The Recurring Refugee Crisis

Ziauddin Choudhury
The Rohingya refugee crisis is looming again in our eastern borders. If the walls break again this will be probably the third time
in last four decades that we will be faced with a crisis that has a history of repeating itself.
I happened to be at the receiving end during the first crisis that occurred in the summer of 1978 as Deputy Commissioner of
Chittagong. In the beginning it was only a group of families that had crossed the border near Ukhiya just across Naf River in then
Coxs Bazar subdivision. The border guards tried to push them back, but they would not budge. They complained of horrendous
torture on their families by Burmese (now Myanmar) Military. But they were not let in. So they stayed on the other side. Soon the
number grew; more and more people converged on the borders with belongings that ranged from clothes and utensils to housing
materials that were apparently taken down from existing homes.
It is at that point that the border guards got alarmed and sought help of the civil administration to cope with what seemed to be a
tide of humans seeking to cross the border. The traveling would be migrants had settled in makeshift huts across the narrow river
on the Burmese side as they were still not allowed inside Bangladesh.
When I reached the borders after getting frantic calls from the SDO I found already a few thousand people had camped out on the
border. They looked very desperate both in appearance and state of mind. There were men, women, and children of all ages in
tattered clothes squatting on paddy lands, some of them had set up beds of straws under a hastily made roof of tree leaves and
bamboos. Some were cooking rice in tin cans and pots over fire made with twigs for the hungry children. Already local people on
Bangladesh side were offering food and shelter materials to the groups, some of whom had managed to sneak to Bangladesh land
since it was impossible for the border guards to push a rising wave of people physically without using force.
To push the migrants back to Burma was difficult as there were already more than a few thousand who had assembled in that
location. The Divisional Commissioner, the GOC of the Army, and Police Chief of the Division were all there along with me. A
decision had to be made on the spot so that the Border Force (Bangladesh Rifles) could officially allow the refugees on purely
humanitarian grounds to enter Bangladesh territory for the time being. It was decided that the refugees would set up camps within
a mile of the border under police watch. Local administration would provide whatever relief could be arranged from local
resources.
In reaching that momentous decision in the field we were unaware what would entail. Although the Home Ministry concurred
with the recommendations made locally, it was unknown to us how many more people would enter after the flood gate was
opened in Coxs Bazar. Initially, relief was provided by the government and our assumption was that the shelter for a few
thousand would be temporary. But our assumption was proved wrong when waves of refugees continued unabated.
In a few weeks over two hundred thousand of uprooted people had entered Bangladesh. We started with two, but ended up with
thirteen camps spread all along Chittagong-Burma border, twelve in Coxs Bazar subdivision, and one in Bandarban of
Chittagong Hill Tracts. It was a monumental effort to house, feed, and keep a watch over two hundred thousand of homeless
people from the neighboring country.
As the number of refugees increased it became apparent that without international help this massive human calamity could not be
contained by a fledgling government. Initially, help came from UNHCR, International Red Cross, OIC, and some international
NGOs. These agencies were later joined by bilateral assistance from several European countries as well as Saudi Arabia.
As foreign help started to arrive and refugees started to receive generous relief in the shape of food, medicine, clothing, and
shelter materials, and the number of inflow from across the border also increased. Ironically, the new refugees did not show much
sign of torture or suffering as the first arrivals had shown. I do not want to sound unresponsive to human desire for better living
conditions, but the more comfortable the refugees became in their new shelters more publicity it received among the compatriots
they had left behind. This told us that the influx of refugees would not stop unless we take measures to repatriate them as soon as
possible.
The strategy we recommended to our Government in dealing with the crisis was twofold: not to internationalize the issue so as
not to displease the Burmese government, and to engage with the Burmese authorities in a bilateral discussion to repatriate the

refugees. Meanwhile we also requested the government to ask foreign agencies providing relief to work through the local
administration.
Fortunately, the government of the period and the Home Minister that time (Mustafizur Rahman) adhered to these
recommendations. Over next six months we had two successful meetings with Burmese authorities, one in Dhaka and the other in
Arakan state where the Burmese Officials discussed the refugees problem with an open mind, and later agreed on their return to
Arakan state where they belonged. In fact, before these official meetings and decisions I escorted a team of Burmese senior
officials (including Burmese Home Minister, Director General of Immigration, and senior Foreign Ministry Officials) to several
refugee camps in Coxs Bazar where they saw the refugees and the shelters they were living in.
The first repatriation began in the summer of 1979 (in less than a year of the arrival of the first group), and it ended in about four
months. I myself escorted the first batch of approximately forty repatriates of as a token across the Gundum outpost in Coxs
Bazar. Then the flood would begin. We closed all thirteen camps by the end of 1979.
In retrospect, I believe several facts were responsible for this successful repatriation, key among which were resisting the urge to
internationalize the issue, keeping the issue bilateral, engaging with the Burmese government from the beginning of the crisis,
and treating the Rohingya refugees humanly but firmly. Insistence on keeping the refugees within defined perimeters along the
border under strict watch on their movement also helped; as did asking the international organizations to work through local
administration.
The lessons learnt in the first Rohingya refugee crisis nearly four decades ago may not bring equal results now for the world is a
very different place. Migrants and refugees are now a common feature of international news. The relatively unknown Rohingyas
of the seventies are a globally recognized oppressed group and therefore what is happening to them in Myanmar now is also
global news. What is unique for them as well as Bangladesh is Bangladesh is the only place they turn to when they face adversity.
This is partly because as Muslims they think of the nearest Muslim neighbor, but also because of historical reasons Bangladesh is
close to them.
In dealing with another impending crisis Bangladesh will probably not be able to deflect a possible influx without using force,
but what it can do is to engage early with Myanmar in resolving the crisis. Myanmar has a leader who is more receptive to
international concerns than her predecessors. Bangladesh needs to initiate discussion on an urgent level before it becomes a crisis.
In the interim, Bangladesh can offer to help Myanmar build temporary safe havens for the Rohingyas who are converging on
Bangladesh border with international help (UNHCR, ICRC) in the border area but inside Myanmar. There is nothing that
discussions cannot solve between two countries. Let us hope we can avert another crisis.