Realizing a Nation’s The Future of Everything But A

Potential Democracy in the Game

Middle East
Caryle Murphy Daniel Brumberg Noam Schimmel

Dr. Ahmadinejad:
How I Stopped Worrying And
Learned To Live With The Bomb
By
Amar Toor

Issue 1549, 15 March 2010

 Editorial

Cover

Established in 1987 by
Prince Ahmad Bin Salman Bin Abdel Aziz

Established by
Hisham and Mohamad Ali Hafez

Editor-in-Chief
ADEL Al TORAIFI Dear Readers,

Managing Director
W elcome to The Majalla Digital, this week our issue brings
to you an analysis of Ahmadinejad’s nuclear intentions.
Amar Toor’s comparison of Ahmadinejad and Stanley Kubrik’s
TARIK ALGAIN infamous character Dr. Strangelove, provides insight in to the
personality of the man behind Iranian nuclear ambitions in this light-
hearted yet informative feature. In addition to this feature, Pulitzer
Prize winner Caryle Murphy evaluates the reform and expansion
of the Saudi education system as a means of combating socio-
economic challenges in her article Realizing a Nation’s Potential.
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Cartoon

Issue 1549 05
Contents
08 Geopolitics
Realizing a Nation’s Potential

11 In Brief
Around The World
Quotes Of The Week
Magazine Round Up
Letters

18 Features
Dr. Ahmadinejad:
How I Stopped Worrying And
Learned To Live With The Bomb

25 News Analysis
Maliki leads the Iraqi parliamentary race

28 Ideas
Everything But A Game

THE MAJALLA EDITORIAL TEAM

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15 March, 2010 06
 33 33 People
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The Future of Democracy in the
Issue 1549,
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41 Economics
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28 58 The Political Essay

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Issue 1549 07
 Geopolitics

Realizing a Nation’s Potential

The reform and expansion of the Saudi education system is a crucial endeavour to address the Kingdom’s
social, demographic and economic long-term challenges. It is no easy task, and to achieve it a three fold recipe
is required—strong leadership, patience, and persistence.

S itting in his spacious Riyadh office,

Khalid Al Khudair smiled as he recalled
how “everyone laughed” when he
who has been in education for 30 years and
served as Al Yamamah’s first president, argues
that the current system, rather than being
started building Al Yamamah University renovated, should be rebuilt from the ground
on the desert outskirts of this city. “Too far up. Labor Minister Ghazi Al Gosaibi called Al
out,” people said. Then, the first crop of 126 Eisa’s book, which was published in Lebanon
students plummeted to 40 in just one semester and not available in bookstores here, “the most
because many could not cope with the course important book talking about a public issue
work. The new university was “too hard,” within the past two decades.” Al Gosaibi also
people said. But Al Khudair persevered. Caryle Murphy wrote that resistance to education reform is due
Today, Al Yamamah has 1,400 students— to “strong ties between the prevailing values
decade ago, Saudi Arabia had only eight public
half of them women—and is recognized as and the education system,” which creates the
universities. Now there are 26, as well as 8
one of the kingdom’s most innovative and impression “that any attempt at educational
privately run universities. And 70,000 Saudis
forward-looking private universities. Still, change is an assault on the constant values
are now studying abroad on government
critics remain. They send Al Khudair emails of society.” This connection is even stronger
scholarships.
and text messages complaining that he is when it comes to educating women and girls.
spreading harmful “liberal” ideas among Here, the trends all point in one, revolutionary
Many Saudis appreciated the need for
Saudi youth. New acquaintances sometimes direction: Saudi females are getting more and
education reform decades ago. But this need
turn cold and distant when they discover that more educated every day. Today, women make
became more urgent after the Sept. 11, 2001
Al Khudair is Al Yamamah’s founder. The up more than 58 % of university students.
terrorist attacks on the United States carried
middle-aged businessman is not perturbed by
out by 19 suicide hijackers, 15 of them Saudi.
the flak because he sees himself on an historic But more needs to be done, according to a bold
This gave impetus to the efforts of those who
mission. “If we go back to our Islamic history, new report by Mona Al Munajjed, a sociologist
want to broaden the horizons of Saudi youth
we created a lot of things,” he said. “I think we and senior advisor with Booz & Company’s
by upgrading education. Mohammed Rasheed,
have to be part of the world. We have smart Ideation Center in Riyadh. As Al Munajjed
who served as education minister from 1995
people….I want my students to think they can writes in “Women’s Education in Saudi
to 2005, was one of them. He is proud, he
have the Nobel Prize one day.” Arabia, The Way Forward,” the government
said in an interview, of what he managed to
needs “to formulate an educational reform
accomplish: Getting girls schools put under
Al Yamamah’s success in such a short time—it strategy for young women that includes major
the same ministry as boys, for example, and
opened in 2004—is evidence of the thirst for structural changes in the school system and
modernizing math and science curriculums.
better education opportunities in this oil-rich that will respond to the demands and priorities
But all too often, Rasheed said, his attempted
kingdom. In the last decade, but particularly of a dynamic society.” The curriculum at
reforms ran into resistance from conservatives
since King Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz ascended girls’ schools through the secondary level is
who feared that change would dilute the
to the throne in 2005, there has been a “dominated by religious studies and Arabic,”
religious component of education. They saw
growing realization among policy-makers the report stated. And at university, the fields
reform as dangerous appeasement of the West,
that Saudi Arabia must revamp and expand of study open to women “are limited”, and
especially the United States. When Rasheed
its entire education system if it is going to “do not correspond to the needs of the labor
campaigned for replacing rote memorization
meet the kingdom’s long-term demographic market.” “We have to upgrade ourselves, we
with a more interactive teaching method, the
and economic challenges. Those challenges women,” Al Munajjed said in an interview.
kingdom’s 400,000 K-12 teachers objected,
include a youth boom: About 70 percent of “We have to be aware of what’s happening
he recalled, because “they were not used to
the country’s 22 million citizens are under around us.” Most importantly, she added,
it.” Even top officials in his own ministry
30. They include high unemployment rates— “we have to differentiate between the local
“would agree with me” on new initiatives
almost 7 percent among men and 25 percent customs and traditions, and religion. There
“but then I found out they were implementing
among women. Moreover, if Saudi Arabia is is too much confusion between them.”
something different from what I wanted.”
going to successfully diversify its economy    
away from near-total dependence on oil, as Sorting out that confusion will be no easy
This resistance, which stems from a religious
well as its dependence on foreign labor— matter; Which is why strong leadership, along
culture suspicious of any change, is one of
which was 51 percent of the nation’s total work with mountains of patience and persistence, is
three major obstacles to improving the Saudi
force in 2007—then it has to develop its own needed to bring Saudi education up to its full
education system, according to Ahmad Al
people into skilled, educated workers. The potential.
Eisa, author of the 2009 book, "Education
king has made education a top priority; 26
Reform in the Kingdom." The lack of a
percent of the national budget is now devoted
detailed vision of education reform from the
to this sector. In 2009, that amounted to Pulitzer Prize Winner in Journalism in
political leadership, and the highly centralized
$32.5 billion. A good deal of that money has 1991, is an independent journalist based
structure of education also are blocking
gone towards expanding higher education. A
effective reform, his book states. Al Eisa, in Riyadh.

15 March, 2010 08
Issue 1549 09
In Brief
Around The World Quotes Of The Week
US - Iran conflict moves to Afghanistan
The escalating American-Iranian
tensions have recently displayed
the potential to involve not
only allegations of Tehran's
interference in Iraq's affairs,
but also a new confrontation in
Afghanistan. In recent statements,
The U.S. Secretary of Defense
Robert Gates has accused Iran of
supporting the Taliban movement.
"Iran is playing a double sided
game in trying to undermine
the Afghani government in
addition to U.S. and NATO
efforts by helping Taliban,"
Gates said during a recent visit to
Issue 1549
Magazine Round Up
Afghanistan. The visit coincides
with the Iranian President's
preparations to visit Afghanistan
in order to meet with his Afghani
counterpart, President Hamid
Karzai. However, Ahmadinejad
has decided — after Gates' visit—
to delay the visit to the second
half of March.
The U.S has launched the
operation "Muashtarak" aided
NATO forces against the city of
Marja in the southern Helmand
province as part of its war on
Taliban. The operation started
on February 13, to become the
Letters
largest operation since the US-led
invasion of Afghanistan in late
2001.
Consequently, Ahmadinejad's
expected visit Afghanistan is
viewed by analysts as an attempt
to fortify the already strong
Iranian-Afghani relations and
establish Iranian presence in the
region to highlight the American
failure in dealing with Taliban.
This step is also traced back to
the strong economic ties between
Iran and Afghanistan, which are
under threat from the American
presence.
11
 In Brief - Around The World
Around The World
1 Thailand
Army reinforcements were rushed
into Thailand's capital as tens of
thousands of anti-government
demonstrators marched Monday
on a key military headquarters
demanding that the government
dissolve Parliament. Some 100,000
Red Shirt protesters who have been
camped out along a boulevard in
the old part of Bangkok have given
Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva a
noon deadline to meet their demand
for new elections.
2 Saudi Arabia
The official Saudi Press Agency
(SPA) denied reports that Riyadh had
agreed during talks with Mr. Gates,
to influence China to support a new
round of sanctions against Iran over
its nuclear program. “This issue
[about Iran sanctions] is not true, it
was not discussed during the visit of
the Secretary of Defense who was in
the kingdom recently,” said SPA citing
an official source
15 March, 2010
4
7
3 Afghanistan
The latest bomb attacks in the
southern Afghan city of Kandahar
were a warning to US and Nato
forces, the Taliban say. A Taliban
spokesman said the attacks were
in response to a planned major
offensive by international forces
against militants in the region. At
least 35 people were killed and some
57 injured in the blasts in Kandahar,
Afghanistan's third largest city.
The main target appeared to be
Kandahar's prison, officials said,
though no prisoners escaped.
4 Belgium
The euro-zone has agreed a
multibillion-euro bailout for Greece
as part of a package to shore up the
5 North Korea
single currency after weeks of crisis. North Korea has internally decided to
Senior sources in Brussels said that return to long-stalled six-nation talks
Berlin had bowed to the bailout on its nuclear arms activities in early
agreement despite huge resistance April. The decision came as North
in Germany and that the finance Korean leader Kim Jong-il reportedly
ministers of the "euro-zone" – the may soon visit China, amid growing
16 member states including Greece pressure for Pyongyang, hit by U.N.
who use the euro – are to finalize the sanctions after its nuclear test in May
rescue package soon. 2009, to return to negotiations.
12
 In Brief - Around The World
7 5
3 months. Iranian authorities have
10 6
8 detained more than 45 Baha'is in
2
1 the State Department said.
9
6 Jordan
Jordanian sources said King
Abdullah has ordered his security
forces to bolster protection of the
Israeli embassy and diplomats in
after a failed attack in January 2010.
They said authorities would bolster
VIP protection and provide advanced
equipment for Israeli convoys.
"The king believes that an attack on
the Israeli presence in Jordan has
strategic implications," a Jordanian
source said.
Issue 1549
7 France
French voters scarred by economic
crisis dealt President a and his
conservative leadership a stern
blow by strongly favoring leftist
candidates in regional elections,
according to near-complete official
results.Some took their worries about
immigration and France's growing
Muslim population to the ballot box
— helping the far right National
Front party upset predictions and
perform strongly in Sunday's first-
round voting to choose regional
governments.
8 Iran
The US State Department
condemned Iran's persecution of
religious minorities following the
Iranian authorities' detention of
Baha'is and Christians in recent
the last four months, and as many
as 60 Baha'is are imprisoned in Iran
on the basis of their religion beliefs,
9 Sudan
The Justice and Equality Movement
(Jem), seen as the main rebel group
in sudan said the government and the
rebels were then supposed to agree
on a number of difficult issues before
signing the final agreement three
weeks later.
10 Israel
The Israeli cabinet approved the
construction of a NIS 1.35 billion
barrier along the border with Egypt,
designed to prevent terrorism, drug
smuggling, illegal infiltrations and
human trafficking. “There is broad
agreement that we need to protect
the State of Israel and its future as a
Jewish and democratic state,” Prime
Minister Binyamin Netanyahu said
during the cabinet discussion on the
matter about the need to keep out
infiltrators.
13
In Brief - Quotes Of The Week Magazine Round Up

Quotes
Of The Week
"The responsibility for the
difficulties in China-US relations
does not lie with China; it is up to
the US to mend frayed relations"
China Foreign Minister
Yang Jiechi

1
"Any relationship is a two-
way street. It is fair to say that
our relations have just gone
through a difficult patch but we
are determined to re-establish a Magazine
Round Up
forward-looking relationship"
American State Department
spokesman PJ Crowley

"Netanyahu would have to make 1 Newsweek

some difficult decisions in order
to advance the Middle East peace
process"
Defense Minister Ehud Barak
"This peace process cannot go
on forever, now is the time for
decisions"
Palestinian negotiator
Saeb Erekat
The Right Woman for the Job
Europe’s indebted governments are on the
verge of being engulfed in a crisis which has
exposed deep chasms within the European
Union. Economic uncertainty has sheared 10
percent off the euro’s value against the dollar
and unemployment and recession plagues the
16 countries which use the common currency.
This article proposes that Angela Merkel, is
the most capable person to lead the EU out
of such crisis. Yet the widely respected leader
of the world's seventh-most-competitive
economy, so far seems unwilling to assume
the mantle of leadership. Newsweek’s Stefan
Theil argues that if Germany overcomes its
grip on the status quo of inwardly looking
political leadership, Merkel may be able to
assume the role she is best suited to.

15 March, 2010 14
 2 TIME
The Iranian Riddle
This essay tackles the enigma of the Iranian Government. Author Parsi
accuses the government of seeking to confuse the outside world on
with regards to its goals. He further suggests that leaders in Tehran
are convinced that opacity will buy them security. Given this, Parsi
acknowledges that it is not surprising that the Obama administration
has struggled to find a successful Iran policy. Parsi argues that the
American government should display patience and avoid confrontation
in relations with Iran.

3 The New Yorker

No Credit Where Credit is Due
he New Yorker looks at Obama’s Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner’s
financial stabilization policies to relieve banks of toxic assets and provide
relief for struggling homeowners. The author argues that such policies have
successfully contributed to the reversal of America’s economic crisis. Yet,
at the same time, taxpayers remain under-impressed by these policies and
the men in charge. This article provides an insight into why this may be and
includes interesting commentary from Geithner and others directly involved
in the financial recovery process.

Cover Of The Week

The Economist
Gendercide
Where have all the girls gone?
It is widely known that impoverished countries have unnaturally high
numbers of boys. The imminent catastrophic consequences of this
phenomenon are discussed in this article. One stark example is China, that
alone stands to have as many unmarried young men as the entire population
of young men in America. In 1990 Amartya Sen put the number of missing
females at 100 million and this articles proposes that the number is now
even higher. However, the article is not all bad news, it also recounts South
Korea’s success in reducing gendercide. The country’s social policies are
discussed in this article as an example of how countries such as China can
raise the value of girls and correct the gender imbalance.

Issue 1549 15
In Brief - Letters
Letters
Al Qaeda’s
Condolences
It is not unlikely that the
Pakistani security agencies and
the U.S. are responsible for
recent bombings and in order to
justify the American presence
in this region as well as to
distract the world's attention
from acts of al Qaeda.
Hussein Yasser
15 March, 2010
LAST ISSUE
Who Will Have The Last Dance
Turkey now needs a sweeping constitutional reform
aimed at decentralization and democratization in the
country. These reforms have been delayed for too long,
hence, the Justice and Development Party along with
the Turkish Parliament have to push for these reforms
during membership talks with the European Union.
Matteo Stendardo
16
In Brief - Magazine Round Up

Issue 1549 15
 Features

© getty images

15 March, 2010 18
18
 Dr. Ahmadinejad:
How I Stopped Worrying
And Learned To Live
With The Bomb
By
Amar Toor

Issue 1549 19
 Features

Dr. Ahmadinejad:
How I stopped worrying and learned to live with the Bomb
Amar Toor
There are significant parallels between Ahmadinejad and Kubrik’s most memorable character, Dr.
Strangelove. Dr. Strangelove was an extremely trigger-happy, suspiciously double-talking character that so
many in 1960s America feared—the same kind of characterization, in fact, that many in the Western media
have now branded upon Ahmadinejad. But is there really a madman lurking far beneath the placid surface
of Iran’s President?

Peter Sellers as Dr. Strangelove

S tanley Kubrick’s classic 1964 film

Dr. Strangelove: Or How I Learned
to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb
places some of the most morbid Cold
War-era nuclear fears and attitudes under
a searing satirical lens of stygian-black
comedy. Released at the zenith of Cold
War frigidity and paranoia, Strangelove
tells the story of a rogue US general who,
having apparently lost his mind, suddenly
pulls the trigger on a fleet of nuclear
warheads aimed at Communist Russia,
threatening global extinction.
The nuclear hysteria upon which Kubrick
based his satirical film has certainly died
out, but many of the core nuclear fears at
which Kubrick takes such deft jabs are still
very much at the center of international
discourse. Nowhere are they more
pertinent than in Iran, where the Islamic
Republic has, justifiably or not, stepped
into the Soviet Union’s gargantuan shoes
as the newest nuclear threat to mankind.
Strangelove in Iran
More than 40 years later, both the film
and its message, are as resonant in today’s
cavernous media amphitheatre as they
were at the height of Cold War tensions.
As global attention centers ever more
intensely on Iran and its apparent push
toward nuclear armament, the principle
personages, as in any film or narrative
structure, have gradually come into more
refined relief.
And, as the line dividing media
consumers from producers blurs to nearly
indiscernible levels of turbidity, we all
become atomized Truffauts, Kubricks,
or, as the case may be, David Lynches.
We read and construct media the same
way any director, screenwriter, or
novelist structures a narrative—namely,
around easily identifiable characters and
personalities.
Heads of state become leitmotif shorthand
for countries, populations, and policies.
Barack Obama is as synonymous with
the US as Paul McCartney once was with
The Beatles, as Charlton Heston was with
Ben-Hur, as Rush Limbaugh will forever
be with Oxycontin. We impose cinematic
and literary archetypes on to political
storyboards because character-driven
tales are, quite simply, more exciting to
read.
The Iranian political landscape may be
complex and multifarious, but it’s not

15 March, 2010 20
 Features
immune to our own storytelling devices.
Although the country’s political
architecture is actually anchored by a
triumvirate of theocratic, presidential
and militaristic constituent regimes, the
“face” of Iran, the singular personage
that’s emerged as its representative actor,
its foremost team captain, is, without
question, President Ahmadinejad.
But what kind of character is he? Where
does he fit in the current political drama
that we as media consumers have
constructed for ourselves? What role does
he fulfill? Does he have the onscreen
charisma and James Dean-like swagger
to actually carry our nuclear film? Or is
he more of a niche character, deigned to
play a small, predictable role but do it to
absolute perfection, à la Jerry Orbach?
Is he, perhaps, the Dr. Strangelove of
the 21st century?
Though he makes only a handful of
appearances onscreen, Kubrick’s most
memorable character, by far, is the
film’s namesake—the deranged (and
ambiguously Nazi) scientist known
only as Strangelove. In what may be the
most economically brilliant performance
in cinematic history, Peter Sellers
brings to life a character so profoundly
enigmatic, so anomalously German, and
so inarguably deviant that one can’t help
but be lulled into the hypnotic spider
web that Sellers casts across the screen.
Granted, Strangelove is no head of state—
no nation, no matter how desperate, would
be that suicidal. And Sellers’ portrayal is
unquestionably more demonstrative and
exaggerated than anything we’ve seen
from Ahmadinejad in the public sphere.
But circumstantial differences aside, there
remain several significant parallels.
Even though he’s technically working
under the American regime, Strangelove
is plainly cast as an extreme caricature
of the same trigger-happy, suspiciously
double-talking character that so many in
1960s America feared—the same kind of
characterization, in fact, that many in the
Western media have now branded upon
Ahmadinejad.
But is there really a madman lurking
far beneath the placid surface of Iran’s
President? Has Ahmadinejad finally and
inexorably stopped worrying, and learned
Issue 1549
to love the bomb?
Dr. Ahmadinejad
Everything about Ahmadinejad—the
man and the fable—speaks to relative
normalcy; relative, obviously, because
compared to other leaders of either
perceived or real nuclear threats, he
comes across as, well…tame.
There doesn't seem
to be any traces of
inflated egomaniacal
nucleotides in
Ahmadinejad’s
DNA
North Korean President Kim Jong-Il is,
by most accounts, certifiably insane. Both
his promethean ego and his diminutive
embonpoint suggest dictatorial tendencies
and inferiority complexes of the
Napoleonic variety.
The man known domestically as “Dear
Leader” has manicured such an absurd
myth about his messianic origins that the
official North Korean records describe his
momentous birth on Mount Paektu as a
near biblical event peppered with "flashes
of light and thunder,” upon which “the
iceberg in the pond of Mount Paektu
emitted a mysterious sound as it broke,
and bright double rainbows rose up."
When Kim Jong-Il boasts of his nuclear
warhead collection, there’s indeed a
measured and understandable ripple
effect of concern that radiates throughout
the international community. But no one’s
really that surprised. After all, Dear Leader
simultaneously claims, in all seriousness,
to have drilled 11 holes-in-one the first
time he ever picked up a golf club.
There doesn’t seem to be any traces of
similarly inflated egomaniacal nucleotides
in Ahmadinejad’s DNA. There
doesn’t even appear to be much of the
showmanship that has become the global
calling cards of both Venezuelan president
Hugo Chavez and Libya’s Muammar al-
Qadaffi. Ahmadinejad’s stage presence,
by comparison, is borderline soporific.
While his plaintive eyebrows and densely
compact eyes render him low hanging fruit
for political cartoonists, Ahmedinejad’s
actual behavior, at first glance, seems
downright vanilla. This is a man, after
all, who ascended to high political office
on the wings of plebeianism. His entire
campaign was built upon the premise
that he was just “one of the guys,” a
man with the same blue-collar origins
of the working class Iranians to whom
he so openly pandered during his 2005
presidential election.
He further strengthened his populist
credo and symbolically reinforced his
commitment to the conservative working
class by famously removing the opulent
furniture in the presidential palace and
replacing it with more acceptably modest
pieces. His wife still packs him lunch
every day. Calling his suits “modest” is
like calling Rembrandt “talented.” Cut
out of a martinet’s cloth, the staunchly
conservative Ahmadinejad represented
an orthogonal right turn from the socially
moderate regimes that preceded him.
On occasion, however, Ahmadinejad
has displayed curiously contradictory
behavior, and has given us brief, puzzling
glimpses into a more complex individual.
The same man who ushered in a new era
of social conservatism is also the man
who, last summer, so tirelessly stood by
his initial choice for First Vice President,
Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei. The move
upset not only the Supreme Leader, who
immediately ordered his resignation, but
also irked many in his conservative base
who weren’t so keen on a high elected
official who’d previously been videotaped
enjoying a wholly inappropriate dance
performance put on by Turkish women.
Ahmadinejad, the “man of the people,”
also happens to be the same man who
infamously claimed that a halo-like light
hovered over his head during a 2005 speech
at the UN. He maintains, furthermore,
that every world leader present for
the speech did not blink for the entire
27-minute duration. These are hardly
words you’d expect from a supposedly
austere, religious conservative, or, for
that matter, from a man of science with
a PhD in engineering—both of which
Ahmadinejad claims to be.
Despite these wrinkles, though, he
continues, in speech and in public, to hold
21
 Features
to his self-perpetuated image of normalcy.
More importantly, when compared to
many of the same men with whom he’s
often mentioned in the same breath, he
still comes across as the only relatively
coherent member of the group.
For all his quirks, he’s still nowhere near
as volatile (or senile?) as Kim Jong-Il.
And you definitely won’t see him dressed
like the veritable Austin Powers extra that
Qadaffi has become.
So why is the international community
so incensed over someone so relatively
normal? Could it be because of this
normalcy? Is the West warier of
Ahmadinejad’s more calculated game of
double talk and duality than they are of
North Korea’s impulsive Dear Leader?
It’s a reasonable explanation; a cagey,
mysterious adversary, after all, is always
worthy of attention, in any forum. And a
cagey, mysterious adversary with nuclear
capabilities is worthy of extra attention.
But does it necessarily make him another
Strangelove? Do nuclear capabilities
have the transformative power to turn an
otherwise sibylline world leader into a
spastic, charlatan of an antagonist?
The answer, of course, depends
on the fiction we construct around
Ahmadinejad’s nuclear ambitions, the
editing and splicing we use to piece
together the story, and the creative license
with which we allow ourselves to do so.  disclosing the details of the endeavor on
However unique each iteration may
be, each auteur remains restricted to
the same material, the same constituent
bits of reality with which to assemble
the Ahmadinejad mosaic. And only
in examining each individual piece of
radioactive mini-narrative can we even
hope to remove the veil, and unearth the
true Strangelove or Regular Joe buried
underneath below.
How He Learned to Stop Worrying…
and Love the Bomb?
At some point over the course of his
presidency, Ahmadinejad, like the
blundering characters in Strangelove,
simply stopped worrying. While he
hasn’t done anything as drastic as pulling
the trigger on a nuclear warhead, his
nuclear rhetoric has certainly become
15 March, 2010
more emboldened and, at times, brazenly
confrontational.
Ahmadinejad is certainly not responsible
for planting the seeds of uranium
enrichment in Iran, but during his time as
president, they’ve blossomed like never
before. After a group of exiles revealed
that Iran had resumed uranium enrichment
activities that had laid dormant ever since
the 1979 Revolution, then-President
Mohammed Khatami confirmed in 2003
that the country had been secretly working
since 1985 to develop a nuclear fuel cycle,
thus setting in motion the international
cat and mouse game of inspections and
sanctions that’s still in full swing today.
Is he as enigmatic
and curiously
placed as Kubrick’s
zany creation?
Absolutely. Then
again, though, so is
all of Iran
While Iran was embarrassingly forced to
import gasoline in 2007 due to insufficient
infrastructure to refine its abundant supply
of oil, Ahmadinejad pushed full steam
ahead with his nuclear program, while
a piecemeal basis to the rest of the world.
After deciding to hold a guided and
highly publicized tour of the new Natanz
uranium enrichment facility in April
of 2008, even in the face of mounting
sanctions handed down from the UN
Security Council, Ahmadinejad appeared
to be more contumacious than ever.
Just last month, at a ceremony celebrating
the 31st anniversary of the Islamic
Revolution, Ahmadinejad not only
proudly declared Iran a “nuclear state,”
but had some carefully articulated words
for concerned Western powers, as well.
As some demonstrators in attendance
shouted chants of “Death to the dictator!”,
the President, from atop a flower-adorned
platform, asked the West to “please pay
attention and understand that the people
of Iran are brave enough that if it wants
to build a bomb it will clearly announce
it and build it and not be afraid of you.”
He went on to assert, “When we say we
won’t build it that means we won’t.”
Iran has claimed, on numerous occasions,
that they’ve cooperated with all of
the UN inspections requirements and
documentation. Inspectors, on the other
hand, say they haven’t had any news from
Iran since mid-2008.
According to a recently publicized
February 14th report from the IAEA,
Iran has now decided to move its entire
stockpile of enriched nuclear fuel to
an above-ground location—just a few
months after claiming that they had
no choice but to build an underground
nuclear facility near Qum, because of the
ever present threat of attack.
The anomalous move struck many as
bizarre, and led to speculations that the
Islamic Republic might be baiting Israel
into striking the facility, as a means of
unifying its suddenly divided electorate.
Others, meanwhile, have hypothesized
that the move was intended as yet another
bold confrontation with the West, in
an attempt to gain leverage in future
diplomatic negotiations.
As he’s done all along, whenever the
currency of clarity and forthrightness
are at an all-time high, Ahmadinejad
continues to sit idly by, and let the
speculation foment.
Dr. Strangelove? Or Dr. Strange?
So, is Ahmadinejad today’s Strangelove?
Not exactly. Does he aspire, in some
way, to step into Sellers’ role of
mad nuclear scientist? Not quite.
But is he as enigmatic and curiously
placed as Kubrick’s zany creation?
Absolutely. Then again, though, so is all
of Iran.
In many ways, Ahmadinejad and his life
stand as a microcosm of the current state
of Iran. His persona, like Iran’s nuclear
and foreign policies, is one shrouded in a
miasma of mystery.
His statements are often schizophrenic
and contradictory, reflective of a state
caught in the vortex between the pull of
22
 Features
religious conservatism and the ongoing
push toward Western ideals of modernity.
Like Strangelove on screen, Ahmedinejad
occupies a strange and peculiarly
precarious space in the international
political fiction we’ve engineered
around Iran. We’re never sure how
much sway Strangelove has over the US
administration, and we’ll never know the
extent of Ahmadinejad’s influence in Iran,
either. He’s neither an absolute authority,
nor a Wizard of Oz, relegated to rote,
behind-the-curtain duties.
And, as with Strangelove, he’s a nearly
impossible character to decode. Much as
the true extent of Iran’s nuclear progress
remains encased in an obscure box of
arcanum, so too does the “true” character
of Ahmadinejad remain blurred. As
with every major politician, it’s become
virtually impossible to separate the
three-dimensional human from the two-
dimensional image.
Even if we tried to derive a “pure” idea
of Ahmadinejad’s actual intentions, we
would have to disentangle the complex
web of power relations that govern the
Iranian presidency, the Supreme Leader,
and the Supreme National Security
Council. Even the most advanced
econometric evidence would be hard
pressed to isolate a pure “Ahmadinejad
factor” in the three-headed consensus-
based process that dictates Iran’s foreign
policy.
As in any film, though, we, as viewers,
must sacrifice some basic level of
objectivity. The only clay with which we
can mold a character is the raw material
before us—what we see on-screen, or read
across headlines. While we can certainly
deduce much from Ahmadinejad’s
actions, circumstantial context remains
paramount. The rhetoric may be fiery,
and his speeches may be hawkish, but
it’s critical to place Ahmadinejad’s recent
actions within the recently transformed
mise-en-scene against which he’s placed.
Ahmadinejad as Wallflower
Last July, for the first time in decades,
Iranian discontent coagulated and
manifested itself as palpable action. Now,
barely seven months removed from this
rupture, Ahmadinejad’s back is pressed
squarely against the wall. The Iranian
Issue 1549
regime last summer perhaps heard the
ominous drone of what Roger Cohen
described as “the death knell of an ossified
post-revolutionary order.”
In response, the Iranian leadership
has turned to the haven of uranium
enrichment. In ramping up the program,
and, more importantly, ramping up his
promotion of the program, Ahmadinejad
and his brass have made their intentions
blatantly clear.
Like Strangelove on
screen, Ahmadinejad
occupies a strange
and peculiarly
precarious space in
the international
political fiction
A “nuclear state,” in their eyes, is a world
player. By their ratiocination, a state that
“goes nuclear” against the wishes of
nearly every other government is even
more fiercely autonomous. Iran, like a
gambler watching his chips dwindle, has
now put everything on the table, and has
begun chanting an interminable chorus
of “Hit me!”—even as the Obamas,
Sarkozys and Merkels perched around the
blackjack table shake their heads.
Whether or not Iran actually plans on using
enriched uranium for militaristic purposes
remains unknown—perhaps even to
Iran’s own leadership. By Ahmadinejad’s
quasi-Buddhist philosophy, the journey
seems to outweigh the destination. It
seems that, for him, simply attaining,
or even attempting to attain nuclear
capacities might be enough of a roborant
to restore a state that’s recently shown
signs of frangibility.
The worry, however, is that simply
building capacity won’t be enough, and
that only international confrontation,
induced either passively or actively,
will placate an administration intent
upon regaining control over its country.
Defusing the Doctor?
We probably shouldn’t spend too much
time constructing doomsday endings for
our Iranian film script just yet. If anything,
we should take solace in the fact that we’re
not dealing with a Strangelove, but simply
with a man and a country that, at the moment,
are at a uniquely transitory inflection point
in their respective evolutionary arcs—a
prolonged mid-life crisis, if you will.
Does this mean we should treat the
threat of a nuclear Iran as nonchalantly
as Kubrick does? No. We should,
however, always keep ourselves firmly
grounded in the truth serum of context,
and realize that Ahmadinejad and
Iran, while certainly playing up the
role of defiant adolescent to the West’s
solicitous parent, are not de facto dangers.
Nor should we expect to see a transparent
Ahmadinejad anytime soon. Opaque
intentions shielded behind a poker-faced
President only raise Iran’s bargaining
value at the card table of international
diplomacy. Much like Peter Sellers,
Iran’s president is perfectly capable of
playing numerous archetypes, and of
sliding seamlessly between his blue-
collar “man of the people” and his
authoritarian “man of The Man” roles.
At the end of Strangelove, the wheelchair
bound doctor suddenly finds the will to
walk, and famously exclaims, “Mein
Fuhrer! I can walk!” just as the warheads
zero in on Russia.
Don’t expect a similar 180 from the
Iranian President.
Ahmadinejad may raise eyebrows. He’s
unquestionably controversial, and eternally
enigmatic. At the end of the day, though,
he’s no Dr. Strangelove. He’s just another
strange doctor, caught in a strange period
of upheaval. When we eventually debunk
the myth of “Ahmadinejad as Madman,”
we’ll all be able to stop worrying, and,
perhaps, begin reconsidering the “bomb”
at the epicenter of our Iranian screenplay.
Amar Toor is a Paris-based freelance
writer and consultant at the OECD.
The views expressed in this article are
those of the author, and do not reflect
the policy or views of the OECD.
23
15 March, 2010
News Analysis

Maliki leads
the Iraqi parliamentary race

Issue 1549 25
 News Analysis
Maliki leads the Iraqi parliamentary race
Shaky elections mark the beginning of Iraq’s pursuit of democracy
Wessam Sherif
D espite the dire
situation—terrorist
security
attacks
killed around 38 people, 6200
candidates from 86 factions stood in
Iraq’s parliamentary elections. The
elections have recorded a ground
breaking 62% turn up rate, making it
one of the biggest ever parliamentary
“battles” in the Middle East.
Partial preliminary results from
Iraq’s 18 districts have shown that
the incumbent Prime Minister has
maintained a sturdy lead over his rival
Ayad Allawi. Maliki's State of Law
coalition leads the parliamentary race
by bagging the votes in 7 provinces,
including Baghdad and the Shi'a
dominated Basra, while Allawi's al-
Iraqia coalition trails behind having
clenched 5 provinces. The battle in
the oil rich predominantly Sunni
district of Kirkuk between the Kurds
and the Arabs has surprisingly ended
with the victory of al-Iraqia, despite
15 March, 2010
expectations of
coalition victory.
the Kurdistania
According to the preliminary results,
it seems unlikely that any of the
commanding coalition will get the
needed majority of votes to form a
government. Consequently, al-Maliki
has already started talks with rival
parties in order to form a coalition
government, a process which could
take months before announcing a
new governmental structure.
The slow pace of vote counting has
led to the delay of the announcement
of the results more than once, which
has raised many eyebrows among the
opposition who claims that elections
might have been tainted by fraud. The
claims were backed by reports from
election monitors who highlighted
the interference of security forces in
rigging the votes by urging the voters
to vote for a specific list of candidates
in some provinces. The monitors
claim to have seen “a number of
security forces even within the voting
hall”.
The claims have been refuted by
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, who
urged the parties to respect the results
and refrain from making allegations
with providing substantial evidence.
Several Western countries have
backed al-Maliki up reiterating many
of the allegations might be nothing
more than attempts at discrediting the
polls by opposition parties.
The elections mark a Shiite electoral
battle between the two leading
coalition parties, the State of Law and
the more secular al-Iraqia coalition.
Results will be officially released by
the end of the current month. In the
meanwhile, many Western nations
have hailed what they called “the
success of the voting process”.
26
27
 Ideas

© getty images

15 March, 2010 28
 Everything
But A GameBy
Noam Schimmel

Issue 1549 29
 Ideas

Everything But A Game

Responding to Child Poverty in Egypt
Noam Schimmel

Despite making great strides in lowering child mortality rates, Egypt has a long way to go in improving the
living standards of its child citizens. The importance of assessing government run development programs is
highlighted when Egypt’s advances are compared to those of Morrocco. Despite sharing similar challenges, their
development trajectories may diverge substantially as a result of different government initiatives. Egypt should
focus on addressing the causes of child poverty rather than responding to these social challenges symptomatically.

An Egyptian boy plays with a ball at the poor area of al-Zabbalin in Cairo

© getty images

A boy, maybe ten or eleven years old,

eyes flashing with enthusiasm takes
me to the second floor of a shelter for
orphans and street children in Alexandria,
eager to show me his room. When we get
to his room he looks for something beside
his bed. Moments later, he hands me a
chocolate bar.
Many images linger from my visit to
community development projects in Egypt.
But it is the memory of this boy and his
desire to share even though he has very
little in the way of material things himself
that resonates most for me. His gratitude
at being given the chance to live in a safe
environment, with access to schooling and
adequate meals was palpable—it was more
than gratitude he was expressing, it was the
joy of dignity, respect, and opportunity.
Egypt has made great strides in lowering
child mortality rates. The UNICEF 2009
State of the World’s Children Report
illustrates the significance of these
improvements in child welfare indicators.
In 1990 Egypt had an under-five mortality
rate of 93 per 1,000 births and by 2007
this had more than halved to 36. Its infant
mortality rate for infants under the age of 1
stood at 68 in 1990. By 2007 it had dropped
to 30. Despite this progress, Egypt has a
long way to go to secure the human rights
of its child citizens.
In the 2009 State of the World’s Mothers
Report, issued by the NGO Save the
Children, Egypt ranks 22 on the Children’s
Index rank (which measures child welfare)
for what it classifies as “Tier two less
developed countries.” To put this in an
Arab states context, and this ranking is

15 March, 2010 30
 Ideas
significantly better than Syria’s ranking
of 55, Morocco’s ranking of 57, Libya’s
ranking of 46, and Algeria’s ranking of 41.
Only three Arab countries do significantly
better in this ranking than Egypt: Jordan,
Qatar and Bahrain.
However, these generally strong numbers
for Egypt are deceptive because Egypt fairs
very poorly when the overall welfare of
mothers and women are taken into account.
A child’s well being is deeply informed
by his/her mother’s access to education,
healthcare, economic resources, and equal
legal rights. With consistently poor results
in these rankings it is highly possible if not
likely that Egypt will lose momentum and
child welfare nationally will stagnate and
soon decline.
When the first UN Arab Human
Development Report was issued in 2002
it focused on three key deficits that were
preventing and slowing development in
the Arab world: access to knowledge and
education, women’s rights, and political
freedoms. These remain key areas of
concern. The lack of access to education
and the lack of women’s rights have a
particularly debilitating impact on children
as they perpetuate a poverty trap and the
marginalization of girls.
Egypt is unique in the Arab world and
faces exceptional human development
challenges because of the large size of its
population. Arab countries that have been
able to achieve major improvements in
child welfare tend to have both smaller
populations, such as Jordan, and are
significantly wealthier, such as Bahrain and
Qatar. It is helpful to compare Morocco, a
country with a similar GDP per capita as
Egypt’s (according to the World Bank’s
latest 2009 data, per-capita GDP stands at
$2,580 in Morocco and at $1,800 in Egypt)
with Egypt. Morocco, like Egypt, suffers
from extreme poverty and high income
inequality as well as an extensive problem
of unemployment. According to UNICEF,
its under-five mortality rate in 1990 was
very close to Egypt’s, standing at 89 per
1,000 births. By 2007 this had dropped
drastically to 34 per 1,000 births.
The development trajectories of Egypt
and Morocco may diverge substantially in
future years, however, as their governments
prioritize different areas for government
expenditure. Morocco currently seems
more invested in improving access to
information, promoting the rights of
women, and increasing educational
opportunity. If these areas receive sufficient
Issue 1549
funding and are developed sustainably they
are likely to yield significant improvements
in Moroccan human development and the
welfare of Moroccan children. Egypt’s
massive military expenditures in particular
undermine its capacity to combat poverty
effectively and to provide for the needs of
its children.
Although there is an enormous gap between
the needs of Egypt’s children to access their
human rights as established in the UN
Convention on the Rights of the Child:
including access to decent education,
healthcare, shelter and sanitation facilities,
and nutrition and Egyptian social realities,
there are also successful child centered
community development projects across
the country that are making a tangible
difference in the quality of life for Egyptian
children and youth.
A diverse group of NGOs are active in
Egypt working with children. Some work
under the auspices of large and familiar
international NGOs such as PLAN, Save
the Children, Oxfam, and CARE who
partner with local Egyptian NGOs. Others
are smaller NGOs without an international
affiliation.
The project with street children I visited
in Alexandria is sponsored by the child-
centered development NGO PLAN
International. Major areas PLAN has
focused its programming on include
increasing school attendance, the creation
of clubs where children have safe places
to read and play, promoting the rights of
girls and women, village savings and loans
programs, revitalization and expansion of
health and nutrition programs for children,
and improving access to clean water and
sanitation services.
PLAN places a unique emphasis on
educating children about their human
rights as children and providing them with
opportunities in the media, community
gatherings, and with government officials
to communicate their concerns, needs, and
experiences of human rights deprivations.
While working on a local level to provide
holistic support to children and to enable
them to realize their rights to survival,
development, and protection, PLAN
also strives to promote child welfare
on a larger scale across the nation..
Egypt’s greatest challenge is to scale up
interventions like PLAN’s community-
based programs and to use the financial
and human resources of the state to do so,
while coordinating them effectively. What
are now projects limited to relatively small
communities and reaching only a small
percentage of Egyptian children and youth
need to be expanded extensively. According
to Save the Children, 54% of girls in rural
Upper Egypt are not enrolled in school, for
example. Ensuring universal enrollment in
school for Egyptian children and improving
teaching methodologies—which are often
rote and involve memorization rather than
interactive learning, a more effective way
of engaging students—is one area the
Egyptian government needs to prioritize.
Some social challenges, such as the large
and growing population of street children
in Cairo and Alexandria are intricately
connected to an array of complex and
longstanding social problems: crime,
poverty, domestic violence and child abuse
that goes unpunished. There are many
projects in Egypt that address these problems
symptomatically rather than structurally,
i.e. drop-in centers for street children that
provide the immediate basic needs of
children and reduce their vulnerability but
do not address the underlying causes of
their homelessness. This is not to underplay
the importance of providing children that
are already living on the street with their
needs—rather, it is to emphasize that such
a response is by its very nature partial and
unlikely to lessen the number of children
migrating to the street nor the push factors
that cause them to do so.
The lack of an organized and well financed
government response in partnership with
civil society to structural causes of child
poverty and deprivation of child rights is
common throughout the developing world
and is not unique to Egypt. However, given
the huge child and youth population of
Egypt, the social, economic, and political
consequences of not finally addressing
this issue intensively and comprehensively
poses a threat to the stability of the Egyptian
state, in addition to the impoverishment
in both human and financial terms that it
causes to Egyptian society and Egypt’s
children in particular. Egypt’s success in
decreasing child mortality during the last
two decades indicates that there is cause for
hope. If political will matches the economic
and human resources that Egypt possesses
then the future of Egypt’s children will
better reflect their human rights, intrinsic
dignity, and potential to the benefit of
Egyptian society at large.
London-based researcher and human
rights practitioner with extensive
development experience in the field.
31
15 March, 2010 36
People

The Future of Democracy

in the Middle East
Daniel Brumberg, acting Director of the United States Institute of
Peace’s Muslim World Initiative

Issue 1549 33
 People - Interview

The Future of Democracy in the Middle East

Daniel Brumberg, acting Director of the United
States Institute of Peace’s Muslim World Initiative.
Professor Brumberg discusses with The Majalla the latest report by the United States Institute
of Peace. He raises questions regarding the appropriate measures that the US should put in place
to protect its security interests in the region, highlighting the role of democracy. Brumberg also
discusses the conditions that are necessary for liberalized autocracies to promote democratization.

© getty images

Daniel Brumberg is acting director

of the United States Institute of
Peace’s Muslim World Initiative.
Brumberg is also an associate
professor at Georgetown university
and a former senior associate at the
Carnegie Endowment’s Democracy
and Rule of Law Project. His research
focuses on issues of democratization
and political reform in the Middle
East and wider Islamic world.
With a grant from the MacArthur
Foundation, he is currently working
on a comparative study of power-
sharing experiments in Algeria,
Kuwait and Indonesia. A brief review
of his most recent publication with the
United States institute of Peace was
published last week on The Majalla.
The Majalla: Do you believe there
is an incompatibility between
Islam and Democracy?
No, I don’t think there is an essential
incompatibility between the two. It is
the case that in any religious system—
whether it is Judaism, Christianity or
Islam—if a government is supposed
to be based on religious precepts
there is going to be a certain tension.
I think democracy faces a broader
problem that is not related to Islam.
Religious ideas do not sit very well
with democracy because religion, by
its very nature, insists on very strict
notions of moral life. If you look at
studies that compare the Arab world
to the Islamic world, you will see that
where you have Muslim majority
societies such as Indonesia and
Senegal, in which democracy is done
remarkably well, there is no evidence
to suggest that it is the Islamic nature
of Muslim majority societies that
accounts for the presence or absence
of democracy. There is some aspect
of Arab politics and the Middle East
that is to account for the phenomenon
and not Islam itself.
Q: What processes do you think
are necessary for political reform
in the Middle East?
Political reform is not a new
phenomenon in the Middle East,
it did not begin with the Bush

15 March, 2010
34
 People - Interview
administration’s effort to promote
it. In fact, there was a long legacy
of state instigated political reform
that goes back many decades.
The primary example of that is
Egypt in the 70’s and the political
liberalization undertaken by the
late President Amar Sadat. This is
a good example of how regimes
have used and invoked political
reform not as a mechanism for actual
democratization, but actually as a
mechanism for holding on to power.
So political reform as an instrument
of state power is an old phenomenon
in many Middle East states, not all,
but many.
The question that I am interested in,
and the question that the USIP report
tackles on reform and security is the
extent to which the state managed
game of political change—in which
the state defines the rules for political
change— can go beyond by a game
that is largely defined by the state and
move towards a pattern of political
reform that is much more substantive
and has a basis in the society itself.
Q: Is political reform in the Middle
East then primarily a bottom up or
top down process?
It has to be both, in part because of
the extent to which the boundaries
of reform have been determined
by states and regimes. Yet the US
has based its hopes for democratic
change in the Middle East largely on
the hope that civil society groups and
NGOs, through their own activism
and their own actions, will be able to
compel regimes to engage in political
reform. That hope, what we call in
our field a demand side approach—
that demand is coming from civil
society—has not been fulfilled.
There has to be a supply of democratic
change from above. Therefore
regimes have to see beyond the
limits of reform that they have so far
imposed, and that means a form of
political liberalization that is wider.
It also implies a genuine dialogue
between regimes and opposition.
Not the kind of dialogues you had
between Egypt and elsewhere
which are choreographed by the
state. That’s typical of the region.
Regimes are constantly engaging in
dialogues but they are mostly really
monologues, not dialogues with a
goal of defining a political formula
that moves beyond the boundaries of
state managed political reform.
There has to be a
supply of democratic
change from above.
Therefore regimes
have to see beyond
the limits of reform
that they have so far
imposed
Q: How do you explain the ability
of liberalized autocracies to endure
despite predications of their
inevitable downfall?
There are several reasons why they
have succeeded so far. These regimes
are not based solely on coercion
and force. They provide goods and
services, and they provide patronage,
they have their own organized
constituencies. They are able to buy
political support to some extent by
distributing all kinds of favours and
goodies from the state. So they are
not really coercive in that sense,
they are patron states. But also these
regimes extend the kind of protection
to various groups in society. It’s
a kind of protection in which the
regime guarantees the safety of
all groups, particularly those non-
Islamist groups who are afraid of the
outcome of a fully democratic game.
What the state does is essentially
liberalize but not democratize.
Therefore you can participate but
not face the possibility of an election
in which you or your allies will
be politically isolated. Algeria is a
great example: the regime extends
protection to non-Islamist groups
afraid of going back to the elections
of 1988-89. So non-Islamist groups
get protection from these regimes,
but so do Islamist groups. That’s
the name of the game, you have to
protect everybody.
Even the Egyptian state, which does
not allow the Ikhuwan-ul-Muslamin
to establish their own political party,
is very god at co-opting the Islamist
message in the regime itself. It
also has had a section of the NDP
extend support to Islamists and
to conservative Muslim leaders.
States are good at creating their own
constituencies and playing them off
one against the other. It’s a divide
and rule tactic, but these tactics
are in part made possible because
they are based on the fact that
there are constituencies that prefer
the status quo of state managed
liberalization over the black hole of
full democratization. That’s really
what counts.
Q: For the case of Iran, what
type of political struggle do you
think would promote democracy?
Iran is in some sense a mirror image
of the case of the Arab world. In the
Arab world you have semi-secular
regimes that extend protection to
all kinds of groups but particularly
non-Islamist groups—bureaucrats,
the business community, secular
intellectual. In Iran it’s a regime rule
by Islamists, and they extend the
protection of an autocratic state to
their constituencies and the clergy,
the true believers, the hardliners who
want to maintain a close relationship
between mosque and state. As a result
those who control the Iranian state
speak not simply for themselves,
but also for a constituency of several
million or more for whom any
political liberalization is a threat
because liberalization is seen as
35
 People - Interview
Algerian rescue workers and bomb experts stand in front of a destroyed building near the United
Nations refugee agency (UNHCR) offices
opening the door to the non-Islamist
opposition. Iran is a highly divided
society and it is ruled by an elite that
sees any form of democratization
as a slippery slope towards its own
downfall. As a consequence there
is no real incentive from those in
power to make any concessions to
the opposition. The problem is that
the opposition doesn’t really have the
power to bring down the regime. The
most likely scenario will be one of
conflict and stalemate for some time,
maybe even years.
Q: How do you assess policies
from the West towards Iran that
encourage sanctions? Do they
promote change, or do they do
more harm than good?
Broad based sanctions, or what we
call crippling sanctions, hurt the
opposition more than the regime. As
a result, broad based sanctions on
say imported gas are probably very
counterproductive in terms of any
resolution of the conflict between
the regime and the opposition, and in
their ability to provide some measure
of political liberalization. Target
sanctions which are the coercive
apparatus in the revolutionary
15 March, 2010
© getty images
guard make a lot more sense. These
would probably be supported by
the opposition. But broad based
sanctions such as the kind that are
supported by the US Congress are
going to hurt the opposition much
more than help them.
Q: What kind of target sanctions, in
this case, would be most effective?
Economic and financial sanctions on
the capacity of elements within the
revolutionary guard to do business
overseas, to import technology and
capital, and to essentially service their
own constituencies within the security
apparatus would be most effective.
Some of those targeted sanctions
have been proposed by Congress and
are getting more attention. Those are
the kind of sanctions that the Obama
administration is now supporting. In
fact that the Obama administration
has come out and said that the
broader sanctions in Congress are
wrong and counter-productive. There
are a set of ideas in sanctions that
can help more than they can hurt.
Sanctions for the Congress are a way
of making a statement in support of
the opposition but it’s a statement
that can do more harm than good.
Q: The US has made various
efforts to promote democracy in
the Middle East. Do you think any
of these have efforts have had the
long term benefits that the US was
looking for?
Under the Bush administration
there was both much continuity
with previous administrations, and
yet somewhat of a break. The break
came in the form of the language of
US support for democracy and the
substance of our policies. Under the
Bush administrations we began to
speak to states much more clearly
about the need for reform. At the
same time we supported civil society
groups. So this equation which I
mentioned before—the demand
side reform vs. supply side—was
addressed by the Bush administration.
The problem there was that there was
a real hesitancy, once Islamist made
advances in Egypt and Palestine,
to support the pressure on regimes.
The last two years of the Bush
administration were spent reverting
to the more traditional US policy to
rely on civil society groups instead
of pressuring regimes themselves.
We are probably now back on that
traditional policy.
It is a policy that is largely risk free
because we promote political reform
by supporting civil society groups
which don’t really have the capacity
to force regimes to change. We can
appear to be supporting democracy
without jeopardizing our relationship
with regimes—the cake and eat it too
strategy.
So we had a period of two to three
years under the Bush administration
which turns out to be in retrospect
quite exceptional. Even during the
last two years of the administration
we were back to a policy of
supporting political reform and not
democracy, because they are not the
same. Whether we are ready now
to walk the walk and really support
democracy instead of patterns of
political change that are ultimately
36
 People - Interview
determined by regimes remains to be
seen.
Q: Implicit in your answer is the
possibility that even a democratic
country would not be US friendly.
Is that the case?
That is a possibility. Governments,
including the United States, do not
like uncertainty, especially in the
diplomatic field. But we really don’t
know what the foreign policy of
regimes in the region would look like
if Islamist played an important part
in the regimes as a consequence of
elections. Elections leading to power
sharing arrangements that would
be inclusive of Islamists wouldn’t
necessarily change the foreign policy
of these regimes because that power
sharing formula would have to be
negotiated. It is also unlikely that
if Islamist had a stronger role in
government in either Egypt or Jordan,
that they would scrap their peace
treaties with Israel. Also, we don’t
know what any of these dynamics
would look like in the context of a
successful peace process between
Israel and Palestine. Its probably the
case that there can be no real progress
in terms of democratization in the
region in the absence of a parallel
effort to bring the Arab-Israeli
conflict to a successful resolution and
a just one.
Q: What policies do you think
are necessary for Afghanistan to
build its credibility and improve its
stability?
The problem with Afghanistan is that
you have had elections in the absence
of a strong state. In the absence of a
state that has a strong legitimacy,
elections are bound to be really about
the distribution of patronage, like
the paying off of war lords, than it is
about strengthening the legitimacy of
the state. So you need a functioning
army, you need to fight corruption,
you need patterns of government
that are legitimate and efficient for
democracy to work. The effort to
Issue 1549
fix the state by democracy alone, to
some extent, flipped the formula.
The problem with
Afghanistan is that
you have had elections
in the absence of a
strong state. In the
absence of a state
that has a strong
legitimacy, elections
are bound to be really
about the distribution
of patronage
For example if you have a military
preying upon the local population,
all the elections in the world would
probably strengthen forces opposed
to the state because the state is seen
as predatory. That doesn’t mean
the democratic process should
be suspended, but that in parallel
with that process, there should be a
focus on issues of economic reform,
education, corruption, governance
and so on. If you don’t do that,
democracy will probably be de-
stabilising instead of stabilizing.
Q: Will the surge in troops in
Afghanistan by the US be able to
achieve its intended objectives?
I doubt it. I think the surge
planned is probably inadequate
for achieving the strategic aims
defined by the administration. I
hope that I will be proven wrong. It
seems to me that politically it was
impossible to make the argument
for a larger surge than the one
defined by the administration and
they will try to make it work within
the troop increase, but considering
the timework defined, we have a
very limited window of opportunity
to strengthen the state and the army
giving them a capacity to both
address the Taliban militarily and
politically. The goal is not simply
to decimate the Taliban but have
a military strong enough to force
them to negotiate, but that requires
a military that is strong well trained
and doesn’t depend ultimately on
the US. That is a lot to accomplish
in the timeframe established by the
Obama administration. We’ll have
to keep our fingers crossed.
Q: How do you assess the
upcoming elections in Iraq,
especially considering the
disqualification of candidates
allegedly affiliated to the Baath
party?
I think if the disqualification
isn’t overruled [the decision was
postponed until after the elections]
its going to do great harm to the
legitimacy of the elections. If
the Sunni community is given a
reason to boycott the elections it
increases the readiness of some
Sunni actors to go back to the old
days with an insurgency against
the regime. That will increase the
fear factor of the Shiite community
and undermine prospects of Sunni-
Shiite reconciliation. In the last
year we have seen this pattern
where the two sides go to the brink
and then step back from it, we may
still see it but if they don’t step
back this disqualification is going
to really harm the election process.
If it’s not thrown out we may see an
election that is seen by the Sunni
community as illegitimate. Al
Qaeda and its mobile operatives are
resorting to the use of bombings to
rekindle the civil war that occurred
in Iraq. That hasn’t happened
because Shia leaders haven’t taken
the bait, but this disqualification
makes the process of reconciliation
difficult.
Interview conducted by Paula
Mejia
37
 People - Profile

An American powerbroker heading to Syria

Robert Stephen Ford, the next US Ambassador to Syria
Robert Ford, the new US envoy to Damascus, is a crafty behind-the-scenes powerbroker. He is one
of the foremost Arabists of the US Foreign Service, played an important role in Iraq, and spent two
years in Algeria. His mission is a tough one. He will seek that Syria facilitates regional stability, and
will try to lure Syria away from Iran’s sphere, while Israel ratchets its bellicose language against
Damascus. The question is—will he handle the spotlight?

© getty images

R obert Stephen Ford, the next

US ambassador to Syria
following a five-year absence, is
“an avid reader of history and a
diplomat.” That’s how he describes
himself in his Amazon profile.
What this discreet career diplomat
doesn’t say is that he has become
one of the foremost Arabists of the
US foreign service, crawling up
the ladder over the last quarter of a
century, mostly in Arab countries.
He’s a savvy powerbroker who
has quietly bent Middle Eastern
politics, most noticeably in Iraq.
But for the first time, Mr. Ford will
be operating under a spotlight as
he tries to lure Syria away from
Iran, all while Israel ratchets
its bellicose language against
Damascus. Will he take the heat?
Mr. Ford will not be arriving to
rekindle a friendship, either. After
all, Syria was included in Bush’s
era “Axis of evil” in 2002, and it
gained world pariah status for its
yet unclear role in the murder of
former Lebanese Prime Minister
Rafiq Hariri on February 14, 2005.
US sanctions are still in place. But
Damascus has regained much of
its clout in the region since.
President Bashar al Assad has
mended ties with his Arab
neighbors, without surrendering
them with Tehran, and he is
cozying up to regional powerhouse
Turkey to increase his bargaining
power in the standoff with Israel.
To be sure, Syria convinced
western diplomats it can play
both ways. The invisible hand of
Damascus has been credited with
convincing Hamas to accept the
Arab-proposed peace offering
to Israel, with easing sectarian
tensions in Iraq via Sunni
politicians, and with Hezbollah’s
recent shows of restraint, both
inside and outside Lebanon.
President Barack Obama, unlike
his predecessor, does not demand
that Syria sever its relations to
Iran, Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah and

15 March, 2010 38
 People - Profile
Hamas. But he does want Syria to
facilitate regional stability.
And that’s where the new
ambassador comes in, probably
this summer, after the Senate
confirms the nomination.
Ford has an impressive track
record when it comes to brokering
solutions against all odds.
Working behind the scenes as
counselor of political affairs of
the US Embassy in Baghdad, he
has been credited with playing
a critical role in mending Iraqi
sectarian divisions in every single
milestone: the January 2005
elections, the establishment of
the transition government, the
writing of the new constitution,
the October 2005 referendum, the
December 2005 national elections,
and the 2009 provincial elections.
Initially after the 2003 invasion,
Mr. Ford was sidelined by
Washington hawks who saw little
need for co-opting Iraqis into
collaborating. But his knowledge
was critical when the Bush
administration backtracked to
reincorporate Sunnis back into
the political mainstream. In Iraq
he also apparently reinforced his
democratic idealism. Back in
2006, during an online chat with
Americans when he worked in
the US embassy he said: “There
are two forces at work in the
Arab world now: those who
want more freedom of choice
and religious fundamentalists
who want to shut choice off.”
Before returning to Iraq in 2008
to his current post as deputy head
of mission, he was ambassador in
Algeria for two years. His record
there is mixed. US interests
were well served, bilateral trade
boomed, and he led a return to
good diplomatic relations.
But he was also harshly criticized
Issue 1549
for intruding in internal affairs.
Algiers protested his embassy’s
apparent premature warning of
a terrorist attacks in 2007, which
triggered chaos in the capital, to
the point official media demanded
that he be expelled. But that
seemed more of an excuse.
Ford was pivotal
in negotiating a
bilateral nuclear
cooperation deal,
an experience
that could well
serve Syria if
indeed insists on
developing its own
program
What really made the government
uncomfortable was his willingness
to meet opposition groups openly.
It’s hard to say whether that
was just an academic exercise
or a calculated move to support
democratic engagement. But
doing so in Syria would be a bigger
gamble. Regardless, in two years
he steered US-Algerian relation
to new highs, economically and
diplomatically.
He was pivotal in negotiating
a bilateral nuclear cooperation
deal, an experience that could
well serve Syria if indeed insists
on developing its own program,
especially when the other tender
could well come from Tehran.  But how quickly they return
Ford’s priority is to sway Syria
into isolating Iran, probably
unattainable considering historic
and economic bonds. But he could
certainly play a significant role
in one of the most destabilizing
elements in the region: the
Golan Heights. His negotiating
expertise could come in handy
in Syrian peace talks with Israel
that would have far-reaching
ripple effects from Lebanon
to Palestine, especially now
that Tel Aviv has intensified its
saber-rattling against Damascus.
Syria could also be critical in
any future agreement between
Palestinian factions, as well as
reconciliation in Lebanon, via its
ties to Hamas and Hezbollah. It’s
equally decisive to Iraq’s future,
not only by reigning in militant
Baathist operating from its
territory, but by simply securing its
borders. Ford will also be tasked
with cementing US influence
in the country by strengthening
bilateral economic ties. Syria
is also a key transit territory
into Europe for Middle Eastern
gas from Egypt, Iraq, and Iran.
Ford has an arts and masters degree
from Johns Hopkins School, where
he specialized in economy and
international studies. He served in
the Peace Corps in Morocco, his
first exposure to Muslim countries.
He joined the foreign service as
an economics officer in 1985
and built his diplomatic career
in Turkey, Egypt, Cameroon,
and Bahrain, where he served as
the deputy chief before he was
sent to Iraq for the first time. He
has multiple awards and speaks
Arabic, French, Turkish, and
German. His wife Alison Barkley
is also a US diplomat working in
the Iraqi embassy. Their official
home is Baltimore, Maryland.
will depend on how he handles
the spotlight of reestablishing
relations with Damascus. For now,
his slate, like Syria’s, is clean.
39
15 March, 2010
 Economics
International Investor Markets

When Sanctions Work

By
Andrés Cala

Issue 1549 41
 Economics - International Economics

When Sanctions Work

Iran braces for an end to subsidies
Andrés Cala
The populist government of Iran has been pressured into modernizing its economy by phasing out costly
subsidies. Although past leaders have been unwilling to withstand the burden that the change in policies will
entail, the prospect of crippling sanctions by the West has aligned its leadership in support of a 5 year subsidy
reform plan. The reforms will save the country $100 billion USD a year in subsidies, while correcting market
distortions, strengthening the middle class and diversifying the country's economy. This progress however will
not come with out challenges, as a rise in costs will likely be followed by inflation.

Iranians walk in a poor neighbourhood in the town of Ghaleh Hassan Khan on the southwestern outskirts of Tehran
© getty images

N Iton is Iran
ironic that Western pressure
will be responsible
for accomplishing the unthinkable:
convincing the populist government of
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to
phase out costly subsidies and modernize
the country’s stagnant economy.
For decades, the high echelons of
Teheran’s political sphere have been
debating on how and when to address the
economy’s Achilles’ heel, but no leader
has so far been willing to take the political
blow, least of all Ahmadinejad. The
growing reality of “crippling sanctions”,
however, has finally lined up the
respective powers–the Supreme Leader,
Parliament (also known as Majlis), the
Central Bank, and the government.
This month, Iran is set to begin the
implementation of its five-year subsidy
reform plan, with a particular emphasis
on energy products. The ultimate goal is
to save up to $100 billion annually that
should, if the policy that accompanies the
plan is implemented correctly, help Iran
modernize its economy and make it less
vulnerable.
Geopolitics aside, the plan will no doubt
be painful and risky. Nevertheless, it
remains a necessary evil that will serve
to correct severe market distortions,
strengthen a rising middle class, and
diversify the productive sector away
from oil dependence.
The plan is not new either. The
International Monetary Fund, the
World Bank, Iran’s Central Bank, and
just about all economists have been
advising Iran–and most other Middle
Eastern countries—to do so for some
time. In fact, Iraq has already phased
out most of fuel subsidies, regardless
of its oil wealth. If done correctly, this
will no doubt strengthen and modernize
Iran’s economy, without abandoning the
poorest to their fate.
The Economic Reform Plan, as it is
known, became law in January after
intense wrangling. Implementation is
expected at the beginning of the next
Iranian year (March 21), along with the
new budget and Iran’s new five-year
plan.
Subsidies on oil derivatives, natural
gas, electricity, water, food, health
and education will be phased out.
Savings of $20 billion annually, which
will total $100 billion at the end of
the five-year plan, will be managed
by the government, but supervised

15 March, 2010 42
 Economics - International Economics
by the Supreme Iranian Audit Court,
which oversees government spending.
A portion of the saved money will be
used to compensate low-income families
with cash for their extra expenses, a
form of explicit subsidies favored by the
International Monetary Fund.
The biggest savings are expected
from oil derivates, which make the
bulk of government subsidies. The
cost of products such as fuel will be
benchmarked to Gulf international prices,
with a maximum 10 percent discount
allowed. Consumer prices of gas, water,
and electricity will also be matched with
production costs.
Until now the government has indirectly
subsidized energy prices by regulating
what consumers pay regardless of
international market prices or production
costs of state energy companies. This has
contributed to creating a huge hole the
budget equal to more than 20 percent of
the country’s GDP.
It also promotes wasteful demand,
especially from the largest consumers
such as industry and wealthier households
which squander resources because of
their low cost. Demand for fuel, gas,
and electricity have soared, making Iran
increasingly dependent on costly foreign
imports, and creating disincentives to
exports.
In the case of natural gas, for example,
distortions in energy markets cause Iran
to miss around 20 percent of its GDP in
potential natural gas sales, according to
the IMF. This stands in stark contrast with
Iran’s ambitious foreign policy objectives
given the significant geopolitical clout
that would accompany higher natural gas
exports.
Productivity is also imperiled as a result
of subsidizing. Unrealistic low industrial
energy costs kill the need to improve
industrial efficiency, thus making
Iranians products generally of lower
quality, despite at times being more
expensive than foreign ones. Iranian
products thus loose international market
appeal.
Low gasoline prices have also led to
increased smuggling across borders.
Authorities estimate that as much as 17
percent of local fuel production—equal
to almost 11 million gallons a day—is
Issue 1549
lost this way.
Urgency to phase out subsidies is also
the result of Ahmadinejad’s populist
policies, which are blamed for rampant
inflation and high unemployment. Their
exponential danger was exposed as the
global economic crisis sent oil prices
plummeting and the government was
forced to use its reserves, without local
demand being curtailed.
The subsidy agreement comes as the
West—led by the U.S.—increased
diplomatic pressure to ratchet sanctions
on Tehran over its defiant nuclear
program. Ahmadinejad, who still faces
strong internal dissent and turmoil over
his reelection last year—believed to
have been at least partially rigged—
ordered uranium enrichment 20 percent
above the threshold needed for scientific
purposes. Weapon grade uranium is over
90 percent enriched.
Ahmadinejad’s subsidy reform plan
has also raised skepticism within Iran,
where it is seen as a ploy to garner more
support for his faction. He has fought for
full control of the savings, even as the
Majlis has tried to curb interventionism.
The budget proposal, which parliament
still has to approve, is based on oil prices
at $60 a barrel, significantly above the
$37.5 per barrel used last year. The nearly
$370 billion budget is almost 25 percent
higher than last year’s $298 billion.
The skepticism was refueled recently
after Ahmadinejad surprised parliament
by including $40 billion of expenditure
in the budget that would be paid with
savings generated through subsidy
reductions, according to Iranian media.
While the president backtracked after the
Majlis rejected the move—reminding
the president that the plan called for $20
billion of savings annually—concerns
that Ahmadinejad could mismanage
funds appear well-rooted.
The issue is still uncertain, as many
things are in Iran until their final
approval. The plan suggest that almost
half of the savings will be redistributed
as targeted subsidies to the most poor,
another 30 percent will go to improving
energy efficiency, and the remaining 20
percent will be kept by the government to
offset losses in state-owned companies.
How the reforms are applied remains
the question and ultimately a risk.
In terms of unrest, some 40 percent
of Iranians are below the poverty
line and at least 11 percent of
the population is unemployed.
Mishandling the subsidy reform plan
thus implies huge risks to internal
stability. Government mismanagement
could be costly, especially in the
current political environment.
But the biggest risk really is related to
inflation. Suddenly cutting subsidies
means that prices will increase and that
inflation will follow. That is manageable
if done correctly though.
Current inflation stands at single digits,
a great accomplishment considering that
only a year ago it fluctuated between 20
and 30 percent. The IMF has also argued
that inflation doesn’t have to accompany
the subsidy reform plan. Malaysia, for
example, increased prices of diesel more
than 80 percent and kerosene almost 70
percent, accompanied by a 4 percent
deflation. There are similar examples,
although not as successful, in Indonesia,
and Turkey that reinforce the importance
of policy when cutting subsidies.
If anything, that illustrates that proper
handling of subsidy-cutting benefit to
the economy. In Iran’s case, of course,
this will depend on how reform will be
managed.
Ahmadinejad appears to have a plan, at
least on paper. “Emphasizing a reduction
of dependence on oil revenues and an
increase of non-oil revenues, with a focus
on industry, agriculture and housing —
these are among the main attributes of the
bill,” he said when presenting his budget.
Public investment on construction
accounts for $110 billion, for example.
The real challenge, though, is diversifying
the economy as much as possible.
“I would not want to pass up a unique
opportunity offered by a populist
administration courageous enough to
raise prices to market levels. The icing
on the cake will be if the government
can combine price reform with achieving
a greater equality in the distribution of
income,” wrote earlier this month in his
blog Djavad Salehi-Isfahani, a Dubai
Initiative research fellow at the Belfer
Center for Science and International
Affairs at Harvard University.
Madrid based freelance journalist
43
 Economics - International Investor
The Future Remains Unwritten
Does the Doha Round still have a future?
The Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations is stuck. A big part of the reason is the misconceptions present at
the launch of the round. Member countries will most likely have to readjust their expectations if the round is to be
concluded.
I The classical model for multilateral
trade negotiations would include trade
liberalisation through tariff reductions and
elimination of non-tariff barriers. This model
includes an expectation of active participation
by around 40 countries—accounting for 90%
of world trade. Among other consequences,
many GATT members in the 1960s and 1970s
were thus peripheral to the process. This led
to skewed results with much less progress in
areas where developing countries had a major
interest, but where the main players had a
defensive attitude, such as agriculture and
textiles.
The Doha Round began with a similar model
and two major differences: first, following
progress in tackling other types of barrier,
there was heavy emphasis on the need to
deal with trade distortions—especially the
effects of export and domestic subsidies in the
agricultural sector in the USA and in Europe.
Second, the active number of participants had
swelled to potentially 120 or more.
Over more than eight years – November
2001 to March 2010 – the negotiations have
limped along with moments of progress amid
long periods of stalemate or failure: deadlines
not respected, discussions collapsed with no
result. A strong concentration on two sectors,
agriculture and NAMA (non-agricultural
market access) tariff cuts, failed to produce an
agreed outcome; and also failed to generate
the needed progress in other areas such as
services, rules or intellectual property, which
might have led to a more balanced deal.
There is doubt at least on whether the Doha
Round will have a successful outcome. So
why is that?
The most obvious factor is that the negotiators
have been trying for so long to forge a deal
acceptable to the 150 or so WTO members
with a conspicuous lack of success. Even
before the Round was launched in Doha, Qatar
in late 2001, there had already been a collapse
of talks in Seattle in 1999. A second collapse
happened in Cancun, Mexico in 2003, when
negotiations were already well under way.
Since then, a further Ministerial Conference
in 2005 barely allowed the Round to survive,
with little real progress; and there have been
15 March, 2010
Roderick Abbott
further setbacks in 2007 and in 2008 and
virtually no progress at all in 2009—the first
full year of the Obama Administration.
As a major contributory factor to these regular
stalemate situations one would mention, first,
that the negotiating model, designed at the
end of the 1990s, no longer fits the needs
of the members. An effort was made at the
Doha conference to re-engineer the model
in a more development friendly direction—
hence the other title for the Round, the Doha
Development Agenda or DDA—but this too
was not very satisfactory. It raised excessive
expectations that poverty and marginalisation
outside world trade would be attacked, but
there was no real substance to the effort which
would make that happen.
Second one would have to cite a lack of
effective leadership, whether at the highest
political level (G8 or G20 summits) or among
the main players in the negotiation. When the
membership rose rapidly after the Uruguay
Round there was no immediate move to
find a successor group to the Quadrilateral
(USA, EC, Japan and Canada) which had
previously exercised leadership. The G20
group of agricultural exporters was only
formed in 2003, and this has slowly morphed
into smaller groups (G.4 with sometimes G.5
or G.6); but they have proved unable to work
out the shape of a negotiating compromise that
different groups of countries with diverging
interests can all accept. On the contrary,
members are more and more divided into
groups with mutually exclusive aims – for
and against tariff preferences, for example;
some focussed on agricultural exports while
others (net importers) argue for food security.
A third major factor would be the aim for
“an ambitious and balanced” outcome which
now appears to be beyond the reach of most
participants. A quick look at the negotiating
complexities in the NAMA sector and in
the effort to reduce domestic subsidies in
agriculture will be enough to prove the point.
Modalities/flexibilities/special products/
variable coefficients: clearly the process has
become too sophisticated (and complicated)
and needs to be simplified and made more
manageable.
So is there still a solution that can be found?
Many observers in the academic world and
the media have written the Round off, with
vivid language that includes long years of
intensive care, ending in ‘rotting corpses’
and the crematorium. The author is a little
more positive; the Round can still be saved
but ONLY if leading countries realise that
the ambitious original targets of liberalisation
set in 2001 are no longer possible. Currently
the major countries are hitting their heads
against a brick wall, and there is little or no
political will to make an effort to circumvent
the obstacles. The WTO has embarked on
its own stocktaking exercise to see what can
be achieved in 2010; but in my view a scaled
down version, with a phase one now and a
phase two later, looks like the best alternative
option.
A more realistic and sustainable target for
tariff reductions and market access, coupled
with commitments to freeze present spending
levels on agricultural subsidies and gradually
reduce from that level, is required. Less
rigorous tariff cutting formulae will lead to
fewer exceptions and fewer special deals to
take account of specific features of individual
countries. It will be less ambitious than
planned – sure – but it could be achieved and
would be better than a total failure. At this
time, however, ideas such as this still cause
political indigestion in Washington and in
Brussels, although they might appeal more in
Delhi or Beijing.
Former Deputy Director General at DG
Trade in the European Commission and
Deputy Director General at the World
Trade Organization
44
 Now you can follow the majalla anywhere anytime on your
Issue 1549
 Economics - Behind the Graph

Islamic Finance Vis a Vis the Financial Crisis

Measuring by Shari'a compli-
ant assets estimates the glo-
bal market for Islamic finan-
cial services to have reached
$951bn by the end of 2008 re-
cording a 25% increase from
2007's $758bn. The global
market for Islamic financial
services has however experi-
enced a suspension in 2009
following steady growth in
the previous years. The as-
sets are majorly constituted
of commercial banks comple-
mented by investment banks,
sukuk issues, funds and taka-
ful. Islamic finance may have
been less vulnerable towards
the global financial crisis, yet
obstacles still lay in the path
of the Sukuk market which
fell back in 2008, recovering
the following year to reach
$20bn issuance.

Geographic Distribution of Islamic Finance

Malaysia, Iran and GCC countries take up most of the shares of Global Is-
lamic Finance, yet that market has not seized to expand. Islamic finance's
reach is spreading beyond its conventional boundaries to reach new terri-
tories. Countries in the Middle East such as Turkey, Sudan, Egypt, Jordan
and Syria have steadily growing Islamic finance, in addition to several
Asian countries such as Indonesia, Hong Kong, Singapore, Pakistan and
China. Furthermore, the ethical and environmental basis of Islamic fi-
nance has also attracted a significant customer base in Western countries
such as the US, France, Germany and the UK. The customer base in these
countries is not solely restricted to the indigenous Muslim populations.

Source: The Banker

Steady growth for Islamic Funds

Islamic funds have been growing continuously where Shari'a compliant
funds have risen to 680 funds by the end of 2008, which is over triple the
number of funds in 2003. The total value of these of funds is estimated
by Ernst and Young to have grown from $20bn in 2003 to $44bn in 2008.
Equity funds account for 40% of funds, with fixed income 16% and real
estate and private equity 13% while cash, commodities and other funds
make up the balance. 58% of the funds is invested in the Middle East and
Africa, 20% is invested globally, 15% in Asia and 6% in America. The
size of Islamic funds is small where two thirds is less than $100m and,
most of which attracting only $10m to $15m.

Source: Ernst & Young Islamic Funds & Investments

Report 2009

Sukuk recovery problems

The issuance of Sukuk jumped from 1$bn a year in 2002 to $34bn
in 2007. The slowdown in the global capital market activity in
2008 has led to a sharp decrease in the issue of Sukuk to $15bn. Q4
of 2008 has witnessed Sukuk issuance rise from its trough of $6bn
in Q3 to a $20bn recording a 30% increase. The financing problems
at Dubai World have lead to the creation of uncertainties bearing
in mind that most issuers in 2009 have been government or quasi
government organizations. Quality Sukuk issuers still continue to
attract demand from Islamic and non-traditional investors despite
concerns. Hindering Sukuk market GCC is blamed on troubled in-
vestment companies, real estate market in the UAE and the credit
deficiency in Saudi Arabia.
Source: Zawya Sukuk Monitor, Islamic Financial
Information Service, Moody's

15 March, 2010 46
 BRIC House.
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Economics - Index
Markets
Page

Industrail Prices
Output Unemployment
Production
Latest qtr 2009 2010 Latest Year Ago 2009 rate latest
Latest
United States -2.6 Q3 +2.2 -2.5 +2.8 -2.0 Dec +2.7 Dec 0.1 -0.3 10.0 Dec
United Kingdom -5.1 Q3 -1.2 -4.7 +1.5 -6.0 Oct +2.9 Dec +3.1 +2.1 7.8 Nov
France -2.3 Q3 +1.0 -2.2 +1.6 -3.8 Nov +0.9 Dec +1.0 +0.1 10.0 Nov
Germany -4.8 Q3 +2.9 -4.7 +1.9 -8.0 Nov +0.9 Dec +1.1 +0.3 8.1 Dec
Euro Area -4.1 Q3 +1.5 -3.9 +1.4 -7.9 Nov +0.9 Dec +1.6 +0.3 10.0 Nov
Japan -5.1 Q3 +1.3 -5.3 +1.5 -4.2 Nov -1.9 Nov +1.0 -1.3 5.2 Nov
UAE +7.4 2008 na -0.2 +2.4 na +0.7 Nov +7.2 +2.5 na
Barhain +6.1 2008 na +3.0 +3.7 na +1.6 Dec +5.1 +3.0 na
Oman +7.9 2008 na +4.0 +3.8 na +0.8 Nov +12.7 3.3 na
Qatar +16.4 2008 na +11.5 +18.5 na -9.9 Dec 13.2 0 0.3 Dec
Kuwait +2.5 2008 na +4.7 +4.4 na na 6.8 +4.7 na
Saudi Arabia +4.8 2008 na -1.0 +3.2 na +4.0 Nov +9.5 +4.3 na
Egypt +4.3 Q3 na +4.7 +5.4 +6.7 Q3 +13.3 Dec +18.3 +11.8 9.3 Q3
Brazil -1.2 Q3 +5.1 -0.3 +4.4 +5.1 Nov +4.3 Dec +5.9 +4.9 7.4 Nov
Russia -8.9 Q3 na -8.0 +3.0 +1.5 Nov +8.8 Dec +13.3 +11.7 8.1 Nov
India +7.9 Q3 na +6.5 +7.1 +11.7 +13.3 Nov +10.6 +10.5 10.7 2009
China +10.7 Q4 na +8.3 +9.3 +18.5 Dec +1.9 Dec +1.2 -0.8 10.2 2009
Hong Kong -2.4 Q3 +1.6 -3.2 +4.6 -8.6 Q3 1.3 Dec +2.1 +0.5 4.9 Dec
Singapore +3.4 Q4 -6.8 -2.1 +4.8 -8.2 Nov -0.2 Nov +5.5 +0.3 3.4 Q3

Financial Markets Trade

% Change Budget Interest Rate
Balance
Index March 10 Since March 3 Since Dec 31
Current Account Balance Currency Units, per$ Balance as a
New York (Dow) 3605.04 2.085291952 1.07551 lastest 12
% of GDP 10 years Govt
New York (Nasdaq) 2358.95 3.431871196 3.957429 months Latest 12 months % of GDP 2009 latest Year ago 3 month latest Bonds latest
London (FTSE 100) 5640.57 1.940284211 4.2060633 2008
Paris (CAC40) 3943.55 2.629264129 0.1834196
$bn
Frankfurt (DAX) 5936.72 2.042668463 -0.3476331 United States -518.4 Nov -465.3 Q3 -3.0 - - -10.0 0.14 3.66
Singapore (STI) 2862.29 2.856845109 -1.2192765 United Kingdom -126.0 Nov -28.2 Q3 -1.9 0.61 0.73 -14.2 0.66 4.10
Hong Kong (Hang Seng) 21208.29 1.587887793 -3.0367356 France -56.1 Nov -56.7 Nov -2.0 0.71 0.78 -8.4 0.72 3.47
Barhain (BSE) 1500.51 -0.13776305 2.8986998
Dubai (DFM) 1659.89 5.513778089 -7.9669324 Germany +187.7 Nov +158.0 Nov +4.2 0.71 0.78 -3.2 0.72 6.17
Oman (ASE) 6654.71 -0.30770383 4.4892287 Euro Area +25.3 Nov -109.6 Oct -0.7 0.71 0.78 -6.9 0.67 3.23
Qatar (DSM) 6818.37 0.54175766 -2.0232298 Japan +34.4 Nov +133.4 nov +2.7 91.2 87.6 -7.4 0.32 1.33
Kuwait (KSE) 7436.8 0.413167346 6.159622 UAE +63.2 2008 +22.3 Dec +8.5 3.67 3.67 na 2.2 na
Riyadh 6565.95 1.348597995 7.2559199
Cairo (Case 30) 1538.2 -1.26515652 9.8322028 Barhain +6.3 2008 +70.6 Dec +44.6 0.37 0.37 +3.3 6.82 na
Japan (Nikkei) 1227.21 0.733000624 4.2774478 Oman +14.8 2008 +5.4 Dec +9.1 0.38 0.38 0 7.21 na
Mumbai (BSE) 9099.62 0.51685495 -0.8665281 Qatar 37.0 2008 +28.6 Dec +27.9 3.64 3.64 +8.8 7.12 na
Kuwait +62.5 2008 +70.5 Dec +44.7 0.29 0.29 +7.8 5.66 na
Bahrain  Stock  Exchange  
Saudi Arabia +212.0 2008 +134.0 2008 +28.5 3.75 3.75 +0.7 0.77 na
1,550.000  
Egypt -25.4 Q3 -4.9 Q3 -1.7 5.44 5.55 -6.9 9.98 1.76
1,500.000   Brazil +24.6 Dec -24.3 Dec -1.0 1.79 2.36 -3.2 8.65 6.16
1,450.000  
Russia +104.1 Nov +47.5 Q4 +3.8 29.7 32.8 _7.2 8.75 7.40
India -74.5 Nov _31.5 Q3 -0.7 45.9 49.1 -8.0 3.80 7.71
1,400.000   China +196.1 Dec +364.4 Q2 +6.3 6.83 8.84 -3.8 1.88 3.79
Hong Kong -26.1 Nov +26.2 Q3 13.7 7.77 7.76 -2.4 0.13 2.63
01 10  

01 10  

01 10  

01 10  

01 10  

02 10  

02 10  

02 10  

02 10  

02 10  

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03 10  

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0  
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Singapore +24.1 Dec +20.9 Q3 +12.7 1.40 1.51 -1.1 0.50 2.44
4/

9/

4/

9/

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9/

3/

8/

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Kuwait  Stock  Exchange   Qatar  Exchange  

7,600.000   7,200.000  
7,500.000   7,050.000  
7,400.000  
7,300.000   6,900.000  
7,200.000   6,750.000  
7,100.000  
7,000.000   6,600.000  
6,900.000   6,450.000  
6,800.000  
6,300.000  
6,700.000  
6,600.000   6,150.000  
01 10  

01 10  

01 10  

01 10  

01 10  

02 10  

02 10  

02 10  

02 10  

02 10  

02 10  

03 10  

03 10  

0  
01 0  

01 10  

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2/

7/

2/

7/

2/

7/

4/

9/

3
 0
 0

 0

Tadawul   Dubai  Financial  Market  

6,600.000   1,900.000  
6,500.000  
1,800.000  
6,400.000  
6,300.000   1,700.000  
6,200.000   1,600.000  
6,100.000  
1,500.000  
6,000.000  
5,900.000   1,400.000  
01 10  

01 10  

01 10  

01 10  

01 10  

02 10  

02 10  

02 10  

02 10  

02 10  

02 10  

03 10  

03 10  

0  

01 0  

01 0  

01 10  

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02 10  

02 10  

02 10  

02 10  

03 10  

03 10  

0  
01

8/ 201

3/ 201

01
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/2
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/
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01
/0
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 0

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 1

15 March, 2010 48
Issue 1549
15 March, 2010

THE MAJALLA 31
Reviews
Books Readings Reports

Issue 1549 51
 Reviews - Books

Elixirs for the

Middle East
Brian Whitaker
What’s Really Wrong with the
Middle East
Saqi 2009
Journalist Brian Whitaker’s latest book attempts to
explain the causes behind the problems the Middle East
faces. Arguing that there is a fundamental similarity
between the cultural practices of Arab states and the
authoritarian nature of the state, Whitaker argues that
society must change in order for regimes better govern
their countries.

F rom struggles against

corruption, discrimination
and bureaucracy, to the
authoritarian nature of the
government and the household,
Guardian journalist Brian
Whitaker takes a look at the
obstacles the Middle East
faces in his latest book What’s
Really Wrong with the Middle
East. Written in the form of
a statement more so than a
question, Whitaker’s analysis
of the region is framed around
the premise that when looking
at the Middle East, the problems
of the region are always blamed
on someone else. Whitaker on
the other hand argues that it is
neither the region itself nor the
West that is to blame because
everyone is at fault.
Whitaker argues that as a
result of playing the blame
game, both the West and the
Middle East have failed to
15 March, 2010
notice that governments “ are
products of the societies they
govern, and in Arab countries
it is often society, as much
as the government itself that
stands in the way of progress.”
Noting examples of the cultural
impediments to progress that
are present in the Middle East,
Whitaker argues
that as a result
of playing the
blame game, both
the West and the
Middle East have
failed to notice
that governments
“ are products of
the societies they
govern
Whitaker makes a claim that
it is the sociological nature
of a state that determines its
government’s capacity to rule
effectively and fairly. While
his evidence does provide
some foundation to this claim,
with numerous interviews
paraphrasing his conclusion,
the argument he presents
overall is found wanting.
His approach of looking beyond
regimes and to society as a whole
is not new. Political sociologists
and anthropologists have long
looked at cultural clues for
how governments develop.
The difference between their
analysis and Whitaker’s
constructivist interpretation
is that his lacks a theoretical
framework around which he can
organize the various examples
and testimonies that support
his claim. It is not enough for
him to quote journalist Khaled
52
 Reviews - Books
Diab saying that “Egypt has a
million Mubaraks” to prove his
point. As a result, what might
have been informative research
turns out to be a disappointing
superficial analysis of the ways
regimes and societies interact.
This flaw might have been
avoided had Whitaker spent
more time addressing the
way the interaction between
government and
plays out. In noting that
society
households in the Arab world
have a tendency of being
paternalistic and authoritarian,
and that this explained the
authoritarian and paternalistic
nature of the government,
Whitaker essentially created an
irrefutable argument the likes
of which are regularly criticized
in the academic circles that
employ constructivist analyses.
Despite being framed around
a logical fallacy, there is
a correlation between the
nature of Arab societies and
governments. Highlighting
this fact might have been
a sufficiently interesting
point around which to focus
his analysis of the region.
Unfortunately, in turning the
cultural dimension of the Arab
world into an explanation of its
failures allows for the book to
develop a subtext of Western
condescension.
For example, one excerpt of
the book notes that “Jumping
the queue may be a fairly
trivial matter but the obsession
with kinship undermines the
principles of meritocracy and
equality.” Although nepotism
is undoubtedly a true problem
Issue 1549
faced not only in the Middle
East but in most developing
regions, associating corruption
in the Middle East to cultural
practices implies that only in
westernizing their culture could
the Middle East (and other
regions with a similar cultural
code) break free from the
Despite being
framed around
a logical
fallacy, there
is a correlation
between the
nature of Arab
societies and
governments
cycle of nepotism and quasi-
authoritarianism that limit its
potential.
Whitaker’s intentions of
highlighting the problems of
the Middle East in his book are
however limited to just that.
While he presents a system for
understanding the problems of
the Middle East, limited as it
may be, he does not argue what
reforms should be put into place.
This is undoubtedly a result of
the nature of his explanation.
After all what reforms could
be put into place that would
alter the cultural practices of a
society? As a result, Whitaker
dedicates only a short amount
of his attention to the possibility
of gradual change dependent
on the impact of globalization.
Specifically, Whitaker argues
that “Trade, travel and global
communications are weakening
the influence of nation states
and the power of governments
to control what happens within
their borders. At the same time,
ordinary people are exposed to
ideas and ways of doing things
that they never know before…
the question is not whether
change will occur but how long
it will take.”
However, there is no evidence
that trade, travel and global
communication are going to
fundamentally change Arab
society thus encouraging its
government to adopt liberal
values. China, a repeatedly
cited example, is especially
pertinent to this argument. A
powerhouse in international
trade, China has managed to
liberalize economically and
remain closed off politically.
Global communications can be
limited through governmental
control of the internet, a trend
present also in the Middle East.
Rather than rendering nation-
states weak, globalization has
encouraged many of them
to revamp their control over
society.
Whitaker’s book is interesting
for the personal accounts it
provides on Arabs’ take on the
problems their region faces.
However, the argument around
which the book is structured
was not well thought out and
it substantially weakens the
contribution of this book to the
literature on the contemporary
Middle East.
53
 Reviews - Readings

Readings
Books
Getting Our Way
Christopher Meyer
Sir Christopher Meyer, former British
Ambassador in Washington, has written
this volume as a panegyric on the virtues
of the old-fashioned diplomat. In it he
explores the importance of the diplomat in
British history. This figure, he argues, must
represent British interests and understand
the interests of the country to which he has
been sent. Getting Our Way recounts nine
stories from Britain's diplomatic annals
over the last five hundred years, in which
the diplomats themselves are at the centre
of the narrative. The episodes illustrate
how the three pillars of the national interest
(security, prosperity, and values) have
remained at the heart of British foreign
policy. Meyer’s principal focus throughout
the book is to explain that whilst much has
changed, these essentials of diplomacy
remain unaltered. This is a convincing
reminder that although Britain’s Foreign
Service currently appears demoralised and
confused, the tasks it faces are much as
they have been throughout history.

Where Power Lies: Prime Ministers and

the Media
Lance Price
Lance Price looks at the sorry state of British
politics today, exposing almost a century of
battles between the media and Britain’s political
leaders in an attempt to determine who is to
blame. This is the story of how for generations
powerful men and woman have struggled to
twist the facts to achieve their own ends. Price,
having been both a BBC reporter and Downing
Street spin ­doctor, has had experience at both
ends of the battlefield. His book combines
this experience with original interviews and
historical research to fashion a ­fascinating
account of how politicians and the media both
desire mastery of ­public opinion. His book is
both rich with ­historical detail and—entertaining
in its contemporary anecdotes. This is a sharp
indictment of the bullies and megalomaniacs in
Downing Street and Fleet Street.

Start Up Nation; The Story of

Israel's Economic Miracle
Dan Senor and Saul Singer
Dan Senor, a senior Fellow for Middle Eastern
studies at the Council on Foreign Relations
and Saul Singer, a foreign policy advisor
on Capitol Hill have both been on the front
of policy and politics in the Middle East for
many years. In Start-Up Nations Senor &
Singer address the trillion-dollar question:
How is it that Israel—a young country of
7.1 million people, surrounded by enemies,
in a constant state of conflict and with no
natural resources—produces more start-up
companies than larger and more peaceful
nations such as Japan, China, and the United
Kingdom? Drawing on examples from the
country’s foremost inventors and investors, the
authors describe how Israel’s adversity-driven
culture fosters a combination of innovative
and entrepreneurial intensity. Much has been
written already about Israel yet very little is
understood of its economic growth.

15 March, 2010 54
 Reviews - Readings

Reports
Son of Hamas
Mosab Hassan Yousef
Son of Hamas is a unique insider
account of the world’s most
notorious terrorist organization.
The oldest son of Sheikh Hassan
Yousef, a founding member of
Hamas, Mosab was groomed to
assume the mantle of leadership
for many years until he turned his
back on the organization. In Son of
Hamas, new information is revealed
about the world’s most dangerous
terrorist organization. The author
discusses his own role and the
difficult decision he had to make to
separate himself from family and
homeland.

The Future of NATO

The Council of Foreign Relations.
NATO has now been a cornerstone of
security in Europe for six decades yet
its ability to continue playing such a
central role is unclear. In this Special
Report, James M. Goldgeiger looks at
how NATO can successfully adapt to
contemporary challenges. He writes that
the organization must expand its vision
of defense in order to remain effective
in the face of new threats. This report
is centrally concerned with NATO’s
increased involvement in conflicts
outside Europe, with new frontiers in
Afghanistan and beyond. The resulting
work is sober and important. Goldgeiger
combines useful analysis and practical
recommendations for policy makers
across the world.

Hostile Shores; Abuse and Refoulement of

Asylum Seekers and Refugees in Yemen
Human Rights Watch
For several years, tens of thousands of
asylum seekers and refugees fleeing to
Yemen from the unstable Horn of Africa
region have suffered terrible human
rights abuses that have gone ignored by
the outside world. This report shows that
the reception awaiting those who survive
the journey to Yemen depends largely on
where they come from. More specifically,
the report documents the harsh treatment
of African refugees in Yemen, while
calling on the Yemeni government to
end the systematic arrests of Ethiopian
asylum seekers. The 53-page report also
urges the UNHCR to increase pressure
on the Yemeni government to meet its
obligations toward all asylum seekers and
refugees.

Issue 1549 55
 Reviews - Reports

Discriminating In the Name of the Law

Group Denial
Repression of Kurdish Political and Cultural Rights in Syria
Human Rights Watch
November 2009

In a recent report, Human Rights Watch highlights the oppression Kurds in Syria face regularly.
Despite limits to their investigation because of a lack of compliance on the part of the Syrian
government, the report is an informative account on the current human rights situation for Kurds in
the country. HRW argues that despite their peaceful intentions, the Syrian government successfully
makes claims to legal codes in order to undermine the political and cultural rights of Kurds in the
country.

S ‘pas’ means ‘Thank you’ in

Kurdish. You would be greeted
with exclamations of surprise and joy
focusing on their oppression in
both political and cultural spheres
of life. The fate of Syrian Kurds is
perspective on
marginalization by citing the
Kurdish

testimonies of Kurdish activists,

if you used this word in response to
receiving a cup of tea from a Kurdish
back alley joint in Damascus. Kurds
make up an estimated ten percent of
Syria’s total population of 20 million,
but you would never know it. In their
63-page report on Kurdish Syrians,
Human Rights Watch (HRW) unearths
the discrimination they experience
under the Syrian government,
largely overshadowed by headlines
covering Turkey’s PKK fighters and
Iraqi Kurdistan autonomy. However,
HRW’s report has given a voice to
Syria’s Kurds who may be less show-
stopping in their fight for minority
rights but whose suffering is just as
profound.
The report provides a personal
their family members and local
human rights campaigners. Group
Denial aims to provide evidence and
raise awareness of the victimisation,
imprisonment and in some cases
torture or even death of Kurdish
activists at the hands of the Syrian
authorities.
The report skims the evolution of

15 March, 2010 56
 Reviews - Reports
Kurdish experience in Syria since
the mid-twentieth century and is
primarily devoted to the events that
unfolded post 2004. This was the
year that clashes with Syrian security
forces at a football match resulted
in the death of Kurdish fans. What
had been a long history of Kurdish
grievances simmering under the
surface suddenly erupted into the
open. Kurds took to the streets in large
scale demonstrations against their
oppression under the Syrian regime.
36 people were killed, mostly Kurds,
and over 2,000 arrested. Alarmed by
the mass rallying of Kurds, Syria’s
government responded by clamping
down on any activities promoting
Kurdish culture or political
participation. The report documents
the Syrian government’s efforts to
ban all Kurdish celebrations and to
crush all events and demonstrations
promoting Kurdish rights.
Syrian Kurds live mainly in the
Northern and Eastern parts of the
country along the borders with Turkey
and Iraq. Unlike their Turkish and
Iraqi counterparts their parties don’t
demand autonomy and separation
from Syria. Syrian Kurdish activism
uses a softer approach. Their
demonstrations are largely peaceful,
demanding only recognition of the
Kurdish population and equal rights
to cultural and political expression.
Yet these peaceful protests are met
with overwhelming violence from
the Syrian authorities. The Kurdish
new year ‘Noruz’ celebrations have
been disrupted for several years
running. Since 2005 HRW found
that 14 political and cultural events
have been broken up by the Syrian
authorities. Yet these celebrations
pose no threat to the stability of Syria
and are a mere expression of Kurdish
heritage.
The key players in Kurdish activism
are listed in affiliation with parties
advocating Kurdish minority rights.
The report reveals that prominent
leaders of various Kurdish parties
no longer have immunity from
prosecution and detention. Since
2005 over a dozen leading figures
Issue 1549
belonging to parties fighting for
Kurdish freedoms have been arrested.
‘Group Denial’ exposes the wider
scale oppression by the Syrian
government on its entire population.
The Syrian political system does
not allow any room for criticism
against the ruling Ba’ath party. The
Emergency Law, in place since
1963, suspends basic freedoms by
banning any form of opposition to
the government. There are penal
provisions that treat ‘any gathering of
more than seven people with the aim
of protesting a decision or measure
taken by the public authorities as a
riot that is punishable by jail’.
The report entails
a run down of the
Syrian security
apparatus
involved in
the detention
and torture of
activists
Just under half of the former
detainees interviewed by HRW
said they had been tortured by the
Syrian security forces. The report
entails a run down of the Syrian
security apparatus involved in the
detention and torture of activists.
Locations and names of various
security groups are given, shedding
some light on the murky world of
Syria’s intelligence agencies. First
hand accounts by those imprisoned
paint a bleak picture for human
rights within Syria’s prison walls.
All 30 former detainees were
held incommunicado when first
imprisoned. The abuses read as a
litany of horrors, trampling over any
human rights acts Syria may have
agreed to. Aside from the physical
torture are the psychological taunts,
derogatory and racist. “All Kurds
are traitors. You are a heavy guest
in Syria” were the words from the
mouth of a Syrian interrogator.
HRW makes a plea to the
international community for
condemnation of repression of
Syria’s Kurds. Syria’s government
has signed several international
treaties that uphold human rights
but it is clearly not playing by the
rules. The report finds the UN and
other international organisations
responsible for keeping the Syrian
government in check and holding
it accountable for breeches of the
guidelines.
The report excels in providing an
in-depth, close contact account but
is extremely narrow in approach. It
would have been enlightening to hear
more about the discrimination that
every Kurd faces on a daily basis,
in the workplace, at the market and
not just at public displays of culture
or dissension. The channels of study
focus only on those Kurds actively
fighting for their rights. However it
is clear that the author has chosen his
fight and did not intend to provide
an exhaustive investigation into
Kurdish rights in Syria.
This narrow approach is largely
unavoidable, going hand in hand
with the problem that comes with
carrying out research in an ultimately
authoritarian nation. The Syrian
government denied HRW access to
carry out research within the country.
The pool of evidence collected in
this study covers mainly personal
accounts, the majority of which were
collected via telephone interviews.
There is little hard evidence provided
through individual case studies.
That said, evidence concerning
human rights abuses will never be
an exact science for as this report
demonstrates human life is more
than just a number.
For the full report please refer to:
www.hrw.org
57
 The Political Essay
Too Big To Fail?
The international efforts to support the Transitional Government of Somalia have been rather limited, only
aiming to contain the chaos which is consequence of the collapse of the Somali state. The Government will not
succeed on its own, as Sheik Sharif Ahmed recently expressed.
R ecently, Sheik Sharif Sheikh
Ahmed, President of the
Transitional Government of Somalia,
spoke at an event organized by Chatham
House, the London-based think tank.
When asked to highlight specific areas of
Somalia’s economy which are suitable
for foreign business cooperation, Sheik
Sharif Ahmed said that “Somalia has
livestock, lots of camels, and fish-stock.”
Jokingly, the President also said “we have
many goats and sheep, I don’t know how
many exactly but [most importantly]
75% of the land can be cultivated.” The
good news about this is that Somalia does
have natural resources. The bad news is
that the President was not able to name
one single sector of the economy where
it is suitable to place foreign investment,
simply because there isn’t one—at least
one that it is not illicit.
The situation in Somalia is much
worse than in Iraq or Afghanistan, by
any criteria. Its strategic importance,
however, is considered less significant.
One of the trends that is possible to
identify in a couple of opinion articles
published in the last few months by The
Majalla is how media coverage plays an
important part in setting the agenda of
what is politically important. As Dr Jon
Alterman, Director and Senior Fellow of
the Middle East Program at the Centre
for Strategic and International Studies in
Washington DC wrote in October 2009
in The Majalla, “it is hard to win a war
no one remembers you are fighting”. Dr
Alterman was referring to Iraq, and how
a crisis in news agencies’ funds coupled
with public fatigue on developments in
Iraq led to an absence of media coverage
there. One of the negative consequences
of the so-called “CNN effect”—a news
cycle that demands political attention
to issues that would otherwise go
unnoticed—is that if a particular issue
does not receive coverage, it ceases to be
an issue altogether.
15 March, 2010
Manuel Almeida
Going back to Sheik Sharif Ahmed’s
speech, it is interesting to note that
the title of the President’s speech was
“Somalia at Crossroads and the Duty of
the International Community”. This title
expresses how bad the situation is, and
how desperately Somalia’s government
needs outside assistance, of all sorts. The
central message of the speech is that to
ask Somalia to deal with the problem
of militancy on its own is unfair and
unrealistic. It also stressed the urgent need
for humanitarian assistance. Another
of the questions addressed to Somalia’s
President is an excellent example of how
deteriorated the security situation in the
capital Mogadishu is. A Somali citizen in
the audience stood up and asked “Why
is your presidential plane targeted by the
militants with mortar shells every time
you go for a presidential trip abroad?”
It is quite accepted that, apart from Al-
Qaeda, nobody wants a weak Somalia,
and nobody benefits from it. Not even
its neighbours, such as Ethiopia or
Kenya. This has not been reflected by
a consistent endeavour to prevent the
country’s collapse. The recent efforts—
by the US, Ethiopia, the UN, and the
African Union—were all limited in
scope and in time. Today, not much aid
reaches Somalia, and even less reaches
the common Somali citizen. As recently
reported by The New York Times,
according to a report to be presented in
the next few days to the UN Security
Council, up to 50% of the food aid is
being diverted or sold to illicit sources,
including to militants. The scenario is so
grim that the report recommends the UN
Security Council to suspend the entire
relief effort of the UN’s World Food
Programme. In addition to the corruption
regarding the aid, the report accuses
Somali authorities of collaborating with
pirates and selling diplomatic visas to
pirates and insurgents for trips to Europe.
Initially hired by the UN Security Council
to track the violations on UN weapons
embargo on Somalia, the investigators’
mandate was expanded and became
related with any threats to stability and
security in Somalia. A particular case
that the NYT journalist who read the
report refers to is the disappearance of
an entire shipment of food. In this case,
the contractor staged the hijacking of his
own trucks and sold the food.
With the international community’s
attention focused elsewhere, there is
only a limited effort to address the chaos
resulting from the collapse of the Somali
state. The UN might consider suspending
the food relief effort. The US—seriously
overstretched—only keeps small counter-
terrorism operations in the region, while
the EU’s and NATO’s naval missions
fight piracy across a mass of water that
is too big to patrol effectively. All these
efforts seek only to contain the chaos
originated by the Somali state collapse,
in what is a minimalist approach that
doesn’t actually address the root causes
of the problem. Without international
support to create minimum conditions
of security for the government and for
the development of anything resembling
normality, things will only get worse—
if that is indeed possible. In the words
of Sheik Sharif Ahmed, “it is easier to
mention the areas where Somalia doesn’t
need help, than to mention those that do.
58
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15 March, 2010 THE MAJALLA 13