostility behind the scenes. And finally,
since that target will eventually be brought back to the foreground
of the discussion, Socrates ensures that philosophy will make its
return in the wake of the results of his examination of Callicles moral
13. Compare the more straightforward procedure Socrates follows in the Apology in responding to an objection to his life very similar to the one raised by
Callicles (28b331c3).
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views results that, as we will see, will not only provide a better
understanding of Callicles concerns but also cast those concerns in
a certain light.
In his own account of justice, Callicles left us with a number of
unresolved questions about the true character of his concerns or convictions. Socrates begins his examination of Callicles with a series of
questions that return to some of the tensions or ambiguities that were
already visible but not fully worked out in Callicles speech.14
The first of these questions returns to Callicles claim that natural justice consists in the superior imposing their will on the inferior. Socrates says that he was puzzled about whether Callicles meant
to claim that superiority is a matter of nothing more than greater
strength. Is that what Callicles meant, or, in calling the men who
deserve to triumph better, did he mean to suggest that they are
distinguished by something beyond strength? Since Callicles wavered
regarding this point in his speech, Socrates insists that Callicles define
more clearly whether he simply equates superiority with greater
strength (488b8d3). Socrates states this demand, however, in such
a way that he can be confident that Callicles will initially take the position that reduces superiority to mere strength. For to accept the other
alternative, as Socrates points out, would mean to accepting the possibility that some better men are weaker, and some stronger men more
vicious (see especially 488c78). By calling Callicles attention to this
14. Some support for the suggestion that Socrates thinks Callicles concerns can
best be understood by beginning from his moral views can perhaps be found
in the way Socrates begins his examination of those views. As a preface to his
opening question about Callicles view of justice, Socrates exhorts Callicles
to pick it back up for me from the beginning (ex arches, 488b2). Although
this remark refers most obviously to the early section of Callicles speech
in which Callicles gave his account of natural justice, Socrates may mean
to indicate that the order of Callicles speech somehow reflected accurately
the true order of his concerns. That is, the beginning to which Socrates
refers may be at once the beginning of Callicles speech and the beginning
for Callicles in a deeper sense.
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implication, Socrates confronts Callicles with thepossibility of a divide

between virtue and success, or, in other words, with the possibility that
the truly deserving do not always prevail in the world. Although Callicles was ultimately forced to acknowledge such a situation in his
speech, he tried his best to deny its existence. He does so here, too,
by taking the position that superiority is simply a matter of greater
strength (488d4).
But there is a problem lurking in this direction as well, one that
Socrates proceeds to spell out. Having encouraged Callicles to equate
superiority with strength, Socrates argues that this view collapses the
distinction that Callicles drew between natural and conventional justice, and at least in some cases even vindicates the democratic justice
that Callicles claims to despise. For if superiority consists in nothing
but greater strength, Socrates explains, then the many, who may be
individually quite weak but are collectively stronger than any individual, ought to be regarded as superior. And if the laws and pronouncements by which the superior subdue the inferior are naturally noble
and just, doesnt that mean that the laws and pronouncements of the
many, when the many win out, are naturally noble and just (488d5
e5)? But the many believe that it is just for each to have an equal share
and that doing injustice is more shameful than suffering it (488e7
489a6). It would seem to follow, then, that these principles are just by
nature and not merely by convention (489e8b6).
There are reasons to be skeptical about Socrates argument as a vindication of the many and their democratic view of justice. For one
thing, Socrates argument succeeds only by foisting on Callicles a view
that he did not quite put forward in his speech the view, namely,
that not only is the rule of the superior in accordance with natural
justice but so are the laws the superior lay down and even the beliefs
they hold.15 But the more important difficulty with Socrates argument
15. Callicles did not mention any laws set down by the superior, at least not by
the superior understood as the group he praised as opposed to the one he
criticized (consider 483b47, c79, e45, 484b5). Even if one takes the justice
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concerns the basis or grounds on which it apparently supports democratic justice. For although Socrates argument initially comes across
as a defense of the democratic understanding of justice, it is a defense
on grounds that no true proponent of democratic justice would be
willing to accept. If the vindication of the democratic (or any other)
view of justice rests simply on its having won out, doesnt that reduce
justice to the crude principle might makes right? Of course, Socrates
has a good excuse for pursuing such a line of argument, since he is
merely working out the implications of one strand of Callicles own
argument the strand that holds that nature herself demonstrates the
truth about justice through the success of the strong (see 483c9e1
together with 488c37). Socrates is therefore justified in pointing out
that, insofar as that is the basis of Callicles position, he should at least
get his facts straight: the many often dominate the few. But Callicles
already displayed an awareness of this point in his speech, and it also
was evident that he did not really mean, at least not in every part of
his speech, simply to equate superiority with brute force or greater
strength. Moreover, when Callicles finally rebels at the conclusion of
Socrates argument and retracts his agreement that he thinks brute
strength is all there is to superiority, Socrates admits that he knew all
along that this was not Callicles deepest view (489c1d5). Socrates
provocative argument thus serves the purpose of forcing Callicles to
open up further and, in particular, of driving him away from a position that would equate superiority with mere strength or reduce virtue
to success. Socrates wants Callicles to reveal more of that side of his
position, or that aspect of what he believes, that regards virtue as something higher than strength alone (consider especially 489d13).16
of their laws as implied by the view that the rule of the superior is just, the
extension from their laws to their beliefs is questionable. Socrates is able to
obscure the dubiousness of this further extension by moving with apparent
seamlessness from the nouns nomous (laws, 488d6) and nomima (lawful
usages, 488d9, e4) to the verb nomizousin (believe, 488e7, 489a2). Cf.
Santas, Socrates, 2634.
16. Cf. Shorey, What Plato Said, 1445; Friedlander,
Plato, 2:262; Klosko, The

Refutation of Callicles in Platos Gorgias, 127; Kahn, Drama and Dialectic
in Platos Gorgias, 99100. Compare Laws 625c9627c2.
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Callicles responds to Socrates argument by insisting that he never

meant to suggest that superiority can be reduced to mere bodily might.
rather than defining superiority by strength, he wants to maintain that
true strength must be defined by superiority (see 489c17). But he
has difficulty articulating what exactly superiority consists in beyond
bodily might. The only answer he is initially able to muster to Socrates
question about who he regards as the better in effect, the better
are the better (see 489e35) is less than fully illuminating.17 But
Socrates pushes him for greater clarity, offering the suggestion that
by the better and the stronger Callicles means the more prudent, a
suggestion that Callicles eagerly accepts (489e69). And shortly after
accepting Socrates suggestion, Callicles goes on to claim, without any
prompting from Socrates, that he has in mind not only the prudent
but also the courageous (491a7b3).18 Before Callicles adds courage
to prudence, however, Socrates uses his agreement that the superior
men who deserve to rule are the more prudent to launch a new line of
questioning.
In this second phase of his examination of Callicles view of justice, Socrates does not challenge the view that truly superior men,
understood as the more prudent, deserve to rule. He grants this point,
and asks instead about the character of the rule of prudent men, in
particular about whether they ought to use their rule to take more
for themselves. Socrates gives several examples (490b1e8). His first
is of a doctor who finds himself in a throng of people in need of an
17. On the other hand, it does reveal, something about Callicles that he does
not have a perfectly clear grasp of who he thinks the better are or in what
he thinks virtue consists. See Nichols, The Rhetoric of Justice in Platos
Gorgias, 143: The greatest weakness associated with [Callicles] position
is that, though he perhaps divines, he cannot yet clearly and coherently articulate in what superiority consists. Nichols also speaks of Callicles inability
to articulate the nobler and more demanding goals to which he is nonetheless somehow drawn (143).
18. Callicles addition of courage at 491a7b3 is prepared by his statement at
490a7 in which he speaks of the better and the more prudent. In this earlier
statement, we can already see that prudence is not all there is to superiority
in Callicles eyes.
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appropriate distribution of food and drink. Should the doctor, because

he is superior in prudence, feast himself by consuming a greater share
of the food and drink? Or should he use his superior prudence to distribute the food and drink in accordance with the needs of each, taking
for himself only what is appropriate to his own body? Socrates other
examples also come from the arts. Should the weaver, who knows the
most about his art, walk around draped in the biggest and most beautiful cloaks? Should the cobbler have the biggest shoes and walk around
wearing more shoes than anyone else? Should the skilled farmer take
the most seeds and plant as many as possible on his land?
Socrates line of questioning here is meant, of course, to be provocative; and it succeeds in arousing the ire of Callicles, who becomes progressively angrier as Socrates goes through his examples (for Callicles
reactions, see 490c8d1, d6, d10, e4, 490e9491a3).19 But if Socrates
intends to provoke this anger, what is his aim in doing so? What
does Callicles anger reveal? To begin from the surface, Callicles finds
Socrates questions ridiculous and beneath the dignity of the issue they
are discussing. But this reveals something about how Callicles regards
the issue at hand. From a certain perspective, after all, Socrates apparently ridiculous questions are quite sensible: Why would one want
more food than one needs for ones body or shoes that are too big
for ones feet? Wouldnt such excess amount to paying a penalty
(see 490c4)? In his questions, Socrates looks at human needs with
the eyes of a sensible artisan, and he expresses a view of justice and
benefit in keeping with an artisans outlook. But in Callicles view, to
approach the question of justice and benefit in this manner is to drag
the high and serious through the mud of the lowly and ridiculous.
What bothers him is not only the silliness of Socrates questions, but
that they make a mockery out of something deserving of respect
the question of the true good that is sought and deserved by the men
he most admires. And if Callicles cannot quite articulate who these
men are and what that good is, he provides us some sense of what
19. On Callicles anger here, compare Newell, Ruling Passion, 1920.
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he has in mind by declaring so clearly and emphatically what he

does not have in mind: You [Socrates] are talking about food and
drink and doctors and drivel; but that is not what I mean. . . . By the
gods, you simply never stop talking about cobblers, weavers, cooks,
and doctors, as if our argument were about these people! (490c8d1;
491a13).
Callicles does manage, however, to give more than a negative expression of his convictions. In fact, Socrates argument together with
some further prodding (see 491a46) prompts Callicles to make one
of his most important statements about the kind of virtue he admires:
First, by the stronger, I mean neither cobblers nor cooks, but those
who are prudent in the affairs of the city, and who can determine in
what way they will be well managed and not only prudent but also
courageous, being capable of accomplishing what they intend and not
flinching through softness of soul (491a7b4). Callicles declares that
it is such men those who are prudent in the affairs of the city and
courageous who deserve to rule the city and who ought to have more
than others (491c6d3). Callicles addition here of courage and his
indication that the prudence he admires is directed to managing well
the affairs of the city are as revealing as anything he has said so
far. We can see with particular clarity here that Callicles is not simply a debunker of justice and virtue but that he believes in a kind of
justice based on a certain view of virtue. And Socrates underlines the
importance of what has just been revealed about Callicles by calling
attention to Callicles addition of courage and by asking Callicles to
repeat his position as it now stands (see 491b5c5).20
Yet, although Socrates calls attention to what has now been revealed
about Callicles views, he responds to this development in a surprising
20. The significance of this moment is stressed also by Newell, Ruling Passion,
20; Nichols, The Rhetoric of Justice in Platos Gorgias, 143; Kahn, Drama
and Dialectic in Platos Gorgias, 102. To see the character of Callicles view
that prudent leaders are rightly concerned that the affairs of the city be
well managed, contrast Protagoras 319a12.
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way. No sooner has Callicles offered his most direct and revealing
statements about justice, claiming that the superior as he has now
defined them deserve to rule and to have more than others, than
Socrates abruptly turns the discussion away from justice. Instead of
pursuing the still incomplete examination of Callicles view of justice,
he asks Callicles whether the superior as he understands them should
also be rulers over themselves, that is, over their pleasures and desires
(491d4e1). Socrates thus changes the topic from justice to moderation and self-control.
MODERATION VERSUS IMMODERATION, AND

THE QUESTION OF HEDONISM (491d4499d8)
Socrates procedure here is one of the most puzzling features of his

entire conversation with Collicles.21 Why does Socrates begin an examination of justice only to abort it so quickly in favor of a discussion
of moderation and self-control? This turn is all the more perplexing
because it comes at the very moment that it has become clearer than
ever before that Callicles is attached to a certain understanding of justice. Why not pursue the question of justice further by challenging
Callicles view of justice and pressing to see whether Callicles really
knows what justice is? What accounts for Socrates abrupt and perplexing turn away from the question of justice?
Rather than try to answer this question at this point, let us postpone it. For we still need to learn more about Callicles beliefs, and we
also need to see where Socrates leads the conversation after his turn
away from the question of justice. Now, once Socrates has turned away
from justice, the immediate effect of his question about whether the
superior are rulers over themselves is to prompt a long and passionate
21. On the suddenness with which Socrates changes the topic of the conversation, see Kahn, Drama and Dialectic in Platos Gorgias, 1023; Klosko,
The Refutation of Callicles in Platos Gorgias, 127; Gentzler, The Sophistic
Cross-Examination of Callicles in the Gorgias, 36.
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103
outburst from Callicles. Although it takes him a moment to understand

Socrates question (see 491d410), Callicles responds, as soon as he
learns that Socrates, just like the many, is speaking about moderation and self-control, or about ruling over ones pleasures and desires
(see 491d11e1), by expressing his contempt for what he regards as
Socrates navete and foolishness. In his longest outburst since his
opening speech, Callicles attacks restraints of all kinds and praises
freedom and the unleashing of intense passions.
As we can see in his outburst, Callicles is hardly concerned or
even aware that Socrates has changed the topic away from justice.
He attacks moderation and justice as belonging to a single class of
restraints for which he declares his disdain. Telling Socrates that he
is now going to speak to him outspokenly, Callicles proclaims that
justice and moderation are mere words used by the weak to hide their
inability to satisfy their desires and to prevent the strong from doing so
at their expense (492a3b8). Those who are strong enough to break free
from these hypocritical pretenses of the weak should liberate themselves. Such men, he argues, would lead wretched lives if they were to
restrain themselves, because true virtue and happiness require the full
flourishing of ones desires and the use of ones courage and prudence
to get what one wants:
This is the noble and just according to nature, which Im now telling you
outspokenly: the man who will live correctly must let his own desires be
as great as possible and not restrain them, and, when they are as great
as possible, he must be capable of serving them through courage and
prudence and of filling them up with the things for which desire at any
given time arises. . . . In truth, Socrates, which you claim to pursue, this is
how it is: luxury, intemperance, and freedom, if they have support that
is virtue and happiness; but those other things, the embellishments, the
agreements of human beings that are contrary to nature, those are drivel
and worth nothing. (491e6492a3, 492c38)
It is striking that, even as he defends the unleashing of passion and

the indulgence of desire, Callicles continues to speak of virtue and
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to describe the life he is praising as the most virtuous.22 Yet, even if

he continues to speak of virtue, he displays in this speech his most
extreme movement away from any ordinary or conventional understanding of the character of virtue. Praising intense pleasure as the
aim of a truly superior life, Callicles presents even the virtues of
courage and prudence as means to the satisfaction of the greatest possible desires. Callicles self-proclaimed outspokenness in this speech,
then, consists above all in his open expression of an extreme view that
is at least one aspect of his thought or one direction in which he is
strongly tempted. According to this view, a man of sufficient abilities
should allow his desires to grow as great as possible and then spend
his life indulging these desires as vigorously as he can. Socrates suggests that this is a view to which not only Callicles but many others
are tempted: Callicles is saying clearly what the others think but are
unwilling to say (492d13).23
After praising Callicles for his outspokenness, Socrates turns to
respond to his speech. In doing so, however, he leaves aside Callicles
criticism of justice and limits himself to Callicles rejection of selfrestraint and his praise of immoderation. Socrates thus completes the
turn initiated by his earlier question about the self-rule of the superior.
Whether or not Callicles is aware of this development, Socrates has
now left behind the question of justice. The ensuing discussion has two
themes: the contest between moderation and immoderation, and the
question of hedonism. There is an obvious connection between these
two themes. But there is also a subtle difference, since it is not quite
the same thing to argue against the immoderate pursuit of pleasure
as it is to argue against the view that pleasure is the only good worth
22. Grote, Plato, and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 2:344; Newell, Ruling
Passion, 2122.
23. By the others at 492d2 Socrates may be referring only to Gorgias and
Polus, who were unwilling to state the view expressed in Callicles speech.
But Socrates remark also admits of a broader reading, and such a reading
is suggested by his use of the present tense at 492d3: dianoountai men legein
de ethelousin. On this point, consider Laws 660d11662a8.
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pursuing.24 Moderation readily lends itself to a defense on prudential

or utilitarian grounds, most simply because it enables one to avoid the
needless pain and suffering that come with immoderation. As it turns
out, Socrates goes on to give just such a defense of moderation: he
presents Callicles with two images of the immoderate life as a toilsome
struggle continually to refill a leaky jar or set of jars (492e7494a5).
Socrates arguments against hedonism, by contrast, rise above such
utilitarian considerations and appeal to considerations of shame and
nobility. And importantly, it is on this latter front that Socrates is able
to make more headway with Callicles, who proves less able to sustain
his feigned unconcern with nobility than his rejection of moderation.
Since Socrates critique of hedonism is more effective than his defense
of moderation, we should examine that critique in detail. Before we
do so, however, we should take at least a brief look at Socrates defense
of moderation and consider why it is less successful.
Socrates defense of moderation begins with an enigmatic suggestion. Perhaps Euripides spoke the truth when he said, Who knows
whether to live is to be dead, and to be dead is to live?, for perhaps we
are in fact dead (492e8493a1). What Socrates means by this becomes
clearer when he adds that he once heard a wise man say that we are
now dead and that the body is our tomb (493a13).25 Socrates defense
of moderation begins, in short, from the premise that our lives as
we now experience them are not our only or even our truest lives,
that we will live on and even live better once our souls are freed from
our bodies. Or rather this is the premise of the first part of Socrates
defense of moderation, a defense that consists, as already noted, of two
images. Although the two images are similar inasmuch as they each
use an analogy involving jars, the most important difference between
24. Cf. Gentzler, The Sophistic Cross-Examination of Callicles in the Gorgias,

3738; Klosko, The Refutation of Callicles in Platos Gorgias, 12834.
25. The word body (soma)

is very similar in Greek to the word tomb (sema).
For the possible Pythagorean or Heraclitean origin of the saying that brings
these words together, see Dodds, Gorgias, 298300.
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them is that the first image relies on an account of the afterlife, whereas
the second does not go beyond this world. The account of the afterlife on which the first image relies comes not from Socrates himself
but from some clever myth-telling man, probably some Sicilian or
Italian (493a56). According to this mans account, which seems to
have been crafted out of a love of wordplay, the part of the soul in
which the desires reside, because it is persuadable ( pithanon) and persuasive ( peistikon) ought to be called a jar ( pithon); the thoughtless
(anoetous) ought to be called the unitiated (amuetous); and the jar
in an uninitiated mans soul since his desires are intemperate and
insatiable ought to be regarded as perforated or leaky (493a6b3). If
this much could suggest that the thoughtless or uninitiated suffer for
their intemperance even during their lives on earth, the heart of the
myth-tellers account is his further suggestion that in Hades the uninitiated are miserable because they are compelled to carry water to their
leaky jars in other leaky things. These other leaky things are sieves,
which, as Socrates learned from the man who explained the mythtellers account to him, represent mens souls regarded as wholes, or at
least the souls of the thoughtless, which are unable to retain anything
due to their unreliability and forgetfulness (493b3c3).26
26. Especially when one tries to put its parts together, the account Socrates
relates has a number of puzzling features. For instance, the soul is presented as a sieve in which water is carried to a jar that itself is presented
as a part of the soul. Should the sieve be seen as the soul in a different
sense or in a different aspect from that of the jar? And what should one
make of the suggestion that the desires that reside in the soul would persist (unchanged?) even after the soul is separated from the body? There
also is the question of Socrates sources, which move from Euripides, to an
anonymous wise man, to some clever myth-telling man whose account
(so the story goes) was explained to Socrates by the anonymous wise man
(on these sources, see Dodds, Gorgias, 297300). Without trying to resolve
the various riddles posed by this patchwork account (e.g., Is the wise mans
interpretation true to the original meaning of the myth?), let me suggest
that Socrates may mean to convey an important thought by indicating that
the desires of the thoughtless are somehow more insatiable than those of
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After presenting this image of suffering souls in Hades, Socrates

acknowledges that there is something strange about it (493c45;
atopa can also mean absurd). But he nonetheless asks Callicles
whether he has been persuaded by the image to change his mind and
to accept the view that the orderly are happier than the intemperate
(493c7d2). Or even if I tell myths about many other such things, will
you still not change at all? (493d23). That Callicles chooses this latter
alternative declaring, in effect, that he is not persuaded comes as
no surprise. In fact, Callicles response is so predictable that Socrates
question about whether Callicles is convinced can have no other purpose than to call attention to the fact that an image such as the one
Socrates presents could never persuade Callicles. After all, Socrates
himself calls the image a myth, and his presentation of it includes a
large element of playfulness or obvious absurdity. But there may be
a serious purpose behind this playfulness, for it at least raises important questions. Could Socrates ever seriously deliver and Callicles ever
seriously accept an account of the afterlife? Moreover, if the most fundamental reason that Callicles is not persuaded by Socrates image
is that he finds it difficult to believe in an afterlife, can this help us
to understand what draws him toward a life of immoderate pleasureseeking?
If Socrates first image fails to persuade Callicles because it relies on
a premise that Callicles does not accept, his second image avoids at
least this problem. The second image, according to Socrates, is from
the same school as the first (493d56); and it resembles the first in
its use of jars as an analogy. But the second image does not involve
the thoughtful, and that this makes the souls of the thoughtless somehow
more fickle and persuadable. According to the suggestion conveyed by the
interpretation of the myth offered by Socrates anonymous wise man, the
souls of the thoughtless seem to be dominated by the part of the soul in
which the desires reside, and, perhaps for that reason, they are less reliable,
more given to changing up and down, and more prone to forgetfulness.
The full meaning of this suggestion, however, cannot be drawn out of the
present passage, which at most provides a few provocative hints.
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Hades. It rests on a simpler consideration regarding life in this world.

Socrates asks Callicles to picture the lives of two men, each with many
jars that hold wine, honey, milk, and many other goods that are scarce
and require toil to acquire. In the case of one man, Socrates says,
Callicles should imagine that his jars are healthy and full and that he
expends no further effort carrying supplies to his jars but as regards
these he is at rest (493e36). As for the other man, while his jars, too,
can be filled, they are leaky and decayed, and thus he is compelled
to spend day and night struggling to refill his jars lest he suffer the
greatest pains (493e6494a1). Such being the life of each, Socrates
asks Callicles, do you claim that the life of the intemperate man is
happier than the life of the orderly man? Do I somehow persuade you,
by saying these things, to concede that the orderly life is better than
the intemperate one, or do I not persuade you? (494a25).
By speaking again of his effort to persuade Callicles, Socrates again
calls attention to the predictable failure of that effort. Socrates second
image, although it does not rely on a premise incredible to Callicles,
still offers merely a utilitarian reason to avoid self-indulgence, and
it offers advice that Socrates can be sure Callicles will reject. For
Socrates gives Callicles no good reason to doubt the view that one
should live for pleasure, and, on hedonistic grounds, Callicles has a
powerful response to Socrates image.27 Callicles explains that he is
not persuaded because the life of the man who rests content with full
jars, while it may be free of pain, is a stonelike life devoid of pleasure
but to live pleasantly consists in keeping as much as possible flowing
in (494a6b2).
With his claim that the pleasant life requires keeping as much as
possible flowing in, Callicles has taken a position that is closer to
indiscriminate hedonism than even his recent outspoken statements
about enlarging and satisfying ones desires. And perhaps Socrates
meant to push Callicles in this direction by presenting him with images
of ascetic self-restraint that he knew Callicles would vehemently reject.
27. Cf. Newell, Ruling Passion, 2324.
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Certainly, Socrates now foists on Callicles an interpretation of his

position according to which pleasure should be pursued not only
immoderately but also indiscriminately, that is, without regard to any
higher standard by which one could judge various pleasures and distinguish good pleasures from bad ones (see especially 494e9495a4).
Socrates thus moves the conversation from the question of moderation
to the question of hedonism, setting up his coming critique of hedonism and ensuring that the hedonism he will be critiquing is hedonism of the lowest sort (consider 495b26).28 Socrates is able to do
this because Callicles thinks that he must defend the indiscriminate
pursuit of pleasure in order to maintain the consistency of his position (see 495a26).29 But we can see from even the brief exchange by
which Socrates leads Callicles to accept the view that the pleasant is
the same as the good, and that there are no pleasures that are not good,
that Callicles heart is not fully in his defense of this view. Not only does
he himself stress that he is accepting this view in order to be consistent, but he also displays a sense of shame that is incompatible with
28. Socrates took an earlier step in this direction with his initial response
to Callicles speech about the unleashing of desire: And tell me: Do you
assert that one must not chasten the desires, if one is to be such as one
ought, but let them be as great as possible and prepare satisfaction for them
from any place whatsoever, and that this is virtue? (492d5e1). Although
Callicles went along with this, Socrates formulation pushed him to a view
that he did not quite assert in his speech. In fact, Callicles probably had
in mind specific desires (the most intense) and specific sources of satisfaction (the most attractive) when he praised the unleashing of desire. On
this issue, see Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness, 144; Newell, Ruling
Passion, 23.
29. That unrestricted hedonism is not, in fact, necessary to a defense of immoderation is pointed out by Gentzler, The Sophistic Cross-Examination of
Callicles in the Gorgias, 3638, and Klosko, The Refutation of Callicles in
Platos Gorgias, 12834. Gentzler provides a helpful discussion of Socrates
tactics in driving Callicles toward a defense of unrestricted hedonism. Her
argument should be contrasted with Irwin, Platos Moral Theory, 120, 124
5, Platos Ethics, 1046. See also Kahn, Drama and Dialectic in Platos
Gorgias, 1034; Newell, Ruling Passion, 24.
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thoroughgoing hedonism. Callicles is bothered by Socrates shameless

examples of great pleasure-pursuers, who keep pleasure continually
flowing in and out. Socrates three examples of would-be or should-be
heroes of a consistent and thoroughgoing hedonist are a bird called
the stone-curlew which eats and excretes at the same time (494b67),
a man who spends his life scratching himself without being so prudish
as to confine his scratching to his head (494c6e1), and, at the peak
of such things, the catamite (494e34). Callicles sense of shame at
even discussing such topics a sense of shame apparently not shared
by Socrates reveals a reservation at abandoning all standards other
than pleasure.30 Nevertheless, Callicles does come to the defense of
hedonism, and Socrates prepares to argue against hedonism as if it
were the view that Callicles truly held (see 495b3c3).
Before he does so, however, Socrates pauses for a second brief
exchange that completes the preparation for his critique of hedonism.
In this exchange, which is even briefer than the exchange in which
he leads Callicles to defend indiscriminate hedonism, Socrates asks
for a clarification of Callicles position before he begins his argument
against it. But Socrates does more than call attention to the hedonistic view Callicles has just accepted. He also makes a point of returning to Callicles understanding of virtue. He asks Callicles whether
he thinks there is such a thing as knowledge; whether, in addition to
knowledge, there is such as thing as courage; and, perhaps most important, whether he thinks courage is something different from knowledge
(495c37). Callicles answers in the affirmative to all of these questions,
30. Klosko, The Refutation of Callicles in Platos Gorgias, 136, is wrong to

claim that Callicles has no shame; see also Barker, Greek Political Theory, 139: Callicles is . . . willing to urge as frankly as possible the gospel of
hedonism. Among those who notice Callicles sense of shame are Olympiodorus, Commentary on Platos Gorgias, Lecture 30; Friedlander,
Plato,
2:263; Kahn, Drama and Dialectic in Platos Gorgias, 1056, Plato and the
Socratic Dialogue, 13642; Newell, Ruling Passion, 2426. McKim, Shame
and Truth in Platos Gorgias, 3448, places the greatest weight on Callicles
sense of shame.
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expressing particularly strong conviction in response to the last of

them, the one that suggests that courage is not reducible to knowledge (see sphodra ge at 495c7). Socrates then gets Callicles to agree
that since knowledge and courage are each different from pleasure,
and since he maintains that pleasure is the good, he must hold that
knowledge and courage are different both from one another and from
the good (495c8d7). Callicles accepts each of these steps and takes
the view they outline to be his own as he awaits Socrates arguments
against hedonism. Yet Socrates final statement in this exchange suggests that Callicles view, as it is presented here, cannot be taken as his
final word. Socrates says that Callicles will not really hold this view
when he looks at himself correctly (495e12). What Socrates means
by this, as we can gather from the context, is that when Callicles considers what is implied in his admiration of knowledge and in his even
deeper admiration of a form of courage that differs both from knowledge and from pleasure, he will see that he believes in a good beyond
mere pleasure. And as it turns out, Socrates refutation of hedonism
proves to be less a refutation of hedonism as such than an effort to
reveal what has already been indicated by Callicles agreements in this
brief exchange.
Socrates returns to Callicles admiration of knowledge and especially of courage in the second of the two main arguments that constitute his critique of hedonism. His first argument, however, concerns
the character of the good. Socrates opens this argument by asking Callicles whether he believes that those who are doing well have suffered
an experience opposite to the experience of those who are doing badly
(495e24). After Callicles says that he believes they have, Socrates
then compares doing well and doing badly, or happiness and misery,
with other opposites, which, he argues, are never present together nor
ever found departing at the same time. Socrates gives the examples of
health and sickness, strength and weakness, and swiftness and slowness. As opposites, the members of each of these pairs cannot coexist and never depart simultaneously (495e6496b4). And so too with
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happiness and misery, or the good and the bad: they cannot coexist,
and it is impossible for a human being to have them or to be released
from them at the same time (496b5c3). Once he has gotten Callicles
to agree that the good and the bad must have this character, Socrates
then argues that pleasure and pain have a different relationship to one
another. Pleasure and pain are necessarily joined, since any particular
pleasure depends on the experience of a particular pain and is always
experienced together with that pain. The pleasures of eating and drinking, for instance, depend on the pains of hunger and thirst, and these
pleasures persist only insofar as those pains have not completely vanished (496c6e8). What is true of the painful desires for food and drink,
Socrates suggests, is true of all other desires and pleasures, for every
lack and desire is painful (496d4; see also 497c68).
Now, Socrates argument is ostensibly meant to show that pleasure
cannot be the good since it lacks the unmixed character of the good
(see 496e9497a5, 497c6d7). But this argument is not an impressive
refutation of hedonism. For one thing, it is not true that the opposites
that Socrates uses as his examples health and sickness, strength and
weakness, and swiftness and slowness cannot coexist. After all, any
human being could be described as both healthy and sick to various
degrees at any given time of his life, at least until his death, at which
point health and sickness depart simultaneously. And strength and
weakness, like swiftness and slowness and many other opposites, are
relative qualities, such that any strong being could also be said to be
weak just as any swift being could also be said to be slow depending
on what it is being compared to. In addition to these difficulties with
Socrates examples, one could also raise objections to his analysis of
pleasure. Does every pleasure really depend on the presence of pain?
Arent there some pleasures for instance, the pleasure of a beautiful
sight, or the smell of a rose, or perhaps even the joy of an insight that
are free of pain?31 More important than this objection, however, is the
31. Compare Philebus 50e552b8, Republic 584b1c2. See also Friedlander,
Plato, 2:265; Newell, Ruling Passion, 27.
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question of whether Socrates argument does not judge even mixed

pleasures by an unrealistic standard of a perfect good unmixed with
evils. For the greatest problem with Socrates argument is that it fails
to show that such a good exists. It is not sufficient merely to say that
the good and the bad are opposites, since, apart from the difficulties
already mentioned with Socrates examples of opposites, pleasure and
pain are surely opposites, too, and hence they more obviously belie
the suggestion that opposites cannot coexist. Might one not plausibly
argue that while the good and the bad are opposites in some sense,
there is no good that is entirely free of the bad, and that by speaking
of happiness as a condition unmixed with evils, Socrates is describing
an impossible dream?32
Yet what is most striking about Callicles response to Socrates argument is that he never makes such an objection. It is true that Callicles
is not really convinced by the conclusion of Socrates argument and
objects that he has merely been ensnared by Socratic sophistry (see
497a6c2, d8e1). But although he is not persuaded by the argument
as a whole, Callicles does express agreement in fact, emphatic agreement with the view that the good must be entirely free of the bad.
I do agree, extraordinarily so is his response when asked by Socrates
whether he agrees that any pair of things that a human being experiences together and is released from at the same time cannot be the
good and the bad; and he gives this response after Socrates has urged
him to think deeply before answering (see 496c15). It appears that
the vision of the good as unmixed with the bad, or of happiness as a
condition entirely free of evils, appeals to Callicles. We see here that
he believes in such a vision. Even if Socrates argument hardly puts
a dent in hedonism itself, then, it does begin to show why a man like
Callicles could never be more than a half-hearted hedonist or what
32. Consider Lysis 220b7d7, Theaetetus 176a59, Protagoras 345b2c3. For
more thorough examinations of the flaws in Socrates first argument against
hedonism, see Grote, Plato, and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 2:1207;
Friedlander,
Plato, 2:2656; Santas, Socrates, 26770. Consider also Irwin,

Platos Moral Theory, 121, Platos Ethics, 107.
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hopes stand in the way of his acceptance of a view as depressing as

the view that the good is nothing more than mere pleasure.
If Callicles has stronger hopes for a good unmixed with evils than
perhaps he himself ever realized, he also has a greater commitment
to virtue. We have already seen several indications of this, but it
is brought out even more clearly by the second argument Socrates
makes against hedonism, an argument that proves to be even more
ad hominem than the first. In his second argument, Socrates attempts
to show Callicles that his admiration of courageous and prudent men
is inconsistent with the view that all pleasures are good regardless of
their source or the character of those who experience them. Socrates
begins from Callicles acceptance of the view that those to whom the
good is present are good, just as those to whom beauty is present are
beautiful (497e13). If pleasure is the good, he argues, then cowards
and fools ought to be regarded as good men just as much as those who
are courageous and prudent, because cowards and fools experience
roughly the same amount of pleasure as the courageous and prudent
(497e6498c8). Socrates gives several examples of people who Callicles
must admit experience pleasure, including children and thoughtless
men. But his most important example is of cowards in war, who are
pained by the advance of the enemy and rejoice upon his retreat at
least as much as the courageous (498a5c1). If Callicles agrees that
those to whom the good is present are good, while holding that pleasure is the good, wouldnt he have to accept that the coward who is
overjoyed as the enemy retreats is a good man? Yet he wants to insist
that only the courageous and prudent are good, whereas the cowardly
and foolish are bad (see 498e26, 499a14). Callicles thus seems to be
reduced to the absurdity of maintaining that the bad are as good as
the good, and sometimes even better (see 498c68, 499a7b3).
The serious point behind this absurd conclusion is that Callicles
cannot account for his admiration of virtuous men, the courageous
and the prudent, simply in terms of pleasure. Callicles could escape
Socrates argument by arguing that courage and prudence should not
be seen as good in themselves but only as useful means to pleasure,
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and that, contrary to Socrates argument, courageous and prudent men

tend to be somewhat more successful in attaining pleasure. Or he could
go a step further and deny that it makes sense to speak of good and
bad men at all: if pleasure is the only thing that ultimately matters,
virtue loses its meaning.33 Yet, while such a response might save hedonism from Socrates critique, Callicles never retracts his agreement
that the courageous and the prudent, as such, are good. And his final
reaction to Socrates argument is to claim that neither he nor anyone
else would ever truly deny that some pleasures are better and others
worse, thus confirming that he believes in a standard beyond pleasure
and that he will abandon his hedonism before abandoning his view of
virtue.34
When we put together the results of Socrates two arguments against
hedonism, not only do we see that Callicles is not a thoroughgoing
hedonist, but we also see what beliefs are more important to him than
his attempt to defend the indiscriminate pursuit of pleasure. That
attempt, never entirely sincere (see again 495a56), is revealed as a
cover concealing his deeper beliefs. And his deeper beliefs are that
true happiness is a condition entirely free of evils and that virtue,
or at least a certain understanding of virtue, is the highest standard
by which human worth should be measured. It is probably no mere
coincidence that each of these two beliefs is given its clearest display
in such close proximity to the other. That they appear alongside one
another gives us reason to think that they are connected, that is, that
Callicles belief in a pure happiness and his concern for virtue go hand
in hand and may even sustain one another. By bringing out these two
beliefs through his two arguments against hedonism, then, Socrates
has provided the fullest view thus far of what may be called Callicles
33. Compare Philebus 13a7c5, 55a9c3.
34. Several commentators have stressed the importance of Callicles reaction to
Socrates argument. Compare McKim, Shame and Truth in Platos Gorgias,
4243; Adkins, Merit and Responsibility, 250, 272; Irwin, Platos Moral Theory,
121, Platos Ethics, 107; Kahn, Drama and Dialectic in Platos Gorgias, 108
10, Plato and the Socratic Dialogue, 137; Newell, Ruling Passion, 2728.
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moral seriousness or his attachment to morality. It is true that this

view of Callicles deepest convictions is not yet complete. Later passages of the dialogue will expand it even further. For instance, we will
soon come to a section in which Callicles defends men who he claims
devoted themselves to the city men such as Themistocles, Cimon,
Miltiades, and Pericles, who Callicles will insist cared for the citizens
they served (see 503a2c3). Callicles defense of service to the common good in that section is important for any attempt to put together
a complete picture of his views, as are other arguments he will go on
to make in the remainder of the dialogue. But these later passages
will serve primarily to confirm and elaborate what has already been
revealed by what we have considered. We are already in a position to
draw the general conclusion that, although his moral seriousness may
at times be hard to see since it is hidden behind his hedonism, Callicles
ultimately has a deeper attachment to virtue than to pleasure.
The discovery that Callicles hedonism is not an expression of his
deepest concerns, however, leaves a couple of questions still to be considered. For why, if Callicles is not really a hedonist, did he argue as
one in the first place? And why has Socrates guided the discussion so
as to focus on the question of pleasure? To begin with the first of these
questions, we have already received a partial answer: Callicles argued
as a hedonist because he thought he had to in order to be consistent
and to avoid refutation by Socrates. But that is not a complete explanation. For it fails to explain why Callicles took an initial step toward
hedonism, and why he at times expresses a serious commitment to
hedonism (see again especially 491e5492e2, 494a6b2, 495b2d7).
While Callicles hedonism is not entirely sincere, neither is it simply
insincere, and it would be a mistake to dismiss it as merely a false
and completely misleading facade. Callicles hedonism is better seen
as part of a serious effort by Callicles to deny, even to himself, that he is
concerned with any kind of virtue and any form of happiness beyond
the enjoyment of pleasure. Yet, since we have seen that Callicles is concerned with precisely these things, we have to try to understand why
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he would take a position that hides or buries his concerns. Why would
Callicles try to conceal his deepest convictions even from himself?
This question can be extended beyond the narrow one of why
Callicles defended hedonism, since hedonism is only the most extreme
of the positions Callicles has taken that would seem to reject all ordinary notions of virtue. If the conversation up to this point has shown
us that Callicles is morally serious or attached to virtue, we have also
seen Callicles make a number of arguments that express what would
appear to be an extremely cynical point of view. In addition to defending hedonism, he has argued, for instance, that nobility has no genuine
meaning beyond what is advantageous, and that it is simply a manifest fact that should not be lamented that the strong dominate the
weak (see again especially 483a7e1, 488d1e6, 491e5492c8). Thus
far, Socrates has had to make considerable efforts to strip away these
covers and bring to the surface what Callicles really believes. But what
is the source of Callicles reluctance to acknowledge what are in fact
his own deeper views?
The reasons for this reluctance run deeper than his desire to avoid
appearing nave or to win a victory over Socrates and his moralistic arguments. To understand the deeper reasons, we must consider
the painful thoughts that come with acknowledging the concerns that
Callicles hides. For to admit that one is concerned with virtue, and
that one has a deep desire to see virtue triumph, is to open oneself
to sorrow and anger when virtue fails or is defeated by vice. That
this problem troubles Callicles can be seen most clearly in an important exchange in a later section of the dialogue. There, Socrates and
Callicles will discuss a possible situation in which a just man who runs
the risk of refusing to assimilate to an unjust regime is destroyed by a
more self-protective man who has assimilated (see 510d4511a7). In
response to Socrates effort to remind him that this prospect would
involve a base man killing one who is noble and good, Callicles will
exclaim, Isnt that exactly the infuriating thing? a response that
reveals both his continued attachment to virtue and also the problem
that leads him to bury that attachment (511b16). The heart of the
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problem, as Callicles response shows, is the painful indignation and

fear that arise with the thought that the virtuous do not always receive
the fate they deserve or that justice has little power in the world. In
keeping with his desire to escape this problem, we earlier saw Callicles
display his reluctance to acknowledge a gap between virtue and success (see again 483c9e1, 488b8d4, 498e23). And although Socrates
was able to draw Callicles toward a position that would make such a
gap possible by appealing to Callicles concern for virtue to pull him
away from a simple reduction of virtue to strength and success, we can
understand why it required an effort to get Callicles to take that step
(see especially 488d5489d5). Even when he did take it, moreover, he
tried to keep it as small as possible by emphasizing virtues prudence
and courage that can be viewed as expressions of strength and selfassertion rather than self-sacrifice (see especially 491a7d3). Nothing
is so characteristic of Callicles as his fluctuation between opposed positions, with his movement in one direction getting not only checked
but also colored by the concerns that lead him in the other. But what
moves him is never simple cynicism. If his attachment to virtue always
draws him back from positions that would ultimately deprive virtue of
any meaning or destroy the virtuous character of virtue, he is driven
toward such positions by his unwillingness to embrace a view that
would leave virtue exposed and vulnerable. His wavering can thus
be understood as a series of responses to an infuriating problem,
none of which Callicles can find satisfactory since none of them fully
solves that problem. By looking at his dilemma from this perspective,
we can make sense both of his earlier statements about justice, in
which he fluctuated between affirming and denying that the superior
who deserve to rule are simply the stronger, and also of his hedonism,
which is the most extreme of his swings toward a view that would
reject all ordinary standards of judgment that leave virtue exposed to
the problem that troubles him.35
35. That Callicles dilemma is not idiosyncratic to him but troubles even people
of more conventional decency can be seen by considering Laws 625c9627c2
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It may be more, however, than indignation at the prospect of virtue

failing to succeed that keeps Callicles from fully acknowledging his
deeper beliefs. For one might respond to the problem of the vulnerability of virtue by declaring that, even in the midst of suffering at the
hands of the wicked, the virtuous man will attain a more perfect good,
a truer happiness, than the base gratification enjoyed by his enemies.36
This would seem, at any rate, to be the promise that virtue holds out,
a promise that we have been given reason to believe Callicles is not
untouched by. Yet, as powerful and alluring as this promise is, Callicles is unable to give himself fully to it. Although he is moved by it,
he is troubled by his doubts about whether virtue can really deliver on
its promise. And these doubts are surely strengthened by his inability to accept the clearest answer that can be given to the question of
how virtue leads to happiness even if the virtuous are harmed by the
wicked. If we look ahead for a moment to the very end of the dialogue, Socrates conversation with Callicles will conclude with a myth
about the afterlife describing Zeus system of punishing those human
beings who have lived unjustly and rewarding the virtuous with an
existence free of evils (522e1527a4). This myth can be seen as a more
serious version of a step already flirted with in Socrates earlier image
of intemperate men in Hades carrying water to their leaky jars with
their leaky sieves (see again 492e7493d3). Yet, if that earlier image
failed to persuade Callicles, is he any more likely to be convinced by the
myth at the end of the dialogue? Socrates acknowledges that Callicles
will almost surely dismiss this myth, too, as nothing more than an old
wives tale (see 523a12, 527a56). That does not mean, as Socrates
also indicates, that there do not remain in Callicles attachments that
will always pull him in such a direction (see 527a8b2). But Socrates
predicts that Callicles will resist looking at the hopes that linger inside
and 661d6662a8 (cf. 689a1c3). What sets Callicles apart from the likes of
Kleinias and Megillus in the Laws is his keener sense of the problem that
they also experience and his greater effort to overcome the internal division
it produces.
36. Consider Republic 357a2362c8.
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of him, perhaps because acknowledging those hopes would require

him to confront his longing for an ultimate salvation from evils, and
thus to face the fact that he yearns for something he fears is impossible.
Rather than acknowledge his deepest hopes and accept the fears that
come with them, Callicles would rather try to convince himself that
happiness can be found in the continual satisfaction of intense desires
and distract himself with a stream of intense pleasures.
These considerations can help us understand the complexity of
Callicles soul and why he would argue as a hedonist. Still, he may
never have been led to express his hedonism and certainly would
never have expressed it as vehemently as he did unless he had been
pushed in that direction by Socrates. We still need to address the question, then, of why Socrates pushed Callicles to defend hedonism. And
this question is really only a more developed version of a question
that we raised earlier but left unanswered: Why did Socrates turn the
discussion away from the question of justice? For it was on the heels
of his examination of the question of justice, or rather on the heels
of his abrupt abandonment of that examination, that Socrates turned
the discussion to a set of questions that culminated in the dispute
over hedonism. When Socrates first turned away from the question
of justice, we were perplexed as to why he would so abruptly abandon his incomplete examination of that question. Since we have now
considered the section that follows that turn, we should be in a better position to explain it by addressing what can now be put as the
question of why Socrates would prefer to argue over the question of
hedonism than over the question of justice.
To address this question, it may help to remember that Socrates
and Callicles are not the only men present. We should not forget
that Gorgias is watching Socrates conversation with Callicles. In fact,
Gorgias, as if to remind us of his presence, has even intervened to keep
the conversation going. In the midst of the first of Socrates two main
arguments against hedonism, at a moment when Callicles annoyance
with Socrates sophistic manner of refutation had become so great
that he came close to breaking off the conversation, Gorgias stepped
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in to urge Callicles not to abandon the argument before it had reached

its end and to submit to Socrates refutation (see 497a6c2). Gorgias
intervention is a sign that Socrates has succeeded in capturing his
interest. But what has Gorgias seen or learned up to this point? Most
important, he has witnessed the uncovering of Callicles attachment to
virtue or his concern for morality. But he also has seen Socrates direct
the conversation to hedonism and away from justice. Now, Gorgias or
anyone else witnessing the conversation might be tempted to explain
Socrates turn away from justice on the grounds that Callicles concern for justice is too shallow for a truly fruitful discussion of that
topic. Perhaps, in turning to the topic of pleasure, Socrates has turned
to what really moves and concerns Callicles. Socrates himself even
encourages this impression (see 492d1e1, 495b8c2). But it is a false
impression, as Socrates also has helped the more discerning among his
audience to see. Gorgias, in particular, has surely been brought to see
that Callicles cares deeply about virtue, and that he even yearns for justice to prevail by the virtuous receiving their due. Given this yearning,
which has been buried and transformed but not destroyed by Callicles struggle with the problem of the vulnerability of virtue, Socrates
turn away from the question of justice cannot rightly be explained as a
turn to what is deeper for Callicles. In fact, the opposite is closer to the
truth. That is, Socrates turn away from the question of justice is better
explained by his caution about critiquing in too thoroughgoing a manner what truly is dearest to Callicles. We should recall, in this connection, that even the few questions that Socrates did raise about Callicles
view of justice provoked an angry response (see again 490b1491a3).
And we must remember that lurking in the background of Socrates
entire conversation with Callicles is Callicles hostility to philosophy,
a hostility whose deepest source may be Callicles moral attachments
together with his vague sense that philosophic questioning threatens
to undermine what he cares most deeply about without offering anything genuinely worthy in return. As Socrates exchanges with Callicles
have helped us to see more clearly, Callicles moral attachments shape
his judgments his judgments of everything and thus even of Socrates
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himself and of philosophy. By directing the discussion to the question of hedonism, however, Socrates has been able to cast the divide
between himself and Callicles in such a way that he is standing on
the high ground, so to speak, against Callicles half-serious arguments
on behalf of the life of pleasure-seeking. Socrates success in seizing
this high ground, which prepares his coming return to the question of
the goodness of the philosophic life, is a crucial part, I suggest, of his
education of Gorgias in a nobler form of rhetoric, a form of rhetoric
whose ultimate purpose is the defense of philosophy against its critics
and potential enemies.
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4 Socrates Situation and the

Rehabilitation of Rhetoric
he Gorgias reveals much about Callicles. It gives us a view into

the soul of a young man who Socrates thinks could never truly
join him in his search for the truth, and who is willing to be an outspoken critic of the philosophic life. It would seem fitting that the dialogue
should also reveal much about Socrates, that we should see a presentation or defense of Socrates philosophic life in response to Callicles
attack on it. And Socrates does return, on the heels of his critique of
hedonism, to the question that he earlier let fade into the background.
He reminds Callicles that the most important question at issue in their
conversation is the most important of all human questions How
ought one to live? and he returns to Callicles exhortation of him to
abandon philosophy and to turn to a more political life (500c18). Yet,
although Socrates returns to the question of whether his life is truly
choiceworthy, he seems to raise this question only to let it fade again
into the background. It takes quite some time in the remainder of the
dialogue before Socrates speaks directly about his own life; and when
he does, his statements are quite brief (see 521a2522e6; cf. 508c4
513c3). Also dampening our expectations that Socrates will be particularly open about his own life in the last part of the dialogue is
his return, in the same section that immediately follows his critique
of Callicles hedonism, to the issue of rhetoric. This return to what
could seem at this point to be a distraction from the more important
issue of the best life adds to our puzzlement. What is Socrates main
123
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Socrates Situation and the Rehabilitation of Rhetoric
purpose after his critique of Callicles hedonism? Is it to give an adequate response to Callicles attack on the philosophic life by revealing
the truth about that life? What we wish to see is what Socrates will soon
call, in reference to Callicles earlier allusion to Euripides Antiope, the
speech of Amphion in exchange for the speech of Zethus that is, the
defense of the private, philosophic life in response to the case against
it. But is that what we will see?
This question becomes murkier the more we come to doubt what
first appears to be the straightforward answer to it. To repeat, Socrates
follows his critique of Callicles hedonism with a return to the question of the best life. His initial approach gives the impression that he
is now prepared to answer that question since he has gotten Callicles to renounce his hedonism and thus to accept the crucial standard
for judging the rival lives. According to Socrates, since Callicles has
agreed that some pleasures are good while others are bad, he must
acknowledge a standard higher than pleasure that makes this distinction intelligible, that is, he must acknowledge the superiority of the
good to pleasure and its status as the true end of all human actions
(499c4500a3). Since it follows from this position that all pleasant
things ought to be done for the sake of good things rather than the
reverse, Socrates insists that there is need of an expert (or, literally,
an artist, a technikos man) to discern which pleasant things are
good and which are bad. Socrates then reminds Callicles of the earlier distinction that was drawn between pursuits that aim at pleasure
alone and those genuine arts that know what is good and bad (500a7
b5). At this point, Socrates returns to the question of the best way
of life, posed now as a dispute between the political life championed
by Callicles and the life spent in philosophy (500c18). The surface
impression conveyed by this approach to the question of the best way
of life is that the question can be settled simply, by referring to the
distinction between the pleasant and the good: unlike the political
life praised by Callicles, the philosophic life is guided by the good
rather than by pleasure. Yet, surprisingly, Socrates does not quite draw
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this conclusion.1 Instead, he presents the question of the true difference between the two lives and the question of which life should be
chosen as questions that still remain open (500c8d4). Beyond this,
he even suggests that it remains a question whether they are really
two distinct lives (consider 500d23). Socrates hesitancy here indicates that he does not think the preceeding discussion has sufficed to
resolve these crucial issues.
One might expect, then, that Socrates would resolve these issues
immediately in what follows. But another reason to doubt that
Socrates purposes are as straightforward as they first appear is his
renewed interest, which we have already noted, in rhetoric. It would
seem that rhetoric reemerges in the discussion as an aspect of the
political life that is to be contrasted with the philosophic life, or, in
other words, as something that belongs to what we anticipate will
be the losing side in the contest (see 500c47). But since rhetoric
was already criticized earlier in the dialogue, why would there be
a need to heap further abuse on it? And more important, although
Socrates repeats in the present section his earlier critique of rhetoric
as a form of flattery directed toward pleasure, we can also discern a
subtle change in his attitude towards rhetoric. It is true that Socrates
once again seems to spare no disdain for those (nonartistic) pursuits
that aim at providing pleasure, now with the apparent purpose of
convincing Callicles to share his contempt (see, in particular, 500d6
501c6, 502d29). Yet Socrates proves in this section not to be overly
concerned with what Callicles really thinks (see 501c7e3; compare
495a79, 496c14, 500b5c1). And Callicles may miss the less obvious
but more important indications that, for all the disdain in Socrates
tone, something different is now in the air.
The first indication of a change is that Socrates returns to an issue
that first arose in his discussion with Gorgias, before his critique of
1. Contrast Jaeger, Paideia, 2:144; Friedlander,
Plato, 2:2667; Dodds, Gorgias,

23; Newell, Ruling Passion, 28.
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rhetoric at the beginning of the Polus section. By asking Callicles, as

they are discussing pursuits that provide pleasure while neglecting
what is best, whether such gratification is possible not only with one
soul but also with two or many or even in crowds, Socrates returns to
the issue of what can realistically be accomplished with large crowds
(501d15). We should recall that this consideration earlier pointed to
an important necessity governing and at least to some extent excusing the way rhetoric operates (see again 454e3455a7). Second, we
should notice that, although Socrates returns in the present context
to the schema by which he criticized rhetoric at the beginning of the
Polus section, his analogies of flattering pursuits that aim at pleasure are no longer cosmetics and cookery but now become music and
poetry (compare 501e5502d3 with 463a6465e1). To be sure, Socrates
is criticizing music and poetry, by arguing that they do not strive to
improve the souls of the audience. Nevertheless, it is one thing for
a rhetorician to be compared to a cook or a cosmetician and quite
another to be compared to a tragic poet, a practitioner of that august
and wondrous nonart, as Socrates puts it perhaps only half sarcastically (502b12). The difference in the analogies is not a matter of mere
pretension: the kind of pleasure supplied by music and poetry is of a
different and more complex sort, just as the skill necessary to produce
such pleasure is harder to come by. The rhetorician now appears as a
figure equal to the great tragic poets, or even superior to them insofar
as his audience is made up solely of free men whereas theirs includes
women, children, and slaves (502d5e2).2
The final and most important sign of a change in Socrates attitude
towards rhetoric is that he now allows that there could be such a thing
as noble rhetoric. No longer condemning rhetoric in its entirety or in
all of its forms, Socrates holds out the possibility of a noble form of
rhetoric, although he suggests that such rhetoric has never been seen
(503a5b1).3 If such rhetoric has never been seen, we must wonder
2. For a different interpretation of the message conveyed by Socrates analogies
in this section, see Jaeger, Paideia, 2:144.
3. Cf. Black, Platos View of Rhetoric, 3667; Newell, Ruling Passion, 28.
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what Socrates has in mind by speaking of it. Is Socrates calling for its
creation? If Socrates has returned to the question of rhetoric for the
sake of Gorgias as much as for the sake of Callicles (see again 500a7
b5, 501c7d2), is Socrates pointing to a better use that could be made
of Gorgias powers? And might Socrates even have wanted to send
a certain message to Gorgias by weaving his return to the theme of
rhetoric together with his reminder of Callicles attack on philosophy?
These questions are difficult to answer at this point, since we have
not learned much about the character of noble rhetoric or why it
might be needed. But we can say that we have seen the first steps
in a restoration or rehabilitation of rhetoric and we may wonder
whether this does not bring us closer to Socrates unacknowledged
but true purpose in the remainder of the dialogue.
NOBLE RHETORIC, THE ORDER OF THE SOUL,

AND THE SOCRATIC THESIS (502d10508c3)
In laying out the criticism of rhetoric that led to the suggestion that
rhetoric is double, with a shameful form and a noble form (see again
503a5b1), Socrates based his argument and thus this distinction on
the difference between aiming at pleasure and struggling to make the
souls of the citizens as good as possible. He complicated matters, however, by adding the further objection that ordinary rhetoricians act for
the sake of their own private interest, giving little thought to the common good (502e67). In other words, Socrates criticism highlighted
not only the lowness of what ordinary rhetoricians provide but also the
selfishness of their motives. This is important because it is the latter
point more than the former that provokes a protest from Callicles that
leads to the next stage of the conversation. Callicles is bothered less
by the thought that ordinary rhetoricians provide mere pleasure than
by the suggestion that they are simply out for themselves (consider
503a24). He does not think that is true in all cases. He insists that
it is not true of the great Athenian statesmen Themistocles, Cimon,
Miltiades, and Pericles (503c13).
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In Callicles protest here we can see something about Callicles character and convictions that was visible but perhaps not fully clear earlier. Callicles deepest admiration is reserved for men who, in his view,
performed great acts of public service for Athens. Great Athenians
such as Pericles hold a higher place in his esteem than foreign tyrants
of the likes of Xerxes (consider again 483c7484c3). And insofar as
the political figures he admires were rhetoricians, he speaks up on
their behalf against Socrates criticism, insisting that they should be
regarded as noble rhetoricians, unlike those of the current generation
(503b4c3).4 Callicles protest here sounds almost as if it could come
from a patriotic young American looking back with reverence to the
time of Washington, Jefferson, and Adams. It is true that, in defending
especially Pericles but also Themistocles and Cimon, he is defending
the architects of Athenian imperialism, who built Athens into a great
power at the expense of the freedom of other Greek cities. But Callicles
can tell himself that, in building and asserting Athenian strength, these
leaders were acting in accordance with the justice of nature that dictates that the strong ought to dominate the weak. In fact, not only is
4. It is important to know the most famous accomplishments of the men whom

Callicles praises. Themistocles, Cimon, Miltiades, and Pericles were all celebrated leaders of Athens whose careers collectively spanned the period of
Athens rise to great power. Miltiades, the earliest of the great four, led the
Athenians in their famous victory against the invading forces of the Persian
king Darius at Marathon in 490 B.C. Themistocles helped, roughly ten years
later, to defeat the second Persian invasion, led by Xerxes. Themistocles
defeated the Persian navy in a crucial battle at Salamis, and he contributed
to the rise of the Athenian empire by building up the Athenian navy. Cimon
carried Themistocles work further by dealing a final defeat to the Persian
navy and by leading Athens during much of the period in which it transformed itself from one of the leading cities in the Greek alliance against
Persia into an imperial power in its own right. Pericles, of course, is the
most famous of all Athenian leaders of this period. He led the Athenians
at the peak of their strength and helped lead them into the Peloponnesian
War. For more extensive discussions of the careers of these four men, see, in
addition to the accounts of Herodotus and Thucydides, Seung, Plato Rediscovered, 23, and Dodds, Gorgias, 3256, 3569.
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Callicles patriotism compatible with his earlier argument about justice, but his admiration of the architects of Athenian imperialism even
suggests that a patriotic concern to vindicate Athens may have played
a role in leading him to defend a view of justice according to which
Athenian imperialism would be an example of natural justice, not a
violation of right.5
Callicles protest against Socrates present suggestion is guided, to
repeat, more by the belief that his heroes served Athens than by a
conviction that their service consisted in improving the souls of the
Athenians. It is only by combining these standards such that their
difference becomes blurred that Socrates is able to provoke Callicles
into defending his heroes as noble rhetoricians. But Callicles response
then allows Socrates to turn to the question of the true task of noble
rhetoric and to sketch out what its aim should be (consider 504c4e1).
Socrates procedure here may serve several purposes at once. Most
obviously, Socrates intends to establish a standard by which Callicles
heroes can be criticized (see 503d56). In addition, and as an extension
of the same effort, Socrates will press Callicles himself to turn his
attention away from the simple fact that his heroes served Athens and
to focus instead on the character of their service. Callicles position, as
it appears here, has the mixed or ambiguous character of patriotism,
which puts service to the city above all else without being too morally
strict about the end that the city itself serves.6 In pressing Callicles,
Socrates will challenge the adequacy of this position a position that
in a way affirms the primacy of virtue (as service of the individual to the
common good) but in another way fails to (as the end to which the city
should be devoted). Since any defender of such a view, precisely as a
5. In support of this suggestion, consider Callicles opening remark at 481b10
c4, where Callicles speaks in defense of the present order of things, and
expresses his concern that Socrates extreme arguments about justice would
turn everything upside down.
6. It is worth comparing, in this connection, a famous passage from the foremost of Callicles heroes. See 2.4143 of Pericles Funeral Oration in Thucydides.
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devotee of virtue and the city, would find it hard to concede that the city
should be devoted to low ends, Socrates is justified in pressing Callicles
toward greater rigor and consistency. Finally, Socrates procedure will
also allow him to begin to sketch something of the character of noble
rhetoric and its aims.
Socrates begins his description of the noble rhetorician the good
man, who speaks with a view to the best by comparing him to the
other craftsmen, who do not perform their tasks at random but instead
look away to something, namely, to whatever their work (ergon) happens to be and to the form (eidos) into which they are trying to mold
whatever they are working on (503e15). (The important Platonic term
form eidos makes its appearance here as an image or pattern that
would seem to exist in the minds eye of a craftsman and then later
in the result of his work.) Socrates gives the examples of painters,
house builders, and shipwrights, all of whom are typical craftsmen in
the sense that they put the materials of their work into a certain order
until they have formed an arranged and ordered whole (503e5504a2).
The same is true, according to Socrates, even of gymnastic trainers
and doctors, who work on the body (504a35). As for the character
and goodness of the final order aimed at by each of the craftsmen,
that would seem to be established by the use to which the craftsmans
work is to be put. For instance, the order of a ship is dictated and
vindicated, so to speak, by the needs of sailing, just as the order of a
house is dictated and vindicated by the needs of daily life. It is hard to
deny that an ordered ship, an ordered house, or even an ordered body
is preferable to a disordered one (504a8b3).
So far so good. But what about the soul? Is it true in that case, too,
that arrangement and order render it useful, whereas disorder has
the opposite effect? Socrates puts this question to Callicles, and Callicles assumes, in the wake of the preceding examples, that it is also
necessary to agree to this (see 504b36). And perhaps it does make
sense to assume that an ordered soul, even if its order is more complicated than that of a ship or a house, is more useful than a disordered
one. But a more questionable step comes next. For after reminding
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Callicles that there is a name or a couple of names for that which

comes about in the body through arrangement and order namely,
health and strength Socrates asks about that which comes to be in
the soul from arrangement and order (504c13). Callicles unwillingness to respond Why dont you say it yourself, Socrates? (504c4)
enables Socrates to declare that the names of the arrangement and
order of the soul are the lawful and the law. From these, he claims,
souls become lawful and orderly; and lawfulness and orderliness in the
soul are justice and moderation (504d13). Callicles response at this
point Let it be (504d4) indicates that he senses a problem with
Socrates argument. But what problem does Callicles sense? What is
questionable here?
To begin with the structure of the argument, Socrates does not work
in the case of the soul, as he did in the preceding analogies of the products of the craftsmen, from the notions of work or use. His statement
about the soul seems closer in this respect to the analogy of the body
(consider 504b4c3). Yet it is much less disputable to claim that the end
or product of the proper arrangement and order of the body is health
and strength, and therefore that the order itself should be called the
healthy (see 504c78), than it is to claim that the arrangement and
order of the soul ought to be called the lawful and law, and then
to conclude that from these arise lawfulness and orderliness, which
in turn ought to be called justice and moderation (compare 504b7
c8 with 504d13). What is the basis for calling the arrangement and
order of the soul the lawful and law? And how do we know that
the lawful and the law produce states of lawfulness and orderliness
that truly deserve the names of the virtues justice and moderation?
Perhaps we do in some sense know this, insofar as the law is commonly held to be the source of lawfulness and orderliness, and such
lawfulness and orderliness are commonly taken to be justice and moderation. Looked at in this way, however, Socrates argument does little
more than appeal to a common opinion without providing a genuine
defense of that opinion. Or, to be more precise, Socrates argument
gives the impression of demonstrating that the lawful and law have a
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rationality that is as straightforward as that found in the works of the

craftsmen, and a goodness that is as unquestionable as that of bodily
health and strength. But this impression of demonstrating that there is
a perfect harmony between law, virtue, and rationality serves to cover
over the problem that the argument really rests on a mere assertion
an assertion, moreover, that avoids the difficult questions that would
be involved in a truly serious effort to discover the arrangement and
order of the soul. After a series of initial steps that give the appearance
of perfect soundness and clarity, Socrates reaches his conclusion by a
nimble and well disguised leap.7
That Socrates does not offer a sound argument here should make
us wonder whether we are not seeing a rhetorical presentation of the
task of rhetoric. According to Socrates account, the rhetorician that
is, the artistic and good one will look when he speaks and acts to the
inculcation of justice, moderation, and the rest of virtue in the souls
of his fellow citizens, and to the removal of injustice, intemperance,
and the rest of vice (504d5e4). This will benefit the citizens, since,
just as it is of no benefit according to the just speech to give a sick
and corrupted body all sorts of food and drink, so must a thoughtless, intemperate, unjust, and impious soul be kept away from the
objects of its desires and directed toward those things from which it
will be made better (504e5505b7). Such restriction involves a certain kind of punishment, namely, the punishment of keeping the sick
soul away from the objects of its desires. But to be punished, Socrates
insists, is better for the soul than to remain immoderate. And Socrates
urges Callicles, who objects to this suggestion, to endure the benefit
he himself is receiving by submitting to the punishment he is getting
(504b9c4).
7. The flaw in Socrates argument is missed by some commentators. See, e.g.,

Jaeger, Paideia, 2:145; Friedlander,
Plato, 2:26869. For other commentators

who raise objections to Socrates argument, see Grote, Plato, and the Other
Companions of Sokrates, 2:37575; Adkins, Merit and Responsibility, 2734;
Kahn, Plato and the Socratic Dialogue, 1424; Newell, Ruling Passion, 31, 7.
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As this last remark to Callicles indicates, Socrates is not only describing a kind of punishment in this section but also practicing it on Callicles. This fits with the suggestion that he is not only describing a
certain sort of rhetoric but also practicing it. But rhetoric of what
sort? As it appears here, the rhetoric that Socrates is at once describing and practicing combines exhortation and a kind of chastisement
that can plausibly be called punishment, although this punishment
involves no physical violence and would seem to work together with
the inspiring effects of exhortation. It may be worth noticing, in this
connection, that Socrates compares what he is doing in this section to
the telling of myths (see 505c10d3). Is Socrates exhorting Callicles to
a view that somehow has the character of a myth? This question cannot yet be answered, since, as Socrates puts it, the argument still does
not have a head (505d23).8 Let it suffice for now to say that Socrates
is presenting what appears to be a doctrine of virtue, a doctrine to the
truth of which he does not quite attest (consider 506a15), but one
that he is willing to spell out at least in part because Gorgias steps in
to express his wish to hear Socrates go through the remaining things
(see 506a8b3).
The exchange in which Gorgias urges Socrates to continue even
as Callicles withdraws from the discussion leads to the strange spectacle of Socrates speaking for an extended section in a mode that
combines dialectical questioning and extended monologue. That is,
Socrates accepts Callicles temporary withdrawal and proceeds on his
own, but he continues to speak as if he were engaged in a back and
forth exchange, taking on the roles of both questioner and respondent
(see 506b4ff.). Socrates argument thus becomes, in its very form or
method, a blend of Socratic dialectics and a kind of rhetoric. And this
form may give us a clue to the character of the content of Socrates
extended monologue. In keeping with this, Socrates also suggests that
8. On this odd expression and Socrates use of the word muthos in this passage,
see Brisson, Plato the Myth Maker, 60.
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his monologue is replacing a more strictly dialectical attempt to give to

Callicles the speech of Amphion in response to the speech of Zethus
(506b4c1).9 This indication that Socrates is no longer arguing in the
strictest dialectical manner, even as he preserves something of the form
of dialectics, suggests that whatever we may see in Socrates monologue, it will not be the truest or deepest response to Callicles attack
on his way of life. Instead, Socrates is completing what he calls the
speech (ton logon) or the just speech (ton dikaion logon), a speech
or an account that he has already given us reason to suspect may have
something of the character of a myth.
With an exhortation of his audience to listen, Socrates returns
to take up the speech from the beginning (506c5). The beginning,
apparently, is the distinction between the pleasant and the good, and
Callicles agreement as to the superiority of the good (506c69). But
after repeating these steps, Socrates now says more than he did earlier
about the character of the good. Just as the pleasant is that through
which, by its presence, we are pleased, so the good is that through
which, by its presence, we are good (506c9d2). But we are good when
some virtue is present (506d24). With these steps, Socrates turns the
acknowledgment of the superiority of the good into a case for virtue,
or, in other words, he brings out the implication that virtue should
be our highest concern. Next, he describes virtue in such a way that
arrangement and order, the principles he has been emphasizing, are its
distinguishing marks and even its sources (see 506d5e2). Once again,
Socrates does not speak in the case of virtue, as he did earlier when
speaking of the products of the craftsmen, of any use or end from
which the arrangement and order in question take their bearings.10
Instead, he speaks simply of an order that, when present, makes a
given being good; and he claims that, when this being is the soul, the
orderly soul is better than the disorderly one (506e26).
9. This phrase refers, of course, to Callicles earlier allusion to Euripides

Antiope. See footnote 10 in Chapter 3.
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As Socrates spells out his account of virtue, we begin to see the significance of his emphasis on order: moderation comes to sight as the
highest virtue. Socrates argues that since the orderly soul is moderate,
the moderate soul is good, and the soul that experiences the opposite
to the moderate is bad (506e6507a7). The soul that experiences the
opposite to the moderate, according to Socrates, is the foolish and
te kai akolastos at 507a67). By menintemperate soul (see he aphron
tioning two opposites of moderation foolishness in addition to intemperance Socrates suggests that at least one meaning of moderation
here is a kind of sensibleness or even a kind of wisdom.11 This, in turn,
can help us to grasp the most remarkable feature of Socrates present
account of virtue: at least at the beginning of this account, he presents
all of the other virtues as derivative from moderation (507a5c7).12
For this to make sense, it would seem that moderation must incorporate a kind of wisdom that is able to discern the fitting things,
since it is out of his concern to do the fitting things that the moderate man as Socrates here describes him can be relied on to do the
just things toward human beings, to act piously toward the gods, and
to be courageous (see 507b15). The virtuous man, because he does
the deeds of justice, piety, and courage, can be said to be just, pious,
and courageous; but the spirit of his actions would seem to be that of a
sensible concern not to make foolish mistakes (consider 507b5c5). By
presenting virtue in this way, Socrates makes it easy to defend virtue
as conducive to the happiness of the moderate man and he even
adds that he himself is convinced that moderation is the path to happiness (see 507b8d1). But one could wonder how closely the virtue
11. On the two opposites of moderation, see Dodds, Gorgias, 336. As Dodds
points out, the more common opposition is sophr

on-akolastos
(moderate
(moderate-foolish) and
intemperate). But for the opposition sophr
on-aphr
on
the broader meaning of moderation implied by that opposition, see Protagoras 332a4335b5; Laws 710a38; Xenophon, Memorabilia 1.1.16, 1.3.9.
12. Cf. Benardete, The Rhetoric of Morality and Philosophy, 61: Moderation
becomes the single virtue into which even justice is absorbed. See also
85, 90.
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that Socrates is describing and defending here resembles the kind of

virtue that most people admire and would like to see defended. What,
for instance, is its relationship to the lawfulness that Socrates spoke
of just moments ago? Would such virtue merit the name the lawful?
Or is it closer to the kind of virtue that Socrates speaks of, for example,
in Book Four of the Republic, where he defines justice as the proper
order of the soul? That definition of justice, like Socrates current
description of moderation, makes virtue appear to be something that
would clearly be good for an individual to possess, but it departs quite
far from any ordinary notion of virtue.13
If Socrates description transforms virtue into something that most
people would find hard to recognize, he does not continue very far
down this path before turning back toward a view that does not give
such pride of place to moderation. Socrates retreat begins when he
returns to the theme of punishment punishment not just of oneself
but also of ones own and when he speaks of the city (see 507d46).
Once the primary object of concern ceases to be ones own soul, as it
seemed to be while Socrates was praising moderation, justice returns
to reclaim at least equal status with moderation. In the second half of
Socrates account of virtue, justice is no longer presented as a subordinate and derivative virtue (compare 507d4508b2 with 507a5d3).
It also is striking that the reemergence of justice from subordinate to
at least equal status with moderation brings with it a transformation
in the character of Socrates case for the goodness of virtue. On the
one hand, the straightforward case for the goodness of virtue that was
presented in the section that elevated moderation casts its glow, so to
speak, over Socrates whole account of virtue, especially since Socrates
does not call attention to the important shift in the account. But, on the
13. See, in particular, Republic 443b7444a2. On the difference between

Socratic temperance and Socratic justice, on the one hand, and commonly recognized temperance and commonly recognized justice, on the
other, see Irwin, Platos Moral Theory, 1256. Compare Santas, Socrates, 295
301.
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137
other hand, Socrates now moves away from the view that the sensible
actions of the moderate man produce benefits that flow directly from
the actions themselves by suggesting, instead, that moderation and
justice are good because they enable the virtuous to unite in friendship and community with other human beings and with the gods (see
507d6e6). Socrates speech culminates in a vision of the cosmos of
heaven, earth, gods, and men bound together by the ties of community, friendship, orderliness, moderation, and justice (507e6508a2).
This is why, he tells Callicles, they call this whole a cosmos, not disordered or intemperate.14 Socrates tells Callicles that he fails to see
the cosmic power of geometrical equality: You seem to me not to
apply your mind to these things, and, wise though you are about them,
you do not realize that geometrical equality has great power among
gods and human beings, but you think that one must practice taking
more, since you neglect geometry (508a38).15
Now, Socrates seems to be serious here in urging Callicles to
embrace the view that he sets forth. He certainly addresses him directly
by name (see 507c1, e6, 508b4). And if we recall our earlier suggestion
that Callicles is troubled by doubts about whether the virtuous receive
14. The Greek word kosmos (translated above as cosmos) is the same word
that I have been translating as order. To call this whole a kosmos is to
claim that it is orderly. As for who they are who call this whole a kosmos,
that may refer either to people in general or to the wise mentioned by
Socrates at 507e6.
15. Geometrical equality refers to what is more often called proportional
equality, the equality of ratios in a geometrical progression. This is the
kind of equality that provides the standard for Aristotles famous account of
distributive justice (see Nicomachean Ethics 1131a10b22). Socrates suggestion here that such equality somehow has force throughout the universe
may have Pythagorean origins (see Dodds, Gorgias, 3389; see also Olympiodorus, Commentary on Platos Gorgias, Lecture 35). Whether or not it
has such origins, the vision Socrates here holds out of an ordered whole,
supportive of virtue, has drawn the attention of many commentators, some
of whom place considerable weight on this passage. See, e.g., Friedlander,
Plato, 2:269; Jaeger, Paideia, 2:1467; Voegelin, Plato, 3637; Kahn, Drama
and Dialectic in Platos Gorgias, 96, 119; Newell, Ruling Passion, 32, 38.
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the happiness they deserve, Socrates speech here in praise of virtue

can be seen as an effort to help Callicles by assuaging his doubts. We
see Socrates here in the role of an exhorter, punisher, and helper. Or,
to use an earlier analogy that will reappear before the conversation
is finished, Socrates seems to be acting like a doctor giving Callicles
soul the medicine that it needs. But does that mean that we should
accept what Socrates says in his account of virtue also as an expression of his own deepest views? A number of difficulties stand in the
way of drawing that conclusion. First, Socrates has not given a completely sound defense of virtue. In fact, his speech, by moving from
an (unconventional) understanding of virtue as a kind of wise moderation to a (more conventional) understanding of it as justice and
moderation, even raises a troubling question about the unity of virtue
and the harmony between wisdom and justice. To be sure, the surface
of Socrates speech affirms the unity of virtue and the harmony of its
parts. But that surface is not supported by an adequate argument.16
Perhaps as an acknowledgment of this, immediately after delivering
his speech, Socrates presents its results in a way that quietly undercuts
the conviction with which he seemed to be speaking: Either this argument [logos], then, must be refuted by us by showing that it is not
by the possession of justice and moderation that the happy are happy,
and by the possession of vice that the miserable are miserable or else,
if this argument is true, we must consider what follows (508a8b3).
Why does Socrates hold out, even if only as one of two alternatives,
the possibility of a refutation of his argument?
Since Socrates goes on at once to connect his defense of virtue
with the Socratic thesis about justice that he has been defending since
the beginning of his discussion with Polus, it may seem mistaken to
raise doubts about his conviction (see 508b3e6). But after referring
back to the Socratic thesis, Socrates then goes on to speak directly
16. Compare the similar objection of Irwin, Platos Moral Theory, 1256, 12930.
Irwins critical analysis should be contrasted with Friedlander,
Plato, 2:269;
Jaeger, Paideia, 2:146; Voegelin, Plato, 36.
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about that thesis, and what he says forces us to confront an even

more far-reaching question about the true character of his views. For
Socrates says unobtrusively but clearly that even his defense of the
Socratic thesis should be understood, not as a defense of a view that
he knows to be true, but only as a defense of a view that no one he
encounters can deny without becoming ridiculous. Speaking of that
thesis, he says to Callicles:
These things that came to sight for us up there in the earlier speeches,
are, as I say, held down and bound if I may put it in a rather rude way
by iron and adamantine arguments [logois], as it would seem at any rate.
And if you or someone younger than you does not loosen them, it will
be impossible for anyone saying something different from what Im now
saying to speak nobly. For to me at least, the speech [logos] is always the
same that I do not know how these things stand, but of those I meet up
with, as now, no one who says something different is able to avoid being
ridiculous. (508e6509a7)
In this statement, Socrates suggests that in defending the Socratic

thesis he is giving voice to a view that has greater power in peoples
souls than many realize. But he stops short of affirming that he himself is convinced of the truth of this view, and he even suggests that
the iron and adamantine arguments holding this view in place, as
it would seem at any rate, might be loosened by Callicles or by someone younger than him (see also 506a15, 508a8b3). We should be
reminded in this connection of another important statement that we
considered earlier in which Socrates made a similar suggestion. For
Socrates virtually began his exchange with Callicles by telling him that
he will never attain consistency that he will go through life in disagreement with himself unless he refutes the Socratic thesis (see
again 482a4b6). The most surprising aspect of that statement, especially since it came immediately after Socrates defense of the Socratic
thesis in the Polus section, is one that I did not call attention to earlier:
Wouldnt one have expected Socrates to say that Callicles must accept
the Socratic thesis as the only way to achieve genuine consistency?
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Does Socrates mean to indicate that he thinks this view is refutable?

To be sure, his statements suggest that a refutation of this view would
be far more difficult than people like Callicles think. In fact, it would
be so difficult that Socrates is able to claim never to have encountered anyone who was able to avoid becoming ridiculous when arguing against the Socratic thesis. But does the great difficulty of refuting
this view amount to an impossibility? Would it be possible for someone of sufficient strength to achieve consistency by loosening the iron
and adamantine bonds?17
SOCRATES SITUATION, THE QUESTION OF ASSIMILATION,

AND THE ISSUE OF SELF-PROTECTION (508c4513d1)
Whatever indications Socrates gives that he may have doubts about

the position he is defending, they do not prevent him from urging
17. On this last question, consider Socrates statement about himself at 482b7
c3 in light of his preceding remark about Callicles. On the general question
of this paragraph, while Socrates statements that he does not know whether
the Socratic thesis is true are sometimes noted by other commentators, these
statements are usually not taken very seriously. See, for instance, Jaegers
claim, after noting what looks like the logical indecision of [Socrates] conversations, that nonetheless there glows the relentless moral conviction of
his life, sure of its ultimate aim, and therefore possessing that hotly sought
for knowledge which renders any faltering of will impossible (Paideia,
2:150; see also 1467). Or consider Kahns claim: There is no doubt that
Socrates regards the doctrine of the paradoxes as established by the refutations of Polus and Callicles (Drama and Dialectic in Platos Gorgias, 110,
the emphasis is Kahns; see also 11113, 11819; in his quotation on page
111 of Socrates crucial statement at 508e6509a7, Kahn omits Socrates
claim that he does not know whether his thesis is true). Similar to Kahns
insistence that there is no doubt that Socrates thinks his thesis has been
established is McKims insistence that Socrates of course believes in the
position he defends, a position whose truth, according to McKim, is beyond
argument (see Shame and Truth in Platos Gorgias, 47, 48; see also 3946).
Consider also Vlastos, Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher, 45, 21432;
Brickhouse and Smith, Platos Socrates, 3041, 1278. Somewhat closer to
my own analysis is Kastely, In Defense of Platos Gorgias, 97.
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Socrates Situation, Assimilation, and Self-Protection
15:37
141
Callicles to reconsider his criticism of Socrates own life in light of that

position (see 508c45: These things being so, let us examine what it
is for which you reproach me . . .; see also the transition at 509b1
5). This makes sense, since, as Socrates insists, absent a refutation
of the Socratic thesis, consistency demands a consideration of the
conclusions that follow from it (see 508a8c3). The conclusions that
Socrates urges Callicles to consider concern whether he was right to
blame Socrates for his inability to defend himself and his friends and
family (508c5d4). Now, before we turn to Socrates response to this
reproach, we should take a moment to remember that this was not all
there was to Callicles criticism of Socrates. To simplify somewhat for
the sake of clarity, Callicles attacked the Socratic life not only for being
defenseless or weak but also for being useless and even worthless due
to its neglect of the affairs of the city.18 It is true that Callicles did
not draw a clear distinction between these two criticisms, which may
not have been entirely separate in his mind. Nevertheless, we should
notice that, by focusing only on the question of his defenselessness,
Socrates makes it easier to present his own life as one that conforms
to the Socratic thesis.19
According to Socrates restatement of Callicles criticism, it is
shameful indeed the most shameful of all things (see 508d4) to be
incapable of defending oneself.20 Since Callicles criticism, especially
when stated in this way, expresses a concern with shamefulness and
nobility, Socrates is able to make that his theme and to raise the stakes,
so to speak, by asking what kind of incapacity is truly the most shameful. It is to address this question that Socrates now relies on the view
that he has been defending throughout the dialogue. He argues that
the shamefulness of different incapacities must be measured by the
18. Compare Republic 487b1d5.
19. It is worth noticing the absence of any mention of the city in Socrates
restatement of Callicles criticism at 508c58. Also, it is worth mentioning
in advance that Socrates will drop the issue of family and friends as he goes
on to focus exclusively on self-protection.
20. Compare Apology 28b35.
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magnitude of the harm they leave one unable to ward off (509b1c3).
By this principle, whenever one is forced to accept one incapacity as
the price of avoiding another, the nobler choice would be to avoid suffering the greatest harm. And the greatest harm, Socrates once again
claims, is doing injustice rather than suffering it (509c67). Of course,
one would wish to be able to avoid both doing injustice and suffering
it. But this wish, according to Socrates, must remain a mere wish,
since one can develop the capacity to avoid one of these evils only by
leaving oneself vulnerable to the other.21
Socrates develops his argument by focusing initially on the capacity
whose importance Callicles is far more willing to grant: the capacity
to avoid suffering injustice. Callicles shows little interest in Socrates
suggestion that it might be necessary to develop a certain capacity and
art to avoid doing injustice, a capacity and art that would enable one
to fulfill what Socrates claims is everyones wish never to do injustice.
Callicles is much more receptive to Socrates suggestion that the art
that enables one to suffer no injustice or as little as possible consists
either in ruling in the city perhaps even becoming a tyrant or in
making oneself a comrade of the regime in power (compare 509d7
510a5 with 510a6b1). Socrates is able to use Callicles eager embrace
of this suggestion, however, to lay out an argument that emphasizes
the divide between the path one must follow to protect oneself from
suffering injustice and the path that keeps one from doing injustice.
Dropping the possibility that one might rule the city oneself, Socrates
concentrates on what it takes to gain the favor of the regime in power.
According to Socrates, the ancient and wise principle of attraction
like to like governs, especially since tyrants fear their superiors
and despise their inferiors. True friendship to any regime, including
a tyranny, requires that one assimilate to the regime by giving oneself the same character as the regime, by praising and blaming the
same things, and by submitting to those in power (510b2d9). Socrates
21. The word dunamin, which I translate as capacity, also carries the sense of
power.
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143
presents this as a line of reflection that might occupy the mind of a

young man deliberating about how he might become powerful enough
to avoid ever suffering an injustice (see 510d49). And Callicles, for his
part, agrees with each step of the argument, giving far more positive
responses than he has for some time. Callicles may even see in this
argument an articulation of a line of thought that has played a role in
his own life without his being fully conscious of it.
But having held out to Callicles this vision of a path to security
from suffering injustice, Socrates then pulls the rug out from under
him by turning back to the question of doing injustice oneself. He
argues that at least in cities in which the regime in power is unjust,
assimilation means assimilation to injustice, and it also provides one
with the power to get away with ones injustices (510e48). Now, it
may be surprising or perhaps it should not be by this point that
Callicles reaction to this turn in the argument is not simply to dismiss the problem Socrates raises. Even before Socrates goes on to
claim that imitating a despot entails maiming ones soul and taking
into it the greatest of evils, Callicles shows that he is bothered by the
prospect of becoming unjust by imitating an unjust regime (see it
appears at 510e9). Callicles would like to have it both ways. That is,
he would like for the path to security from suffering injustice also to
allow one to remain just. But Socrates argument splits apart these
two ends that he would like to keep together. Callicles reaction initially makes it difficult to see the complexity of his concerns: I dont
know how you turn the arguments up and down each time, Socrates.
Or dont you know that this man who imitates [an unjust regime] will
kill that one who doesnt imitate, if he wishes, and take away his possessions? (511a47). Despite first appearances, however, Callicles is
not simply on the side of the unjust assimilator against the just man
who refuses to assimilate. The complexity of his concerns comes out
in his response to Socrates reminder that the scenario he speaks of
would involve a base man killing one who is noble and good (511b15).
Callicles exclaims in return, Isnt that exactly the infuriating thing?
(511b6).
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This important response, which we considered in an earlier context, shows that Callicles is far from indifferent to the fate of the
virtuous. Of his many revealing responses to Socrates arguments,
none reveals more clearly his continued attachment to justice.22 But
Callicles response, as I suggested earlier, can also help us to understand what leads him down paths that promise to solve or to remove
the problem that troubles him. We considered earlier the paths down
which Callicles is led in his thought to assert, for instance, a right
of the stronger that would remove any gap between virtue and success, and even to come to the defense of hedonism. But the present
section can help us to see more clearly the solution to which Callicles
clings in practice. That solution is to assimilate to a powerful regime
which, even if its justice may be questionable, holds out the promise
that it is possible to be virtuous without being left too vulnerable. In
Callicles own life, this means allegiance to Athens and to the regime
that rules there. And that can help to explain why, despite his willingness in his most radical moments to criticize the Athenian regime,
his deepest admiration is reserved for the men whom he regards as
the greatest servants of his city. By assimilating himself to Athens and
submitting to its authority, while burying any doubts about the justice
of the Athenian regime that may continue to trouble him, Callicles has
found a solution that would seem to shield him from the anger and
pain that he would have to confront if he embraced a purer notion of
virtue that left the good more exposed to suffering at the hands of the
wicked. As Callicles expression of indignation indicates, however, this
solution does not fully solve the problem. Callicles anger is a sign
that he remains troubled by lingering doubts and pains that he would
rather Socrates not stir up.
Since Callicles response Isnt that exactly the infuriating thing?
betrays a continued concern for justice, Socrates is justified in urging
22. Even Shorey, who presents Callicles as the uncompromising immoralist,

grants that we see Callicles here perhaps momentarily falling out of [that]
role (What Plato Said, 149).
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145
Callicles to listen to that concern and not to bury or distort it as he

has been led to do. In other words, Socrates has a certain right to
take a step that is in another respect unfair to Callicles views: he acts
as if Callicles eagerness to embrace the principle of assimilation is
driven entirely by a concern for safety from danger and by a desire
to live as long as possible. Socrates acts as if these concerns are also
the true source of Callicles exhortation of him to practice the kind
of rhetoric that provides one with safety in law courts (511b7c2).
Yet Callicles never, in so many words, gave such advice. Socrates is
characterizing a position that is motivated in large part by a concern
to have the power to fight for what is right especially but not only in
ones own case as if it were driven merely by a cowardly concern for
safety.23
By characterizing Callicles position in this way, Socrates is able to
compare the art of courtroom rhetoric, which he prompts Callicles
to defend (see 511c3), with other saving arts and thereby to diminish its nobility. The arts with which Socrates compares rhetoric are
swimming, ship-piloting, and engineering, all of which save people
from dangers. The spirit of Socrates argument about these saving
arts comes out most clearly in his discussion of ship-piloting, which
receives the longest treatment of the three arts Socrates discusses.
Although the ship-pilot saves people and their possessions from the
greatest dangers, he is kept humble, according to Socrates, by his
awareness that he cannot be sure which of the people sailing with him
he benefits when he keeps them from being drowned. The pilot knows,
Socrates says, that he does not improve the souls of those on his ship,
and he is aware that it is not better for a wretched human being to live,
since he necessarily lives badly (511d1512b2). In the outlook of this
imaginary ship-pilot, we can see a reflection of Socrates demotion of
the concern for mere life. And by pressing such an extreme view of the
lowness of the concern for mere life after having reduced Callicles
position to a concern for mere life Socrates is able to attack the
lofty view that Callicles takes of courtroom rhetoric. The rhetorician
23. Compare Apology 28b39.
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is left without any grounds for his disdain for what he regards as
the lowly arts of his inferiors. Any notion that there is a difference
between rhetoric and the other saving arts or at any rate one that
reflects well on rhetoric is made to appear as unjustified snobbery
on the part of the rhetorician and his advocates such as Callicles (see
512b3d6).
But the main point of this argument is not to chastise Callicles for
his snobbery. Rather, it is to exhort him to embrace a notion of virtue
that does not give so much weight to protection:
Consider, you blessed man, whether the noble and the good are really
nothing more than saving and being saved. For the true man, at least,
must give up his concern to live for some specific length of time, and he
must not cling to life. Instead, turning over what concerns such things to
the god and trusting in the womens saying that no one can escape his fate,
he must examine what lies beyond that: In what way may he who is going
to live for a time live best? Will it be by assimilating himself to that regime
in which he lives, and should you, then, now become as similar as possible
to the Athenian demos, if you are going to be dear to it and to have great
power in the city? Consider whether this is profitable for you and for me,
so that, you demonic man, we shall not suffer what they say the Thessalian
women who draw down the moon suffer: our choice of this power in the
city will come at the cost of what is dearest to us. (512d6513a7)
After this statement, Socrates continues his exhortation of Callicles to

abandon the path of assimilation by stressing the impossibility of gaining power through merely partial assimilation (513a7c2). Concluding by addressing Callicles with the odd but intimate appellation dear
head, he presents his exhortation as a friendly attempt to urge Callicles to reevaluate the way he looks at both his own life and Socrates
life.
Socrates exhortation is not without an impact on Callicles. In a
moment in which he displays none of his usual bitterness, Callicles replies with an honest and even poignant line: In some way, I
dont know what, Socrates, you seem to me to speak well, but I suffer the experience of the many I am not altogether persuaded by
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147
you (513c46).24 That Callicles is moved by Socrates exhortation is

understandable in light of the concern for justice and nobility that we
have seen in him. That he is not altogether persuaded is explained
by Socrates: The love of the demos, Callicles, which is in your soul,
opposes me (513c78). What Socrates means by this striking remark
is hard to say. But the remark is probably best understood by considering how Callicles has chosen to live his life and the effects of that
choice. In their discussion of assimilation, Socrates and Callicles are
speaking less about a future decision confronting Callicles though
Socrates at times presents it that way than about a road Callicles has
already traveled. Although his life has been shaped by concerns more
complicated than a simple desire for protection, Callicles has assimilated to the regime in power, which in Athens means the Athenian
demos. And despite his occasional expressions of contempt for the
Athenian demos, his greatest aspiration is still to follow in the footsteps of those Athenian statesmen who he thinks served the Athenian
demos well. Callicles has thus, without being fully aware of it, formed
an attachment to the demos that can even be characterized as a form of
love. Yet, while this attachment cannot be understood without seeing
its connection to Callicles attachment to justice and his struggle with
the problem of the vulnerability of virtue, it has nevertheless become
a further obstacle to his willingness to embrace any understanding of
virtue that would challenge and threaten his love.25
24. Contrast the suggestion of Benardete, The Rhetoric of Morality and Philosophy, 93, that Callicles praises Socrates speech, but his feelings are
not behind it. This suggestion, in my view, misjudges the tone of Callicles response and the dramatic significance of this moment in the
dialogue.
25. Socrates statement about Callicles love of the demos poses a problem
for those commentators who portray Callicles as an aristocrat who simply despises the Athenian people. See, for instance, Barker, Greek Political
Theory, 7172; Romilly, The Great Sophists in Periclean Athens, 120, 158
61; Dodds, Gorgias, 1314; Kastely, In Defense of Platos Gorgias, 1012.
Of these commentators, only Dodds mentions Socrates statement; and he
attempts to explain it away with the remark that Callicles love of the demos
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As for Socrates himself whose life is also a subject of this section

(see 509c4d4, 511b7c2, 513a37) he appears here as a noble and
heroic figure who looks down with disdain on the concern for mere
self-protection.26 But are we to conclude that we finally have in this
section a straightforward expression of Socrates own convictions? Is
the view to which he exhorts Callicles also the basis of his own life?
Certainly, Socrates life cannot be regarded as a model of assimilation.
And certainly, too, Socrates did not consider safety at all costs to be
the guiding principle of a good life. As his own account of his life in
the Apology attests, he ran considerable risks in the way he lived his
life.27 Yet, as his account in the Apology also attests, Socrates was not
as disparaging of the concern for self-protection as he sometimes suggests.28 And in the present section of the Gorgias, there are reasons to
hesitate in taking what Socrates says as his last word. Perhaps most
important, Socrates urges Callicles, in delivering the statement that
is the heart of his exhortation, to put his faith in the god and in a
piece of old wives folk wisdom (see again 512e24).29 Are we to think
that these are the soundest sources of guidance in Socrates eyes? Or
rather, should our earlier doubts about Socrates own acceptance of the
Socratic thesis also lead us to doubt that he truly takes self-protection
26.
27.
28.
29.
is in fact love of power (352). For a more balanced account, see Newell,
Ruling Passion, 1213, 3537.
Kahn, Drama and Dialectic in Platos Gorgias, 96, is moved by this section
to speak of Socrates fearlessly risking and finally giving up his life in the
cause of justice and loyalty to moral principle. He argues: The dialectical
invulnerability to contradiction which Socrates claims for his basic thesis
that arete is what we really want, our true good and happiness is matched
by the dramatic appeal of the portrait of Socrates as the embodiment of this
very thesis (113). For similar expressions of admiration of Socrates as he
portrays himself in this section, see Friedlander,
Plato, 2:2701, and Jaeger,

Paideia, 2:1478.
See, e.g., Apology 23b724b2, 28d629a1, 37c4e2.
Compare Apology 28b530c1 with 32e233a1; see also 31c432c3.
Cf. Brisson, Plato the Myth Maker, 57.
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Callicles Heroes, True Rhetoric, and Socrates True Political Art
149
as lightly as he seems to here? Connected with this question, it is also

worth wondering whether Socrates present condemnation of forensic
rhetoric is really as thoroughgoing a condemnation as its tone makes
it seem. If we do not allow ourselves to be swept away by its harsh
tone, doesnt Socrates argument lead to the suggestion that forensic
rhetoric should be regarded as low but necessary? To be sure, Socrates
suggests that virtue is a higher consideration than the mere protection
of life and thus that there is nothing exalted about those arts that protect life. But his argument allows that life should carry some weight,
at least for those who are virtuous and have good lives to lose. This
may help to explain why Socrates is willing to refer to the arts that
protect life as genuine arts.
CALLICLES AND HIS HEROES, TRUE RHETORIC, AND

SOCRATES TRUE POLITICAL ART (513d1522c3)
To the extent that the preceding section of the dialogue offered a portrait of Socrates life, which was at least one of its aims, that life came
to sight as one opposed to assimilation and guided by a concern to live
well rather than to live long. Whatever may be the advantages of such
a presentation, it makes the philosophic life appear as a life at odds
with the city. And for this reason it would meet with at least some
resistance from those who place great weight on service to the city,
as it did from Callicles. In this connection, it is worth recalling that
Socrates has taken up only part of Callicles charge against philosophy:
the reproach of vulnerability rather than that of uselessness. Socrates
never explicitly addresses the latter part of the charge. But he may
address it implicitly. The section of the dialogue to which we have
now come will culminate in Socrates famous claim that he practices
the true political art. We will have to consider, however, the precise
meaning of that claim, and to see whether the true purpose of this
section is to show that, when each is seen in the proper light, there is
a harmony between philosophy and the city.
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The new section is actually a return to an earlier line of argument.

Socrates returns to the division between pursuits that aim to gratify by
providing pleasure and those that struggle toward the best (513d4
5). He does so in order to prepare his return to his critique of Callicles
heroes, or to recover a line of argument that temporarily disappeared
behind his account of virtue and his exhortation of Callicles to place
virtue before protection. That Socrates is returning to an earlier line
of argument is brought out most clearly by his reliance on earlier
agreements (see, e.g., 513d18, 513e5514a3). But it also can be seen
in his movement away from the question of how best to preserve the
purity of ones own soul and back to the question of the proper task of
politics. Socrates suggests, once again, that the task of politics should
be the improvement of ones fellow citizens. It is in light of this task
that Socrates will now pass judgment on Callicles heroes.
Before he does so, however, Socrates directs an attack at Callicles
himself. Socrates attack on Callicles takes the form of a test that
Socrates proposes. In the arts, he points out, no one would undertake grand public tasks before practicing in private and displaying his
mastery on that smaller scale. Any competent artisan, before undertaking public projects, should be able to point to many private accomplishments, be they buildings constructed or sick bodies made healthy
(514a5e10). The same principle should apply to political expertise.
That is, anyone intending to enter politics should be able, according to Socrates, to point to individual citizens whose souls he has
improved. Socrates therefore applies the test to the politically ambitious Callicles: Shall we not examine each other? Come then: Has
Callicles already made anyone of the citizens better? Is there anyone
who was previously base unjust, intemperate, and imprudent but
then, through Callicles, became noble and good, whether he be a foreigner or a townsman, slave or free? (515a47). Just as an architect
could display the private houses he has designed, Callicles, if he is
truly qualified to enter politics, should be able to point to souls that
he has transformed in private life. But this is of course something that
Callicles must admit he cannot do (515a7b5).
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151
Socrates argument here suggests that the public realm, or the city
as city, is higher and more important than the private realm in which
people are treated as individuals: the latter appears as a mere training
ground for the former. Yet Socrates argument also should lead us
to ask whether equivalent things can be accomplished in each realm.
Might it not be the case, especially when it comes to improving peoples
souls, that narrower but deeper results can be achieved in private? If
the main purpose of Socrates present argument is to pour cold water
on Callicles political ambitions, his argument also points to a certain
question. This is a question that arose earlier in another form, when
Socrates raised the issue of the size of public audiences and of what
can truly be accomplished by public speech (see again 454c7455a7).
By making another argument that leads us to reflect on the same issue,
Socrates may be urging his audience to keep that issue in mind during
his present treatment of Callicles and his heroes. Also, we should bear
in mind that it is not only the political ambitions of Callicles and the
political activity of his heroes that are at issue, but also the political
activity or lack thereof of Socrates himself. On this point, it is
worth noticing that Socrates does not apply to himself the test that he
applies to Callicles, although he leads us to think for a moment that
he is about to do so (see 514a5b3, 515a14). By pointing to such a
step and then backing away from it, Socrates makes us wonder how
he would be judged. In his case, however, the troubling prospect is
not so much that he himself might fail the test that Callicles fails.
Rather, it is closer to the opposite: if Socrates could pass the test by
pointing to souls that he has improved in private, the question would
then arise of why he has not taken the further step of using his abilities
in public life.30 This is a question that Socrates will eventually allow
to come to the surface and address explicitly. Before that moment
comes, however, he may supply some less conspicuous indications of
considerations that should affect how we receive his explicit answer.
30. Compare Apology 31c47.
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However this may be, Socrates testing of Callicles is only a brief

prelude to his longer and more important critique of Callicles heroes
Pericles, Cimon, Miltiades, and Themistocles. It makes sense that
Socrates should turn to these heroes, since the failings of Callicles himself hardly settle the issue of the character of political excellence and
who its true exemplars are. Socrates prepares his critique of Callicles
heroes by reasserting that the true task of politics is to make the citizens better. Indeed, according to Socrates, making the citizens better
should be the only concern of a political man (see 515b8c3). But what
exactly does Socrates mean by making the citizens better? What sort
of virtue should political men try to instill?
Socrates trains his sights first and foremost on Pericles, the greatest
leader of imperial Athens and the leader Callicles most admires. The
issue Socrates raises is whether the Athenians were better when Pericles ended his career than when he first came to power. Callicles predictably comes to the defense of Pericles against Socrates, who seems
to take the side of the traditionalists who claim that Pericles brought
about a decline in Athenian virtue.31 After repeating the reproaches
of Pericles that he has heard from others, Socrates then speaks in
his own name about Pericles career. Early in his career, according to
Socrates, Pericles enjoyed a great reputation among the Athenians. But
near the end of his life after he had supposedly made the Athenians
noble and good he was accused of theft and almost put to death
31. To Socrates claim that he has heard the charge that Pericles made the
Athenians lazy, cowardly, overly talkative, and greedy, Callicles responds that
Socrates must have been listening to those with cauliflower ears (515e4
9, following Doddss suggested translation). This odd expression refers to
those traditionalists in Athens who retained Spartan tastes for simplicity, and for manly activities such as boxing and wrestling (thus the crushed
or cauliflower ears) and who were critical of the Periclean movement
toward luxury and the liberation of desire. For a colorful depiction of this
political divide, see the dispute between the Just Speech and the Unjust
Speech in Aristophanes Clouds. See also Protagoras 342b6c3; Kagan, The
Great Dialogue, 75, 131; Seung, Plato Rediscovered, 67; Benardete, The
Rhetoric of Morality and Philosophy, 95.
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(515e10516a4). Leaving out any mention of Pericles later restoration

to office, and ignoring the circumstances, including a terrible plague,
that contributed to his troubles,32 Socrates compares Pericles to a
caretaker of animals whose flock or herd has become wilder and more
unruly, even toward the caretaker himself (516a5d3). Socrates then
extends this comparison to include Callicles other heroes: Cimon was
ostracized by the Athenians; Themistocles was ostracized and exiled;
and Miltiades was almost thrown into the pit by the Athenians (516d5
e2). And yet, these men, Socrates tells Callicles, if they were good
men, as you claim, would never have suffered these things. It cannot
be that good charioteers in the beginning do not fall from their chariots, but that when they have trained their horses and have themselves
become better charioteers, they then fall out (516e36).
Socrates argument here hardly seems fair or sufficient to justify the
conclusion that Pericles, Cimon, Themistocles, and Miltiades were not
good men. The very short account that Socrates gives of the careers of
Callicles heroes omits much relevant and exculpatory information.33
Furthermore, the standard by which Socrates judges these careers to
be failures would seem to be unreasonable. His argument does not
32. Cf. Thucydides 2.4765.

33. Socrates says very little about the achievements of Callicles heroes, without
which Athens would never have risen to prominence and power, or perhaps even have survived. He also speaks of the troubles of these men without discussing the complex wartime circumstances that contributed to the
sometimes unpopular measures they took. For instance, without mentioning the great victories that Miltiades and Cimon won for Athens against the
Persians, Socrates focuses only on subsequent difficulties they faced, and he
exaggerates the Athenian hostility to them. He does not mention that Cimon
was recalled from his exile by the Athenians before he had been gone the
normal ten years, or that Miltiades was merely fined fifty talents. Irwin, Gorgias, 235, calls Socrates account a perversion of the historical conditions
as far as we know them; Dodds, Gorgias, 3559, also stresses that Socrates
account is highly selective and designed to put the conduct of the Athenians
in the worst possible light. See also the helpful discussion of Seung, Plato
Rediscovered, 25.
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take account of the role fortune plays in political affairs. Nor does it
acknowledge the limits of human nature, which restrict the improvement that any political leader can achieve in his efforts to reshape the
human beings under his rule. Or does Socrates show some recognition of the limits of what can be achieved in politics by restricting the
improvement of which he speaks to the instilling of a kind of justice
that seems to consist in mere gentleness (consider 516b7c4)? Does
Socrates use of the analogy of the taming of animals by caretakers
and charioteers suggest that the civilizing effect of good political rule
is not so different from a kind of taming?
If Socrates restriction of the virtue achievable in politics to mere
gentleness suggests that his argument is not simply unrealistic but
blends idealism and realism in a complex mixture, the same can be
said of the remarkable conclusion of his argument. In fact, the most
important and surprising thing about the argument is how Socrates
ends it:
So the earlier arguments [logoi] were true, as it seems that we know
of no one in this city who has become a good man in political matters.
You [Callicles] agree that there is no one among the current figures, and
from among the earlier ones, you pick out these men. But they have been
shown to be about equal to the current ones, so that, if these men were
rhetoricians, they used neither true rhetoric for then they would not have
fallen nor the flattering kind. (516e9517a6)
Several things are important and surprising in this conclusion, especially what Socrates says in the last few lines. For one thing, Socrates
indicates here that his deepest criticism of Callicles heroes is not that
they were flatterers. He even denies that they practiced the flattering kind of rhetoric. Yet that is puzzling, since surely some of them
Pericles, in particular practiced the kind of rhetoric that Socrates earlier described as flattery.34 What, then, does Socrates have in mind by
34. Socrates will later refer to the characteristic activity of Callicles heroes as
flattery. See 521b1.
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denying that they were flatterers? He would seem to be pointing here

to a kind of flattery different from that characteristic of the rhetoric
that he criticized earlier in the dialogue, a kind for which he does
not show the same disdain. Socrates apparent openness here to some
form of flattery should also help us to notice that he is no longer
denigrating the concern for self-protection either. Without according
self-protection some importance, Socrates argument would not make
sense, since he is stressing the trouble that Callicles heroes brought
upon themselves. And Socrates goes beyond even what his argument
would require to suggest that self-protection is the end or at least one
of the ends of true rhetoric, the practice of which, he says, would
have kept Callicles heroes from falling. In fact, in a formulation so
jarring that some editors wish to emend the text to do away with it,
Socrates suggests that true rhetoric shares at least one end with the
rhetoric that operates through flattery: both true rhetoric and the flattering kind should keep their practitioners from falling.35 If we put
this suggestion together with Socrates indications about the proper
aim of good statesmen, the fuller suggestion that emerges is that true
rhetoric aims at taming the citizens or making them gentler, and that
at least one reason for doing so is to provide safety for its practitioners. This suggestion represents an important acknowledgment of the
importance of self-protection, and it also acknowledges the usefulness
of a kind of rhetoric that can serve that end, perhaps even by drawing
on a form of flattery. We are thus led to ask: Is the true purpose of the
present section which would otherwise seem a blatantly unfair criticism of four impressive political figures to advance Socrates effort
to sketch out the case for a certain kind of rhetoric?
That we are seeing here any restoration or rehabilitation of rhetoric
would seem to be belied by Socrates repetition of the schema he used
35. This suggestion would be lost if one followed Meisers suggestion to fill a supposed lacuna before te kolakike at 517a6. For a discussion of this suggestion,
see Dodds, Gorgias, 360. Dodds himself is tempted by Meisers suggestion,
but he does not follow it.
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earlier to criticize rhetoric. Socrates repeats this schema in a long

speech that he delivers in response to Callicles renewed protest on
behalf of his heroes (see 517a7b1). Yet, although Socrates introduces
his repetition of this schema as if he were annoyed by the tediousness
of having to return to a point that should have been clear by now
the whole time we have been talking, we havent stopped always being
brought back around to the same thing (517c56) he in fact makes
some significant changes in the schema.
The schema in question, of course, is the one that divides pursuits
that pertain to the soul from those that pertain to the body, and then
further subdivides each of these into good and bad pursuits. Socrates
present version of this schema differs from his earlier one in the first
place by identifying the bad pursuits not so much by their deceptive use of flattery as by their skill at serving desires (see 517c7d5).
Since the desires that Socrates mentions, however, are for such things
as food, drink, and clothing that is, for things that address important human needs it becomes unclear just how much he is really
condemning such pursuits.36 To be sure, pursuits such as cooking,
shoemaking, weaving, and their equivalents in serving the desires of
the soul can be given too much emphasis; they can come to appear
as the highest or sole forms of care for the body or the soul (517d6
518a1). But Socrates point is not that there is no good place for such
pursuits. Rather, he argues that they are rightly subordinate to master
arts that know what is good for the body or the soul (518a17). If this
argument implies the lowness of the serving arts, it also implies or
acknowledges their necessity.37 And thus we should not be surprised
that Socrates now openly refers to them as arts something he refused
to do when first presenting his schema (compare 517e47 with 464e2
465a6). Such arts may be slavish, servile, and unfree, but they are
still arts (see 518a13). They have a place in Socrates vision of the
36. Notable for its absence from Socrates list is his earlier example of cosmetics.
37. See Kastely, In Defense of Platos Gorgias, 104. Kastely also stresses the
broader movement in this passage towards a greater openness to rhetoric.
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proper hierarchy, in which the serving arts would act as assistants to

the master art or set of arts that directs them (518a35). Applying this
suggestion to rhetoric, as Socrates urges us to do (see 518a56), the
criticism of rhetoric that emerges is a criticism only of its tendency to
break out of this order and to claim to be autonomous or sovereign.
Properly directed, rhetoric would seem to accomplish something valuable and even necessary. It is true that a form of rhetoric that would
accept such guidance would be different from rhetoric as it is usually
practiced.38 Perhaps, then, it is best to take Socrates suggestion as a
kind of proposal of a better order, or as a proposal of an alliance of
sorts between rhetoric and the master art that knows what is good for
the soul. Socrates does not say much about the character of the master
art that would be the superior partner in such an alliance. His primary
aim at this point seems to be simply to indicate that rhetoric has an
important, if subordinate, role to play.
If Socrates is rehabilitating rhetoric, however, he is embedding that
rehabilitation in a continuing critique of Callicles heroes, who are
presented as servants who have taken as their master art, not the art
that knows the good of the soul, but the most destructive desires of the
citizens. Socrates presents especially the heroes of imperial Athens as
men who feasted the city sumptuously on the things it desired, leaving it swollen and festering with hidden sores (518b2519a7).39 The
sins of the fathers of Athenian imperialism, Socrates predicts, will be
blamed on the sons, since the evils set in motion by men like Themistocles, Cimon, and Pericles will become manifest in the generation
that includes Alcibiades and Callicles himself (see especially 519a7
b2). After issuing a warning to Callicles that his generation is in particular danger, Socrates then makes a strange transition to register a
38. Cf. Black, Platos View of Rhetoric, 366.

39. Socrates emphasis here on Athenian imperialism is underscored by his
exemption of Miltiades from his present criticism (see 519a56). Unlike
Callicles other heroes, who each played a role in the rise of the Athenian
empire, Miltiades belonged to an earlier, pre-imperial generation.
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complaint about all political men, past and present. On the heels of a
suggestion that would seem to suggest that the blame likely to come
to the current generation of Athenian leaders is misplaced, Socrates
says that it is ridiculous of political leaders to complain, as they often
do, that they are mistreated by the city they have served. Such men
claim that they are unjustly treated by the very city for which they
have done so much good. But the whole business is a lie, Socrates
argues, for no leader of a city would ever be unjustly brought down
by the very same city that he leads (519b8c2). The complaint of
indignant political leaders, according to Socrates, resembles that of
the sophists, who claim to be teachers of virtue only to turn around
and complain when they are mistreated by their students. Neither
political leaders nor sophists can accuse their students of mistreating them without thereby undercutting their claims to be teachers of
virtue (519c2520b8).
Socrates line of argument here includes a serious critique of Athenian imperialism, especially of those leaders such as Pericles who created or at least exacerbated a feverish sickness in Athens by inflaming the passions of the Athenians. To this extent, Socrates argument may be regarded as a genuine, if very brief and blunt, criticism of the politics that fueled Athens rise to great power and set
it up for a fall.40 Nevertheless, it is hard to swallow his claim that
the complaints of all mistreated political leaders are the height of
irrationality (see especially 519b34, d15). The standards to which
40. On Socrates critique of Athenian imperialism, see Seung, Plato Rediscovered, 24; Saxonhouse, An Unspoken Theme in Platos Gorgias, 1657;
Dodds, Gorgias, 3233; Nichols, The Rhetoric of Justice in Platos Gorgias,
1467; Villa, Socratic Citizenship, 34. Socrates critique of Pericles in particular should be compared with the much fuller and subtler critique found
in Thucydides. Consider, for instance, Thucydides assessment of Pericles
(2.65) in light of his account of Pericles career. That Socrates harsh criticism of Pericles in the Gorgias is not his last word on the matter is confirmed
by Meno 93a294b8.
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he is holding political leaders in general and Callicles heroes in particular have become even more extreme than they were earlier. To
accept Socrates argument, one would have to believe not only that
education to virtue is possible but also that it is foolproof, and that
political leaders can provide the entire populace of a city with an education comparable to the education provided to private individuals by
the sophists. What is the purpose of this attack on political leaders,
the most fundamental premise of which namely, that it is possible
to make others good Socrates himself admits is questionable (see
520d67)? 41
The very extremism of Socrates attack may be intended, in part,
to make us question whether that attack is really sound and thus to
consider whether political leadership can reasonably be expected to
accomplish what Socrates demands of it here. That is, by pushing his
argument to such an extreme, Socrates may mean to raise doubts in at
least some minds about the position he seems to be defending. To focus
on a specific issue just raised by Socrates analogy between political
leaders and sophists: Can political activity, while broader in scope than
sophistry, have as profound an effect on its students as private educational efforts? Or has Socrates gone out of his way to compare political
leaders with sophists and to point to a difference even as he obscures
it (see 520a3b3) as a way of encouraging reflection on the limits to
41. For examples of passages in which Socrates offers a more sober assessment
of what can be accomplished in politics, see Republic 487e7489a2, Apology
31d633a1. Too many commentators, in my view, fail to raise the question
of the adequacy of Socrates argument about political leadership in their
admiring accounts of this argument. See, e.g., Barker, Greek Political Theory, 13943; Taylor, Plato, 1257; Shorey, What Plato Said, 14652; Jaeger,
Paideia, 2:14950; Friedlander,
Plato, 2:2701; Voegelin, Plato, 38; Kahn,

Plato and the Socratic Dialogue, 131. Those who do question Socrates argument include Arieti, Platos Philosophic Antiope, 199; Kastely, In Defense
of Platos Gorgias, 1023; Vickers, In Defense of Rhetoric, 8990. Vickers
criticism is a case in which a critic of Socrates is more perceptive than his
admirers.
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which any political activity, including even true rhetoric, would have
to bow? We should be reminded here of our earlier question about
whether the taming that political leaders might achieve, while surely
something to be appreciated, is the same as instilling genuine virtue,
and also of the questions raised by Socrates earlier acknowledgment
of the problem posed by the sheer number of people to whom a political leader must speak. Might the thread that runs throughout Socrates
seemingly ever more unreasonable condemnation of political leaders
be an indirect and well-disguised reflection on the limits of politics? If
so, this reflection should be brought together with the rehabilitation of
rhetoric that also runs throughout this same section. For not only are
the limits of politics important to understanding the need for rhetoric,
but they also would have a necessary influence on the character of even
true or noble rhetoric. Could any rhetoric even the true rhetoric to
which Socrates points dispense entirely with all forms of flattery
and with all service to desires, including the flattery that consists in
praising a kind of virtue that may not be true virtue and the service to
desires that may not be entirely reasonable? These considerations, furthermore, may also help us to come to a deeper understanding of why
Socrates himself stayed out of politics and why his recommendation
of a new kind of rhetoric is not accompanied by a willingness to take
it up himself. Since Socrates own avoidance of politics is one of the
underlying issues of this section of the dialogue, it makes sense that he
would want to provide at least some indications of the reasons for that
choice.42
There are reasons, however, that Socrates would not want to make
these considerations too clear or prominent. For one thing, there is a
danger that his avoidance of politics, if explained by pointing to the
limits of politics, might appear to some as a shameful abandonment
42. In his explicit account of his own life to which he is about to turn, Socrates
will say, in a comment on pleasures that the Athenians regard as benefactions and benefits, I envy neither those who provide them nor those to
whom they are provided (522b6).
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of his duty to accomplish the limited good that can be accomplished

in political life.43 Socrates has placed himself in a delicate position
with his critique of Callicles heroes and of political leaders in general.
On the surface, Socrates argument would seem to lead to the conclusion that one should go into politics but strive to practice the virtuous
form of politics that aims at the improvement of the citizenry; and it
might well seem to anyone moved by this conclusion that, even if one
comes to doubt that perfection is possible, one should not abandon
the attempt to do what one can. Socrates, then, can hardly afford at
this point to call too much attention to the fact that his own life is
a private life, not a political one. Indeed, more than simply keeping
quiet about that fact, Socrates is about to return explicitly to the
question of his own situation and to raise the claim that, unlike the
men he has criticized, he himself practices the true political art. To
prepare the way for that remarkable claim is the most obvious purpose of his critique of Callicles heroes. For that critique enables him
to approach the question of his own situation and his own activity
against the backdrop of what has been presented as the failure of the
greatest Athenians to practice politics as it ought to be practiced. In
keeping with this approach, when he puts to Callicles the question that
leads the conversation back to the question of his own life, the crucial
issue is no longer posed as a contest between the private philosophic
life and the political life, but rather as one between two versions of the
political life: Define for me, then, to which kind of care of the city you
43. At 520e25, Socrates calls attention to the common or conventional belief
(see nenomistai at e4) that, when it comes to the question or matter (praxeos)
of how one would be as good as possible and how ones family and city would
best be governed, it is shameful to refuse to give counsel unless one is paid
for it. That Socrates calls attention to this belief is more significant than his
explanation of it is persuasive (see 520e710). With this passage, compare
Republic 346e7347d8. On the same issue, consider Callicles expression of
contempt for private sophists at 520a12, a remark that should be viewed in
light of its broader context and Callicles earlier criticism of philosophy. Also
worth considering are Republic 420b3421c6, 487b1d5, and 519b7520d4.
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are exhorting me: Is it that of struggling with the Athenians so that

they will be the best they can be, as a doctor would, or should I act as
a servant and direct my association with them toward gratification?
(521a25).
Socrates critique of Callicles heroes, I have suggested, displays a
delicate attempt simultaneously to reveal and to conceal. The same
is true of Socrates description of his own activity. After putting to
Callicles the stark choice of recommending either that he struggle to
improve the Athenians or that he serve their desires, Socrates is then
able to insult Callicles predictable recommendation of service: You
are urging me to practice flattery, noblest man (521b1). Callicles further objection, which Socrates completes by putting words in Callicles
mouth (see 521b24), then enables Socrates to direct attention back
to the issue of safety and danger:
Dont say [Callicles] what you have said many times, that [if I dont do
what you encourage me to] anyone who wishes will kill me, lest I, in
turn, say that it will be a base man killing a good one. And dont say that
he will seize anything I have, lest I, in turn, say that whatever things he
seizes he will not know how to use, but rather, just as he seized them from
me unjustly, so too, once he has them, he will use them unjustly, and if
unjustly, shamefully, and if shamefully, badly. . . . This I know well: if I am
called before a law court in a case involving one of these dangers of which
you speak, my accuser will be someone base for no decent man would
accuse a human being who doesnt do injustice and it would be nothing
strange if I should die. Do you want me to tell you why I expect these
things? (521b4c2, c9d4)
Socrates seems, once again, to disparage the danger he is in. But he

certainly does not deny it. Nor does he deny that this danger has something to do with his unwillingness to practice flattering rhetoric. Furthermore, it would seem to follow from Socrates own earlier argument
that he does not practice true rhetoric either; if he did, he would not
be in danger (see 517a56). What he does practice, he says, is the true
political art, which should not be confused with true rhetoric. Unlike
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such rhetoric, Socrates true political art is the source of the danger
he is in rather than a path to safety. Socrates stresses that it is because
of his practice of this art that he will find himself helpless in a law
court. In a famous statement that predicts his ultimate fate, he compares his hopeless situation in court to that of a doctor brought before
a jury of children to be accused by a cook of harming and corrupting the children with his painful procedures, deprivations, and bitter
medicines:
I suppose that together with a few Athenians so that I dont claim to be
alone I take up the true political art, and I alone of those alive today do
the political things. Since, then, it is not toward gratification that I direct
the speeches I give on each occasion, but rather toward the best instead
of the most pleasant, and since I am unwilling to do what you exhort me
to do these refined things I will not have anything to say in the law
court. The account that I gave to Polus applies to my own case for I will
be judged as a doctor accused by a cook would be judged among children.
Consider what such a person, caught in such circumstances, would say in
his defense, if someone accused him by saying, Children, this man has
done you yourselves many evils; and he corrupts the youngest of you by
cutting and burning; and, by reducing and choking you, he causes you to
be at a loss, giving you the bitterest potions and compelling hunger and
thirst unlike me, who feasts you with many pleasant dishes of all sorts.
What do you suppose a doctor caught in this bind would have to say? Or
if he told the truth that I did all these things, children, for the sake
of health how great do you think the disturbance would be from the
judges? Wouldnt it be huge? (521d6522a7)
By comparing himself to a doctor, Socrates suggests that there is something medical about his activity. But what exactly he has in mind
by that analogy in this context is hard to discern, since his statement about his own activity is so brief. What does he mean by calling his activity the true political art and by comparing himself to a
doctor?
On the surface, by calling his activity the true political art, Socrates
characterizes his activity or at least the part of it that he is concerned
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with here44 as a form of service to the city that seeks to improve the
city by improving its citizens. But according to his further account
of what he actually does, as opposed to the impressive lead-up he
gives (compare 522b49 with 521d6e1), Socrates accomplishments
are fairly limited. By his own description, or at any rate according to a
charge that he does not deny (see 522b79 and 521e6522a3), Socrates
does not seem to lead his fellow citizens all the way to virtue. Rather,
he does two perhaps interconnected things: he produces perplexity
(aporia) in the young, and he abuses those who are older by making bitter speeches in public and in private (522b79). The speeches
that Socrates directs against those who are older would seem to be
his bitter potions, which may serve not so much to remedy the illnesses of the adults themselves as to contribute to his effort to produce perplexity in the young by shaking their admiration of the most
prominent models and authorities.45 Considered in light of these indications, however, Socrates activity, while in some sense directed to the
improvement of the young, cannot be regarded as an effort to inculcate
virtue in any ordinary sense of the term.46 Could the deeper meaning,
44. The reason I add this qualification is that, not only because of its brevity but
also because of its character and purpose, Socrates account of his activity here may not speak to all of its aspects. Socrates may be referring only
to that aspect that can with some plausibility be called political. Despite
his efforts in some places (especially in the Apology) to give the impression that this aspect is the whole of his activity, Socrates also indicates that
that impression is misleading: consider Apology 38a16 and Phaedo 96a6
100a8.
45. Consider Apology 21b923a2 together with 23c2d1 and 33b9c4. Also worth
considering in this connection are Republic 331c1332c3, 515c4516d7,
537e1539c3. In speaking in the present passage of the Gorgias of the
younger and the older, Socrates may have in mind not only age but also
attitude and openness.
46. Some commentators go too far, in my view, in ascribing such an aim
to Socrates true political art. See, e.g., Jaegers discussion of Socratic
paideia as a complete system that provides the moral education that
fulfills the states true mission as a moral teacher (Paideia 2:14959).
See also Friedlander,
Plato, 2:2702; Barker, Greek Political Theory, 1414;
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then, of his claim that he alone practices the true political art be that
he provides the true education that the leaders of the city only claim
to provide? And might not that education consist, in large measure,
in a kind of deeducation, or in a stripping away of the convictions
that the young have already received from their primary education at
the hands of the city?47 This suggestion would help to explain what
Socrates means by indicating here that his activity is medical. It
would also help to explain why, as Socrates gently indicates, the city
is not likely to see him merely as a pain-inducing surgeon working
towards health, but will grasp and sympathize with the charge that
he is a corrupter (see the use of diaphtheirein at 522b7 and the otherwise strange use of diaphtheirei at 521e8). Bringing the young into
a state of perplexity may well appear to the city to be an act of corruption; and Socrates, I suggest, is trying in this very brief account
of his predicament to provide some indication of the source of the
citys anger against him, without making matters worse by saying too
much.48
To spell out a bit more fully the character and necessity of Socrates
delicate account of his situation, Socrates is far from denying that he is
in danger and that he would have a hard time defending his life before
the city. In fact, if anything, he exaggerates the danger he is in and his
own helplessness (see 522a9b1). This exaggeration contributes to his
self-presentation as a man who is above considerations of safety. But
it also serves a further purpose for those in his audience who would
be likely to doubt the sincerity of that aspect of his self-presentation.
For such listeners, Socrates account of the danger he faces carries a
different message. Socrates, I suggest, is trying to indicate at least the
Brickhouse and Smith, Platos Socrates, 13741. Consider the more complex
account of Villa, Socratic Citizenship, 1516, 2728, 3641.
47. Consider Republic 515c4516d7, 537e1539a1.
48. A sign of Socrates reserve in this passage is that, while he predicts his later
indictment for corrupting the young, he makes no mention of impiety as
part of the charge that could be and of course later was brought against
him. Compare Apology 18a7c3, 23c2d7, 24b8c1.
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outlines of a predicament he is in and thus to call attention to his need

for assistance. In other words, he is trying to show that his situation
in the city is in fact a problem a problem of which his true political
art is the cause, not the solution. That Socrates also wants to give an
account of his situation that does not exacerbate the problem and
therefore that his different purposes here are not in perfect harmony
dictates that he reveal something of the predicament he is in while
providing only a slight and partial indication of its source. Yet Socrates
cannot simply avoid the matter altogether, if one of his aims is to call
the problem to the attention of someone who could possibly provide
him with help. If Socrates account is intended largely for the sake of
such a person, his restraint can even be seen as a lesson to him in
prudence and reserve.
The person who most fits the description of such a listener is
Gorgias, who, by my suggestion, is the target of Socrates account
of his predicament at least as much as Callicles. It is worth wondering what impression this account makes on Gorgias, who is also the
listener most likely to have noticed Socrates preceding rehabilitation
of rhetoric, as well as his quiet indications that he is not as unconcerned with self-protection as he explicitly suggests. If Gorgias has
been wondering why Socrates is interested in a new form of rhetoric,
he finally receives an answare. The answer is a simple one, although
Socrates has done much to obscure it: Socrates is interested in a new
form of rhetoric, above all, because he is interested in somehow mitigating the danger he is in or in finding a way out of the predicament
in which he finds himself. Gorgias can thus understand and so can
we why Socrates rehabilitation of rhetoric has been followed by a
description of his own situation, or what the connection is between
these themes. Indeed, Socrates description of his own situation, and
especially his presentation of it as an unsolved problem, is in a way
the fitting conclusion of the dialogue as a whole. Although an important section still remains, the crucial answer to the guiding question
of the dialogue is conveyed here. From the beginning, we have been
asking why Socrates is so interested in rhetoric, and why he made
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an effort to seek out Gorgias and grab his attention. But only in this
passage near the end does Socrates speak directly enough, if still
very briefly, about his own life to provide us with the answer. The
answer is conveyed by Socrates indication of the predicament caused
by his true political art, an art that required that he direct his own
efforts above all to producing perplexity in the young. Socrates may
have regarded the practice of this art, and in particular its emphasis
on bitter speeches designed to produce perplexity in the young, as
incompatible with devoting his own energies to the more flattering
art of rhetoric. The predicament caused by this art, however, explains
Socrates need for an ally with great rhetorical powers and a sympathetic view of his activity and situation. Yet, even at this point, several
questions remain: How exactly could Gorgias help Socrates? How seriously are we to take the possibility of a Gorgias-Socrates alliance? And
more generally, does Socrates really present in the Gorgias an adequate
solution to the problem he reveals? Let us return to these questions,
however, after first considering the final section of the dialogue.
THE LOGOS ABOUT THE AFTERLIFE (522c4527e7)
Without an understanding of what led Socrates to practice his true

political art, it could well seem as if his way of life entails running
a senseless risk that leaves him exposed to attack within the city.
Socrates has not really met that objection of Callicles. Nor could he
meet it adequately without an account of the end or the good that
could make running such a risk worthwhile.49 Yet that account is not
really present in the Gorgias. And there is reason to doubt that someone
like Callicles would find the genuine account persuasive in any case.50
It is thus fitting, in a sense, that Callicles responds to Socrates account
of his situation by repeating his basic objection: Do you regard as
noble, Socrates, a human being who finds himself in such a situation
49. Compare Apology 20c423d2.
50. Consider Apology 37e338a8.
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in the city, and who is unable to come to his own aid? (522c46).
Socrates may have emphasized the danger he faces in order to call it
to the attention of Gorgias, but, by doing so, he elicits this predictable
objection from Callicles. Socrates, however, would not want this objection to be the last word, in part because there may be others in the audience who are troubled by the same concerns as Callicles, even if they
are more sympathetic to Socrates.
Socrates basic response to Callicles objection is to return, one last
time, to the Socratic thesis and to argue that the most important way
in which one can come to ones own aid is to keep oneself free of
injustice (522c7e3). But he now adds to this position a further reflection on justice and death that moves in a direction in which he took
only small steps earlier (compare 492e7493d3, 507d6508a8, 512d6
513a7). Far more prominently than he has up to this final moment of
the dialogue, Socrates now seems to rest his confidence in choosing
to lead a dangerous life on thoughts about the gods and the afterlife.
He tells Callicles that the most extreme of all evils is to arrive in Hades
with ones soul full of injustices, and he offers to give an account to
support this claim (522e36).
The most striking thing about the account Socrates gives is simply
that he calls it an account, a logos, rather than a myth (see 522e5
6, 523a12).51 What he means by this, however, is unclear. The most
straightforward explanation, of course, would be that Socrates thinks
the account is true, and that calling it a logos is his way of expressing
his own conviction of its truth. That is certainly the explanation that
Socrates offers to Callicles (see 523a13, 524a8b1, 526d35).52 But
51. For a helpful general discussion of the distinction between muthos and logos
as Plato uses the terms, see Brisson, Plato the Myth Maker, 712. Brisson
discusses the logos of the Gorgias on pages 1089.
52. It is also the explanation accepted by some commentators. See, for instance,
Shorey, What Plato Said, 1524; Brickhouse and Smith, Platos Socrates,
2056; Dilman, Morality and the Inner Life, 17086; Mackenzie, Plato on
Punishment, 2359; Olympiodorus, Commentary on Platos Gorgias, Lecture
47. Consider also the symbolic readings of Voegelin, Plato, 3945, and
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there are difficulties with this explanation. The most obvious is that
the logos Socrates gives depends for its crucial premises on tales about
the gods that Socrates says he has heard from Homer and others,
including some of the very same tales he vehemently criticizes in other
settings (see 523a35, 524a8b2).53 Beyond this difficulty, the logos,
as we will see, presents a view or a doctrine that is not entirely in
harmony with the position that Socrates has defended throughout the
dialogue. And finally, after delivering the logos, Socrates will all but
retract his claim that he thinks it is true (consider 527a58). In the
same context, however, Socrates will also make a remark that may
give us a clue to what he means by calling the account he gives a logos
rather than a myth. Exhorting Callicles to look toward the ultimate
happiness that awaits the just in the afterlife, Socrates tells him that
the account should be accepted as your logos indicates (527c56).54
Perhaps what Socrates means by calling the account he gives a logos
rather than a myth is that such an account follows in a sense from a
certain kind of view, namely, from the view of someone who believes
in virtue but is not convinced that the virtuous always receive the
happiness they deserve in this world. Such a view, as Socrates remark
suggests and as earlier passages in the dialogue have shown, belongs
more to Callicles than to Socrates.
However this may be, the logos, as Socrates presents it, has two
main parts: Socrates first presents a set of tales that he claims to have
heard, and then he draws a series of conclusions from these tales (see
Dodds, Gorgias, 3767. According to Dodds, the Gorgias myth is called a

logos because it expresses in imaginative terms a truth of religion (377).
Voegelin makes a similar suggestion in his attempt to interpret the logos
by translat[ing] the symbols into the experiences of the soul which they
articulate (41).
53. Compare Euthyphro 5e56c4, Republic 377e6378e3; consider also Apology
29b26, 40c49.
54. I am following the most reliable manuscripts, which have ho sos logos (your
logos) at 527c6. Dodds follows manuscript F, which omits sos and reads simply ho logos (the argument). See Dodds, Gorgias, 3856. Compare 477e2.
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the transition at 524a8b2).55 The tales begin with Homers account of

the passing of rule among the gods from Cronos to his sons, a transition that led to the ascendance of Zeus.56 The movement from the age
of Cronos to the age of Zeus eventually brought a partial change in
the system by which the gods decide the fate of human beings.57 Even
in the age of Cronos, there was a law, which always existed and still
now exists, that human beings who have lived justly and piously are
sent after their deaths to live in perfect happiness on the Isles of the
Blessed, while the unjust and impious go to receive their punishment
in the prison called Tartarus. Although Zeus preserved this law, he
changed the way in which the judgments of human beings are made.
In the time of Cronos reign and in the first days after Zeus rise, men
were judged while they were still alive on the day they were to die, and
the judgments were made by judges who were themselves living. After
learning that this system was producing bad decisions, Zeus concluded
that the sources of the problem were that both those being judged and
those judging were clothed that is, their souls were covered by bodies, ancestry, and wealth and that the defendants could bring many
biased witnesses to speak in their defense. Zeus therefore instituted
55. On the importance of this division, see Alexandra Fussi, The Myth of the
Last Judgment in the Gorgias, 52930; Benardete, The Rhetoric of Morality
and Philosophy, 98.
56. See Iliad 15.18793; cf. Hesiod, Theogony 453506, 617819. Although
Socrates begins from a Homeric tale, he adds to this tale or extends it in
directions not found in Homer. He claims that he has heard the further
tales he reports, without indicating from whom he has heard them. This
has led to much speculation on Socrates (or Platos) sources in this part
of the logos. For a helpful summary and analysis of the different views,
see Dodds, Gorgias, 3736; see also Fussi, The Myth of the Last Judgment in the Gorgias, 540. Also worth considering is Olympiodorus contention that the logos should be read as a philosophical myth, as distinguished from a poetic one (see Commentary on Platos Gorgias, Lectures
47 and 48).
57. The whole account of this change and of Zeus new system runs from 523a3
to 524a7.
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two reforms. First, he told Prometheus to deprive men of their foreknowledge of death.58 And second, he decreed that the judgments must
be made naked that is, they must be made of the dead and by the
dead, so that a soul stripped of the body could be judged by another
soul stripped of the body. To effect this second change, Zeus set up
three of his sons as judges in the meadow where the road forks, with
one path leading to the Isles of the Blessed and the other to Tartarus.
At this fork in the road, Rhadamanthus, Aeacus, and Minos make their
decisions about the journey for human beings.
The primary result of Zeus reforms seems to have been a general
advance in justice. But the reforms also, and perhaps more importantly, indicate a movement toward a certain understanding of justice according to which what matters most is not ones record of particular deeds or other external factors such as ones position in
the city or the standing of ones family but the internal quality of
ones soul. In this respect, the account Socrates gives pulls the traditional view of divine justice in a Socratic direction. But Socrates is
also conceding some ground, so to speak, to the view he is pulling
toward his own. His account can be seen as a compromise between
two somewhat opposed outlooks. The character of this compromise
and of what Socrates concedes can be seen more clearly in the second part of the account, where he draws his conclusions from the
tales he was supposedly merely reporting in the first part (see again
524a8b2).
58. The most likely meaning of Zeus order to Prometheus is that he was to
prevent people from knowing when they will die, and the most likely purpose of this order would be to obstruct deathbed conversions. See Dodds,
Gorgias, 378. Another possible meaning, however, is that Zeus intended
for Prometheus to stop all foreknowledge of death, including even human
beings awareness of their mortality. This interpretation has the problem, however, that it would seem to require the further suggestion that
Prometheus did not carry out the order. Or is there some sense in which
human beings are not aware of death? Compare Aeschylus, Prometheus
Bound, 24853.
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The second part begins with the claim that death is merely the separation of the body and the soul, after which each retains its character
at least for some time (524b2d4). According to Socrates, far from
dying when it is stripped naked of the body, the soul then displays
itself more clearly, since its natural traits and the effects of the experiences it has endured from its different pursuits can be seen more
clearly when the screen of the body is removed (524d37). This would
seem to be in keeping with Socrates earlier description of Zeus system, which requires such nakedness for the judges to do their judging
well. But Socrates explanation in this part of the account also raises
questions about that system: Is it entirely just for souls to be judged
and sometimes punished for qualities that they have received at least
in part from nature (see 524d56; consider also 524b67 and c1)? And
shouldnt the circumstances in which one lived ones life have at least
some bearing on the judgment of ones ultimate fate (consider 524d7
525a8, 525d2526b3)? More broadly, can the eternal punishments of
which Socrates speaks (see, e.g., 525c6, e1) ever be truly warranted as
retribution for the brief lives lived by embodied souls?59 We should
also recall Socrates suggestions earlier in the dialogue that pity is
due to the unjust, since they are already suffering from the greatest
evil, and that punishment is a benefit to the unjust which one should
wish upon ones unjust friends but not upon ones unjust enemies (see
again 468e6469b11 and 479d7481b1). Can those earlier suggestions,
which were presented as conclusions following from a rigorous adherence to the Socratic thesis, be squared with Socrates present account?
If Socrates raises questions like these, however, he does so quietly. The
main impression conveyed by his account is that the unjust will receive
what Socrates speaks of as the fitting sufferings a phrase that
reflects Socrates allowance of the retributive spirit into the account
(525a67; see also 526b8c1 and consider the formulation at 523b24).
59. For a line of reflection that raises similar questions, see Fussi, The Myth of
the Last Judgment in the Gorgias, 5435.
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While some of the details may call the reasonableness of that spirit into
question, the more obvious thrust of the account is to make room for
it.60
Yet Socrates does make some efforts to hide or disguise the fact
that he is allowing a place for retribution. He claims that it is fitting for all who are punished either to become better and thereby to
be benefited or else to serve as useful paradigms for others (525b1
4). In other words, he suggests that the only legitimate purposes of
punishment are rehabilitation and deterrence. But Socrates description of the punishments in Hades strays from this suggestion. In his
description of the souls in Hades, Socrates speaks of two groups who
receive punishment. Those who benefit from the punishments they
receive are the curables, who can be released from injustice by enduring pain and grief (525b4c1). But those souls that arrive in Hades
having done the most extreme injustices are incurable. These latter souls cannot themselves be benefited by punishment because they
are beyond rehabilitation. Their eternal punishment, Socrates says,
serves as a warning to other souls as they arrive in Hades and witness the spectacle of eternal suffering (525c18). There is a problem,
however, with this suggestion about the deterrent effect of the punishment of the incurables. Havent the souls for whom they are supposedly to provide deterrent examples already lived their mortal lives,
such that they will witness the punishment of the incurables only
after they have already made their crucial choices? The punishment
of the incurables is hard to explain as an effective deterrent. Their
punishment, which would seem on Socratic grounds to be pointless, makes more sense as a concession to non-Socratic grounds, or,
more specifically, to the view that calls for eternal punishment as
fitting even in cases in which it benefits no one. Perhaps indicating his attitude toward the concession he is making, Socrates speaks
60. Mackenzie, Plato on Punishment, 2339, stresses this feature of what she
calls the retributive eschatology of the Gorgias.
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of the souls of the incurables hung up crudely (atechnos) in Hades

(525c67).61
But if Socrates makes this concession to a non-Socratic outlook,
he pulls back in the other direction by suggesting that it is easier for a man who lives a private, philosophic life to save himself
from the sufferings in Hades. According to Socrates account, it is
extremely rare for a political man to make it to the Isles of the Blessed.
Aristides better known as Aristides the Just is one of the few
political men to escape vice and therefore punishment (526a5b4).
But he is the exception that proves the rule. Hades, according to
Socrates, is full of the souls of tyrants, kings, and other powerful men
who abused their power to commit the greatest injustices (525d1
526a5). While the powerful suffer in Hades, another fate awaits the
philosophic:
Sometimes, when [Rhadamanthus] sees a soul that has lived piously and
with truth the soul of a private man or of someone else, but above all,
as I at least claim, Callicles, the soul of a philosopher who has minded his
own business and not been a busybody in his life he admires it and sends
it off to the Isles of the Blessed. And Aeacus, too, does these same things
each of them holding a staff. But Minos sits supervising, he alone holding
61. One possible way of explaining the punishment of incurables as a deterrent is to suppose a doctrine of reincarnation, at least for the curables. Yet,
while Dodds, Gorgias, 375, 381, finds such a doctrine implicit in Socrates
account, Socrates certainly does not mention it, and his account seems to
move in the other direction (consider 523a9b4, 524a17, 524b24, 525c48,
525d7e2, 526e14; contrast with Republic 614b2621b7). Another conceivable way out of the problem one more in keeping with Socrates explicit
account would be to suppose that the curable souls, while not to be reincarnated, still have important lives to live and choices to make in Hades.
This might help to explain what Socrates means by calling them curable.
Yet, even in the case of the curables, it is striking that Socrates goes out
of his way to stress the pain and grief they have to endure before they are
cured (see 525b6c1). That suggests that, even in their case, Socrates is
making a place for the retributive desire to ensure that the unjust suffer. See
Mackenzie, Plato on Punishment, 2379.
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the golden scepter, as Homers Odysseus says he saw him: holding the
golden specter, passing his judgments on the dead. (526c1d2)
In accord with the general character of the logos, Socrates here weaves
a Homeric passage together with a view of the afterlife that casts a
favorable light on the philosophic life. In this presentation, the philosophic life also comes to sight as directed toward death. It is the life
that is guided, more than any other, by the need to prepare for the
ultimate judgment that will be passed by gods rather than by men
(526d3527a3). Socrates presents philosophy, in other words, as a way
of life whose goodness lies above all in another, far greater world. And
in keeping with this presentation, he exhorts not only Callicles but all
other human beings as well to follow the path that leads towards this
life and this contest (526e13).
Once he has completed his account of the afterlife, Socrates predicts
that Callicles will probably regard the account he has just heard as a
myth and despise it as he would an old wives tale (527a56). Socrates
then says, more surprisingly, that it would be nothing amazing to
despise these things, if we were able, by searching somewhere, to find
better and truer things (527a68). In addition, Socrates, in a striking
and important remark, offers as evidence in support of the account
he has just delivered the fact that his interlocutors have not been able
to show that one ought to live a life other than the one that appears
to be beneficial in Hades (see 527a8b2). So long as the Socratic thesis remains unrefuted, he suggests, one ought to acknowledge it and
live by its principles (see 527b2c4). Socrates even gives Callicles a
final command: Having been persuaded, then, follow me to the place
where, having arrived, you will be happy both when you are alive and
when you have come to your end, as your logos indicates (527c5
6). Socrates exhorts Callicles to live by the implications of the logos,
which would seem to mean here to live by the implications of his unacknowledged but nonetheless deep attachment to the view expressed
by the Socratic thesis. Yet Socrates also points toward an alternative
that remains open to some, if not to Callicles. This alternative is to
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follow the logos in another sense, namely, by examining the matter

further. Socrates points to this alternative by reminding his audience
of the lack of certainty that has beset the entire conversation and that
remains even at the end. He suggests that the question of the best way
of life has hardly been resolved, and that the conversation has led only
to deeper confusion and perplexity: To such lack of education have
we come! (527d5e1). By ending in this way, Socrates encourages at
least some in his audience to take his final exhortation to follow the
logos as an exhortation to continue thinking through the questions
that remain unanswered even at the end of the conversation.
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Conclusion: A Final Reflection

on Noble Rhetoric
specially if it is right to have doubts that Socrates himself is

genuinely convinced of the truth of the account of the afterlife
that he presents to Callicles, his presentation of that account may be

regarded as an example of noble rhetoric. Certainly, one of the virtues
of the account is that it portrays the philosophic life in a light that,
were the account to be believed, would lessen peoples anger toward
that life and win it respect. But how believable is Socrates account?
Socrates himself says that he is not very optimistic that Callicles will
believe it. And he may not have had high hopes that Callicles would
believe even his claim that he believes it himself (consider again 523a1
3, 527a59). If Callicles silence at the end of the dialogue reflects this
likely skepticism, he would not be unlike many readers of the Gorgias,
who do not hesitate to refer to Socrates account as a myth, despite
his insistence that it should be regarded as a logos.1 Socrates account,
I would suggest, is not meant to be at least not in any simple or

direct way the primary model of the kind of noble rhetoric to which
Socrates is pointing in the Gorgias. But if the account at the end of the
dialogue is not the primary model of noble rhetoric, and yet Socrates
is nonetheless calling for a new kind of rhetoric, what would be the
character of such rhetoric?
1. See, e.g., Friedlander,
Plato, 2:272; Taylor, Plato, 128; Brisson, Plato the

Myth Maker, 108, 143; Kastely, In Defense of Platos Gorgias, 99; Arieti,
Platos Philosophic Antiope, 202; Nightingale, Platos Gorgias and Euripides Antiope, 1323.
177
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This question is difficult to answer since, according to an earlier

suggestion of Socrates, noble rhetoric has never been seen (see again
503a5b1, 516e9518a7). Socrates earlier remarks are best understood as a call for the creation of something new, not as a defense
of something already in existence. And I have suggested that he is
asking for Gorgias help in the creation of this new kind of rhetoric.
But hasnt Socrates provided Gorgias with at least an outline, if only
to guide him in the work that he would want him to do? While the
account of the afterlife at the end of the dialogue may not be intended
as a straightforward model of the kind of noble rhetoric Socrates envisions, we can find more revealing indications of what he has in mind
in other passages, even if they remain somewhat incomplete.
Most important and more instructive than the account of the afterlife is Socrates presentation of a doctrine of virtue that unites the
virtues of wisdom, moderation, and justice, and that proclaims that
these virtues are in harmony with a cosmic order bound together by the
power of geometrical equality (see again 506c5508c3).2 Socrates
defense of such a doctrine should be considered together with his
description of his own activity as the true political art, as well as with
his efforts to rebuke Polus and Callicles for their attraction to injustice
and to exhort them to greater devotion to virtue. These efforts, even
if not entirely successful in swaying Polus and Callicles, at least succeed in giving an important impression of Socrates own views. The
combined impact of Socrates speeches and arguments is to present
his views, or more broadly the views and character of philosophy, as
critical of ordinary politics and of the city as it usually operates and yet
ultimately supportive of the highest aspirations and deepest yearnings
of ordinary citizens. In this sense, Socrates speeches and arguments
2. That Socrates doctrine of virtue and his account of order make a deeper
impact than the account of the afterlife can be seen by considering Jaeger,
Paideia, 2:1467; Shorey, What Plato Said, 148; Voegelin, Plato, 367; Seung,
Plato Rediscovered, 312; Kahn, Plato and the Socratic Dialogue, 1407,
Drama and Dialectic in Platos Gorgias, 11621.
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combine a form of accusation and exhortation with something that

could even be called flattery. More generally, while acknowledging and
even in a way stressing that there is some tension between philosophy
and the city, Socrates presents his views in such a way that philosophy comes to sight as something like the moral conscience of the city,
and as a pursuit that seeks wisdom about an orderly cosmos that is
in harmony with human virtue. Such a presentation of philosophy in
general, and of Socrates life in particular, I suggest, is the heart of
the noble rhetoric that Socrates is urging Gorgias to practice in the
Gorgias.3
To be sure, the successful practice of such rhetoric would have implications at once limited and profound. A city influenced by it would not
thereby become philosophic, nor would it even come fully to understand the true character of Socratic philosophy. But the philosophic
life would become an object of admiration and respect rather than
contempt and hostility. Unlike the more ambitious modern philosophers, such as Hobbes, Locke, and Montesquieu, who aimed at a more
complete enlightenment of political life and a much more radical
transformation of the relationship between philosophy and politics,
Socrates may have thought that the more limited achievements possible through noble rhetoric were all that could reasonably be expected,
at least without paying a heavy price in damage both to political life
and to philosophy. To pursue the question of the reservations Socrates
might have had if he were confronted with the modern solution to
the problem of the tension between philosophy and the city would
require that we go well beyond the Gorgias. It would require a thorough study of dialogues such as the Republic, the Laws, and the Symposium, as well as a comparison of these works with the great foundational works of modern thought. But we can get at least a sense of the
objections Socrates might have raised by thinking about the concerns
that he has brought to light in Callicles. Could an erotic man such as
Callicles ever be satisfied with the way of life that has come to dominate
3. Compare Apology 29c631c3, Republic 499d10501a1.
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Conclusion
modern political communities? Would the doctrines of modern philosophy enable him to understand his deepest concerns, and could he
ever fully embrace the outlook these doctrines encourage? Or would
the troubles, confusions, and dissatisfactions we have seen in Callicles
only be deeper and more prevalent in a world shaped by an attempt
to rationalize politics? Socrates may have argued against the moderns that, rather than seeking a thorough transformation of political
life, it would be wiser to limit the aims of philosophy, or of rhetoric in
the service of philosophy, to calming the sort of anger toward philosophy that Callicles expresses and to winning for philosophy a place of
respect in the eyes of the city.
But could even as much as I have just suggested be expected? How
realistic was Socrates hope to find in Gorgias an ally who could
successfully carry out the rhetorical project to which he points in
the Gorgias? There are reasons to conclude that Socrates attempt to
recruit Gorgias was not fully serious, or at least that Gorgias was at
best a long shot for Socrates. For one thing, it is hard to see why the
wealthy, cosmopolitan, and self-satisfied Gorgias would want to take
up a task largely intended to protect a pursuit that was not his own and
to which Socrates gives him only an introduction in the Gorgias. And
these doubts about Gorgias eagerness to ally himself with Socrates
are confirmed in Platos Meno, where Socrates, speaking some years
later, indicates that his relationship with Gorgias never developed
beyond their initial encounter. In the Meno, Socrates claims not even to
remember clearly what he thought of Gorgias.4 Do we have to accept,
then, the disappointing conclusion that the Gorgias presents a problem
without offering an adequate solution? That is, by offering a solution
that never had a good chance of success and that Plato allows us to
see did not succeed, does the dialogue leave us simply with a deeper
appreciation of an unsolved problem? The answer to this question,
at least in one way, is yes. And yet, in another way, the problem did
ultimately get solved, not by Gorgias but by an even greater master of
4. See Meno 71c5d2; consider also Apology 18c48.
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181
rhetoric with much closer ties to Socrates and a much deeper appreciation of his life and activity. For didnt Plato himself accomplish what
Socrates had in mind? It is true that Plato did not protect Socrates
while he was alive, and thus he did not accomplish the most basic task
that Gorgias might have been able to accomplish. But Plato certainly
succeeded indeed he succeeded tremendously in winning a place
of place of high esteem for Socrates and for Socratic philosophy in
the hearts and minds of future generations. It is primarily through
the writings of Plato, through his presentation of a Socrates who has
become beautiful and young,5 that Socrates has come down to us as
one of the heroes of Western civilization, and as a man whose life has
long inspired respect and reverence. One of the signs of Platos success
is the difficulty many readers of his dialogues have in even grasping
why Socrates was ever the target of contempt and hostility.
The Gorgias, then, can provide a window on the aims of Platos
literary-rhetorical project as a whole. In a word, Gorgias gives us reason to believe that Plato in fact had a literary-rhetorical project in his
presentation of Socratic philosophy, a project that was guided by his
appreciation of the problem that the Gorgias the brings to light. After
all, it is Plato, the author of the Gorgias, who helps us to understand
the need for rhetoric, and who, by presenting Socrates unsuccessful
pursuit of a solution to his dilemma, points to the need for a better
solution. In this sense, the very failure presented in the Gorgias may
be seen as Platos way of revealing the problem to which his writings respond and of indicating the role he plays in defending Socratic
philosophy. In keeping with this suggestion, we can find in Platos corpus a picture of the philosophic life and of the views of philosophy
that expands and completes the picture he has Socrates merely begin
to sketch in the Gorgias. Platos dialogues are famous for their many
beautiful passages defending the unity of virtue, describing the orderliness of nature and the divine, and praising the high aspirations and
noble resolve of the philosophic life. The Gorgias, however, gives us
5. See again Second Letter 314c24.
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Conclusion
reason to wonder, as we turn to Platos other dialogues, whether some

of the most famous and moving features of Platos works belong to a
rhetorical project designed to inspire admiration of Socratic philosophy and to assuage the hostility of its critics. That is not to say, of
course, that Plato did not also want to point his readers to the truth
about Socrates and the philosophic life. But the Gorgias suggests that
those who want to understand the philosophic life as Socrates lived it
must make an effort to distinguish what is genuinely admirable about
that life from what may belong to Platos rhetorical project of embellishment. To understand and appreciate the aims of that project is not
at odds with, but can even contribute to, an effort to discover the truth
behind the rhetoric. Such an effort, however, must proceed with great
caution and care. For it would be a mistake, in considering any passage
in Platos dialogues, to jump quickly to rhetoric as an explanation of
difficult or initially unpersuasive arguments or doctrines. The only
sure way to proceed is through a close, painstaking, and open-minded
reading of each of Platos dialogues.
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16:1
Index
Achilles, 11
Adeimantus, 65
Adkins, A. W. H., 47, 72, 115, 132
Aeschylus, 171
Agathon, 61
Ahrensdorf, Peter, 7
Alcibiades, 55, 84, 157
Alfarabi, 7
Anaxagoras, 49
Archelaus, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64,
74
Arieti, James, 43, 76, 91, 159, 177
Aristides, 174
Aristocrates, 65
Aristophanes, 19, 152
Aristotle, 3, 42, 137
Barker, Ernest, 29, 88, 110, 147,
159, 164
Benardete, Seth, 5, 17, 26, 28, 32,
33, 36, 43, 62, 63, 75, 76, 77, 89,
94, 134, 135, 147, 152, 170
Black, Edwin, 29, 44, 126, 157
Bolotin, David, 7, 28
Brickhouse, Thomas, 65, 67, 140,
165, 168
Brisson, Luc, 133, 148, 168, 177
Bruell, Christopher, 18, 55, 56
Burnet, John, 14, 88
Caskey, Elizabeth, 9
Cimon, 89, 116, 127, 128, 152, 153,
157
Consigny, Scott, 16
Darius, 87, 89, 128
Derrida, Jacques, 1
Dilman, Ilham, 5, 29, 168
Diodotus, 28
Dodds, E. R., 3, 5, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17,
26, 27, 30, 37, 42, 47, 49, 61, 65,
72, 78, 83, 86, 88, 91, 105, 106,
125, 128, 135, 137, 147, 152,
153, 155, 158, 169, 170, 171,
174
Euben, Peter, 83
Euripides, 61, 91, 105, 106, 124,
134, 177
Friedlander,
Paul, 15, 29, 37, 44, 53,

54, 72, 73, 88, 98, 110, 112, 113,
125, 132, 137, 138, 148, 159,
164, 177
Fussi, Alessandra, 17, 38, 170, 172
Gentzler, Jyl, 102, 105, 109
Grote, George, 3, 29, 43, 53, 57, 72,
76, 77, 104, 113, 132
189
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190
Harrison, E. L., 16
Hegel, G. W. F., 49
Heracles, 89
Heraclitus, 105
Hermann, Karl Friedrich, 8
Herodotus, 128
Hesiod, 170
Hobbes, Thomas, 1, 179
Homer, 16, 169, 170, 175
Irwin, Terence, 4, 5, 8, 29, 36, 47,
53, 71, 94, 109, 113, 115, 136,
138, 153
Jaeger, Werner, 3, 4, 15, 29, 37, 45,
47, 53, 83, 87, 90, 94, 125, 126,
132, 137, 138, 140, 148, 159,
164, 178
Kagan, Donald, 3, 152
Kahn, Charles, 3, 4, 8, 15, 33, 35,
36, 54, 56, 71, 73, 83, 88, 98,
101, 102, 109, 110, 115, 132,
137, 140, 148, 159, 178
Kastely, James, 27, 29, 37, 44, 76,
140, 147, 156, 159, 177
Kerferd, G. B., 16
Klein, Jacob, 7
Kleinias, 119
Klosko, George, 98, 102, 105, 109,
110
Lewis, Thomas J., 26, 37
Locke, John, 179
Machiavelli, Niccolo, 1
MacIntyre, Alasdair, 4
Mackenzie, Mary, 36, 57, 71, 73, 76,
168, 173, 174
McKim, Richard, 56, 67, 71, 73, 74,
76, 94, 110, 115, 140
Megillus, 119
December 1, 2005
16:1
Index
Meiser, K., 155
Michelini, Ann, 43, 94
Miltiades, 89, 116, 127, 128, 152,
153, 157
Montesquieu, 179
Morrow, Glenn, 9
Murray, John, 27, 33
Newell, Waller, 3, 63, 83, 88, 89, 100,
101, 104, 108, 109, 110, 112,
115, 125, 126, 132, 137, 148
Nichols, James Jr., 14, 20, 26, 27,
29, 33, 35, 38, 43, 62, 65, 86, 99,
101, 158
Nicias, 65
Nightingale, Andrea Wilson, 91, 177
Nussbaum, Martha, 109
Olympiodorus, 110, 137, 168, 170
Orwin, Clifford, 28
Perdiccas, 59, 60, 62
Pericles, 30, 65, 89, 92, 116, 127,
128, 129, 152, 153, 154, 157,
158
Philostratus, 16
Plato, Works
Apology of Socrates, 9, 10, 11, 12,
17, 18, 24, 28, 38, 56, 57, 90,
95, 141, 145, 148, 151, 159,
164, 165, 167, 169, 179, 180
Cleitophon, 56, 57
Crito, 56
Euthyphro, 169
Greater Hippias, 16
Laws, 7, 29, 44, 57, 65, 69, 77, 87,
98, 104, 118, 119, 135, 179
Lysis, 113
Meno, 7, 16, 35, 158, 180
Phaedo, 18, 49, 164
Phaedrus, 18, 23, 29, 41, 42, 48, 65
Philebus, 16, 112, 115
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16:1
Index
Protagoras, 16, 21, 23, 32, 38, 39,
101, 113, 135, 152
Republic, 26, 29, 48, 57, 63, 65, 69,
79, 87, 112, 119, 136, 141, 159,
161, 164, 165, 169, 174, 179
Second Alcibiades, 55
Second Letter, 9, 181
Seventh Letter, 9
Statesman, 29
Symposium, 9, 83, 179
Theaetetus, 113
Plochmann, George, 5
Protagoras, 16, 32, 38
Pythagoras, 105, 137
Rankin, H. D., 16, 27, 83
Renehan, R., 42
Robinson, Franklin, 5
Romilly, Jacqueline de, 4, 16, 23, 24,
27, 29, 33, 37, 83, 88, 90, 147
Rorty, Richard, 1
Rosen, Stanley, 9
Sallis, John, 7
Santas, Gerasimos, 4, 54, 56, 63, 71,
73, 76, 98, 113, 136
Saxonhouse, Arlene, 17, 18, 28, 61,
63, 88, 89, 158
Schleiermacher, Friedrich, 7, 8
191
Seung, T. K., 4, 18, 87, 128, 152,
153, 158, 178
Shorey, Paul, 3, 4, 33, 36, 38, 43, 94,
98, 144, 159, 168, 178
Smith, Nicholas, 65, 67, 140, 165,
168
Strauss, Leo, 7, 13
Taylor, A. E., 3, 4, 15, 17, 48, 72, 83,
86, 88, 159, 177
Themistius, 3
Themistocles, 30, 89, 116, 127, 128,
152, 153, 157
Thompson, W. H., 78
Thucydides, 28, 61, 87, 128, 129,
153, 158
Vickers, Brian, 159
Villa, Dana, 158, 165
Vlastos, Gregory, 8, 71, 72, 73,
140
Voegelin, Eric, 4, 15, 63, 83, 137,
138, 159, 168, 169, 178
Weiss, Roslyn, 27, 29, 32, 38
Williams, Bernard, 3
Xenophon, 18, 135
Xerxes, 87, 89, 128

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Devin Stauffer The Unity of Platos Gorgias Rhetoric, Justice, and The Philosophic Life 2006 PDF

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THE UNITY OF PLATOS GORGIAS

The Unity of Platos

cambridge university press

978-0-511-14646-6 eBook (EBL)

Examining the Master of Rhetoric . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

The Ensnaring of Gorgias, Part Two

Polus and the Dispute about Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

The Ensnaring of Gorgias, Part One

Are Rhetoricians Powerful?

The Turn to Justice and the Socratic Thesis

Polus Refutation of Socrates

Socrates Refutation of Polus

The Confrontation between Socrates and Callicles . . . . . . . . 82

Socrates Examination of Callicles View of Justice

Moderation versus Immoderation, and the Question

Socrates Situation and the Rehabilitation of Rhetoric . . . . 123

Callicles and His Heroes, True Rhetoric, and Socrates

Conclusion: A Final Reflection on Noble Rhetoric . . . . . . . . . . . 177

tradition, Plato was subjected to powerful attacks by the founders of

the early moderns to those of our time, can help us to understand

in the Gorgias as the noble figure whose intransigent defense of moral

Kahn, Plato and the Socratic Dialogue, 127.

reasonably hope to uncover what the dialogue is really about. Such a

they lose in arbitrariness of interpretation, which is the result of taking

Unlike the common efforts to uncover the development of Platos own

predictable, for Socrates examinations of the claims to wisdom made

lead us to wonder about its purpose. Might Socrates response to the

critique is second only to Socrates duel with Callicles as the most

body of my text are to Doddss edition of the Gorgias. The translations

1 Examining the Master of Rhetoric

he Gorgias is divided into three main sections of unequal length.

sation with Gorgias, which is followed by a longer conversation with

as I stressed in the introduction, should not lead us to overlook the

Examining the Master of Rhetoric

the ancient worlds most famous rhetoricians and teachers of rhetoric.

THE PRELUDE (447a1449c8)

Socrates blames his late arrival on his companion Chaerephon, who

5. The precise location of the conversation presented in the Gorgias is left

Examining the Master of Rhetoric

that no one surpassed him in wisdom.6 Since the examinations that

Examining the Master of Rhetoric

fundamental, difference through his complaint about Polus speech:

If the prelude has already indicated something about the character of

The Ensnaring of Gorgias, Part One

about [peri] the production of cloaks), Socrates choice of these two

Examining the Master of Rhetoric

The Ensnaring of Gorgias, Part One

That Socrates goes on at considerable length to explain how various

14. Consider Protagoras 312d3e6, Phaedrus 259e1260a4, 267a6b2, 272c10

Examining the Master of Rhetoric

does not do so, and the explanation of his brevity, is unlikely to be

The Ensnaring of Gorgias, Part One

the rhetoricians knowledge, allows for a franker and fuller answer.

are about the greatest and best of human affairs (pragmaton)

Examining the Master of Rhetoric

16. Cf. Benardete, The Rhetoric of Morality and Philosophy, 17.

The Ensnaring of Gorgias, Part One

If Gorgias pride is one spur to frankness, his related desire to expand

Examining the Master of Rhetoric

from those arts that produce persuasion by teaching people about

The Ensnaring of Gorgias, Part Two