Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. L-19864 and 19685
17, 1923
October
J. J. GO CHIOCO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
E. MARTINEZ, ET AL., defendantsappellees,
and
ORTIGA HERMANOS, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
J. J. GO CHIOCO, defendant-appellantappellee.
Gibbs, McDonough and Johnson for Ortiga as
appellant.
Araneta and Zaragoza for J. J. Go Chioco as
appellant-appellee.
Gibbs and McDonough for Ortiga Hermanos
as appellee.
Fisher, DeWitt, Perkins and Kincaid as amici
curiae.
VILLAMOR, J.:
It appears from the record that on June 2, 1919,
J. J. Go Chioco made a loan of P40,000 to
Ortiga Hermanos, and to that effect a
"ORTIGA HERMANOS
"CHAN LIN CUN
MARTINEZ
"E.
INFORMATION
The undersigned accuses REYNALDO LAQUI
Y AQUINO of a VIOLATION OF
PARAGRAPH 3, PRESIDENTIAL DECREE
NO. 9 in relation to Letter of Instruction No.
266 of the Chief Executive dated April 1, 1975,
committed as follows:
That on or about the 28 th day of January, 1977,
in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and knowingly carry outside of his residence a
bladed and pointed weapon, to wit: an ice pick
with an overall length of about 8 inches, the
same not being used as a necessary tool or
implement to earn his livelihood nor being used
in connection therewith.
Contrary to law. (p. 14, rollo of L-46229-32)
The other Informations are likewise similarly
worded except for the name of the accused, the
date and place of the commission of the crime,
and the kind of weapon involved.
3. In L-46997, the Information before the Court
of First Instance of Samar is quoted hereunder:
INFORMATION
VIOL. OF PAR. 3,
The
undersigned
accuses
PORFIRIO
CANDELOSAS Y DURAN of a violation of
PD 9 IN REL. TO LOI
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
complainant, versus PANCHITO REFUNCION,
accused.
For:
ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF
DEADLY WEAPON
(VIOLATION OF PD NO. 9)
INFORMATION
The undersigned First Assistant Provincial
Fiscal of Samar, accuses PANCHITO
REFUNCION of the crime of ILLEGAL
POSSESSION OF DEADLY WEAPON or
VIOLATION OF PD NO. 9 issued by the
President of the Philippines on Oct. 2, 1972,
pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated Sept.
21 and 23, 1972, committed as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of October, 1976,
in the evening at Barangay Barruz,
Municipality of Matuginao, Province of Samar
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorabe Court, the abovenamed accused,
knowingly, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
carried with him outside of his residence a
deadly weapon called socyatan, an instrument
which from its very nature is no such as could
be used as a necessary tool or instrument to
earn a livelihood, which act committed by the
accused is a Violation of Presidential Decree
No. 9.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (p. 8, rollo of L-46997)
crime nor as their farm implement but for selfpreservation or self-defense if necessity would
arise specially in going to and from their farm.
(pp. 18-19, rollo of L-46997)
In most if not all of the cases, the orders of
dismissal were given before arraignment of the
accused. In the criminal case before the Court
of (First Instance of Samar the accused was
arraigned but at the same time moved to quash
the Information. In all the cases where the
accused were under arrest, the three Judges
ordered their immediate release unless held on
other charges.
C. The law under which the Informations in
question were filed by the People.
As seen from the Informations quoted above,
the accused are charged with illegal possession
of deadly weapon in violation of Presidential
Decree No. 9, Paragraph 3.
We quote in full Presidential Decree No. 9, to
wit:
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 9
DECLARING VIOLATIONS OF GENERAL
ORDERS NO. 6 and NO. 7 DATED
SEPTEMBER 22, 1972, AND SEPTEMBER 23,
1972, RESPECTIVELY, TO BE UNLAWFUL
AND PROVIDING PENALTIES THEREFORE.
WHEREAS, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081
dated September 21, 1972, the Philippines has
been placed under a state of martial law;
when
the
conceived
to
produce
such
unreasonable, and insensible results?
absurd,
given an opportunity
Information. 16
to
amend
the
TRENT, J.:
The appellants, Hart, Miller, and Natividad,
were arraigned in the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga on a charge of vagrancy under the
provisions of Act No. 519, found guilty, and
were each sentenced to six months'
imprisonment. Hart and Miller were further
sentenced to a fine of P200, and Natividad to a
fine of P100. All appealed.
The evidence of the prosecution as to the
defendant Hart shows that he pleaded guilty and
was convicted on a gambling charge about two
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-27761 December 6, 1927
PHILIPPINE SUGAR CENTRALS
AGENCY, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
THE INSULAR COLLECTOR OF
CUSTOMS, defendant-appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellant.
Dionisio de Leon for appellee.
STATEMENT
This case had its origin in the Court of First
Instance of Manila where it was tried and
submitted upon the following stipulation of
facts:
Come now the parties, plaintiff and defendant,
in the above-entitled cause, by their
undersigned attorneys, and respectfully submit
to this Honorable Court the following statement
of facts, which the court may find as true and
enter judgment thereon:
I. That the plaintiff at all times and in all
transactions herein mentioned have always
acted as representative and attorney-in-fact of
the Ma-ao Sugar Central Co.
JOHNS, J.:
FERNANDO, J.:
Is the power of preventive suspension of a
municipal mayor against whom charges have
been filed still vested in the provincial
governor? That is the novel question presented
in this petition for certiorari and prohibition.
Such an authority he did possess under the
former law. 1 Then came the Decentralization
Act of 1967, which took effect on September 12
of that year. 2
What before could not be denied apparently no
longer holds true. The statutory provision now
controlling yields a contrary impression. The
dominant
factor
in
determining
meaning." 19 For, to paraphrase Frankfurter,
legislative words are not inert but derive vitality
from the obvious purposes at which they are
aimed.20 The same jurist likewise had occasion
to state: "Regard for [its] purposes should
infuse the construction of the legislation if it is
to be treated as a working instrument of
government and not merely as a collection of
English words." 21 In the sixth annual Benjamin
Nathan Cardozo lecture delivered by him,
entitled "Some Reflections on the Reading of
Statutes", he developed the theme further: "The
generating consideration is that legislation is
more than composition. It is an active
instrument of government which, for purposes
of interpretation, means that laws have ends to
be achieved. It is in this connection that Holmes
said, 'words are flexible.' Again it was Holmes,
the last judge to give quarter to loose thinking
or vague yearning, who said that "the general
purpose is a more important aid to the meaning
than any rule which grammar or formal logic
may lay down." And it was Holmes who chided
courts for being 'apt to err by sticking too
closely to the words of a law where those words
import a policy that goes beyond them.' Note,
however, that he found the policy in 'those
words'." 22
It may be noted parenthetically that earlier, the
United States Supreme Court was partial more
to the term "objective" or "policy" rather than
"purpose." So it was in the first decision where
this fundamental principle of construction was
relied upon, the opinion coming from Chief
Justice Marshall. Thus: "The two subjects were
x--------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. L-3055
x--------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. L-2756
L-2756
Araneta and Araneta and Jesus G. Barrera for
petitioners.
Assistant City Fiscal Luis B. Reyes for
respondent.
Claro M. Recto as amici curiae.
L-3054
Claro M. Recto, Ramon Diokno, Jose O. Vera,
Alejo Mabanag, Jose B. Laurel, Jr. and Antonio
Barredo for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista
Angelo for respondent.
Vicente de Vera, Chairman, Commission on
Elections.
Alfonso Ponce Enrile, Alva J. Hill and Honorio
Poblador, Jr. and Emiliano R. Navarro as amici
curiae.
Jesus G. Barrera, Enrique M. Fernando,
Ramon Sunico, and Francisco A. Rodrigo also
as amici curiae.
L-3055
Claro M. Recto and Leon Ma. Guerrero for
petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista
Angelo for respondents.
V. G. Bunuan, Administrator, Sugar Quota
Office.
Jesus G. Barrera, Felixberto M. Serrano,
Enrique; Honorio Poblador, Jr. and Emiliano
R. Navarro as amici curiae.
L-3056
Claro M. Recto and Antonio Barredo for
petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista
SECRETARY
Sir:
This with reference to your request for opinion
on whether or not Republic Act No. 1081,
which has increased the maximum accumulable
leave of a government officer or employee from
5 months to 10 months, applies retroactively to
those whose length of service prior to its
approval would have entitled them to an
accumulated leave in excess of five months.
Prior to the enactment of Republic Act No.
1081, section 286 of the Revised Administrative
Code provides as follows:
"SEC. 286. When vacation leave and sick leave
may be taken. Vacation leave and sick leave
shall be cumulative and any part thereof which
may not betaken within the calendar year in
which earned may be carried over to the
succeeding years, but whenever any officer,
employee, or laborer of the Government of the
TUASON
May 8, 2009
KUWAIT AIRWAYS,
CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., Respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This petition for review1 filed by the duly
designated air carrier of the Kuwait
Government assails a decision2 dated 25
October 2002 of the Makati Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 60, ordering Kuwait
Airways to pay respondent Philippine Airlines
the amount of US$1,092,690.00, plus interest,
attorneys fees, and cost of suit.3 The principal
liability represents the share to Philippine
Airlines in the revenues the foreign carrier had
earned for the uplift of passengers and cargo in
its flights to and from Kuwait and Manila which
the foreign carrier committed to remit as a
contractual obligation.
On 21 October 1981, Kuwait Airways and
Philippine Airlines entered into a Commercial
Agreement,4 annexed to which was a Joint
Services Agreement5 between the two airlines.
proprietary rights
Agreement.
under
the
Commercial
clauses of Administrative
270,27 which read
Order
No.
General
Santos
and the neighboring
municipalities, and they are quite interested and
even the AID people are asking me, "What is
holding the creation of a new province when
practically you need it?" Its not 20 or 30
kilometers from the capital town; its about 140
kilometers. And imagine those people have to
travel that far and our road is not like
Metropolitan Manila. That is as far as from here
to Tarlac. And there are municipalities there that
are just one municipality is bigger than the
province of La Union. They have the income.
Of course, they dont have the population
because thats a part of the land of promise and
people from Luzon are migrating everyday
because they feel that there are more
opportunities here.