Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
Editors:
Tricia Lacuesta
Lorenzo Gayya
Cristopher Reyes
Macky Siazon
Janine Arenas
Ninna Bonsol
Lloyd Javier
POLITICAL
LAW
REVIEW
First Semester Cases
Table of Contents
3
15
Legislative Department
17
31
Legislative Function
32
Executive Department
36
39
53
Constitutional Commissions
Bill of Rights
36
59
62
68
70
73
85
Freedom of Religion
100
103
Right of Association
105
Eminent Domain
79
101
106
113
116
Self-Incrimination 120
1 | Page
121
135
135
142
148
155
170
2 | Page
3 | Page
14 | P a g e
17 | P a g e
Facts:
Lord Allan Jay Velasco filed a petition for Mandamus against Hon.
Speaker Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. and Secretary General Marilyn Barua-Yap to
order them, respectively, to administer the oath of Velasco in the House of
Representatives, and to remove the name of Regina Ongsiako Reyes in the
roll of the members of the House of Representatives and replace it with
Velascos name. Before this petition was filed, a Comelec decision was
promulgated cancelling the certificate of candidacy of Reyes because she
lacks the citizenship requirement to be able to qualify to run for the
representative of Marinduque in the House of Representatives. Subsequently,
a petition was filed by Reyes with the Suprme Court, questioning Comelecs
jurisdiction to pass upon her qualifications as a member of the House of
Representatives. The Supreme Court ruled against Reyes and enunciated that
her certificate of candidacy was validly cancelled and therefore there was no
basis for her proclamation in the House of Representatives, thus the Comelec
has jurisdiction to question her qualifications.
Issue:
Whether or not Speaker Belmonte and Sec Gen Yap can be compelled by
mandamus.
Ruling:
24 | P a g e
26 | P a g e
28 | P a g e
32 | P a g e
33 | P a g e
38 | P a g e
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
39 | P a g e
44 | P a g e
Facts:
The petitioners in these consolidated cases, as well as its intervenors,
argue that the proscription against the president or acting president, under
Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitute, includes the
members of the Supreme Court, as a general rule. The OSG, on the other
hand, argues that the same provision does not apply to the Judiciary and that
the petitions should be dismissed for prematurity, because the JBC has not
yet decided at the time of the petitions were filed whether or not the
incumbent President has the power to appoint a new chief justice.
45 | P a g e
to
Ruling:
No. The CCP and NCCA Board jointly administer the said award and,
upon their recommendation, the President confers the award. Thus, the
advice of the NCCA and the CCP is subject to the Presidents discretion.
Nevertheless, the Presidents discretion on the matter is not totally
unfettered, nor the role of the NCCA and the CCP Boards meaningless. The
Presidents power must be exercised in accordance with existing laws.
49 | P a g e
An absolute pardon fully restores all civil and political rights, which
naturally includes the right to seek public elective office.
Facts:
The Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada for the crime of
plunder. On Oct. 25, 2007, however, former President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo extended executive clemency, by way of pardon, to former President
Estrada. Then, he ran for the presidency again but lost. Afterwards, he ran for
Manila City Mayor. A petition to disqualify him was filed on the theory that the
51 | P a g e
with
calling-out powers,
as
the
Facts:
Three members from the International Committee of the Red Cross
were kidnapped by the Abu Sayyaf Group. In response thereto, a task force
was created by the ICRC and the PNP, which organized a parallel local group
later renamed Sulu Crisis Management Committee and convened under the
leadership of respondent Governor Abdusakur Mahail Tan. Also, Governor Tan
organized the Civilian Emergency Force. Governor Tan issued Proclamation 109 declaring a state of emergency using the kidnapping incident as a ground.
It also invoked Section 465 of the LGC which bestows on the Provincial
52 | P a g e
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent governor is authorized to declare a
state of emergency, and exercise the powers enumerated under Proclamation
1-09, specifically the conduct of general searches and seizures.
Ruling:
No. It is only the President, as Executive, who is authorized to exercise
emergency and the calling-out powers. There is one repository of executive
powers, and that is the President of the Republic. This means that when
Section 1, Article VII of the Constitution speaks of executive power, it is
granted to the President and no one else. There are certain acts which, by
their very nature, may only be performed by the president as the Head of the
State. One of these acts or prerogatives is the bundle of Commander-in-Chief
powers to which the "calling-out" powers constitutes a portion. The
Presidents Emergency Powers, on the other hand, is balanced only by the
legislative act of Congress. The Constitution bestows on the President full
discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the
necessity for the exercise of such power. In the case of Integrated Bar of the
Philippines v. Zamora, the Court had occasion to rule that the calling-out
powers belong solely to the President as commander-in-chief. Respondent
provincial governor is not endowed with the power to call upon the armed
forces at his own bidding. In issuing the assailed proclamation, Governor Tan
exceeded his authority when he declared a state of emergency and called
upon the Armed Forces, the police, and his own Civilian Emergency Force.
The calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to
the President. An exercise by another official, even if he is the local chief
executive, is ultra vires, and may not be justified by the Local Government
Code
DATU ZALDY UY AMPATUAN, et al. v. HON. RONALDO PUNO, in his
capacity as Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local
53 | P a g e
Issue:
Whether or not Proclamation 1959 is constitutional.
Ruling:
The Court deems any review of its constitutionality the equivalent of
beating a dead horse. Under the 1987 Constitution, the President and the
Congress act in tandem in exercising the power to proclaim martial law or
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. They exercise the power,
not only sequentially, but in a sense jointly since, after the President has
initiated the proclamation or the suspension, only the Congress can maintain
the same based on its own evaluation of the situation on the ground, a power
that the President does not have. Consequently, although the Constitution
reserves to the Supreme Court the power to review the sufficiency of the
55 | P a g e
56 | P a g e
Facts:
The Philippines and the USA entered into their first military
arrangement pursuant to the Treaty of General Relations - the 1947 MBA. In
view of the impending expiration of the 1947 MBA in 1991, the Philippines
and the U.S. negotiated for a possible renewal of their defense and security
relationship. However, the Senate rejected the proposed treaty. The
expiration of the MBA led to the suspension of the large-scale joint military
exercise but they agreed to hold joint exercises at a substantially reduced
58 | P a g e
Issue:
Whether or not the Executive Department committed grave abuse of
discretion in entering into EDCA in the form of an executive agreement.
Ruling:
No. The duty to faithfully execute the laws of the land is inherent in
executive power and is intimately related to the other executive functions
which is also self-executory. In light of this constitutional duty, it is the
President's prerogative to do whatever is legal and necessary for
Philippine defense interests. Despite the President's roles as defender of
the State and sole authority in foreign relations, the 1987 Constitution
expressly limits his ability in instances when it involves the entry of
foreign military bases, troops or facilities. However, a plain textual reading
of Article XIII, Section 25, inevitably leads to the conclusion that it applies
only to a proposed agreement between our government and a foreign
government, whereby military bases, troops, or facilities of such foreign
government would be "allowed" or would "gain entry" Philippine territory.
It is evident that the constitutional restriction refers solely to the initial
entry of the foreign military bases, troops, or facilities. Once entry is
authorized, the subsequent acts are thereafter subject only to the
limitations provided by the rest of the Constitution and Philippine law,
and not to the Section 25 requirement of validity through a treaty. The
VFA has already allowed the entry of troops in the Philippines. The
power of the President to enter into binding executive agreements without
Senate concurrence is already well-established in this jurisdiction. One of
the distinguishing features of executive agreements is that their validity
and effectivity are not affected by a lack of Senate concurrence. This
distinctive feature was recognized as early as in Eastern Sea Trading
(1961) which states that Treaties are formal documents which require
ratification with the approval of two-thirds of the Senate. Executive
agreements become binding through executive action without the need of
a vote by the Senate or by Congress. Thus, no court can tell the President
to desist from choosing an executive agreement over a treaty to embody
an international agreement, unless the case falls squarely within Article
VIII, Section 25.
59 | P a g e
62 | P a g e
68 | P a g e
70 | P a g e
73 | P a g e
is an incident of sovereignty
so potent that it should be
the proprietary rights of a
and uniformly, lest the tax
Issue:
Whether or not Sec. 36(c) and (d) of the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002 violates the constitutional right against unreasonable
searches, and therefore unconstitutional.
Ruling:
No. The drug test prescribed under Sec. 36(c), (d), and (f) of RA 9165
for secondary and tertiary level students and public and private employees,
83 | P a g e
88 | P a g e
89 | P a g e
90 | P a g e
93 | P a g e
94 | P a g e
97 | P a g e
99 | P a g e
112 | P a g e
Facts:
This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the
court to order the respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. to issue
travel documents to former President Marcos and the immediate members of
his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar
their return to the Philippines. Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses
to return in the Philippines is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, specifically
Sections 1 and 6. They contended that Pres. Aquino is without power to
impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so
within the limits prescribed by law. Nor the President may impair their right to
travel because no law has authorized her to do so. They further assert that
113 | P a g e
Facts:
116 | P a g e
122 | P a g e
HARRY L. GO, TONNY NGO, JERRY NGO AND JANE GO v. THE PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES and HIGHDONE COMPANY, LTD., ET AL.,
G.R. No. 185527 July 18, 2012 PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
The right of confrontation, on the other hand, is held to apply
specifically to criminal proceedings and to have a twofold purpose: (1) to
afford the accused an opportunity to test the testimony of witnesses by
cross-examination, and (2) to allow the judge to observe the deportment of
witnesses.
Facts:
Harry Go, Tonny Ngo, Jerry Ngo and Jane Go (petitioners) were charged
before the MeTC of Manila for Other Deceits under Article 318 of the Revised
Penal Code. The private prosecutor filed a Motion to Take Oral Deposition of
Li Luen Ping, an old frail businessman from Laos, Cambodia who is the
prosecutions complaining witness. It was alleged that Li Luen Ping was being
127 | P a g e
147 | P a g e
must
be
by
reason
of
incapacity
Facts:
Judge Moslemen Macarambon was an RTC Judge who was appointed as
Comelec Commissioner before reaching the optional retirement age of 60.
He requested that he be allowed to retire under Sec. 1 of RA 910. The Judge
asserts that Section 1 allows the payment of retirement benefits to a judge of
the RTC who resigns by reason of incapacity to discharge the duties of his
office. Citing the case of Re: Associate Justice Britanico, he posits that his
appointment as Comelec Commissioner incapacitated him to discharge his
duties as an RTC judge on account of his submission to the will of the political
authority and appointing power. As an alternative, he appeals that he be
allowed to retire under the second sentence of Section 1 considering that he
has rendered a total of 18 years, 1 month and 16 days of judicial service and
a total of 35 years of government service. Judge Macarabon claims that while
he was short of the minimum age requirement of 60, he believes that the
Courts ruling in Re: Pineda is applicable to his case where the Court brushed
aside such requirement and considered the retirees career which was marked
with competence, integrity, and dedication to public service.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court can allow a judge who voluntarily resigned
from his judicial office before reaching the optional retirement age to receive
retirement benefits under RA 910.
Ruling:
No. Resignation and retirement are two distinct concepts carrying
different meanings and legal consequences in our jurisdiction. While an
employee can resign at any time, retirement entails the compliance with
certain
age
and
service
requirements
specified
by
law
and
jurisprudence. Resignation stems from the employees own intent and volition
to resign and relinquish his/her post. Retirement takes effect by operation of
law. Strict compliance with the age and service requirements under the law is
the rule and the grant of exception remains to be on a case to case basis. We
have ruled that the Court allows seeming exceptions to these fixed rules for
certain judges and justices only and whenever there are ample reasons to
grant such exception.
On the other hand, resignation under RA 910, as amended must be by
reason of incapacity to discharge the duties of the office. Resignation
contemplated under the law must have the element of involuntariness on the
part of the justice or judge. More than physical or mental disability to
discharge the judicial office, the involuntariness must spring from the intent
of the justice or judge who would not have parted with his/her judicial
employment were it not for the presence of circumstances and/or factors
153 | P a g e
163 | P a g e
169 | P a g e
174 | P a g e
183 | P a g e
185 | P a g e
186 | P a g e
188 | P a g e
198 | P a g e
204 | P a g e
206 | P a g e
207 | P a g e