S. Hrg.

109304

VULNERABILITIES IN THE U.S. PASSPORT SYSTEM

CAN BE EXPLOITED BY CRIMINALS
AND TERRORISTS

HEARING
BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY AND
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

JUNE 29, 2005

Printed for the use of the

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

(
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON

22199 PDF

2006

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine, Chairman
TED STEVENS, Alaska
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
CARL LEVIN, Michigan
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware
LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island
MARK DAYTON, Minnesota
ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah
FRANK LAUTENBERG, New Jersey
PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas
JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia
MICHAEL D. BOPP, Staff Director and Chief Counsel
MICHAEL L. STERN, Deputy Staff Director Director for Investigations
JOYCE A. RECHTSCHAFFEN, Minority Staff Director and Counsel
KEVIN J. LANDY, Minority Counsel
TRINA D. TYRER, Chief Clerk

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CONTENTS
Opening statements:
Senator Collins .................................................................................................
Senator Lautenberg ..........................................................................................

Page

1
4

WITNESSES
WEDNESDAY, JUNE 29, 2005
Jess T. Ford, Director, International Affairs and Trade, U.S. Government
Accountability Office ............................................................................................
Michael L. Johnson, Former Special Agent in Charge, Miami Field Office,
Diplomatic Security Service, U.S. Department of State ...................................
Frank E. Moss, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Passport Services, Bureau
of Consular Affairs, U.S. Department of State ..................................................
Donna A. Bucella, Director, Terrorist Screening Center ......................................
Thomas E. Bush, III, Assistant Director, Criminal Justice Information Services Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation ..................................................
ALPHABETICAL LIST

OF

5
8
19
21
22

WITNESSES

Bucella, Donna A.:

Testimony ..........................................................................................................
Prepared statement ..........................................................................................
Bush, Thomas E., III:
Testimony ..........................................................................................................
Prepared statement ..........................................................................................
Ford, Jess T.:
Testimony ..........................................................................................................
Prepared statement ..........................................................................................
Johnson, Michael L.:
Testimony ..........................................................................................................
Prepared statement ..........................................................................................
Moss, Frank E.:
Testimony ..........................................................................................................
Prepared statement with attachments ...........................................................

21
66
22
69
5
33
8
49
19
54

APPENDIX
National Federation of Federal Employees, International Association of
Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFLCIO, Local 1998, prepared statement ......................................................................................................................
Reponses to questions for the Record for Mr. Moss from:
Senator Collins .................................................................................................
Senator Lieberman ...........................................................................................

75
90
92

(III)

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VULNERABILITIES IN THE U.S. PASSPORT

SYSTEM CAN BE EXPLOITED BY CRIMINALS
AND TERRORISTS
WEDNESDAY, JUNE 29, 2005

U.S. SENATE,
ON HOMELAND SECURITY
AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

COMMITTEE

Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:31 a.m., in room
SD562, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Susan M. Collins,
Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Collins, Carper and Lautenberg.
Chairman COLLINS. The Committee will come to order. Good
morning.
Before I begin the hearing today, I would like to express my
deepest condolences to my friend and the Committees Ranking
Member, Senator Joe Lieberman. Senator Liebermans mother
passed away on Sunday, June 26, and he is unable to be with us
today because he is observing the traditional Jewish 7-day period
of mourning.
He is a co-requester with me of the GAO report on passport integrity, and I know that he is very concerned and interested in this
subject. Senator Lieberman will be submitting questions for the
record, and the record will remain open for 15 days in order to receive his materials as well as any others that the Committee Members wish to express, but I did want to explain the reason for Senator Liebermans absence since he is such a diligent Member of this
Committee.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN COLLINS

Today the Committee will examine an issue that is central to our

homeland security and that is the process for issuing a U.S. passport. As a new Government Accountability Office report makes
clear, this process suffers from several vulnerabilities that could be
exploited by terrorists and other criminals.
The U.S. passport is the gold card of travel documents. Governments worldwide treat it as unassailable proof of identity and of
citizenship. It opens doors to international travel and expedites reentry to our country upon return. A fraudulent passport, however,
can be a ticket to criminal activity and terrorism.
Technological improvements have made it extremely difficult to
counterfeit or alter a U.S. passport, but it is less difficult to obtain
an authentic passport by fraudulent means. A common fraud
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2
scheme, accounting for 69 percent of cases detected last year,
according to the State Department, is the use by an imposter of legitimate birth certificates and other identification documents belonging to another, in other words, identity theft. This scheme is
often facilitated by organized fraud rings that can provide the imposter with suitable documents at a price. One such ring was recently uncovered smuggling hundreds of undocumented aliens from
Ecuador and other South American countries into the United
States for fees ranging from $12,000 to $14,000 each.
And there can be no doubt that fraudulent travel documents are
essential to terrorists. As the 9/11 Commission found: For terrorists, travel documents are as important as weapons. Terrorists
must travel clandestinely to meet, train, plan, case targets, and
gain access to attack. The Commission reported on many instances
of al Qaedas use of fraudulent foreign passports. In fact, the Commissions report documents an al Qaeda office of passports, which
was charged with altering passports and other documents. Further,
Jihadists were required to turn in their passports so that they
could be recycled if they were killed. The Commissions report also
describes how the operatives were trained to alter passports.
Around the world, in Australia, Indonesia, and South Africa,
among other places, governments are investigating passport fraud
with clear ties to terrorism. It is not surprising, therefore, that
former Secretary of State Colin Powell described maintaining the
integrity of the U.S. passport as a critical component of our global
effort to fight terrorism.
The GAO report that this Committee requested identifies a number of weaknesses in the State Departments efforts to detect and
prevent passport fraud. These include insufficient staffing, training
and oversight, and a lack of investigative resources dedicated to
stopping passport fraud.
The GAO also raises troubling concerns about the State Departments ability to provide adequate oversight of nearly 7,000 passport acceptance facilities throughout the Nation, such as local post
offices and courthouses which accept millions of passport applications each year. Last year the State Department had to stop accepting passport applications from one of these facilities when it
learned that a corrupt county employee in New Jersey was aiding
passport fraud by selling fraudulent birth certificates to illegal
aliens.
Another fundamental flaw uncovered by GAO relates to an issue
that Members of this Committee know all too well, and that is a
profound lack of consistent and effective information sharing. It is
inconceivable to me that in this post September 11 world we are
still seeing examples of Federal agencies not sharing information
that is vital to our security. The Terrorist Screening Center, which
began operating in 2003, has a consolidated watch list database of
known or suspected terrorists. The GAO reports that more than
20,000 names of Americans on this watch list were not incorporated into the State Departments database for passports. As the
State Department and the Terrorist Screening Center have acknowledged, the failure to share this information means that a suspected terrorist could obtain a passport without alerting the appropriate authorities.

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The fact that one of these individuals listed on the terrorist
watch list has applied for a passport would almost certainly be significant for purposes of a counterterrorism investigation. Moreover,
in an appropriate case, the Secretary of State could use her authority to deny a passport on the grounds that U.S. nationals activities
abroad are likely to cause serious damage to national security. But
obviously, if an investigation is never triggered because the information is not shared, there is nothing that can be done.
The information-sharing problems go beyond the shadowy world
of terrorism. The GAO investigation also revealed that the State
Department name check system does not include the names of
many Federal and State fugitives, individuals wanted for such
crimes as murder, rape, robbery, and embezzlement. In fact, the
CLASS system, the database used by the State Department, contains the names of only 50,000 of the more than 1.2 million Federal, State, and local fugitives in the United States. That is less
than 5 percent.
To illustrate the problem, the GAO tested the names of 67 fugitives wanted for a variety of serious crimes, including murder, felonious assault, and child sex offenses. The GAO found that fewer
than half were included in the CLASS database.
These fugitives not in CLASS could apply for and receive a U.S.
passport in their own names and flee the country. In fact, one of
the Federal fugitives, whose name GAO found was not in the
CLASS system, did obtain a U.S. passport on May 12, 2004. This
was 17 months after the FBI had listed this person in its database
as wanted in connection with an $11 million telemarketing fraud.
The fugitive was able to obtain an updated passport from an embassy abroad after his name was cleared in the State Departments
database. This occurred despite the fact that there was an outstanding Federal warrant for his arrest.
Perhaps more alarming, one of the names tested by the GAO and
found not to be in the State Departments database was that of
Donald Eugene Webb. Mr. Webb, who is wanted in connection with
the brutal murder of a police chief in Pennsylvania, appears on the
FBIs Ten Most Wanted List. If someone like Mr. Webb could potentially apply for and receive a passport, the prospects of denying
passports to possible terrorists are even more worrisome.
I am pleased that the Committees investigation has spurred action on this subject. The State Department and the Terrorist
Screening Center are making arrangements to share information
on Americans on the terrorist watch list. The State Department
has informed the Committee that it is near an agreement with the
FBIs Violent Crimes Section to gain access to more fugitive data.
The State Department has also taken steps recently to improve
fraud detection training, enhance oversight, and dedicate more resources to fraud investigations. These developments are encouraging and welcome, but there is much more that remains to be
done, and it disturbs me that these problems have continued for as
long as they have.
Protecting the integrity of the U.S. passport is essential to protecting our citizens from those who would do us harm, whether
they are terrorists or other criminals.

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4
I look forward to hearing the testimony of our witnesses today
as we seek to fortify our defenses.
Senator Lautenberg.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LAUTENBERG

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman.

Apparently you have set off an alarm through the bureaucracy that
this is going to be under review and they had better get going. This
morning I saw on television that there was talk between the FBI
and the State Department. So you have already ruffled the feathers, and it is a good thing that you did.
You were kind enough, Madam Chairman, to mention Joe
Lieberman, my dear friend, colleague here, the loss of his mother,
and I join you in sending our condolences to him.
My guess is that the United States is the largest issuer of passports in the world of any of the countries, but if not the largest,
certainly among the largest, and the fact that people on the terror
watch list can get by, the criminals that we have identified here
is outrageous. The funniest thing is that I have seen an example
of the failure to connect with the terror watch list when it comes
to issuing gun permits. We found out that they would almost never
hit the terror watch list to see if someone was on that list, and how
could we ignore that?
So it tells us something, I think, about the general policy or the
general attitude that permits these people to get by and crack our
security wall. It has always been important for us to maintain our
Nations borders, but it became absolutely vital in the wake of the
terrorist attacks of September 11.
In order to keep track of who is crossing our borders, coming in
and out of our country, we obviously rely on passports and visas.
A valid U.S. passport is the ticket upon return to the country of
citizens or those who would purport to be eligible passport recipients, that enables a person to enter our country and cross our borders at will. So any problem in the issuance of a passport is no
mere bureaucratic hitch, it is a potential threat to our national security.
Passport fraud often is committed in connection with other
crimes including those mentioned by the Chairman, including drug
trafficking, money laundering, and smuggling of illegal aliens.
I know that various Federal agencies including DHS are working
with the State Department to ensure that people who are not entitled to the U.S. passports do not get them. While that is comforting, it was alarming to learn that the State Department system
for checking names on passports does not have access to the terrorist watch list or databases of wanted Federal and State fugitives.
Therefore a passport examiner would be unaware if a person
seeking a passport was suspected of links to terrorism, even though
our government has compiled a lengthy list of suspected terrorists.
This looks like the classic example of the left hand not knowing
what the right hand is doing, and I understand the State Department is now negotiating an agreement to make this information
available, and we say here, the sooner the better.

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5
The passport system also does not contain the names, as the
Chairman said, of most Federal fugitives even though they are legally prohibited from receiving passports. GAO tested the names of
a number of Federal fugitives and found that many were not in the
State Department name check system. So it simply makes no
sense. And as we approach the fourth anniversary of September 11,
there is no longer any excuse for the bureaucracy standing in the
way of national security.
Once again, thank you for calling this hearing, and I look forward to the thoughts of our witnesses.
Chairman COLLINS. Thank you, Senator.
I am delighted to welcome our first panel of witnesses this morning. Jess Ford is the Director of International Affairs and Trade at
the U.S. Government Accountability Office and is the lead author
of the report that we will discuss today. He has extensive experience in the areas of national security and international affairs, and
I want to thank him for doing an excellent, thorough investigation.
Michael Johnson is the Former Special Agent in Charge of the
Diplomatic Security Services Miami Field Office, an office that I
would note is the busiest office in the Nation for visa and passport
fraud prosecutions. As Special Agent in Charge, Mr. Johnson was
responsible for all Diplomatic Security Service operations in eight
States. He, too, has extensive previous experience in running security programs at embassies around the world, and he currently
serves in the Department of Commerce in the area of export enforcement.
I want to welcome both of you, and I thank you for joining us.
Mr. Ford, we will start with your testimony.
TESTIMONY OF JESS T. FORD,1 DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS AND TRADE, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE

Mr. FORD. Thank you, Madam Chairman and Members of the

Committee. I would like my full statement to be submitted in the
record.
Chairman COLLINS. Without objection, all statements will be included in the record as well.
Mr. FORD. I am pleased to be here today to discuss our report
on the State Departments efforts to strengthen U.S. passport fraud
detection. Maintaining the integrity of the U.S. passport is essential to the State Departments effort to protect U.S. citizens from
terrorists, criminals, and others.
The Department issued about 8.8 million passports in fiscal year
2004. Each year the State Department passport examiners refer
tens of thousands of applicants they suspect may be fraudulent to
their local Fraud Prevention Offices. In fiscal year 2004, the State
Departments Diplomatic Security Service arrested about 500 individuals for passport fraud and about 300 of them were convicted.
Passport fraud is often intended to facilitate such crimes as illegal immigration, drug trafficking, and alien smuggling. Our report
addresses three key issues: How passport fraud is committed, what
key challenges the State Department faces in fraud detection ef1 The

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forts, and what effect new passport examiner performance standards could have on fraud detection. Today I am going to focus my
discussion on the first two issues, and I will also discuss our recommendations to the State Department to respond to them.
We found that identity theft is the primary tactic used by individuals fraudulently applying for U.S. passports. Specifically, impostors using other peoples legitimate birth and other identification documents accounted for about 69 percent of passport fraud
detected in fiscal year 2004, while false claims of lost, stolen, and
damaged passports and other methods accounted for the remaining
31 percent of cases.
According to the State Departments Bureau of Diplomatic Security, passport fraud is often committed in connection with other
crimes, including narcotics trafficking, organized crime, money
laundering, and alien smuggling. Fraudulently obtained passports
can enable criminals to hide their movements and activities, and
concerns exist that fraudulently obtained passports could be used
to support terrorism. U.S. passports allow their holders to enter the
United States with much less scrutiny than is given to foreign citizens and also allow visa-free passage into many countries around
the world, providing obvious potential benefits to terrorists and
criminals operating on an international scale.
Our report details a number of challenges to the State Departments passport fraud detection effort, including information sharing deficiencies, insufficient fraud prevention training, staffing and
oversight, and investigative resources. These challenges make it
more difficult to protect U.S. citizens from terrorists, criminals, and
others who would harm the United States.
Specifically, the State Department does not currently receive information on U.S. citizens listed in the Terrorist Screening Center
database, which is the Federal Governments consolidated terrorist
watch list. Nor does the State Department routinely obtain information from the FBI on the names of individuals wanted on both
Federal and State law enforcement authority warrants. Therefore,
many of these individuals are not listed in the State Departments
Consular Lookout and Support System name check database for
passports, and they could obtain passports and travel internationally without the knowledge of appropriate authorities.
We tested the names of 67 different Federal and State fugitives,
some wanted for serious crimes including murder and rape, and
found that fewer than half were in the State Department system.
To my left and right are some graphics that illustrate the issue.
The first poster on my right-hand side is a table that summarizes
the listing of the 37 individuals that we found were not in the Consular Lookout System. As you can see in the chart, many of these
individuals were wanted for serious crimes.1
To my left is a graphic of the most wanted poster individual in
the FBIs Ten Most Wanted List, whom we found was not in the
State Department system. You will note that Donald Eugene Webb
is a dangerous individual. He is wanted for a brutal beating and
murder of a police chief in Pennsylvania, and the FBI is offering
a $100,000 reward for information leading to his capture.
1 The

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Also to my left is a wanted bulletin for James Stanley Eberhart,
wanted for involvement in a telemarketing scheme which defrauded website investors out of $11 million.
As the Chairman noted in her opening statement, Mr. Eberhart
obtained an updated U.S. passport 17 months after he had been
listed in the FBIs Most Wanted List as an individual that they
were interested in arresting.
Finally, the photograph to my right is a bulletin for William P.
Fischer, wanted by the New York State Police for murdering his
son and daughters girlfriend.
These examples are merely illustrative of the many thousands of
other wanted fugitives who are currently not listed in the State Departments name check system. Although the State Department,
the Terrorist Screening Center, and the FBI have been made aware
of this situation, they are now in the process of reaching an agreement to try to foreclose this vulnerability.
The State Department does not maintain a centralized electronic
fraud prevention library that enables information sharing on fraud
alerts, lost and stolen birth and naturalization certificates, counterfeit documents, and other fraud prevention resources.
We found that fraud prevention training is provided unevenly at
the various passport issuing offices. Some examiners have not had
formal fraud prevention training in years, and training and oversight of a passport acceptance agent operations are even more sporadic.
The State Department does not have any way of tracking whether many of the acceptance agent employees are receiving required
training. It makes oversight visits in only a limited number of
cases and it does not maintain records of all of the individuals in
the acceptance facilities, posing significant fraud vulnerability.
Any effect that new passport fraud examiner performance standards may have had on the State Departments fraud detection efforts is unclear because the State Department has continued to adjust the standards. The State Department began implementing a
new standard in January 2004 to make work processes and performance expectations more uniform nationwide. Passport examiner union representatives expressed concern that the new production quotas may require examiners to shortcut fraud detection efforts. However, in response to union and examiner concerns, the
State Department eased the production standards during the rest
of 2004 and made other modifications to the standards.
We made six recommendations to the State Department designed
to improve the coordination and execution of passport fraud detection efforts. These included actions to improve and expedite information sharing specifically by ensuring that the State Departments Consular Lookout System for passports contains more comprehensive lists of individuals identified in the Terrorist Screening
Center, as well as State and Federal fugitives.
We also recommended that they establish and maintain a central
electronic fraud prevention library.
We are also recommending that the State Department consider
designating additional positions for fraud prevention coordination
and training in some domestic passport issuing offices.

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We also recommended that they examine the impact of other
workload-related issues related to fraud prevention and strengthen
its fraud prevention training and acceptance agent oversight programs.
The State Department indicated in a response to our report that
they were taking actions on most of the areas that we recommended.
This concludes my opening statement. I would be happy to answer any of your questions.
Chairman COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Ford. Mr. Johnson.
TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL L. JOHNSON,1 FORMER SPECIAL
AGENT IN CHARGE, MIAMI FIELD OFFICE, DIPLOMATIC SECURITY SERVICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. JOHNSON. Good morning. I would like to thank Chairman

Collins and all the other Members of the Committee for the opportunity to appear before you today. Passport fraud is a much misunderstood problem, and I am very pleased that the Committee is
holding a hearing to discuss how it affects our countrys homeland
security, including the possibility that weaknesses in the passport
issuance regime could be exploited by terrorists.
For the record, my name is Michael Johnson. I served in the
State Departments Bureau of Diplomatic Security for 18 years. In
1999, I began serving in Diplomatic Securitys Miami Field Office,
rising to be a Special Agent in Charge in 2002 until I left at the
end of 2004. I would like to add that while I am currently the Special Agent in Charge of the Miami Field Office of the Office of Export Enforcement for the Department of Commerce, I am not here
today testifying on their behalf.
As you know, the State Department is the sole Executive Branch
Department with the authority to issue passports to citizens of the
United States. With this authority comes the responsibility to
maintain the integrity of the U.S. passport. The Departments Bureau of Consular Affairs handles much of this responsibility, with
the task of supporting its mission falling to the Bureau of Diplomatic Securitys criminal investigative programs. Investigating
passport fraud is just one of Diplomatic Securitys responsibilities,
which also include protecting the Secretary of State and high-ranking foreign dignitaries and officials visiting the United States, protecting U.S. embassies and consulates abroad, conducting personnel security investigations, and training foreign civilian law enforcement officers to protect their countries from terrorism.
As Special Agent in Charge of Diplomatic Securitys Miami Field
Office, I was charged with overseeing what has historically been
Diplomatic Securitys busiest field office. I believe this places me in
a unique position to discuss efforts to combat passport fraud.
Possession of a U.S. passport is important because it allows an
individual to prove two things: United States citizenship and identity. In fact, it is the only official government document that establishes both, making the U.S. passport the most widely accepted and
versatile government-issued document in the United States. Most
consider it the gold standard of all passports, and, as a result, it
1 The

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can be used throughout the world to establish bank and credit accounts, to cash checks, apply for drivers licenses, welfare or unemployment, and any other activity requiring an individual to prove
citizenship or identity.
There is a common misperception about passport fraud that I
would like to clear up. First, passport fraud is not primarily committed to facilitate illegal immigration. In fact, the overwhelming
majority of passport fraud cases involve applicants who are already
in the United States. By fraudulently obtaining a U.S. passport, an
unscrupulous individual will have the document that allows its
holder to travel into and out of the United States freely, bypassing
the border requirements for non-U.S. citizens.
It also provides ironclad proof of an individuals identity. The
value of this document to an individual trying to conceal his identity or blend into American society is obvious, given the post September 11 scrutiny placed on non-U.S. citizens inside the United
States. Stopping passport fraud should be at the core of strong border and homeland security procedures.
When discussing the problems posed by passport fraud, we
should remember that the U.S. passport is an extraordinarily difficult document to counterfeit or to fraudulently modify. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for a document used to establish
eligibility for a passport. The threat to the passport comes when
bogus versions of these documents, called breeder documents, are
used in the passport application process to falsely establish an applicants citizenship or nationality and proof of identity. Key among
these breeder documents are bogus birth certificates. Weaknesses
in these documents can provide unscrupulous individuals a back
door method of acquiring a U.S. passport.
Despite the challenge posed to the integrity of the U.S. passport,
I do not believe that enough is being done within the Department
of State to protect this vitally important document. For example,
in my experience, Diplomatic Security Service thinks of itself primarily as a security service and tends to view passport fraud as a
less important part of its mission. Because it is not its main priority, sufficient resources are not dedicated to fighting passport
fraud.
One way to solve this problem would be to assign additional civil
service Diplomatic Security special agents to field offices for whom
they would investigate passport fraud on a permanent basis. This
would give them the time needed to develop sufficient expertise to
effectively combat passport fraud and would develop a cadre of
agents with the expertise to take down the fraud rings that are attacking the integrity of the U.S. passport.
Another significant obstacle in combatting passport fraud is that
Diplomatic Security lacks an analytic capacity. During my service
in the DSS, I found that there was simply no institutional capacity
to spot and understand trends, analyze information gained from operations, and share intelligence across the DSS and other law enforcement organizations. The lack of such an intelligence capacity
cripples DSSs ability to identify and dismantle organizations
across the world that are involved in the manufacture and sale of
counterfeit documents used to illegally enter and/or remain in the
United States.

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I again want to thank the Committee for holding this hearing,
and I am now prepared to answer your questions.
Chairman COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Johnson. You made an interesting comment that the passport fraud that you have seen was not
primarily to facilitate illegal immigration and that the value of
having a U.S. passport is that it allows the holder to conceal his
true identity. Based on your considerable experience, how easy do
you think it would be for a terrorist to obtain a fraudulent passport?
Mr. JOHNSON. I think it would be relatively easy, unfortunately,
because we know from past experiences that you can go anywhere
in the United States, any city, and you are probably going to find
someone on a street corner or somewhere who is selling birth certificates, Social Security cards, documents that can be used to obtain a drivers license and apply for a U.S. passport ultimately. I
do not think in my experience that these so-called document vendors selling these breeder documents would think twice about selling it to someone who was here to commit terrorism or bank robbery or anything else. They are out to make the quick buck.
These documents can sell for anywhere from $200 to as much as
$6,000 for sometimes a very poor quality document. So I think it
would be relatively easy, unfortunately, for someone with these
ideas in mind to do this.
Chairman COLLINS. Mr. Ford, the GAO found that although the
Terrorist Screening Center has been operational since December
2003, the State Department and the Center did not even begin exploring the possibility of linking the names in the Terrorist Screening Center system with the State Departments name check system
for passports until December 2004, and it is my understanding that
even today that link still has not been established.
In your judgment, why did not the Terrorist Screening Center
start sharing information with the passport name check system at
the same time that it started sharing information with the State
Departments name check for visas?
It is odd to me because there is sharing of information on visas,
but there appears not to be sharing of information on American
citizens with ties to terrorism.
Mr. FORD. It is unclear to us why the information was not shared
initially when they stood up in December 2003. We have been told
that the focus initially was on the visa issue. We were concerned
about foreign aliens, potentially bad people that live in other countries. The TSC visa system was set up so that they could reduce
the vulnerability in the visa world. But it is not clear to us why
passports were not thought of as another potential vulnerability for
sharing that information.
So, again, we never really got a very clear explanation as to why
the passport area was not considered at the time they set up the
Terrorist Screening Center.
Chairman COLLINS. Mr. Johnson, do you have any insights on
that? Did the State Department think about asking the Terrorist
Screening Center for its complete watch list?
Mr. JOHNSON. No, maam. I have no knowledge as to why that
was not done.

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Chairman COLLINS. Mr. Ford, we find a similar problem dealing
with criminal fugitives and the FBI not sharing the names of many
State and Federal fugitives, including those, as your testimony
pointed out, who are wanted for very serious violent crimes. Once
again my question is the same. Why did not the FBI make certain
that the State Department had access to its list of fugitives in
order to prevent one of them from getting a passport and fleeing
the country?
The regulations prohibit the issuance of a passport to someone
with an outstanding Federal warrant. It seems a logical step to
have been taken.
Mr. FORD. Well, again, I do not know completely the reasons why
that information was not being shared. The State Department indicated to us early on in our assignment that they believed that they
were getting Federal warrants through the U.S. Marshals Service,
and as the course of our work went on, we found that, in fact, the
U.S. Marshals Service database does not contain all Federal warrants and that the FBI is a better database, is more comprehensive, and includes not only Federal warrants but also State warrants.
So again, it is not clear to us why this issue was not pursued by
the Department of State in terms of getting access to the information. We do know that there was a dialogue between the FBI and
the State Department in late 2004 up through just recently, we understand, about trying to find a way to share this information.
It is not really clear to us why this was not considered early on
as a way to again foreclose a vulnerability.
Chairman COLLINS. Mr. Johnson, the GAO, in its computer
match, uncovered a case of a fugitive receiving a Federal passport,
an American passport, even in just the limited review that it did.
Have you had any experience with a fugitive trying to apply for a
passport at the office for which you worked?
Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, maam. In late 2003 there was an individual
who had committed a murder in Georgia, and it was about 2 or 3
days previously. I guess the police had received a tip that this individual was driving to Miami in an attempt to get a U.S. passport
in his true identity to leave the country. So they just called our office. Basically the duty agent answered the phone, and it was about
1:30 in the afternoon. And the agent said, Well, let me go check,
take the name and go down to the passport agency and check and
see if this person had applied. And in fact, when she went down,
the person had applied for a U.S. passport and was coming to pick
it up within the next hour, and the passport was going to be
issued.
So what happened was when he came to pick it up, two of my
agents detained him and his vehicle, which he had actually used
in the commission of the crime, and we were able to turn him over
to State authorities.
I would add that while he was not a Federal fugitive, he was a
State fugitive, a very brutal murderer, who later was convicted and
sentenced to life in prison.
Chairman COLLINS. But for that tip, the individual would have
been able to pick up the passport and flee the country; is that correct?

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Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, maam.
Chairman COLLINS. So it is not because there was an information
sharing system in place that this was discovered. It was due to a
tip which was followed up on quickly.
Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, maam.
Chairman COLLINS. Thank you.
Senator Carper, I know you are on a tight schedule. I have some
additional questions for our witnesses, but I would like to yield to
you.
Senator CARPER. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I was just handed a note that said my 10:15 call has been rescheduled for 3 oclock.
Chairman COLLINS. In that case I will reclaim my time. No, go
right ahead. [Laughter.]
Senator CARPER. Thanks, Madam Chairman.
And to our witnesses, thank you for joining us today. I do not
care who responds to this question. Either of you are welcome to.
But a person in this country who is interested in getting a passport
fraudulently, how might they go about it?
Mr. JOHNSON. The first thing, as I said earlier, they would have
to prove is their U.S. citizenship and their identity. Typically they
would either steal or buy some type of birth certificate from a
State. In some States, unfortunately, it is relatively easy to go in
and just get a copy of a birth certificate without any proof of identification. So they would procure or obtain a birth certificate from
some State or one of the territories.
Senator CARPER. Could you slow down just for a second? So a
person alleging to be me or you or anybody else in this room might
be able to go to an agency within their State and ask for a birth
certificate, not have to present identification?
Mr. JOHNSON. In some cases that is correct, yes, sir.
Senator CARPER. And obtain that?
Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, sir.
Senator CARPER. Is that commonplace?
Mr. JOHNSON. It happens. I can think of numerous cases where
that has happened. But if they do not do that, certainly, as I indicated earlier, there are plenty of people out there on the streets
who are illegal document vendors, and you can buy blank birth certificates where you essentially fill in the blank, what name do you
want to use. You can buy birth certificates that are legitimate in
someone elses identity, and then they typically would take that
birth certificate and apply for a drivers license or a State ID card.
And with those two documents, that should be sufficient, that is all
the information that is really needed to go and apply for a U.S.
passport. It can be a relatively simple process.
Senator CARPER. Mr. Ford, would you concur with that?
Mr. FORD. Yes. In our discussions with the Diplomatic Security
Service, the individuals who investigate these type of cases, use of
eligibility documents like drivers license, birth certificates can be
used as a vehicle to illegitimately get a passport.
Senator CARPER. My staff, as they sometimes do, gave me several
questions that I might want to consider asking. The first question
starts off and says, it seems to me like our first line of defense
against passport fraud are the men and women who work at places

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like the Postal Service that accept passport applications and forward them to the State Department for review.
In listening to this testimony today, Madam Chairman, I am reminded the first line of defense probably is not the Postal Service,
it probably starts well before that in some of these agencies that
you are talking about that can issue a drivers license or a birth
certificate, or for the lack of enforcement to crack down on folks
who might be out on the streets trying to sell these bogus documents.
How do we confront and deal with the sort of situations that you
just described?
Mr. JOHNSON. One, I think this is a big step because I think it
serves as a recognition that on Capitol Hill everybody is looking at
this, is this a problem. I am of the mindset that we should always
be proactive and not just react, and I think if you give, for instance,
Diplomatic Security the adequate special agent resources to actively pursue these so-called document vendors, I think you start
in a proactive manner, starting to eliminate and make it very difficult for these people on the street to vend these and sell these
documents.
Another way, quite frankly, is the sentences handed down when
you have someone convicted of passport fraud are very small typically.
Senator CARPER. Give us some idea what the range of sentences
might be for a first offense and multiple offenses.
Mr. JOHNSON. Someone with no criminal history, never been convicted of a crime, they typically would get probation if convicted of
passport fraud. I can remember cases where someone who has
maybe been arrested multiple times on very heinous crimes but
never convicted. Therefore, it does not kick it up in terms of the
guidelines. So what would happen, that person would get essentially probation or certainly less than 6 months, and I think that
is a huge problem in the system because it serves as no deterrence
and it serves as no punishment. I think if we recognize that it is
something that we want to go after, then we have to have a punishment that meets the crime. In my estimation it totally undermines a lot of our homeland security efforts by allowing these people to go out there and commit this crime.
Senator CARPER. In whose courts would crimes of this nature be
tried, and in your own viewand this would be for either of you
what might be more appropriate sentences, particularly for multiple offenses?
Mr. JOHNSON. These are all going to be tried typically in Federal
courts, U.S. Attorneys Offices around the country prosecuting these
cases.
We did a big study a couple of years ago trying to promote the
U.S. Sentencing Commission an initiative to raise the so-called
guidelines, base offense levels for passport and visa fraud. We did
a pretty in-depth study in terms of what would be appropriate, and
essentially, we looked at some of the other like crimes, for instance,
perjury before a government official or a grand jury, false statements to a Federal agent. Typically those crimes can get someone
in the 18- to 24-month time frame. And we sort of made the connection that, OK, if you are fraudulently applying for a U.S. pass-

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port you are essentially under mining homeland security. That we
think would be appropriate range for someone who commits this
crime.
Senator CARPER. Mr. Ford, any thoughts?
Mr. FORD. We really did not look at the sentencing issue per se.
The few cases that we identified that we did some research on, we
found that although the sentencing for passport fraud may not
have been extensive in terms of amount of time, often they were
connected to other much more violent crimes, so the individual, in
a few cases that we looked at, would be prosecuted for the more
violent crime. So the fact that they were apprehended allowed Federal or State authorities to prosecute them for more violent crimes,
which of course had much longer potential sentences. But we have
not studied this issue.
Senator CARPER. Share with us, if you would, the range of the
kinds of people who might be seeking a passport fraudulently. The
ones we might be most concerned about are those who may be terrorists or seek to commit some terrorist act. I am sure there are
some that are more benign. But just give us the range of uses or
backgrounds of the people that we are concerned about here.
Mr. JOHNSON. Certainly in the 5 years I was in Miami, the extremes were several murderers that were attempting to get U.S.
passports and different identities. I can think of probably two or
three cases right off the top of my head where someone wanted for
murder in a State was attempting to get a passport in a totally different identity, bank robbers
Senator CARPER. For the purpose of leaving?
Mr. JOHNSON. For the purpose of leaving or just melding into society. There was one case where it was an individual out of Maryland who had allegedly killed a person and seriously injured another. He came down to Florida, bought one of these rather cheap
counterfeit Virgin Islands birth certificates.
Senator CARPER. What do they cost?
Mr. JOHNSON. I do not recall what these things range. One person paid $6,000 for one of these documents. I mean on face value
you could tell it was not a very good document, but to the criminal,
OK, it is $6,000, it must be worthwhile.
Senator CARPER. What do they go for up in, say, Bangor, Maine?
[Laughter.]
Just kidding.
Mr. JOHNSON. I am thinking about the Miami market. So this individual came to South Florida, bought one of these counterfeit Virgin Islands birth certificates, had the name typed in using a totally
different made-up name. And I had a really impressive agent who
worked the case, realized right up front that it was a fraudulent
case. He went and got an arrest warrant in that bogus identity because our efforts to find him were negative. So he put him in
NCIC, and then a short while after that a police officer in Palm
Beach County stopped this individual on the street corner, and the
individual handed him his drivers license and this bogus identity,
and the warrant came up wanted by Diplomatic Security for passport fraud. So we still did not know who this individual was.
We put him into our custody, fingerprinted him, and soon after
the fingerprints came back from the FBI we realized who he was

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because he was wanted for murder in Maryland. And that is a classic example of had it not been probably for an aggressive young
Diplomatic Security agent, this murderer, who had a totally clean
identity, and apart from having been fingerprinted and having his
fingerprints in NCIC, he might still be walking free.
Senator CARPER. Madam Chairman, my time has expired. Could
I ask one more question?
Chairman COLLINS. Certainly.
Senator CARPER. Thank you very much.
Talk to us about what other ways that we can, using technology
that we have today, that we can better ensure that the person who
is applying for a passport is indeed the person that they say they
are.
Mr. JOHNSON. There are so many different governmental databases, law enforcement, intelligence, private sector, in my mind
something as important as issuance of a passport, you should have
as many cross-checks as possible. To me, having stovepipes of different systems where only certain agencies can get to it, or even
stovepipes within your agency, totally defeats what we are trying
to do here. To the extent possible, even if we have to pass laws to
allow NCIC to be passed to Consular Affairs, then maybe that is
what we need to do because I think we have to be extremely aggressive in developing systems, intelligence and law enforcement
sharing to prevent these types of things. To me that is a big step.
Senator CARPER. Mr. Ford, would you answer the same question,
please?
Mr. FORD. I totally concur that I think the issue of sharing appropriate information with all the various parties involved is critical to this process because the examiners in the passport area, if
they do not get a hit that an individual is somebody they ought to
be worrying about, then they are not going to know not to approve
the documentation for the passport. I think this is the most critical
issue.
I think with regard to at least the management of the process,
and as we say in our report, there is a need for more training.
Training was very inconsistent in the passport offices. The acceptance agents, we have 7,000 of those around the country. It is not
clear to us to what extent individuals at post offices and county
clerks, places like that, are well trained in this area. So I think our
focus is on better training, better awareness of what some of the
fraud indicators are, better information sharing, that those things
in total should help prevent fraud more than it is currently based
on our analysis.
Senator CARPER. The last thing, just as succinctly as you can,
what should we do? Senator Collins, our Chairman, those of us who
serve on this Committee, what should we do?
Mr. FORD. I think that the one issue, again, we have not studied
it in detail, but I think there are some legal issues regarding what
can be shared between the law enforcement community, basically
the FBI and the State Department, that may require some legislative changes.
Senator CARPER. Mr. Johnson, what should we do?
Mr. JOHNSON. I would hope that as a result of these hearings,
that the Department of State, both in Consular Affairs and in Dip-

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lomatic Security, would come forward with some initiatives for additional resources. Throughout the report they cite resources as one
of the problems, and quite frankly, I think that is something that
this Committee maybe can help them resolve.
Senator CARPER. Our thanks to both of you. Thanks, Madam
Chairman.
Chairman COLLINS. Thank you.
Mr. Johnson, I want to follow up on that last question. We have
talked a lot about the vulnerability created by a lack of information
sharing. You have been on the front lines. You have mentioned
that the inadequate penalties are another issue that needs to be
addressed, but what about staffing, training? Is there a sufficient
staff that is dedicated to passport fraud? Talk to us more if you will
about the personnel and resource constraints that the GAO identified.
Mr. JOHNSON. I will sort of split in both halves, first with Consular Affairs and their passport agencies. I was still at the Agency
when they made the decision to eliminate their assistant fraud program managers. This was I think in early 2004. I recall at the time
telling the various Consular Affairs officials that I really felt that
was not a very good idea. Many of these assistants had been in
those jobs for years and years, and had a great deal of local and
national knowledge when it came to fraud. I recognize what the
Departments idea was, to rotate the examiners through to get everybody a little bit of a sharing of how fraud works, but in my
mind, why not leave the assistants there and then still rotate? You
are in essence multiplying your ability to identify fraud.
I guess they had their reasons for doing it. To me, coming simplistically from a law enforcement standpoint, they literally are the
ones who have to identify the fraud. Why would you want to shorten or potentially shorten or short staff yourself? I think that is one
thing from a resource standpoint, that if anything, they should be
beefing this up. I know that they are looking at a period where the
issuance of passportsthey are looking at maybe from 8 million to
potentially 12 million. With that is going to come a lot more fraud.
I think you should be beefing up your efforts as opposed to cutting
back or shorting.
On the Diplomatic Security side, there is no organization that is
better at doing what they do, but the problem is they have too
many missions. The summer of 2004 in my field office at the time
was approximately 50 special agents, and at any given time I
would have five or six of my agents on rotation to Baghdad to the
temporary duty assignments in Iraq, not to mention Kabul, Afghanistan, and other protective security details. So it was literally
moving chess pieces. Who am I going to have this week? Because
those agents were being pulled for other priority missions.
I think there has to be a recognition that this is a problem and
that they have to dedicate the number of resources they need to
combat this problem, and that is simply what it comes down to. I
think they have the expertise, but they need the intelligence, as I
mentioned in my statement, they need intelligence ability, and they
just quite simply need more agents.
Chairman COLLINS. Mr. Ford, I could see you nodding your head
in agreement when Mr. Johnson was outlining the personnel and

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resource challenges. What did the GAO find with regard to adequate staffing and also the elimination of the assistant fraud manager position?
Mr. FORD. We visited 7 of the 16 passport offices, and we telephonically contacted the fraud prevention managers in all the other
offices. A fairly consistent message we heard was that the elimination of the assistant fraud prevention manager was viewed as
hurting the effort to look at fraud.
The Department wanted to expand training by having individuals put in a rotational program. That made sense to us, but the
elimination of the assistant position, given the workload problems
that the fraud managers had in most of the posts we visited, did
not seem like was a good idea to us. Our recommendation, basically
we went to the State Department and said, we think you need to
reexamine the overall staffing profile here because, again, the message was fairly consistent in almost every passport office we visited. They said that this is hurting the effort to identify potential
fraud.
As Mr. Johnson indicated, if the volume of passports is going to
continue to grow over the next several years, it seems the problem
will be compounded unless there is enough people out there who
are trained in fraud prevention to really put a kink into the potential that could be out there of the country being vulnerable.
Chairman COLLINS. Mr. Johnson, in your testimony you describe
fraud rings that sell bogus breeder documents such as birth certificates that are in turn used to secure a passport. What is your evaluation of Federal efforts to crack down on these fraud rings? Is
there an organized Federal effort to go after these rings that are
selling the breeder documents?
Mr. JOHNSON. Not that I am aware of. I think it really always
came toand I have worked all over the country in the passport
fraud arenaand it always came down to regional nuances. I mean
in some regions you might haveDiplomatic Security would be aggressive in pursuing these document vendors, and maybe the
former Immigration, now Homeland Security, ICE, would be aggressive. Other areas, the FBI might have an interest, but unfortunately, I cannot say across the board that any particular agency or
any group of agencies would wholeheartedly go after these rings.
In my mind, again, I think that is a little bit of a lapse, that we
need to sort of have a consolidated across the U.S. approach to
combating this problem.
Chairman COLLINS. That does seem to be an important gap because if you can break the rings that are providing the bogus documents, you prevent the person from getting the passport in the
first place.
Mr. JOHNSON. If I might add, sometimesand I think the report
refers to thisthat most of these individuals were not successful
in getting these passports issued, but you still have an individual
with a new birth certificate and a new identity. While he or she
may not have gotten the passport, they are still out there walking
around with a drivers license and a birth certificate and a different
identity. What are they doing? It is just something that maybe the
State Department willI am just saying that is a whole

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Chairman COLLINS. A whole other area for us to crack down on.
Thank you.
Mr. Ford, just one final question. On its comments on the GAOs
report, the State Department points to a new series of unannounced audits that it is conducting that it started in April to determine the effectiveness of anti-fraud programs at various passport offices. And the State Department officials have trumpeted
these results in saying that they show only very minor errors.
What is your response to that?
Mr. FORD. First of all, we have not examined their audits in detail. We have seen some information regarding the reported results.
With regard to the issue that it appears to be a minor problem,
looking at their analysis, I believe they extrapolated their sample
by indicating there could be the potential for 4,000 cases, if they
extrapolated to all the passports being issued. If that were the
case, since I believe they referred around 3,200 cases last year,
that would indicate that the potential for fraud is a lot greater
than what was reported last year through their fraud prevention
system.
So again, I have not examined it in detail. I think it is good that
they are doing it, but it does point to the fact that the potential
for more fraud out there may be greater than what they suggest.
Chairman COLLINS. Thank you very much for your testimony.
Senator Carper.
Senator CARPER. I have no further questions. Again, our thanks
to both of you. Thanks, Madam Chairman.
Chairman COLLINS. Thank you very much. Your testimony has
been extremely helpful, and we look forward to working further
with you.
Mr. FORD. Thank you.
Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you.
Chairman COLLINS. I would now like to call forward our second
panel, which brings together three accomplished Federal officials
with the responsibility for issues related to the security of the U.S.
passport system.
Frank Moss is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Passport Services. He is responsible for overseeing the processing of
some 8.8 million passport applications last fiscal year.
Donna Bucella is the Director of the Terrorist Screening Center
and is on detail to the FBI from the Transportation Security Administration, where she was the Southeast Area Director.
Thomas Bush began his FBI career in 1975 in the Identification
Division. Last December he was appointed by Director Mueller to
be the Assistant Director of that division, now called the Criminal
Justice Information Services.
I want to thank all of you for being here today, and we will start
the panel by hearing Mr. Mosss testimony.

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TESTIMONY OF FRANK E. MOSS,1 DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR PASSPORT SERVICES, BUREAU OF CONSULAR
AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. MOSS. Good morning, Madam Chairman and Members of the

Committee.
I am pleased to be here today to discuss how the State Department is responding to concerns raised by the Government Accountability Office in its report, Improvements Needed to Strengthen
U.S. Passport Fraud Detection Efforts. I want to thank the GAO
and especially their lead examiner, Michael Courts, for their hard
work on this project. As the GAO report recognizes, the Department of State, especially the Bureau of Consular Affairs and the
Diplomatic Security Service, are working hand in hand with elements of the Homeland Security and Justice Departments to protect the integrity of the U.S. passport. We acknowledge, however,
that it is always possible to improve, and welcome GAOs observations and suggestions.
The integrity of the passport rests upon three major elements,
the quality of the adjudication process, the security features of the
passport itself, and the introduction of biometrics to make certain
that the passport can only be used by the person to whom it is
issued. This is what I illustrate on this charts to my right.2 Taken
together these elements form a comprehensive approach to passport security. Securing the document and the adjudication process
is particularly important in an era when terrorists, transnational
criminals, and others seeking to enter the U.S. illegally, view travel
documents as valuable tools.
While my written statement discusses this in greater detail, let
me highlight for the Committee just a few steps we are taking to
improve the passports design and to introduce biometrics.
We recently completed the first cover-to-cover redesign of the
passport in more than a decade. The new document will include a
host of new security features. These include sophisticated new art
work, printing techniques used in the current generation of U.S.
currency, and other changes that will significantly increase the
physical security aspects of the U.S. passport.
This next generation U.S. passport, the e-passport, also includes
biometric technology that will further support the governments
border security goals. The e-passport includes a contactless chip in
the rear cover that will contain only the data on the biographic
data page of the passport and a digital image of the bearer. I am
happy to share examples with the Committee, and some of the art
work here to my left demonstrates the new security features and
some of the other aspects of the new passports.
Let me discuss the GAOs recommendations and how the Department of State is implementing them. We agree with the GAO that
enhanced interagency data sharing can significantly improve passport adjudication. We have taken numerous steps to meet that objective. For example, in April 2004 we signed an MOU with the Social Security Administration that allows us to verify Social Security
numbers of U.S. passport applicants. We have a longstanding and
1 The
2 The

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prepared statement of Mr. Moss with attachments appears in the Appendix on page 54.
charts referred to appear in the Appendix on pages 6365.

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effective working relationship with Federal law enforcement agencies. Today we have nearly 50,000 names of fugitives or other persons of interest to law enforcement in the passport lookout system.
Half of those entries were made individually as a result of our outreach efforts. The other half are based on data transfer from the
U.S. Marshals Service on persons subject to Federal fugitive warrants.
To complement this information, we are working with the FBI to
add to the passport lookout system an extract of information from
their NCIC database. I am happy to report that last week I received a letter from Mr. Bush that responds positively to our request for access to this information. We appreciate this positive response which we believe will enable us to include in the passport
lookout system information on persons subject to State or local
warrants. This is a long-sought objective of ours.
We have also just signed an agreement with the Terrorist
Screening Center that will provide us information on American citizens who may have a nexus to terrorism or to an ongoing investigation. Under this agreement the State Department will inform
the TSC whenever any such individual applies for passport services. In addition, the Department of State provides the National
Counter Terrorism Center, NCTC, access to our PRISM database
which includes images of all passport applications since 1994 including the photographs of the applicants.
GAO also recommends creating a national fraud library of suspect documents. There are several different resources containing
such information, and we agree that finding a way to bring them
together is desirable. In this regard we are pursuing access to the
U.S. Secret Services Questionable ID Documents (QID) database.
This database includes sections on valid documents, stolen documents, and on counterfeits and alterations. A significant advantage
to this initiative is that we at the State Department can contribute
to the Secret Services database, and therefore assist them in their
mission, and of course it will also allow us to avoid significant development costs because we will piggyback on what the Secret
Service is already doing.
The GAO recommends designating additional positions for fraud
prevention coordination and training in domestic passport agencies
and establishing a more formalized fraud prevention training program. We agree and have taken several steps to make this happen.
We are adding more fraud prevention managers to the staffs of our
larger passport agencies. We have increased the number of persons
working in the fraud offices as well as the length of time they
spend there. These are on rotational assignments. This will have
a direct, positive impact on improving training provided to the
passport specialists who adjudicate passport applications and stand
as the first line of defense against passport fraud.
Finally, under a Washington-based reorganization, we will add to
the staff that coordinates and backstops fraud prevention operations. Part of the work of that expanded staff will be to develop
a national fraud training program for passport specialists.
The GAO also looked at workload transfers from one domestic
passport agency to another. We do this, quite honestly, to make the
best use of our issuance capabilities nationwide. A theoretical risk

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in doing so is that we could miss opportunities to identify fraud.
We believe that we address this risk successfully through our selection of highly skilled fraud program managers, by rotating senior
passport specialists through the Fraud Program Management Office, so that they can assist and better train their staff, and by
training all of our newly hired specialists centrally.
Finally, the GAO suggested increased training and oversight of
the more than 7,000 passport acceptance agents nationwide. These
are, as you noted in the earlier round of testimony, principally U.S.
Postal Service employees and clerks of court who accept applications from U.S. citizens and identify the passport applicant as the
person he or she claims to be. This is, of course, only the first step
in the passport adjudication process.
Improved training is already under way through use of Computer
Based Training modules developed in cooperation with the U.S.
Postal Service that we are also adopting for use by other facilities
and deliverers of acceptance agent services.
We are also exploring initiatives to better monitor the quality of
the acceptance agents work.
Chairman Collins, other Members of the Committee, thank you,
and at this time I am happy to answer any questions you may
have.
Chairman COLLINS. Thank you very much. Ms. Bucella.
TESTIMONY OF DONNA A. BUCELLA,1 DIRECTOR, TERRORIST
SCREENING CENTER

Ms. BUCELLA. Good morning, Chairman Collins. Thank you for

the opportunity to discuss the missions and objectives of the Terrorist Screening Center as they relate to information sharing with
the Department of State.
The mission of the Terrorist Screening Center is to consolidate
the governments approach to screening terrorism and to consolidate the identities of all known and suspected terrorists into a single database.
The Terrorist Screening Center represents one of the most
unique support organizations to terrorist screening and law enforcement operations ever conceived or implemented. The TSC has
been providing key resources since December 1, 2003, including a
single coordination point for terrorist screening data, the Terrorist
Screening Centers database, a 24/7 call center for encounter identification assistance, access to coordinated law enforcement response,
a formal process for tracking encounters, encounter feedback to appropriate entities, and a process to address misidentification issues.
Since the TSC was established, the Department of State has
been a significant contributor to all of our overall success. The Department of State is a full partner at the TSC, and one of my executive deputies is a Department of State detailee. The close on-site
partnership with the Department of State has enhanced our ability
to administer the Visa Security Advisory Opinion Review, the Visa
Revocation Review, and nominations to our database. Additionally,
the Terrorist Screening Center and State are working to ensure
that appropriate officials will be notified when a U.S. person is list1 The

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ed in the TSDB and/or applies for a new, renewed, or amended
U.S. passport. And we have signed that agreement.
Visa Security Advisory Opinions are generated by the Department of State Consular Affairs officers when a visa applicant is, in
fact, a possible match to the CLASS system. The Department of
State personnel at the Terrorist Screening Center have reviewed
over 138 Security Advisory Opinions since December 1, 2003, our
inception.
Visa Revocation Reviews are conducted for new entries into our
database to determine if those new entries have been issued visas
before the derogatory information surfaced. The Terrorist Screening Center has reviewed over 52,000 new names to our Terrorist
Screening Center database, and we have alerted the Department of
State to about 850 cases of possible visa revocation.
The Department of State specialists assigned to the Terrorist
Screening Center play a very important role in the Terrorist
Screening Center nominations process. The specialists have the expertise to ensure that foreign individuals nominated for inclusion
into the Terrorist Screening Center database are thoroughly evaluated and made available to overseas posts.
The screening of U.S. passport applications, a highlight of the
May 2005 GAO report, is a collaborative initiative that began this
past January when it was identified as a vulnerability and basically a screening opportunity, and proposed by our State Department representative that we get the names of U.S. persons listed
in the TSDB and make them available to the Department of State
during the passport application process.
As I mentioned, the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) has
been signed. The TSC looks forward to continued collaboration with
the Department of State on this project. Since Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 6 was issued on September 16, 2003, the
Terrorist Screening Center and the Department of State have been
partnering to protect our Nations security through the robust sharing of terrorist information. The Terrorist Screening Center has
provided support to those functions identified by the Department of
State as priorities and will continue to expand our relationship.
This close and continuing cooperation contributed to worldwide efforts to keep terrorists out of the United States and locate those
who may already be in our Nation.
The Terrorist Screening Center thanks the Committee for the opportunity to provide clarity and looks forward to continued work
with the Committee in TSCs efforts to consolidate the governments approach to terrorist screening.
Thank you.
Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Mr. Bush.
TESTIMONY OF THOMAS E. BUSH, III,1 ASSISTANT DIRECTOR,
CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION SERVICES DIVISION, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.

Mr. BUSH. Good morning, Madam Chairman, and Members of

the Committee, and our condolences to Senator Lieberman and his
family.
1 The

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As you mentioned, I am the Assistant Director of the FBIs
Criminal Justice Information Services Division, otherwise known
as CJIS. By way of background, CJIS is responsible for five services to law enforcement: Fingerprint identification; uniform crime
reporting; National Crime Information Center, also known as
NCIC; the National Instant Criminal Background Check System;
and Law Enforcement Online.
NCIC, the service which is of interest to this Committee today,
is a computerized database of documented criminal justice information available to virtually every law enforcement agency nationwide, 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. Since its inception, NCIC
has been a highly effective tool for information sharing with local,
State, tribal, and Federal entities. NCIC is operated under a
shared management concept between our State and local and Federal criminal justice users. The database currently consists of 18
files, 7 property files, and 11 person files to include the Wanted
Person Files.
During NCICs first year of operation, which was 1967, 2 million
transactions were processed. In May of this year, NCIC processed
an average of 4.6 million transactions per day, with an average response time of less than 0.06 seconds. On May 27 of this year,
NCIC processed a record 5.2 million transactions in a 24-hour period.
I would like to outline some of NCIC files and features that assist in immigration and border security. The Foreign Fugitive File,
established July 1, 1987, contains information on persons wanted
in connection with offenses committed outside the United States.
There are two types of records in the Foreign Fugitive FileCanadian records and INTERPOL records.
The Immigration Violator File was established on August 25,
2003. In 1996, NCIC implemented the Deported Felon File. Today,
this is now a category of records within the Immigration Violator
File. Immigration Violator File includes two additional categories of
records, individuals wanted as absconders, and individuals in violation of the National Security Entry/Exit Registration System or
NSEERS. As of July 1 of this year, there were 163,000 plus records
in the NCIC Immigration Violator File.
The Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File, or VGTOF,
was implemented in December 1994. This file was designed to provide identifying information about violent criminal gang and terrorist organization members to protect the law enforcement community and the public. Traditionally, NCIC Person Files serve the
needs of the criminal justice community and are supported by the
judicial process. Most typically, a warrant is on file. However, with
the creation of VGTOF, that philosophy was expanded to support
law enforcement, investigative and information needs related to
terrorism. When the Terrorist Screening Center became operation
in December 2003, the FBI CJIS Division modified the NCIC
VGTOF file to support TSCs mission.
VGTOF is the means to make the terrorist screening information
available to the law enforcement community nationwide. When an
officer hits on a VGTOF terrorist record, he is instructed to contact
TSC for additional information on the subject.

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The Department of State Bureau of Diplomatic Security is a fully
authorized NCIC user when conducting criminal investigations.
Additionally, the FBI has provided the Department of State Bureau
of Consular Affairs with extracts of the NCIC Wanted Person, Immigration Violator, Foreign Fugitive files, VGTOF, and the Interstate Identification Index on a daily and weekly basis for inclusion
in its Consular Lookout and Support System, as required by Section 403 of the U.S. PATRIOT Act. The Department of State uses
the information to ascertain whether visa applicants have records
indexed in NCIC which might preclude the issuance of a visa.
In April 2005, CJIS received a request from Department of State
Passport Services for an extract of the FBI fugitives contained in
the NCIC system. Our immediate response was that the FBI fugitives in NCIC, which is approximately 7,000, represent only a fraction of the more than one million felony and serious misdemeanor
wanted person records entered into NCIC. We requested that DOS
Passport Services work with us toward the ultimate goal of system
interoperability and direct NCIC access for passport screening. As
an interim step toward this goal, we have agreed to and have provided the requested extracts to them as recently as, I believe, Monday of this week.
In closing, I would like to thank you for allowing me the opportunity to explain the use of NCIC for immigration and border security. I would now answer any questions you might have.
Chairman COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Bush. It looks like there has
been some considerable progress made in the past few days.
Let me start, Mr. Moss, with a threshold question for you. Do
you believe that terrorists are trying to get their hands on U.S.
passports? Is this a problem?
Mr. MOSS. Madam Chairman, I am unaware of any reports of
terrorists themselves, people we knew were involved in terrorism,
attempting to get a U.S. passport.
Taking it a little bit more broadly though, obviously we are concerned about anyone who may be seeking a passport in order to
flee prosecution or to engage in activities inimicable to our interests. That is why we think that these recent breakthroughs we
have had on terrorists, on exchanging screening information with
TSC and with the FBI, are major steps forward toward making our
borders more secure and obviously making our passport screening
system more robust than has heretofore been the case.
Chairman COLLINS. Let me read from testimony that you gave
on the House side just recently. You said, We at the Department
of State are certainly aware of how sought after this document is,
not only by American citizens with legitimate travel plans, but by
illegal immigrants, as well as terrorists and others who would do
this Nation harm. A key objective of the Department is to ensure
that U.S. passports are issued only to persons who are legitimately
entitled to them. This is particularly important in an era when terrorists, transnational criminals, and others seeking to enter the
U.S. illegally view travel documents as valuable tools. This morning you seem to be giving a different answer.
Mr. MOSS. I am sorry, Madam Chairman, I misinterpreted your
question. In my testimony earlier, and even in some of the comments I made today, I would like to differentiate between what

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happens in terms of people applying for passports domestically, and
then the misuse of lost or stolen U.S. passports around the world.
In the case of applying for passports in the United States, I am
unaware of any information on terrorists doing so, but obviously,
having the access to the TSC data will help us ensure that does
not happen.
The other side of the coin is when passports are lost or stolen
abroad. There is an active international market that supports illegal immigration, transnational crime, and yes, terrorism, trying to
acquire lost or stolen documents, not just from the United States
but issued by legitimate governments around the world. The 9/11
Commission dealt with this in depth both in its comprehensive report as well as in an appendix it wrote on the issue of terrorist
travel.
In terms of trying to prevent the misuse of U.S. passports, I
would mention, for example, that whenever we become aware of a
lost or stolen U.S. passport, we provide that data to INTERPOL so
that it can be shared with governments throughout the world. We
have given INTERPOL information on some 660,000 lost or stolen
passports over the last year. That is several years worth of data,
but it shows our commitment to try to prevent the misuse of the
U.S. passport.
We also invalidate the use of a U.S. passport for travel once it
has been reported as lost or stolen.
And the third point I would say is we have taken dramatic steps
to improve the physical security of the U.S. passport, so that one
of the longstanding vulnerabilities, which was changing the photograph, the tactic we all saw in the movies made in the 1960s, that
just simply cannot be done now. We think we have a very robust
passport physically as well as systems to prevent the misuse.
Thank you.
Chairman COLLINS. Mr. Moss, I agree with you that the passport
has improved greatly as far as becoming very difficult to counterfeit, but that is not the focus of the GAO report, nor our previous
witnesses. What they are trying to alert you to are very serious
vulnerabilities where phony breeder documents such as phony
birth certificates or drivers licenses could be used to secure a legitimate U.S. passport. We are not talking about a stolen or lost
passport falling into terrorist hands. We are talking about
vulnerabilities in the system that could be exploited by terrorists
using phony birth certificates to obtain a U.S. passport, and that
is what the GAO has tried to alert you to, and that is what Mr.
Johnsons testimony suggests is a real problem.
Mr. MOSS. Well, Madam Chairman, first of all, I do want to
thank the GAO for their work. They have alerted us to areas we
have to make improvements in. And I would like to thank you as
well, because in the Intelligence Reform Bill that you passed last
December, there were some important developments that apply to
this very issue you have talked about, moves toward Federal standards for birth certificates, for example.
My understanding is that right now there are 8,000 different jurisdictions in the United States that issue birth certificates, and
there are something like 50,000 different types of birth certificates

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in circulation. The same applies clearly to the issue of drivers licenses.
The third point I would make is that is why it is so important,
we believe, to give so much training and so much close management supervision to our passport specialists. These are the people
we depend upon to identify fraudulent documents by their look, by
their feel, by relationships between that document and what the
passport application says. This is an area where we are making
major investments.
The fourth point I would say is clearly we continue to strengthen
our fraud prevention program activities. For example, mention was
made of lost and stolen birth certificates issued here in the United
States. We have a particular concern over one jurisdiction in the
United States. We talked a little bit about Hudson County in the
earlier round of testimony, but the other thing is that in one case
involving, quite honestly, Puerto Rico, we do subject any passport
applications supported by a Puerto Rican birth certificate to extraordinary security reviews before issuance because of our concern
over the security of that document.
So we do have, I believe, a robust system in hand, and it will
only get better as we move toward Federal standards on drivers
licenses and birth certificates.
Chairman COLLINS. If you are not currently receiving information from the Terrorist Screening Center on Americans who are on
the watch list, how would you know whether or not an American
with ties to terrorist groups is receiving a passport?
Mr. MOSS. The way I would answer that is the following. For
about a generation we have depended upon a push system in which
Federal agencies and State and local law enforcement authorities
have shared data with us on persons of particular concern to us.
We are now trying to go to a system where basically we pull that
data from other databases. That is why access to the TSC database
is so important. The same applies to Mr. Bushs offer of access to
NCIC. I think we have a good system right now. Can it get better?
Yes. And I think that the GAO report has advanced that process.
The cooperation of my colleagues here at the table will help us to
do a better job in the future.
But let me assure you, if any agency at this table or another Federal agency or a State or local authority has a concern about an
individual, they can tell us right now. They know how to get in
touch with us. We will put that person in the lookout system and
prevent passport issuance to them until we have resolved that
problem.
Chairman COLLINS. Mr. Moss, in your written testimony you said
the Department of State is about to sign an agreement with the
Terrorist Screening Center that will provide information on American citizens who are of concern to TSC due to the nexus to terrorism or an ongoing investigation. I believe I heard you say this
morning that you have signed it. Could I ask when it was signed?
Mr. MOSS. It was signed last evening by the two agencies, including by Donna Bucella here at the my left.
Chairman COLLINS. See, sometimes oversight hearings do have
the desired result. [Laughter.]

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I am very pleased to learn that it has been signed. I think that
is a really important improvement to make.
Ms. Bucella, let me ask you, the Terrorist Screening Center was
sharing information on visas with the State Department, why was
there not sharing of information on U.S. citizens of particular concern?
Ms. BUCELLA. Chairman Collins, I wish that I could tell you
when we set up the Terrorist Screening Center I just went around
to different government agencies and knocked on their doors and
they gave me their list.
What we have had has been a tremendous effort in trying to
gather the names of all suspected, known, international and domestic terrorists from all the different agencies. What we had to do
is gather information in various forms. Some had full names, some
had partial dates of birth. We had to prioritize, and still trying to
gather our arms as the U.S. Government as to all the names.
And so one of our first priorities was preventing people from
coming into the country, and so we went through theobviously,
when we were set up, the State Department donated part of their
Tipoff staff to us, but that Tipoff staff dealt solely with those individuals that were applying for visas, keeping people outside the
country. So we loaded up our system using the Tipoff system. It
was not until, I believe, January of this year, when we were having
discussions with the State Department, that we realized that there
was yet another screening opportunity, and that was the U.S. passports.
And so the reason whyI read the GAO report, and when it had
that we were not cooperating, we were. We were just trying to figure out what it is that you want, what it is that you need, and how
can we get it to you. And so that was the discussion that we have
had over the last couple of months with our lawyers and making
sure that we complied with the privacy laws and things, and that
is why we have recently just signed the Memorandum of Understanding.
The implementation of thisbecause it is a technology issue, it
is really the connectivitywill be done before August of this year.
Chairman COLLINS. Mr. Moss, did the State Department ask for
this information?
Mr. MOSS. Madam Chairman, we have an effort going back 2 or
3 years now, trying to reach out to Federal agencies to acquire additional information to put into our screening system. One of our
first successes was the U.S. Marshals Service. We were then looking for other databases. By last December the letter left us and arrived in January at TSC, it is almost immaterial. Between ourselves we identified an opportunity to strengthen our passport lookout system by incorporating the TSCs information, and we have
been working together since then.
And I would say the same applies to the FBI. We are trying to
make this database richer, and now of course, not only do we have
an offer of 7,000 additional names of persons subject to Federal
warrants, but this great development over access to persons who
are subject to State warrants and local warrants as well.
Chairman COLLINS. Mr. Bush, that leads me into a question for
you. It seems to me that the FBI has a very strong interest in mak-

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ing sure that fugitives do not gain access to passports that they
could use to flee the country. Can you explain to us why the FBI
took so long to make the names of its fugitives available to the
State Department so that you could be alerted if one of these fugitives applied for a passport? I find it so inconceivable that we have
posters of the Ten Most Wanted in our Post Offices, and yet we are
not sharing that information in databases throughout our government.
Mr. BUSH. And let me backup what Mr. Moss has said. Historicallyand I was a fugitive hunter in the 1980s in the Washington
Field Office, and we were always encouraged and had procedures
to put stops individually, as he says, in a push type of format with
the State Department, and we often did individually. So case
agentsand I cannot speak about these particular cases that were
up herehad the opportunity, always have had, and I know we
took collectively large numbers of fugitives and persons of interest
and put them in the Tipoff system, which when CLASS was
searched would designate the fact that they were wanted. But
clearly, with the examples given here, there were opportunities to
catch individuals that were applying that were not taken advantage of by our case agents on an individual basis.
So as we move into this process to ensure in their pool process
to get as many in there as we can, then we will clearly fill some
of those gaps that we have had. But it has always beenI remember doing it myself with the State Department, so always had that
option. We clearly did not put all of them in there.
I think some of it was a resource issue. When you talk about
issuing 10 million passports a year that are name-based, when
NCIC records about a 10 percent or plus 10 percent hit rate, so you
are looking at about a million hits there on names that are phonetic searches. And they did not even used to be exact date of
birth, they had a range. So you would pull out a lot of false
positives. So you had an impact there on resources at the State Department and within the FBI, and that is what we need to work
around with access even to these 1.2 million fugitives. That is
going to create a lot of hit activity. That is the back side to sharing
information. It is the what do you do with it when you get it and
you get these hits? That is what we want to work with them closely
with, to a mutually agreeable system of applying that service.
Chairman COLLINS. It seems a very burdensome, labor-intensive
process, however, to rely on individual case agents trying to guess
whether a fugitive is at risk of flight and alerting the State Department. It seems much more efficient to have a database sharing
where perhaps you do not share all 1 million fugitives names, but
you do those convicted of serious crimes. I mean it seems to me
that you can deal with the data issue overwhelming the system by
selecting it based on the seriousness of the crime, but it is disturbing to me that the GAOs limited review found so many instances of fugitives who had committed extremely serious crimes,
and yet were not included in the State Department system, and indeed, the GAO, despite a very limited review, was able to come up
with some very egregious cases.

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So I hope the FBI will work to come up with a system that automatically shares the names of fugitives who have been convicted,
or who are wanted for serious crimes.
Mr. BUSH. And clearly, there are more effective means. There are
other means with checking passenger manifests and putting stops
in the Treasury enforcement computer system that would also pick
up on some of these fugitives travel, and the fact that they obviously do not always use their true name. In the case here, they obviously did.
But I think our mutual goal is to do the best we can and to make
it better wherever we can, whether it is terrorist related or fugitive
related.
Chairman COLLINS. Mr. Moss, one other question for you. We
talked a lot about the information sharing challenges and the need
to improve that, and indeed the agreement signed last night, I
think, is a very good step in the right direction, as well as good
timing for this hearing.
But the GAO and Mr. Johnson also identified a number of other
weaknesses in the State Departments overall fraud prevention program. For example, GAO was critical of the limited oversight and
training of acceptance agents, the lack of a consistent nationwide
training program, the absence of a centralized and up-to-date electronic fraud prevention library, and the fact that headquarters responsibility for fraud prevention support is somewhat unclear. Mr.
Johnson raised concerns about the elimination of the assistant
fraud manager position, and suggested also that not enough resources are focused on fraud detection and prevention.
What steps is the State Department taking to address these concerns which are organizational, resource, training, or oversight concerns?
Mr. MOSS. I think we are in fact addressing each and every one.
Let me begin with the issue of the so-called elimination of the antifraud, assistant anti-fraud program managers.
What we had was a situation where we had a couple of people
encumbering these positions and some other people who had been
assigned to this function basically on informal details at the passport agency level. What we are trying to do, Madam Chairman, in
this effort, is to make certain that the knowledge that is held by
our fraud program managers really gets tofor want of a better
term, the passport floor. Passport fraud is identified by our passport specialists. They are the people who literally see the application, look at databases, touch the birth certificates and things like
this.
What we are trying to do by our current strategy is to rotate our
supervisory passport specialists through the anti-fraud program office, have them spend 3 to 6 months there, understand the antifraud tools, and then go back to help train their own staff.
Second, we have also implemented a centralized training program for our new passport specialists so that they all have a thorough grounding in passport fraud detection efforts.
I should also talk a little bit about resources, both in terms of
the passport side, and I would also like to mention briefly some developments on the Diplomatic Security side. We are continuing to
hire additional personnel. Our workload is growing dramatically.

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You are well aware, of course, of the Western Hemisphere Initiative that is coming along as well. We are not trying to overburden
our staffs. We are trying to hire and keep our staff ratios in line
with our workload. Also our colleagues at Diplomatic Security have
gone to a new model for staffing their own offices around the country. They are beginning to assign civil service personnel to those
offices as investigators so that they have the long-term continuity
that Mr. Johnson mentioned in his testimony.
On the question of the acceptance agents, I think there are two
things I would like to mention. First of all, most of the acceptance
agents are employees of the U.S. Postal Service, have been vetted
by the U.S. Postal Service, and are U.S. citizens. The U.S. Postal
Service has developed a computerized-based training program for
those people. We are so impressed with it that we are actually acquiring rights to use it to help train those non-Postal Service acceptance agents, clerks of court, a handful of universities, things
like this, some public libraries around the United States. We also
use our own customer service staffs in the passport agencies to do
outreach to these agencies.
The final point I would say is that if an acceptance agent has
any question about a passport application, they simply accept it,
they flag it for us, and we take it from there. They have a very limited role, basically, to ensure that the person applying for a passport is who they claim to be. We make the decision on passport
issuance. That is inherently a Federal Government responsibility.
So I really think that between our work with DS, the additional
personnel we are assigning to the anti-fraud program responsibilities at our largest agencies, our rotational activities, and our training opportunities for all of our staffs that we already had in place,
we have a robust strategy to help address many of the suggestions
and recommendations made by the GAO.
Chairman COLLINS. Thank you for that summary statement.
I want to thank all of the witnesses who have participated in our
hearing today.
As Mr. Moss indicated, this Committee spent a great deal of time
last year drafting intelligence reform legislationsweeping reforms. One of the major issues that we focused on in the hearings
as a result of the 9/11 Commission report was the lack of information sharing among Federal agencies, a lack that prevented agencies from putting together the pieces of the puzzle that might have
allowed us to thwart the attacks on our country on September 11,
and that is why it is particularly frustrating to me personally to
see that there are still serious examples of a lack of consistent information sharing that could be harmful to our homeland security.
In the case that the GAO has identified and that you are all
working to remedy, it is particularly frustrating to me because it
does not require a new law to be passed. It does not require a new
Executive Order. It does not require a massive new appropriation.
What it requires is simply to have agencies working together to
share vital information to help protect our Nation against terrorists
and other criminals who would do us harm.
I want to close this hearing by urging you to work very closely
together to improve the system. I realize there are technological
challenges. I realize there are the problems of false positives. But

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in this age of databases and computers, surely we ought to be able
to come up with a system that allows us to stop issuing passports
to fugitives wanted for serious crimes, and to terrorists. I do not
feel confident that we have such a system now. I believe we are
making progress, and I think the agreement signed is a major step
in the right direction. But I urge you to redouble your efforts. This
is so important. I think Secretary Powell was correct when he said
that the integrity of the U.S. passport is absolutely essential in the
global war on terrorism.
So this is an issue that the Committee is going to continue to follow very closely. We look forward to getting an update from you as
implementation goes forward, as you meet the August goal that
you have set for implementation. I realize there will be challenges,
both from technology and privacy concerns and other issues, but
surely we can do better.
Again, I thank you for your cooperation with this investigation,
and I look forward to working not only with this panel, but our previous one, to make sure that the system for issuing passports is as
secure as it can possibly be. Thank you for being here today.
The hearing record will remain open for 15 additional days.
I want to thank the GAO for its excellent investigation in this
area, and I want to thank my staff for their hard work.
This hearing is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:16 a.m., the Committee was adjourned.]

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