DENNIS HABAWEL and ALEXIS MEDINA v.

COURT OF TAX APPEALS 1ST DIVISION

GR No. 174759 7 September 2011
By Kylie Dado
FACTS:
Petitioners (counsel of Surfield Development Corporation) sought from the Office of City Treasurer (CT) the refund
of excess realty taxes paid from 1995 until 2000 (DENIED by the CT). Because of such denial, Surfield filed an SPA
for mandamus in RTC-Mandaluyong
Surfield amended the petition and change the years to include its claim for refund of the excess taxes paid
from 2001 until 2003
RTC: Dismissed on the grounds 1. Period to file had already prescribed
2. Surfield failed to exhaust admin remedies
3. Grant of tax refund was not a ministerial duty compellable by writ of mandamus
Surfield CTA
CTA: Denied lack of jurisdiction and failure to exhaust the remedies provided under Section 253[11] and
Section 226[12] of LocGov Code
Petitioners (in behalf of Surfield) Motion for Recon, insisting:
1. The CTA had jurisdiction pursuant to Section 7(a)(3) of RA 9282
2. CTA 1st Division manifested its lack of understanding or respect for the doctrine of stare decisis in not
applying the ruling in Ty v. Trampe to the effect that there was no need to file an appeal before the Local
Board of Assessment Appeals pursuant to Section 22 of RA 7160.
CTA: Motion for Recon was denied.
As to jurisdiction - jurisdiction conferred by Section 7(a)(3) RA 9282, referred to appeals from the decisions,
orders, or resolutions of the RTCs in local tax cases and did not include the real property tax, an ad valorem
tax

Real property tax cases fell under a different section of RA 9282 and under a separate book of RA 7160
Required the petitioners to explain within 5 days from receipt why they should not be liable for
indirect contempt or be made subject to disciplinary action
o Ground: It finds the counsels statement as derogatory, offensive and disrespectful.
(Statement: gross ignorance of the law for the Honorable Court to have held that it has no
jurisdiction over this instant petition; the grossness of this Honorable Courts ignorance of the law is
matched only by the unequivocal expression of this Honorable Courts jurisdiction over the instant
case and this Court lacked the understanding and respect for the doctrine of stare decisis)
o Lawyers are charged with the basic duty to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of
justice and judicial officers
Petitioners submitted a compliance they apologized but nonetheless justified their language as, among others,
necessary to bluntly call the
Honorable Courts attention to the grievousness of the error by calling a spade by spade.
CTA: Found the apology wanting in sincerity and humility
Adjudged both of the petitioners guilty of direct contempt of court for failing to uphold their duty of
preserving the integrity and respect due to the courts, sentencing each to suffer imprisonment of ten days
and to pay P2K as fine
Petitioners sought reconsideration and submitted that they could not be held guilty of direct contempt because:
(a) the phrase gross ignorance of the law was used in its legal sense to describe the error of judgment and was
not directed to the character or competence of the decision makers;
(b) there was no unfounded accusation or allegation, or scandalous, offensive or menacing, intemperate,
abusive, abrasive or threatening, or vile, rude and repulsive statements or words contained in their motion
for reconsideration;
(c) there was no statement in their motion for reconsideration that brought the authority of the CTA and the
administration of the law into disrepute; and
(d) they had repeatedly offered their apology in their compliance
CTA: Still not convince ordered the petitioners to pay P2K and suffer imprisonment for 10 days
Petitioners SC (certiorari grave abuse of discretion)

ISSUE: W/N CTA abused its discretion in finding the petitioners liable for direct contempt under Sec. 1, Rule 71 of
ROC
Petitioners Argument:
1. The phrase gross ignorance of the law was used in its strict legal sense to emphasize the gravity of the error
of law committed by the CTA
2. Statements described by the CTA as abrasive, offensive, derogatory, offensive and disrespectful should be
viewed within the context of the general tone and language of their motion for reconsideration
3. The overall language was tempered, restrained and respectful and should not be construed as a display of
contumacious attitude or as a flouting or arrogant belligerence in defiance of the court to be penalized as
direct contempt
CTAs Contention:
1. Petitioners statements reflected no humility, nor were they expressive of a contrite heart
2. Petitioners submissions instead reflected arrogance and sarcasm, that they even took the opportunity to
again deride the public respondent on the manner of how it wrote the decision
OSGs opinion:
1. Submitting a pleading containing derogatory, offensive and malicious statements to the same court or judge
in which the proceedings are pending constitutes direct contempt
2. CTA did not abuse its discretion
SC: NO. CTA First Division did not abuse its discretion, least of all gravely, in finding that the
petitioners committed direct contempt of court.
In the Code of Professional Responsibility, it is conceded that an attorney or any other person may be critical of the
courts and their judges provided the criticism is made in respectful terms and through legitimate channels.
The test for criticizing a judges decision is, therefore, whether or not the criticism is bona fide or done in good faith,
and does not spill over the walls of decency and propriety.
Here, the petitioners motion for reconsideration contained the following statements, to wit:
(a) It is gross ignorance of the law for the Honorable Court to have held that it has no jurisdiction over
the instant petition;
(b) The grossness of the Honorable Courts ignorance of the law is matched only by the unequivocal
expression of this Honorable Courts jurisdiction; and
(c) The Honorable Courts lack of understanding or respect for the doctrine of stare decisis.
An imputation in a pleading of gross ignorance against a court or its judge, especially in the absence of any
evidence, is a serious allegation, and constitutes direct contempt of court. It is settled that derogatory, offensive or
malicious statements contained in pleadings or written submissions presented to the same court or judge in which
the proceedings are pending are treated as direct contempt because they are equivalent to a misbehavior
committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the administration of justice. This is true,
even if the derogatory, offensive or malicious statements are not read in open court.
SC might have been more understanding of the milieu in which the petitioners made the statements had
they convinced the Supreme Court that the CTA First Division truly erred in holding itself bereft of
jurisdiction over the appeal of their client. But SCs review of the text of the legal provisions involved reveals
that the error was committed by them, not by the CTA First Division.
The Court has not lacked in frequently reminding the Bar that language, though forceful, must still be dignified; and
though emphatic, must remain respectful as befitting advocates and in keeping with the dignity of the Legal
Profession. It is always worthwhile to bear in mind, too, that the language vehicle did not run short of expressions
that were emphatic, yet respectful; convincing, yet not derogatory; and illuminating, yet not offensive. No attorney
worthy of the title should forget that his first and foremost status as an officer of the Court calls upon him to be
respectful and restrained in his dealings with a court or its judge. Clearly, the petitioners criticism of the CTA First
Division was not bona fide or done in good faith, and spilled over the walls of propriety.
The power to punish contempt of court is exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle, and only
occasionally should a court invoke its inherent power to punish contempt of court in order to retain that respect
without which the administration of justice must falter or fail. SC reiterate that the sanction the CTA First Division
has visited upon the petitioners was preservative, for the sanction maintained and promoted the proper respect
that attorneys and their clients should bear towards the courts of justice.
Inasmuch as the circumstances indicate that the petitioners tone of apology was probably feigned, for they
did not relent but continued to justify their contemptuous language, they do not merit any leniency.
Nonetheless, the penalty of imprisonment for 10 days + fine of P2K is excessive punishment of direct

contempt of court for using contemptuous and offensive language and verges on the vindictive. The Court
forgoes the imprisonment.
The Courts treatment of contemptuous and offensive language used by counsel in pleadings and other
written submissions to the courts of law, including this Court, has not been uniform. The sanction has
ranged from a warning (to be more circumspect), a reprimand with stern warning against a repetition of the
misconduct, a fine of P2K, a fine of P5K, and even indefinite suspension from the practice of law.

Court concurs with the offended courts treatment of the offensive language as direct contempt. Thus, SC impose on
each of them a fine of P2K, the max imposable fine under Section 1 of Rule 71, taking into consideration the fact
that the CTA is a superior court of the same level as the Court of Appeals, the second highest court of the land. The
penalty of imprisonment, as earlier clarified, is deleted.
xxx
Del Castillo, J., DISSENTING OPINION.
I fully understand the sentiments of the CTA, more so because petitioners failed to show that it committed an
error that is so gross, patent, deliberate, palpable and malicious as to warrant such an accusation. However, I
cannot sustain its finding of contempt because the power to punish for contempt should be exercised on the
preservative and not on the vindictive principle. It must never be used for retaliation or vindication but only for the
preservation of the dignity and integrity of the courts. Courts must therefore be patient and understanding of hasty
and unguarded expressions of passion made by the losing party.