Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
PER CURIAM:
Good moral character is a continuing qualification required
of every member of the bar. Thus, when a lawyer fails to
meet the exacting standard of moral integrity, the Supreme
Court may withdraw his or her privilege to practice law.
On November 13, 1989, Mrs. Julieta B. Narag filed an
administrative complaint 1 for disbarment against her
husband, Atty. Dominador M. Narag, whom she accused of
having violated Canons 1 and 6, Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Ethics for Lawyers. 2
The complainant narrated:
The St. Louis College of Tuguegarao engaged the services
of Atty. Dominador M. Narag in the early seventies as a
full-time college instructor in the College of Arts and
Sciences and as a professor in the Graduate School. In
1984, Ms. Gina Espita, 17 years old and a first year college
student, enrolled in subjects handled by Atty. Narag.
Exerting his influence as her teacher, and as a prominent
member of the legal profession and then member of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Tuguegarao, Atty. Narag courted
Ms. Espita, gradually lessening her resistance until the
student acceded to his wishes.
They then maintained an illicit relationship known in
various circles in the community, but which they managed
to from me. It therefore came as a terrible
embar[r]assment to me, with unspeakable grief and pain
when my husband abandoned us, his family, to live with
Ms. Espita, in utterly scandalous circumstances.
It appears that Atty. Narag used his power and influence
as a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Cagayan to cause the employment of Ms. Espita at the
Department of Trade and Industry Central Office at Makati,
Metro Manila. Out of gratitude perhaps, for this gesture,
Ms. Espita agreed to live with Atty. Narag, her sense of
right[e]ousness and morals completely corrupted by a
member of the Bar.
It is now a common knowledge in the community that Atty.
Dominador M. Narag has abandoned us, his family, to live
with a 22-year-old woman, who was his former student in
the tertiary level[.] 3
This Court, in a Resolution dated December 18, 1989,
referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. 4
On June 26, 1990, the office of then Chief Justice Marcelo B.
Fernan received from complainant another letter seeking the
dismissal of the administrative complaint. She alleged
therein that (1) she fabricated the allegations in her
complaint to humiliate and spite her husband; (2) all the
love letters between the respondent and Gina Espita were
forgeries; and (3) she was suffering from "emotional
confusion arising from extreme jealousy." The truth, she
stated, was that her husband had remained a faithful and
responsible family man. She further asserted that he had
neither entered into an amorous relationship with one Gina
Espita nor abandoned his family. 5 Supporting her letter were
an Affidavit of Desistance 6 and a Motion to
Dismiss, 7 attached as Annexes A and B, which she filed
before the IBP commission on bar discipline. 8 In a Decision
dared October 8, 1991, the IBP Board of
Governors 9 dismissed the complaint of Mrs. Narag for failure
to prosecute. 10
Q You said also that Atty. Narag and your sister have two
children, Aurelle Dominic and Kyle Dominador, is it not?
did not present any evidence to prove that the love letters
were not really written by him; he merely denied that he
wrote them.
A Yes, sir.
Q How do you know that they are the children of Atty.
Narag?
A Because you are staying together in that house and you
have left your family. 44
In addition, Charlie Espita admitted (1) that it was he who
handed to Mrs. Narag the love letters respondent had sent
to his sister, and (2) that Atty. Narag tried to dissuade him
from appearing at the disbarment proceedings. 45
Witness Bienvenido Eugenio strengthened the testimony of
Charlie Espita in this wise:
Q Mr. Witness, do you know the respondent in this case?
A I know him very well, sir.
Q Could you please tell us why do you know him?
A Because he was always going to the house of my son-inlaw by the name of Charlie Espita.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Mr. Eugenio, do you know the residence of Atty.
Dominador M. Narag?
A At that time, he [was] residing in the house of Reynaldo
Angubong, sir.
Q And this is located where?
A Centro Tamauini, Isabela, sir.
Q And you specifically, categorically state under oath that
this is the residence of Atty. Narag?
A Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q And under oath this is where Atty. Narag and Gina
Espita are allegedly living as husband and wife, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
46
SO ORDERED.
November 2, 1916
TRENT, J.:
This is an action by the wife against her husband for support
outside of the conjugal domicile. From a judgment sustaining
the defendant's demurrer upon the ground that the facts
alleged in the complaint do not state a cause of action,
followed by an order dismissing the case after the plaintiff
declined to amend, the latter appealed.
It was urged in the first instance, and the court so held, that
the defendant cannot be compelled to support the plaintiff,
except in his own house, unless it be by virtue of a judicial
decree granting her a divorce or separation from the
defendant.
The parties were legally married in the city of Manila on
January 7, 1915, and immediately thereafter established
their residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino, where they lived
together for about a month, when the plaintiff returned to
xxx
xxx
xxx
It is urged that the actions for legal separation and for quasidelict have prescribed: the first, because it was not filed
within one year from and after the date on which the plaintiff
became cognizant of the cause; and, the second, because it
was not filed within four years since the Tenchavez-Escao
marriage in 1948.
The argument on both points is untenable.
The action for legal separation was filed on 31 May 1956.
Although in a letter, under date of 10 December 1954, the
Department of Foreign Affairs informed plaintiff Tenchavez
that "According to information, she (appellee) secured a
decree of divorce on October 21, 1950 ... and married an
American citizen, Russel Leo Moran, on September 13,
1954", there is no satisfactory and convincing evidence as to
the time when plaintiff Tenchavez, received the said letter;
nor was she duty-bound to act immediately upon hearsay
information. Since prescription is an affirmative defense, the
burden lay on the defendant to clearly prove it, and her
proof on it was inadequate.
On the argument about the action on tort having prescribed,
the basis thereof is erroneous: the marriage was not the
cause of appellee's wrongful conduct. Her denial of
cohabitation, refusal to render consortium and desertion of
her husband started right after their wedding but such
wrongs have continued ever since. She never stopped her
wrongdoings to her husband, so that the period of limitation
has never been completed.
Finally, we see no point in discussing the question of
appellee Escao's criminal intent, since nothing in the main
decision was designed or intended to prejudge or rule on the
criminal aspect of the case, if any, or any of its constituent
elements. It is to be noted that in this civil case only a
preponderance of evidence is required, and not proof
beyond reasonable doubt. While much could be said as to
the circumstances surrounding the divorce of the appellee,
we prefer to abstain from so doing in order not to influence
in any way the criminal case, should any be instituted.
For the reasons above cited, all motions for reconsideration
are hereby denied.
Concepcion, C.J., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, J.P.
Bengzon, Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.
R E S O L UT I O N
September 14, 1966
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
STREET, J.:
This action was instituted on May 27, 1927, in the Court of
First Instance of the City of Manila by Aurelia Dadivas de
Villanueva against her husband, Rafael Villanueva, for the
purpose of obtaining separate maintenance and custody of
the two younger minor children, Guillermo and Sergio
Villanueva, as well as a proper allowance for professional
legal services rendered by the plaintiff's attorneys in this
action, as well as costs. Upon hearing the cause the trial
court absolved the defendant from the complaint and
abrogated a prior order of the court for
maintenance pendente lite, with costs against the plaintiff.
From this judgment the plaintiff appealed.
The plaintiff, Aurelia Dadivas de Villanueva, was married to
the defendant, Rafael Villanueva, on July 16, 1905, in the
City of Manila, where the pair have since resided. To them
have been born three children, namely, Antonio, Guillermo,
and Sergio, who were, at the time of the trial of this case in
the lower court, aged respectively 18, 10 and 9 years. The
grounds on which separate maintenance is sought infidelity
and cruelty. With respect to the first of these charges the
proof shows that during the period of about ten years prior
to the institution of the action, the defendant was guilty of
repeated acts of infidelity with four different women, and
even after the action was begun, he is shown to have had
illicit relations with still another, an incident which is
incorporated in the case by means of the amended
complaint. Thought at all times protesting against these
irregularities in her husband's conduct, the plaintiff appears
to have exhibited forbearance; and she long continued in
marital relations with him with a view to keeping the family
intact as well as with hope of retrieving him from his erring
course. In the end, however, the incorrigible nature of the
defendant in his relations with other women, coupled with a
lack of consideration and even brutality towards the plaintiff,
caused her to withdraw from the domestic hearth and to
establish a separate abode for herself and two younger
children. This final separation occurred on April 20, 1927,
about one month before the present action was begun.
The proof with respect to the charge of cruelty shows that
the defendant has not infrequently treated the plaintiff
roughly and that he has at times directed abusive words to
her and challenged her to carry her troubles into court. The
proof in support of this charge does not in our opinion
establish a case for separate maintenance, without relation
to the graver charge of conjugal infidelity; and if the case
depended, for its solution, upon cruelty alone, the case could
doubtless be affirmed, in conformity with the doctrine stated
in Arroyo vs. Vazquez de Arroyo (42 Phil. 54), where the
charges of cruelty were found to be unproved or insufficient.
In that case, however, we were able to record the fact that
neither of the spouses had at any time been guilty of
conjugal infidelity, and that neither had, so far as the proof
OSTRAND, J.:
BIDIN, J.:
On May 5, 1990, Hatima C. Yasin filed in the Shari'a District
Court in Zamboanga City a "Petition to resume the use of
maiden name" (Sp. Proc. No. 06-3). The petition reads:
1. That she is of legal age, a divorcee, a Muslin Filipino and
a resident of Suterville, Zamboanga City, Philippines, and
is duly represented in this act by her elder brother and
attorney-in-fact, HADJI HASAN S. CENTI by virtue of an
instrument of a Special Power of Attorney, original copy of
which is hereto attached and marked as Annex "A" hereof;
2. That she was formerly married to a certain Hadji Idris
Yasin, also a Muslim Filipino in accordance with Muslim
rites and customs, and who is now residing at Barangay
Recodo, Zamboanga City, but sometime on March 13,
1984, they were granted a decree of divorce by the
Mindanao Islamic Center Foundation, Inc., in accordance
with Islamic Law, the divorce rites was officiated by Ustadz
Sharif Jain Jali as evidenced by his Certification, dated
march 13, 1984, copy of which is hereto attached as
Annex "B" to form an integral part hereof;
3. That, thereafter the former husband Hadji Idris Yasin
contracted another marriage to another woman;
WHEREFORE, invoking the provisions of Article 143, par.
1(c) of Presidential Decree No. 1083 in relation to Article
371 (2) of the New Civil Code, and after due notice and
hearing, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable
Court that petitioner be allowed to resume the use of her
maiden name Hatima Centi y Saul.
On July 4, 1990, the respondent court issued an order which
reads as follows:
It patently appearing that the petition filed is not sufficient
in form and substance in accordance with Section 2(a) and
3, Rule 103, Rules of Court, regarding the residence of
petitioner and the name sought to be adopted is not
properly indicated in the title thereof which should include
all the names by which the petitioner has been known (Ng
Yao Siong v. Republic of the Philippines, L-20306, March
31, 1966, 16 SCRA [483]; Go v. Republic of the Philippines,
L-31760, May 25, 1977; Pabellar v. Republic, L-27298,
march 4, 1976), the pleading must be rectified
accordingly.
WHEREFORE, petitioner is hereby ordered to effect the
necessary amendment of the petition within one (1) week
from receipt hereof so as to reflect the formal
requirements adverted to. (Rollo, p. 9)
Hatima filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid
order alleging that the petition filed is not covered by Rule
103 of the Rules of Court but is merely a petition to resume
the use of her maiden name and surname after the
dissolution of her marriage by divorce under the Code of
xxx
xxx
STREET, J.:
P1,204.3
4
6.000.00
1,400.05
8,604.39
Personal Property
(1) 177 shares of stock of Canacao Estate
at P10.00 each
Judicial Expenses:
1,770.00
652.50
P10,000.
00
79,800.00
Sub-Total
4,870.88
851.97
P130,792.8
5
22.47
10,022.4
7
P21,365.
88
and adhere to our ruling in the Lara case (supra) that the
amount of $2,000.00 allowed under the Federal Estate Tax
Law is in the nature of a deduction and not of an exemption
regarding which reciprocity cannot be claimed under the
provision of Section 122 of our National Internal Revenue
Code. Nor is reciprocity authorized under the Federal Law. .
On the issue of the correctness of the appraisal of the two
parcels of land situated in Baguio City, it is contended that
their assessed values, as appearing in the tax rolls 6 months
after the death of Stevenson, ought to have been considered
by petitioner as their fair market value, pursuant to section
91 of the National Internal Revenue Code. It should be
pointed out, however, that in accordance with said proviso
the properties are required to be appraised at their fair
market value and the assessed value thereof shall be
considered as the fair market value only when evidence to
the contrary has not been shown. After all review of the
record, we are satisfied that such evidence exists to justify
the valuation made by petitioner which was sustained by the
tax court, for as the tax court aptly observed:
"The two parcels of land containing 36,264 square meters
were valued by the administrator of the estate in the
Estate and Inheritance tax returns filed by him at
P43,500.00 which is the assessed value of said properties.
On the other hand, defendant appraised the same at
P52,200.00. It is of common knowledge, and this Court
can take judicial notice of it, that assessments for real
estate taxation purposes are very much lower than the
true and fair market value of the properties at a given
time and place. In fact one year after decedent's death or
in 1952 the said properties were sold for a price of
P72,000.00 and there is no showing that special or
extraordinary circumstances caused the sudden increase
from the price of P43,500.00, if we were to accept this
value as a fair and reasonable one as of 1951. Even more,
the counsel for plaintiffs himself admitted in open court
that he was willing to purchase the said properties at
P2.00 per square meter. In the light of these facts we
believe and therefore hold that the valuation of
P52,200.00 of the real estate in Baguio made by
defendant is fair, reasonable and justified in the
premises." (Decision, p. 19).
In respect to the valuation of the 210,000 shares of stock in
the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc., (a domestic
corporation), respondents contend that their value should be
fixed on the basis of the market quotation obtaining at the
San Francisco (California) Stock Exchange, on the theory
that the certificates of stocks were then held in that place
and registered with the said stock exchange. We cannot
agree with respondents' argument. The situs of the shares of
stock, for purposes of taxation, being located here in the
Philippines, as respondents themselves concede and
considering that they are sought to be taxed in this
jurisdiction, consistent with the exercise of our government's
taxing authority, their fair market value should be taxed on
the basis of the price prevailing in our country.
Upon the other hand, we find merit in respondents' other
contention that the said shares of stock commanded a lesser
value at the Manila Stock Exchange six months after the
death of Stevenson. Through Atty. Allison Gibbs, respondents
have shown that at that time a share of said stock was bid
for at only P.325 (p. 103, t.s.n.). Significantly, the testimony
of Atty. Gibbs in this respect has never been questioned nor
refuted by petitioner either before this court or in the court
below. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we are,
therefore, constrained to reverse the Tax Court on this point
and to hold that the value of a share in the said mining
company on August 22, 1951 in the Philippine market was
P.325 as claimed by respondents..
It should be noted that the petitioner and the Tax Court
valued each share of stock of P.38 on the basis of the
declaration made by the estate in its preliminary return.
Patently, this should not have been the case, in view of the
fact that the ancillary administrator had reserved and
availed of his legal right to have the properties of the estate
declared at their fair market value as of six months from the
time the decedent died..
On the fifth issue, we shall consider the various deductions,
from the allowance or disallowance of which by the Tax
Court, both petitioner and respondents have appealed..
Petitioner, in this regard, contends that no evidence of
record exists to support the allowance of the sum of
P8,604.39 for the following expenses:.
1) Administrator's fee
P1,204.
34
2) Attorney's fee
6,000.0
0
3) Judicial and
Administrative expenses
Total Deductions
2,052.5
5
P8,604.
39
P1,204.
34
2) Attorney's fee
6,000.0
0
3) Judicial and
Administration
expenses as of August
9, 1952
2,052.5
5
Total
P9,256.
89
February 8, 1916
AVANCEA, C. J.:
The spouses Juan Lambino and Maria A. Barroso begot three
children named Alejo, Eugenia and Marciana Lambino. On
June 2, 1919 said spouses made a donation of propter
nuptias of the lands described in the complaint in favor of
the gift in question does not fall within the exception therein
established. We cannot say, as a matter of law, that the gift
of an automobile by a husband to his wife is not a moderate
one. Whether it is or is not would depend upon the
circumstances of the parties, as to which nothing is
disclosed by the record.
Defendant contends that the statement regarding the cost of
the automobile was a warranty, that the statement was
false, and that, therefore, the policy never attached to the
risk. We are of the opinion that it has not been shown by the
evidence that the statement was false on the contrary we
believe that it shows that the automobile had in fact cost
more than the amount mentioned. The court below found,
and the evidence shows, that the automobile was bought by
plaintiff's husband a few weeks before the issuance of the
policy in question for the sum of P2,800, and that between
that time and the issuance of the policy some P900 was
spent upon it in repairs and repainting. The witness Server,
an expert automobile mechanic, testified that the
automobile was practically as good as new at the time the
insurance was effected. The form of proposal upon which the
policy was issued does not call for a statement regarding the
value of the automobile at the time of its acquisition by the
applicant for the insurance, but merely a statement of its
cost. The amount stated was less than the actual outlay
which the automobile represented to Mr. Harding, including
repairs, when the insurance policy was issued. It is true that
the printed form calls for a statement of the "price paid by
the proposer," but we are of the opinion that it would be
unfair to hold the policy void simply because the outlay
represented by the automobile was made by the plaintiff's
husband and not by his wife, to whom he had given the
automobile. It cannot be assumed that defendant should not
have issued the policy unless it were strictly true that the
price representing the cost of the machine had been paid by
the insured and by no other person that it would no event
insure an automobile acquired by gift, inheritance,
exchange, or any other title not requiring the owner to make
a specific cash outlay for its acquisition.
Furthermore, the court below found and the evidence shows,
without dispute, that the proposal upon which the policy in
question was issued was made out by defendant's agent by
whom the insurance was solicited, and that appellee simply
signed the same. It also appears that an examiner employed
by the defendant made an inspection of the automobile
before the acceptance of the risk, and that the sum after this
examination. The trial court found that Mrs. Harding, in
fixing the value of the automobile at P3,000, acted upon
information given her by her husband and by Mr. Server, the
manager of the Luneta Garage. The Luneta Garage, it will be
remembered, was the agent of the defendant corporation in
the solicitation of the insurance. Mrs. Harding did not state
of her own knowledge that the automobile originally cost
P3,000, or that its value at the time of the insurance was
P3,000. She merely repeated the information which had
been given her by her husband, and at the same time
disclosed to defendant's agent the source of her information.
There is no evidence to sustain the contention that this
communication was made in bad faith. It appears that the
statements in the proposal as to the price paid for the
automobile and as to its value were written by Mr. Quimby
who solicited the insurance on behalf of defendant, in his
capacity as an employee of the Luneta Garage, and wrote
out the proposal for Mrs. Harding to sign. Under these
circumstances, we do not think that the facts stated in the
proposal can be held as a warranty of the insured, even if it
should have been shown that they were incorrect in the
absence of proof of willful misstatement. Under such
circumstance, the proposal is to be regarded as the act of
the insurer and not of the insured. This question was
considered in the case of the Union Insurance
Company vs. Wilkinson (13 Wall., 222; 20 L. ed., 617), in
which the Supreme Court of the United States said:
This question has been decided differently by courts of the
highest respectability in cases precisely analogous to the
present. It is not to be denied that the application logically
considered, is the work of the assured, and if left to
himself or to such assistance as he might select, the
person so selected would be his agent, and he alone
would be responsible. On the other hand, it is well-known,
so well that no court would be justified in shutting its eyes
....
HEARING OFFICER:
Make it of record also that the witness made use of the
word kalokohan in Filipino language. Let that term
be put on record.
ATTY. LOCKEY:
Q Whereat?
Mark it.
ATTY. LOCKEY:
Q Aside from that, what else did she do, if any?
A She wants to try to forge the signature of Maria Tait.
Q Was she able to do it?
A Yes, sir.[30]
Petitioners should have presented handwriting experts
to support their claim that George K. Tait, Sr.s signature on
the deed of donation was indeed a forgery.
Second. Petitioners argue that the deed of donation is
invalid under Art. 749 of the Civil Code, which requires a
public instrument as a requisite for the validity of donations
of immovable property. They contend that the person who
notarized the deed had no authority to do so. However,
petitioners have not shown this to be the case. The
acknowledgment clause states that the person who
notarized it was the deputy clerk of court, Gonzalo Reyes,
who acted For and in the absence of the Clerk of Court. Sec.
21 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, as amended
by C.A. Nos. 270 and 641, provides:
SEC. 21. Officials authorized to administer oaths. The
following officers have general authority to administer oaths,
to wit:
Notaries public; justices of the peace and auxiliary justices of
the peace; clerks of court; the Secretary of the National
Assembly; bureau directors; registers of deeds; provincial
governors and lieutenant-governors; city mayors; municipal
mayors, municipal district mayors; any other officer in the
Philippine service whose appointment is vested in the
President of the Philippines, Secretary of War, or President of
the United States. A person who by authority of law shall act
in the capacity of the officers mentioned above shall possess
the same power. (Emphasis added).[31]
SO ORDERED
(1) Lots Nos. 210, 211, 388, 389, 390, and 407 of the San
Jose Cadastre situation in Rizal, San Jose with a combined
area of about sixty-six (66) hectares covered by OCT No.
6176-N.E. issued in the name of Nicolas Delizo, married to
Dorotea de Ocampo (Exh. F or 11);
(2) Lot No. 1915 of the San Jose Cadastre with an area of
about 1,056 square meters and covered by OCT No. 5783 in
the name of Nicolas Delizo, married to Dorotea de Ocampo
(Exh. G or 12);
(3) Lot No. 498 of the San Jose Cadastre with an area of
about 3,366 square meters and covered by OCT No. 5622,
N.E. issued in the name of Nicolas Delizo, married to Dorotea
de Ocampo (Exh. H. or 13);
(4) A parcel of land in San Jose, Nueva Ecija containing an
area of 13.2948 hectares and covered by TCT No. 2985-N.E.
(Exh. I. or 13-A);
ANTONIO, J.:
which took place some four years after the SpanishFilipino revolution of 1896 (t.s.n., pp. 548-549, June 21,
1963), or approximately 1900. Therefore, it could not be
Dorotea de Ocampo, but Rosa Villasfer, who was
admittedly still alive and the wife of Nicolas Delizo at the
time of the acquisition.
Ranged against these unreliable testimonies for the
defendants, is the testimony of Lorenzo Delizo, who
being a brother of deceased Nicolas Delizo, stands in
equal relationship to the plaintiffs, who were Nicolas'
children by the first marriage, and the defendants, who
were children of Nicolas in his second marriage. His
testimony therefore carries great weight. This witness
averred that 16 hectares were acquired as homestead by
his deceased brother, Nicolas Delizo, from Pedro Salvador
and Mauricio Salvador who were then 'cabecillas'
distributing lands to homesteaders in 1905 (t.s.n., p. 12,
January 20, 1961); that Nicolas acquired by sale the 16hectare homestead of Nicolas Dacquel in 1906, another
16- hectare homestead of Mariano Antolin in 1907 and
the 16-hectare homestead of Francisco Pascua in 1908
(id., pp. 14-15). Lorenzo's declarations are supported by
the testimonies of (1) Urbana Delizo, a daughter of
Nicolas by his first marriage and who was already 17
when her mother, Rosa Villasfer, died in 1909 (id., p. 19);
(2) Sabiniano Villanueva, a son of one of Nicolas' tenants
on the controverted Caanawan lands (id., pp. 93-168)
and (3) Raymundo Eugenio, a former clerk in the
municipal treasurer's office who u to collect taxes on the
land belonging to Nicolas and later became municipal
"president of San Jose, Nueva Ecija (t.s.n., pp. 367-368,
Jan. 31, 1964), although these Caanawan lands cannot be
traced back to TD 431, Exhibit P-9 issued in 1906, cited
by appellants (see notations at bottom of reverse side of
alleged succeeding TDs) aside from the fact that the
notations on the reverse side thereof are suspicious (see
years when tax commenced and when issued) and the
discrepancy between areas (8 Ha. in Exhibit P-9 and 57
Ha. for lots 210 and 211).
Accordingly, we find with the trial court that the
Caanawan lands, comprising lots Nos. 210, 211, 388,
390, 398 and 407.1-under Original Certificate of Title No.
6176 (Exh. F or 11) were acquired during the existence of
the first marriage of Nicolas Delizo to Rosa Villasfer and
there being no affirmative showing that they belonged
exclusively to said Nicolas Delizo, should therefore
correspond to the first conjugal partnership of Nicolas
Delizo and Rosa Villasfer. So with the lot and house at
562 P. Campa St., Sampaloc, Manila, known as Lot 47,
Block 83 covered by TCT No. 9616-Manila which was
ceded during the second marriage in payment of, or
substitution for, the Caanawan property, because the
Asiatic Petroleum Company to which it had been
mortgaged as bond for Juan Par as agent foreclosed the
mortgage, when the agent defaulted in his obligation to
the company, Exhibits 6, 7 & 19 (Art. 153 [formerly, 140],
par. 1, new Civil Code).
However, with regard to the other properties in question,
like lot No. 498 of the San Jose Cadastre, under Original
certificate of Title No. 5622, likewise issued in the name
of Nicolas Delizo, married to Dorotea de Ocampo'; a
parcel of land in San Jose, Nueva Ecija under TCT No.
2985 (Exh. I or 13)' and agricultural land of about
17.4753 hectares in Sitio Rangayan, Muoz Nueva Ecija
under TCT No. 5162 (Exh. J or 14); another parcel of land
in Caanawan, San Jose, with an area of about 14.0354
hectares under TCT No. 11910 (Exh. K or 10); a coin land
in barrio Rangayan, Muoz, Nueva Ecija, of about 1,500
square me ' quarters under Tax Declaration No. 5476; a
riceland in barrio San Andres, Muoz Nueva Ecija, of
about 5,083 square meters under Tax Dec. 7083; another
riceland in Rangayan, Muoz, of about 17.4755 hectares
under Tax Dec. No. 812; a riceland, lot No. 847, of about
13.0902 hectares covered by TCT No. 3585 issued on
April 29, 1929 in the name of 'Nicolas Delizo, married to
Dorotea de Ocampo'(Exh. L or 1.5)-, a camarin of strong
materials with galvanized iron roofing in San Jose, Nueva
Ecija, about 8 meters by 12 meters; a residential lot at
Sanches Street, San Jose, Nueva Ecija; lot No. 1790 of the
San Jose Cadastre consisting of 2,840 square meters,
more or less, under Original Certificate of Title No. 8131
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
Our Ruling
Petitioners elevated this case to this Court, because they
were allegedly denied due process when the CA rejected
their second attempt at the annulment of the Decision of the
RTC and their Humble Motion for Reconsideration.
We DENY petitioners claims.
with the CA, without waiting for the resolution by the RTC of
the issues still pending before the trial court.
DECISION
IMPERIAL, J.:
This is an appeal taken by the Peoples Bank and Trust Co.
from the judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of
Manila, denying the registration of a certain instrument
entitled "Agreement and Declaration of Trust."
The undisputed facts of the case may be summarized as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
On October 26, 1933, Dominga Angeles, married to Manuel
Sandoval who resides in Palawan and from whom she lives
separate and apart, executed an instrument entitled
"Agreement and Declaration of Trust" in favor of the Peoples
Bank and Trust Co. whereby she conveyed in trust her
paraphernal property consisting of three (3) parcels of land
together with two (2) buildings thereon, situated at Nos.
1989 and 1993 Juan Luna, Manila, particularly described in
transfer certificate of title No. 21661 issued in her name. The
said trust was constituted in order that the lands would be
subdivided into small lots; that said lots would be sold either
for cash or by installments; that the trustee would redeem
the mortgage constituted on said property with funds
derived from the rents or sale thereof; that the trustee would
grant a loan of P10,000 with which to redeem the mortgage
in question; and that the said trustee would collect the rents
to be derived from said property while the lots remained
unsold.
The instrument was presented to the register of deeds for
the City of Manila for registration, which was denied by the
said official. Whereupon the Peoples Bank and Trust Co.
brought the matter in consulta before the Court of First
Instance of Manila, which on January 5, 1934, sustained the
action of the register of deeds and denied the registration
applied for.
The trial court based its decision on the alleged ground that
according to the terms of the contract the trustee was
authorized to collect the fruits of the paraphernal property
while the lots remained unsold or unalienated to other
persons in the manner above stated, and, inasmuch as
under the provisions of articles 1385 and 1401 (3) of the
Civil Code such fruits are considered conjugal partnership
property, the management of which corresponds to the
husband, in accordance with article 1412 of the said Code,
and said husband did not intervene in nor give his consent
to the instrument in question, the same is null and void and,
therefore, not susceptible of registration.
The appellant contends that pursuant to the provisions of
article 1387 of the Civil Code, as amended by section 1 of
Act No. 3922 of the Philippine Legislature, the grantor
Dominga Angeles did not need marital consent thereto and,
therefore, the instrument is valid and susceptible of
registration.
The question raised in this appeal does not require
interpretation nor application of the provisions of Act No.
3922, amending article 1387 of the Civil Code. For the
purposes of this decision it is taken for granted that, in
accordance with the provisions of articles 1385 and 1401 (3)
of the Civil Code, the fruits of the paraphernal property,
which had been conveyed in trust, belong to the conjugal
partnership, the management of which corresponds
exclusively to the husband of the grantor (article 1412).
It should be borne in mind that according to the deed of
trust the grantor neither parts with nor conveys the rents of
her paraphernal property in favor of the trustee but merely
authorizes it to collect them during the time the lots remain
unsold. The authority thus conferred only constitutes a mere
act of administration which article 1384 expressly vests
upon the grantor, in the instant case involving paraphernal
property which she has not delivered to her husband before
a notary, for the purpose of conferring its management upon
him. The article in question reads as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ART. 1384. The wife shall have the management of the
paraphernal property unless she has delivered the same to
her husband before a notary, for the purpose of conferring
its management upon him.
"In such cases it shall be the duty of the husband to execute
a mortgage for the value of any personality which may be so
delivered to him or otherwise secure it in the manner
prescribed with respect to dowry property."cralaw virtua1aw
library
If the grantor is the legal administratrix of the property in
September 23, 1924, and for the first time, the appellant
personally appeared by her present attorney, and objected
to the confirmation of the sale, among other things, upon
illegally executed, and is null and void, because the agent of
this defendant was not authorized to execute it. That there
was no consideration. That the plaintiff, with full knowledge
that J. M. Poizat was acting beyond the scope of his
authority, filed this action to subject the property of this
defendant to the payment of the debt which, as to appellant,
was not a valid contract. That the judgment was rendered by
confession when the plaintiff and J. M. Poizat knew that
Poizat was not authorized to confess judgment, and that the
proceeding was a constructive fraud. That at the time the
action was filed and the judgment rendered, this defendant
was absent from the Philippine Islands, and had no
knowledge of the execution of the mortgage. That after the
judgment of foreclosure became final and order of the sale
of the property was made, that this defendant for the first
time learned that he mortgage contract was tainted with
fraud, and that she first knew and learned of such things on
the 11th of September, 1924. That J. M. Poizat was not
authorized to bind her property to secure the payment of his
personal debts. That the plaintiff knew that the agent of the
defendant was not authorized to bind her or her property.
That the mortgage was executed to secure a loan of 10,000
Pounds which was not made to this defendant or for her
benefit, but was made to him personally and for the
personal use and benefit of J. M. Poizat.
Among other things, the mortgage in question, marked
Exhibit B, was introduced in evidence, and made a part of
the record.
All of such objections to the confirmation of the sale were
overruled, from which Gabriela Andrea de Coster appealed
and assigns the following errors:
I. The lower court erred in finding that Juan M. Poizat was,
under the power of attorney which he had from Gabriela
Andrea de Coster, authorized to mortgage her paraphernal
property as security for a loan made to him personally by
the Philippine Sugar Estates Development Company, Ltd.,
to him;
II. The lower court erred in not finding that under the
power of attorney, Juan M. Poizat had no authority to make
Gabriela Andrea de Coster jointly liable with him for a loan
of 10,000 pound made by the Philippine Sugar Estates
Development Co., Ltd., to him;
III. The lower court erred in not finding that the Philippine
Sugar Estates Development Company, Ltd., had
knowledge and notice of the lack of authority of Don Juan
M. Poizat to execute the mortgage deed Exhibit A of the
plaintiff;
IV. The lower court erred in holding that Gabriela Andrea
de Coster was duly summoned in this case; and in holding
that Attorney Jose Galan y Blanco could lawfully represent
her or could, without proof of express authority, confess
judgment against Gabriela Andrea de Coster;
V. The court erred in holding that the judgment in this case
has become final and res judicata;
VI. The court erred in approving the judicial sale made by
the sheriff at an inadequate price;
VII. The lower court erred in not declaring these
proceedings, the judgment and the sale null and void.
JOHNS, J.:
For the reasons stated in the decision of this court in the
Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. De Coster, the alleged
service of the summons in the foreclosure suit upon the
appellant was null and void. In fact, it was made on J. M.
Poizat only, and there is no claim or pretense that any
service of summons was ever made upon her. After service
(Sgd.)
6) Lorenzo C. Valenzuela
(kapatid ni Concordia)
(Sgd.)
2) Avelina J. Miat
(asawa ni Ceferino)
(Sgd.)
7) Patricio C. Valenzuela
(kapatid ni Concordia)
(Sgd.)
4) Aurea Miat-Joson
(kapatid ni Moises)
(Sgd.)
9) Elsa P. Miranda
(Sgd.)
5) Jose A. Joson
(asawa ni Aurea)
(Sgd.)
REYNALDO P. WONG
Kapitan ng Barangay
Sta. Maria, Licab, N.E."(emphasis supplied)
The consideration for the grant to Romeo and Alexander of
the Paco property was best expressed by Moises himself in
his letter to Romeo, which reads as follows:
"Labis akong nagpapasalamat at nauunawaan ninyo ang
mga pagkakamali ko at mga kasalanan kong nagawa sa
inyong mag-iina, huwag kayong mag-alala at lahat nang
naipundar namin nang (sic) inyong nanay ay sa inyong
dalawang magkapatid mapupunta." 59
We also hold that the oral partition between Romeo and
Alexander is not covered by the Statute of Frauds. It is
enforceable for two reasons. Firstly, Alexander accepted the
six thousand (P6,000.00) pesos given by Romeo as
his wife testified that they did not know whether or not
Agustina was involved in some other business (p. 40, t.s.n.,
July 30, 1974; p. 36, t.s.n., May 24, 1974).
On the other hand, Agustina testified that she was engaged
in the business of buying and selling palay and rice even
before her marriage to Ernesto Vasquez sometime in 1948
and continued doing so thereafter (p. 4, t.s.n., March 15,
1976). Considering the foregoing and the presumption that a
contract is with a consideration (Article 1354, Civil Code), it
is clear that petitioner miserably failed to prove his
allegation.
Secondly, neither may the contract be declared void
because of alleged inadequacy of price. To begin with, there
was no showing that the prices were grossly inadequate. In
fact, the total purchase price paid by Agustina JocsonVasquez is above the total assessed value of the properties
alleged by petitioner. In his Second Amended Complaint,
petitioner alleged that the total assessed value of the
properties mentioned in Exhibit 3 was P8,920; Exhibit 4,
P3,500; and Exhibit 2, P 24,840, while the purchase price
paid was P10,000, P5,000, and P8,000, respectively, the
latter for the 1/3 share of Emilio Jocson from the paraphernal
properties of his wife, Alejandra Poblete. And any difference
between the market value and the purchase price, which as
admitted by Emilio Jocson was only slight, may not be so
shocking considering that the sales were effected by a father
to her daughter in which case filial love must be taken into
consideration (Alsua-Betts vs. Court of Appeals, No. L-4643031, April 30, 1979, 92 SCRA 332).
Further, gross inadequacy of price alone does not affect a
contract of sale, except that it may indicate a defect in the
consent, or that the parties really intended a donation or
some other act or contract (Article 1470, Civil Code) and
there is nothing in the records at all to indicate any defect in
Emilio Jocson's consent.
Thirdly, any discussion as to the improbability of a sale
between a father and his daughter is purely speculative
which has no relevance to a contract where all the essential
requisites of consent, object and cause are clearly present.
There is another ground relied upon by petitioner in assailing
Exhibits 3 and 4, that the properties subject matter therein
are conjugal properties of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra
Poblete. It is the position of petitioner that since the
properties sold to Agustina Jocson-Vasquez under Exhibit 3
were registered in the name of "Emilio Jocson, married to
Alejandra Poblete," the certificates of title he presented as
evidence (Exhibits "E', to "J', pp. 4-9, Records) were enough
proof to show that the properties covered therein were
acquired during the marriage of their parents, and,
therefore, under Article 160 of the Civil Code, presumed to
be conjugal properties.
Article 160 of the Civil Code provides that:
All property of the marriage is presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership, unless
it be proved that it pertains exclusively to
the husband or to the wife.
In Cobb-Perez vs. Hon. Gregorio Lantin, No. L-22320, May 22,
1968, 23 SCRA 637, 644, We held that:
Anent their claim that the shares in question are conjugal
assets, the spouses Perez adduced not a modicum of
evidence, although they repeatedly invoked article 160 of
the New Civil Code which provides that ... . As interpreted
by this Court, the party who invokes this presumption
must first prove that the property in controversy was
acquired during the marriage. In other words, proof of
acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine
qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of
conjugal ownership. Thus in Camia de Reyes vs. Reyes de
Ilano [62 Phil. 629, 639], it was held that "according to law
and jurisprudence, it is sufficient to prove that the
Property was acquired during the marriage in order that
the same may be deemed conjugal property." In the
recent case ofMaramba vs. Lozano, et. al. [L-21533, June
SO ORDERED.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse
respondent appellate court's decision 1 promulgated on
October 7, 1991, affirming in toto the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court which ruled, 2 thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court renders
judgment in favor of the defendants and against the
plaintiff, as follows:
1) Ordering the dismissal of the Complaint with costs
against the plaintiff;
2) Declaring the defendant Eusebio Francisco the
administrator of the properties described in paragraph
eight (8) of the Complaint; and
3) Sentencing the plaintiff to pay the defendants the sum
of P10,000.00 as and for attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner is the legal wife of private respondent Eusebio
Francisco (Eusebio) by his second marriage. Private
respondents Conchita Evangelista, Araceli F. Marilla and
Antonio Francisco are children of Eusebio by his first
marriage.
Petitioner alleges that since their marriage on February 10,
1962, she and Eusebio have acquired the following: (1) a
sari-sari store, a residential house and lot, and an apartment
house, all situated at Col. S. Cruz St., Barangay Balite,
Rodriguez (formerly Montalban), Rizal, and; (2) a house and
lot at Barrio San Isidro, Rodriguez, Rizal. Petitioner further
avers that these properties were administered by Eusebio
until he was invalidated on account of tuberculosis, heart
disease and cancer, thereby, rendering him unfit to
administer them. Petitioner also claims that private
respondents succeeded in convincing their father to sign a
general power of attorney which authorized Conchita
Evangelista to administer the house and lot together with
the apartments situated in Rodriguez, Rizal.
On August 31, 1988, petitioner filed a suit for damages and
for annulment of said general power of attorney, and
thereby enjoining its enforcement. Petitioner also sought to
be declared as the administratrix of the properties in
dispute. In due course, the trial court rendered judgment in
favor of private respondents. It held that the petitioner failed
to adduce proof that said properties were acquired during
the existence of the second conjugal partnership, or that
they pertained exclusively to the petitioner. Hence, the court
ruled that those properties belong exclusively to Eusebio,
and that he has the capacity to administer them.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision
of the trial court. Hence, this petition.
Petitioner raised the following errors allegedly committed by
the appellate court:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
14
RESOLUTION
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Both parties in this case have moved for the reconsideration
of the decision of this Court promulgated on February 29,
1972. Plaintiffs maintain that the decision appealed from
should be affirmed in toto. The defendant, in turn, prays that
the decision of this Court be "set aside ... with or without a
new trial, ... and that the complaint be dismissed, with costs;
or, in the alternative, that the amount of the award
embodied therein be considerably reduced." .
Subsequently to the filing of its motion for reconsideration,
the defendant filed a "petition to annul proceedings and/or
to order the dismissal of plaintiffs-appellees' complaint"
upon the ground that "appellees' complaint actually seeks
the recovery of only P5,502.85 as actual damages, because,
for the purpose of determining the jurisdiction of the lower
court, the unspecified sums representing items of alleged
damages, may not be considered, under the settled
doctrines of this Honorable Court," and "the jurisdiction of
courts of first instance when the complaint in the present
case was filed on Sept. 30, 1965" was limited to cases "in
which the demand, exclusive of interest, or the value of the
property in controversy amounts to more than ten thousand
pesos" and "the mere fact that the complaint also prays for
unspecified moral damages and attorney's fees, does not
bring the action within the jurisdiction of the lower court."
We find no merit in this contention. To begin with, it is not
true that "the unspecified sums representing items or other
alleged damages, may not be considered" for the purpose
of determining the jurisdiction of the court "under the
settled doctrines of this Honorable Court." In fact, not a
single case has been cited in support of this allegation.
Secondly, it has been held that a clam for moral damages is
one not susceptible of pecuniary estimation. 1 In fact, Article
2217 of the Civil Code of the Philippines explicitly provides
that "(t)hough incapable of pecuniary computation, moral
damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result
of the defendant's wrongful act or omission." Hence, "(n)o
proof pecuniary loss necessary" pursuant to Article 2216
of the same Code "in order that moral ... damages may be
adjudicated." And "(t)he assessment of such damages ... is
left to the discretion of the court" - said article adds "according to the circumstances of each case." Appellees'
complaint is, therefore, within the original jurisdiction of
courts of first instance, which includes "all civil actions in
which the subject of the litigation is not capable of pecuniary
estimation." 2
Thirdly, in its answer to plaintiffs' original and amended
complainants, defendant had set up a counterclaim in the
aggregate sum of P12,000, which is, also, within the original
jurisdiction of said courts, thereby curing the alleged defect
if any, in plaintiffs' complaint. 3
We need not consider the jurisdictional controversy as to
the amount the appellant sues to recover because the
counterclaim interposed establishes the jurisdiction of the
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED UPON EQUITABLE GROUNDS
IN, IN EFFECT, GIVING JUDICIAL FLAT To THE UNJUST
ENRICHMENT OR BENEFIT OF ONE PERSON AT THE EXPENSE
OF ANOTHER OR OTHERS.
On the other hand, Julia R. De Reyes made the following
assignments of errors in her petition for review.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE
PROPERTIES IN QUESTION ARE THE CONJUGAL
PROPERTIES OF THE RESPONDENT PONCIANO S. REYES
AND THE PETITIONER IN SPITE OF THE CATEGORICAL
JUDICIAL DECLARATION AND ADMISSION BY SAID
RESPONDENT THAT THE SAID PROPERTIES ARE THE
EXCLUSIVE AND PARAPHERNAL PROPERTIES OF HIS WIFE,
THE PETITIONER HEREIN.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HAVING DECIDED THE
CASE NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW AND THE
APPLICABLE DECISIONS ON THE MATTER IN THE SENSE,
PARTICULARLY, THAT THE ACT AND DECLARATION OF A
PARTY AGAINST HIS INTERESTS CAN NOT BE
CONTRADICTED BY HIM, AND IN SO DOING THE DECISION
AMOUNTED TO SANCTIONING A PERJURED TESTIMONY.
On the first issue regarding the alleged paraphernal
character of the disputed properties, we find that the records
sustain the findings of the Court of Appeals
The fact are:
(2) The party precluded must intend that the other should
act upon the facts as misrepresented;
(3) The party misled must have been unaware of the true
facts; and
(4) The party defrauded must have acted in accordance
with the representation.
The principle of estoppel rests on the rule that whenever a
party has, by his declaration, act or omission, intentionally
and deliberately led the other to believe a particular thing
true and to act, upon such belief he cannot, in any litigation
xxx
xxx
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Petition for Review on certiorari assailing the Decision, dated
October 6, 1980, and the Resolution on the Motion for
Reconsideration, dated November 27, 1980, of the then
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch I, in Civil Case
No. 15620 entitled "Corazon DAGUINES vs. MERCEDES
Calimlim-Canullas," upholding the sale of a parcel of land in
favor of DAGUINES but not of the conjugal house thereon'
The background facts may be summarized as follows:
Petitioner MERCEDES Calimlim-Canullas and FERNANDO
Canullas were married on December 19, 1962. They begot
five children. They lived in a small house on the residential
land in question with an area of approximately 891 square
meters, located at Bacabac, Bugallon, Pangasinan. After
FERNANDO's father died in 1965, FERNANDO inherited the
land.
In 1978, FERNANDO abandoned his family and was living
with private respondent Corazon DAGUINES. During the
pendency of this appeal, they were convicted of
concubinage in a judgment rendered on October 27, 1981 by
the then Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch II,
which judgment has become final.
On April 15, 1980, FERNANDO sold the subject property with
the house thereon to DAGUINES for the sum of P2,000.00. In
the document of sale, FERNANDO described the house as
"also inherited by me from my deceased parents."
Unable to take possession of the lot and house, DAGUINES
initiated a complaint on June 19, 1980 for quieting of title
and damages against MERCEDES. The latter resisted and
claimed that the house in dispute where she and her
children were residing, including the coconut trees on the
land, were built and planted with conjugal funds and through
her industry; that the sale of the land together with the
house and improvements to DAGUINES was null and void
because they are conjugal properties and she had not given
her consent to the sale,
In its original judgment, respondent Court principally
declared DAGUINES "as the lawful owner of the land in
question as well as the one-half () of the house erected on
said land." Upon reconsideration prayed for by MERCEDES,
however, respondent Court resolved:
WHEREFORE, the dispositive portion of the Decision of this
Court, promulgated on October 6, 1980, is hereby
amended to read as follows:
(1) Declaring plaintiff as the true and lawful owner of the
land in question and the 10 coconut trees;
(2) Declaring as null and void the sale of the conjugal
house to plaintiff on April 15, 1980 (Exhibit A) including
the 3 coconut trees and other crops planted during the
conjugal relation between Fernando Canullas (vendor) and
his legitimate wife, herein defendant Mercedes CalimlimCanullas;
xxx xxx xxx
The issues posed for resolution are (1) whether or not the
construction of a conjugal house on the exclusive property of
the husband ipso facto gave the land the character of
conjugal property; and (2) whether or not the sale of the lot
together with the house and improvements thereon was
valid under the circumstances surrounding the transaction.
The determination of the first issue revolves around the
interpretation to be given to the second paragraph of Article
158 of the Civil Code, which reads:
xxx xxx xxx
Buildings constructed at the expense of the partnership
during the marriage on land belonging to one of the
spouses also pertain to the partnership, but the value of
the land shall be reimbursed to the spouse who owns the
same.
We hold that pursuant to the foregoing provision both the
land and the building belong to the conjugal partnership but
the conjugal partnership is indebted to the husband for the
value of the land. The spouse owning the lot becomes a
creditor of the conjugal partnership for the value of the
lot, 1 which value would be reimbursed at the liquidation of
the conjugal partnership. 2
In his commentary on the corresponding provision in the
Spanish Civil Code (Art. 1404), Manresa stated:
El articulo cambia la doctrine; los edificios construidos
durante el matrimonio en suelo propio de uno de los
conjuges son gananciales, abonandose el valor del suelo
al conj uge a quien pertenezca.
It is true that in the case of Maramba vs. Lozano, 3 relied
upon by respondent Judge, it was held that the land
belonging to one of the spouses, upon which the spouses
have built a house, becomes conjugal property only when
the conjugal partnership is liquidated and indemnity paid to
the owner of the land. We believe that the better rule is that
enunciated by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Padilla vs.
Paterno, 3 SCRA 678, 691 (1961), where the following was
explained:
As to the above properties, their conversion from
paraphernal to conjugal assets should be deemed to
retroact to the time the conjugal buildings were first
constructed thereon or at the very latest, to the time
immediately before the death of Narciso A. Padilla that
ended the conjugal partnership. They can not be
considered to have become conjugal property only as of
the time their values were paid to the estate of the
widow Concepcion Paterno because by that time the
conjugal partnership no longer existed and it could not
acquire the ownership of said properties. The acquisition
by the partnership of these properties was, under the
1943 decision, subject to the suspensive condition that
their values would be reimbursed to the widow at the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership; once paid, the
effects of the fulfillment of the condition should be
deemed to retroact to the date the obligation was
constituted (Art. 1187, New Civil Code) ...
The foregoing premises considered, it follows that
FERNANDO could not have alienated the house and lot to
DAGUINES since MERCEDES had not given her consent to
said sale. 4
Anent the second issue, we find that the contract of sale was
null and void for being contrary to morals and public policy.
The sale was made by a husband in favor of a concubine
after he had abandoned his family and left the conjugal
home where his wife and children lived and from whence
they derived their support. That sale was subversive of the
stability of the family, a basic social institution which public
policy cherishes and protects. 5
Article 1409 of the Civil Code states inter alia that: contracts
whose cause, object, or purpose is contrary to law, morals,
GANCAYCO, J.:
The issue posed in this petition for review on certiorari is the
validity of a promissory note which was executed in
consideration of a previous promissory note the enforcement
of which had been barred by prescription.
On February 10, 1940 spouses Patricio Confesor and Jovita
Villafuerte obtained an agricultural loan from the Agricultural
and Industrial Bank (AIB), now the Development of the
Philippines (DBP), in the sum of P2,000.00, Philippine
Currency, as evidenced by a promissory note of said date
whereby they bound themselves jointly and severally to pay
the account in ten (10) equal yearly amortizations. As the
obligation remained outstanding and unpaid even after the
lapse of the aforesaid ten-year period, Confesor, who was by
then a member of the Congress of the Philippines, executed
a second promissory note on April 11, 1961 expressly
acknowledging said loan and promising to pay the same on
or before June 15, 1961. The new promissory note reads as
follows
I hereby promise to pay the amount covered by my
promissory note on or before June 15, 1961. Upon my
failure to do so, I hereby agree to the foreclosure of my
mortgage. It is understood that if I can secure a certificate
of indebtedness from the government of my back pay I
will be allowed to pay the amount out of it.
Said spouses not having paid the obligation on the specified
date, the DBP filed a complaint dated September 11, 1970 in
the City Court of Iloilo City against the spouses for the
payment of the loan.
After trial on the merits a decision was rendered by the
inferior court on December 27, 1976, the dispositive part of
which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court renders
judgment, ordering the defendants Patricio Confesor and
Jovita Villafuerte Confesor to pay the plaintiff Development
Bank of the Philippines, jointly and severally, (a) the sum
of P5,760.96 plus additional daily interest of P l.04 from
September 17, 1970, the date Complaint was filed, until
said amount is paid; (b) the sum of P576.00 equivalent to
ten (10%) of the total claim by way of attorney's fees and
incidental expenses plus interest at the legal rate as of
September 17,1970, until fully paid; and (c) the costs of
the suit.
Defendants-spouses appealed therefrom to the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo wherein in due course a decision was
rendered on April 28, 1978 reversing the appealed decision
and dismissing the complaint and counter-claim with costs
against the plaintiff.
A motion for reconsideration of said decision filed by plaintiff
was denied in an order of August 10, 1978. Hence this
petition wherein petitioner alleges that the decision of
respondent judge is contrary to law and runs counter to
decisions of this Court when respondent judge (a) refused to
recognize the law that the right to prescription may be
renounced or waived; and (b) that in signing the second
promissory note respondent Patricio Confesor can bind the
conjugal partnership; or otherwise said respondent became
liable in his personal capacity. The petition is impressed with
merit. The right to prescription may be waived or renounced.
Article 1112 of Civil Code provides:
MARTINEZ, J.:
Under Article 161 of the Civil Code, what debts and
obligations contracted by the husband alone are considered
"for the benefit of the conjugal partnership" which are
chargeable against the conjugal partnership? Is a surety
agreement or an accommodation contract entered into by
the husband in favor of his employer within the
contemplation of the said provision?
These are the issues which we will resolve in this petition for
review.
The petitioner assails the decision dated April 14, 1994 of
the respondent Court of Appeals in "Spouses Alfredo and
Encarnacion Ching vs. Ayala Investment and Development
Corporation, et. al.," docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
29632, 1 upholding the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig, Branch 168, which ruled that the conjugal partnership
of gains of respondents-spouses Alfredo and Encarnacion
Ching is not liable for the payment of the debts secured by
respondent-husband Alfredo Ching.
A chronology of the essential antecedent facts is necessary
for a clear understanding of the case at bar.
Philippine Blooming Mills (hereinafter referred to as PBM)
obtained a P50,300,000.00 loan from petitioner Ayala
Investment and Development Corporation (hereinafter
referred to as AIDC). As added security for the credit line
extended to PBM, respondent Alfredo Ching, Executive Vice
President of PBM, executed security agreements on
December 10, 1980 and on March 20, 1981 making himself
jointly and severally answerable with PBM's indebtedness to
AIDC.
PBM failed to pay the loan. Thus, on July 30, 1981, AIDC filed
a case for sum of money against PBM and respondenthusband Alfredo Ching with the then Court of First Instance
of Rizal (Pasig), Branch VIII, entitled "Ayala Investment and
Development Corporation vs. Philippine Blooming Mills and
Alfredo Ching," docketed as Civil Case No. 42228.
After trial, the court rendered judgment ordering PBM and
respondent-husband Alfredo Ching to jointly and severally
pay AIDC the principal amount of P50,300,000.00 with
interests.
Pending appeal of the judgment in Civil Case No. 42228,
upon motion of AIDC, the lower court issued a writ of
execution pending appeal. Upon AIDC's putting up of an
P8,000,000.00 bond, a writ of execution dated May 12, 1982
was issued. Thereafter, petitioner Abelardo Magsajo, Sr.,
Deputy Sheriff of Rizal and appointed sheriff in Civil Case No.
42228, caused the issuance and service upon respondentsspouses of a notice of sheriff sale dated May 20, 1982 on
three (3) of their conjugal properties. Petitioner Magsajo
then scheduled the auction sale of the properties levied.
On June 9, 1982, private respondents filed a case of
injunction against petitioners with the then Court of First
Instance of Rizal (Pasig), Branch XIII, to enjoin the auction
sale alleging that petitioners cannot enforce the judgment
against the conjugal partnership levied on the ground that,
among others, the subject loan did not redound to the
benefit of the said conjugal partnership. 2 Upon application
of private respondents, the lower court issued a temporary
restraining order to prevent petitioner Magsajo from
proceeding with the enforcement of the writ of execution
and with the sale of the said properties at public auction.
AIDC filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals, 3 questioning the order of the lower court enjoining
the sale. Respondent Court of Appeals issued a Temporary
Restraining Order on June 25, 1982, enjoining the lower
court 4 from enforcing its Order of June 14, 1982, thus paving
the way for the scheduled auction sale of respondentsspouses conjugal properties.
On June 25, 1982, the auction sale took place. AIDC being
the only bidder, was issued a Certificate of Sale by petitioner
13
cited
benefit, if any, continuously harped by respondentsappellants, are not only incidental but also speculative.
19
On the basis of the facts, the rules, the law and equity, the
assailed decision should be upheld as we now uphold it. This
is, of course, without prejudice to petitioner's right to
enforce the obligation in its favor against the PBM receiver in
accordance with the rehabilitation program and payment
schedule approved or to be approved by the Securities &
Exchange Commission.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review should be, as it is
hereby, DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
April 9, 2002
Q
How far were you from Manuel Abelardo from the
dining table at the time when he was preparing a letter.
Q
And do you know where in, what particular paper did
Mr. Abelardo prepare or write this letter?
A
Q
What happened after Manuel Abelardo prepared this
letter in a Manila envelope?
A
He got a small envelope and placed there the name
of Mr. Carlos as the addressee, sir.
xxx
Q
After preparing this letter on a Manila envelope and
then getting another envelope and writing on it the
address of herein plaintiff, what did the defendant Manuel
Abelardo do, if any?
A
He instructed me to mail the letter which he
prepared, sir.
xxx
Q
And did you actually accede to the request of herein
defendant Manuel Abelardo for you to mail that letter to
Engr. Carlos?
xxx
Q
May we know from you the reason why you did not
mail said letter?
A
xxx
Q
And what happened when Manuel Abelardo refused
to sign that letter coming from the other defendant?
A
He made me wait and he prepared a letter to Mr.
Honorio Carlos, sir.
xxx
Q
Where were you at the time when this defendant
Manuel Abelardo prepared this letter?
Q
What did you do with that letter, although you did
not mail it?
A
Q
And what did you do next after keeping the letter for
several days?
A
No, sir.
Q
What prompted you to give that letter to Engr.
Carlos instead of mailing it?
A
x20
Q
And when he said his father in law to whom was he
referring at that time?
A
Q
After mentioning the name of his father-in-law Mr.
Honorio Carlos what happened next?
A
He told me "Sabihin mo sa biyenan ko babarilin ko
siya pag nakita ko siya."
Q
Where was Manuel Abelardo at that particular time
when he told this threatening remark against Honorio
Carlos?
A
Q
Will you please narrate to this Honorable Court that
unusual incident?
Q
How about you where were you approximately at
that particular time when he narrated that message to
you threatening the herein plaintiff?
A
Manuel Abelardo passed by and when he saw me he
called me. I approached him while he was then on board
his car and asked me who was my companion, sir.
Q
And what was your reply or reaction when he made
this threatening remarks?
A
He again asked me if I have in my company one of
his children, sir.
Q
Q
Incidentally Mr. Witness, where or in what particular
place did this conversation between you and Manuel T.
Abelardo take place?
A
Parking Area of Academy I, Gov. Santos corner
Aguirre St., sir.
Q
Now, what else happened after you talk[ed] with
this Manuel T. Abelardo?
A
He said I may be fooling him because he said I once
fooled him when I ran away with his children which he is
going to take back, sir.
Q
A
I answered I did not do that and he said that once he
discovered that I did it he would box me, sir.
Q
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Court
of Appeals Decision1 and Resolution affirming the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) Decision rendering herein petitioners
Arcadio and Luisa Carandang [hereinafter referred to as
spouses Carandang] jointly and severally liable for their loan
to Quirino A. de Guzman.
The Court of Appeals summarized the facts as follows:
[Quirino de Guzman] and [the Spouses Carandang] are
stockholders as well as corporate officers of Mabuhay
Broadcasting System (MBS for brevity), with equities at fifty
four percent (54%) and forty six percent (46%) respectively.
On November 26, 1983, the capital stock of MBS was
increased, from P500,000 to P1.5 million and P345,000 of
this increase was subscribed by [the spouses Carandang].
Thereafter, on March 3, 1989, MBS again increased its
capital stock, from P1.5 million to P3 million, [the spouses
Carandang] yet again subscribed to the increase. They
subscribed to P93,750 worth of newly issued capital stock.
[De Guzman] claims that, part of the payment for these
subscriptions were paid by him, P293,250 for the November
26, 1983 capital stock increase and P43,125 for the March 3,
1989 Capital Stock increase or a total ofP336,375. Thus, on
March 31, 1992, [de Guzman] sent a demand letter to [the
spouses Carandang] for the payment of said total amount.
[The spouses Carandang] refused to pay the amount,
contending that a pre-incorporation agreement was
executed between [Arcadio Carandang] and [de Guzman],
whereby the latter promised to pay for the stock
subscriptions of the former without cost, in consideration for
[Arcadio Carandangs] technical expertise, his newly
purchased equipment, and his skill in repairing and
upgrading radio/communication equipment therefore, there
is no indebtedness on their part [sic].
On June 5, 1992, [de Guzman] filed his complaint, seeking to
recover the P336,375 together with damages. After trial on
the merits, the trial court disposed of the case in this wise:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of [de Guzman]. Accordingly, [the spouses
Carandang] are ordered to jointly and severally pay [de
Guzman], to wit:
(1) P336,375.00 representing [the spouses Carandangs]
loan to de Guzman;
(2) interest on the preceding amount at the rate of twelve
percent (12%) per annum from June 5, 1992 when this
complaint was filed until the principal amount shall have
been fully paid;
In the present case, there had been no court order for the
legal representative of the deceased to appear, nor had any
such legal representative appeared in court to be
substituted for the deceased; neither had the complainant
ever procured the appointment of such legal representative
of the deceased, including appellant, ever asked to be
substituted for the deceased. As a result, no valid
substitution was effected, consequently, the court never
acquired jurisdiction over appellant for the purpose of
making her a party to the case and making the decision
binding upon her, either personally or as a representative of
the estate of her deceased mother.8
It also pays to look into the spirit behind the general rule
requiring a formal substitution of heirs. The underlying
principle therefor is not really because substitution of heirs is
a jurisdictional requirement, but because non-compliance
therewith results in the undeniable violation of the right to
due process of those who, though not duly notified of the
proceedings, are substantially affected by the decision
rendered therein.12 Such violation of due process can only be
asserted by the persons whose rights are claimed to have
been violated, namely the heirs to whom the adverse
judgment is sought to be enforced.
The failure to comply with the order for his inclusion, without
justifiable cause, shall be deemed a waiver of the claim
against such party.
The non-inclusion of a necessary party does not prevent the
court from proceeding in the action, and the judgment
rendered therein shall be without prejudice to the rights of
such necessary party.
Non-compliance with the order for the inclusion of a
necessary party would not warrant the dismissal of the
complaint. This is an exception to Section 3, Rule 17 which
allows the dismissal of the complaint for failure to comply
with an order of the court, as Section 9, Rule 3 specifically
provides for the effect of such non-inclusion: it shall not
prevent the court from proceeding in the action, and the
judgment rendered therein shall be without prejudice to the
rights of such necessary party. Section 11, Rule 3 likewise
provides that the non-joinder of parties is not a ground for
the dismissal of the action.
Q: Now, can you tell this Honorable Court how do you feel
with respect to the Complaint of the plaintiff in this case
charging you that you paid for this year and asking enough
to paid (sic) your tax?
The averments in the complaint disclosed that plaintiffappellee Joe A. Ros obtained a loan of P115,000.00 from PNB
Laoag Branch on October 14, 1974 and as security for the
loan, plaintiff-appellee Ros executed a real estate mortgage
involving a parcel of land Lot No. 9161 of the Cadastral
Survey of Laoag, with all the improvements thereon
described under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-9646.
Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result,
PNB instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the
mortgaged property. After the extrajudicial sale thereof, a
Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of PNB, Laoag as the
highest bidder. After the lapse of one (1) year without the
property being redeemed, the property was consolidated
and registered in the name of PNB, Laoag Branch on August
10, 1978.
Claiming that she (plaintiff-appellee Estrella Aguete) has no
knowledge of the loan obtained by her husband nor she
consented to the mortgage instituted on the conjugal
property a complaint was filed to annul the proceedings
pertaining to the mortgage, sale and consolidation of the
property interposing the defense that her signatures
affixed on the documents were forged and that the loan did
not redound to the benefit of the family.1avvphi1
In its answer, PNB prays for the dismissal of the complaint
for lack of cause of action, and insists that it was plaintiffsappellees own acts [of]
omission/connivance that bar them from recovering the
subject property on the ground of estoppel, laches,
abandonment and prescription.4]
SO ORDERED.
April 6, 2011
SO ORDERED.
MAKASIAR, J.:
Two petitions are herein filed to review on certiorari the
decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 1, 1976 in CAG.R. No. 05387- SP docketed as L-45418 and L-45574
respectively, affirming the order of respondent Judge Pedro
C. Navarro of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Pasig,
Branch II in Civil Case No. 21277 dated September 29, 1975.
On March 25, 1975, petitioners Pentel Merchandising Co.,
Inc. (Pentel for short) and Teofista Payumo Tinitigan (Payuran
for short) entered into a contract of lease of a residential
house whereby for a term of four years Payumo shall lease
to Pentel the premises at 205 Loring St., Pasay City covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15923, at a rental of
P1,500.00 per month with option to buy the same within the
term of the lease for P350,000.00 [pp. 13-16, rec].
On April 22, 1975, Payumo and her three children, Efren,
Elsa, and Severino Jr., all surnamed Tinitigan, leased to
United Electronics Corporation a factory building together
with the portion of land on which it is erected covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 160998 situated in Banwag,
Paraaque, Rizal (pp. 17-20, rec., L-45418).
In both transactions, the consent of Severino Tinitigan Sr.
(Tinitigan for short), husband of Payumo and private
responded herein, was not secured. Consequently, on May
22, 1975, Severino Tinitigan Sr., as conjugal partner and
shareholder of Molave Development Corporation which is a
family corporation filed a complaint captioned "Annulment of
Ownership and Contract of witness Pre-Injunction" in the
Court of First Instance of Rizal in Pasig, 7th Judicial District
(pp. 23-27, rec.). This case docketed Civil Case No. 21277
and which was assigned to Branch II presided by the
Honorable Judge Pedro C. Navarro principally sought to annul
the contract of lease executed by Payumo in favor of United
Electronics Corporation The property involved in this
contract is entirely different from that leased to Pentel with
option to buy.
The complaint, however, was later amended with leave of
court granted by order of August 20, 1975, to include in the
prayer the following:
... 2. to restrain the defendant-relatives of the plaintiff
from encumbering or disposing properties in the name
of the Molave Development Corporation or those in the
name of Severino Tinitigan Sr. and Teofista Payuran; ...
In the same order, the CFI of Rizal, Branch II enjoined
petitioner from doing any "act to dispose, mortgage or
otherwise encumber the properties described in paragraphs
7 and 8 of the complaint" and set the case for hearing on
the issuance of a preliminary injunction on September 5,
SO ORDERED.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both
the husband and the wife. The absence of the consent of
one renders the sale null and void, while the vitiation thereof
makes it merely voidable. Only in the latter case can
ratification cure the defect.
The Case
These were the principles that guided the Court in deciding
this petition for review of the Decision 1 dated January 30,
1996 and the Resolution 2 dated May 28, 1996, promulgated
by the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 41758, affirming
The Issues
In their Memorandum, petitioners assign to public
respondent the following errors: 10
I
Whether or not the assailed Deed of Transfer of Rights was
validly executed.
II
Whether or not the Cour of Appeals erred in not declairing
as voidable contract under Art. 1390 of the Civil Code the
impugned Deed of Transfer of Rights which was validly
ratified thru the execution of the "amicable settlement" by
the contending parties.
III
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not setting
aside the findings of the Court a quo which recognized as
lawful and valid the ownership and possession of private
respondent over the remaining one half (1/2) portion of
the properly.
In a nutshell, petitioners-spouses contend that (1) the
contract of sale (Deed of Transfer of Rights) was merely
voidable, and (2) such contract was ratified by private
respondent when she entered into an amicable sttlement
with them.
This Court's Ruling
The Facts
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
16
Makati Property
6th
month
P200,000.00
P300,000.00
12th
month
700,000.00
1,600,000.00
18th
month
500,000.00
June 5, 2008
On July 19, 2000, the RTC, in its Joint Decision, annulled the
deed of absolute sale dated May 13, 1992, and ordered
petitioners to vacate the lot and remove all improvements
therein. The RTC likewise dismissed Civil Case No. 4460, but
ordered Florentino to return to petitioners the consideration
of the sale with interest from May 13, 1992.10 The fallo of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, by preponderance of evidence, judgment is
hereby rendered as follows:
For Civil Case No. 4383, (a) annulling the Deed of Sale
executed by Florentino Chiong in favor of Walter
Villanueva, dated May 13, 1992 (Exhibit "2"); ordering
defendant Walter Villanueva to vacate the entire land in
question and to remove all buildings therein, subject to
[i]ndemnity of whatever damages he may incur by virtue
of the removal of such buildings, within a period of 60
days from the finality of this decision; award of damages is
hereby denied for lack of proof.
In Civil Case No. 4460, complaint is hereby dismissed, but
defendant Florentino Chiong, having received the amount
of P8,000.00 as consideration of the sale of the land
subject of the controversy, the sale being annulled by this
Court, is ordered to return the said amount to [the]
spouses Villanueva, with interest to be computed from the
date of the annulled deed of sale, until the same is fully
paid, within the period of 60 days from finality of this
judgment. Until such amount is returned, together with
the interest, [the] spouses Villanueva may continue to
occupy the premises in question.
No pronouncement as to costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.11
The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC's decision:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed
decision dated July 19, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 6, Dipolog City is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.12
Petitioners sought reconsideration, but to no avail. Hence,
this petition.
Petitioners assign the following errors as issues for our
resolution:
I.
THAT THE COURT A QUO AS WELL AS THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS ... GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING
THAT THE LAND IN QUESTION BELONGED SOLELY TO
RESPONDENT FLORENTINO CHIONG AND ULTIMATELY TO
THE HEREIN PETITIONERS.
II.
THAT THE LOWER COURT AS WELL AS THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE ERRED IN DECLARING AS
NULL AND VOID THE DEED OF SALE EXECUTED BY
RESPONDENT FLORENTINO CHIONG IN FAVOR OF THE
HEREIN PETITIONERS.13
Simply put, the basic issues are: (1) Is the subject lot an
exclusive property of Florentino or a conjugal property of
respondents? (2) Was its sale by Florentino without Elisera's
consent valid?
Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred when it
held that the lot is conjugal property. They claim that the lot
belongs exclusively to Florentino because respondents were
already separated in fact at the time of sale and that the
share of Elisera, which pertains to the eastern part of Lot No.
997-D-1, had previously been sold to Spouses Jesus Y. Castro
and Aida Cuenca. They also aver that while there was no
grounds of improper venue, res judicata and forumshopping, invoking the Decision of the RTC, Branch 33. On 7
March 2005, respondents also filed a Motion to Dismiss on
the grounds of res judicata and lack of cause of action.
The Decision of the Trial Court
On 22 July 2005, the RTC, Branch 42 issued an
Order8 denying the motion to dismiss. The RTC, Branch 42
ruled that res judicata will not apply to rights, claims or
demands which, although growing out of the same subject
matter, constitute separate or distinct causes of action and
were not put in issue in the former action. Respondents filed
a motion for reconsideration. In its Order9 dated 8 February
2006, the RTC, Branch 42 denied respondents motion. The
RTC, Branch 42 ruled that the RTC, Branch 33 expressly
stated that its decision did not mean that petitioner could no
longer recover the loan petitioner extended to Edna.
Respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus
with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order before the Court of Appeals.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its 30 May 2008 Decision, the Court of Appeals set aside
the 22 July 2005 and 8 February 2006 Orders of the RTC,
Branch 42 for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion.
The Court of Appeals ruled that while the general rule is that
a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and not appealable, the
rule admits of exceptions. The Court of Appeals ruled that
the RTC, Branch 42 acted with grave abuse of discretion in
denying respondents motion to dismiss.
The Court of Appeals ruled that under Section 3, Rule 2 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may not institute
more than one suit for a single cause of action. If two or
more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of
action, the filing of one on a judgment upon the merits in
any one is available ground for the dismissal of the others.
The Court of Appeals ruled that on a nonpayment of a note
secured by a mortgage, the creditor has a single cause of
action against the debtor, that is recovery of the credit with
execution of the suit. Thus, the creditor may institute two
alternative remedies: either a personal action for the
collection of debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage,
but not both. The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner had
only one cause of action against Edna for her failure to pay
her obligation and he could not split the single cause of
action by filing separately a foreclosure proceeding and a
collection case. By filing a petition for foreclosure of the real
estate mortgage, the Court of Appeals held that petitioner
had already waived his personal action to recover the
amount covered by the promissory note.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 4 August
2008 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the motion.
PARAS, J.:
This is a Petition for certiorari which questions the order of
the respondent court granting the Motion for Allowance filed
by private respondents. Said order reads as follows:
Acting on the Motion For Allowance dated June 30, 1982
filed by Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina and Miguel, all
surnamed Santero, thru their guardian, Anselma Diaz, the
Opposition thereto dated July 8, 1982 filed by the
oppositors, the Reply to Opposition dated July 12, 1982
filed by movant Anselma Diaz and the Rejoinder dated July
26, 1982 filed by the oppositors, the Court was
constrained to examine the Motion For Allowance filed by
the herein movant last year wherein the ground cited was
for support which included educational expenses, clothing
and medical necessities, which was granted and said
minors were given an allowance prayed for in their
motion.
In the Motion For Allowance in question guardian-movant
Anselma Diaz only followed the precedent of the Court
which granted a similar motion last year to be spent for
the school expenses of her wards. In their opposition the
oppositors contend that the wards for whom allowance is
sought are no longer schooling and have attained majority
age so that they are no longer under guardianship. They
likewise allege that the administrator does not have
sufficient funds to cover the said allowance because
whatever funds are in the hands of the administrator, they
constitute funds held in trust for the benefit of whoever
will be adjudged as owners of the Kawit property from
which said administrator derives the only income of the
intestate estate of Pablo Santero, et al.
In the Reply filed by the guardian-movant, she admitted
some of her children are of age and not enrolled for the
first semester due to lack of funds but will be enrolled as
soon as they are given the requested allowances. She
cited Article 290 of the Civil Code providing that:
Support is everything that is indispensable for
substance, dwelling, clothing and medical attendance,
according to the social position of the family.
Support also includes the education of the person
entitled to be supported until he completes his
education or training for some trade or vocation, even
beyond the age of majority.'
citing also Section 3 of Rule 83 of the Rules of Court which
provides:
Allowance to widow and family. The widow and minor or
incapacitated children of a deceased person, during the
settlement of the estate, shall receive therefrom, under
the direction of the Court, such allowance as provided
by law.'
From the foregoing discussion alone, the Court cannot
deviate from its duty to give the allowance sought by the
wards, the fact that they need further education which
should have been provided to them if their deceased
father were alive.
September 7, 2011
BERSAMIN, J.:
The disposition by sale of a portion of the conjugal property
by the surviving spouse without the prior liquidation
mandated by Article 130 of the Family Code is not
necessarily void if said portion has not yet been allocated by
judicial or extrajudicial partition to another heir of the
deceased spouse. At any rate, the requirement of prior
liquidation does not prejudice vested rights.
Antecedents
On February 22, 1976, Jesus B. Gaviola sold two parcels of
land with a total area of 17,140 square meters situated in
Southern Leyte to Protacio B. Go, Jr. (Protacio, Jr.). Twenty
three years later, or on March 29, 1999, Protacio, Jr.
executed an Affidavit of Renunciation and Waiver, 1 whereby
he affirmed under oath that it was his father, Protacio Go, Sr.
(Protacio, Sr.), not he, who had purchased the two parcels of
land (the property).
On November 25, 1987, Marta Barola Go died. She was the
wife of Protacio, Sr. and mother of the petitioners.2On
190, new Civil Code; Article 1432, old Code); and in the
latter case, it may only be ordered by the court for causes
specified in Article 191 of the new Civil Code:
ART. 191. The husband or the wife way ask for the
separation of property, and it shall be decreed
when the spouse of the petitioner; has been
sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil
interdiction, or has been declared absent, or when
legal separation has been granted.
In case of abuse of powers of administration of the
conjugal partnership property of the husband, or in
case of abandonment by the husband, separation
of property may also be ordered by the court
according to the provisions of articles 167 and 173,
No. 3.
In all these cases, it is sufficient to present the final
judgment which has been entered against the guilty
or absent spouse.
The husband and the wife may agree upon the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the
marriage, subject to judicial approval. All the
creditors of the husband and of the wife, as well as
of the conjugal partnership, shall be notified of any
petition for judicial approval of the voluntary
dissolution of the conjugal partnership, so that any
such creditors may appear at the hearing to
safeguard his interests. Upon approval of the
petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership,
the court shall take such measures as may protect
the creditors and other third persons.
After dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the
provisions of Arts 214 and 215 shall apply. The
provisions of this Code concerning the effect of
partition stated in Arts. 498 to 501 shall be
applicable.
This enumeration must be regarded as limitative, in view of
the Code's restrictive policy. The appellant recognizes that
his case does not come within the purview of the first
paragraph of the Article quoted; but vigorously contends
that the provisions of the second paragraph, like those of
Articles 167 and 178, should be interpreted as
applicable, mutatis matandis, to the husband, even if the
letter of the statute refers to the wife exclusively.
ART. 167. In case of abuse of powers of
administration of the conjugal partnership property
by the husband, the courts, on petition of the wife,
may provide for a receivership, or administration by
the wife, or separation of property.
ART. 178. The separation in fact between husband
and wife without judicial approval, shall not affect
the conjugal partnership, except that:
(1) In the spouse who leaves the conjugal home or
refuses to live therein without just cause, shall not
have a right to be supported;
(2) When the consent of one spouse to any
transaction of the other is required by law, judicial
authorization shall be necessary;
(3) If the husband has abandoned the wife without
just cause for at least one year, she may petition
the court for a receivership or administration by her
of the conjugal partnership property, or separation
of property.
In support of his thesis, appellant argues that in case of
mismanagement and maladministration by the wife, the
husband should be entitled to the same relief as the wife,
otherwise there would be a void in the law. This contention
ignores the philosophy underlying the provisions in question.
CRUZ, J.:
The herein private respondent, Jose Jo, admits to having
cohabited with three women and fathered fifteen children.
The first of these women, the herein petitioner, claims to be
his legal wife whom he begot a daughter, Monina Jo. The
other women and their respective offspring are not parties of
these case.
CASTRO, J.:
sent any letter to her, you are not familiar with her
handwriting?
A. Yes.
Q. You have not seen her writing anybody?
A. Yes.
The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of
the conjugal partnership during the marriage, subject to
judicial approval. All the creditors of the husband and of the
wife as well as of the conjugal partnership, shall be notified
of any petition for judicial approval of the voluntary
dissolution of the conjugal partnership, so that any such
creditors may appear at the hearing to safeguard his
interests. Upon approval of the petition for dissolution of the
conjugal partnership, the court shall take such measures as
may protect the creditors and other third persons.
It should be noted this connection, that, although petitioner
Jose Bermas, Sr. admittedly has children by a previous
marriage, their names have not been given in either Exhibit
Q or the petition for the approval thereof, despite the fact
that his children with his co-petitioner have been named in
both. Consequently, said children by first marriage of
petitioner Jose Bermas, Sr. do not appear to have been
notified personally of the filing of the petition and of the date
of the hearing thereof. In fact, no similar notice appears to
have been given to the children of the petitioners herein,
although the danger of substantial injury to rights would
seem to be remote.
The situation as regards the children by first marriage is,
however, materially different. Indeed, the contract, Exhibit
Q, purports to dissolve and, hence, liquidate the conjugal
partnership between the petitioners. But, this liquidation
should not and cannot be effected without a liquidation of
the conjugal partnership between Jose Bermas, Sr. and his
first wife, in which the children by first marriage certainly
have an interest (Onas v. Javillo, 59 Phil. 733, 737). At any
rate, said Exhibit Q could adversely affect the rights of said
children by first marriage, for, "in case of doubt, the
partnership property shall be divided between the different
(conjugal) partnerships in proportion to the duration of each
and to the property belonging to the respective spouses," as
provided in Article 189 of the aforementioned Code (Article
1431 of the Spanish Civil Code). Hence it is essential that
said children by previous marriage be personally notified of
the instant proceedings, and that, for this purpose, their
names and addresses, as well as the addresses of the
children of herein petitioners, be furnished by them.
WHEREFORE, the decision from is hereby set aside, and the
case remanded to the lower court for further proceedings in
conformity with this decision. It is so ordered.
June 8, 2007
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
xxxx
I.
WHETHER OF NOT A SPOUSE CONVICTED OF EITHER
CONCUBINAGE OR ADULTERY, CAN STILL SHARE IN THE
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP;
II
WHETHER OR NOT A COMPROMISE AGREEMENT ENTERED
INTO BY SPOUSES, ONE OF WHOM WAS CONVICTED OF
ADULTERY, GIVING THE CONVICTED SPOUSE A SHARE IN THE
CONJUGAL PROPERTY, VALID AND LEGAL;
III
WHETHER OR NOT A JUDGMENT FOR ANNULMENT AND
LEGAL SEPARATION IS A PRE-REQUISITE BEFORE A SPOUSE
CONVICTED OF EITHER CONCUBINAGE OR ADULTERY, BE
DISQUALIFIED AND PROHIBITED FROM SHARING IN THE
CONJUGAL PROPERTY;
IV
WHETHER OR NOT THE DISQUALIFICATION OF A CONVICTED
SPOUSE OF ADULTERY FROM SHARING IN A CONJUGAL
PROPERTY, CONSTITUTES CIVIL INTERDICTION.5
The petitioner argues that the Compromise Agreement
should not have been given judicial imprimatur since it is
against law and public policy; that the proceedings where it
was approved is null and void, there being no appearance
and participation of the Solicitor General or the Provincial
Prosecutor; that it was timely repudiated; and that the
respondent, having been convicted of adultery, is therefore
disqualified from sharing in the conjugal property.
The Petition must fail.
June 9, 1969
VITUG, J.:p
The petition for new bewails, purely on the question of law,
an alleged error committed by the Regional Trial Court in
Civil Case No. Q-92-12539. Petitioner avers that the court a
quo has failed to apply the correct law that should govern
the disposition of a family dwelling in a situation where a
marriage is declared void ab initio because of psychological
incapacity on the part of either or both parties in the
contract.
The pertinent facts giving rise to this incident are, by large,
not in dispute.
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married on 05
January 1971. Begotten during the marriage were five
children. In a petition, dated 22 June 1992, Valdez sought
the declaration of nullity of the marriage pursuant to Article
36 of the Family code (docketed Civil Case No. Q-92-12539,
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 102). After the
hearing the parties following the joinder of issues, the trial
court, 1 in its decision of 29 July 1994, granted the
petition, viz:
A.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMIT[TED] A
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN APPLYING RETROACTIVELY THE
1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE IN THE PRESENT CASE
AND HOLDING THE FIRST ASSIGNED ERROR THEREIN
MOOT AND ACADEMIC THUS, FAILED TO RULE ON THE
PROPRIETY OF THE TRIAL COURTS REFUSAL TO SET ASIDE
THE ORDER OF DEFAULT DUE TO MISTAKE AND/OR
EXCUSABLE NEGLIGENCE COMMITTED BY PETITIONER.
B.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMIT[TED] A
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RELYING ON THE FACTUAL
FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT WHICH RECEIVED THE
EVIDENCE OF HEREIN RESPONDENT ONLY EX PARTE. 19
The issues for resolution are: (1) whether or not the trial
court erred in allowing private respondent to present
evidence ex parte; and (2) whether or not the trial courts
decision is supported by evidence.
Under Section 6, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, the failure of the defendant to file a pre-trial brief
shall have the same effect as failure to appear at the pretrial, i.e., the plaintiff may present his evidence ex parteand
the court shall render judgment on the basis thereof. 20 The
remedy of the defendant is to file a motion for
reconsideration21 showing that his failure to file a pre-trial
brief was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
neglect.22 The motion need not really stress the fact that the
defendant has a valid and meritorious defense because his
answer which contains his defenses is already on record. 23
In the case at bar, petitioner insists that his failure to file a
pre-trial brief is justified because he was not represented by
counsel. This justification is not, however, sufficient to set
aside the order directing private respondent to present
evidence ex parte, inasmuch as the petitioner chose at his
own risk not to be represented by counsel. Even without the
assistance of a lawyer, petitioner was able to file a motion
for extension to file answer,24 the required answer stating
therein the special and affirmative defenses,25 and several
other motions.26 If it were true that petitioner did not
understand the import of the April 23, 1997 order directing
him to file a pre-trial brief, he could have inquired from the
court or filed a motion for extension of time to file the brief.
Instead, he waited until May 26, 1997, or 14 days from his
alleged receipt of the April 23, 1997 order before he filed a
motion asking the court to excuse his failure to file a brief.
Pre-trial rules are not to be belittled or dismissed because
their non-observance may result in prejudice to a partys
substantive rights. Like all rules, they should be followed
except only for the most persuasive of reasons when they
may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not
commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not
complying with the procedure prescribed.27
In the instant case, the fact that petitioner was not assisted
by a lawyer is not a persuasive reason to relax the
application of the rules. There is nothing in the Constitution
which mandates that a party in a non-criminal proceeding be
represented by counsel and that the absence of such
representation amounts to a denial of due process. The
assistance of lawyers, while desirable, is not indispensable.
The legal profession is not engrafted in the due process
clause such that without the participation of its members the
safeguard is deemed ignored or violated.28
However, the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the
effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, specifically,
Section 6, Rule 18 thereof, rendered moot and academic the
issue of whether or not the plaintiff may be allowed to
present evidence ex parte for failure of the defendant to file
a pre-trial brief. While the rules may indeed be applied
retroactively, the same is not called for in the case at bar.
Even before the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure took effect on
July 1, 1997, the filing of a pre-trial brief was required under
Circular No. 1-89 which became effective on February 1,
1989. Pursuant to the said circular, "[f]ailure to file pre-trial
briefs may be given the same effect as the failure to appear
at the pre-trial," that is, the party may be declared nonsuited or considered as in default.29
petitioner. Hence, their share therein is equivalent to onehalf, i.e., P55,687.50 each.
February 6, 2007
February 6, 2007
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 18
October 2006 Decision2 and the 12 March 2007 Order3of the
Regional Trial Court of Las Pias City, Branch 254 (trial court)
in Civil Case No. LP-01-0149.
The Antecedent Facts
Alain M. Dio (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L. Dio
(respondent) were childhood friends and sweethearts. They
started living together in 1984 until they decided to separate
in 1994. In 1996, petitioner and respondent decided to live
together again. On 14 January 1998, they were married
before Mayor Vergel Aguilar of Las Pias City.