Persons Case Digests Part Two

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS CASE DIGESTS
Atty. Legarda/Atty. Ayo

DLSU College of Law Batch 5, OG05
PANA v. HEIRS OF JUANITE, SR.
AUTHOR: Villaseor, Pamela
[G.R. No. 164201. December 10, 2012.]
NOTES:
TOPIC: Requisites of validity of marriage settlements
Prior to marriage
PONENTE: Abad, J.
FACTS:
The prosecution accused petitioner Efren Pana (Efren), his wife Melecia, and others of murder before the RTC of Surigao City.
RTC rendered a consolidated decision2
RTC acquitted Efren of the charge for insufficiency of evidence but finding Melecia and another person guilty as charged
and sentenced them to the penalty of death. The RTC ordered those found guilty to pay each of the heirs of the victims.
Upon motion for execution by the heirs of the deceased, the RTC ordered the issuance of the writ resulting in the levy of real
properties registered in the names of Efren and Melencia. Subsequently, a notice of levy and a notice of sale on execution
were issued.
Efren and his wife Melecia filed a motion to quash the writ of execution claiming that the properties levied were conjugal
assets and not paraphernal of Melecia. RTC denied the motion.
The spouses moved for reconsideration but the RTC denied the same. In this case, it is submitted that Efren and Melencia were
married when the Civil Code was still in effect. They did not execute a pre-nuptial agreement, hence CPG governed their
property relations.
However, both RTC and CA held that property regime changed into ACP when family code took effect it reason out that Art.
256 of the Family Code provides that the Code shall have retroactive effect in so far as it does not prejudice or impair vested
or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
ISSUE(S): Can the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Melencia can be levied and executed upon for the satisfaction of
Melencias civil liability in the aforesaid murder case?
HELD: YES, provided that the conditions under Art. 121 of the Family Code have been covered.
RATIO:
Efren and Melecias property relation was admittedly conjugal under the Civil Code but, since the transitory provision of the
Family Code gave its provisions retroactive effect if no vested or acquired rights are impaired, that property relation between
the couple was changed when the Family Code took effect in 1988. The latter code now prescribes in Article 75 absolute
community of property for all marriages unless the parties entered into a prenuptial agreement.
Both the RTC and the Court of the Appeals are in error on this point. While it is true that the personal stakes of each spouses in
their conjugal assets are unclear prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership of gains and therefore none of them can
be said to have acquired vested rights in specific assets , it is evident that Article 256 of the Family Code does not intend to
read back and automatically convert into absolute community of property relations all conjugal partnership of gains that
existed before 1988 excepting only those with prenuptial agreements.
Therefore, the conjugal partnership of gains that governed the marriage between Efren and Melecia who were married prior to
1988 cannot be modified except before the celebration of that marriage.
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Magsino Padrones Parian Ocampo Rayos Del Sol Villaseor
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Art. 121 allows payment of the criminal indemnities imposed on his wife, Melecia, out of the partnership assets even before
these are liquidated.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Art. 121. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
(1) The support of the spouse, their common children, and the legitimate children of either spouse; however, the support of
illegitimate children shall be governed by the provisions of this Code on Support;
(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated administrator-spouse for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership of gains, or by both spouses or by one of them with the consent of the other;
(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have
benefited;
(4) All taxes, liens, charges, and expenses, including major or minor repairs upon the conjugal partnership property;
(5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during the marriage upon the separate property of either spouse;
(6) Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or complete a professional, vocational, or other activity for self-improvement;
(7) Antenuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have redounded to the benefit of the family;
(8) The value of what is donated or promised by both spouses in favor of their common legitimate children for the exclusive purpose
of commencing or completing a professional or vocational course or other activity for self-improvement; and
(9) Expenses of litigation between the spouses unless the suit is found to be groundless.
If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance
with their separate properties.
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
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Solis v. Barosso
AUTHOR: Ocampo, Miguel
No. 27939. October 30, 1928
TOPIC: Donations propter nuptias, FC82
PONENTE: Avacena, C.J.
FACTS:
Respondent Maria Barosso and her husband Juan Lambino had 3 children, namely: Alejo, Eugenia and Marciana.
On June 2, 1919, the spouses made a donation propter nuptias in favor of their son Alejo, and petitioner Fortunata Solis, the
future wife of Alejo, evidenced by a private document. Also, this was subject to a condition wherein in case of the death of
one of the donees (Alejo or Fortunata), 1/2 of these lands thus donated would revert to the donor-sps. while the surviving
donee would retain the other half.
So on June 8, 1919, they got married and the donor-sps. immediately delivered such lands.
However, on Aug. 3, 1919, Alejo died and later on, Juan also died w/c prompted Maria to recover the donated lands.
So this gave rise to this petition filed by Fortunata wherein she demanded Maria to deliver to her such donated lands.
CFI ruled in favor of Fortunata pursuant to NCC1279 (requirement on special form of contract).
ISSUE:
WON the donation propter nuptias is valid. NO.
HELD:
First of all, the donation is void and did not create any right, since it was not made in a public instrument.
SC says CC1279 is inapplicable because CC1328 provides that donations are governed by Title 2 of Book 3 of the Civil Code
(CC618-633; now NCC 725-773), to wit:
a. CC633 (NCC 749) immovable properties must be in a public instrument;
b. CC622 (NCC 733) - Exceptions to CC633 are onerous and remuneratory donations, in so far as they do not exceed the
value of the charge imposed, which are then governed by the rules on contracts; and
c. CC620 (NCC 728) - Those which are to take effect upon the donor's death, which are governed by the rules established
for testamentary successions (Donations mortis causa.)
The CFI argues that the donation by reason of marriage is in itself onerous, and pursuant to CC622, it must be governed by the
rules on contracts.
But the SC counter-argues:
a. That a donation propter nuptias, the marriage is really a consideration, but not in the sense of being necessary to give birth
to the obligation;
b. That onerous donations are to compensate services which constitute debts recoverable from the donor, or which impose
a charge equal to the amount of the donation upon the done.
In short, the donor had debts to compensate for it, thus, donates to the donee and does not need to be in a public instrument
pursuant to CC622;
c. That the argument of the CFI about it being onerous is not applicable to the donation in this case because it was only
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made in consideration of marriage;
d. Because if it would be applicable, even if the marriage does not happen, the donation propter nuptias would still be valid
because of the debt of the donor.
Hence, it must be viewed rather as a resolutory condition which presupposes the existence of the obligation which may be
resolved or revoked (As it depends if the marriage will happen or not), and it is not a condition necessary for the birth of the
obligation.
In light of all of the arguments presented, had it been made in a public document, this case would have told a different story.
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HEIRS of VELASQUEZ v CA, HEIRS of De GUZMAN
[G.R. No. 126996. February 15, 2000]
TOPIC: donation propter nuptias
PONENTE: Gonzaga-Reyes, J.
AUTHOR: PARIAN
NOTES: (if applicable)
FACTS: (chronological order)

1945 and 1947, respectively: Conrado Aquino and Leonicia de Guzman died childless and intestate. Leonicia was
survived by her sisters: De Guzman and Tranquilina (mother of Velasquez).
1944: Leonicia allegedly had a conference with Tranquilina, Velasquez, De Guzman and her heirs; dividing Leonicia
and Conrados 6 conjugal properties equally between Tranquilina and De Guzman.
1989: Heirs of De Guzman filed a complaint for annulment and partition against the Heirs of Velasquez for the latters
refusal to partition the conjugal properties of the Aquinos.
Heirs of Velasquez defended that they have acquired ownership of the properties prior to the death of the spouses,
presenting notarized deeds of: 2 properties as donation propter nuptias to Velasquez and to then future-wife Camila in
1919; 1 (b) property sold to Velasquez; (c) 1 property as donation intervivos to the Heirs of Velasquez. The rest of the
properties owned by third parties.
RTC solely relied on the testimony that the conference took place and that the conjugal properties were partitioned
equally between De Guzman and Tranquilina.
RTC declared the deeds of the properties null and void as far as of ownership is concerned since the Heirs of De
Guzman are the legitimate owners of half of it.
CA affirmed RTCs decision.
ISSUE(S): WON the donations (propter nuptias and intervivos) and the sale of the properties to Velasquez and his heirs are valid.
HELD:
Yes. Petition granted. CA decision reversed.
RATIO:
The lower courts committed an error for solely relying on the testimony of the Heirs of De Guzman when it was not
corroborated with evidence and other testimonies.
It also erred in not giving merit on the notarized ancient deeds of conveyance presented by the Heirs of Velasquez. Since
the deeds are notarized, it is presumed to be valid. The deeds also presume that Velasquez and his heirs are the owners of
their respective properties. The Heirs of De Guzman failed to disprove the validity of the deeds.
The alleged reason by the Heirs of De Guzman for the revocation of the donation that the spouses did not intend to give
away all their properties is untenable as it is not one of the grounds for revocation of donation either inter vivos or propter
nuptias, although the donation might be inofficious.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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The deed of donation propter nuptias can be revoked by the non-performance of the marriage and other grounds provided in FC
Art. 86.
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Abobon v. Abobon
[August 15, 2012]
TOPIC: Donations propter nuptias
PONENTE: Bersamin, J.
AUTHOR: RAYOS DEL SOL, Angelo S.

FACTS:
Respondents Felicitas and Gelima Abobon sued their first cousin, petitioner Numeriano Abobon, to recover possession of a
certain piece of land, stating that they only allowed Numeriano to use the land out of benevolence.
Numeriano argued that the land was actually his because his grandfather, Emilio, the original owner of the land, granted
ownership to his father, Rafael, via donation propter nuptias when Emilio married Rafaels mother, Apolonia. He then inherited
it from Rafael.
The MCTC found that respondents parents, Leodegario (Abobon) and Macaria, bought the land from Emilio, sold it to a Juan
Mamaril, then bought it back from Mamaril. When Leodegario died, respondents inherited the land and even registered it in
their own names. After the 1989 palay harvest, they allowed Numeriano to use it, out of benevolence, then years later
demanded it back.
In addition, the MCTC found that the 3,000 sq. m. land that Numeriano claimed was donated to his parents was not the same
as the land in question because it had different boundaries; because Emilio did not register the donated land under the
Spanish Mortgage Law, but the land in question was registered;
Even if the 3,000 sq. m. land was inside the land in question, the donation propter nuptias was invalid because Rafael did not
sign and accept it in writing; and the donation would have been canceled because Numerianos mother signed as
instrumental witness and Rafael consented to the sale of the land from Emilio to Leodegario. This consent to the sale by
Numerianos parents signified that either they accepted the dissolution of the donation propter nuptias, or the land sold to
Leodegario (a.k.a. the land in question in this case) was different from the land donated to them.
Numeriano was ordered to vacate the land and to pay moral and exemplary damages, and attorneys fees. The RTC and CA
affirmed the MCTCs decision.
ISSUE(S):
WON Numeriano is the owner of the land in question.
HELD: No, he is not. Petition DENIED, but decision MODIFIED to exclude payment of damages and fees.
RATIO:
Whoever holds the Torrens title (TCT) to a land, as respondents do, owns the land. The Torrens title is the indefeasible and best
proof of ownership over the land covered by it, and may only be countered if it was acquired by fraud or with bad faith.
Numerianos argument against the TCT is invalid because it is only a collateral, defensive allegation an action against a TCT
must be direct.
The allegation of a donation propter nuptias lacks factual support because it is a different land (the one in question is 4,668 sq.
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m.).
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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VALENCIA v. LOCQUIAO
[G.R. No. 122134. October 3, 2003]
NOTES:
TOPIC: Form of donations
PONENTE: Tinga, J.
FACTS:
This is a consolidated case involving an action for annulment of title and an action for ejectment.
Both cases involve a parcel of land consisting of 4,876 square meters situated in Urdaneta, Pangasinan. This land was originally
owned by the spouses Herminigildo and Raymunda Locquiao evidenced by a certificate of title.
Herminigildo and Raymunda executed a deed of donation propter nuptias which was written in the Ilocano dialect
(Inventario Ti Sagut) for of Benito Locquiao (Respondent) and his bride, Tomasa Mara (Respondent). By the terms of the deed,
the donees were gifted parcels of land which includes the land in question.
Herminigildo and Raymunda died leaving 6 heirs (respondent Benito, Marciano, Lucio, Emeteria, Anastacia, and petitioner
Romana, all surnamed Locquiao).
With the permission of respondents Benito and Tomasa, Romana Valencia (Petitioner) took possession and cultivated the
subject land. Her daughter Constancia Valencia (Petitioner) took over and has been in possession of the land since then.
The heirs of the Locquiao spouses, including respondent Benito and petitioner Romana, executed a Deed of Partition with
Recognition of Rights, wherein they distributed among only three (3) of them, the twelve (12) parcels of land, excluding the
land in question and other lots disposed of by the Locquiao spouses earlier. The deed contains a statement that Benito and
Marciano, along with the heirs of Lucio have already received their shares.
The heirs executed a Deed of Compromise Agreement which provided for the re-distribution of the two (2) lots. Benito signed
the compromise agreement.
Constancia filed an annulment of title before RTC of Pangasinan. Her petition was dismissed. It was appealed in RTC of
Pangasinan and is still pending.
Then, Benito filed before MTC of Urdaneta, Pangasinan a complaint seeking the ejectment of petitioner Constancia from the
subject property. His petition was granted.
Romana and Constancia countered with a Complaint for the annulment of Transfer Certificate of the two parcel of land in
question against Benito and Tomasa which they filed with the RTC of Pangasinan. Romana and Constancia alleged: (1) that
the issuance of the transfer certificate of title was fraudulent; (2) that the Inventario Ti Sagut is spurious; (3) that the notary
public who notarized the document had no authority to do so, and; (4) that the donation did not observe the form required
by law as there was no written acceptance on the document itself or in a separate public instrument. RTC dismissed the
complaint on the grounds of prescription and laches and held that the Inventario Ti Sagut is a public document which
transmitted ownership to Benito and Tomasa. CA affirmed.
ISSUE(S): Is the donation valid?
HELD: Yes. Decision is affirmed.
RATIO:
The donation was evidenced by the Inventario Ti Sagut which was notarized and was presented in the Register of deeds of
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Pangasinan for registration.
Also, it was evidenced by the Compromise Agreement that Benito and Tomasa does not question the Deed of Partition as
they have already received what is rightfully theirs.
Also, they do not need to present their acceptance of the donation in a public document, the mere fact that they married
each other signifies their acceptance.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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Doronio v Heirs
TOPIC: Forms of Donations (FC 38, NCC 748-749
PONENTE: REYES, J.
AUTHOR: Magsino, Patricia Marie C.

Note:

Petition for review on certiorari of a CA decision, reversing an RTC decision granting petitioners ownership to disputed parcel
of land
Petitioners are the heirs of Marcelino Doronio, and the respondents are the heirs of Fortunato Doronio (M and F are kids of
Simeon and Cornelia)
Spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante (both dead) are the registered owners of a parcel of land in Pangasinan
Apr. 24, 1919 Simeon and Cornelia executed a private deed of donation propter nuptias to Marcelino and wife Veronica
The properties were described as; a piece of residential land located in the barrio.. we did not measure it, the area is
bounded.. on the east by Fortunato Doronio..
From the description, there is a significant discrepancy as to the identity of the owner of the adjacent property on the eastern
side
Deed of donation remained to be a private document as it was never notarized
Both parties have been occupying the land for several decades now, petitioners claim that they own the entirety of the
property in view of the donation propter nuptias, respondents on the other hand claim that only half of the property was
donated
Petitioners filed for the registration of the land before the RTC, and this was granted, the deed of donation was then cancelled
and in place was a new transfer certificate of title in the name of Marcelino and Veronica
The respondents filed for a motion for reconsideration which was subsequently denied
RTC held that the deed of donation propter nuptias gave Marcelino and Veronica the ownership to the land, and that
respondents heirs were not entitled to any damages because they are not the rightful owners
Respondents appealed before the CA, the appellate court then reversed the decision of the RTC and declared the
respondents as the proper ownersciting the description in the deed of donation and that only half was donated to
Marcelino and Veronica
Petitioners then filed the instant case (petition for review on certiorari)
ISSUE(S):
WON donation propter nuptias to spouses Marcelino Doronio and Veronica Pico (parents of petitioners) is valid
HELD:
NO. Donation propter nuptias is not valid.
NULL and VOID
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RATIO:
Since the deed of donation was executed in 1919, the governing law would be the Old Civil Code. Under the Old Civil Code,
donations propter nuptias must be made in a public instrument in which the property donated must be specifically described. If it is
not made in a public instrument, the same would be void.
The donation propter nuptias executed did not become valid, and it did not create any right because it was never made into a
public instrument. It would follow then that the cancellation of the ownership (of Simeon and Cornelia) and the subsequent transfer of
title would have no legal basis whatsoever.
Court did not specifically settle who among petitioners and respondents own the land.
Appealed decision of CA is REVERSED and SET ASIDE!
Private deed of donation propter nuptias is NULL and VOID!
Transfer Certificate of Title is CANCELLED!
Ownership by Simeon and Cornrelia is RESTORED!
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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Mateo v. Lagua
No. L-26270. October 30, 1969
TOPIC: What may be donated by a spouse as
donor: (a) present property, FC84(1), NCC720
and 1070, (b) future property, FC84(2), NCC
761
PONENTE: Reyes, J.B.L., J.
FACTS:
Cipriano Lagua owned 3 parcels of land. And sometime in 1917, he and his wife, in a public instrument, donated 2 parcels
(11k+ sqm) to their son, Alenjandro, in consideration of his marriage to petitioner Bonifacia Mateo.
The marriage happened on May 15, 1917 and the newly wed took possession of it BUT the certificates still remained in the
Ciprianos name.
Unfortunately, on 1923, Alejandro died and subsequently, on 1926, Cipriano refused to deliver Bonifacias share on the parcel s
of land. Thus, prompting Bonifacia to file a petition of delivery of possession and it was granted by the CFI.
Despite the judgment, on July 31, 1941, Cipriano made a deed of sale of the 2 parcels of land in favor of his younger son,
respondent Gervasio.
It was only on Sept. 22, 1955 that Bonifacia knew about the sale when the titles were registered in Gervasios name. And so,
she filed another petition but to annul the 2 deeds of sale and it was also granted. This decision attained finality, thus,
Bonifacia recovered possession.
Gervasio and his father Cipriano filed a petition to annul the 1917 donation alleging the prejudice it would bring on Gervasios
legitime.
While the case was still pending, Cipriano died on Nov. 12, 1958.
And the CFI still ruled in favor of Bonifacia for the action of Gervasio to annul the donation had prescribed and that Gervasio
was a possessor in bad faith.
Gervasio appealed to the CA and it ruled in his favor, stating that the donation was inofficious and Bonifacia is to deliver to
him a portion of the 2 donated lands because it is prejudicial to Gervasios legitime (494.5 sqm. to be exact).
Bonifacia now appeals to the SC.
ISSUE:
WON the CA erred in reducing the donation for being inofficious. YES.
HELD:
SC states that the CA acted on unsupported assumptions because:
a. The deceased Cipriano left no unpaid debts, charges, taxes, etc., for which the estate would be answerable;
b. In the computation of the heirs' legitime, the CA also considered only the area, not the value, of the properties.
NCC908 was mention To determine the legitime, the value of the property left at the death of the testator shall be
considered, deducting all debts, and charges, which shall not include those Imposed in the will. To the net value of the
'hereditary estate, shall be added the value of all donations by the testator that are subject to collation, at' the time he made
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them.
Before any conclusion about the legal share due to Gervasio, the compulsory heir, may be reached, it is necessary that
certain steps be taken first. And in order to determine that the donation may be reduced for being inofficious, there must be
proof that the value of the donated property exceeded the prescribed amount.
From the CAs ruling, it can hardly be said that there was evidence to begin with.
Hence, CA decision set aside, CFI ruling about annulling the 2 deeds of sale affirmed w/o prejudice to the case on the
donations inofficiousness w/c must be given a proper proceeding.
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CHING v GOYANKO, JR.
[G.R. No. 165879. November 10, 2006]
TOPIC: Void donation by the spouses during
marriage
PONENTE: CARPIO-MORALES, J.
AUTHOR: PARIAN

Goyanko, Sr. married Epifania. Goyanko, Jr. and the rest of the respondents were born out of this union.
1961: Goyanko siblings allege that their parents acquired a property in Cebu City. But since their parents were Chinese
citizens at that time, the property was registered in the name of their aunt, Sulpicia.
1993: Sulpicia executed a deed of sale of the property in favor of Goyanko, Sr. In turn, Goyanko, Sr. executed a dded
of sale in favor of his common-law wife, Ching.
1996: After Goyanko, Sr.s death, the Goyanko siblings discovered that Ching has already been the registered owner
of the property. They verified the signature of their father in the deed of sale and PNP Crime Lab found it to be a
forgery.
Goyanko siblings then filed for a complaint for recovery of property; praying for the nullification of the deed of sale.
In defense, Ching claimed that she provided the purchase price for the sale and she presented the notary public who
testified that Goyanko, Sr. signed the deed of sale in his presence.
RTC dismissed the case. CA reversed the decision and declared the sale null and void for being contrary to morals and
public policy which prohibits spouses from selling properties to each other.
ISSUE(S): WON the deed of sale is null and void
HELD: Yes. Petition dismissed. SC affirmed CA.
RATIO:
The deed of sale violates NCC Art. 1409: contracts whose cause, object, or purposes is contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order, or public policy are void and inexistent from the very beginning;
NCC Art 1352: Contracts without cause, or with unlawful cause, produce no effect whatsoever. The cause is unlawful if it is
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy;
And NCC Art. 1490: The husband and wife cannot sell property to each other, xxx.
It was designed to prevent the exercise of undue influence by one spouse over the other, as well as to protect the institution
of marriage.
Art 1490 also applies to common-law spouses, otherwise, the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be
better than those in legal union.
In general, transfers or conveyances (in a form of sale or donation) is prohibited between spouses.
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CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
The proscription against transfers or conveyances between spouses applies even to common law relationships.
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Arcaba v. Vda. De Batocael
[November 22, 2001]
TOPIC: Void donations in common law marriages
PONENTE: Mendoza, J.
AUTHOR: RAYOS DEL SOL, Angelo S.

FACTS:
Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima owned a lot in Dipolog City, Zamboanga del Norte. When Zosima died, her mother
waived her right to the land, so Francisco owned the whole thing. Without any children, Francisco asked his niece Leticia
Bellosillo, her cousin Luzviminda Paghacian, and petitioner Cirila Arcaba, a widow, to take care of his house and the store
inside.
Leticia alleged that Cirila and Francisco were lovers because they slept in the same bedroom; while another niece, Erlinda
Tabancura, said that Francisco told her that Cirila was his mistress.
Cirila, however, claimed that she was only a helper because Francisco was old and she would only enter his room when he
called, and that they never had sexual intercourse (that escalated quickly). When Leticia and Luzviminda got married (not to
each other), only Cirila was left to care for Francisco. She was a 34-year old widow, and he was a 75-year old widower when
she began working for him.
Erlinda claimed, however, that Franciscos only source of income was rentals from his lot, and that Francisco did not pay Cirila
regular cash wage, but provided her family with food and lodging.
A few months before dying, Francisco executed a deed of donation inter vivos, donating 150 sq. meters of his land (the rest
was still in his name), and his house to Cirila, who accepted it in the same instrument. The deed stated that the consideration
was for Cirilas faithful services over the past 10 years.
After Francisco died, the respondents (Erlinda The Gossiper Tabancura among them) filed a complaint against Cirila for
declaration of nullity of a deed of donation inter vivos, among other things, under Art. 87 of the FC.
The trial court ruled in respondents favor based on Erlinda Tabancuras testimony, and certain documents signed Cirila
Comille. The CA upheld the decision based on errbodys testimony; on the fact that Cirila used Franciscos surname when
signing documents; a pleading in another civil case mentioning payment of rentals to Cirila, Franciscos common-law wife;
and the fact that Cirila did not have a regular salary.
ISSUE(S):
WON the CA correctly applied Art. 87 of the FC to this case.
HELD: Yes it did. Petition DENIED.
RATIO:
Blah blah blah Some stuff about Rule 45 yadda yadda
Because the CA affirmed the facts and did not abuse discretion, etc. the general rule that their factual findings will not be
questioned, is upheld.
Cohabitation, or living together as husband and wife, means more than sexual intercourse, esp. when one party may be old
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and uninterested in sex. It is the public assumption by a man and a woman of the marital relation, and dwelling together as
husband and wife. Meeting up every night to F is not the same.
It is difficult to believe that Cirila only stayed with Francisco out of being nice, given she wasnt being paid. It is also difficult to
believe that they didnt F because Cirila gave Francisco therapeutic massages and slept in the same room.
Preponderance of evidence says that they are husband and wife without a valid marriage, and because of this, Art. 87
applies and voids the donation inter vivos.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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MATEO v. LAGUA
[29 SCRA 864. October 30, 1969.]
NOTES:
TOPIC: Revocation of donations propter nuptias
FACTS:
Cipriano Lagua and his wife Alejandra Dumlao, as evidenced in a public instrument, donated the land in question to their son
Alejandro Dumlao by reason of his marriage to Bonifacia Mateo. They got married and took possession of the land but the title
remained in the donors name.
Alejandro died leaving his wife Bonifacia and an infant child. They then lived with their father-in-law, Cipriano, who farmed the
land in question. Cipriano then refused to give Bonifacia her share of the harvest of the land in question.
Bonifacia then gained possession of the land in question through the Justice of Peace of Asingan, Pangasinan.
Cipriano Lagua executed a deed of sale of the land in question to his younger son, Gervasio but Bonifacia was continuously
still given the owner's share of the harvest until 1956. When they stopped giving her a share of the harvest, it was only then that
Bonifacia learned of the sale of the lots to her brother-in-law.
Bonifacia sought the annulment of the deed of sale before CFI Pangasinan. Her petition was granted.
Cipriano and Gervasio filed before CFI Pangasinan for annulment of donation of the land in question. It was their claim that in
donating the land in question, Cipriano not only neglected leaving something for his own support but also prejudiced the
legitime of his forced heir, Gervasio. Their petition was denied.
CA affirmed the ruling. However, they said that the land in question exceeded the supposed legitime of Alejandro and should
be disposed for Gervasio. They ordered the reconveyance of part of the land to Gervacio.
ISSUE(S): WON CA acted correctly in ordering the reduction of the donation for being inofficious and reconvey a portion of the land
in question.
HELD: No. RTC ruling affirmed.
RATIO:
The CA acted on several unsupported assumptions: (1) that the land in question were the only properties composing the net
hereditary estate of the deceased Cipriano; (2) that Alejandro and Gervasio were his only legal heirs; (3) that the deceased
left no unpaid debts, charges, taxes, etc., for which the estate would be answerable.
In order that a .donation may be reduced for being inofficious, there must be proof that the value of the donated property
exceeds that of the disposable free portion plus the donee's share as legitime in the properties of the donor.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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Muller v Muller
TOPIC: Presumption of ACP (FC 93, NCC 160)
PONENTE: Ynares-Santiago, J.

Note: Art. 86 is from old CC, refer to FC 45 and FC 46, specifically 46!!

Petition for review on certiorari of a CA decision and resolution affirming an RTC decision which terminated the absolute
community of property between petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut Muller
Sept. 22, 1989 Helmut and Elena were married in Hamburg, Germany, they resided in a house owned by Helmuts parents
but then decided to move and permanently reside in the Philippines in 1992
By this time, Helmut had already inherited the house from his parents which he then sold and used the proceeds to purchase
a parcel of land in Antipolo (Php 528,000.00) and for construction of a house (Php 2,300,000.00), this property was registered in
the name of petitioner Elena
Because of their incompatibility, and Helmuts alleged womanizing, drinking, and maltreatment; the spouses eventually
separated
Sept. 26, 1994 Respondent Helmut filed a petition for separation of properties before the RTC
Aug. 12, 1996 RTC rendered a decision terminating the regime of absolute community of property of the parties and
decreed the separation of the properties and ordered the equal partition of the personal properties in the PHL excluding
those acquired by gratuitous titled during the marriage
As to the Antipolo property, the court held that Helmut cannot recover his funds because the property was purchased in
violation of Sec. 7, Art. XII of the Constitution ..no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals..
qualified to acquire or hold lands..
Respondent Helmut appealed to the CA, which held that Helmut only prayed for reimbursement and ordered Helena to
reimburse the cost of purchase and construction, the court also held that there is nothing in the Constitution prohibiting
Helmut from acquiring the property
Hence, instant petition for review
ISSUE(S):
WON Helmut Muller is entitled to reimbursement of the funds used for the acquisition of the Antipolo property
HELD:
NO.
Helmut Muller is not entitled to reimbursement, because he is an alien and thus disqualified from acquiring land.
RATIO:
Sec. 7, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution provides; Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be
transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
Pursuant to this, aliens are disqualified from acquiring private lands. Helmut was aware of this prohibition and expressly admitted his
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knowledge to the SC. He declared that the Antipolo property was put in the name of Elena specifically because of the prohibition.
The rule on prohibiting Helmut (an alien) from owning lands is in the Philippines is absolute. Helmut cannot seek reimbursement on the
ground of equity where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly bought property despite the constitutional prohibition.
Petition is GRANTED!
CA decision ordering Elena to reimburse is REVERSED and SET ASIDE!
RTC decision terminating the regime of absolute community of property between Helmut and Elena, and ordering the partition of the
personal properties located in the PHL equally is REINSTATED!
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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Abrenica v. Law Firm of Abrenica, Tungol and AUTHOR: Ocampo, Miguel
Tibayan
TAKE NOTE: This topic was only a minor issue
G.R. No. 180572. June 18, 2012
TOPIC: What is excluded from ACP, FC92 &
142
PONENTE: Sereno, J.
FACTS:
This case is a continuation of a case decided by the SC on Sept. 22, 2006. Petitioner Atty. Erlando Abrenica was a partner at
respondent (LFATT). This case arose on 1998 where respondent filed 2 cases w/ Sec. Exchange Comm. (SEC) against Atty.
Erlando for Accounting and Return and Transfer of Partnership Funds, allegedly:
a. Refusing to return partnership funds representing profits (Php4.5M) from a sale of a parcel of land in Lemery, Batangas; and
b. Atty. Erlando received retainer fees (Php320k) from 2 clients of the firm and the balance of the cash advance that he
obtained in 1997.
SEC transferred this case to the RTC of QC and it ruled in favor of LFATT. CA affirmed it. Thus, Atty. Erlando was to give back the
4.5M and 320k he received.
Atty. Erlando filed so many petitions w/ the RTC and CA, I lost track. He also filed a 105-page petition. But those petitions were
all dismissed by the CA.
But pertaining to the topic, he filed a petition alleging that the sheriff had levied properties belonging to his co-petitioner/wife
Joena. And subsequently, Joena filed a 3rd party claim alleging also that personal properties belonging to her and to her
stepchildren were also subject to levy, namely, 2 motor vehicles and a house and lot, w/c were part of the ACP.
ISSUE:
WON the disputed properties mentioned are part of the community property, thus, exempted from being levied. NO.
HELD:
SC notes that Atty. Erlando was 1st married on May 13, 1983 to a certain Ma. Aline Lovejoy Padua and had 3 children. But
after the dissolution of such married, he contracted a subsequent marriage w/ co-petitioner/wife Joena on May 28, 1998.
And in Joenas 3rd party claim, aside from the properties mentioned above, personal properties like a piano w/ a chair,
computer equipment and a computer table were bought in 1992 and 1997.
However, SC states FC92(3) which excludes from the community property the properties acquired before the marriage of a
spouse (Joena) who has legitimate descendants by a former marriage (Lovejoy), and the fruits and the income, if any, of that
property.
Plus, neither these 2 vehicles nor the house and lot belong to the 2nd marriage. Hence, can be levied.
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LUZON SURETY CO., INC. v. DE GARCIA
[30 SCRA 111. October 31, 1969.]
NOTES:
TOPIC: Charges upon ACP
PONENTE: Fernando, J.
FACTS:
Ladislao Chavez, as principal, and Luzon Surety Co., Inc., (Petitioner) executed a surety bond in favor of the Philippine
National Bank to guaranty a crop loan granted by the latter to Ladislao Chavez. Vicente Garcia, together with Chavez and
one Ramon B. Lacson, as guarantors, signed an indemnity agreement wherein they bound themselves, jointly and severally, to
indemnify Luzon Surety Co., Inc.
PNB filed a complaint before CFI Negros Occidental against Chavez and Luzon Surety Co., Inc. and in turn filed a third party
complaint against Lacson and Garcia based on the indemnity agreement. CFI was in favor of PNB and so it also ordered
Lacson and Garcia to pay.
CFI Negros Occidental issued a writ of execution against Vicente Garcia for the satisfaction of the claim Thereafter, a writ of
garnishment was issued by the Provincial Sheriff of Negros levying and garnishing the sugar quedans of Vicente Garcia and
Josefa Aguirre de Garcia (Respondent spouses) from their sugar plantation.
Respondent spouses filed a suit for injunction before the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental against its Provincial
Sheriff to enjoin him from selling the sugar allegedly owned by their conjugal partnership.
Lower court was in favor of the respondent spouses. It was found that the garnishment in question was contrary to Art. 161 of
the Civil Code and granted their petition for injunction. CA affirmed the decision.
ISSUE(S): WON a conjugal partnership, in the absence of any showing of benefits received, could be held liable on an indemnity
agreement executed by the husband to accommodate a third party in favor of a surety company.
HELD: No. Decision affirmed.
RATIO:
It is true that the husband is the administrator of the conjugal property pursuant to the provisions of Art. 163 of the new Civil
Code. However, what is chargeable against the conjugal property are those incurred in the legitimate pursuit of his career,
profession or business with the honest belief that he is doing right for the benefit of the family. This is not true in the case at bar
since the husband, in acting as guarantor or surety for another in an indemnity agreement, did not act for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership. There is no evidence that Vicente being the guarantor would help the conjugal property.
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Gelano v. CA
No. L-39050. February 24, 1981
TOPIC: Charges upon ACP, FC 94
PONENTE: De Castro, J.

NOTE: This was a corp law case. The main issue was because Insular was already
dissolved while the case was pending, hence, could not anymore sue or be sued.
But there was a provision stated that after dissolution, it can still sue or be sued for 3
years and the counsel of Insular did so, to collect the debt.
FACTS:
Respondent Insular Sawmill is a corporation with a corporate life of 50 years (Sept. 17, 1945-Sept. 17, 1995) w/ the purpose of
carrying on a lumber and sawmill business. To carry on this business, it leased the paraphernal property of petitioner-wife
Guillermina Gelano at Paco, Manila for P1.2k/month.
Between Nov. 19, 1947-Dec. 26, 1950 petitioner-husband Carlos Gelano obtained P25,950 as cash advances from Insular on
the agreement that Insular could deduct the same from the monthly rentals of the leased premises until said cash advances
are fully paid.
With that said, Carlos was able to pay the 5k but left a balance of 20k. Guillermina refused to pay the balance because the
amount was for the personal account of Carlos asked for by, and given to him, w/o her knowledge and consent and did not
benefit the family.
Also, from May 4, 1948 to Sept. 11, 1949 petitioner sps. made credit purchases of lumber materials from Insular w/c totaled
P1.1k for the repair and improvement of their residence. Carlos only made 1 installment and left a balance of P946.
On July 14, 1952, in order to accommodate and help the sps. renew previous loans obtained by them from the China Bank,
Insular executed a joint and several promissory note w/ Carlos in favor of said bank in the amount of 8k payable in 60 days.
The total amount is 9.1k w/ interest but Carlos was only able to pay 5k.
And so, Insular filed a collection case on May 29, 1959. But while pending, the corporation shortened its life up to Dec. 31,
1960. (This was the main issue.)
CFI and CA ruled in favor of Insular regarding the collection case making them jointly liable.
ISSUE:
WON petitioner spouses should be jointly and severally liable. NO.
HELD:
When Guillermina alleged that the obligations contracted by Carlos from Nov. 19, 1947-Aug. 18, 1950 (before NCC) and from
Dec. 26, 1950-July 14, 1952 (during NCC) were his personal obligations, hence, petitioner sps. should not be held jointly and
severally liable.
So the SC stated that the CA erred in ruling that they should be held jointly and severally liable. Since it redounded to the
benefit of the family, hence, the conjugal property should be liable for the debt of Carlos. The SC considered the conjugal
property as a single entity.
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G-Tractors, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
[135 SCRA 192, Feb. 28, 1985]
TOPIC: Charges upon ACP
PONENTE: Cuevas, J.
AUTHOR: PARIAN

Luis Narciso (husband; private respondent) has a logging business. He rented bulldozers from G-Tractors for his
operations.
Narciso defaulted on his lease. G-Tractors filed a collection suit and won the case. The lower court levied on a parcel
of land of Narciso which is the conjugal property of Luis and Josefina (wife; co-respondent).
The land was auctioned. G-Tractor was the highest bidder.
Soon after the issuance of certificate of sale. Both parties executed a contract of over the said property where Luis is
the lessee.
After a year of lease, the spouses filed with CFI for declaration of nullity of levy on execution and auction of sale the
said conjugal property with preliminary injunction.
They alleged that the decision on G-Tractors collection suit is binding only on Luis and could not affect or bind Josefa
who was not a part to that suit.
That the conjugal property should not be liable considering the subject matter (the bulldozer) of the said suit was never
used for the benefit of the conjugal partnership or the family.
The petition, preliminary injunction, and the subsequent MR were denied by CFI. The spouses appealed to the CA.
CA annulled the levy on, and the certificate of sale of the disputed property. G-Tractors filed for certiorari.
ISSUE(S): WON the judgment debt of Luis Narciso is a conjugal debt in which the conjugal property should be held liable.
HELD: Yes. CA decision reversed and set-aside.
RATIO:
Luis holds his office right in the conjugal dwelling and his logging concession in Camarines Sur is also a conjugal property.
There is no doubt then that his account with the petitioner was brought about in order to enhance the productivity of said
logging business, a commercial enterprise for gain which he had the right to undertake the conjugal partnership.
The husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership and as long as he believes he is doing right to his family, he
should not be made to suffer and answer alone.
So that, if he incurs an indebtedness in the legitimate pursuit of his career or profession or suffers losses in a legitimate business,
the conjugal partnership must equally bear the indebtedness and the losses, unless he deliberately acted to the prejudice of
his family.
Consequently, the conjugal partnership of gains of private respondents Narcisos, must answer for the same.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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All debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership do not require that actual profit or
benefit must accrue to the conjugal partnership from the husbands transaction, but it suffices that the transaction should be one
that normally would produce such benefit for the partnership.
JBL Reyes in Luzon Surety v De Gracia, as cited in the instant case
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FRANCISCO v. GONZALES
[G.R. No. 177667, 2008]
NOTES:
TOPIC: Family expenses
PONENTE: Austria-Martinez, J.
FACTS:
Cleodia and Ceamantha Francisco (Petitioners) are the minor children of Cleodualdo and Michele Francisco. RTC of Makati
rendered a decision of the Francisco spouses Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and entered a Compromise Agreement
stating that the title and ownership of the property consisting of a house and lot located in Ayala Alabang shall be transferred
by way of a deed of donation to Cleodia and Ceamantha, as co-owners, when they reach 19 and 18 years old, respectively.
The land is registered as TCT No. 167907 is in the name of Cleodualdo M. Francisco, married to Michele U. Francisco.
Meanwhile, a case for Unlawful Detainer with Preliminary Attachment was filed by spouses Gonzales (Respondents) against
Michele Francisco and her partner, George Zoltan Matrai, the MeTC of Muntinlupa City ordering them to vacate the premises
leased to them and to pay the rentals, unpaid telephone bills, and attorneys fees.
A notice of sale by execution was then issued by the sheriff covering the real property of the Francisco spouses.
Petitioners grandmother, as guardian-in-fact of petitioners, filed with the RTC an Affidavit of Third Party Claim and a Very
Urgent Motion to Stop Sale by Execution. This was denied, as well as the motion for reconsideration.
Petitioners filed certiorari in CA. Pending resolution by the CA, the RTC granted respondents petition for the issuance of a new
certificate of title. The RTC granted respondents motion for the issuance of a writ of possession. CA dismissed the petition.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
Petitioners argue that: (1) they are the rightful owners of the property as the Partial Decision issued by the RTC of Makati had
already become final; (2) their parents already waived in their favor their rights over the property; (3) the adjudged obligation
of Michele in the ejectment case did not redound to the benefit of the family; (4) Micheles obligation is a joint obligation
between her and Matrai, not joint and solidary.
ISSUE(S): Did RTC commit grave error when it proceeded with the execution, levy and sale of the subject property?
HELD: Yes. Petition granted. The property should not have been levied and sold at execution sale.
RATIO:
The power of the court in executing judgments extends only to properties unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor
alone, in the present case to those belonging to Michele and Matrai. One mans goods shall not be sold for another mans
debts.
A wife may bind the conjugal partnership only when she purchases things necessary for the support of the family, or when
she borrows money for that purpose upon her husbands failure to deliver the needed sum; when administration of the
conjugal partnership is transferred to the wife by the courts or by the husband; or when the wife gives moderate donations for
charity. Failure to establish any of these circumstances means that the conjugal asset may not be bound to answer for the
wifes personal obligation.
^^ This is not present since Micheles liability arose from an unlawful detainer case with her partner.
The RTC and the sheriff should not have proceeded with the action and should have relied solely on the decree of the nullity
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of marriage of the Francisco spouses with the deed of donation to the children.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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Buado v. CA
G.R. No. 145222, April 24, 2009
TAKE NOTE: There were no mentioning when the parties were married. But as seen
TOPIC: Subsidiary liabilities, Art. 94 (9)
from the date of the complaint, it is NCC.
PONENTE: Tinga, J.
FACTS:
On April 30, 1984, petitioner-sps. Roberto and Venus Buado filed a complaint for damages (40k) against Erlinda Nicol w/ the
RTC of Bacoor for Erlinda was convicted of slander in a criminal case. CA affirmed this.
Since, Erlindas personal property was insufficient so the sheriff levied on her real property and the petitioner-sps were the
highest bidders.
But on Feb. 2, 1994, respondent Romulo Nicol, the husband of Erlinda, filed for annulment of certificate of sale and damages
w/ preliminary injunction against the Buados and the sheriff alleging that the Buados connived and directly levied upon his
real property w/o exhausting the personal properties of Erlinda Nicol. Also, the price was very low (51k) because the property
was valued at 500k.
ISSUE:
WON the husband, who was not a party to the suit but whose conjugal property is being executed on account of the other
spouse being the judgment obligor, can be considered a stranger? YES.
HELD:
To determine this, the SC must take into account the character of the property:
a. In Mariano v. CA, which was later adopted in Sps. Ching v. CA, the SC held that the husband of the judgment debtor
CANNOT be deemed a stranger to the case prosecuted and adjudged against his wife for an obligation that has
redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Hence, it must further be settled WON the obligation of the
judgment debtor redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership;
b. But in Naguit v. CA and Sy v. Discaya, the SC stated that a spouse is DEEMED a stranger to the action wherein the writ of
execution was issued and is therefore justified in bringing an independent action to vindicate her right of ownership over
his exclusive or paraphernal property.
The SC ruled that there was no doubt the property is conjugal in nature. But pursuant to FC122 (since the Nicol sps. marriage
are before the FC, it is governed by NCC, hence, default is CPG), personal debts by a spouse before the marriage shall not be
charged to the conjugal property except if it has redounded to the benefit of the family.
But in no case that a civil obligation arising from the crime of slander committed by a spouse (Erlinda) redounded to the
benefit of the family.
Unlike the default regime in FC (ACP), the liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of a crime or quasi-delict is chargeable
to the absolute community of property.
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Dar vs. Alonzo-Legasto
[306 SCRA 339, Aug. 30, 2000]
TOPIC: joint administration of ACP
PONENTE: Kapunan, J.
AUTHOR: PARIAN
Unlawful detainer retaining possession of property without legal rights
Details on the unlawful detainer suit were not given. Im assuming the
couples have their conjugal home in Bautistas land.

An unlawful detainer suit was filed by Bautista (private respondent) against Mr. and Mrs. Dar, Mr. and Mrs. Angeles, Mr.
and Mrs. Cruz, and Mr. and Mrs. Constantino (petitioners).
Judge Alonzo-Legasto ordered their ejectment.
The petitioners filed for certiorari with CA.
CA dismissed their petition for non-compliance with Administrative Circular No. 04-94 (issuance of Certification of Nonforum Shopping by the petitioner) when only one spouse for each couple signed the certificate.
The petitioners raised the issue to SC via certiorari.
ISSUE(S): If the petitioners are husband and wife and only one of them signs the petition (for review on certiorari and mandamus), is
the petition dismissible for violation of the Rule on Certification of Non- Forum Shopping requiring all petitioners to certify it under oath?
HELD: NO. CA decision reversed and set aside. Remanded back to CA.
RATIO:
The Court of Appeals should have taken into consideration the fact that the petitioners were sued jointly, or as Mr. and Mrs.
over a property in which they have a common interest.
Such being the case, the signing of one of them in the certification substantially complies with the rule on certification of nonforum shopping.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Where the petitioners were sued jointly, or as Mr. and Mrs. over a property in which they have a common interest, the signing of one
of them in the certification substantially complies with the rule on certification of non-forum shopping.
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UY v. COURT OF APPEALS
[G.R. No. 109557. November 29, 2000]
NOTES:
TOPIC: Incapacity
PONENTE: Pardo, J.
FACTS:
Dr. Ernesto Jardelaza suffered stroke that rendered him comatose. Gilda (Petitioner), wife of the latter, filed a petition in RTC
Iloilo to be allowed as sole administrator of their conjugal property and be authorized to sell the same as her husband is
physically incapacitated to discharge his functions.
She further alleged that the expenses needed for the illness of the husband would require her to sell their property. RTC ruled in
favor of Gilda contending that such decision is pursuant to Article 124 of FC and that the proceedings thereon are governed
by the rules on summary proceedings.
The son of the spouses, Teodoro, filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the petition made by her mother was
essentially a petition for guardianship of the person and properties of his father. As such it cannot be prosecuted in
accordance with the provisions on summary proceedings instead it should follows the rules governing special proceedings in
the Revised Rules of Court requiring procedural due process particularly the need for notice and a hearing on the merits. He
further reiterated that Chapter 2 of the FC comes under the heading on Separation in Fact Between Husband and Wife
contemplating a situation where both spouses are of disposing mind. Hence, he argued that this should not be applied in
their case.
During the pendency of the motion, Gilda sold the property to her daughter and son in law. Upon the appeal by Teodoro,
CA reversed the decision of the lower court.
Hence, this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE(S): Can Gilda, as the wife of a husband who suffered stroke, assume sole powers of administration of the conjugal property and
dispose a parcel of land with improvements?
HELD: No. The Court ruled in favor of Teodoro. The Court affirms the decision of the CA.
RATIO:
The rule on summary proceedings does not apply to cases where the non-consenting spouse is incapacitated or
incompetent to give consent.
In this case, trial court found that subject spouse was incompetent who was in a comatose condition and with a diagnosis of
brain stem infract. Hence, the proper remedy is a judicial guardianship proceeding under the Revised Rules of Court. The law
provides that wife who assumes sole powers of administration has the same powers and duties as a guardian and not the
power of disposition and encumbrance of property as these powers require consent of the other spouse or court authority.
Consequently, a spouse who desires to sell real property as administrator of the conjugal property, must observe the
procedure for the sale of the wards estate required of judicial guardians, and not the summary judicial proceedings under
FC.
The Court further held that such incapacity of the trial court to provide for an opportunity to be heard is null and void on the
ground of lack of due process.
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MATTHEWS v. TAYLOR
NOTES: Kawawa si foreign spouse
[G.R. No. 164584. June 22, 2009]
TOPIC: Disposition and encumbrance
PONENTE: Nachura, J.
FACTS:
Respondent Benjamin A. Taylor (British) married Joselyn C. Taylor , a Filipina who is only 17 years old.
While their marriage was subsisting, Joselyn bought a property situated in Boracay. The sale was allegedly financed by
Benjamin.
Using Benjamins money, Joselyn constructed improvements and eventually converted the property to a resort.
However, Benjamin and Joselyn had a falling out, and Joselyn ran away with Kim Philippsen.
Joselyn executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of Benjamin, authorizing the latter to maintain, sell, lease, and
sub-lease and otherwise enter into contract with third parties with respect to their Boracay property.
Joselyn and Philip Matthews (Petitioner), entered into an Agreement of Lease involving the Boracay property.
Claiming that the Agreement was null and void since it was entered into by Joselyn without his consent, Benjamin instituted an
action for Declaration of Nullity of Agreement of Lease with Damages against Joselyn and the petitioner. Benjamin claimed
that his funds were used in the acquisition and improvement of the Boracay property, and coupled with the fact that he was
Joselyns husband, any transaction involving said property required his consent.
No Answer was filed, hence, the RTC declared Joselyn and the petitioner in default and declared the agreement null and
void.
It was set aside by CA and also ordered the RTC to allow the petitioner to file his Answer, and to conduct further proceedings.
In his Answer, petitioner claimed good faith in transacting with Joselyn. Since Joselyn appeared to be the owner of the
Boracay property, he found it unnecessary to obtain the consent of Benjamin. Moreover, as appearing in the Agreement,
Benjamin signed as a witness to the contract, indicating his knowledge of the transaction and, impliedly, his conformity to the
agreement entered into by his wife. Benjamin was, therefore, estopped from questioning the validity of the Agreement.
RTC ruled in favor of Benjamin. The property is conjugal. It was also supported with the fact that Benjamin funded the
improvement of the property.
CA affirmed the decision. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE(S): Can an alien husband nullify a lease contract entered into by his Filipina wife bought during their marriage?
HELD: No. The Agreement of Lease entered into between Joselyn and petitioner cannot be nullified on the grounds advanced by
Benjamin. The decision of the CA is reversed.
RATIO:
The rule is clear and inflexible: aliens are absolutely not allowed to acquire public or private lands in the Philippines, save only
in constitutionally recognized exceptions.
Benjamin has no right to nullify the Agreement of Lease between Joselyn and petitioner. Benjamin, being an alien, is
absolutely prohibited from acquiring private and public lands in the Philippines. Considering that Joselyn appeared to be the
designated vendee in the Deed of Sale of said property, she acquired sole ownership thereto.
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This is true even if we sustain Benjamins claim that he provided the funds for such acquisition. By entering into such contract
knowing that it was illegal, no implied trust was created in his favor; no reimbursement for his expenses can be allowed; and
no declaration can be made that the subject property was part of the conjugal/community property of the spouses.
In any event, he has no capacity or personality to question the subsequent lease of the Boracay property by his wife even if
he was merely exercising the rights of a husband in respect of conjugal property.
To allow him to meddle with the property would be violative of the constitution. If the property were to be declared conjugal,
this would accord the alien husband a substantial interest and right over the land, as he would then have a decisive vote as
to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that the Constitution does not permit him to have.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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QUIAO v QUIAO
[G.R. No. 176556. July 4, 2012]
TOPIC: Effects of annulment on property regime
PONENTE: Reyes, J.
AUTHOR: PARIAN
Effectivity of NCC: Aug 30, 1950
FC: Aug 3, 1988

Brigido and Rita were married on January 1977.
2000: Rita filed for legal separation.
RTC found that the spouses dont have separate properties. And because theyre married before Aug 3, 1988, CPG
governs their property relations.
RTC granted the legal separation and ordered that properties be separated equally. But since Brigido is the guilty
spouse for cohabiting with another woman, he is forfeited to receive his share from the net profits earned by the
conjugal partnership, and that it will be awarded to his children with Rita.
Brigido did not appeal and the decision became final and executory.
The writ was partially executed. However, Brigido filed a motion for clarification to define the term net profits earned.
As per RTC: It is the remainder of the properties of the parties after deducting the separate properties of each of the
spouse and the debts.
ISSUE(S): What is net profits earned?
How do you compute for it with respect to ACP, with respect to CPG?
HELD/RATIO:
FC Art. 102 (4) provides: Net profits earned - shall be the increase in value between the market value of the community
property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution.
For the purpose of dissolution and liquidation, the definition of Art 102 (4) shall govern; both for ACP (Art. 102) and CPG (Art.
129)
ACP Art 102:
(1) Find the market value of the properties at the time of the communitys dissolution.
(2) Total market value of all the properties - Debts and obligations of the absolute community = Net assets or net remainder of
the properties of the absolute community
(3) Net assets or net remainder of the properties of the absolute community - market value of the properties at the time of
marriage = Net profits earned
(4) Net profits earned 2
CPG Art. 129:
(1) Conjugal properties + Reimbursements for benefits received by a spouse from the
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conjugal partnership Reimbursements to spouse/s for benefits received by conjugal partnership = Total assets of conjugal
partnership
(2) Total assets of conjugal partnership - Debts and obligations of the conjugal partnership = Net profits earned
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Net profits earned shall be the increase in value between the market value of the community property at the time of the celebration
of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution.
Note: The definition was not used in computing for CPG. There was no computation of market value, etc. They strictly used Art. 129,
and only provided Art 102 (4) as the definition of net profits earned to clarify the dispositive portion of RTC.
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Orpiano v. Tomas
G.R. No. 178611, Jan. 14, 2013
TOPIC: CPG
PONENTE: Del Castillo, J.
FACTS:
On 1979, Juvenile and Domestic Relations court declared Estrella absent spouse and granted Alejandro the authority to sell a
part of their conjugal estate (809 sqm. QC lot) to respondent sps. Antonio and Myrna Tomas for php12.1M.
Alejandro sold it on installments on March 19, 1996 and immediately transferred the sps. names even if the price has not yet
been fully paid. Alejandro gave them a year to pay but eventually failed.
So Alejandro filed for a collection case on Oct. 28, 1996 to collect php4.3M. Unfortunately, he died while pending litigation so
the heirs took place, including Estrella.
Estrella moved to amend the collection petition to a rescission/annulment case of the TCT but the RTC denied it. She next
tried to amend it by be dropped as a party but this was also denied.
While the collection case was pending, Estrella filed on June 11, 2005 an annulment case of the sale and cancellation of the
TCT. She claims:
a. That the declaration of her absence and authorization to sell were obtained by Alejandro through misinterpretation, fraud
and deceit; and
b. That the declaration was not published as required by law. Hence, the sale is null and void.
Sps. Tomas alleged forum shopping:
a. The filing of the annulment case was prompted by the RTCs denial of Estrellas motion in the collection case to amend
the complaint to an annulment of sale;
b. The annulment case is Estrellas attempt at securing a remedy which she could not obtain in the collection case;
c. It would render contradictory rulings (If the annulment case is allowed to proceed, it could result in a judgment declaring
the sale null and void, just as a decision in the collection case could be issued ordering them to pay the balance of the
price, which is tantamount to a declaration that the sale is valid.)
RTC ruled in favor of the sps. Tomas and stated that Estrella only filed the annulment case because the collection court
denied her motion to amend it to an annulment case.
CA affirmed that it also amounts to res judicata.
ISSUE:
WON there was forum shopping. YES.
HELD:
Estrella argues:
a. That it was Alejandro and not she who initiated the collection case, and that she, their 2 children, and Alejandros 4
illegitimate children were merely substituted as his heirs by operation of law;
b. That she was not a privy to Alejandros sale;
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c. That since she was unwilling to be substituted, she tried to amend it to an annulment case but the RTC did not heed her
contentions;
d. With (c) said, she then moved to file an annulment case.
The SC defines forum shopping - act of a party, against whom an adverse judgment or order has been rendered in one
forum, of seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or special civil action for
certiorari.
Reason - it trifles w/ and abuses court processes, degrades the administration of justice, and congests court dockets. It is a
ground for dismissal and direct contempt.
But the SC believes that Estrella did not want to trifle court processes but it still produces same effects; not only would it render
conflicting decisions, but also an unfair situation to the Tomas sps. because if the 2 petitions were granted, they would have
to pay the unpaid balance and have the TCT anulled.
The SC added that what Estrella should have done is to file a petition for certiorari on the RTCs denial on her motion to
amend the collection case. She availed the proper remedies at first (Amend the collection case) but the stupid RTC just kept
denying her. KITID NG UTAK! GUSTO SARILI LANG PAKINGGAN!
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CASTRO v. MIAT
AUTHOR:
TOPIC: For marriages before FC
NOTES:
PONENTE: Puno, J.
FACTS:
Moises and Concordia, parents of Romeo and Alexander, bought a piece of property in Paco on installment basis on May 17,
1977. While at the UAE, Moises agreed that the said property, along with another located in Paraaque, would go to his sons.
He recanted later on when he came back for good, claiming the Paraaque property for himself and leaving the one in
Paco to his sons, both of them agreed.
The two boys and their families proceeded to live in the Paco property. Alexander eventually left for personal reasons and
made arrangements with Romeo regarding his share.
Romeo heard from his godmother, Mrs. Rosalina Castro, mother of Virgilio Castro. Moises was planning to sell her the Paco
property and that she had already given a down payment of P30000 for it. Along with her son, she brought the brothers Miat
to court to talk about the sale. Moises told his sons that he would be forced to sell the property because he mortgaged it
when he came to some dire financial straights.
The sale was eventually finalized and the proceeds went to Moises and Alexander. Romeo didnt get a single cent but was
allowed to till their lands in Nueva Ecija.
Romeo filed the case to nullify the sale and to compel his father and brother to convey the property to him, as well as
damages.
The trial court decided in favor of Romeo as far his and Alexanders share are concerned. With regard to their fathers sale
though, the court said that he should consider it as valid.
On appeal to the CA, the decision was modified, stating that the sale was not considered valid and the conveyance be
ordered executed as well (as well as payment of costs against the appellees). The petitioners elevated the case then to the
Supreme Court claiming the CA gravely erred in all accounts.
ISSUE(S):
(1) Is the Paco property conjugal? Held: YES
(2) Was there a valid oral partition? Held: YES
(3) Were the spouses Castro buyers in good faith? Held: NO
The decision was AFFIRMED.
RATIO:
The property IS conjugal because it was purchased during Moises and Concordias marriage. Even though it was made on
installment basis and the purchase was finalized after Concordias death, it is still conjugal because what applies here would
be Article 153(1) of the New Civil Code. The provision states that all property acquired by onerous title during the marriage is
considered conjugal. Purchasing on installment is considered onerous title because onerous means burdensome, an
installment payment imposes a burden on a person to pay regularly.
The oral partition is valid because it was corroborated by pretty much everyone involved, even Moises himself. The
requirement that it must be in a public document is only for the benefit of creditors whose rights may be infringed by the
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arbitrariness of oral agreements.
The Castro spouses are not buyers in good faith because they knew all along that the brothers Miat were in possession of the
property. They knew full well that Moises had agreed to give the property to his sons. A buyer in good faith, especially of
property, must inquire with due diligence on the rights of other persons in possession of their desired purchase before making
any solid moves.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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TITAN v DAVID
[GR 169548]
TOPIC: What is included in the CPG
PONENTE:
AUTHOR: retrieved online


1. Manuel and Martha got married and owned property.
2. The marriage went bad and they had a de facto separation.
3. The wife sold the property to the Petitioner.
4. She had an SPA from her husband claiming that he was authorizing her to make the sale.
5. The husband filed a case to void the contract of sale because he claims that the property is conjugal thus requires his permission,
which she did not get and that the SPA was a forgery.
6. The company claims that it purchased the property in good faith.
7. The company also asserts that the husband did not show proof he had money to buy the property originally thus it should be the
sole property of the wife.
ISSUE(S):
1. Is the sale valid? Held: No
2. Does the property belong solely to the wife? Held: No
3. Is the company a buyer in good faith? Held: No
RATIO:
1. SC agrees with the lower courts that the SPA was indeed a forgery, thus his consent was not obtained making the deed of sale
void.
2. The property was bought during the time of marriage thus the presumption is that it is conjugal property, thus not requiring the
husband to furnish financial proof that he had the financial capacity to buy it.
3. The property was registered in both their names (husband and wife), but the deed of sale only included the wifes name. This is
quite peculiar that an SPA would have been needed. This should have made the petitioner company question. The court presumes
that Titan was aware that Manuels consent may be necessary. In addition, Titan sent their representative to the Register of Deeds of
QC to verify the SPA, thus they would have been aware that the SPA was never registered before the Register of Deeds.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
FC 116: All property acquired during the marriage whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in
the name of one or both spouses is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved.
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LIM v. EQUITABLE PCI BANK
[G.R. No. 183918. January 15, 2014]
NOTES:
TOPIC: What is included in the CPG
FACTS:
1988 - Francisco Lim (petitioner) executed an Irrevocable Special Power of Attorney in favor of his brother, Franco Lim
authorizing the latter to mortgage his share in which they co-owned.
1989 - Banco De Oro Savings and Mortgage Bank released a loan in the amount of P8.5 million by virtue of the said
Irrevocable Special Power of Attorney.
1992 Franco fully paid the debts.
1996 Francisco, Franco, and Victoria Yao Lim obtained a loan in the amount of P30 million in favor of Sun Paper Products,
Inc. To secure the loan, Francisco and Franco executed in favor of respondent bank a Real Estate Mortgage over the same
property. However, when the loan was not paid, respondent foreclosed the mortgaged property.
RTC issued a writ of possession in favor of the respondent bank.
Petitioner filed a TRO and the cancellation of the Special Power of Attorney, Mortgage Contract, Certificate of Sale. He
alleges that he did not authorize Franco to mortgage the subject property to respondent and that his signatures in the Real
Estate Mortgage and the Surety Agreement were forged.
RTC granted petitioners Motion for the issuance of a TRO to prevent respondent from enforcing the Writ of Possession.
Respondent filed an Answer Cum Motion to Dismiss contending that the trial court has no jurisdiction to issue a TRO or a
preliminary injunction enjoining the implementation of the Writ of Possession issued by a co-equal court. Respondent also
argued that it is not privy to the execution of the Irrevocable Special Power of Attorney and that since there is no allegation
that the foreclosure was defective or void.
RTC was in favor of petitioner. It ruled that petitioner was able to prove by preponderance of evidence that he did not
participate in the execution of the mortgage contract giving rise to the presumption that his signature was forged.
On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC Decision. It ruled that petitioners mere allegation that his signature in the mortgage
contract was forged is not sufficient to overcome the presumption of regularity of the notarized document.
ISSUE(S): Was the petitioner able to prove that his signatures were forged?
HELD: No. Petition is denied.
RATIO:
It must be proved with clear, positive, and convincing evidence by the party alleging it and it should not be presumed. In this
case, the alleged forged signature was not compared with the genuine signatures of petitioner as no sample signatures were
submitted.
The respondent bank was not negligent when it accepted the mortgage and petitioner was erroneously described as single
and a Filipino citizen in the mortgage contract, when in fact he is married and an American citizen.
The absence of his wifes signature on the mortgage contract also has no bearing in this case. We are not unaware that all
property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal, unless it is shown that it is owned exclusively by the husband or the wife;
that this presumption is not overcome by the fact that the property is registered in the name of the husband or the wife alone;
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and that the consent of both spouses is required before a conjugal property may be mortgaged THIS DOES NOT APPLY IN THE
CASE One cannot presume it conjugal as the nature was never an issue or discussed in the lower courts.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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LAPERAL v. KATIGBAK
[10 SCRA 493. March 31, 1964]
NOTES:
TOPIC: What is excluded from CPG Brought as
exclusive property
PONENTE: Regala, J.
FACTS:
This is an appeal from a decision of the CFI of Manila declaring a property to be the separate or paraphernal property of
Evelina Kalaw. Spouses Laperal disagree with the decision and held that it was a conjugal property of Evelina Kalaw and
Ramon Katigbak.
This litigation is a sequel to the one instituted by the Laperals against Kalaw and Katigbak. Spouses Laperal then sought
recovery of P14,000 evidenced by various promissory notes executed in favor of the Laperals by Katigbak, and for the return
of jewelry valued at P97,500.00, delivered by the Laperals to Katigbak for sale on commission, or a total of P111,500.00." The
trial court rendered judgment against Katigbak due to his testimony to pay the Laperals the sum of P14,000.00, and to return
the jewelry involved.
Kalaw filed a complaint against her husband before CFI of Manila, for judicial separation of property and separate
administration, it was granted.
Spouses Laperal filed a petition for annulment of the judicial separation of property and separate administration before CFI of
Manila, it was dismissed. CA also dismissed.
ISSUE(S): Is the property part of the conjugal property?
HELD: No. The property is a paraphernal property of Kalaw.
RATIO:
There is no denying that all properties acquired during the marriage are, by law, presumed conjugal. (Art. 160, Civil Code) The
presumption, however, is not conclusive but merely rebuttable
This is a case where the presumption has been sufficiently and convincingly disproven.
- the deed to the disputed land is in the name of the wife
- the property was already of such substantial value the husband, by himself could not have afforded to buy, source of income then
was his P200.00 a month
Kalaw testified and was believed by the trial court, that the purchase price was furnished by her mother.
The husband expressly acknowledged in the deed of sale that he did not have any interest in the property.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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TAN v. ANDRADE
[G.R. No. 171904. August 7, 2013]
NOTES:
TOPIC: Brought as exclusive property
PONENTE: Perlas-Bernabe, J.
FACTS:
Rosario Vda. De Andrade was the registered owner of four parcels of land situated in Cebu City which she mortgaged to and
subsequently foreclosed by one Simon Diu. When the redemption period was about to expire, Rosario sought the assistance of
Bobby Tan who agreed to redeem the subject properties.
Rosario sold the same to Bobby and her son, Proceso Andrade, Jr. for P100,000.00 as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale.
Proceso, Jr. executed a Deed of Assignment, ceding unto Bobby his rights and interests over the subject properties in
consideration of P50,000.00.
Notwithstanding the aforementioned Deed of Assignment, Bobby extended an Option to Buy the subject properties in favor
of Proceso, Jr., giving the latter until 7:00 in the evening of July 31, 1984 to purchase the same for the sum of P310,000.00. When
Proceso, Jr. failed to do so, Bobby consolidated his ownership over the subject properties, and the TCTs therefor were issued in
his name.
Rosarios children filed a complaint for reconveyance and annulment of deeds of conveyance and damages against Bobby
before the RTC. They alleged that the transaction between Rosario and Bobby was not one of sale but was actually an
equitable mortgage which was entered into to secure Rosarios indebtedness with Bobby. They also claimed that since the
subject properties were inherited by them from their father, Proceso Andrade, Sr. and the subject properties were conjugal in
nature, and thus, Rosario had no right to dispose of their respective shares therein. They argued that they should be co-owners
of the properties even if the TCTs were issued in Bobbys name.
RTC dismissed the petition. It ruled that the subject transaction was a bona fide sale and not an equitable mortgage as can
be gleaned from its terms and conditions, noting further that the subject deed of sale was not even questioned by the
Andrades at the time of its execution. CA affirmed the rulling.
Both parties filed their motion for reconsideration: 1) The Andrades filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision insisting
that it was an equitable mortgage, and 2) Bobby filed that it should have included the whole property and not just Rosarios
share. Both were denied by the CA.
ISSUE(S): Is petitioner right when it contented that CA erred in ruling that the subject properties are conjugal in nature? (Is the property
an exclusive property of Rosario?)
HELD: Yes. RTC ruling upheld. Court grants the petition of Bobby, but dismissed the petition of the Andrades.
RATIO:
In this case, records reveal that the conjugal partnership of Rosario and her husband was terminated upon the latters death
on August 7, 1978 while the transfer certificates of title over the subject properties were issued on September 28, 1979 and
solely in the name of Rosario Vda. de Andrade, of legal age, widow, Filipino. Other than their bare allegation, no evidence
was adduced by the Andrades to establish that the subject properties were procured during the coverture of their parents or
that the same were bought with conjugal funds.
Moreover, Rosarios declaration that she is the absolute owner of the disputed parcels of land in the subject deed of sale was
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not disputed by her son Proceso, Jr., who was a party to the same. Hence, by virtue of these incidents, the Court upholds the
RTCs finding that the subject properties were exclusive or sole properties of Rosario.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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Veloso v. Martinez
No. 8715. October 24, 1914
TOPIC: What is excluded from CPG, FC 109;
Acquired by gratuitous title during
marriage,FC109(2) cf FC113-115, NCC1015
PONENTE: Johnson, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Mariano Veloso filed this petition to recover from respondent Lucia Martinez the possession of a parcel of land.
Lucia filed a counterclaim stating:
a. That Mariano must pay 18.5k as attys. fees for the service rendered by Domingo Franco (D.F.) to Mariano;
b. That Mariano must return the jewelry as it was alleged that it is in his possession or pay 6k as is was the value.
Lower court ruled that Mariano was entitled to the land and Lucia was entitled to (b).
ISSUE:
WON Lucia exclusively owns the jewelries. YES.
HELD:
It was admitted that before Mariano got the jewelries, Lucia inherited it from her mother.
From the record, she borrowed 4.5k from Mariano and the jewelry was made as security.
What was not clear was WON the jewelry was delivered to Mariano because it was in a closed box and the key remained in
the possession of D.F. Then Lucia became a widow of this D.F., and after his death, she was appointed administrator and she
possessed the key.
Mariano as defense states that such jewelries were pawned to him by D.F. w/ full and knowledge and consent of D.F. Lucia
denies this.
So the SC states that since Lucia inherited it, she has exclusive control and management over it until and unless she had
delivered it to her husband, before a notary public, with the intent that her" husband might administer it properly. Since no
contrary proof was shown, she could not be deprived of it by any act of her husband, w/o her consent.
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BERCILES v. GSIS
AUTHOR:
[GR No. L-57257. March 5, 1984]
NOTES:
PONENTE: Guerrero, J.
FACTS:
Judge Pascual Berciles died of cardiac arrest.
His retirement benefits, unpaid salary, retirement premiums and terminal leave, as well as representation and transportation
allowances are being contested in this case by two families.
Illuminada Ponce Berciles and her four children allege that they are the lawful legal heirs of the deceased.
Illuminada presents as proof, evidence of her marriage with the deceased which entitled her and their legitimate children to
a share in the said benefits.
On the other hand, Flor Fuentabella and her four children also claim a share in the benefits.
The GSIS resolved to grant the benefits in the following proportion:
77/134 for Illuminada as surviving spouse
10/134 each for the legitimate children (of Illuminada)
5/134 for Pascual Voltaire (son of Flor) as an acknowledged natural child
4/134 each for the illegitimate children (of Flor)
Both parties appealed: a) The lawful heirs contend that the GSIS ruling is erroneous and that they are the only legal heirs under
the law. B) The contending claimants claim that they should be the only ones entitled to the benefits.
ISSUE(S): Is the GSIS decision valid?
HELD: No.
RATIO:
The marriage between Illuminada and the deceased was sufficiently proven and ruled upon by this court, fully supported by
appropriate evidence as certified by the civil registry; therefore, the 4 children begotten by said spouses during their marital
union are all legitimate. THEY ARE ENTITLED TO THEIR SHARE IN THE BENEFITS.
On the other hand, the marriage between Flor and the deceased was not proven. She only presented a certification that
their marriage records could not be found or located in the civil registry.
As for Pascual Voltaire, his paternity cannot be sufficiently proven. His birth certificate was not signed by either the father or
mother and under the law, if the alleged father did not intervene in the birth certificate, the putting of his name by the mother
and the doctor is null and void. Pascual, therefore, cannot be considered as a natural child.
Under the law, illegitimate children are entitled to support and such successional rights as long as there is admission or
recognition of paternity. As a result, the illegitimate children of Flor cannot share in the benefits as the marriage between Flor
and the deceased was not sufficiently proven and paternity was not established.
The retirement benefits and the terminal leave pay, unpaid salary and allowances accruing to the deceased shall be
distributed equally to Illuminada and her children.
As for the retirement premiums, it is also presumed conjugal, there being no proof that the premiums were paid from the
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exclusive funds of the deceased. One-half belongs to the wife as her property in the conjugal partnership and the other half
to the estate of the deceased to be distributed to his legal heirs.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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PLATA v YATCO
[12 SCRA 718]
TOPIC: excluded from CPG - acquired by
redemption/exchange
PONENTE:
AUTHOR: PARIAN
unlawful detainer - ordinarily refers to the conduct of a tenant who is in
possession of an apartment or leased property and refuses to leave the
premises upon the expiration or termination of the lease. Typically, the
landlord wishes to evict the tenant for not paying the rent or for
endangering the safety of the other tenants or the landlord's property.
Paraphernal property - refers to property over which the wife has complete
control.

1. Amalia Plata acquired a tract of land while she was still single. She then sold that property but seven months after bought it back.
This time he was already married to Gaudencio Begosa.
2. The land was then mortgaged in consideration of a loan to Ceasaria Villanueva. And for failure to pay the loan it was
extrajudicially foreclosed with the mortgagee as the highest bidder.
3. Subsequently, Villanueva sued Gaudencio alone for illegal detainer. A writ of execution was issued but Amalia resisted all efforts to
be evicted and filed third-party claims averring ownership of the property.
ISSUE(S):
1. Is the land in question part of the conjugal property? Held: No.
2. Could Amalia be be bound by the detainer judgement against Gaudencio? Held: No.
HELD:
RATIO:
1. Despite the validity of the marriage between Amalia and Gaudencio the paraphernal character of the property which was
acquired by Amalia while she was still single, there is no proof that the money used in the reconveyance of the land came from the
common or conjugal property of the spouses. The signing as co-mortgagor of the Gaudencio does not suffice to make it a conjugal
property.
2. The illegal detainer judgment against the husband is not binding to the wife nor affects her paraphernal for she holds and
administers independently.
3. She is also exempt from the writ of execution and contempt of court as the action not lawful against her.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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LAURENA v. CA
AUTHOR:
[G.R. No. 159220. September 22, 2008]
NOTES:
TOPIC: Properties of parents
PONENTE: Carpio, J.
FACTS:
Ma. Darlene Dimayuga-Laurena (petitioner) and Jesse Lauro Laurena (respondent)were married. Darlene filed for
declaration of nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity. She also prayed for dissolution of CPG.
She alleged that during their marriage, she and husband acquired the ff properties which were all part of their conjugal
partnership of gains: duplex house and lot located at Palanan, Makati City; house and lot in Tanauan, Batangas; dealership
of Jeddah Caltex Service Station in Tanauan, Batangas (Jeddah Caltex Station); Personal vehicles consisting of a Mitsubishi
Lancer, Safari pick-up, L-300 van and L-200 pick-up; and Jeddah Trucking.
ISSUE(S): Do the aforecited properties form part of the CPG?
HELD: Not all, most are husbands parents properties. Petition was partly granted
RATIO:
The transfer of the parcels of land in Batangas was merely an accommodation so that petitioner, who was then working at
the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), could acquire a loan from BSP at a lower rate using the properties as collateral.
Jeddah Caltex Station was husbands parents business.
Jeddah Trucking was established from the proceeds and income of the Jeddah Caltex Station.
But duplex house and lot in Makati City should be included in the conjugal partnership of gains.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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ONG v. CA
[204 SCRA 297. November 29, 1991]
NOTES:
TOPIC: Administration of exclusive property By the
other spouse
PONENTE: Paras, J.
FACTS:
Teodora Ong conducted her own logging business in Camarines Sur. She secured a loan from Francisco Boix in the amount of
P2,827.83.
She was unable to pay. Thus, Boix was awarded by the court a parcel of land that was to be auctioned.
CFI of Manila awarded the land to Boix.
Ramon Ong, husband of Teodora, filed an Omnibus Motion to quash the writ of possession. It was denied.
Ramon then filed before CA a petition to annul the auction sale as it was irregularly executed on the grounds that the
property was conjugal and thus could not be held liable for personal debts contracted by the wife, and that there was no
valid publication thus making the auction sale void. CA affirmed the decision of the Trial Court. Motion for reconsideration was
also denied.
ISSUE(S): Is the property conjugal? If yes, would it have been saved from being auctioned?
HELD: No, the property is not conjugal. No, it would not have been saved from being auctioned.
RATIO:
It is undisputed that the subject parcel was declared solely in the wifes name, but the house built thereon was declared in the
name of the spouses. The lot in question is a paraphernal property of the wife and should be liable for the debts of the wife.
When the property is registered in the name of a spouse only and there is no showing as to when the property was acquired
by said spouse, this is an indication that the property belongs exclusively to said spouse. And this presumption under Art. 160 of
the Civil Code cannot prevail when the title is in the name of only one spouse and the rights of innocent third parties are
involved.
Conjugal property may still be held liable for the debts of the wife.
Art 117 of the CC provides that the wife may engage in business although the husband may object, but there are no signs
that he objected and in fact even approved said business.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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WONG v. IAC
AUTHOR:
[G.R. No. 70082. August 19, 1991]
NOTES:
TOPIC: Encumbrance/disposition of exclusive property
PONENTE: Fernan,C. J.
FACTS:
Romarico Henson and Katrina Pineda are married with three children but have since lived separately. During their marriage
the husband bought a parcel of land from his father paid for by a loan from his officemate.
Katrina on the other hand consigned jewelries from Anita Chan worth P321,830 which she failed to return within 20-day period.
Thus Anita Chan and her husband filed an action for collection of money wherein the trial court ordered Remerico and
Katrina to pay the Wongs the amount plus interest.
A writ of execution was thus levied involving four lots all in the name of Romarico. The lands was sold in a public auction and
was individually both by Juanito Santos and Leonardo Joson.
A month before such redemption Romarico filed an action for annulment of the said decision as well as the writ and levy if
execution and the auction of sale of the properties because he was not given his day in court.
The court ruled in favor of Romarico and as he had nothing to do with the transactions and ruled for reconveyance.
ISSUE(S): Can the conjugal property be levied for Katrinas nonpayment of her obligation?
HELD: No.
RATIO:
The properties are presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership as it was acquired during their marriage but even if they
are conjugal they cannot answer for Katrinas obligation as it did not have the consent of the husband nor the administration
of conjugal properties conferred to her.
Furthermore Romarico was did not act or failed to act on the belief that he was not involved in the dealings of his estranged
wife. The court also found that he was not represented by Katrinas counsel and was not given the opportunity to defend
himself in court.
The decision in the civil case is null and void as it was rendered without jurisdiction for having failed to observe the notice
requirement prescribed by law. The writ of execution is cannot be issued against him for he has not been given his day in
court thus the auction sale is null and void.
Katrinas rights over the properties are merely inchoate prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the consent of her
husband and her authority to incur such indebtedness had not been alleged in the complaint and proven in the trial.
Moreover, the wife may only bind the conjugal partnership when she purchases things necessary for the support of the family
or when she borrows money necessary for the support of the family.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Inchoate - imperfect; partial; unfinished; begun, but not completed
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DEWARA v. LAMELA
AUTHOR:
[G.R. No. 179010. April 11, 2011]
NOTES:
TOPIC: Presumption of CPG
FACTS:
Eduardo Dewara (Eduardo) and petitioner Elenita Magallanes Dewara (Elenita) were married before the enactment of the
Family Code. Husband and wife were separated-in-fact because Elenita went to work in California, United States of America,
while Eduardo stayed in Bacolod City.
Eduardo, while driving a private jeep registered in the name of Elenita, hit respondent Ronnie Lamela. He filed a criminal case
for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence against Eduardo before the MTCC Bacolod City.
The MTCC found Eduardo guilty of the charge. On appeal, the RTC affirmed the decision of the MTCC and it became final
and executor.
The writ of execution on the civil liability was served on Eduardo, but it was returned unsatisfied because he had no property in
his name. Ronnie requested the City Sheriff, respondent Stenile Alvero, to levy on a property under with TCT in the name of
ELENITA M. DEWARA, of legal age, Filipino, married to Eduardo Dewara, and resident of Bacolod City, to satisfy the
judgment on the civil liability of Eduardo.
The City Sheriff served a notice of embargo on the title of the lot and subsequently sold the lot in a public auction. In the
execution sale, there were no interested buyers other than Ronnie. The City Sheriff issued a certificate of sale to spouses
Ronnie and Gina Lamela.
Thus, Elenita, represented by her attorney-in-fact, filed a case for annulment of sale and for damages against respondent
spouses and ex-officio sheriff Stenile Alvero before the RTC of Bacolod City. Petitioner claimed that the levy was illegal
because the said property was her paraphernal or exclusive property and could not be made to answer for the personal
liability of her husband. Furthermore, as the registered owner of the property, she received no notice of the execution sale.
She sought the annulment of the sale and the annulment of the issuance of the new TCT in the name of respondent spouses.
RTC was in favor of petitioner. She inherited the property from her father who acquired the property by sale of her aunt to her
father.
The CA reversed the decision. It held that Elenita and Eduardo acquired the property by onerous title during their marriage
through their common fund. Thus, it belonged to the conjugal partnership of gains and might be levied upon to answer for
civil liabilities adjudged against Eduardo.
ISSUE(S): WON the subject property is the paraphernal/exclusive property of Elenita or the conjugal property of spouses Elenita and
Eduardo.
HELD:
RATIO:
The subject property was acquired by spouses Elenita and Eduardo during their marriage. Their marital relations are governed
by the conjugal partnership of gains, since they were married before the enactment of the Family Code and they did not
execute any prenuptial agreement as to their property relations. Thus, the legal presumption of the conjugal nature of the
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property applies to thelot in question.
The presumption that the property is conjugal property may be rebutted only by strong, clear, categorical, and convincing
evidencethere must be strict proof of the exclusive ownership of one of the spouses, and the burden of proof rests upon the
party asserting it.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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DE LA PENA v. AVILA
AUTHOR:
TOPIC: Presumption of CPG
NOTES:
PONENTE: Perez, J.
FACTS:
Antonia Dela Pena obtained from A.C.Aguila & Sons, Co. a loan with interest. She executed a promissory note and a
notarized Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over a parcel of residential land, together with the improvements thereon, situated
in Marikina City and previously registered in the name of petitioner Antonia R. Dela Pea (Antonia), married to Antegono A.
Dela Pea
Antonia executed another notarized Deed of Absolute Sale over the property in favor of Gemma Remilyn C. Avila. As such,
Gemma caused the transfer of the aforesaid property to her name. Gemma also constituted a real estate mortgage over
same property in favor of FEBTC-BPI, to secure a loan facility with a credit limit of P1,200,000.00.
Antonia filed with the Register of Deeds of Marikina an Affidavit of Adverse Claim, that she was the true and lawful owner of
the property and, that the Deed of Absolute Sale Gemma utilized in procuring her title was simulated. The Register of Deeds
inscribed the adverse claim.
FEBTC-BPI caused an extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage constituted over the property due to Gemmas
failure to pay the loan. As the highest bidder at the public auction conducted in the premises, FEBTC-BPI later consolidated its
ownership over the realty and caused the same to be titled in its name under TCT No. 415392 of the Marikina registry.
Antonia and her son, petitioner Alvin Dela Pea, filed against Gemma the complaint for annulment of deed of sale as the
subject realty was conjugal property, and that the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage Antonia executed in favor of Aguila was not
consented to by Antegono who was already dead by that time. Gemma specifically denied the material allegations,
maintaining that the realty was the exclusive property of Antonia who misrepresented that her husband was still alive.
RTC held that the subject property was conjugal in nature and that the Deed of Absolute Sale Antonia executed in favor of
Gemma was void as a disposition without the liquidation required under Article 130 of the Family Code. CA reversed the RTC
decision, stating that the property was paraphernal in nature for failure of the Dela Peas to prove that the same was
acquired during Antonias marriage to Antegono. Furthermore, that the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Avila and the
subsequent sale on auction of the subject property to FEBTC-BPI are upheld as valid and binding. Hence this petition.
ISSUE(S): Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the RTC holding the house and lot covered by TCT No. N-32315 conjugal property of
the spouses Antegono and Antonia Dela Pea.
HELD: No, petition is denied. CA decision affirmed in toto.
RATIO:
Pursuant to Article 160 of the NCC, all property ofthe marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it is
proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Although it is not necessary to prove that the property was
acquired with funds of the partnership, proof of acquisition during the marriage is an essential condition for the operation of
the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. In the case of Francisco vs. Court of Appeals, the Court said that the
party who invokes the presumption under Art. 160 of the NCC, must first prove that the property in controversy was acquired
during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption
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in favor of the conjugal partnership. The party who asserts this presumption must first prove said time element. Needless to say,
the presumption refers only to the property acquired during the marriage and does not operate when there is no showing as
to when property alleged to be conjugal was acquired. Moreover, this presumption in favor of conjugality is rebuttable, but
only with strong, clear and convincing evidence; there must be a strict proof of exclusive ownership of one of the spouses.
As the parties invoking the presumption of conjugality, the Dela Peas did not even come close to proving that the subject
property was acquired during the marriage between Antonia and Antegono. Beyond Antonias bare and uncorroborated
assertion that the property was purchased when she was already married, the record is bereft of any evidence from which
the actual date of acquisition of the realty can be ascertained.
In the case Ruiz vs. Court of Appeals, the phrase married to is merely descriptive of the civil status of the wife and cannot be
interpreted to mean that the husband is also a registered owner. Because it is likewise possible that the property was acquired
by the wife while she was still single and registered only after her marriage, neither would registration thereof in said manner
constitute proof that the same was acquired during the marriage and, for said reason, to be presumed conjugal in nature.
Since there is no showing as to when the property in question was acquired, the fact that the title is in the name of the wife
alone is determinative of its nature as paraphernal, i.e., belonging exclusively to said spouse.
As such, the nature of the property is paraphernal and the CA correctly ruled that the RTC reversibly erred in nullifying
Antonias sale thereof in favor of Gemma, for lack of the liquidation required under Article 130 of the Family Code.
Furthermore, Antonia treated the realty as her own exclusive property may, in fact, be readily gleaned from her utilization
thereof as security for the payment of the P250,000.00 loan she borrowed from Aguila.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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Ugalde v. Ysasi
G.R. No. 130623. February 29, 2008
TAKE NOTE: This petition is for the dissolution, acquire share, support, etc. w/c is a
TOPIC: Legal sep., FC63(2); FC 66, Annulment
special proceeding. Hence, different from the case regarding their marriages
and declaration of nullity, FC50 in rel. to
validity and the amicable settlement.
FC43(2),147-148; Judicial separation of
property, FC 134-138
PONENTE: Carpio, J.
FACTS:
On Feb. 15, 1951, petitioner Lorea Ugalde and respondent Jon de Ysasi got married in Negros Occidental. But they
separated on April 1957 and made a judicial separation of property w/c was approved by the CFI.
This was a case for petitioner to dissolve their CPG and acquire her shares, support and custody, etc. so she states:
a. That Jon contracted another marriage w/ Victoria Smith on May 26, 1964;
b. That they had been acquiring and disposing of real and personal properties to Loreas prejudice as the lawful wife;
c. That she had been defrauded of rental income, profits, and fruits of their conjugal properties;
But Jon sated as defense:
a. That on June 2, 1961, he and Lorea entered into an agreement w/c provided that their CPG shall be deemed dissolved
as of April 15, 1957;
b. That they made an amicable settlement regarding (a) w/c was granted on June 6, 1961 and it attained finality;
c. That they already obtained a divorce decree in the SC of Mexico;
d. He contracted 2 subsequent marriages already;
e. Loreas action was barred by estoppel, laches and res judicata; and
f. That their marriage was void due to absence of a valid marriage license.
RTC ruled in favor of Jon upholding Jons defenses (d & e).
CA affirmed upholding Jons defenses (a, b, d & e).
ISSUE:
WON the CA erred in affirming the CFIs decision in dimissing Loreas action for dissolution of their CPG. NO.
HELD:
The SC stated first that CFI cannot rule on the validity of their marriage just because Jon raised it as a defense, hence, the
CFI, in this case, exceeded its jurisdiction.
But the validity of their marriage was already decided in another case w/c invalidated their marriage on May 31, 1995 for
lack of marriage license. And neither of the parties appealed.
The SC did not favor Loreas claim that the CFI did not have authority to grant the amicable settlement because the case
was for custody, and the creditors were not given notice by the parties.
A judgment upon a compromise agreement has all the force and effect of any other judgment, and conclusive only upon
parties thereto and their privies, and not binding on third persons who are not parties to it. Therefore, when the CFI approved
it, the CPG was already dissolved.
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DELIZO v. DELIZO
[69 SCRA 216. January 30, 1976]
NOTES:
PONENTE: Antonio, J.
FACTS:
The case involves the partition of the conjugal partnership properties of two marriages contracted by Nicolas Delizo.
1st marriage with Rosa Villasfer (April 20, 1891 until Rosas death on December 7, 1909 18 years)
2nd marriage with Dorotea de Ocampo (October, 1911 until the death of Nicolas on May 3, 1957 46 years)
April 15, 1957 Action for partition instituted by heirs of the first marriage (Urbana, Severino, and heirs of Francisco) against
their father, Nicolas and Dorotea and their heirs. The defendants (Nicolas with heirs of the second marriage) opposed
claiming that the property in dispute is of the second marriage. Nicolas died on May 3, 1957.
June 3, 1957 Special Proceedings No. 1058 (Intestate Estate of the late Nicolas Delizo) was filed by Dorotea.
The Lower Court divided the properties: a) to the 3 children of the first marriage, b) to Dorotea, and c) children of both
marriages which is divided in 13 parts.
Dorotea and her heirs appealed to the CA due to Trial courts judgment that the disputed land situated in Caanawan were
part of the conjugal property of the 1st marriage. It ruled that that because there was no liquidation of the conjugal
partnership property of the 1st marriage, upon the death of the first wife, the conjugal partnership was converted into one of
co-ownership between Nicolas and his children of the first marriage. Hence, all the fruits or increase of the properties acquired
thereafter shall belong to such co-ownership.
But CA ruled that it was Dorotea and Nicolas who cultivated the land, hence the fruits of the land should go to the 2 nd
marriage.
Hence, this petition for review. According to Dorotea, the Canaawan properties cannot be part 1 st marriages CPG as lands
were homesteads. She also said that the 1st marriage had possessory rights, but 2nd marriage had exclusive right over it as it
was during the second marriage that it was registered as evidenced by the Torrens title in the name of Nicolas Delizo,
married to Dorotea de Ocampo and it was registered pursuant to Act 926. They also had continuous possession of the
property for 47 years and the action by the children of the 1 st marriage should be barred by acquisitive and extinctive
prescription.
ISSUE(S): Which CPG does the disputed land belong to (1st or 2nd marriage)?
HELD: It belongs to the 2nd marriage. Remanded to Trial Court for further proceedings.
RATIO:
Property belongs to the CPG of the 2 nd marriage it was only registered during second marriage.
Act 926 (Homestead Act): Rights of homesteader to land does not become absolute until the following requirements of law
are fulfilled: a) Person filing application backed by two credible witnesses has to prove he has resided and cultivated the land
for 5 years after filing application and b) Person filing has to make affidavit attesting that the land is not
encumbered/alienated.
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Deciding factor where homestead belongs to is the time of registration NOT when homestead patent is issued as registration is
the only time all requirements have been fulfilled.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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Orpiano v. Tomas
G.R. No. 178611, Jan. 14, 2013
TOPIC: CPG
FACTS:
On 1979, Juvenile and Domestic Relations court declared Estrella absent spouse and granted Alejandro the authority to sell a
part of their conjugal estate (809 sqm. QC lot) to respondent sps. Antonio and Myrna Tomas for php12.1M.
Alejandro sold it on installments on March 19, 1996 and immediately transferred the sps. names even if the price has not yet
been fully paid. Alejandro gave them a year to pay but eventually failed.
So Alejandro filed for a collection case on Oct. 28, 1996 to collect php4.3M. Unfortunately, he died while pending litigation so
the heirs took place, including Estrella.
Estrella moved to amend the collection petition to a rescission/annulment case of the TCT but the RTC denied it. She next
tried to amend it by be dropped as a party but this was also denied.
While the collection case was pending, Estrella filed on June 11, 2005 an annulment case of the sale and cancellation of the
TCT. She claims:
c. That the declaration of her absence and authorization to sell were obtained by Alejandro through misinterpretation, fraud
and deceit; and
d. That the declaration was not published as required by law. Hence, the sale is null and void.
Sps. Tomas alleged forum shopping:
d. The filing of the annulment case was prompted by the RTCs denial of Estrellas motion in the collection case to amend
the complaint to an annulment of sale;
e. The annulment case is Estrellas attempt at securing a remedy which she could not obtain in the collection case;
f. It would render contradictory rulings (If the annulment case is allowed to proceed, it could result in a judgment declaring
the sale null and void, just as a decision in the collection case could be issued ordering them to pay the balance of the
price, which is tantamount to a declaration that the sale is valid.)
RTC ruled in favor of the sps. Tomas and stated that Estrella only filed the annulment case because the collection court
denied her motion to amend it to an annulment case.
CA affirmed that it also amounts to res judicata.
ISSUE:
WON there was forum shopping. YES.
HELD:
Estrella argues:
e. That it was Alejandro and not she who initiated the collection case, and that she, their 2 children, and Alejandros 4
illegitimate children were merely substituted as his heirs by operation of law;
f. That she was not a privy to Alejandros sale;
g. That since she was unwilling to be substituted, she tried to amend it to an annulment case but the RTC did not heed her
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contentions;
h. With (c) said, she then moved to file an annulment case.
The SC defines forum shopping - act of a party, against whom an adverse judgment or order has been rendered in one
forum, of seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or special civil action for
certiorari.
Reason - it trifles w/ and abuses court processes, degrades the administration of justice, and congests court dockets. It is a
ground for dismissal and direct contempt.
But the SC believes that Estrella did not want to trifle court processes but it still produces same effects; not only would it render
conflicting decisions, but also an unfair situation to the Tomas sps. because if the 2 petitions were granted, they would have
to pay the unpaid balance and have the TCT anulled.
The SC added that what Estrella should have done is to file a petition for certiorari on the RTCs denial on her motion to
amend the collection case. She availed the proper remedies at first (Amend the collection case) but the stupid RTC just kept
denying her. KITID NG UTAK! GUSTO SARILI LANG PAKINGGAN!
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LAPERAL v. KATIGBAK
[10 SCRA 493. March 31, 1964]
NOTES:
TOPIC: What is excluded from CPG Brought as
exclusive property
PONENTE: Regala, J.
FACTS:
Ramon Katigbak.
RATIO:
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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Veloso v. Martinez
No. 8715. October 24, 1914
TOPIC: What is excluded from CPG, FC 109;
Acquired by gratuitous title during
marriage,FC109(2) cf FC113-115, NCC1015
PONENTE: Johnson, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Mariano Veloso filed this petition to recover from respondent Lucia Martinez the possession of a parcel of land.
Lucia filed a counterclaim stating:
c. That Mariano must pay 18.5k as attys. fees for the service rendered by Domingo Franco (D.F.) to Mariano;
d. That Mariano must return the jewelry as it was alleged that it is in his possession or pay 6k as is was the value.
Lower court ruled that Mariano was entitled to the land and Lucia was entitled to (b).
ISSUE:
WON Lucia exclusively owns the jewelries. YES.
HELD:
It was admitted that before Mariano got the jewelries, Lucia inherited it from her mother.
From the record, she borrowed 4.5k from Mariano and the jewelry was made as security.
What was not clear was WON the jewelry was delivered to Mariano because it was in a closed box and the key remained in
the possession of D.F. Then Lucia became a widow of this D.F., and after his death, she was appointed administrator and she
possessed the key.
Mariano as defense states that such jewelries were pawned to him by D.F. w/ full and knowledge and consent of D.F. Lucia
denies this.
So the SC states that since Lucia inherited it, she has exclusive control and management over it until and unless she had
delivered it to her husband, before a notary public, with the intent that her" husband might administer it properly. Since no
contrary proof was shown, she could not be deprived of it by any act of her husband, w/o her consent.
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ONG v. CA
[204 SCRA 297. November 29, 1991]
NOTES:
TOPIC: Administration of exclusive property By the
other spouse
PONENTE: Paras, J.
FACTS:
Teodora Ong conducted her own logging business in Camarines Sur. She secured a loan from Francisco Boix in the amount of
P2,827.83.
She was unable to pay. Thus, Boix was awarded by the court a parcel of land that was to be auctioned.
CFI of Manila awarded the land to Boix.
Ramon Ong, husband of Teodora, filed an Omnibus Motion to quash the writ of possession. It was denied.
Ramon then filed before CA a petition to annul the auction sale as it was irregularly executed on the grounds that the
property was conjugal and thus could not be held liable for personal debts contracted by the wife, and that there was no
valid publication thus making the auction sale void. CA affirmed the decision of the Trial Court. Motion for reconsideration was
also denied.
ISSUE(S): Is the property conjugal? If yes, would it have been saved from being auctioned?
HELD: No, the property is not conjugal. No, it would not have been saved from being auctioned.
RATIO:
It is undisputed that the subject parcel was declared solely in the wifes name, but the house built thereon was declared in the
name of the spouses. The lot in question is a paraphernal property of the wife and should be liable for the debts of the wife.
When the property is registered in the name of a spouse only and there is no showing as to when the property was acquired
by said spouse, this is an indication that the property belongs exclusively to said spouse. And this presumption under Art. 160 of
the Civil Code cannot prevail when the title is in the name of only one spouse and the rights of innocent third parties are
involved.
Conjugal property may still be held liable for the debts of the wife.
Art 117 of the CC provides that the wife may engage in business although the husband may object, but there are no signs
that he objected and in fact even approved said business.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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VILLANUEVA v. CA
[G.R. No. 143286. April 14, 2004]
NOTES:
TOPIC: What are included in CPG
PONENTE: Carpio, J.
FACTS:
Eusebia Retuya is the legal wife of Nicolas Retuya having been married in 1926, and they begot 5 children.
During their marriage they acquired real properties and all improvements situated in Mandaue City, Consolacion and Cebu.
(22 stipulated properties)
In 1945, he no longer lived with Eusebia and cohabited with Pacita Villanueva, wherein Procopio, is their illegitimate son.
Nicolas, then was the only person who received income from these properties.
Pacita, from the time she started living in with Nicolas, has no occupation, she had no properties of her own from which she
could derive income.
In 1985, Nicolas suffered a stroke, cannot talk anymore and in the long run became senile and had a child-like mind.
Natividad Retuya, the eldest child of Eusebia, went to Procopio to negotiate about the properties. At this time, Procopio was
still the receiver of the income of these properties.
However, things were not settled. From a failed barangay mediation, it was raised to a court proceeding by Natividad. The
ruling was to transfer the sole administration of the spouses Eusebia-Nicolas to Eusebia because these were conjugal
properties, reconveyance of the lands, and ordering Procopio to account and turn-over all proceeds or rentals/income of the
conjugal properties when he took over as administrator until he shall have ceased administering.
Eusebia died in November 23,1996, and so Eusebias heirs substituted her, which the CA upheld.
Pacita and Nicolas were married on December 16, 1996 Take note: Nicolas was already in child-like state at this time.
ISSUE(S): Are the subject properties conjugal?
HELD: YES.
RATIO:
The Family Code provisions on conjugal partnership govern the property relations between Nicolas and Eusebia even if they
were married before the effectivity of the Family Code. Article 105 Family Code shall apply to conjugal partnerships
established before the FC w/o prejudice to vested rights already acquired under the Civil Code or other laws.
Presumption: If properties are acquired during the marriage - conjugal
Petitioners point out that the deed of sale, the transfer certificalte of title and tax declaration of Lot. No. 152 are all in the
name of Pacita and that Pacita is the real owner No. This is just one of the scheme Nicolas employed to deprive Eusebia of
their conjugal property.
Tax declarations are in the name of Nicolas alone, proving exclusive ownership No. Tax declarations are not sufficient proof
to overcome the presumption Article 116 (FC) Presumption remains even if the property is registered in the name of one or
both of the spouses.
Nicolas, in some documents, misrepresented his civil status by claiming that he was single, proving exclusive ownership No.
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Whether a property is conjugal or not is determined by law and not by the will of the spouses. No unilateral declaration by one
spouse can change the character of conjugal property.
Petitioners: The lot cannot be deemed conjugal of Eusebia and Nicolas because Pacita and Nicolas were already cohabiting.
JUSTICE CARPIO, ANNOYED: Petitioners keep belaboring this point in their petition and memorandum. The cohabitation of a
spouse with another, even for a long period, does not sever the tie of a subsisting marriage.
Proof of actual contribution by both live-in partners is required, otherwise, there is no co-ownership and no presumption of
sharing.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
FC 177 Conjugal properties include: those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund,
obtained from work of either or both spouses, fruits and net fruits from the exclusive property of each spouse, share of each spouse in
the hidden treasure, livestock upon the dissolution of the partnership and those acquired by chance (losses, however, shall be born
exclusively by the loser-spouse)
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MENDOZA v. REYES
AUTHOR:
[October 11, 1979]
NOTES:
PONENTE: Abad Santos, J.
FACTS:
The properties in question were bought under installment basis from Araneta.
Ponciano and Julia had to borrow money to pay; jointly obtained a loan to complete the construction of building and to
pay balance on price of lot. A deed of sale was made by Julia, with Poncianos signature under the phrase with my marital
consent. The titles of land were named after Julia Reyes, married to Ponciano Reyes.
On March, 1961, while Ponciano was absent attending his farm in Pampanga, Julia sold the lots in question together with their
improvements to the Medozas without his knowledge and consent.
Julia and Ponciano were living separately and were not in speaking terms.
A complaint was then filed by Ponciano for the annulment of a deed of sale for 2 parcels of land with their improvements
executed by his wife, Julia Reyes as vendor and the spouses Efren Mendoza and Inocencia De Mendoza as vendees.
Ponciano claims that the properties were conjugal properties and were sold without his knowledge and consent. The spouses
Mendoza alleged that properties were paraphernal properties of Julia (Julia herself supported this).
CFI: dismissed complaint and said that Julia can validly dispose of properties without the consent of her husband. CA reversed
the decision.
ISSUE(S): Are the parcels of land paraphernal property?
HELD: NO. The decision was affirmed.
RATIO:
Art. 135. (1) says what is conjugal property: that which is acquire by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the
common fund, whether acquisition be for the partnership or for only one of the spouses.
There was no question that the disputed property was acquired by onerous title during marriage.
The question of a common fund was not sufficiently addressed by the petitioners.
The records say that funds from loans that were obtained by the spouses were used. Under Art. 161 all debts and
obligations contracted by husband and wife for the benefit of the conjugal partnership are liabilities of the partnership.
Julias testimony is without merit, so it doesnt help the petition at all.
The fact that the land is later registered in the name of only one of the spouses does not destroy its conjugal nature.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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AGUETE v. PNB
[G.R. No. 170166. April 6, 2011]
NOTES:
PONENTE: Carpio, J.
FACTS:
Spouses Jose Ros and Estrella Aguete filed acomplaint for annulment against PNB before the Court of First Instance of Rizal.
Jose Ros previously obtained a loan in the amount of P115,000.00 from PNB and as security, a real estate mortgage over a
parcel of land with TCT. No. T-9646 was executed. Upon maturity, the loan remained unpaid and an extrajudicial foreclosure
proceeding on the mortgaged property was instituted by PNB. After the lapse of a year, the property was consolidated and
registered in the name of PNB.
Estrella Aguete, claiming she had no knowledge of the said loan nor the mortgage constituted on the land which is part of
their conjugal property, contested the transactions and filed for an annulment of the proceedings. She interposed in her
defense that the signatures affixed on the documents were forged and that the proceeds of the loan did not redound to the
benefit of the family.
RTC ruled for the spouses, stating that Aguete may during their marriage and within ten years from the transaction mentioned,
may ask the court for an annulment of the case. On notice of appeal by PNB, Court of Appeals reversed this ruling and found
for PNB, stating that forgery was concluded without adequate proof. It also found that the loan was used in the expansion of
the family business.
ISSUE(S): If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, that contract falls within the term x x x x obligations for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership.
Here, no actual benefit may be proved. It is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent at the signing of the contract. Where
the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will redound
to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
Court denies the petition.
RATIO:
Annulment of the contract will only be granted upon a finding that the wife did not give her consent to the transaction. Even
as Aguete disavows the documents supposedly acknowledged before the notary public, the document carries the
evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due exececution. It has in its favor the presumption of regularity which
may only be rebutted by evidence so clear, strong and convincing as to exclude all controversy as to the falsity of the
certificate.
Petitioners did not present any corroborating witness, such as a handwriting expert, who could authoritatively declare that
Aguetes signatures were really forged.
In her testimony, Aguete confirmed that Ros engaged in such business, but claimed to be unaware whether it prospered.
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Debts contracted by the husband for and in the exercise of the industry or profession by which he contributes to the support
of the family cannot be deemed to be his exclusive and private debts. It is immaterial, if in the end, his business or profession
fails or does not succeed, such may still be charged against the conjugal property of the spouses.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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JOVELLANOS v. CA
AUTHOR:
[G.R. No. 100728. June 18, 1992]
NOTES:
TOPIC: If property bought by installments
PONENTE: Regalado, J.
FACTS:
Daniel Jovellanos and Philamlife entered into a a lease and conditional sale agreement over a house and lot. At that time,
Daniel Jovellanos was married to Leonor Dizon, with whom he had three children, the petitioners.
Leonor Dizon died consequently. Then Daniel married private respondent Annette with whom he begot two children. The
daughter from the 1st marriage Mercy Jovellanos married Gil Martinez and at the behest of Daniel Jovellanos, they built a
house on the back portion of the premises.
With the lease amounts having been paid, Philamlife executed to Daniel Jovellanos a deed of absolute sale and, on the next
day, the latter donated to herein petitioners all his rights, title and interests over the lot and bungalow thereon. In 1985, Daniel
died.
Private respondent Annette H. Jovellanos claimed in the lower court that the aforestated property was acquired by her
deceased husband while their marriage was still subsisting and which forms part of the conjugal partnership of the second
marriage. Petitioners contend that the property, were acquired by their parents during the existence of the first marriage
under their lease and conditional sale agreement with Philamlife of September 2, 1955.
ISSUE(S): WON the house and lot pertains to the second marriage?
HELD: YES
RATIO:
The conditional sale agreement in said contract is, therefore, also in the nature of a contract to sell, as contradistinguished
from a contract of sale. In a contract to sell or a conditional sale, ownership is not transferred upon delivery of the property
but upon full payment of the purchase price. Generally, ownership is transferred upon delivery, but even if delivered, the
ownership may still be with the seller until full payment of the price is made, if there is stipulation to this effect. The stipulation is
usually known as a pactum reservati dominii, or contractual reservation of title, and is common in sales on the installment plan.
Compliance with the stipulated payments is a suspensive condition. The failure of which prevents the obligation of the vendor
to convey title from acquiring binding force.
Daniel consequently acquired ownership thereof only upon full payment of the said amount hence, although he had been in
possession of the premises since September 2, 1955, it was only on January 8, 1975 that Philamlife executed the deed of
absolute sale thereof in his favor.
Daniel Jovellanos did not enjoy the full attributes of ownership until the execution of the deed of sale in his favor. The law
recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established by law, 19
and, under the contract, Daniel Jovellanos evidently did not possess or enjoy such rights of ownership.
Upon the execution of said deed of absolute sale, full ownership was vested in Daniel Jovellanos. Since. as early as 1967, he
was already married to Annette H. Jovellanos, this property necessarily belonged to his conjugal partnership with his said
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second wife.
NB: But since it pertained to the second wife, she is still liable to pay the corresponding reimbursements to the petitioners who
helped pay for the amortization of the house and lot. Remember Article 118 of the Family Code on property bought on
installments, where ownership is vested during the marriage, such property shall belong to the conjugal partnership.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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TARROSA v DE LEON
[GR 185063, July 23, 2009]
TOPIC: What constitutes CPG - if property bought by
installments
AUTHOR: PARIAN
*Lot bought from PHHC on installment basis under contract to SELL

1. In 1965, Bonifacio De Leon, then single, and the PHHC entered into a Conditional Contract to Sell for the purchase on
installment of a parcel of land
2. In 1968, Bonifacio married respondent Anita de Leon.
3. In 1970, following the full payment for the, a Final Deed of Sale in favor of Bonifacio was executed. Accordingly, Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) was issued in 1972 in the name of Bonifacio, "single."
4. Subsequently, Bonifacio sold the subject lot to her sister, Lita, and husband Felix Rio Tarrosa (Tarrosas), petitioners herein. The
conveying Deed of Sale dated January 12, 1974 did not bear the written consent and signature of Anita.
5. On February 29, 1996, Bonifacio died. Three months later, the Tarrosas registered the Deed of Sale and had the former TCT
cancelled.
6. Getting wind of the cancellation of their fathers (and Anitas husband) title, Anita, Danilo, and Vilma filed a reconveyance suit.
7. Tarrosas assert that, since Bonifacio purchased the lot from PHHC on installment before he married Anita, the land was
Bonifacios exclusive property and not conjugal, even though some installments were paid and the title was issued to Bonifacio
during the marriage.
ISSUE(S): Is the property part of the CPG?
HELD: Yes, therefore Bonifacios sale, without his wifes consent, to the petitioners is void
RATIO:
1. Tarrosas assertion is wrong. Article 160 of the 1950 Civil Code, the governing provision in effect at the time Bonifacio and Anita
contracted marriage, provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership unless it is proved
that it pertains exclusively to the husband or the wife.
2. Only proof of acquisition during the marriage is needed to raise the presumption that the property is conjugal. In fact, even when
the manner in which the properties were acquired does not appear, the presumption will still apply, and the properties will still be
considered conjugal.
3. In the case at bar, ownership over the lot and covered by the Conditional Contract to Sell was only transferred during the
marriage of Bonifacio and Anita; as such, ownership to the property is, by law, presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership.
4. The mere registration of a property in the name of one spouse does not destroy its conjugal nature. What is material is the time
when the property was acquired.
5. Since the sale of the CPG lot was without Anitas consent, its void. And even on the supposition that Bonifacio only sold his portion
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of the conjugal partnership, the sale is still theoretically void, for the right of the husband or the wife to one-half of the conjugal assets
does not vest until the liquidation of the conjugal partnership
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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Munoz, Jr. v Ramirez
GR 156125, August 25, 2010
TOPIC: Improvements on CPG property
PONENTE:
AUTHOR: PARIAN
Paraphernal property - refers to property over which the wife has complete
control.

Ramirez spouses mortgaged a residential lot (which the wife inherited) to the GSIS to secure a housing loan (200k). Thereafter,
they used the money loaned to construct a residential house on said lot.
It is alleged that MUNOZ granted the spouses a 600k loan, which the latter used to pay the debt to GSIS. The balance of the
loan (400k) will be delivered by MUNOZ upon surrender of the title over the property and an affidavit of waiver of rights (over
the property) to be executed by the husband.
While the spouses were able to turn over the title, no affidavit was signed by the husband. Consequently, MUNOZ refused to
give the 400k balance of the loan and since the spouses could no longer return the 200k (which was already paid to GSIS),
MUNOZ kept the title over the property and subsequently, caused the issuance of a new one in his own name.
The spouses then filed a case for the annulment of the purported sale of the property in favor of MUNOZ. The RTC ruled that
the property was the wifes exclusive paraphernal property (since she inherited it from her father) and as such, the sale is valid
even without the husbands consent.
The CA reversed and ruled that while the property was originally exclusive paraphernal property of the wife, it became
conjugal property when it was used as a collateral for a housing loan that was paid through conjugal funds. Hence, the sale is
void.
ISSUE(S): Is the property paraphernal or conjugal?
HELD: Paraphernal
RATIO:
As a general rule, all property acquired during the marriage is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved.
In this case, clear evidence that the wife inherited the lot from her father has sufficiently rebutted this presumption of conjugal
ownership. Consequently, the residential lot is the wifes exclusive paraphernal property (pursuant to Article 92 and 109 of FC).
It was an error for the CA to apply Article 158 of the CC and the ruling on Calimlim-Canullas. True, respondents were married
during the effectivity of the CC and thus its provisions should govern their property relations. With the enactment of the FC
however, the provisions of the latter on conjugal partnership of gains superseded those of the CC.
Thus, it is the FC that governs the present case and not the CC. And under Article 120 of the FC (which supersedes Article 158
of the CC), when the cost of the improvement and any resulting increase in the value are more than the value of the property
at the time of the improvement, the entire property shall belong to the conjugal partnership, subject to reimbursement;
otherwise, the property shall be retained in ownership by the owner-spouse, likewise subject to reimbursement for the cost of
improvement.
In this case, the husband only paid a small portion of the GSIS loan (60k). Thus, it is fairly reasonable to assume that the value of
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the residential lot is considerably more than the contribution paid by the husband.
Thus, the property remained the exclusive paraphernal property of the wife at the time she contracted with MUNOZ; the
written consent of the husband was not necessary.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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Mariano vs. CA
174 SCRA 59
TOPIC: charges upon and obligations of CPG
PONENTE:
AUTHOR: PARIAN
conjugal property liable to wifes RTW business

1. This action originated from a suit by Esther Sanchez against Lourdes Mariano in Caloocan RTC for recovery of RTW she delivered to
Lourdes. This resulted in the seizure of Lourdes property worth 15,000.
2. Lourdes appealed to the Court of Appeals and it ordered the trial court to receive evidence. Upon trial, it was found that the
attachment had been improperly issued and consequently dissolved it. The Court ordered Esther to pay Lourdes for damages.
3. In virtue of the writ of execution, the sheriff levied real and personal property belonging to the conjugal partnership of Esther and
her husband Daniel Sanchez. Esther prayed for annulment of the execution pending appeal but was denied.
4. Daniel then filed his own petition. He claimed that the conjugal assets could not validly be made to answer for obligations
contracted by Esther. QC RTC agreed and ordered the sheriff of Caloocan RTC to desist from auctioning the property.
5. Lourdes appealed to the CA but was dismissed. The CA held that the QC RTC did not interfere with the execution of the
Caloocan RTC because Daniels action raised an issue different from that in the Caloocan RTC.
ISSUE(S): Should the Sanchez conjugal property be held liable to Esthers obligations?
HELD: Yes. Daniel consented to the business of Esther and the benefit redounded to the partnership.
RATIO:
1. The conjugal partnership of Daniel and Esther was liable for the debts and obligations contracted by Esther in her business since the
income derived from it had redounded to the benefit of the partnership.
2. Esther engaged in business not only without the objection of the part of Daniel but in truth with his consent and approval.
3. The intervention of the QC RTC was erroneous since the Caloocan RTC had jurisdiction over the case. Daniel cannot be deemed a
stranger to the case prosecuted and adjudged against Esther. Only strangers may initiate an entirely separate and distinct action for
preliminary injunction against the sheriff.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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Homeowners Savings and Loan vs. Dailo
[G.R. No. 153802, Mar.11, 2005]
TOPIC: charges upon obligations of CPG
PONENTE:
AUTHOR: PARIAN
Under the Spanish Civil Code, the wifes consent to the sale of conjugal
property is not required.

1. Miguela and Marcelino Dailo, Jr. were married on August 8, 1967.
2. During their marriage, the spouses purchased a house and lot in Bgy. San Francisco, San Pablo City from a certain Sandra Dalida.
3. The subject property was declared for tax assessment purposes under Assessment of Real Property.
4. The deed of absolute sale, however, was executed only in favor of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. as vendee to the exclusion of his
wife.
5. Marcelino executed an SPA in favor of one Lilibeth Gesmundo, authorizing her to obtain a loan from Homeowners Savings and
Loan Bank to be secured by the spouses house and lot in San Pablo City.
6. Gesmundo obtained a P300,000 loan, and as security, she executed on the same day a Real Estate Mortgage constituted on the
subject property in favor of the Bank.
7. However, this transaction, including the execution of the SPA, took place without Miguelas knowledge.
8. The loan was not paid, and so the Bank instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property. And
subsequently, the Bank, being the highest bidder in the public sale, was issued a Certificate of Sale.
9. Marcelino died in 1995.
10. In one of her visits to the subject property, she learned that the Bank had already employed Roldan Brion to clean its premises and
that her car, a Ford seldan, was razed because Brion allowed a boy to play with fire within the premises.
11. Claiming she had no knowledge of the mortgage on the subject conjugal property, she instituted a civil case for the nullity of the
certificate of sale. The bank was ordered to reconvey the said property.
12. On appeal, the CA declared as void the mortgage on the subject property since it was constituted without the wifes knowledge
and consent.
ISSUE(S): Is the conjugal partnership liable for the payment of the loan?
HELD: NO.
RATIO:
In applying Article 124 of the Family Code, the court declared that the absence of the consent of one renders the entire sale
null and void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the husband who contracted the sale.
In the absence of a marriage settlement, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains governed the
property relations between them. With the effectivity of the FC, Chapter 4 on CPG was made applicable to the CPG already
established, unless vested rights have already been acquired.
The conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on contract of partnership, unlike in absolute community which is rules
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on co-ownership.
Under FC 121, The conjugal partnership shall be liable for debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the
consent of the other to the extent that the family may have been benefited.
There is nothing in the records to compel a finding that indeed, the loan obtained by Marcelino redounded to the benefit of
the family, and so, the conjugal partnership cannot be held liable for the payment of principal obligation.
Ei incumbit probation qui dicit, non qui negat (He who asserts, not he who denies, must prove) --the bank was not able to
prove
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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ANDO v CAMPO
GR 184007, February 16, 2011
TOPIC: charges upon and obligations of CPG
PONENTE:
AUTHOR: PARIAN
NLRC National Labor Relations Commission

Paquito Ando (petitioner) was the president of Premier Allied and Contracting Services, Inc. (PACSI), an independent labor
contractor.
Andresito Campo and the other respondents were hired by PACSI as pilers or haulers. Respondents were dismissed from
employment. Consequently filing a case for illegal dismissal and some money claims with the NLRC.
The Labor Arbiter ruled in respondents favor. PACSI and Ando were directed to pay a total of P422,702.28 (for separation pay
and award of attorneys fees). PACSI and Ando appealed to NLRC, which affirmed the Labor Arbiters decision. Respondents
moved for its execution.
To answer for the reward, the NLRC acting sheriff issued a Notice of Sale on Execution of Personal Property over a property in
the name of Paquito V. Ando xxx married to Erlinda S. Ando.; prompting Ando to file an action for prohibition before the
RTC.
Ando claims that the property belonged to him and his wife and not the corporation, and hence, could not be the subject of
the execution sale.
RTC denied the prayer for TRO and directed him to file a claim with the NLRC Sheriff.
Instead, Ando filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. Ando argued that the property to be levied belonged to him and
his wife in their personal capacity and thus the execution should not prosper. It was likewise denied.
ISSUE(S): WON the property owned by Ando and his wife could be levied for reason of a debt incurred by him, in his representative
capacity and his company, PACSI.
HELD: NO
RATIO:
The power of the NLRC to execute its judgment extends only to properties unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor
alone.
Thus, a sheriff has no authority to attach the property of any person except that of the judgment debtor. The property in
question belongs not only to Ando, but his wife as well.
She stands to lose the property subject to execution without ever being a party to the case which is tantamount to
deprivation of property without due process.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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Security Bank vs Mar Tiera Corp.
AUTHOR: PARIAN
G.R. No. 143382
TOPIC: charges upon and obligations of CPG with
consent
PONENTE:
1. Mar Tierra Corporation, through its president, Wilfrido C. Martinez, applied for a P12,000,000 credit accommodation with petitioner
Security Bank and Trust Company
2. On July 2, 1980, the credit line agreement was amended and increased to P14,000,000
3. It was able to pay P4,648,000 for the principal loan and P2,729,195.56 for the interest and other charges.
4. However, the corporation was not able to pay the balance as it suffered business reversals, eventually ceasing operations in 1984.
5. Security Bank complaint for a sum of money with a prayer for preliminary attachment against respondent corporation and
individual respondents
6. RTC issued a writ of attachment on all real and personal properties of respondent corporation and individual respondent
Martinez
7. The conjugal house and lot of the spouses Wilfrido and Josefina Martinez was levied on
ISSUE(S): Can the RTC levy the conjugal house?
HELD: NO.
RATIO:
1. The conjugal partnership is liable for "all debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership."
2. The principal contract, the credit line agreement between petitioner and corporation, was solely for the benefit of the
corporation.
3. The accessory contract (the indemnity agreement) under which individual respondent Martinez assumed the obligation of a surety
for respondent corporation was similarly for the corporations benefit.
4. Petitioner had the burden of proving that the conjugal partnership of the spouses Martinez benefited from the transaction.
5. It failed to discharge that burden.
6. To hold the conjugal partnership liable for an obligation pertaining to the husband alone defeats the objective of the Civil Code to
protect the solidarity and well being of the family as a unit.
7. The underlying concern of the law is the conservation of the conjugal partnership
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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Ravina v Villa-Abrille
AUTHOR: PARIAN
GR No. 160708, Oct. 16, 2009
TOPIC: charges upon CPG without consent
PONENTE:
*2 adjoining lots, 1 under CPG, the other exclusive property
Respondent Mary Ann Villa Abrille and Pedro Villa Abrille are husband and wife. They have four children, who are also parties
to the instant case and are represented by their mother, Mary Ann.
In 1982, the spouses acquired a parcel of land. Said lot is adjacent to a parcel of land which Pedro acquired when he was still
single and which is registered solely in his name
Through their joint efforts and the proceeds of a loan from DBP, the spouses built a house on those 2 lots. When the house was
finished, the spouses continuously made improvements on those properties.
In 1991, Pedro got a mistress and began to neglect his family. He offered to sell the house and the two lots to herein
petitioners, Patrocinia and Wilfredo Ravina. Mary Ann objected and notified the petitioners of her objections, but Pedro
nonetheless sold the house and the two lots without Mary Anns consent; she didnt sign the deed of sale.
Thus, respondents Mary Ann and her children filed a complaint for Annulment of Sale. During the trial, Pedro declared that the
house was built with his own money.
ISSUE(S): Is the sale of the 2 lots by Pedro, (w/o Anitas consent) valid?
HELD: Only the sale of his exclusive property is valid
RATIO:
That 1 lot which was acquired in 1982 during the marriage of Pedro and Mary Ann is conjugal in nature.
Likewise, the house built thereon is conjugal property, having been constructed through the joint efforts of the spouses, who
had even obtained a loan from DBP to construct the house
A sale or encumbrance of conjugal property concluded after the effectivity of the Family Code in 1988, is governed by Article
124 of the same Code that now treats such a disposition to be void if done without the consent of both the husband and the
wife
If the sale was with the knowledge but without the approval of the wife, thereby resulting in a disagreement, such sale is
annullable at the instance of the wife who is given five (5) years from the date the contract. Here, respondent Mary Ann
timely filed the action for annulment of sale.
As to the other lot, there is no issue with it which was an exclusive property of Pedro, having been acquired by him before his
marriage to Mary Ann.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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Fuentes vs. Roca
[GR. No. 178902, 2010]
TOPIC: Effect and retroactivity
PONENTE: Abad, J.

NOTES:

October 11, 1982 Sabina Tarroza sold a parcel of land to her son, Tarciano T. Roca (Tarciano) under a deed of
absolute sale.
1988 - Tarciano offered to sell the lot to the Fuentes spouses (petitioners). The agreement required the Fuentes spouses
to pay Tarciano a down payment of P60,000.00 for the transfer of the lots title to him. Within six months, Tarciano was
to clear the lot of structures and occupants and secure the consent of his estranged wife, Rosario Gabriel Roca
(Rosario), to the sale.
Atty. Plagata fixed all the requirements of the sale and he allegedly went to see Rosario in one of his trips to Manila
and had her sign an affidavit of consent. He then notarized the said affidavit.
1989 Tarciano executed a deed of absolute sale.
1990 Tarciano died.
1997 Respondents (children of Tarciano and Rosario) filed an action of annulment of sale since their mother did not
give consent to the sale.
Petitioners contend that Rosario gave her consent as evidenced by the affidavit that was notarized bearing her
signature and that four year prescriptive period on filing already elapsed.
ISSUE(S):
1. WON Rosarios signature on the document of consent to her husband Tarcianos sale of their conjugal land to the Fuentes spouses
was forged;
2. WON the Rocas action for the declaration of nullity of that sale to the spouses already prescribed; and
3. WON only Rosario, the wife whose consent was not had, could bring the action to annul that sale.
HELD:
1. YES. Different strokes.
2. NO.
3. NO. Heirs can bring an action to annul the sale.
RATIO:
The law that applies to this case is the Family Code, not the Civil Code. Although Tarciano and Rosario got married in 1950,
Tarciano sold the conjugal property to the Fuentes spouses on January 11, 1989.
While its Article 165 made Tarciano the sole administrator of the conjugal partnership, Article 166 prohibited him from selling
commonly owned real property without his wifes consent.
Still, if he sold the same without his wifes consent, the sale is not void but merely voidable. Article 173 gave Rosario the right to
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have the sale annulled during the marriage within ten years from the date of the sale.
Article 124 of the Family Code does not provide a period within which the wife who gave no consent may assail her
husbands sale of the real property. It simply provides that without the other spouses written consent or a court order allowing
the sale, the same would be void.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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PANA v. HEIRS OF JUANITE, SR.
[G.R. No. 164201. December 10, 2012.]
NOTES:
TOPIC: Requisites of validity of marriage settlements
Prior to marriage
PONENTE: Abad, J.
FACTS:
The prosecution accused petitioner Efren Pana (Efren), his wife Melecia, and others of murder before the RTC of Surigao City.
RTC rendered a consolidated decision2
RTC acquitted Efren of the charge for insufficiency of evidence but finding Melecia and another person guilty as charged
and sentenced them to the penalty of death. The RTC ordered those found guilty to pay each of the heirs of the victims.
Upon motion for execution by the heirs of the deceased, the RTC ordered the issuance of the writ resulting in the levy of real
properties registered in the names of Efren and Melencia. Subsequently, a notice of levy and a notice of sale on execution
were issued.
Efren and his wife Melecia filed a motion to quash the writ of execution claiming that the properties levied were conjugal
assets and not paraphernal of Melecia. RTC denied the motion.
The spouses moved for reconsideration but the RTC denied the same. In this case, it is submitted that Efren and Melencia were
married when the Civil Code was still in effect. They did not execute a pre-nuptial agreement, hence CPG governed their
property relations.
However, both RTC and CA held that property regime changed into ACP when family code took effect it reason out that Art.
256 of the Family Code provides that the Code shall have retroactive effect in so far as it does not prejudice or impair vested
or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
ISSUE(S): Can the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Melencia can be levied and executed upon for the satisfaction of
Melencias civil liability in the aforesaid murder case?
HELD: YES, provided that the conditions under Art. 121 of the Family Code have been covered.
RATIO:
Efren and Melecias property relation was admittedly conjugal under the Civil Code but, since the transitory provision of the
Family Code gave its provisions retroactive effect if no vested or acquired rights are impaired, that property relation between
the couple was changed when the Family Code took effect in 1988. The latter code now prescribes in Article 75 absolute
community of property for all marriages unless the parties entered into a prenuptial agreement.
Both the RTC and the Court of the Appeals are in error on this point. While it is true that the personal stakes of each spouses in
their conjugal assets are unclear prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership of gains and therefore none of them can
be said to have acquired vested rights in specific assets , it is evident that Article 256 of the Family Code does not intend to
read back and automatically convert into absolute community of property relations all conjugal partnership of gains that
existed before 1988 excepting only those with prenuptial agreements.
Therefore, the conjugal partnership of gains that governed the marriage between Efren and Melecia who were married prior to
1988 cannot be modified except before the celebration of that marriage.
Art. 121 allows payment of the criminal indemnities imposed on his wife, Melecia, out of the partnership assets even before
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these are liquidated.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Art. 121. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
(1) The support of the spouse, their common children, and the legitimate children of either spouse; however, the support of
illegitimate children shall be governed by the provisions of this Code on Support;
(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated administrator-spouse for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership of gains, or by both spouses or by one of them with the consent of the other;
(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have
benefited;
(4) All taxes, liens, charges, and expenses, including major or minor repairs upon the conjugal partnership property;
(5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during the marriage upon the separate property of either spouse;
(6) Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or complete a professional, vocational, or other activity for self-improvement;
(7) Antenuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have redounded to the benefit of the family;
(8) The value of what is donated or promised by both spouses in favor of their common legitimate children for the exclusive purpose
of commencing or completing a professional or vocational course or other activity for self-improvement; and
(9) Expenses of litigation between the spouses unless the suit is found to be groundless.
If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance
with their separate properties.
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Guiang v. CA
G.R. No. 125172. June 26, 1998
TOPIC: Ownership, administration and
enjoyment; Joint administration, FC124 cf.
FC96, 142
PONENTE: Panganiban, J.
FACTS:
Respondent Gilda Corpuz married Judie Corpuz in Bacolod City and had 3 children.
On Feb. 14, 1983, they bought a 421 sqm. lot in Koronadal, South Cotobato from a Manuel Callejo for 14k.
On April 22, 1988, Corpuz sps. sold 1/2 of the lot to petitioner-sps. Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang.
Gilda left for Manila to look for work on June 1989. But on Jan. 1990, Harriet Corpuz, 1 of their children, found out that Judie
wanted to sell the remaining 1/2 of the lot including the house built on it w/c they actually live in, to the Guiang sps. Hence,
she wrote a letter to their mother Gilda and Gilda wrote back objecting the sale. Unfortunately, Harriet gave the letter to the
Guiang sps. instead of Judie.
The sale went on even if Gilda was still in Manila and Judie made a deed of transfer of rights in favor of Guiang sps for 30k.
Since there was a defect (not really a defect, its void), Luzviminda made an agreement over the 1st 1/2 of the lot sold to
them, in favor of the spouse of Manuel Callejo, Manuela.
On March 11, 1990, Gilda returned to home to South Cotobato but she was complained of trespassing by the Guiang sps.
before the barangay and they made an amicable settlement where Gilda and the children have to leave the premises
voluntarily.
On May 28, 1990, Gilda filed a complaint against her husband Judie Corpuz and Guiang sps. She wants to declare the deed
of sale null and void because Judie sold it w/o her consent.
RTC of Koronadal, South Cotobato ruled in favor of Gilda. CA affirmed. Both stating that the sale of the husband Judie was
w/o Gildas consent under FC124. The amicable settlement as well was void under NCC1409.
ISSUE:
WON the sale and the amicable settlement were valid. NO.
HELD:
Guiang sps. insist its only voidable contract pursuant to NCC1390(2) which is about vitiated consent. But the SC states that it is
NOT vitiated consent because it was very clear the sale happened while Gilda was still in Manile, hence, consent was absent.
Guiang sps. also insist that the amicable settlement made in the barangay ratified the sale. But again, the SC states that it is
also VOID because it was a direct result of the deed of transfer of rights which was also VOID as pointed out in the 1st bullet.
This is pursuant to NCC1422.
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AGGABAO v. PARULAN
[G.R. No. 165803. September 1, 2010]
NOTES: Looooong facts sorry
TOPIC: Joint administration
FACTS:
This action involves two parcels of land located in Paraaque City and registered in the name of respondents Spouses Maria
Elena A. Parulan and Dionisio Z. Parulan, Jr., who have been estranged from one another.
Marta K. Atanacio, a real estate broker, offered the property to the petitioners. Ma. Elena showed the owners original copy of
TCT a certified true copy of TCT, tax declarations; and a copy of the special power of attorney executed by Dionisio
authorizing Ma. Elena to sell the property.
Petitioners paid 20k as earnest money with receipt that stipulated: (a) they would pay an additional payment of 130k; (b) they
would pay the balance of the bank loan of the respondents amounting to 650k; and (c) they would make the final payment of
700k once Ma. Elena turned over the property.
Petitioners then checked the validity of the TCT in the Office of the Register of Deeds and the Assessors Office of Paraaque
City. They discovered that one of the lots had been encumbered to Banco Filipino, but that the encumbrance had been
cancelled due to the full payment of the obligation. They noticed that the loan was effected through and SPA executed by
Dionisio in favor of Elena. The other lot on the other hand had an annotation of an existing mortgage in favor of Los Baos Rural
Bank, with the same SPA with a court order authorizing Elena to mortgage the lot to secure the loan.
The petitioners delivered P130,000.00 as additional down payment; and subsequently P650,000.00 to the Los Baos Rural Bank,
which then released the owners duplicate copy of TCT to them.
The petitioners delivered the final amount of P700,000.00 to Elena, who executed a deed of absolute sale in their favor.
However, Elena did not turn over the owners duplicate copy of the TCT claiming that said copy was in the possession of a
relative who was then in Hongkong. She assured them that the owners duplicate copy of TCT would be turned over after a
week.
The TCT was cancelled and a new one was issued in the name of the petitioners. Elena did not turn over the duplicate owners
copy of TCT as promised. In due time, the petitioners learned that the duplicate owners copy of TCT had been all along in the
custody of Atty. Jeremy Z. Parulan, who appeared to hold an SPA executed by his brother Dionisio authorizing him to sell both
lots. The petitioners met with Atty. Parulan at the Manila Peninsula. They were accompanied by one Atty. Olandesca. They
recalled that Atty. Parulan smugly demanded P800,000.00 in exchange for the duplicate owners copy of TCT, because Atty.
Parulan represented the current value of the property to be P1.5 million. As a counter-offer, however, they tendered
P250,000.00, which Atty. Parulan declined, giving them only until April 5, 1991 to decide. Hearing nothing more from the
petitioners, Atty. Parulan decided to call them on April 5, 1991, but they informed him that they had already fully paid to Elena.
Dionisio filed a petitiom praying for the declaration of the nullity of the deed of absolute sale executed by Ma. Elena, and the
cancellation of the title issued to the petitioners by virtue thereof. In turn, the petitioners filedtheir own action for specific
performance with damages against the respondents. Both cases were consolidated for trial and judgment in the RTC.
RTC Makati City declared that the SPA in the hands of Ma. Elena is forged. It rendered the sale void pursuant to Art. 124 of FC.
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The CA affirmed the RTC decision.
ISSUE(S): Does Art. 124 of the Family Code apply to the sale of the conjugal property executed without the consent of Dionisio?
HELD: Yes. CA decision affirmed.
RATIO:
The sale was made on March 18, 1991, or after August 3, 1988, the effectivity of the Family Code. The proper law to apply is,
therefore, Article 124 of the Family Code, for it is settled that any alienation or encumbrance of conjugal property made during
the effectivity of the Family Code is governed by Art. 124 of the Family Code.
Art. 256 of the Family Code also provides that the Family Code may apply retroactively provided no vested rights are impaired.
In Tumlos v. Fernandez, the Court rejected the petitioners argument that the Family Code did not apply because the
acquisition of the contested property had occurred prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, and pointed out that Article 256
provided that the Family Code could apply retroactively if the application would not prejudice vested or acquired rights
existing before the effectivity of the Family Code. In the case, the petitioners did not show any vested right in the property
acquired prior to August 3, 1988 that exempted their situation from the retroactive application of the Family Code.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Article 124
The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement,
the husbands decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within
five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the
other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of
the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall
be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person,
and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer
is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
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UY v. COURT OF APPEALS
[G.R. No. 109557. November 29, 2000]
NOTES:
TOPIC: Incapacity
PONENTE: Pardo, J.
FACTS:
Dr. Ernesto Jardelaza suffered stroke that rendered him comatose. Gilda (Petitioner), wife of the latter, filed a petition in RTC
Iloilo to be allowed as sole administrator of their conjugal property and be authorized to sell the same as her husband is
physically incapacitated to discharge his functions.
She further alleged that the expenses needed for the illness of the husband would require her to sell their property. RTC ruled in
favor of Gilda contending that such decision is pursuant to Article 124 of FC and that the proceedings thereon are governed
by the rules on summary proceedings.
The son of the spouses, Teodoro, filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the petition made by her mother was
essentially a petition for guardianship of the person and properties of his father. As such it cannot be prosecuted in
accordance with the provisions on summary proceedings instead it should follows the rules governing special proceedings in
the Revised Rules of Court requiring procedural due process particularly the need for notice and a hearing on the merits. He
further reiterated that Chapter 2 of the FC comes under the heading on Separation in Fact Between Husband and Wife
contemplating a situation where both spouses are of disposing mind. Hence, he argued that this should not be applied in
their case.
During the pendency of the motion, Gilda sold the property to her daughter and son in law. Upon the appeal by Teodoro,
CA reversed the decision of the lower court.
ISSUE(S): Can Gilda, as the wife of a husband who suffered stroke, assume sole powers of administration of the conjugal property and
dispose a parcel of land with improvements?
HELD: No. The Court ruled in favor of Teodoro. The Court affirms the decision of the CA.
RATIO:
The rule on summary proceedings does not apply to cases where the non-consenting spouse is incapacitated or
incompetent to give consent.
In this case, trial court found that subject spouse was incompetent who was in a comatose condition and with a diagnosis of
brain stem infract. Hence, the proper remedy is a judicial guardianship proceeding under the Revised Rules of Court. The law
provides that wife who assumes sole powers of administration has the same powers and duties as a guardian and not the
power of disposition and encumbrance of property as these powers require consent of the other spouse or court authority.
Consequently, a spouse who desires to sell real property as administrator of the conjugal property, must observe the
procedure for the sale of the wards estate required of judicial guardians, and not the summary judicial proceedings under
FC.
The Court further held that such incapacity of the trial court to provide for an opportunity to be heard is null and void on the
ground of lack of due process.
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SABALONES v CA
[G.R. No. 106169. February 14, 1994]
TOPIC: Effects of pendency of legal separation
administration of properties
PONENTE: Cruz, J.
AUTHOR: PARIAN

Samson Sabalos was an ambassador. While out of the country, Remedios was the administrator of their conjugal
properties.
After retiring in 1985, Sabalones returned to the Philippines but not to his wife, Remedios.
He filed an action for judicial authorization to sell a building and lot belonging to the conjugal partnership; for his
medical expenses.
Remedios opposed the authorization and filed a counterclaim for legal separation. She alleged that she and her six
children with him are living in the said property; and that their residence in Forbes Park was on lease; and that they
depend for their support on such lease revenues. More over, that when he returned, he instead cohabit with
Curameng and their children.
Because of this, Remedios prayed for legal separation, the liquidation of the conjugal properties, and that Sabalones
is forfeited of his share because of his adultery. She also prayed to enjoin him from disturbing the tenants in Forbes Park
and from disposing any of the conjugal properties.
The lower court decreed the legal separation and the forfeiture of Sabalones share in the conjugal properties.
Sabalones appealed this decision. While the case was pending, Remedios filed a writ of preliminary injunction to
prevent Sabalones from interfering with the administration of their properties alleging that Sabalones was harassing
the tenants in Forbes Park.
The Court of Appeals granted the preliminary injunction.
Sabalones filed for petition for review of this order arguing FC Art. 124 provides that the administration and enjoyment
of the conjugal properties belong to both spouses jointly. Therefore, no injunctive relief can be issued against him.
And that the court failed to appoint an administrator of the conjugal assets after the filing of the petition for legal
separation, as mandated by Art. 61.
ISSUE(S): WON the injunctive relief should be issued despite FC Art 124.
HELD: Yes. Petition denied. Injunction affirmed.
RATIO:
It is true that there was no formal designation of administrator, but the designation was implicit when the lower court denied
Sabalones of his share in the conjugal properties. Thus, disqualifying him as well to be an administrator.
There is enough evidence to raise doubts that entrusting the properties to Sabalones may result to the detriment of his wife
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and children.
The Supreme Court agrees that it would be prudent not to allow him in the meantime to participate in its management; given
that he harassed the tenants and that he issued a quit claim regarding a conjugal property in US in favor of Curameng.
Therefore, injuctive relief is proper to protect Remedios and their children.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
The right of a spouse to administer the conjugal property is also forfeited when his or her share to it was forfeited as a result of a
petition for legal separation.
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CHEESMAN v. IAC
[G.R. No. 74833. January 21, 1991]
NOTES:
TOPIC: Disposition and encumbrance
PONENTE: Narvasa, J.
FACTS:
Thomas Cheesman and Criselda P. Cheesman were married then separated.
A "Deed of Sale and Transfer of Possessory Rights" was executed by Armando Altares conveying a parcel of unregistered land
and the house in favor of Criselda. Thomas, although aware of the deed, did not object to the transfer being made only to his
wife.
Tax declarations for the property purchased were issued in the name only of Criselda Cheesman.
Criselda assumed exclusive management and administration of said property, leasing it to tenants.
Criselda sold the property to Estelita M. Padilla, without the knowledge or consent of Thomas.
Thomas brought suit against his wife, Criselda, and Estelita Padilla in CFI Olongapo City, praying for the annulment of the sale
on the ground that the transaction had been executed without his knowledge and consent. The decision was in favor of
Thomas. The sale was declared void and Thomas is declared the administrator of the property.
Defendants alleges that (1) the property sold was paraphernal, having been purchased by Criselda with funds exclusively
belonging to her (2) Thomas, being an American, was disqualified to have any interest or right of ownership in the land; and
(3) Estelita Padilla was a buyer in good faith. The Trial Court then executed a summary judgment presenting that the sale is
valid since it was a paraphernal property of Criselda.
Thomas appealed in the IAC. His petition was denied.
ISSUE(S): Is the property a paraphernal property of Criselda?
HELD: Yes. Decision affirmed.
RATIO:
Both Courts found that the fact that the funds used by Criselda was money she had earned and saved prior to her marriage
to Thomas.
Thomas cannot acquire the property because of the constitutional prohibition on aliens to own property in the Philippines.
Thus, assuming that it was his intention that the lot in question be purchased by him and his wife, he acquired no right
whatever over the property by virtue of that purchase;
Estelita Padilla is a purchaser in good faith, both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court having found that Cheesman's own
conduct had led her to believe the property to be exclusive property of the latter's wife, freely disposable by her without
hisconsent or intervention.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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FLORES v LINDO
G.R. No. 183984. April 13, 2011
TOPIC: Disposition and encumbrance of CPG
PONENTE: Carpio, J.
AUTHOR: PARIAN
Case is about procedural law. See bold text for issue/ratio related to the
topic.

Edna Lindo (wife, respondent) obtained a P400,000 loan from Flores (petitioner). To secure the loan, Edna executed a
Deed of Real Estate Mortgage of her property with her husband, Enrico.
Oct. 31, 1995 - Edna signed a promissory note and the Deed for herself and for her husband as his attorney-in-fact.
Nov. 4, 1995 Enrico issued an SPA in favor of Edna to mortgage the said property.
She issued three checks as partial payments but all of them were dishonored.
Flores filed a Complaint for Foreclosure of Mortgage.
RTC ruled that petitioner was not entitled to judicial foreclosure of mortgage because the deed was executed without
the consent of Enrico since the SPA was only issued after the execution of the Deed. Hence, the mortgage deed is
void.
But Flores is not precluded in filing a personal action against Edna for recovering the loan.
He then filed a Complaint for Sum of Money against the spouses.
The Lindo spouses prayed for its dismissal due to forum shopping and res judicata.
RTC denied the motion to dismiss and the subsequent MR; ruling that res judicata will not apply to rights, claims or
demands which, although growing out of the same subject matter, constitute separate or distinct causes of action
and were not put in issue in the former action;
And that the previous RTC decision did not mean that petitioner could no longer recover the loan petitioner extended
to Edna.
The Lindos appealed. CA ruled that Flores has only two alternative remedies to collect: either a personal action for the
collection of debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage, but not both.
By filing a petition for foreclosure of the real estate mortgage, CA held that Flores had already waived his personal
action to recover the amount covered by the promissory note.
Therefore, the Complaint for Sum of Money against the Lindos was dismissed.
Flores filed for certiorari.
ISSUE(S): WON the Complaint for Sum of Money should be dismissed due to multiplicity of suits. NO.
WON the deed of mortgage is void. NO.
RATIO:
Edna did not deny before the RTC, that she obtained the loan. She claimed, however, that her husband did not give his
consent and that he was not aware of the transaction. Hence, the RTC, held that petitioner could still recover the amount due
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from Edna through a personal action over which it had no jurisdiction. The RTC, also ruled that Ednas liability is not affected by
the illegality of the real estate mortgage.
Both Article 96 (administration of ACP) and Article 124 (administration of CPG) of the Family Code provide that the powers do
not include disposition or encumbrance without the written consent of the other spouse. Any disposition or encumbrance
without the written consent shall be void.
However, both provisions also state that the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting
spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse x x x
before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
In this case, the Promissory Note and the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage were executed on 31 October 1995. The Special Power
of Attorney was executed on 4 November 1995. The execution of the SPA is the acceptance by the other spouse that
perfected the continuing offer as a binding contract between the parties, making the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage a valid
contract.
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Partosa-Jo v. CA
G.R. No. 82606. December 18, 1992
TOPIC: Effect of abandonment, FC 128 cf. FC
101
PONENTE: Cruz, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Prima Partosa-Jo was the lawful wife of Chinese citizen respondent Ho Hang. They only had 1 child, Monina Jo. Ho
Hand had aliases such as Consing and Jose Jo.
On 1980, Prima filed for judicial separation of property. She also filed another one for support.
The 2 cases were consolidated and the RTC of Negros Oriental ruled in favor of Prima, ordering Ho to give 500 as monthly
support and 40k for the construction of the house.
The RTC ruling was very definite of the support case but did not mention any about the judicial sep. of property case.
CA affirmed the RTC ruling but dismissed the judicial sep. of property case for lack of cause of action and not covered by
NCC178. Also, the ground for dismissal was because the sps. separation was due to their agreement and not abandonment.
(Agreement was to live separately w/c is void under NCC221.)
ISSUE:
WON the CA erred in dismissing the case for judicial separation of property. YES.
HELD:
There was no mention in the RTC ruling about the disputed case, it only stated in the dispositive portion:
a. It is, therefore, hereby ordered that all properties in question are considered properties of Jose Jo, the defendant in this
case, subject to separation of property under NCC178(3), which is subject of separate proceedings as enunciated herein.
Prima said she did not feel to appeal at first because such portion was in her favor. It was only when the CA dismissed the
case about it that prompted her to appeal.
The SC states the dispositive portion was incomplete because the drafting of the decision was not careful even though the
RTC noted that they were legally married and Ho acquired properties during the marriage and registered in dummy names.
Prima also contends that the CA erred when it misinterpreted their agreement to live separately. She states:
a. That it is only temporary because she was pregnant and she wanted to live w/ her parents wherein Ho could visit her there
and give support;
b. That the agreement to live separately was not intended to be permanent. Even if it were permanent, it should have
happened in 1942 because when she returned to him at Dumaguete City, Ho refused to accept her;
c. (b) is pursuant to NCC178(3) w/c is superseded now by FC128 w/c states:
1. That the abandonment w/o just cause or failure to support by Ho would give Prima remedies such as sole
administration, judicial separation of property, etc.
2. Abandonment w/o intention to return or left for 3 months or failed to give info. About his/her whereabouts constitutes
abandonment w/o just cause.
As early as 1942, Ho already rejected Prima when she returned from Negros Oriental. And from the support case, Ho never
gave support to Prima. These gives 2 grounds under FC128. Also, Ho admitted that he had cohabited w/ 3 women and
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fathered 15 children.
The RTC and CA made their decisions solely because Ho was the real owner properties. But SC states that it is presumed that
they were acquired DURING their marriage and Ho violated the Anti-Dummy Law. Hence, the petition for judicial separation
of property was granted to Prima.
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Heirs of Go v Servacio
TOPIC: Effect of death

Note:
Petition for review on certiorari of a CA decision

Feb. 22, 1976 Jesus B. Gaviola sold 2 parcels of land to Protacio Go Jr.
Nov. 25, 1987 Marta Go (wife of Protacio Sr died)
Mar. 29, 1999 Protacio Jr. executed an Affidavit of Renunciation & Waiver stating that it was his father who purchased the
land
Dev. 28, 1999 Protacio Sr, son Rito Go sold a portion of the property to Ester Servacio
Mar. 2, 2001 Petitioners (Protacio Sr heirs) demanded the return of the property but Servacio refused
After barangay proceedings failed to resolve the dispute, petitioners sued Servacio in RTC for the annulment of the sale
Petitioners aver that following Protacio Jrs renunciation, the property became conjugal property and the sale without prior
liquidation was null and void
Oct. 3, 2002 RTC declared the property was the conjugal property of Protacio Go Sr. and Marta Go
RTC affirms the validity of the sale and held that as long as portion sold does not encroach upon the legitimate of the other
heirs, it is valid
ISSUE(S): WON sale of land without prior liquidation is valid

HELD: YES!
RATIO:
Under FC 130, if the marriage is terminated by death, the conjugal partnership property shall be LIQUIDATED in the same proceeding
for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. Any disposition (alienation) without liquidation shall be VOID!
Protacio and Marta were married prior to the affectivity of the FC so their property regime is CPG, following the death of Marta in
1987the CPG was dissolved and implied co-ownership ensued. Under CC 493, co-owners may alienate but only limited to the
portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon termination of the co-ownership, if it turns out that the property alienated
really would pertain to the share of the surviving spouse then it is VALID!
Petition is DENIED!
RTC decision is AFFIRMED!
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UGALDE v YSASI
AUTHOR: Ocampo, Miguel (edited by Parian)
G.R. No. 130623. February 29, 2008
TOPIC:; Judicial separation of property, FC
TAKE NOTE: This petition is for the dissolution, acquire share, support, etc. w/c is a
134-138
special proceeding. Hence, different from the case regarding their marriages
PONENTE: Carpio, J.
validity and the amicable settlement.
FACTS:
On Feb. 15, 1951, petitioner Lorea Ugalde and respondent Jon de Ysasi got married in Negros Occidental. But they separated
on April 1957 and made a judicial separation of property w/c was approved by the CFI.
This was a case for Ugalde to dissolve their CPG and acquire her shares, support and custody, etc. so she states:
d. That Ysasi contracted another marriage w/ Victoria Smith on May 26, 1964;
e. That they had been acquiring and disposing of real and personal properties to Loreas prejudice as the lawful wife;
f. That she had been defrauded of rental income, profits, and fruits of their conjugal properties;
But Ysasi raised as defense:
g. That on June 2, 1961, he and Ugalde entered into an agreement w/c provided that their CPG shall be deemed dissolved
as of April 15, 1957;
h. That they made an amicable settlement regarding (a) w/c was granted on June 6, 1961 and it attained finality;
i. That they already obtained a divorce decree in the SC of Mexico;
j. He contracted 2 subsequent marriages already;
k. Loreas action was barred by estoppel, laches and res judicata; and
l. That their marriage was void due to absence of a valid marriage license.
RTC ruled in favor of Ysasi upholding Jons defenses (d & e).
CA affirmed upholding Ysasis defenses (a, b, d & e).
ISSUE:
WON the CA erred in affirming the CFIs decision in dimissing Ugaldes action for dissolution of their CPG. NO.
HELD:
The SC stated first that CFI cannot rule on the validity of their marriage just because Ysasi raised it as a defense, hence, the
CFI, in this case, exceeded its jurisdiction.
But the validity of their marriage was already decided in another case w/c invalidated their marriage on May 31, 1995 for lack
of marriage license. And neither of the parties appealed.
The SC did not favor Ugaldes claim that the CFI did not have authority to grant the amicable settlement because the case
was for custody, and the creditors were not given notice by the parties.
A judgment upon a compromise agreement has all the force and effect of any other judgment, and conclusive only upon
parties thereto and their privies, and not binding on third persons who are not parties to it. Therefore, when the CFI approved it,
the CPG was already dissolved.
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CABREZA v. CABREZA
[G.R. No. 171260, 2009]
TOPIC: Effects of dissolution
PONENTE: Peralta, J.


Ceferino S. Cabreza, Jr. (respondent) filed with the RTC Pasig City a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to
Amparo Robles Cabreza (petitioner). The petition was granted. It also dissolved and liquidated the conjugal partnership.
Ceferino filed with the RTC a Motion for Execution (Re: Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership). He sought to implement the order
for the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. He moved that said property be sold and the proceeds be divided and
distributed. RTC granted the petition.
RTC issued another order granting Ceferinos motion which prayed for the approval of the deed of absolute sale, for the
authorization for respondent to sign said deed in behalf of petitioner, and for an order requiring the occupants to vacate the
property.
Amparo filed a Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Writ of Possession and Notice to Vacate arguing that Article 129(9) of the
New Civil Code provides that, in the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and lot on which it is situated shall be
adjudicated to the spouse with whom majority of the children choose to remain. Hence, since the majority of the children
opted to stay with her, she asserted that the family home should be given to her.
RTC Her petition was denied as the decision before was final and executory.
There was a notice to vacate the property. Amparo filed for certiorari before CA, it was denied.
ISSUE(S): Is Amparo right in arguing that Art. 129(9) of the Civil Code is applicable in this case?
HELD: No. Petition is denied. The sale is valid.
RATIO:
The decision by the RTC was already final and executor. Hence, Amparo cannot question the decision anymore. The original
decision on their nullity of marriage presented: Further, the conjugal partnership is hereby dissolved and must be liquidated in
accordance with Art. 129 of the Family Code, without prejudice to the prior rights of known and unknown creditors of the
conjugal partnership.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Art. 129(9) of the Civil Code provides: In the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and lot on which it is situated shall be
adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority of the common children choose to remain.
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QUIAO v QUIAO
[G.R. No. 176556. July 4, 2012]
TOPIC: Effects of annulment on property regime
PONENTE: Reyes, J.
AUTHOR: PARIAN
Effectivity of NCC: Aug 30, 1950
FC: Aug 3, 1988

Brigido and Rita were married on January 1977.
2000: Rita filed for legal separation.
RTC found that the spouses dont have separate properties. And because theyre married before Aug 3, 1988, CPG
governs their property relations.
RTC granted the legal separation and ordered that properties be separated equally. But since Brigido is the guilty
spouse for cohabiting with another woman, he is forfeited to receive his share from the net profits earned by the
conjugal partnership, and that it will be awarded to his children with Rita.
Brigido did not appeal and the decision became final and executory.
The writ was partially executed. However, Brigido filed a motion for clarification to define the term net profits earned.
As per RTC: It is the remainder of the properties of the parties after deducting the separate properties of each of the
spouse and the debts.
ISSUE(S): What is net profits earned?
How do you compute for it with respect to ACP, with respect to CPG?
HELD/RATIO:
FC Art. 102 (4) provides: Net profits earned - shall be the increase in value between the market value of the community
property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution.
For the purpose of dissolution and liquidation, the definition of Art 102 (4) shall govern; both for ACP (Art. 102) and CPG (Art.
129)
ACP Art 102:
(5) Find the market value of the properties at the time of the communitys dissolution.
(6) Total market value of all the properties - Debts and obligations of the absolute community = Net assets or net remainder of
the properties of the absolute community
(7) Net assets or net remainder of the properties of the absolute community - market value of the properties at the time of
marriage = Net profits earned
CPG Art. 129:
(1) Conjugal properties + Reimbursements for benefits received by a spouse from the
conjugal partnership Reimbursements to spouse/s for benefits received by conjugal partnership = Total assets of conjugal
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partnership
(2) Total assets of conjugal partnership - Debts and obligations of the conjugal partnership = Net profits earned
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Net profits earned shall be the increase in value between the market value of the community property at the time of the celebration
of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution.
Note: The definition was not used in computing for CPG. There was no computation of market value, etc. They strictly used Art. 129,
and only provided Art 102 (4) as the definition of net profits earned to clarify the dispositive portion of RTC.
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SANTERO v. CFI
[Nos. L-61700-03. September 14, 1987]
NOTES:
TOPIC: Support during CPG liquidation
PONENTE: Paras, J.
FACTS:
Pablo Santero, the only legitimate son of Pascual and Simona Santero, had three children with Felixberta Pacursa namely,
Princesita, Federico and Willie (petitioners). He also had four children with Anselma Diaz namely, Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina,
and Miguel (private respondents). These children are all natural children since neither of their mothers was married to their
father. In 1973, Pablo Santero died.
During the pendency of the administration proceedings with the CFI-Cavite involving the estate of the late Pablo Santero,
petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the SC questioning the decision of CFI-Cavite granting allowance (allegedly
without hearing) in the amount of Php 2,000.00, to private respondents which includes tuition fees, clothing materials and
subsistence out of any available funds in the hands of the administrator. The petitioners opposed said decision on the ground
that private respondents were no longer studying, that they have attained the age of majority, that all of them except for
Miguel are gainfully employed, and the administrator did not have sufficient funds to cover the said expenses.
Before the SC could act on said petition, the private respondents filed another motion for allowance with the CFI-Cavite
which included Juanita, Estelita and Pedrito, all surnamed Santero, as children of the late Pablo Santero with Anselma Diaz,
praying that a sum of Php 6,000.00 be given to each of the seven children as their allowance from the estate of their father.
This was granted by the CFI-Cavite.
Later on, the CFI-Cavite issued an amended order directing Anselma Diaz, mother of private respondents, to submit a
clarification or explanation as to the additional three children included in the said motion. She said in her clarification that in
her previous motions, only the last four minor children were included for support and the three children were then of age
should have been included since all her children have the right to receive allowance as advance payment of their shares in
the inheritance of Pablo Santero.
The CFI-Cavite issued an order directing the administrator to get back the allowance of the three additional children based
on the opposition of the petitioners.
ISSUE(S): Are the private respondents entitled to allowance?
HELD: Yes. They are still entitled as the Code did not specify.
RATIO:
The fact that private respondents are of age, gainfully employed, or married is of no moment and should not be regarded as
the determining factor of their right to allowance under Art. 188.
While the Rules of Court limit allowances to the widow and minor or incapacitated children of the deceased, the New Civil
Code gives the surviving spouse and his/her children without distinction.
Since the provision of the Civil Code, a substantive law, gives the surviving spouse and to the children the right to receive
support during the liquidation of the estate of the deceased, such right cannot be impaired by Rule 83 Sec. 3 of the Rules of
Court which is a procedural rule.
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Maquilan vs. Maquilan
G.R. No. 155409. June 8, 2007
TOPIC: JSP when applicable
PONENTE: Austria - Martinez, J.
AUTHOR: PARIAN

Dita (respondent) was convicted of adultery and was sentenced to prision correccional.
She then filed for declaration of nullity of her marriage due to psych incapacity of her husband, Virgilio (petitioner).
During pre trial, the spouses entered into a compromise agreement dividing their conjugal properties partially, without
prejudice to the outcome of the annulment case. It was judicially approved by the RTC.
However, Virgilio filed an Omnibus Motion for the repudiation of the compromise agreement; stating that his consent
was vititated because his former lawyer did not intelligently inform him of the legal consequences of the compromise
agreement.
RTC denied the motion and the MR. CA upheld the RTC decision.
Virgilio filed for certiorari assailing that: (1) Dita is disqualified to receive her share in the conjugal property due to
adultery;
(2) That the judgment approving the agreement is void because there is no intervention from OSG;
(3) That the compromise agreement is void due to (1) and (2);
ISSUE(S): WON partial voluntary separation of property, pendent lite, is valid
HELD: YES. CA decision affirmed.
RATIO:
The effects of termination of marriage under Art. 43 (declaration of nullity) and Art. 63 (legal separation), which disqualify the
guilty spouse of his share in the conjugal property, cannot be applied in this case since the marriage has not yet been
terminated.
Prision correccional does not carry an accessory penalty of civil interdiction. Hence, Dita can still encumber her share in the
conjugal property.
OSG is not required to intervene in the proceedings of the judicial approval of the compromise agreement since it is a
separate petition and without prejudice to the outcome of the petition of declaration of nullity of their marriage. The
compromise agreement pertains merely to an agreement between Virgilio and Dita to separate their conjugal properties
partially without prejudice to the outcome of the pending case of declaration of nullity of marriage.
The defense of vitiated consent has no merit since the compromise agreement was plainly worded; and that any common
man will be able to comprehend the document.
FC Art. 143: separation of property may be effected voluntarily or for sufficient cause, subject to judicial approval. The
judicially approved compromise agreement is exactly such a separation of property allowed under the law. This is true even if
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the proceedings for the declaration of nullity of marriage was still pending.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Judicial separation of property is valid even during pendent lite.
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SALES v. SALES
[G.R. No. 174803. July 13, 2009]
NOTES:
TOPIC: Judicial separation of property For sufficient
cause
PONENTE: Quisumbing, J.
FACTS:
Marywin Albano Sales (Petitioner) filed for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership and separation of properties against her
husband, Mayor Reynolan T. Sales (Respondent). He subsequently filed for the declaration of nullity of their marriage.
RTC declared the marriage void on the ground of mutual psychological incapacity. It also ordered the dissolution of their
conjugal partnership. The trial court ordered the liquidation, partition and distribution of their properties as stated in Art. 147 of
the Family Code.
Marywin filed a Motion for Execution and a manifestation listing her assets with Reynolan for the purpose of having them
partitioned.
Reynolan opposed the said motion arguing: (1) That the RTC Decision had ordered the distribution of their common properties
without specifying what they were, (2) Marywin has no share in the properties she specified because they were the fruits solely
of his industry, (3) The property relations should not be governed by the rules of co-ownership because they did not live
together as husband and wife, and (4) Marywin appropriated the rentals of his properties and even disposed one of them
without his consent, in violation of Article 1477 of the Family Code. RTC ruled that they need to receive evidence regarding
the petition.
Marywin filed a reiterative motion for execution to implement the decision and to order partition of their common properties.
She brought to the attention of the court the 12 units of townhouses in Quezon City with 8 units to be partitioned between her
and Reynolan. She proposed to give out two units to their son Maindryann and equally divide the remaining six units between
her and Reynolan. She also alleged that she tried to obtain Reynolans approval on the proposed partition of properties, but
to no avail.
The reiterative motion was heard in the absence of Reynolan and his counsel. On the same date, the RTC issued an order
approving the proposed project of partition since the proposal appears to be reasonable and there has been no opposition
or appearance from Reynolan. The branch clerk of court was ordered to execute the necessary deeds of conveyance to
distribute the eight townhouse units in accordance with the motion.
Reynolan filed a motion for reconsideration. He said that the original decision of RTC (re: reception of evidence) should first be
implemented before the reiterative motion.
RTC denied Reynolans motion for reconsideration. It ruled that reception of evidence is no longer necessary because the
parties were legally married prior to its nullification and the fact that they begot a son whom they raised together proved that
their connubial relations were more than merely transient.
CA held in favor of Reynolan saying RTCs recall of its previous order for further reception of evidence deprives and violates
Reynolans constitutional right to property. Hence, this petition of review.
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ISSUE(S): Did the Court of Appeals err when it entertained Reynolans appeal from an order granting the issuance of a writ of
execution?
HELD: No. Petition denied. Remanded to the lower courts because some factual issued should still be settled for a reasonable division
and distribution of the properties. They need to receive evidence first.
RATIO:
What is being questioned by Reynolan was not really the decision of the RTC declaring their marriage void ab initio on the
ground of mutual psychological incapacity, but the Orders of the trial court dividing their common properties in accordance
with the proposed project of partition without the benefit of a hearing.
Allegations regarding the collection of rentals without proper accounting, sale of common properties without the husbands
consent and misappropriation of the proceeds thereof, are factual issues which have to be addressed in order to determine
with certainty the fair and reasonable division and distribution of properties due to each party.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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LAPERAL v. KATIGBAK
[10 SCRA 493. March 31, 1964]
NOTES:
TOPIC: Binding effect on third parties
PONENTE: Regala, J.
FACTS:
Ramon Katigbak.
RATIO:
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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Valdes v. RTC of QC
G.R. No. 122749. July 31, 1996
TOPIC: Effects of final judgment declaring
nullity on the marriages property regime,
FC147-148
PONENTE: Vitug, J.
FACTS:
On Jan. 5, 1971, Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez got married and had 5 children.
On June 22, 1992, Valdes filed a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to Consuelo pursuant to FC36 which was
granted by the RTC of QC.
In such ruling, RTC states that (3) the petitioner and respondent are directed to start proceedings on the liquidation of their
common properties as defined by FC147, and to comply with FC50-52, within thirty (30) days from notice of this decision.
Dahil hindi maintindihan netong si Consuelo, nag file pa ng clarification regarding the provisions and even asserted that the
FC contained no provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of common property in unions without marriage.
And so, when the RTC clarified, Valdes moved for reconsideration of the ruling but it was denied. He then argued that:
a. FC147 does not apply to cases where the parties are psychologically incapacitated;
b. FC50-52 in relation to FC102 and FC129 govern the disposition of the family dwelling in cases where a marriage is declared
void ab initio, including a marriage declared void by reason of the psychological incapacity of the spouses; and
c. Assuming arguendo that FC147 applies to marriages declared void ab initio on the ground of the psychological
incapacity of a spouse, the same may be read consistently w/ FC129.
ISSUE:
WON FC147 applies. YES.
HELD:
In void ab initio marriages such as the Antonio-Consuelo marriage, regardless of the cause, the property relations during the
period of their cohabitation is governed by FC147 or 148.
FC50-52 only applies to voidable marriages in which does not apply to this case because it is not the same w/ void marriages
where in it is void or inexistent. Voidable marriages, like valid marriages, are also valid until annulled and the governing
provision is either FC102 or 129.
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Carino v. Carino
G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001
TOPIC: Property regime of unions w/o
marriage, FC147-148
FACTS:
SPO4 Santiago Carino had 2 marriages:
a. W/ petitioner Susan Nicdao Carino on June 20, 1969 (Santiago-Nicdao);
b. W/ respondent Susan Yee Carino on Nov. 10, 1992 (Santiago-Yee).
On Nov. 23, 1992 (13 days after his 2nd marriage), he died due to diabetes. Yee was the one who spent for his medical and
burial expenses.
Both Susans filed claims for monetary and death benefits from govt agencies:
a. Nicdao got 146k from MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, Pagibig;
b. Yee only got 21k from GSIS and SSS.
On Dec. 14, 1993, Yee filed this collection case against Nicdao:
a. Wanting Nicdao to give her 1/2 of the 146k as death benefits;
b. Admits her marriage to Santiago was w/o obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of Santiago-Nicdao marriage (FC40);
c. But claims she did not know Santiago had a previous wife (Nicdao) until the funeral;
d. Contends Santiago-Nicdao marriage is void ab initio due to absent marriage license;
e. In support of (d), Yee presented the marriage certificate of Santiago-Nicdao marriage w/c bears no marriage license no.
and was certified by the San Juan civil registry.
RTC and CA ruled in favor of Yee ordering Nicdao to give 76k to her.
ISSUE:
WON Susan Yee, the 2nd wife should receive half of the death benefits. NO. RTC and CA decision reversed. Nicdao receives it
all and Yee, none.
HELD:
FC40 is invoked in the subsequent marriage for it to be free from legal infirmity. However, for purposes other than remarriage,
no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity.
Other purposes are but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate,
dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter.
The court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties and even in a suit not directly made to
question the validity of such prior marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. Evidence whether
testimonial or documentary must be provided to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a prior marriage an absolute
nullity.
Yee was correct in contending the the Santiago-Nicdao marriage was void ab initio due to absent marriage license. But SC
states that it does not follow that the death benefits would be awarded to her.
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SC reiterates that under FC40, if there is no judicial declaration stating that the prior marriage is void ab initio and enters into a
subsequent marriage, it is also void. In the case, Yee admitted it, hence, makes her marriage void as well.
In effect, FC147-148 governs their property regimes.
FC148 refers to bigamous marriages, adulterous/concubine relationships, relationships involving both parties married to other
persons, etc.:
a. Considering the Santiago-Yee marriage a bigamous one because it was celebrated while the prior was still existing, FC148
governs;
b. The 146k are clearly incentives, benefits from govt agencies earned by Santiago as a police officer, therefore, belongs to
him alone and shall be passed to his legal heirs and Yee is not one of them.
c. Unless Yee presents proof contrary to (b), it cannot be said that she actually contributed in acquiring such benefits.
FC147 governs to parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose
marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like the absence of a marriage license:
a. Governs Santiago-Nicdao marriage and even if such benefits were only acquired by Santiago alone, FC147 provides coownership w/c entitles Nicdao 1/2 of it (other half to their 2 children) because there is no presumption of bad faith here,
unlike FC148.
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GONZALES v. GONZALES
[G.R. No. 159521. December 16, 2005]
NOTES:
TOPIC: Unions under FC 147
PONENTE: Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.
FACTS:
Erminda Gonzales (Respondent) filed a complaint with the RTC Makati for annulment of marriage with prayer for support
pendente lite and the dissolution of their conjugal property of gains against her husband Francisco Gonzales (petitioner). The
complaint alleges that petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the obligations of marriage. He beats her for
no justifiable reason, humiliates and embarrasses her, and denies her love, sexual comfort and loyalty.
Erminda manages their pizza business and they acquired properties throughout their marriage.
Francisco denied that she was the one who managed the pizza business and claimed that he exclusively owns the properties
existing during their marriage.
Trial court nullified the marriage and dissolved the CPG. It ordered equal partition of properties. CA affirmed.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE(S): Should there be equal partition of properties?
HELD: Yes, as governed by Art. 147. Petition denied.
RATIO:
Art. 147 applies when a man and a woman live together under a void marriage.
Under this property regime of co-ownership, properties acquired during the marriage are presumed to have been obtained
through their joint efforts and will be owned by them in equal shares.
If the other party did not participate in the acquisition, it shall be deemed that he/she has contributed jointly in the acquisition
if his/her efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
Francisco himself admitted that Erminda was not a plain housewife and that she helped him in managing their pizza business.
Erminda started managing the business in 1976. She worked daily without receiving any salary or allowance.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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Dino v. Dino
[G.R. No. 178044, January 19, 2011]
TOPIC: Property regime of the marriage (FC 147, 148)
PONENTE: Carpio, J.
AUTHOR: Padrones, Mark


- 1984: Alain (petitioner) and Caridad (respondent) started living together.
- 1994: they decided to separate
- 1996: they decided to live together again
- January 14, 1998: They got married
- May 30, 2001: Alain filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Caridad under Art. 36 of FC
- October 5, 2001: Caridad got married with Manuel V. Alcantara
- RTC granted the petition and decided that the Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage shall be issued after liquidation,
partition and distribution of the parties properties under Art. 147 of the FC.
ISSUE(S): WON the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation,
partition, and distribution of the parties properties under Art. 147 of FC
HELD: Yes
RATIO:
- In Valdes v. RTC, a void marriage, regardless of its cause, the property relations of the parties during the period of
cohabitation is governed by either 147 or 148.
- Art. 45 refers to voidable marriages and the marriages are governed wither by ACP or CPG
- Petitoners marriage was declared void under Art. 36 and not under Arts. 40 or 45. The liquidation of properties owned in
common of the spouses are governed by the rules on co-ownership and should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil
Code.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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Salas v. Aguila
G.R. No. 202370. September 23, 2013
TAKE NOTE: Original petition was for partition
TOPIC: Property regime of unions w/o
marriage, FC147-148
PONENTE: Carpio, J.
FACTS:
On Sept. 7, 1985, petitioner Juan Salas and respondent Eden Aguila got married. But after more than a year, he left her.
So on Oct. 7, 2003, Aguila filed a petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage under FC36 and also states that they did
not acquire any properties during their marriage.
On May 7, 2007, the RTC granted this declaring the marriage void ab initio.
But on Sept. 10, 2007, Aguila filed a manifestation that she discovered 2 properties (200sqm. lot in QC and 108sqm. lot in
Tondo) and was registered to Juan Salas married to Rubina Salas.
Salas opposed this and states that there was no property to be partitioned based on Aguilas manifestation.
RTC ruled in favor of Aguila stating that the discovered properties belonged to the CPG, hence, has to be partitioned.
Rubina filed a complaint-in-intervention stating:
a. She is a widow and unmarried to Juan Salas;
b. Disputed properties are her paraphernal properties;
c. Salas could not have contributed money to purchase because he had no permanent job in Japan;
d. She authorized her brother to purchase them but he was not well versed thats why he registered them in Salas name,
married to Rubina Salas.
RTC still denied this. Hence, Salas appealed to the CA but affirmed the RTC decision.
ISSUE:
WON the CA erred in affirming the RTCs decision w/c stated that the discovered properties were part of the Salas-Aguila
marriage. NO. It is really part of it.
HELD:
Aguila was able to prove that the discovered properties were acquired during their marriage. The TCTs of such properties
were entered on July 2, 1999 and Sept. 29, 2003 respectively.
Also, Rubinas contention is untenable because the Torrens title is generally conclusive evidence of ownership and the words
married to were merely descriptive. And Salas did not even rebut his ownership at first when he opposed Aguilas
manifestation. It was only when Rubina filed her own petition did he rebut his ownership.
Lastly, the SC states that it cannot partition the discovered properties unless it determines first what property relations governs
them. The RTC decided that their marriage is void ab initio, hence, it is not CPG that governs their property regime, but FC147.
In FC147, property acquired during the marriage is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through the couples joint
efforts and governed by the rules on co-ownership.
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BIENVENIDO v. CA
[G.R. No. 111717. October 24, 1994]
NOTES:
FACTS:
Aurelio Camacho has three wives:
First Wife: Consejo Velasco
Second Wife: Luisita Camacho (Respondent), contracted while first one was valid and subsisting (bigamous), had a son
named Chito.
Third Wife: Nenita Bienvenido (Petitioner), cohabitation only.
Aurelio and Nenita lived in a house in Scout Delgado, QC with Nanette (Nenitas daughter) and Chito.
Aurelio bought the house from the owners. In the deed of sale, he described himself as single.
Aurelio then executed a deed of sale in favor of Nenita in consideration of 250k.
Aurelio died. Initially, the body was with Nenita. Having returned from the US upon being informed of his death, Luisita took the
body of Aurelio.
Luisita was granted death benefits by the AFP as the spouse. She also claimed ownership of the house in Scout Delgado.
Luisita and Chito brought a case in the QC RTC to seek the annulment of the sale of the house to Nenita.
The RTC rendered a decision upholding the sale of the property to Nenita.
The CA reversed the decision. It ruled that in the absence of proof to the contrary, Consejo must be presumed to have been
absent for seven years without Aurelio having news of her being alive when he married Luisita. It declared the house as their
conjugal property.
ISSUE(S): Is the sale of the property to Nenita valid?
HELD: Yes, it is not part of the conjugal partnership of Aurelio and Luisita.
RATIO:
Aurelios marriage with Luisita was void for being bigamous. She did not present proof that when they got married, the first
wife had been absent for 7 years.
There is no basis for holding that the property in question was the conjugal property of Aurelio and Luisita since there was no
such partnership in the first place (marriage being void).
An action for declaration of the nullity of such donations can only be brought by the innocent spouse (Consejo) and not
Luisita whose marriage to Aurelio is void.
The sale must be presumed. There was a valid deed of absolute sale, Transfer Certificate of Title, and Nenita has possession.
There was no basis for ruling that Nenita was a buyer in bad faith since it was not shown that Nenita knew Aurelios marriage
with Luisita.
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Lacbayan vs. Samoy, Jr.
G.R. No. 165427. March 21, 2011
TOPIC: co-ownership
PONENTE: Villarama, Jr., J.
AUTHOR: PARIAN

Lacbayan had an illicit relationship with Samoy, Jr., Samoy being married. Lacbayan gave birth to Samoys child.
During their illicit relationship, Lacbayan and Samoy, and three others, became business partners for a manpower
services company.
During the same period, four parcels of land were registered to Samoy, married to Lacbayan; and one land
registered to Spouses Samoy and Lacbayan.
Their relationship turned sour and agreed to divide the properties and terminate their business partnership.
Initially, Samoy agreed to sign the Partition Agreement. However, Lacbayan wanted additional demands included in
the agreement. Samoy refused.
Lacbayan filed for judicial partition.
RTC dismissed the case, ruling that Samoy is the sole owner of the properties. She admitted in the trial that the
properties were acquired not from her own personal funds but from the income of the company.
CA affirmed the decision.
Lacbayan filed for certiorari; asserting her co-ownership as evidenced by the TCT.
ISSUE(S): WON Lacbayan is the co-owner of the disputed properties, hence, has the right to partition.
HELD: NO. RTC decision affirmed.
RATIO:
Lacbayan confuses title with the certificate of title. Title as a concept of ownership should not be confused with the
certificate of title as evidence of such ownership (although both are interchangeably used).
The certificate cannot always be considered as conclusive evidence of ownership. Mere issuance of the certificate of title in
the name of any person does not foreclose the possibility that other parties may have acquired interest over the property
subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title.
(SC basically used these reasons why her defense, that her co-ownership is evidenced by TCT, lacks merit)
SC affirmed the findings of RTC that Lacbayan did not contribute to the acquisition of the properties.
As to her defense that Samoys initial acceptance to the Partition agreement amounts to admission that such co-ownership
exists has no merit. She has no right to insist the agreement since she refused to sign it.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
In JSP, it must first be determined whether a co-ownership in fact exists before deciding whether partition is proper.
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J. Brions separate opinion:
1. I find that the petitioner failed to discharge by clear preponderant evidence her co-ownership of the subject properties to
warrant their judicial partition.
2. Citing FC Art 148 (co-ownership); [C]o-ownership only arises when there is clear proof showing the acquisition of the property
during the cohabitation of the parties, and the actual joint contribution of the parties to acquire the same. These two (2)
conditions must concur.
3. Mere cohabitation under Article 148 of the Family Code, without proof of contribution, will not result in a co-ownership; proof
of actual contribution must be established by clear evidence showing that the party either used his or her own money or that
he or she actually contributed his or her own money to purchase the property.
4. I disagree with the Majoritys conclusion declaring Samoy as the sole owner of the property registered under Spouses Samoy
and Lacbayan.
5. By the tenor of its decision, the Majority effectively (and unnecessarily) introduced a cloud over the petitioners interests in this
commonly-owned property.
6. The complaint underlying this petition is an action for partition; the adjudication of this case should necessarily be limited to
resolving the propriety of the partition sought. xxx this Decision should be without prejudice to an action for partition to divide
up this property xxx.
1, 2, and 3 in essence: Lacbayan failed to prove that she personally contributed to the acquisition of the properties.
4,5, and 6 in essence: The property registered under Spouses Samoy and Lacbayan should not be awarded solely to Samoy
since Lacbayan is a co-registrant, giving the presumption that she is the co-owner.
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GO-BANGAYAN v. BANGAYAN
[G.R. No. 201061. July 3, 2013]
NOTES:
PONENTE: Carpio, J.
FACTS:
1973 Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. (Respondent) married Azucena Alegre.
1979 Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally Go-Bangayan (Petitioner).
1982 Benjamin and Sally lived as husband and wife. Sally brought Benjamin to an office where they signed a purported
marriage contract. Sally, knowing Benjamins marital status, assured him that the marriage contract would not be registered.
Their cohabitation produced two children and several real properties and certificates were in the names of: (1) Benjamin and
Sally as spouses, (2) Benjamin married to Sally, (3) Sally married to Benjamin, and (4) Sally as single.
1994 Their relationship ended and Sally left for Canada. She then filed criminal actions for bigamy and falsification of public
documents against Benjamin, using their simulated marriage contract as evidence.
Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before
RTC Manila. He alleges that his marriage to Sally was bigamous and that it lacked the formal requisites to a valid marriage. He
also petitioned for the partition of the properties he acquired with Sally in accordance with Article 148 of the Family Code, for
his appointment as administrator of the properties during the pendency of the case, and for the declaration of their children
as illegitimate children. He presented evidence.
Sally filed a demurrer to evidence which the trial court denied. She appealed before CA but denied. She refused to present
evidence before RTC due to pendency of her case in CA.
RTC ruled in favor of Benjamin. It was seen that their marriage license was not valid. Their marriage was not bigamous. The trial
court ruled that the second marriage was void not because of the existence of the first marriage but because of other
causes, particularly, the lack of a marriage license. The trial court ruled that Sally could not claim the 37 properties she named
in her answer as part of her conjugal properties with Benjamin. The 37 properties were conveyed by Benjamins father to their
children as inheritance in advance. Sally acted in bad faith knowing that Benjamin was married and was forfeited of her share
of the conjugal property according to Article 148 of the Family Code.
CA partly granted the appeal. It said that 2 properties were exclusive of Sally because in the absence of proof of Benjamins
actual contribution in their purchase, but affirmed with the rulings on the other properties of the spouses. Sally filed for MR, it
was denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE(S): Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming with modification the trial courts decision regarding
the property relations of Benjamin and Sally.
HELD: No. Petition denied.
RATIO:
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and Sally is governed by Article 148 of the Family
Code.
Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only the properties acquired by them through their
actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
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contributions. Thus, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly excluded the 37 properties being claimed by Sally
which were given by Benjamins father to his children as advance inheritance.
Only the properties in Sallys name was given to her.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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BORROMEO v. DESCALLAR
[G.R. No. 159310. February 24, 2009]
NOTES:
TOPIC: Property relations of mixed marriages
PONENTE: Cruz, J.
FACTS:
Willhelm Jambrich, a German national, is working in the country. He eventually fell in love with Antonietta Opalla-Descalar
(Respondent), who was working as a waitress in a hotel. He first asked her to teach him English. They eventually lived together.
Willhelm bought three parcels of land that was named after Anotnietta because the Register of Deeds refused that he be the
owner because of the constitutional prohibition on aliens that they cannot own land. His signature is still found on the deed.
He also adopted her two sons.
Their relationship did not last long. Jambrich eventually had a new girlfriend.
Jambrich purchased an engine and some accessories for his boat from Camilo Borromeo (Petitioner) for which he became
indebted to the latter for about P150,000.00. To pay for his debt, Willhelm sold his rights and interests in the Agro-Macro
properties to Camilo for P250,000, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment. Then he found out that titles to the
three lots have been transferred in the name of Antonietta, and that the subject property has already been mortgaged.
Camilo then filed a case for recovery of property before RTC Mandaue City. He alleged that Antonietta did not pay a single
centavo of the purchase price and was not in fact a buyer; that it was Jambrich alone who paid for the properties using his
exclusive funds. She claimed that she "solely and exclusively used her own personal funds to defray and pay for the purchase
price of the subject lots in question.
RTC was in favor of Camilo saying that it is highly improbable that Antoinetta is capable of purchasing the said property.
CA reversed the decision as the subject property was in the name of Antoinetta.
ISSUE(S): Does Antonietta have the right over the said property?
HELD: No. She had a subsisting relationship which is why she is not capacitated to cohabit with Willhelm. Petition is granted.
RATIO:
The Court ruled that Jambrich was rightfully the owner of the said properties as it was clear that he had the means to pay for
the properties while Antonietta was only a waitress and couldnt have afforded to purchase the properties amounting to
P700,000.00
Also the DSWD home report used for the adoption of her two children by Wilhelm showed that Antonietta who was miserable
and financially distressed at that time accepted the offer for the sake of the children .
The rule that co-ownership applies to a man and a woman living exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage, but are otherwise capacitated to marry each other, does not apply. In the instant case, respondent was
still legally married to another when she and Jambrich lived together. In such an adulterous relationship, no co-ownership
exists between the parties
It is necessary for each of the partners to prove his or her actual contribution to the acquisition of property in order to be able
to lay claim to any portion of it. Presumptions of co-ownership and equal contribution do not apply.
The transfer of land from Agro-Macro Development Corporation to Jambrich, who is an Austrian, would have been declared
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invalid if challenged, had not Jambrich conveyed the properties to petitioner, Borromeo, who is a Filipino citizen.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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MATTHEWS v. TAYLOR
NOTES: Kawawa si foreign spouse
[G.R. No. 164584. June 22, 2009]
TOPIC: Property relations of mixed marriages
FACTS:
Respondent Benjamin A. Taylor (British) married Joselyn C. Taylor , a Filipina who is only 17 years old.
While their marriage was subsisting, Joselyn bought a property situated in Boracay. The sale was allegedly financed by
Benjamin.
Using Benjamins money, Joselyn constructed improvements and eventually converted the property to a resort.
However, Benjamin and Joselyn had a falling out, and Joselyn ran away with Kim Philippsen.
Joselyn executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of Benjamin, authorizing the latter to maintain, sell, lease, and
sub-lease and otherwise enter into contract with third parties with respect to their Boracay property.
Joselyn and Philip Matthews (Petitioner), entered into an Agreement of Lease involving the Boracay property.
Claiming that the Agreement was null and void since it was entered into by Joselyn without his consent, Benjamin instituted an
action for Declaration of Nullity of Agreement of Lease with Damages against Joselyn and the petitioner. Benjamin claimed
that his funds were used in the acquisition and improvement of the Boracay property, and coupled with the fact that he was
Joselyns husband, any transaction involving said property required his consent.
No Answer was filed, hence, the RTC declared Joselyn and the petitioner in default and declared the agreement null and
void.
It was set aside by CA and also ordered the RTC to allow the petitioner to file his Answer, and to conduct further proceedings.
In his Answer, petitioner claimed good faith in transacting with Joselyn. Since Joselyn appeared to be the owner of the
Boracay property, he found it unnecessary to obtain the consent of Benjamin. Moreover, as appearing in the Agreement,
Benjamin signed as a witness to the contract, indicating his knowledge of the transaction and, impliedly, his conformity to the
agreement entered into by his wife. Benjamin was, therefore, estopped from questioning the validity of the Agreement.
RTC ruled in favor of Benjamin. The property is conjugal. It was also supported with the fact that Benjamin funded the
improvement of the property.
CA affirmed the decision. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE(S): Can an alien husband nullify a lease contract entered into by his Filipina wife bought during their marriage?
HELD: No. The Agreement of Lease entered into between Joselyn and petitioner cannot be nullified on the grounds advanced by
Benjamin. The decision of the CA is reversed.
RATIO:
The rule is clear and inflexible: aliens are absolutely not allowed to acquire public or private lands in the Philippines, save only
in constitutionally recognized exceptions.
Benjamin has no right to nullify the Agreement of Lease between Joselyn and petitioner. Benjamin, being an alien, is
absolutely prohibited from acquiring private and public lands in the Philippines. Considering that Joselyn appeared to be the
designated vendee in the Deed of Sale of said property, she acquired sole ownership thereto.
This is true even if we sustain Benjamins claim that he provided the funds for such acquisition. By entering into such contract
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knowing that it was illegal, no implied trust was created in his favor; no reimbursement for his expenses can be allowed; and
no declaration can be made that the subject property was part of the conjugal/community property of the spouses.
In any event, he has no capacity or personality to question the subsequent lease of the Boracay property by his wife even if
he was merely exercising the rights of a husband in respect of conjugal property.
To allow him to meddle with the property would be violative of the constitution. If the property were to be declared conjugal,
this would accord the alien husband a substantial interest and right over the land, as he would then have a decisive vote as
to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that the Constitution does not permit him to have.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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Beumer vs. Amores
G.R. No. 195670. December 3, 2012
TOPIC: Property relations of mixed marriage
AUTHOR: PARIAN

Beumers marriage to Amores was annulled due to psych incapacity of Beumer.
Consequently, Beumer filed for the dissolution of their conjugal partnership, praying for the partition of several lots and
2 houses.
Amores alleged that, besides the 2 houses, she exclusively acquired the rest of the properties.
Beumer alleged that the funds which was used to acquire the lots came from him and that these were registered
solely under Amores since he is prohibited from owning land, him being a Dutch national.
Amores maintained that she acquired them from her income selling jewelries, Avon, Tupperware, etc.
RTC ruled that the lots were paraphernal properties of Amores; and the houses co-owned by the ex-spouses.
Beumer appealed to the CA and prayed for the reimbursement of half of the value of what he had paid in the
acquisition of the lots, waiving the other half in favor of Amores.
CA affirmed RTC.
ISSUE(S): WON Beumer may seek reimbursement of the value he paid for the acquisition of the disputed lands on the grounds of
equity (Amores having been enriched at the expense of Beumer)
HELD: NO. SC affirmed CA.
RATIO:
In Muller v Muller, it held that Helmut Muller cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear that he
willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the prohibition against foreign ownership of Philippine land enshrined
under Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution.
In any event, the Court cannot, even on the grounds of equity, grant reimbursement to Beumer given that he acquired no
right whatsoever over the subject properties by virtue of its unconstitutional purchase.
The doctrine on unjust enrichment does not apply if, as in this case, the action is proscribed by the Constitution or by the
application of the pari delicto doctrine.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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Gayon vs. Gayon
No. L-28394. November 26, 1970
TOPIC: Effects of family relations on legal disputes
PONENTE: Concepcion, C. J.
AUTHOR: PARIAN

1951: Spouses Silvestre and Genoveva Gayon (respondents) allegedly sold a parcel of land to Gelera subject to
redemption within 5 years. The right to redemption has prescribed and the spouses did not redeem the land from
Gelera.
1957: Gelera then sold the land to Pedro Gayon (petitioner, brother of Silvestre).
Pedro, as required by law to lands acquired through a conditional sale, filed an action to obtain a judicial decree for
the consolidation of the land title; the spouses being the defendants.
In her defense, Mrs. Gayon alleged that Silvestre died on January 6, 1954, long before the institution of this case; that
her signature to the deed in favor of Gelera is not hers; and that as a brother of Silvestre, Pedro did not exert efforts for
the amicable settlement of the case. She then filed a motion to dismiss.
The lower court granted the motion, ruling that Silvestre Gayon is the absolute owner of the disputed land and that
considering Silvestre is now dead, Mrs. Gayon has nothing to do with the land subject of Pedros complaint.
ISSUE(S): WON Mrs. Gayon has interest in the disputed land. YES.
WON Pedro is required to exert efforts for the amicable settlement of the case. NO
HELD: CFI decision set aside and remanded back to the lower court with the inclusion of respondent as administrator of the estate
of Silvestre.
RATIO:
As a widow, she is one of her deceased husband's compulsory heirs and has, accordingly, an interest in the property in
question.
CC Art 222: No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it should appear that earnest
efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed, subject to the limitations in article 2035.
However, CC Art 217 provides who are the members of the same family: (1) Between husband and wife; (2) Between parent
and child; (3) Among other ascendants and descendants; (4) Among brothers and sisters.
Mrs. Gayon is Pedros sister-in-law. Their relationship is not included as members of the same family.
Therefore, Pedros failure to seek a compromise before filing the complaint against his sister-in-law does not bar him from filing
the said complaint.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Amicable settlement is only required if the parties belong to the same family, as enumerated by FC Art. 150.
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HEIRS of FAVIS v GONZALES
[713 SCRA 569, 2010]
TOPIC: Restrictions on capacity to act k. Physical
incapacity/disease
PONENTE: Perez, J.
AUTHOR: PARIAN
Dr. Favis and his sneaky, greedy 2nd wife.

Dr. Favis was married to Capitolina and had children with her. After she died, he took in Juana as his common-law wife
(they eventually got married). They had one child, Mariano, with whom they had four grandchildren.
In 1992, he was diagnosed with Parkinsons disease, kidney trouble, hernia, etc.
In 1994, he allegedly executed a Deed of Donation transferring and conveying parts of his estate in favor of his
grandchildren with Juana.
In 1995, Dr. Favis died.
Dr Favis children with Capitolina filed an action for annulment of the deed, claiming that it prejudiced their legitime.
RTC found that Dr. Favis, at the age of 92, plagued with illnesses, could not have had full control of his mental
capacities to execute a valid Deed of Donation. It nullified the deed on the ground of vitiated consent.
CA dismissed the complaint solely because of Art. 151 FC: that it was not alleged that there was earnest efforts toward
a compromise, and that it had failed.
ISSUE(S): WON the deed of donation is valid.
HELD: No. CA decision was set aside. RTC decision affirmed.
RATIO:
CA did not touch on the correctness of the findings of RTC. CA chose to confine its review to the procedural aspect.
RTCs findings, therefore, stands unreversed.
RTC decision: The fact that the deed of donation was only executed after Dra. Mercedes (his daughter from 1 st marriage) left
his fathers house necessarily indicates that they dont want the same to be known by the first family, which is an indicia of
bad faith on the part of the defendant, who at the time had influence over the donor.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Physical incapacity brought by illness is a restriction on capacity to act.
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Patricio v. Dario
G.R. No. 170829, November 20, 2006
TOPIC: Beneficiaries, FC 154, 158, 194-196, 199
FACTS:
On July 5, 1987, Marcelino V. Dario died intestate and was survived by his wife, petitioner Perla Patricio and their 2 sons,
Marcelino Marc Dario and respondent Marcelino G. Dario III.
He left properties such as the disputed ones, house and lot and a pre-school building in Cubao w/ 755 sqm.
On Aug. 10, 1987, Perla and the 2 sons extra-judicially settled the estate of Marcelino V. They cancelled the TCTS of the 2
disputed properties and new ones were issued in their names.
Perla and Marcelino Marc advised Marcelino III about their intention to partition the disputed properties and terminate the coownership but he refused and this prompted Perla to file this petition for partition at the RTC of QC.
RTC granted the partition where Perla would get 4/6 of it and 1/6 to each son.
Marcelino III filed w/ the CA but it affirmed the RTCs decision at first.
But when he filed for his 2nd motion for reconsideration, thats when the CA dismissed Perlas petition for partition because the
family home should continue despite their fathers death as long as theres still a minor beneficiary residing in it.
The CA considered Marcelino IIIs son, Marcelino Lorenzo Dario IV, as a minor beneficiary (makes him grandson of the
deceased and Perla.)
ISSUE:
WON respondent Marcelino IIIs son is considered a minor beneficiary w/c would be the reason for the continued existence of
the family home. NO.
HELD:
Marcelino V. died on July 5, 1987 and the family home should continue to exist for 10 yrs. or until July 1997. But respondent
argues that his 12 yr. old son is a minor beneficiary w/c would continue the existence of the family home beyond July 1997.
Perla argues that their 2 sons are already of age at the time of their husband/fathers death, hence, no more minor
beneficiary to speak of.
The SC cites FC154 w/c enumerates the beneficiaries and in relation to FC159 (10 yr. existence after death of spouse/s).
In FC159, the SC takes into consideration Dr. Tolentinos comments where he stated the requisites to be considered a minor
beneficiary:
a. The relationship enumerated in FC154;
b. They live in the family home;
c. Dependent for legal support upon the head of the family.
In contemplating such requisites:
a. Since the son is the grandson Perla and the deceased, he is a descendant w/c satisfies (a);
b. The son, has been living in the family home since 1994, hence, also satisfies (b);
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c. However, he is not dependent from his grandmother (Perla) because such obligation is burdened on Marcelino III as he is
the head of his family. Hence, not a beneficiary.
Professor Pinedas comments were also taken into account wherein she stated that pursuant to FC199 (Order of support), the
obligation for legal support is vested on the parents first. It only becomes the burden of the grandparents when parents are in
default or incapable. Therefore, grandchildren cannot demand support directly from their grandparents if they have parents
capable of supporting them.
Reason is the closer the relationship of the relatives are, the stronger the tie that binds them.
Since, there are no more persons dependent on Perla, the petition for partition is granted but remanded the case to the RTC
for it to conduct a partition by commissioners, 4/6 for Perla and 1/6 to each son.
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Arriola vs. Arriola
G.R. No. 177703. January 28, 2008
TOPIC: Family home when terminated
PONENTE: AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.
AUTHOR: PARIAN
SC ruled that RTC should have dismissed the contempt case right away for
procedural error. They went on and resolved the issue anyway.

Fidel died intestate. John (respondent), his son from his 1 st marriage, filed an action for judicial partition against Vilma
and Anthony (petitioners), Fidels 2 nd wife and son, on the properties Fidel left.
RTC ordered the disputed lot to be partitioned equally to them.
However before the auction, Vilma and Anthony refused to include the house - which is their family home for 20 years standing on the subject land, as it was not part of the RTC decision.
John filed for contempt. RTC denied the motion and held that the subject house should not be included in the
auction.
John appealed to the CA. CA held that the house is an accessory to the land. Accessory must follow the principal.
Therefore, the house must be included in the auction sale.
Vilma and Anthony filed for certiorari.
ISSUE(S): WON the family home should be included in the auction of the land.
HELD: NO. Only the land outside the area of the family home may be auctioned.
RATIO:
SC upheld CAs postulate that the house is an accessory to the land, in which the former should be included in the auction.
However, the house being the family home, it is precluded from being partitioned by the heirs within 10 years after the death
of Fidel or as long as there is a minor beneficiary; as stated in FC Art. 159.
This includes the lot where the house is standing; as stated in FC Art. 153: The family home is deemed constituted on a house
and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
The heirs are barred to partition the family home within 10 years after the death of their decedent or until a minor is residing in it.
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FORTALEZA v. LAPITAN
[G.R. No. 178288. August 15, 2012]
NOTES:
TOPIC: The family home When may be sold
FACTS:
Spouses Fortaleza (Petitioners) obtained a loan from spouses Lapitan (Respondent). As security, spouses Fortaleza executed a
Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over their residential house and lot situated in Los Baos, Laguna
When spouses Fortaleza failed to pay their debt, the creditors applied for extrajudicial foreclosure of the Real Estate
Mortgage. A public auction was made and Lapitans son emerged as the highest bidder and was issued the Certificate of
Sales. The 1 year redemption period expired without spouses Fortaleza redeeming the mortgage.
Spouses Lapitan executed an affidavit of consolidation of ownership and caused the cancellation and the registration of the
subject property in the names of Spouses Fortaleza.
Spouse Fortaleza refused spouses Lapitans formal demand to vacate and surrender possession of the subject property.
Spouses Lapitan filed an ex parte petition for the issuance of writ of possession with RTC Calamba City As new registered
owners of the subject property, spouses Lapitan claimed that they were entitled to its possession, but spouses Fortaleza
questions the validity of the mortgage and the foreclosure sale.
RTC allowed the presentation of evidence ex parte because of the failure spouses Fortaleza to appear on the scheduled
hearings. RTC then ordered the issuance of a writ of possession in the name of spouses Lapitan. They explained that it is a
ministerial duty of the court especially since the redemption period had expired and a new title had already been issued.
Spouses Fortaleza filed for motion for reconsideration. They argued that the subject property is their family home and is
exempt from foreclosure sale. RTC dismissed their motion.
CA affirmed. It was stressed that any question regarding the regularity and validity of the mortgage or its foreclosure cannot
be raised as a justification for opposing the issuance of the writ of possession since the proceedings is ex parte and nonlitigious.
ISSUE(S): Is the family home exempted from a forced sale?
HELD: No. Petition is denied. CA affirmed.
RATIO:
As a rule, the family home is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment. However, Article 155(3) of the Family Code
explicitly allows the forced sale of a family home for debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such
constitution.
In this case, there is no doubt that spouses Fortaleza voluntarily executed a deed of Real Estate Mortgage over the subject
property which was even notarized.
Assuming that the property is exempt from forced sale, spouses Fortaleza did not set up and prove to the Sheriff such
exemption from forced sale before it was sold at the public auction.
Honrado vs. CA presented: Such claim for exemption should be set up and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the
property at public auction. Failure to do so would estop the party from later claiming the exemption.
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De Mesa v. Acero
G.R. No. 185064 January 16, 2012
TOPIC: Rights of creditors, FC 157, 160-162
PONENTE: Reyes, J.
FACTS:
Before petitioner-sps. Araceli and Ernesto De Mesa got married, they purchased on April 17, 1984 a parcel of land in Mt.
Carmel Subd. in Bulacan. A house was later built on it and became the family home after they got married on Jan. 1987.
On Sept. 1988, Araceli got a 100k loan from respondent Claudio Acero secured by a mortgage on the property. As payment,
Araceli issued a check from China Bank payable to Claudio.
However, the check was dishonored because the account was already closed and De Mesas failed to pay. This prompted
Claudio to file a petition for violating B.P.22.
RTC acquitted the De Mesas but ordered them to pay the 100k and a writ of execution was made and the Sheriff levied on
the family home w/c was eventually sold to Claudio and a TCT was issued in his name.
On Feb. 1995, Claudio leased it to them and a certain Juanito Oliva for 5.5k/month. They defaulted in payment and the debt
amounted to 170.5k. Meanwhile, a final deed of sale was issued in Claudios name regarding the property.
Unable to collect the debt, Claudio and his wife Rufina (Acero sps.) filed for ejectment w/ the MTC of Bulacan against the
lessor-sps. and that Juanito. De Mesa sps. as defense states that they were the lawful owners since its their family home.
MTC and CA ruled in favor of Acero sps. stating that the Torrens title was registered in the name of Claudio and never did the
De Mesas questioned the levy of the Sheriff and the Torrens title.
On Oct. 29, 1999, De Mesas filed w/ the RTC of Bulacan complaining to nullify the TCT in Claudios name because it is their
family home w/c is exempted from execution. However, the RTC dismissed their petition, which the CA affirmed, both stating
that no time did the petitioners raise the supposed exemption of the subject property from execution on account of the same
being a family home.
De Mesas now file appeal to the SC. Aceros commented it is forum shopping because of the MTC, CA ruling earler.
ISSUE:
WON there was forum shopping. NO.
WON the lower courts erred in not cancelling the Torrens title in favor of Claudio over the subject property. NO.
HELD:
Not focusing here but no forum shopping because no identity of issues between the first petition for ejectment and the
petition for nullity of the Torrens title.
The SC agrees w/ the CA (ejectment case) that it is true that it is the family home of the De Mesas and should therefore be
exempted from execution. However, such right to prove it to be exempted can be waived and in this case, they are barred
due to laches.
The De Mesas negligence:
a. Allowed the property to be levied upon and the public sale to proceed;
b. The final deed of sale was issued to Claudio and, later, Araceli De Mesas Torrens title was cancelled and a new one
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issued under Claudios name, still, they remained silent;
c. It was only after the Aceros filed for unlawful detainer (4 years from after the auction), that they claimed that the subject
property is a family home, thus, exempt from execution.
TAKE NOTE: Got this from the Biala v. CA in ObliCon.
Laches - failure or neglect, for an unreasonable length of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence could or should
have been done earlier; negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time warranting a presumption that the
party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it. It has 4 elements:
a. Conduct of defendant that give rise to the situation of which complaint is made and seeks remedy;
b. Delay in asserting complainants rights despite knowledge or motive of defendants conduct and having opportunity to
do so;
c. Lack of knowledge or motive of defendant that complainant will file suit;
d. Defendant will be the injured or prejudiced party if the suit be allowed or not barred.
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Suntay III vs. Cojuangco-Suntay (MR)
G.R. No. 183053. October 10, 2012
TOPIC: legitimate children
PONENTE: Perez, J.
AUTHOR: PARIAN
This is only for the administration of the estate, not the partition among heirs.
In Suntay v Suntay, 1998, SC ruled that Isabel and her siblings are legitimate
children of Emilio I and Isabel; given that their marriage were annulled. (This
should be the case being discussed under this topic. This is more of a
succession case.)
My opinion: Federicos adoption of Emilio III only came about after Cristinas
death. Even so, he cannot be considered as Cristinas next of kin, only
Federicos.

Cristina Suntay died intestate. Her husband Federico died while the case was pending. Cristina and Federicos son,
Emilio I, predeceased the spouses.
Emilio I left them with 5 grandchildren: 3 legitimate including Isabel (respondent), and 2 illegitimate including Emilio III
(petitioner).
The legitimate grandchildren were separated from their grandparents 30 years from the time Emilio I annulled (psych
incapacity) his marriage to his wife Isabel (they like using the same names).
The illegitimate grandchildren were under the care of the grandparents since birth. Federico even adopted Emilio III as
his son when Cristina died.
This case is a motion for reconsideration, filed by Isabel, of SCs decision appointing Emilio III and Isabel as coadministrator of Cristinas estate.
Isabel assails that she should be the sole administrator as she is the next of kin, not Emilio III; and that Emilio III is not fit to
administer the estate.
Isabel alleged that since 2001, when RTC appointed him, he has mismanaged and did not properly account the
estate
ISSUE(S): WON Emilio III should be excluded as co-administrator.
HELD: YES. MR granted.
RATIO:
The letters of administration, generally, is granted to the surviving spouse. If there is no surviving spouse, the next of kin is
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preferred. (RoC Rule 78, Sec. 6)
It had been decided that Isabel is a legitimate child of Emilio I. In effect, she is the legitimate grandchild of Cristina. Her next of
kin.
In contrast, Emilio III cannot be considered as the preferred next of kin of Cristina since he is an illegitimate grandchild, and
since a legitimate next of kin is present.
Also, he is excluded as co-administrator because he is unfit and incompetent to administer the estate.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
In administering the estate of an intestate decedent, the legitimate next of kin is preferred.
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ARBOLARIO v. CA
[G.R. No. 129163. April 22, 2003]
NOTES:
TOPIC: Who are considered legitimate children
Conceived during a valid marriage
FACTS:
Anselmo Baloyo and Macaria Lirazan had five children Agueda Colinco, Catalina Baloyo, Eduardo Baloyo, Gaudencia
Baloyo, and Julian Baloyo (Parents and children are already dead).
1st child, Agueda Colinco, was survived by her children: Irene Colinco and Antonio Colinco who was predeceased by her
daughters.
2nd child, Catalina Baloyo married Juan Albolario. Their daughter Purificacion Albolario died a spinster (matandang dalaga
hehe). Juan Albolario cohabited with Francisca Malvas and had children (Petitioners).
1946 3rd child, Eduardo Baloyo sold his entire interest in the subject land to his sister Agueda Colinco, by virtue of a notarized
document.
1951 - Gaudencia conveyed her interest in the said lot in favor of her two nieces Irene to one-half and Purificacion to the
other half. Purificacion took possession of the land until she died.
Irene and Antonios daughters, the Colincos (Respondents), believing that they were the only heirs, executed a Declaration
of Heirship and Partition Agreement. Irene was to get half of the properties and the other half will be shared by Antonios
daughters.
Petitioners filed for the cancellation of title. They allege that the Declaration of Heirship and Partition Agreement were void as
petitioners were not included.
RTC Negros Occidental was in favor of petitioners. It ordered the nullity of the Declaration of Heirship. The trial court further
held that the Arbolarios were the brothers and the sisters of the deceased Purificacion Arbolario, while the Colincos were her
cousins and nieces. Pursuant to Art. 1009 of the Civil Code, the Colincos could not inherit from her, because she had halfbrothers and half-sisters.
CA reversed the decision It is noted that all the petitioners were born before 1951 which the year when Catalina died,
therefore making them illegitimate children. Illegitimate children are barred by Art. 992 of the Civil Code from inheriting
intestate from the legitimate children and relatives of their father or mother.
ISSUE(S): Are illegitimate children entitled to inherit from their half-sister?
HELD: No. Petition denied. CA affirmed.
RATIO:
Petitioners in this case were unable to establish any right to partition, because they had failed to establish that they were
legitimate half-brothers and half-sisters of the deceased Purificacion. Questions as to the determination of the heirs of a
decedent, the proof of filiation, and the determination of the estate of a decedent and claims thereto should be brought up
before the proper probate court or in special proceedings instituted for the purpose. Such issues cannot be adjudicated in an
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ordinary civil action for the recovery of ownership and possession.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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Continental Steel v. Montano
G.R. No. 182836. October 13, 2009
TOPIC: Conceived during marriage FC168
PONENTE: Chico-Nazario, J.
FACTS:
Hortillano is an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Corp. and a member of respondent Nagkakaisahang Manggagawa
ng Centro Steel Corporation-Solidarity of Trade Unions in the Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms (Union).
He filed for a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to
the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between petitioner and respondent.
Cont. Steel granted the paternity leave but denied his claims for bereavement, leave and death and accident for
dependent.
The Union file with the DOLE to settle the dispute and the parties chose Atty. Montano, an accredited voluntary arbitrator, to
be the arbiter of the case.
The Union then states:
a. The CBA did not specifically state that the dependent should have 1st been born alive or must have acquired juridical
personality so that his/her subsequent death could be covered by the CBA death benefits;
b. Cited the Steve Dugan case wherein he is an employee of Mayer Steel whose wife also prematurely delivered a fetus w/c
died before delivery. And he received all benefits;
c. In Dugans case, the child was only 24 weeks when he/she died, unlike to this case, the child is already 37-38 weeks;
d. NCC1702 provides that all doubts in labor legislations and labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the laborer.
Continental Steel states:
a. The CBA did not contemplate the death of an unborn child, a fetus, without legal personality. The CBA provisions are clear
and unambiguous;
b. That there are 2 elements for the entitlement to the benefits, namely: (1) death and (2) status as legitimate dependent,
none of which existed in Hortillanos case;
c. Citing NCC40-42. Only those w/ civil personality could die. Hence, the unborn child never died because it never acquired
juridical personality;
d. Also, a fetus that was delivered dead could not be considered a dependent, since it never needed any support, nor did it
ever acquire the right to be supported.
Atty. Montano rules in favor of Hortiallno and lays down elements for entitlement to the benefits:
a. There is death;
b. Such death must be of employees dependent; and
c. Such dependent must be legitimate;
d. The fetus had the right to be supported by the parents from the very moment he/she was conceived. The fetus had to rely
on another for support; he/she could not have existed or sustained himself/herself without the power or aid of someone
else, specifically, his/her mother.
CA affirmed Atty. Montanos decision reiterating his ruling and adding that a dead fetus simply cannot be equated with
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anything less than loss of human life, especially for the expectant parents.
ISSUE:
WON Hortillano is entitled to the benefits. YES.
HELD:
The SC reiterates the elements Atty. Montano mentioned and Continental Steels reliance on NCC40-42 is misplaced:
a. NCC40-42 does not provide at all a definition of death;
b. While the NCC expressly provides that civil personality may be extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that only
those who have acquired juridical personality could die;
c. Death has been defined as the cessation of life. Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil
personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life;
d. The life of the unborn from conception, the State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has
life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death;
e. Reiterating (d) of Atty. Montanos ruling, hence, the unborn child can be considered a dependent under the CBA.
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Moore v. Republic
G.R. No. L-18407. June 26, 1963
TOPIC: Rights of legitimate children, FC 173174
PONENTE:
FACTS:
Petitioner Elaine Moore, a US citizen, had 2 marriages:
a. Married Joseph Velarde, also US citizen, in which they had a child, William Velarde (14 yrs. old, living in LA, USA);
b. After a divorce was decreed by the SC of California on (a), Elaine married Don Moore on Sept. 29, 1956 in LA, USA.
Don treated William like his own son and this prompted Elaine to file this petition for change of name of William Velarde to
William Moore.
The govt opposed such petition stating 2 issues:
a. Whether under our laws a minor may be permitted to adopt and use the surname of the second husband of his mother;
b. Whether justifiable reasons exist to allow such change of name.
ISSUE:
WON William, the son, is allowed to use the surname of the subsequent husband of Elaine. NO.
HELD:
The SC cites NCC364 w/c provides that legitimate children shall principally use the surname of their father.
NCC369 also provides that in case of annulment of avoidable marriage the children conceived before the annulment, must
principally use the surname of the father. In this case, William was born before the divorce was decreed.
The SC states the reason that if a child born out of a lawful wedlock be allowed to use the surname of the 2nd husband of the
mother, should the 1st husband die or be separated by a decree of divorce, there may result a confusion to his real paternity.
Also, in the long run, the change of name may redound to the prejudice of the child in the community.
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Republic v. CA (Vicencio)
G.R. No. 88202 December 14, 1998
TOPIC: Rights of legitimate children, FC 173174
PONTENTE: Quisumbing, J.
FACTS:
Respondent Cynthia was born on Jan. 19, 1971 as result of the marriage of Pablo Vicencio and Fe Ezperanza de Vega
Leabres.
However, Pablo left the family on Jan. 10, 1972 after a disagreement. He never gave support after he left. It was a certain
Ernesto Yu who gave support to Fe and Cynthia after the husbands abandonment.
Fe filed several petitions w/ different dates w/ the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court:
a. On June 29, 1976, for the dissolution of the CPG; and
b. On 1983, change of name wherein shed drop Vicencio;
c. On 1984, to declare Pablo as absentee;
On April 15, 1986, she married Ernesto Yu w/c was solemnized by Mayor Abalos of Mandaluyong.
Ernesto Yu was like a father to Cynthia and w/ her using the surname Vicencio has caused confusion as to her parentage and
was even subjected to questions by neighbors and classmates like on 2 occasions:
a. When she ran as a beauty contestant at the Lions Club Affair; and
b. At the Manila Red Cross pageant because the name she used was Cynthia Yu.
The RTC and CA ruled in favor of Cynthia granting her to use the surname Yu:
a. RTC says no valid cause as to deny her petition and could not compel Ernesto to adopt Cynthia because adoption is a
voluntary act;
b. CA says the change of surname would give her opportunity to improve her personality and welfare.
OSG appeals to SC.
ISSUE:
WON the Cynthia should be allowed to change her surname. NO.
HELD:
The SC cites Rep. v. Hernandez wherein change of surname is allowed under the ff. circumstances:
a. When the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
b. When the change is a legal consequence of legitimation or adoption;
c. When the change will avoid confusion;
d. When one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name and was unaware of alien
parentage;
e. When the change is based on a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith
and without prejudice to anybody; and
f. When the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent
purpose, or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.
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g. Cynthia claims her case falls under 1 of the circumstances above but the SC points out that she used Vicencio in her
school documents and subsequently used Yu in the 2 beauty contest and in her debut at the Mnl Hotel.
The OSG was correct in saying that it might give confusion as to the legal implications because Ernesto had 2 children w/ Fe
and when Ernesto dies, it is possible that Cynthia may even claim inheritance rights as a legitimate daughter.
Also, the RTC already gave Ernesto the remedy to have Cynthia the opportunity to use his surname, w/c is to adopt Cynthia.
But it seems that he did not want to because he had no intention in making her an heir.
A legitimate child generally bears the surname of his or her father. It must be stressed that a change of name is a privilege, not
a matter of right, addressed to the sound discretion of the court, which has the duty to consider carefully the consequences
of a change of name and to deny the same unless weighty reasons are shown.
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Uy vs. Chua
G.R. No. 183965. September 18, 2009
TOPIC: Who are considered legitimate
PONENTE: CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
AUTHOR: PARIAN
Demurrer of Evidence defendant does not dispute the evidence but
claims it is not sufficient grounds to justify the legal action.

Uy filed a petition for the issuance of a decree of illegitimate filiation against Chua (as her father).
Uy alleged that Chua, who was then married, had an illicit relationship with her mother Irene.
This illicit relationship bore two children: Uy and her brother Allan.
She alleged that Chua instructed that her birth certificate be filled out with the names: Alfredo Surposa as father and
Irene Ducay as mother. Alfredo is the father of Irene and Duca is the maiden surname of her mother.
She also stated that Chua had supported her family; and that Chuas family recognizes the siblings as members of
Chuas family, as evidenced by their attendance in their (siblings) special occasions (wedding, baptismal, etc.)
Chua denied the allegations and subsequently filed a Demurrer to Evidence on the ground that the petition had
already been barred by res judicata in a prior special proceeding.
This prior proceeding is a similar petition filed by Uy.
It ended with a judicially approved compromise agreement wherein Uy acknowledges that there is no blood
relationship between the siblings and Chua; and as an act of good will, Chua will pay them P2M each.
RTC granted the demurrer and dismissed the case. Uy went straight to SC for certiorari (since it is a question of law).
ISSUE(S): WON the instant petition is barred by res judicata (in relation to the compromise agreement)
HELD: No. Compromise agreement void. No res judicata. Case remanded to RTC.
RATIO:
The compromise agreement is intended to settle the question of Uys filiation and civil status, i.e. whether she is an illegitimate
child of Chua.
ART. 2035: No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid:

(1) The civil status of persons;
(2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation;
(3) Any ground for legal separation;
(4) Future support;
(5) The jurisdiction of courts;
(6) Future legitime.
Therefore, the compromise agreement is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy and order.
RTC, then, has no jurisdiction to legalize something that is illegal.
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To conclude, no res judicata.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Civil status cannot be the subject of a compromise agreement.
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Osmea de Valencia v. Rodriguez
[84 Phil 223. August 2, 1949]
NOTES:
TOPIC: Rights of illegitimate children
PONENTE: Paras, J.
FACTS:
Pio Valencia is married to Catalina Osmea.
He cohabited with Emilia Rodriguez. He begot children with both women.
Pios illegitimate children with Emilia used his surname.
When the plaintiffs (the Osmea de Valencia children) learned about this, they instituted an injunction case before CFI Cebu
preventing them to use such surname. They claimed as they are the legitimate children of Pio Valencia, only they can use his
last name. They presented Art. 114 of the Civil Code which provides that legitimate children have the right to bear the
surname of the father.
CFI dismissed the case.
ISSUE(S): Can illegitimate children use their fathers surname?
HELD: Yes. CFI affirmed.
RATIO:
There is nothing in the law that says that legitimate children have an exclusive right to their fathers surname.
The reliance of the plaintiffs on the combination of certain provisions in the civil code is misplaced. Art. 114, which says that
legitimate children have the right to use their fathers surname, and Art. 139 and 845 which say illegitimate children shall be
entitled only to support, will not work to create an exclusive right for legitimate children.
The evidence shows that Pio acquiesced to the illegitimate childrens use of his surname even if they have come of age. And
even if he did not agree the children can still use his surname in the absence of a law expressly prohibiting them from doing
so.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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Gotardo v. Buling
GR 165166, August 15, 2012
TOPIC: Rights of illegitimate children, FC 173,
172, 175-176
PONENTE: Brion, J.
FACTS:
Respondent Divina Buling met petitioner Charles Gotardo on Dec. 1, 1992 at the Ph Comm. Industrial Bank Southern Leyte
branch when she started working there as a casual employee and Charles as accounting supervisor.
Charles started dating her on the 3rd week of December 1992 and became sweethearts on the last week of Jan. 1993.
On Sept. 1993, started having sex at the room he rented at the boarding house. He rented such room from March 1, 1993
Aug. 30, 1994.
On Aug. 8, 1994, Divina found out that she was pregnant and told it to Charles, he was happy about it and they both decided
to get married. Unfortunately, Charles backed out w/c prompted Divina to file for damages for breach of promise but it was
amicably settled.
Divina gave birth to Gliffze on March, 9, 1995 and wanted him to acknowledge his son but he never did and never gave
support.
So on Sept. 6, 1995, Divina filed w/ the RTC of Southern Leyte for compulsory recognition of Gliffze and support pendente lite.
Divina also presented Rodulfo Lopez as witness (Uncle of Divina and the owner of the boarding house he rented out to
Charles.)
Charles denied this and said that he first had sex w/ Divina on the 1st week of Aug. 1994 and she could have not been
pregnant for 3 months after he was informed about such pregnancy on Sept. 15, 1994.
RTC dimissed Divinas petition for recognition and support for insufficiency of evidence of proving Gliffzes filiation.
CA reversed the decision and said:
a. That they had sex even before Aug. 1994 and that Divina had only 1 boyfriend, Charles, from Jan. 1993 to Aug. 1994; and
b. That Charles allegation that Divinas previous relationships with other men remained unsubstantiated.
ISSUE:
WON the CA erred in saying that Charles is the real father of the child of Divina. NO. Charles is the real father.
HELD:
In Herrera v. Alba, there are 4 significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action that parties have to face:
a. A prima facie case;
b. Affirmative defenses;
c. Presumption of legitimacy; and
d. Physical resemblance between the putative father and the child.
In case (a), it is when a woman declares (supported by corroborative proof) that she had sex with the putative father; at this
point, the burden of evidence shifts to the putative father.
With that said, there 2 defense available for the putative father and these are:
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a. Incapability of sexual relations with the mother due to either physical absence or impotency; or
b. That the mother had sexual relations with other men at the time of conception.
Charles did not deny that he had sex w/ Divina, only that it occurred on a much later date than she asserted, such that it was
physically impossible for her to have been 3 months pregnant already in Sept. 1994 when he was informed of the pregnancy.
Also, add CAs (b) ruling.
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GRANDE v ANTONIO
G.R. No. 206248. February 18, 2014
TOPIC: Rights of illegitimate children
PONENTE: VELASCO, JR., J.
AUTHOR: PARIAN

Grande and Antonio lived together as husband and wife, although Antonio was at that time married to someone else.
They had two sons.
Antonio did not expressly recognize the sons as his own in the Records of Birth in the Civil Registry.
Grande and Antonio eventually separated, and Grande left for the US.
This prompted Antonio to file a Petition for Judicial Approval of Recognition with Prayer to take Parental Authority,
Parental Physical Custody, Correction/Change of Surname of Minors and for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary
Injunction before the RTC.
He appended a notarized Deed of Voluntary Recognitions of Paternity of the children.
RTC awarded him the parental authority and custody, and granted his prayer of change of surname of the children.
Grande appealed with the CA attributing grave error on the part of RTC for not granting sole custody as provided in
FC Art 176 (illegitimate children shall be under the parental authority of the mother).
CA modified RTCs ruling, granting Grande sole custody but sustained the change of surname.
She then filed for certiorari on CAs decision sustaining the change of surname.
ISSUE(S): WON the father can compel his illegitimate children to use his surname
HELD: NO. CA and RTC decision SET ASIDE. Change of surname case REMANDED back to RTC due to the letters submitted by the
children during the certiorari, opposing the change of their surname.
RATIO:
Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname of their father or not.
Art 176: Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be
entitled to support in conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if their
filiation has been expressly recognized by their father xxx.
The use of the word may in the provision readily shows that an acknowledged illegitimate child is under no compulsion to
use the surname of his illegitimate father.
The word may is permissive and operates to confer discretion upon the illegitimate children.
It is not the father (Antonio) or the mother (Grande) who is granted by law the right to dictate the surname of their illegitimate
children.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Illegitimate children, recognized by their father, MAY use their fathers surname. Otherwise, they shall use their mothers.
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Reyes v. Mauricio
[G.R. No. 175080. November 24, 2010]
NOTES: The main issue is about the validity of the Kasunduan, incidental issue
TOPIC: Action to impugn legitimacy
lang yung legitimacy lol
PONENTE: Perez, J.
FACTS:
Eugenio Reyes was the registered owner of a parcel of land located in Bocaue, Bulacan. Its title came from and cancelled
TCT registered in the name of Eufracia and Susana Reyes, his siblings.
The subject property was adjudicated to Eugenio by virtue of an extrajudicial settlement among the heirs following the death
of his parents.
A complaint was filed before the DARAB (DAR Adjudication Board) by respondent Librada Mauricio and her daughter
Leonida for annulment of contract denominated as Kasunduan. They allege that:
They are heirs of the Godofredo Mauricio who was the lawful and registered tenant of the subject land;
That Godofredo introduced improvements to the land (seasonal crops, fruit bearing trees, residential house, etc.)
That the Kasunduan Eugenio made was unlawfully and ejected respondents from the subject property,
That Librada never appeared before the Notary Public;
That Librada was illiterate and the contents of the Kasunduan were not read nor explained to her so Eugenio took advantage
of this, making the contract void for lack of consent;
Eugenio contented that there was no relationship of tenancy between him and the respondents. Librada affixed her signature
on the Kasunduan voluntarily and she knew the contents.
DARAB concluded that Godofredo was the tenant of Eugenio. Librada should be maintained in peaceful possession of the
subject land being the surviving spouse. Eugenio filed for motion for reconsideration but was denied.
CA affirmed the ruling of DARAB. It issued a resolution regarding the status of Leonida as a legal heir and allowed her to
substitute Librada, who died during the pendency of the case.
Leonidas legal standing as a party was also assailed by Eugenio. Eugenio submitted that the complaint was rendered moot
with the death of Librada, Godofredos sole compulsory heir. Eugenio contended that Leonida is a mere ward and not a
legal heir.
ISSUE(S): Does Leonida have legal standing as a party to the case?
HELD: Yes. Petition denied.
RATIO:
SC held that Eugenio cannot collaterally attack the status of Leonida in the instant petition. Filiation cannot be collaterally
attacked.
Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code provide that the action can be brought only by the husband or his heirs and within
the periods fixed in the present articles.
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Andal v. Macaraig
No. L-2474. May 30, 1951
TOPIC: Action to impugn legitimacy, Physical
impossibility of access
PONENTE: Bautista Angelo, J.
FACTS:
Respondent Eduvigis Macaraig, mother of Emiliano Andal, made a donation propter nuptias of a parcel of land in his favor
and his wife Maria Duenas. And if they had a legitimate son, he shall own such if he survive his parents. Otherwise, such land
would revert back to Eduvigis.
Then Emiliano suffered from Tuberculosis. His sickness became worse that on or about Sept. 10, 1942, he became so weak that
he could hardly move and get up from his bed. His brother, Felix, went to live in his house to help him work his farm.
But on Sept. 10, 1942, Maria, eloped w/ Felix, and both went to live in the house of Maria's father. Since May, 1942, Felix and
Maria had sex and treated each other as husband and wife. On June 17, 1943, Maria gave birth petitioner Mariano Andal.
Emiliano died on Jan. 1, 1943 and he was survived by his alleged legitimate son Mariano and Maria, his wife. He died w/o the
presence of Maria and she did not even attend his funeral.
Eduvigis took back the land and this prompted Maria to file w/ the lower court to recover such land because Mariano is their
legitimate son.
RTC ruled in favor of Maria and Mariano and Eduvigis appealed to SC because this involves a pure question of law and it
involves the legitimacy of Mariano.
ISSUE:
WON Mariano is the legitimate child of Emiliano and Maria. YES.
HELD:
The SC cited Manresas supporting evidence to Impossibility of access by husband to wife:
a. Absence during the initial period of conception;
b. Impotence which is patent, continuing and incurable; and
c. Imprisonment, unless it can be shown that cohabitation took place through corrupt violation of prison regulations.
Since the boy was born on June 17, 1943, and Emiliano died on Jan. 1, 1943, Mariano is presumed to be the legitimate son of
Emiliano and Maria, he having been born within 300 days ff. the dissolution of the marriage.
Such presumption can only be rebutted by proof that it was physically impossible for Emiliano to have had access to Maria
during the first 120 days of the 300 next preceding the birth of the child.
The presumption was unrebutted because Emiliano and Maria still lived under the same roof and it does not prevent Emiliano
from cohabiting w/ Maria even if Felix moved in and fucked Maria.
Emilianos sickness, even though serious, does not prevent him from having sex w/ Maria. Such cases suffering from this sickness
can have sex even in the most crucial stage because they are more inclined to it.
As an author has said, "the reputation of the tuberculous towards eroticism (sexual propensity) is probably dependent more
upon confinement to bed than the consequences of the disease."
The fact that Maria has committed adultery cannot also overcome this presumption.
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Macadangdang v CA, Mejias
No. L-49542. September 12, 1980
TOPIC: Action to impugn legitimacy physical
imposiibility of acces
PONENTE: Makasiar, J.
AUTHOR: PARIAN

Mejias (respondent), married to Anahaw, had sex (for the first time) with Macadangdang.
Anahaw left Mejias when he discovered his wifes affairs.
7 months after the first sexual incident, Mejias gave birth to Rolando. Rolando had no birth certificate or baptismal
records
Mejias then filed for action for recognition and support for Rolando against Macadangdang.
Macadangdang opposed to the allegations and prayed for its dismissal.
RTC dismissed the case, citing NCC 255 (FC 166: physical impossibility to have sex) and NCC 256 (FC 167: still legitimate
even if mother declared against its legitimacy).
CA reversed it and held that Rolando is the illegitimate son of Macadangdang.
Macadangdang filed for certiorari.
ISSUE(S): WON Rolando is the illegitimate son of Macadangdang. NO
WON Mejias may institute an action to bastardize her son without giving the legally presumed father an
opportunity to be heard. NO
HELD: CA decision set aside.
RATIO:
NCC Art. 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of the marriage, and before three
hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.
Against this presumption, no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical impossibility of the husbands having access
to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the child.
This physical impossibility may be caused:
(1) By the impotence of the husband; (2) By the fact that the husband and wife were living separately, in such a way that
access was not possible; (3) By the serious illness of the husband.
Rolando was born within 300 days after Mejias and Anahaw separated. (The 180 days is already out of the question since
Anahaw and Mejias already had 4 kids.) Based on Art 255, Rolando is presumed to be the legitimate child of Anahaw.
This presumption became conclusive when Mejias failed to prove that there was physical impossibility for her and Anahaw to
have sex during the initial 120 days of the 300 hundred which preceded the birth of Rolando.
In fact, Mejias even went to Anahaws home to visit her children.
Also, given the 7-month period from the first sexual intercourse to the birth of Rolando, he could have been born prematurely.
This is not the case. The birth was normal. Rolando was born healthy and did not need special medical attention during his
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infancy.
The Court ruled that Mejias underwent a normal nine-month pregnancy. That Rolando was conceived before the first
encounter of Macadangdang and Mejias.
As to who may institute an action to impugn legitimacy, only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his
wife.
He is the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces; and he should decide
whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it, in view of the moral or economic interest involved.
The right to repudiate or contest the legitimacy of a child born in wedlock belongs only to the alleged father, who is the
husband of the mother and can be exercised only by him or his heirs, within a fixed time, and in certain cases, and only in a
direct suit brought for the purpose
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

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Concepcion v. CA
[G.R. No. 123450 August 31, 2005]
NOTES:
TOPIC: Physical impossibility of access
PONENTE: Corona, J.
FACTS:
Gerardo Concepcion was married Ma. Theresa Almonte. They have a son named Jose Gerardo.
Gerardo filed a petition to have their marriage annulled on the ground of bigamy. Her previous marriage with Mario Geopao
was never annulled. She contends however that it was a sham marriage and that she never lived with him.
The trial court ruled that her previous marriage was valid and subsisting when she married Gerardo and annulled her marriage
to the latter for being bigamous. It also declared Jose Gerardo to be an illegitimate child. The custody of the child was
awarded to Ma. Theresa and visitation rights were given to Gerardo
Ma. Theresa filed for reconsideration. She is only allowing Gerardo to visit their son between the hours of 8 in the morning to
12pm of any Sunday and that his surname changed to Almonte which Gerardo opposed.
The trial court, acting in the best interest of the child, denied her petitions. It held that the child needed to have a continuous
connection with his father.
Ma. Theresa elevated the case to the CA in which it denied her petition as well. CA also provided that Jose Gerardo was the
legitimate children of Ma. Theresa and Mario. Gerardo filed for motion for reconsideration. It was denied. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE(S): Is Jose Gerardo a legitimate son of Mario?
HELD: Yes. Petition is denied.
RATIO:
Gerardo invokes Article 166 (1) (b) of the Family Code. He cannot. He has no standing in law to dispute the status of Jose
Gerardo. Only Ma. Theresas husband Mario or, in a proper case, his heirs, who can contest the legitimacy of the child Jose
Gerardo born to his wife.
The presumption of legitimacy proceeds from the sexual union in marriage, particularly during the period of conception. To
overthrow this presumption on the basis of Article 166 (1)(b) of the Family Code, it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt
that there was no access that could have enabled the husband to father the child. Ma. Theresa did not show evidence to
disprove sexual relationship between her and Mario (they live 4km apart)
An assertion by the mother against the legitimacy of her child cannot affect the legitimacy of a child born or conceived
within a valid marriage. Because Ma. Theresa said that his son is not a legitimate son of Mario but an illegitimate son of
Gerardo.
Gerardo relied on Jose Gerardos birth certificate. This has no evidentiary value in this case because it was not offered in
evidence before the trial court. The rule is that the court shall not consider any evidence which has not been formally offered
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Art. 166 FC - Legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the following grounds:
(1) That it was physically impossible for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days
which immediately preceded the birth of the child because of:
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(b) the fact that the husband and wife were living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse was not possible.
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Agustin v. CA
TOPIC:
PONENTE:
FACTS:
This case was filed by respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante against Martins alleged biological father,
petitioner Arnel L. Agustin, for support and support pendente lite before the RTC of QC.
It was alleged that Arnel dated Fe in 1992, after which, he impregnated her on her 34th birthday or on Nov. 10, 1999.
Despite Arnels insistence on abortion, Fe decided to give birth to their illegitimate child, Martin, on Aug. 11, 2000 in QC. The
birth certificate was signed by Arnel as the father and he shouldered the hospital expenses but refused Fes repeated requests
for Martins support despite his adequate financial capacity and even suggested to have the child committed for adoption.
Arnel also denied having fathered Martin because his affair w/ Fe had allegedly ended in 1998, long before Martins
conception. He claimed:
a. That Fe had at least one other secret lover, a certain Jun.
b. Arnel admitted that their relationship started in 1993 but "he never really fell in love w/ her not only because she had at
least one secret lover but also because she proved to be scheming and overly demanding and possessive.
Fe and Martin then moved to order all parties to submit themselves for DNA testing under R28 of the ROC. But Arnel opposed
this invoking self-incrimination.
The RTC and CA ruled in favor of Fe and Martin ordering them to submit for DNA testing. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
WON the CA erred in affirming the RTCs decision in submitting themselves for DNA Testing. NO. Not self-incrimination.
HELD:
In Tecson, et al. v. COMELEC, the SC decided over the issue of filiation of presidential candidate Fernando Poe Jr. wherein it
stated In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA
testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long
dead parent could be resorted to. A positive match would clear up filiation or paternity.
The SC notes the ff. factors in DNA testing which are how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility
of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether proper standards and
procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.
In this case, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria was duly qualified by the prosecution as an expert witness on DNA print or
identification techniques and based on her finding, it was determined:
a. That the gene type and DNA profile of Arnel are identical to the extracts subject of examination;
b. The blood sample taken from Arnel are identical w/ semen taken from the Fes vaginal canal;
c. A DNA match exists between the semen found in the victim and the blood sample given by Arnel during trial.
Hence, Arnel was the father of Martin.
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LUCAS v LUCAS
G.R. No. 190710. June 6, 2011
TOPIC: Action to impugn legitimacy biological or
other scientific grounds
PONENTE: NACHURA, J.
AUTHOR: PARIAN

Jesse filed a Petition to Establish Illegitimate Filiation (with Motion for the Submission of Parties to DNA Testing) before
the RTC.
Jesse alleged that her mother had an intimate relationship with Jesus (respondent) and he (Jesse) was the result of it.
RTC found the petition sufficient in form and substance, and issued an order setting the case for hearing.
Jesus filed an MR. He averred that the petition was not in due form and substance because Jesse could not have
personally known the matters he was alleging.
He also argued that DNA testing cannot be conducted on the basis of mere allegation pointing to Jesus as Jesses
father.
RTC granted the MR and dismissed the case for failing to establish the four significant procedural aspects of a
traditional paternity action in Herrera v Alba: (1) prima facie case; (2) affirmative defense; (3) presumption of
legitimacy; (4) physical resemblance of the putative father and the child.
(Skip this) Jesse filed an MR: RTC reversed the decision and set the case for hearing. Jesus filed an MR, denied. He
appealed: CA upheld RTCs first decision (dismissal)
Jesse filed for certiorari
ISSUE(S): WON a prima facie showing (evidence) is necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing order.
HELD: YES. SC affirmed RTCs second decision (setting the case for hearing)
RATIO:
During the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable
possibility of paternity.
It should be stressed that the issuance of a DNA testing order remains discretionary upon the court.
The court may, for example, consider whether there is absolute necessity for the DNA testing.
SC sees the danger of allowing an absolute DNA testing to a compulsory recognition test even if the plaintiff/petitioner failed
to establish prima facie proof. Unscrupulous women, unsure of the paternity of their children may just be taking the chancesjust in case-by pointing to a sexual partner in a long past one-time encounter.
In the instant case, it is premature to discuss whether, under the circumstances, a DNA testing order is warranted considering
that no such order has yet been issued by the trial court.
In fact, the RTC has just set the said case for hearing.
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Chua Keng Giap v. IAC
[159 SCRA 18. February 17, 1988]
NOTES:
TOPIC: Effect of a mothers declaration
PONENTE: Cruz, J.
FACTS:
May 19, 1983 Chua Keng Giap filed a petition for the settlement of the estate of Sy Kao in the RTC of Quezon City. He is
alleging that Sy Kao is his mother.
The private respondent, Chua Lian King, moved to dismiss for lack of a cause of action and of the petitioner's capacity to file
the petition as he was not declared as the son of the spouses Chua Bing Guan and Sy Kao.
The motion was denied by Judge Jose P. Castro in IAC, who held that the case invoked decided the paternity and not the
maternity of the petitioner. Holding that this was mere quibbling, the respondent court reversed the trial judge in a petition for
certiorari filed by the private respondent.
The motion for reconsideration was denied for late filing. The petitioner insists that he is the son of the deceased Sy Kao and
that it was error for the respondent court to reject his claim. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE(S): Is Chua Keng Giap the son of Sy Kao?
RATIO:
The issue of his claimed filiation has long been settled, and with finality, by no less than this Court. That issue cannot be
resurrected now because it has been laid to rest in Sy Kao v. Court of Appeals. In that case, Sy Kao flatly and unequivocally
declared that she was not the petitioner's mother.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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People v. Quitoriano
G.R. No. 118852. January 20, 1997
TOPIC: Action to impugn legitimacy, In
subsequent marriages, FC168-169
PONENTE: Puno, J.
FACTS:
Accused-appellant Edgardo Quitoriano y Briones was convicted before the RTC of Marinduque of rape by Edna Pergis and
was sentenced of reclusion perpetua.
Edna testified:
a. That on the evening of Dec. 24, 1992, Edgardo entered her home and poked a knife at her neck, dragged her to her
bamboo bed, stripped her down and raped her;
b. After that, he told her not to tell anybody or else he will kill her
On Oct. 31, 1993, she gave birth to a child.
Edgardo stated as defense:
a. That from 7-10pm on such day, he was at the house of Paulino Rioflorido in the same brgy., drinking w/ Reynaldo Rioflorido
and the son of Paulino;
b. At 10pm, they attended a party at the house of Jose Ampiloquio w/c was about 400 meters from the Paulinos house;
c. The party ended at around 1am and they proceeded to Edgardos house after.
ISSUE:
WON Edgardo is guilty. YES.
HELD:
The SC stated that in rape cases, the lone testimony of the victim, if credible, is enough to sustain a conviction. Ednas
testimony was clear and consistent;
a. She positively identified Edgardo as the rapist;
b. The kitchen was sufficiently illuminated by a gas lamp when Edgardo entered. Then, he stood in front of her and stared at
her for a moment before dragging her to the bamboo bed, thus allowing her to see his face.
Edgardo failed to prove his defense of physical impossibility:
a. The rape happened on Dec. 24, 1992 at around 9pm at brgy. Pakaskasan, Torrijos, Marinduque.
b. He testified that from 7pm-10pm, 10pm-1am, he had drinking sessions but the house of Paulino and Jose were all located
in the same brgy.;
c. Paulinos house is only 200 meters away from Ednas house and admitted he could walk such distance in 5 mins. from
Paulinos house;
d. He and Reynaldo even passed by Ednas house to go to Joses house;
e. Thus, it was not impossible for him to slip into Ednas house and rape her.
The SC stated that Ednas delay in reporting the rape should not be taken against her because accused-appellant
threatened to kill her if she tells anybody about it. It was only because of the pregnancy.
Also, Edna gave birth more than 10 months after the alleged rape does not discredit her testimony. Dr. Honesto Marquez, a
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physician from the Marinduque Provincial Hospital, explained that the normal gestation period is 40 wks. or 280 days, but it can
also extend beyond 40 wks. if the woman is having her first pregnancy.
It is undisputed that the child delivered by Edna on Oct. 31, 1993, is her first. Hence, it is not impossible that the child was
conceived in Dec. 1992, the date of the alleged rape.
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Gaspay, Jr. v CA
G.R. No. 102372. November 15, 1994
TOPIC: Prescription of action to impugn legitimacy
PONENTE: Puno, J.
AUTHOR: PARIAN

Gaspay, Sr. died intestate.
Lupe Gaspay Alfaro (respondent) filed a petition in RTC that she is the acknowledged illegitimate daughter of Gaspay,
Sr. She identified that Sr had an illicit affair with her mother while Sr was married to Denoso.
Lupe prayed for issuance of letters of administration of Sr.s estate.
Gaspay, Jr. (petitioner; adopted son) filed for motion to dismiss. It was not granted. However, the case was dismissed
due to: (1) failure to prove the recognition/acknowledgment of Sr.; (2) failure to file the petition during Sr.s lifetime.
Lupe appealed and CA reversed the decision, giving full merit to Lupes evidence.
ISSUE(S): WON actions based on voluntary acknowledgment may be brought even after the fathers death
HELD: YES. CA decision affirmed.
RATIO:
The death of Gaspay, Sr., does not constitute a time bar to Lupes claim as his acknowledged illegitimate daughter.
It has been settled in Vda. de Sy-Quia vs. Court of Appeals that actions based on voluntary acknowledgment may be
brought even after the fathers death.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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Benitez-Badua v. CA
[G.R. No. 105625. January 24, 1994]
NOTES: They are not impugning the legitimacy of the child but alleging that
TOPIC: Who may impugn legitimacy
the child was not born to the spouses - Legarda
PONENTE: Puno, J.
FACTS:
Vicente and Isabel died and left a considerably large estate without an administrator.
Vicentes sister and nephew, Victoria Benitez Lirio and Feodor Benitez Aguilar then instituted an action before RTC of San
Pablo City to grant them the power of administration of the estate of Vicente.
The petitioner, Marissa, then opposed the petition, claiming that she is the only surviving heir of the dead spouses and she is
capable of administering the estate. She was a daughter of Vicente with another woman.
She presented evidence: (1) her Certificate of Live Birth; (2) Baptismal Certificate; (3) Income Tax Returns and Information
Sheet for Membership with the GSIS of the late Vicente naming her as his daughter; and (4) School Records.
The respondents countered by saying that Isabel was sterile, and that the spouses could not possibly have been able to
procreate.
The trial court decided in favor of Marissa. It declared Marissa as a legitimate heir.
On appeal, the CA reversed the trial courts decision and ruled in favor of Victoria and Feodor. It held that trial court erred in
applying Art. 166 and 170 of the Family Code.
ISSUE(S): Can the certificate of live birth be sufficient evidence to establish her legitimacy? NO
Can Victoria and Feodor impugn the validity of the presumption that Marissa is the child of Vicente and Isabel? NO
RATIO:
The reliance of petitioner Marissa on the provisions of the Family Code on impugning the legitimacy of a child is misplaced.
The provisions (164, 166, 170, and 171) are meant for a father questioning a child of his wife. They do not apply to the case at
bench because it merely involves the claim by the respondents that Marissa was not born to Vicente and Isabel.
Under Art. 166, it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of said child by proving: (1) it was physically impossible for him
to have sexual intercourse, with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the
child; (2) that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been his child; (3) that in case of children
conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification by either parent was obtained through
mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence.
The mere registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the supposed parents is not a valid adoption. It
does not confer upon the child the status of an adopted child and her legal rights. Such act amounts to simulation of the
child's birth or falsification of his or her birth certificate, which is a public document.
Victoria and Feodor are not questioning her legitimacy, but her claim that she is the only surviving heir. It is useless therefore to
use the provisions of the Family Code to bar the respondents from filing this action.
The lower courts found evidence to prove that Marissa is not the daughter: (1) Isabel never got pregnant; (2) If she got
pregnant, why would she give birth in their house, she is allegedly 36 years old when she gave birth making her situation very
delicate; (3) Isabels brother provided in the extrajudicial settlement that they are the only heirs; (4) It is odd that Isabel wrote
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a letter saying that even without legal papers, they should get the properties.
Despite the fact that Marissa presented her certificate of live birth, which listed Vicente and Isabel as her parents, the totality
of evidence to the contrary clearly rebuts her claim.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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Republic v. Magpayo
G.R. No. 189476. February 2, 2011
TOPIC: Action to impugn legitimacy, Who
may impugn
PONENTE: Carpio-Morales, J.
FACTS:
Respondent Julian Coseteng-Magpayo is the son of Fulvio Magpayo and Anna Coseteng as evidenced by his birth certificate
that the parents got married on March 26, 1972. He was born in Makati on Sept. 9, 1972.
He filed this petition w/ the RTC of QC to change his name to Julian Coseteng. He claims that his parents were never legally
married and in support of this:
a. He submitted an NSO certificate that says her mother does not appear in the National Indices of Marriage;
b. Used Coseteng in his school docs. from elementary to college;
c. His birth certificate bears the Coseteng surname;
d. On the 1998, 2001, and 2004 elections, he ran for Councilor of QC and used Coseteng.
He amended his petition and stated he complied w/ the 3-year residency requirement under Sec. 2, R103 of the ROC. The RTC
granted his petition since there was no opposition.
The OSG appeals to the SC for pure question of law because it involves the case wherein Julian wants to change his status
from legitimate to illegitimate.
ISSUE:
WON Julian can use the surname of his mother. NO.
HELD:
Under R103 (Change of name), a person can change his name:
a. When the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
b. When the change results as a legal consequence such as legitimation;
c. When the change will avoid confusion;
d. When one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien
parentage;
e. A sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing
anybody; and
f. When the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent
purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.
This case does not fall under any of the allowable events because he wanted to change his legitimacy w/c does not fall
under R103, rather R108.
In Republic v. Belmonte, the SC stated that the procedure in R103 regarding change of name and in R108 concerning the
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry are separate and distinct.
Even assuming arguendo that Julian had simultaneously availed of these 2 statutory remedies, he cannot be said to have
sufficiently complied with R108 because:
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a. Improper venue, he was born at Makati, therefore this petition pursuant to R108 should be filed there, not w/ the RTC of
QC; and
b. He did not include all parties affected by his case, particularly, his parents.
They include not only the declared father of the child but the child as well, together with the paternal grandparents, if any, as
their hereditary rights would be adversely affected thereby. All other persons who may be affected by the change should be
notified or represented. The truth is best ascertained under an adversary system of justice.
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Diaz vs. Court of Appeals
No. L-42007. June 22, 1984
TOPIC: Proof of filiation of legitimate children
PONENTE: MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.
AUTHOR: PARIAN

Leodegario Azarraga (Decedent) died intestate leaving no surviving spouse or descendant.
Diaz, the niece of Leodegario, filed a petition for issuance of letters of administration of the Decedent. The lower court
granted the petition.
20 years after, Eduardo Azarraga (respondent) filed a petition to remove Diaz as administratix and also filed for
declaration of Decedents heirs.
Eduardo and his brothers are descendants of one of the Decedents half siblings.
Eduardo claims that the Decedent is also an illegitimate child and full blood sibling of their ascendant.
Diaz claims that the Decedent is the full blood brother of Filomena, her mother, making him a legitimate child. It is
unquestioned that Filomena is a legitimate child.
Eduardo avers that since Diaz is a descendant of a legitimate child, and the Decedent is an illegitimate child, she
cannot inherit from the Decedent as per NCC 992 (legitimates cannot inherit from illegitimates, vice versa).
ISSUE(S): What is the decedents civil status?
HELD: Legitimate child.
RATIO:
Diaz presented documents that show he is as legitimate as Filomena; school records wherein he used Lozada as his middle
name (Filomenas mothers maiden name), last will of Filomenas sister naming the Decedent as her brother, and using the
name Leodegracia Lozada Azarraga.
On the other hand, Eduardo failed to prove their claim that the Decedent is an illegitimate child.
Overall, the presumption in DECEDENTs favor of legitimacy has not been successfully contradicted nor overcome by
Eduardos testimonial or documentary evidence.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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De Jesus vs. Estate of Decedent Juan Gamboa Dizon
[G.R. No. 142877. October 2, 2001]
NOTES: Children impugning legitimacy with their legitimate father to be
TOPIC: Proof of filiation Legitimate Children
illegitimate children of another man
PONENTE: Vitug, J.
FACTS:
Danilo de Jesus and Carolina de Jesus got married. They had children: Jacqueline and Jinkie Christie.
In a notarized document, dated June 1991, Juan Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as being his own
illegitimate children by Carolina.
Juan G. Dizon died intestate leaving behind considerable assets consisting of shares of stock in various corporations and some
real property.
Petitioners (Jacqueline and Jinkie, represented by their mother) filed a petition for "Partition with Inventory and Accounting" of
the Dizon estate before RTC QC.
Respondent (the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the decedent, including the corporations of which the deceased
was a stockholder) filed for dismissal of the case. They argued that the complaint would change the status of petitioners from
being the legitimate children of the spouses Danilo and Carolina to instead be the illegitimate children of Carolina and
deceased Juan. They also contended that an action for partition was not an appropriate forum to ascertain the question of
paternity and filiation, an issue that could only be taken up in an independent suit or proceeding.
But petitioners maintain that their recognition as being illegitimate children of the decedent, in a notarized document, is
sufficient to establish their status and does not require a separate action for judicial approval.
Trial court denied the motion to dismiss. Appellate Court upheld the decision and ordered the case to be remanded to the
trial court for further proceedings.
Respondents filed an omnibus motion. They pray for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the action instituted
was made to compel the recognition of petitioners as being the illegitimate children of decedent Juan and that the partition
sought was merely a relief once petitioners would have been able to establish their status as such heirs.
Trial court dismissed the complaint of petitioners for lack of cause of action and for being improper. It decreed that the
declaration of heirship could only be made in a special proceeding inasmuch as petitioners were seeking the establishment
of a status or right.
Hence, this petition for certiorari
ISSUE(S): Is the childrens status as illegitimate children made in a notarized document sufficient?
HELD: No. They are born in the duration of the marriage of Danilo and Carolina, therefore they are legitimate children of the
marriage and not illegitimate children of Juan and Carolina.
RATIO:
A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners were born during the marriage of their parents. The certificates of live
births would also identify Danilo de Jesus as being their father.
In an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to the Juan, petitioners, in effect, would impugn their legitimate status as
being children of Danilo and Carolina. This step cannot be aptly done because the law itself establishes the legitimacy of
children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents.
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The rule that the written acknowledgement made by the deceased Juan G. Dizon establishes petitioners' alleged illegitimate
filiation to the decedent cannot be validly invoked to be of any relevance in this instance. This issue, i.e whether petitioners are
indeed the acknowledge illegitimate offsprings of the decedent, cannot be aptly adjudicated without an action having
been first instituted to impugn their legitimacy as being the children of Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus born in
lawful wedlock.
Jurisprudence is strongly settled that the paramount declaration of legitimacy by law cannot be attacked collaterally, one
that can only be repudiated or contested in a direct suit specifically brought for that purpose.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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Jison v. CA
[G.R. No. 124853. February 24, 1998]
TAKE NOTE: 11 witnesses was presented by respondent. Too many to cite here.
TOPIC: Proof of Filiation, Of illegitimate
children, FC175
PONENTE: Davide, Jr., J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Francisco Jison was married to Lilia Jison since 1940. At the end of 1945 or early 1946, Francisco impregnated
Esperanza Amolar, who is the nanny/yaya of Franciscos daughter to Lilia, Lourdes.
Esperanza gave birth to respondent Monina Jison on Aug. 6, 1946 in Dingle, Iloilo and since childhood, she continuously
enjoyed implied recognition as an illegitimate child of Francisco by his acts and that of his family.
Monina alleges that Francisco answered her education expenses until she obtained a Masters degree and until she became
a CPA and eventually, a Central Bank examiner.
Francisco denied having sex w/ Ezperanza because her employment was terminated as early as 1944 and never recognized
Monina as his illegitimate child.
Monina then filed a petition against Francisco for compulsory recognition as his illegitimate child and had 11 witnesses as
evidence.
ISSUE:
WON Monina is the illegitimate child of Francisco. YES.
HELD:
Under FC175, illegitimate children may be established in the same way and on the same evidence as that of legitimate
children.
Even though Moninas reliance on the certificate of live birth, baptismal certficiates, school docs., etc. were not deemed
competent evidence to identify Francisco as the father, Monina was able to prove her filiation by the 11 witnesses she
presented. The ff. facts were established based on the testimonies:
a. That Francisco was her father and she was conceived at the time when her mother, Esperanza, was employed by
Francisco;
b. That Francisco recognized her as his child through his acts and conduct (answering her education, medical expenses
when she was caught in an accident, paid for plane tickets, etc.)
As the SC stated, it hurdles the high standard of proof required for the success of an action to establish ones illegitimate
filiation in relying upon the provision on open and continuous possession.
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PERLA v BARING
G.R. No. 172471. November 12, 2012
TOPIC: proof of filiation of illegitimate child
AUTHOR: PARIAN

Baring filed a complaint for support against Perla for his alleged son Randy.
Baring claimed that from 1981-1983, she had a relationship with Perla and Randy was the fruit of it, who was born on
November 1983. She alleged that Perla abandoned them when he became a seaman.
She claims that after the birth of Randy, both of them supplied the information in the birth certificate. A baptismal
certificate also indicates that Perla is the father.
Randy testified that he met Perla in 1994 and was promised that Perla will support him. He even claims that Perlas
family accepted him when he stayed in the house of Perlas sister for a week.
Perla denies that he had a relationship with Baring but admitted having sex with her a couple of times in 1981.
He raised that the documents presented do not have his signature; that his information in the birth certificate is wrong
that his middle initial is E not A, and he is not a Protestant and a laborer, as indicated in the certificate.
He also denies offering support for Randy in 1994; that he met Randy that time because Baring was already harassing
him for support.
RTC awarded the support; ruling that the documents are proof that Perla is the father.
CA affirmed.
ISSUE(S): WON Perla is the father.
HELD: NO. Petition granted. Complaint for support dismissed.
RATIO:
A high standard of proof is required to establish paternity and filiation. It must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established
by clear and convincing evidence. The evidence in this case failed to do so.
A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no
showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificate. Just like in a birth certificate, the lack of
participation of the supposed father in the preparation of a baptismal certificate renders this document incompetent to
prove paternity.
To prove open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, there must be evidence of the manifestation of
the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his, by continuous and clear manifestations of
parental affection and care, which cannot be attributed to pure charity.
The only instance where Perla and Randy met in 1994 does not prove manifestation of the permanent intention of Perla to
consider Randy as his.
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Baring did not testify on whether they had sex in the early months of 1983. Even if he admitted of having sex with her, which
happened in 1981, it cannot be attributed that he is the father of Randy.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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People v. Abella
[G.R. No. 177295. January 6, 2010]
NOTES:
TOPIC: Compulsory recognition
PONENTE: Leonardo-De Castro, J.
FACTS:
Marlon Abella is convicted with the crime of rape. While armed with a balisong and under the influence of liquor, by means of
force and intimidation, he entered the house and had sexual intercourse with AAA. She is a 38 years old woman with
moderate mental retardation or intellectual quotient of a 7 to 8-year old child.
Trial Court ruled against the accused. It further ruled that the child conceived by AAA is his illegitimate child and was ordered
to give support to the child and AAA.
The decision of the Trial Court was directly elevated to SC. It was transferred to CA.
The CA gave credence to the testimonies of the doctors who examined AAA that she was pregnant and she suffered rape.
They also gave to the testimonies of AAA as they were candid, sincere, straightforward and simple. The decision is affirmed.
ISSUE(S): Is Marlon required to recognize and support his child?
HELD: Yes. Article 345 of the RPC applies.
RATIO:
Marlon was the biological father of the victims two-year old daughter as a result of the rape and in view of their striking
facial similarities and features.
In accordance with Article 345 of the RPC, he is required to acknowledge and support her.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Revised Penal Code, Art. 345. Civil Liability of persons guilty of crimes against chastity. Persons guilty of rape, seduction, or
abduction, shall also be sentenced:
1. To indemnify the offended woman;
2. To acknowledge the offspring, unless the law should prevent him from so doing;
3. In every case to support the offspring.
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Abadilla v. Tabiliran
A.M.No. MTJ-92-716. October 25, 1995
TAKE NOTE: FC177 - Only children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents
TOPIC: Legitimated Children, who may be
who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any
legitimated, FC 177, RA 9858
impediment to marry each other may be legitimated.
PONENTE:
FACTS:
Respondent Judge Tabiliran was married to Teresita Banzuela. Sometime on 1965, Teresita abandoned the family home in
Zamboanga de Norte w/o info. of her whereabouts.
On 1970, Tabiliran began cohabiting w/ Priscilla Baybayan and as a result, 3 illegitimate children.
They got married on 1986 and in such marriage contract, Tabiliran represented himself as single and he registered as
"legitimate" his 3 illegitimate children w/ Priscilla.
Petiitoner Blyth Abadilla was the clerk of court assigned in Tabirilans chambers and filed this petition and charged him for
gross immorality for allegedly cohabiting w/ Priscilla during the existence of his marriage to Teresita.
ISSUE:
WON Judge Tabilirans 3 illegitimate children may be legitimated. NO.
HELD:
The SC pointed out that:
a. The 3 children were born prior to the marriage to Priscilla;
b. Tabiliran, as a lawyer and a judge, ought to know that, despite his subsequent marriage to Priscilla, these 3 children
cannot be legitimated nor in any way be considered legitimate since at the time they were born, there was an existing
valid marriage between him and his first wife, Teresita.
This is pursuant to FC177. Legitimation is limited to natural children and cannot include those born of adulterous relations
(Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855).
The reasons for this limitation are:
a. The rationale of legitimation would be destroyed;
b. It would be unfair to the legitimate children in terms of successional rights;
c. There will be the problem of public scandal, unless social mores change;
d. It is too violent to grant the privilege of legitimation to adulterous children as it will destroy the sanctity of marriage;
e. It will be very scandalous, especially if the parents marry many years after the birth of the child (Alicia v. Sempio Diy).
Regarding the gross immorality charge, he was guilty of gross immorality and was dismissed from service. Such dismissal
carried with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits, and disqualification from reemployment in the government-service, all without prejudice to criminal or civil liability.
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Lazatin v. Campos
[92 SCRA 250. July 30, 1979]
NOTES:
TOPIC: Adoption
probate the process of proving in court that the will of a person who died is
PONENTE: Teehankee, J.
valid
FACTS:
Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin died intestate. He was survived by his wife, Margarita de Asis, and his adopted twin daughters,
respondents Nora and Irma.
Margarita died and left a holographic will. She left legacy of cash, jewelry, and stocks to respondent Arlene de Leon, a
granddaughter; a legacy of support to Rodolfo Gallardo, a son of her late sister; and a legacy of education to Ramon, son of
petitioner Renato Lazatin alias Renato Sta. Clara.
The wife also kept a safety deposit box in a bank where only she and respondent Nora can open which she opened after her
mothers death. The box contains (a) shares of stock; (b) her adoption papers; and (c) jewelry belonging to her and to her
mother.
After having learned that Nora had opened this safety deposit box, Ramon filed a motion in the probate court. He claims that
Margarita had executed a will subsequent to that submitted for probate and demanding its production. He likewise prayed
for the opening of the safety deposit box. Nora admitted that she opened the box but there was no will or any document
resembling a will therein.
Judge Campos issued an order requiring her to give back the contents of the box. Nora failed to return the contents of the
box, she gave the keys instead.
Renato filed a motion to intervene in the estate of Margaria as an adopted child, on the basis of an affidavit signed by the
brother of Dr. Lazatin which says that Renato is the illegitimate son of Dr. Lazatin who was later adopted by him.
Renatos evidence that he was adopted: (a) he had been supported by them until their death; (b) his last name was Lazatin,
however he has an alias because the deceased spouses did not consent to his marriage; (c) he and his wife resided in the
Mercy Hospital at Taft Avenue which the deceased spouses owned; and (d) Photograph of Irma where she addressed herself
as Renatos sister.
The court held that Renato filed to establish his status as an adopted child. The court denies any motion for reconsideration
unless its a documentary proof.
Hence, this petition for certiorari on the courts decision that Renato failed to establish his status as an adopted child of the
deceased spouses.
ISSUE(S): Does Renatos evidence prove that he is an adopted child of the deceased couple? NO
Can he intervene in the case? NO
HELD: Petition dismissed.
RATIO:
There are no juridical records of such adoption or copies. There were also no witnesses cited to that adoption proceeding.
A certification from the CFI reported that after diligent search, no files were found regarding the adoption.
If there was really such adoption, petitioner could have secured a copy of the newspaper publication of the adoption.
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The thrust of the evidence presented is to establish his status as an admitted illegitimate child, not an adopted child.
Does not matter if the spouses clothed, fed and educated him. These do not prove adoption.
Secondary evidence is admissible where the records of adoption proceedings were actually lost or destroyed but prior to the
intro of such secondary evidence, it must first be established that the records of adoption actually existed.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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Cervantes v Fajardo
G.R. No. 79955. January 27, 1989
TOPIC: Adoption
PONENTE: PADILLA, J.
AUTHOR: PARIAN

Spouses Cervantes filed (adoptive parents) a petition for a writ of habeas corpus of minor Angelie Cervantes against
Fajardo and Carreon (natural parents, live-in partners).
The Cervantes legally adopted Angelie from the other spouses. In fact, Fajardo and Carreon offered Angelie to the
Cervantes for adoption when Angelie was then two weeks old.
However, the natural parents sent a letter demanding P150,000 from the adoptive parents, otherwise, they will get their
child back. Cervantes refused the demand.
Carreon took the child from her yaya on the pretext that the Cervantes wife instructed her.
Cervantes demanded the return of the child but Carreon refused.
She claims that she had no desire to give up her child for adoption.
But she will, however, return the child if she will get the P150,000.
ISSUE(S): WON Angelie should be returned to her natural parents
HELD: NO. Petition granted
RATIO:
The provision that no mother shall be separated from a child under five (5) years of age, will not apply where the Court finds
compelling reasons to rule otherwise. (NCC Art. 363)
In all cases involving the custody, care, education and property of children, the latters welfare is paramount.
Compelling reasons: (1) The natural parents are not married. (2) Carreon had previously given birth to another child by
another married man. (3) Carreon is jobless and maintains an illicit relationship with a married man.
On the other hand, petitioners who are legally married appear to be morally, physically, financially, and socially capable of
supporting the minor and giving her a better future.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim,
Monina P. Lim
G.R. Nos. 168992-93. May 21, 2009.
TOPIC: Requisites to be an adopter, spouses
jointly
PONENTE: Carpio, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Monina Lim is an optometrist by profession. On 23 June 1974, she married Primo Lim.
They were childless but they were entrusted by a certain Lucia Ayuban w/ 2 minor children, whose real parents are unknown:
Michelle and Michael.
Sps. Lim registered them as their children and they eventually cared for and supported them in such as the sps. sent them to
exclusive schools and let them bear the Lim surname in the school docs.
Unfortunately, Primo died on Nov. 28, 1998 and Monina remarried on Dec. 27, 2000 w/ Angel Olario who is an American
citizen.
Monina now wanted to adopt the 2 by amnesty under R.A.8552 to those individuals who simulated the birth of a child.
On April 24, 2002, she filed separate petitions for adoption of the 2 before the RTC and had the consents of her spouse,
Michelle and Michael as well (They were both of legal age already at this petition.)
But the RTC dismissed the petitions because since she remarried, she did not include her husband Angel in the petition.
She directly appealed to SC.
ISSUE:
WON Monina can singly adopt Michelle and Michael. NO. RTC decision affirmed.
HELD:
The SC says that Moninas argument by saying that parental authority (PA) is not necessary here because the 2 were already
emancipated, Michelle was even already married, is untenable. Because adoption has effects:
a. Sever all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee, except when the biological parent is the spouse of
the adopter;
b. Deem the adoptee as a legitimate child of the adopter; and
c. Give adopter and adoptee reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including
but not limited to:
1. The right of the adopter to choose the name the child is to be known; and
2. The right of the adopter and adoptee to be legal and compulsory heirs of each other.
Therefore, even if emancipation terminates PA, adoptee is still considered a legit child of the adopter w/ all the rights of a
legitimate child such as:
a. Bear the surname of the father and the mother;
b. Receive support from their parents; and
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c. Be entitled to the legitime and other successional rights.
FC185 and Art. 3 Sec. 7 of RA8552 is clear. Her husbands consent in the adoption is insufficient if not included in the petition.
Also, the husband, Angel, must meet the qualifications in Art. 3 Sec. 7 of RA8552 but such were shown and proved during the
trial. Such qualifications are:
a. Must prove that his country has diplomatic relations with the PH;
b. Must have been living in the PH for at least 3 continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption;
c. Must maintain such residency until the adoption decree is entered;
d. Has legal capacity to adopt in his own country; and
e. The adoptee is allowed to enter the adopters country as the latters adopted child.
Moninas defense that Angel already filed w/ the California courts the dissolution of their marriage, hence, joint adoption not
needed, is also untenable. The SC states that w/o a judicial decree/final judgment, marriage is still valid, hence, joint adoption
still needed.
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Landingin v. Republic
[G.R. No. 164948. June 27, 2006]
NOTES:
TOPIC: Need for consent
PONENTE: Callejo, Sr., J.
FACTS:
Diwata Ramos Landingin (Petitioner), an American citizen but of Filipino parentage and a resident of Guam, filed a petition for
the adoption of minors Elaine, Elma, and Eugene. The minors are the natural children of her brother, Manuel.
Diwata alleges in her petition that:
The children were left to their paternal grandmother when their father died;
Their biological mother went to Italy and now has another family;
The minors are being financially supported by her;
The minors have given their written consent to the adoption;
She is qualified to adopt, she has a job as a waitress in a restaurant;
She came back to the Philippines to spend time with the minors;
Her children gave their written consent to the adoption of the minors.
Pagbilao, a DSWD Social Welfare Officer, has consulted the biological mother who consented to the adoption. However,
Diwata failed to present Pagbilao as witness and so there is no evidence which showed that the mother consented to the
adoption.
The lower court granted the petition for adoption. The OSG appealed before CA in which it reversed the decision of the lower
court.
CA held that she failed to present evidence on the consent of the mother, that they cannot use the affidavit of consent of her
children as it was not authenticated in the Philippine consular office, and that her job was not stable to support the children.
Her motion for reconsideration was also not granted
ISSUE(S): Is Diwata entitled to adopt the minors without the written consent of the biological mother?
HELD: No. Petition dismissed. CA decision affirmed.
RATIO:
Diwata failed to present a written consent of the biological mother, which is an indispensable for the validity of a decree of
adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child requires that his consent must be obtained before his parental rights
and duties may be terminated and reestablished in adoptive parents.
If said biological mother was interviewed by Pagbilao, it is incredible that the latter would not require Amelia Ramos to
execute a Written Consent to the adoption of her minor children. Neither did the petitioner bother to present Amelia Ramos as
witness in support of the petition.
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Republic vs Toledano
G.R. No. 94147. June 8, 1994
TOPIC: Aliens as adopters
PONENTE: Puno, J.
AUTHOR: PARIAN

Judge Toledano granted the petition for adoption of Solomon Alcala (brother of Evelyn) by spouses Alvin (American)
and Evelyn Clouse (Filipino, US Citizen).
OSG appealed, contending that they are not qualified to adopt; as expressed in FC Art. 184 (aliens cannot adopt)
ISSUE(S): WON can the spouses Clouse adopt Solomon Alcala
HELD: NO. Petition for certiorari granted.
RATIO:
As per Article 184, paragraph (3) of FC expressly enumerates the persons who are not qualified to adopt, viz:
(3) An alien, except:
(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity;
(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or
(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by
consanguinity of the
latter.
Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in accordance with the rules on inter-country adoption as
may be provided by law.
Alvin Clouse does not fall under the exceptions:
(1) he is not a former Filipino citizen but a natural born citizen of USA;
(2) Solomon is neither his relative by consanguinity nor the legitimate child of his spouse;
(3) when spouses Clouse jointly filed the petition to adopt Solomon Alcala, Evelyn was no longer a Filipino citizen. She lost her Filipino
citizenship when she was naturalized as a US citizen.
On the other hand, Evelyn may appear to qualify pursuant to paragraph 3(a).
Unfortunately, the petition for adoption cannot be granted in her favor alone without violating Article 185.
Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and wife, a condition that must be read along together with Article 184.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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Bagayas v. Bagayas
G.R. Nos. 187308 and 187517. September 18,
2013.
TOPIC: Effects of a decree of adoption, On
parental authority
FACTS:
Petitioner Hilaria Bagayas filed this petition for annulment of sale and partition of 2 parcels of land against her sibling
respondents Rogelio, Felicidad, Rosalina, Michael, and Mariel, all surnamed Bagayas.
Hilaria alleges:
a. They intended to exlude her from inheriting from the estate of her legally adoptive parents, Maximino and Eligia Bagayas;
b. So they made a fake deed absolute of sale purportedly executed by the parents, transferring and registering in the name
of Rogelio and Orlando, biological children of the parents;
c. Said deed of sale was supposedly executed on Oct. 7, 1974;
d. But Eligia, the wife, died on Aug. 21, 1971, hence, her signature was forged;
Respondents denied this and claimed:
a. They did not know Hilaria was adopted because she never lived w/ the family;
b. Rogelio claims that after their parents died, they made a Deed of Extrajudicial Succession to transfer the 2 lands in their
names;
c. But before (b) could be registered, a deed of absolute sale transferring the subject lands to them was discovered from the
old files of Maximino, the husband, which they used by reason of convenience to acquire title to the said lands.
RTC ruled in favor of respondents in which it stated:
a. Hilaria was really adopted;
b. But the signature of Eligia w/ regard to the disputed deed of sale is immaterial since the 2 lands were the exclusives of
Maximino;
c. Even though Hilaria was adopted, she could not ask for partition of the subject lands as she because she was not able to
prove any evidence that would invalidate the deed of absolute sale (The 3 year gap between the date of death and
alleged forged signature was not proven.); and
d. The action for annulment of sale was improper as it constituted a collateral attack on the title of Rogelio and Orlando.
Such ruling attained finality because Hilaria did not appeal.
She instead filed 2 subsequent petitions to amend and include her name in the TCTs and used her adoption status as
evidence but was also denied by the RTC because of res judicata, the goal of these 2 petitions was similar to the 1st petition
and same ruling as (d).
ISSUE:
WON the RTC erred in dismissing her petitions. NO. AFFIRMED.
HELD:
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The SC mainly reiterated the RTC ruling (c) in bold letters, thats why she couldnt partition and get her share, the deed of sale
was presumed to be valid.
Later on in the 1st petition, during the motion for reconsideration, the RTC admitted its mistake when it ruled that it was
Maximinos exclusive because during trial, Rogelio and Orlando admitted it was part of the CPG. But still denied the motion
because a title cannot be collaterally attacked.
Instead of proving the dates, she let the decision attain finality.
W/ regard to the 2 subsequent petitions:
a. Hilaria being adopted did not amount to a declaration of heirship and co-ownership upon which she may institute an
action for the amendment of the certificates of title covering the subject land;
b. The RTC cannot make a declaration of heirship in an ordinary civil action, for matters relating to the rights of filiation and
heirship must be made in a special proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of determining such rights;
c. RTC ruling (d) as supported by the ruling in Lacbayan v. Samoy, Jr., what cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate
of title and not the title itself. Title as a concept of ownership should not be confused with the certificate of title as
evidence of such ownership although both are interchangeably used. Hilaria confused the 2 because they were
interchangeably used.
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In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy
Astorga Garcia
NOTES:
[G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005]
TOPIC: Effects of decree of adoption On Name
PONENTE: Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.
FACTS:
Honorato B. Catindig (Petitioner) filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child, Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia.
Her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia. Stephanie has been using her mothers middle name and surname. He is now a
widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanies middle name Astorga be changed to
Garcia, her mothers surname, and that her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his surname.
Trial court granted the adoption. Her name is now Stephanie Nathy Catindig.
Petitioner filed for motion for reconsideration that his daughter may use her mothers maiden name Garcia as her middle
name. His motion for reconsideration was denied. They held there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use
the surname of his biological mother as his middle name.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner submits that the trial court erred in depriving Stephanie of a middle name as a consequence of adoption because:
(1) there is no law prohibiting an adopted child from having a middle name in case there is only one adopting parent; (2) it is
customary for every Filipino to have as middle name the surname of the mother; (3) the middle name or initial is a part of the
name of a person; (4) adoption is for the benefit and best interest of the adopted child, hence, her right to bear a proper
name should not be violated; (5) permitting Stephanie to use the middle name Garcia (her mothers surname) avoids the
stigma of her illegitimacy; and; (6) her continued use of Garcia as her middle name is not opposed by either the Catindig or
Garcia families.
OSG supports the petition.
ISSUE(S): May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name?
HELD: Yes. There is no law which prohibits an adopted child to use his/her natural mothers surname as middle name. Petition
granted. Stephanie is allowed to use her mothers surname as her middle name.
RATIO:
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a
legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother.
The modern trend is to consider adoption not merely as an act to establish a relationship of paternity and filiation, but also as
an act which endows the child with a legitimate status.
Stephanies continued use of her mothers surname as her middle name will maintain her maternal lineage.
To allow Stephanie to use her mothers surname as her middle name will not only sustain her continued loving relationship with
her mother but will also eliminate the stigma of her illegitimacy.
The law should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption. The interests and welfare of the
adopted child are of primary and paramount consideration.
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There is no law regulating the use of a middle name. The middle name or the mothers surname is only considered in case
there is identity of names and surnames between ascendants and descendants, in which case, the middle name or the
mothers surname shall be added (Article 375(1) of the Civil Code).
The members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees that drafted the Family Code recognized the Filipino custom of
adding the surname of the childs mother as his middle name and approved the suggestion that the initial or surname of the
mother should immediately precede the surname of the father.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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Lahom vs Sibulo
G.R. No. 143989. July 14, 2003
TOPIC: Rescission of adoption
PONENTE: Vitug, J.
AUTHOR: PARIAN

Lahom filed a petition to rescind the decree of adoption of Sibulo.
She alleged that Sibulo has been indifferent to her and her late husband until the latters death.
That Sibulo dropped his surname Lahom and reverted back to using Sibulo in his medical profession; and refused to
change his surname back to Lahom.
Sibulo opposed, raising the newly enforced RA 8552, which abrogated and repealed the right of an adopter to
rescind the adoption decree, as a defense.
Lahom countered that it should not have a retroactive effect.
RTC dismissed the case; applying RA 8552.
ISSUE(S): WON the adoptive parent can still rescind the adoption decree
HELD: NO. RTC decision affirmed.
RATIO:
Jurisprudence dictates that the controversy should be resolved in the light of the law governing at the time the petition was
filed.
When Lahom filed the petition, RA 8552 was already in effect. The petition was filed three months after the effectivity of the
statute.
Assuming arguendo that it shall not have a retroactive effect, Lahom still has no cause of action for she is barred by
prescription.
An action to set aside the adoption is subject to the 5-year bar rule under Rule 100 of the Rules of Court.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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Pelayo v. Lauron
No. 4089. January 12, 1909.
TOPIC: Who are obliged to provide support,
FC195-196
PONENTE: Torres, J.
FACTS:
On Nov. 23, 1906, petitioner Arturo Pelayo, a physician in Cebu, filed this petition against respondents Marcelo Lauron and
Juana Abella, to collect 500 petots from the service he rendered.
He filed this because on Oct. 13, 1906, evening, he was summoned to the house of respondents to render medical assistance
to their daughter-in-law who was about to give birth to a child.
Respondents denied this because the daughter-in-law was living in a separate house from her husband and her stay in the
house of respondents was only accidental.
ISSUE:
WON the respondents are liable to the service rendered by Pelayo. NO.
HELD:
The SC states that the rendering of medical assistance in case of illness is comprised among the mutual obligations to which
spouses are bound by way of mutual support, hence, the husband of the daughter-in-law is liable and not the respondents.
The fact that it was not the husband who called Pelayo and requested his assistance for his wife is no bar.
It was improper to have brought an action against respondents simply because:
a. Such occurrence happened in their house; and
b. That they were the ones who called and requested him to assist their daughter-in-law.
Respondents were not, nor are they now, under any obligation by virtue of any law, to pay the fees claimed, nor in
consequence of any contract entered into between them and Pelayo from w/c such obligation have arisen.
Also, respondents are even strangers to this mutual obligation of the spouses.
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Lim-Lua v. Lua
[G.R. Nos. 175279-80. June 5, 2013]
NOTES:
TOPIC: Who are obliged to provide support
FACTS:
Susan Lim-Lua (Petitioner) filed an action for the declaration of nullity of her marriage with Danilo Y. Lua (Respondent) before
RTC Cebu City.
Petitioner sought the amount of P500,000.00 as monthly support, citing respondents huge earnings from salaries and dividends
in several companies and businesses here and abroad as support pendente lite. Support was granted.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. He asserts that petitioner is not entitled to spousal support. He further asserts
that the amount needed for support is unconscionable and beyond the intendment of the law for not having considered the
needs of the respondent.
Respondents motion for reconsideration was denied since the decision was already final and executory. CA reversed the
decision and held that the Trial Court approved the amount without evidence to prove respondents actual income. Her
support: from P500,000.00 to P115,000.00 a month.
Respondent deducted from the amount of support in arrears. In her Comment to Compliance with Motion for Issuance of a
Writ of Execution, petitioner asserted that none of the expenses deducted by respondent may be chargeable as part of the
monthly support.
The trial court issued an Order granting petitioners motion for issuance of a writ of execution as it rejected respondents
interpretation of the CA decision.
On appeal before CA, respondents petition is granted. He can deduct the amount of support in arrears and resume to pay
P115,000.00 per month.
ISSUE(S): Whether certain expenses already incurred by the respondent may be deducted from the total support in arrears owing to
petitioner and her children.
HELD: Yes. Petition granted (but they dismissed petition for contempt). He can now deduct from the support in arrears and resume
giving P115, 000.00 per month.
RATIO:
The amount of support may be increased or decreased proportionately in accordance with the necessities of the recipient
and the resources or means of the person obliged to support.
As a matter of law, the amount of support which those related by marriage and family relationship is generally obliged to give
each other shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and to the needs of the recipient. Such support
comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in
keeping with the financial capacity of the family.
Here, the CA should not have allowed all the expenses incurred by respondent to be credited against the accrued support
pendente lite. As earlier mentioned, the monthly support pendente lite granted by the trial court was intended primarily for
food, household expenses such as salaries of drivers and house helpers, and also petitioners scoliosis therapy sessions.
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Hence, the value of two expensive cars bought by respondent for his children plus their maintenance cost, travel expenses of
Susan Lua and Angelli, purchases through credit card of items other than groceries and dry goods (clothing) should have
been disallowed, as these bear no relation to the judgment awarding support pendente lite.
It is but fair and just that he give a monthly support for the sustenance and basic necessities of petitioner and his children. This
would imply that any amount respondent seeks to be credited as monthly support should only cover those incurred for
sustenance and household expenses.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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Lerma vs. Court of Appeals
No. L-33352. December 20, 1974
TOPIC: source of support
PONENTE: Makalintal, C.J.
AUTHOR: PARIAN

Lerma filed for adultery against his wife Diaz and a certain Ramirez.
Diaz subsequently filed for legal separation (concubinage and attempt against her life) with an urgent motion for
support pendent lite
Lerma opposed the support pendent lite, setting up his adultery charge against Diaz as his defense.
The lower court granted the support pendent lite.
Lerma appealed. CA dismissed his petition, relying on CC 292 (FC 198: During the proceedings for legal separation xxx,
the spouses and children shall be supported from the conjugal partnership property. xxx)
While the legal separation case was pending, Diaz and Ramirez was convicted of adultery.
ISSUE(S): WON adultery is a defense against the respondents claim for support pendente lite.
HELD: NO. RTC and CA decision set aside.
RATIO:
CC 292 contemplates the pendency of a court action and, inferentially at least, a prima facie showing that the action will
prosper.
If the action is shown to be groundless the mere filing thereof will not necessarily set Article 292 in operation.
This is in relation to Rule 61 ROC, the procedural law on support pendent lite, in which the court shall determine provisionally
the probable outcome of the case.
Article 100 of the Civil Code provides that the legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there
has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage . . . (and) where both spouses are offenders, a legal
separation cannot be claimed by either of them. . .
Within the meaning of Rule 61, the probable failure of Diaz suit for legal separation can be foreseen since she is not an
innocent spouse, having been convicted of adultery by the CFI.
If legal separation cannot be claimed by the guilty spouse in the first place, the fact that an action for that purpose is filed
anyway should not be permitted to be used as a means to obtain support pendente lite
Even without such action for support pendent lite, the Court will deny it due to adultery.
Hence, adultery is a good defense.
Otherwise, all that an erring spouse has to do to circumvent such defense would be to file a suit for legal separation no matter
how groundless.
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CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Sec. 5 Rule 61, ROC: The court shall determine provisionally the pertinent facts, and shall render such order as equity and justice may
require, having due regard to the necessities of the applicant, the means of the adverse party, the probable outcome of the case,
and such other circumstances as may aid in the proper elucidation of the questions involved, x x x.
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Reyes v. Ines-Luciano
No. L-48219. February 28, 1979.
TOPIC: Source of support, FC197-198, cf.
FC49, 70, 94, 121-122
PONENTE: Fernandez, J.
FACTS:
Respondent Celia Ilustre-Reyes filed w/ the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of QC a complaint against petitionerhusband Manuel Reyes for legal separation on the ground that he tried to kill her.
She asked for support pendente lite for her and her 3 children but Manuel opposed this on the ground that she committed
adultery w/ her physician.
Presiding Judge Leonor Ines-Luciano granted Celias petition in the amount of 5k/month starting from June 1976.
Manuel files for reconsideration reiterating that she is not entitled because she committed adultery and even if she was
entitled, 5k is excessive. So the judge lowered it to 4k.
Manuel now appeals to the CA but it affirmed because it considered him being capable of giving such support.
ISSUE:
WON Manuel is correct is contending that Celia is not entitled to support. NO. CA decision affirmed.
HELD:
The SC states that it is true that adultery is a good defense but Manuel did not substantiate his allegation that Celia committed
adultery. A mere allegation does not bar her from entitlement.
In addition, Celia noted that she was not asking for support from Manuels exclusive funds but rather from the CPG. In
Quintana vs. Lerma, the action for support was based on the obligation of the husband to support his wife.
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Mangonon v. CA
[G.R. No. 125041. June 30, 2006]
NOTES:
TOPIC: Order of support
PONENTE: Chico-Nazario, J.
FACTS:
Ma. Belen B. Mangonon (Petitioner) filed, in behalf of her then minor children Rica and Rina, a Petition for Declaration of
Legitimacy and Support, with application for support pendente lite with the RTC Makati.
It was alleged in the petition that petitioner and Federico Delgado (Respondent) were civilly married. At that time, petitioner
and respondent were only 21 and 19 years respectively. The marriage was annulled because it was celebrated without the
required consent.
7 months after the annulment of their marriage, petitioner Rica and Rina (twins). Petitioner raised the children with her second
husband.
At the time of the petition, the twins were accepted in universities in the US where the family resides. Despite the acceptance,
they cannot afford the tuition fees.
Petitioner and the children sought help from respondent and his father, Francisco, as they are known to be financially well-off.
The twins filed a petition before the trial court to be judicially declared as legitimate children of Federico.
They further present that they are legitimate children as they were born 7 months from the date of the annulment of marriage.
However, the birth certificate of the twins does not bear the name of Federico as father or his signature.
Petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Set Application for Support Pendente Lite because the twins needed the money right
away for their education. Her petition was granted. CA affirmed the petition.
Petitioner is filing for certiorari because the court only granted P5,000.00 per child.
ISSUE(S): Are the twins entitled for support?
HELD: Yes. Case remanded back to Trial Court to determine the proper amount.
RATIO:
There being prima facie evidence showing that petitioner and respondent Federico are the parents of Rica and Rina, then
they are primarily charged to support their childrens college education.
Under Article 199 of the Family Code, respondent Francisco, as the next immediate relative of Rica and Rina, is tasked to give
support to his granddaughters in default of their parents. It having been established that respondent Francisco has the
financial means to support his granddaughters education, he, in lieu of petitioner and respondent Federico, should be held
liable for support pendente lite.
By and large, the status of the twins as children of Federico cannot be denied. They had maintained constant communication
with their grandfather Francisco. As a matter of fact, respondent Francisco admitted having wrote several letters to Rica and
Rina. In the said letters, particularly at the bottom, respondent Francisco wrote the names of Rica and Rina Delgado. Likewise,
he referred to himself in his letters as either "Lolo Paco" or "Daddy Paco."
The obligation to give support rests principally on those more closely related to the recipient. However, the more remote
relatives may be held to shoulder the responsibility should the claimant prove that those who are called upon to provide
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support do not have the means to do so.
Respondent Francisco and Federicos claim that they have the option under the law as to how they could perform their
obligation to support Rica and Rina, respondent Francisco insists that Rica and Rina should move here to the Philippines to
study in any of the local universities. After all, the quality of education here, according to him, is at par with that offered in the
USA. The applicable provision of the Family Code on this subject provides:
In this case, this Court believes that respondent Francisco could not avail himself of the second option. Given all these, we
could not see Rica and Rina moving back here in the Philippines in the company of those who have disowned them.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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Spouses Lim vs Lim
G.R. No. 163209. October 30, 2009
TOPIC: order of support
PONENTE: Carpio, J.
AUTHOR: PARIAN

Edward Lim (son of spouses Lim) and Cheryl are married. They live at Spouses Lims residence.
She allegedly caught Edward with his grandmothers midwife in a compromising situation.
Cheryl and her children (respondents) left the residence after a violent confrontation with Edward and Edwards
grandparents.
She filed for concubinage against Edward; and physical injuries, grave threats, and support against Edward and his
grandparents. Edward was ordered to provide P6000 support pendent lite (his total monthly earnings).
RTC ordered Edward, his grandmother, and the Spouses Lim to jointly provide P40,000 monthly support for the
respondents.
Spouses Lim filed an MR, questioning their liability. RTC dismissed it but clarified that petitioners and the grandmother
were held jointly liable with Edward because of the latters inability x x x to give sufficient support x x x.
Spouses Lim appealed. CA affirmed RTCs decision.
ISSUE(S): WON Spouses Lim are concurrently liable with Edward to provide support to the latters family.
HELD: YES. RTC and CA decision affirmed but limiting support to grandchildren, and excluding Cheryl from Spouses Lims liability.
RATIO:
Although the obligation to provide support arising from parental authority ends upon the emancipation of the child, the same
obligation arising from spousal and general familial ties ideally lasts during the obligees lifetime.
Also, while parental authority under Title IX (and the correlative parental rights) pertains to parents, passing to ascendants only
upon its termination or suspension, the obligation to provide legal support passes on to ascendants not only upon default of
the parents but also for the latters inability to provide sufficient support.
As an alternative proposition, petitioners wish to avail of the option in FC 204 where the person obliged to give support shall
have the option to fulfill the obligation by receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the person who has a right to
receive support.
It cannot be availed of because of a moral obstacle where Cheryl will be forced to live again at the house where she
caught her husband cheating with the midwife (although acquitted, she still insists).
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Calderon v. Roxas
G.R. No. 185595. January 9, 2013.
TAKE NOTE: Main petition was annulment of marriage under FC36 (Roxas v. CA and
TOPIC: Support, Manner and time of
Roxas), this petition for support pendente lite was anchored on such case.
payment, FC 200-204
FACTS:
On Dec. 4, 1985, petitioner Carminia Roxas and respondent Jose Roxas got married. They had 4 children.
On Jan. 16, 1998, Carminia filed for declaration of nullity of their marriage under FC36 (Main case.) Also, on May, 19, 1998, the
RTC granted Carminias petition for support pendente lite ordering Jose to give support in the amount of 42k, effective May 1,
1998, within first 5 days of the month (See take note.)
On Feb. 11, 2003, Jose filed to reduce support because it was higher than his php20.8k salary as city councilor.
So on March 7, 2005, the RTC granted this for it considered the ff:
a. Eldest son is an SK chairman earning his own salary;
b. All children stay w/ Jose in Pasay City;
c. He has no other means of income except his salary as city councilor;
d. He showed documents, billings, receipts, etc. that hes fulfilling his obligation of support pendente lite;
e. No proof that Carminia is unemployed because they were both medical doctors;
f. The alleged arrearages (unpaid support) were not proved by Carminia.
Carmina appeals but also denied, on May 4, 2005.
On May 16, 2005, the RTC rendered their marriage null and void and ordering Jose to provide 30k as support.
On June 14, 2005, Carminia appeals to the March 7 and May 4 decisions because it was decided before the main case (w/c
was decided on May 16 eventually, declaring their marriage void) was decided. She elaborates that such rulings are final in
nature therefore Jose should pay the arrearage.
RTC denies her appeal w/c the CA affirmed because she failed to avail the proper remedy to question an interlocutory order.
ISSUE:
WON the CA erred in saying the March 7 and May 4 decisions are merely interlocutory. NO.
HELD:
The SC defines interlocutory - an order that does not finally dispose of the case, and does not end the Courts task of
adjudicating the parties contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as regards each other, but obviously indicates
that other things remain to be done by the Court, is "interlocutory".
The unclear decisions were issued prior to the rendition of the decision of the main case are therefore interlocutory. Such
decisions cannot be appealed unlike a final judgment.
Provisional remedies are writs and processes available pendente lite w/c Carminia can avail (Increasing/decreasing the
amount of support). They are provisional because they constitute temporary measures and they are ancillary because they
are mere incidents in and are dependent upon the result of the main action (Annulment of marriage under FC36).
They have availed such when they filed their respective petitions (increase/decrease amount of support), hence, Carminias
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contention that the unclear decisions have ceased to be provisional due to the arrearages incurred by Jose is therefore
untenable.
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Lacson v. Lacson
[G.R. No. 150644. August 28, 2006]
NOTES:
TOPIC: Amount of support
PONENTE: Garcia, J.
FACTS:
Sisters Maowee and Maonaa (Respondents) are legitimate daughters of petitioner Edward Lacson (Petitioner) and his wife,
Lea Daban Lacson.
Edward left the conjugal home in Molo, Iloilo City, virtually forcing mother and children to seek, apparently for financial
reason, shelter somewhere else. The sisters and their mother moved in different houses for 18 years.
It appears that from the start of their estrangement, Lea did not badger her husband Edward for support, relying initially on his
commitment in a note that he will give support to his daughters. But Edward would only give meager amounts for school
expenses.
Maowee and Maonaa, through their mother, averred that their father Edward, despite being gainfully employed and owning
several pieces of valuable land, do not provide them support. They also alleged that, owing to years of Edwards failure and
neglect, their mother had, from time to time, borrowed money from her brother Noel Daban
Edward alleged giving support to the children. He explained, however, that his lack of regular income and the unproductivity
of the land he inherited, not his neglect, accounted for his failure at times to give regular support.
Trial Court ruled in favor of the sisters. It ordered Edward to pay the sisters support in arrears in the amount of P2,496,000.00
from which amount shall be deducted one hundred twenty-four (P124,000.00) pesos that which they received from
defendant for two years and that which they received by way of support pendent lite (Yung 2M, lahat lahat yun from 216
months or 18 years of support = 12k per month Gusto ni Trial Court bayaran lahat lahat)
Edward appealed. CA affirmed the decision of the Trial Court.
Edward invokes Art. 203 of the Family Code: The obligation to give support shall be demandable from the time the person
who has a right to receive the same needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date of judicial or
extrajudicial demand.
ISSUE(S): Should Edward be made to pay P2,496,000.00?
HELD: Yes. Petition is denied.
RATIO:
He abandoned the respondent sisters when they were young. To be sure, petitioner could not plausibly expect any of the
sisters during their tender years to go through the motion of demanding support from him, what with the fact that even their
mother (his wife) found it difficult during the period material to get in touch with him.
Also, it may be that Lea made no extrajudicial demand in the sense of a formal written demand in terms commonly used by
legal advocates. Nonetheless, what would pass as a demand was, however, definitely made. Asking one to comply with his
obligation to support owing to the urgency of the situation (they needed to pay the childrens tuition fee) is no less a demand
because it came by way of a request or a plea.
As for the amount of support in arrears, there is also no reason to disturb the absolute figures arrived at by the two courts,
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appearing as they do to be reasonable and proper.
They fixed such amount based on the varying needs of the respondents during the years included in the computation and to
the financial resources of the Edward
As a matter of law, the amount of support which those related by marriage and family relationship is generally obliged to give
each other shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and to the needs of the recipient
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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Medina vs Makabali
No. L-26953. March 28, 1969
TOPIC: Concept of parental authority
AUTHOR: PARIAN
Medina is a mistress of a certain Casero. She only earns P4 to P5 a day.

Medina gave birth to Joseph Casero in a clinic owned by Makabili. Medina abandoned Joseph in the clinic. From
then on, Makabili took care of Joseph as her own son and even paid for medical expenses and his tuition fees.
Medina never visited Joseph until she filed for writ of habeas corpus for the custody of Joseph.
During the trial, the lower court asked Joseph with whom he wanted to stay. He pointed to Makabili and called her
Mammy.
The court denied the writ and held that it was for the childs best interest to be left with his foster mother.
Medina appealed.
ISSUE(S): WON Josephs custody should be awarded to Medina.
HELD: NO. CFI decision affirmed.
RATIO:
While the law recognizes the right of a parent to the custody of her child, Courts must not lose sight of the basic principle that
in all questions on the care, custody, education and property of children, the latters welfare shall be paramount (Civil Code
of the Philippines, Art. 363).
For compelling reasons, even a child under seven may be ordered separated from the mother.
Compelling reason: Medina not only failed to provide the child with love and care but actually deserted him, with not even a
visit, in his tenderest years, when he needed his mother the most.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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Habeas Corpus Of Minor Shang Ko Vingson v
Cabcaban
UDK No. 14817. January 13, 2014.
TOPIC: Concept of parental authority, Art. II,
Sec. 12, 1987 Constitution, FC 209, 211, NCC
356-363
PONENTE : Abad, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Shirly Vingson alleged that Shang Ko Vingson Yu, her 14 yr. old daughter, ran away from home on September 23,
2011.
She immediately went to the police station in Bacolod City when she heard that Shang Ko was in custody of respondent Jovy
Cabcaban, a police officer in that station.
Jovy refused Shirly so Shirly when to the NBI to help her. But the NBI did not find Shang Ko there anymore because it was said
that she was transferred to a private org. named Cavalry Kids.
This prompted Shirly to file this petition for habeas corpus against Jovy and the unnamed officers of Cavalry Kids before the
CA instead of the RTC because there were several threats against her life.
But the CA dismissed her petition for not stating who clearly has custody of Shang Ko and stating that such petition may not
be used as a means of obtaining evidence on the whereabouts of a person or as a means of finding out who has specifically
abducted or caused the disappearance of such person.
ISSUE:
WON Shirly should have custody over Shang Ko. NO. Case was brought to the Family Court of Cebu for further proceedings
but in the meantime, Shang Ko stays at Cavalry Kids since she chose to instead w/ Shirly.
HELD:
Jovy claimed:
a. That a social worker sat with the minor Shang Ko who said that her mother Shirly had been abusive in treating her. Shang
Ko narrated:
1. That on Sept. 27, 2011, Shirly instructed another daughter to give Shang Ko P280, take her to the pier to board a boat
going to Iloilo City;
2. Was told to look for a job there and to never come back to Bacolod City;
3. Since she had nowhere to go when she arrived in Iloilo City, she decided to return to Bacolod City with the money
given her;
4. She went to her best friends house but was turned away for fear of Shirly;
5. She called her sister so that she and her boyfriend could get her but they, too, turned her down.
b. Shang Ko pleaded with the police and the social worker not to return her to her mother. So the police filed a complaint
against Shirly for abusing her (But she never showed up);
c. She decided to turn over Shang Ko to the Calvary Kids, that gave sanctuary and schooling to abandoned and abused
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children;
d. This petition of Shirly accompanied by the NBI was saying that Jovy kidnapped Shang Ko so she proved this petition wrong
by bringing the NBI agents to Calvary Kids to talk to the institutions social worker, school principal, and director and was
provided the original case report (W/c says that Shirly really maltreated her because she was using Shang Ko to get
support from the Taiwanese husband.)
e. As proof, Shang Ko wrote a letter stating that, contrary to her mothers malicious insinuations, Jovy actually helped her
when she had nowhere to go after her family refused to take her back.
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Eslao v. CA
[G.R. No. 116773. January 16, 1997]
NOTES:
TOPIC: Transfer of parental authority
PONENTE: Torres, Jr., J.
FACTS:
Maria Paz Cordero-Ouye and Reynaldo Eslao were married. They are living in the house of the husbands mother, Teresita
Eslao (Petitioner). They have two children, Angelica and Leslie.
Reynaldo died. Teresita asked for the company of her grandchildren for comfort since he lost his son while Maria fixed the
funeral of her husband. Maria entrusted the custody of Angelica to Teresita while Leslie is with her mother.
Maria met Dr. James Ouye and eventually decided to get married. She migrated to San Francisco, California to join her new
husband.
Dr. James Ouye, expressed his willingness to adopt Leslie and Angelica and to provide for their support and education.
However, Teresita resisted the idea. She further explained that the child was entrusted to her when she was ten days old and
accused Maria of having abandoned Angelica.
Teresita also argues that it has been demonstrated during the trial that private respondent had indeed abandoned Angelica
to her care and custody; that during all the time that Angelica stayed with petitioner, there were only three instances or
occasions wherein the private respondent saw Angelica.
Teresita asserts that she is deserving to take care of Angelica; that she had managed to raise 12 children of her own herself;
that she has the financial means to carry out her plans for Angelica.
The Trial Court ruled in favor of Maria Paz, she gets the custody of Angelica. CA affirmed the decision.
ISSUE(S): Can the mother-in-law keep custody of the child from her natural mother?
HELD: No. The right of the parent to the custody of the child is inherent.
RATIO:
When Maria entrusted the custody of her minor child to the petitioner, what she gave to the latter was merely temporary
custody and it did not constitute abandonment or renunciation of parental authority.
The Court considered that the children will have a bright future with the mother. Finally, considering that in all controversies
involving the custody of minors, the foremost criterion is the physical and moral well being of the child taking into account the
respective resources and social and moral situations of the contending parties.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Santos vs. Court of Appeals: Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or renounced except in
cases authorized by law. The right attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority
only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children home or an orphan institution. When a parent entrusts the
custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it
does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the same.
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Unson III vs Navarro
No. 52242. November 17, 1980
TOPIC: who exercises parental authority
PONENTE: BARREDO, J.
AUTHOR: PARIAN
Araneta claims that her situation may look unacceptable to the society but
Unson, his family, and her family, in fact, accept it.

Unson and Araneta were legally separated. No specific provision on custody of their child Maria Teresa was contained
in the separation agreement.
However, Maria Teresa lived with Unson in Makati when she started going to school, and stayed only on weekends with
Araneta.
Unson tightened his custody when he found out that Araneta is now residing in Makati and cohabiting with her
brother-in-law. And that the said brother-in-law was admitted twice for manic-depressive disorder.
Araneta filed a writ of habeas corpus for Maria Teresas custody. Judge Navarro granted the writ and ordered Unson
to produce Maria Teresa and return her to Araneta.
Unson appealed.
ISSUE(S): WON Maria Teresas custody should be awarded to Araneta.
HELD: NO. CFI decision reversed and set aside.
RATIO:
SC finds the current setup of Araneta as unwholesome and immoral; that such situation might influence the moral and social
outlook of Teresa.
That no respectable father, properly concerned with the moral well-being of his child, specially a girl, can be expected to
have a different attitude than Unsons in this case.
In all controversies regarding the custody of minors, the sole and foremost consideration is the physical, education, social and
moral welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the respective resources and social and moral situations of the
contending parents.
The Court finds no alternative than to grant Araneta no more than visitation rights over Maria Teresa.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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Pablo-Gualberto v. Gualberto V.
G.R. No. 154994. June 28, 2005
TOPIC: Who exercises PA, FC211-213 cf. FC49,
102(6), 43(2), 63(2), 176. 49, 102 (6), 129 (9)
FACTS:
On March 12, 2002, respondent Crisanto Gualberto filed w/ the RTC of Paranaque an annulment of his marriage w/ petitioner
Jocelyn Pablo-Gualberto under FC36 and an ancilliary prayer for custody of their 4 yr.old child, Rafaello.
He wants custody because:
a. Jocelyn took Rafaello away from the conjugal home and his school when she decided to abandon Crisanto on Feb. 2002;
b. Jocelyn was having lesbian relations w/ a certain Noreen Gay Cuidadano in Cebu.
The RTC judge Helen Ricafort granted his custody. But the same judge reversed its decision under FC213, kids below 7 yrs. old
should stay w/ mother unless unfit and granted Crisanto visitation rights. There was no reason for her to be unfit.
CA reversed and gave back custody to Crisanto because the only incident to resolve was Joycelyns Motion to Dismiss, not
the issuance of the earlier Order (Custody).
ISSUE:
WON custody should be awarded to Jocelyn. YES.
HELD:
The SC states that under FC213, a mother is deemed unfit in the ff. events, neglect, abandonment, unemployment,
immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity or affliction with a communicable
disease.
Crisanto alleged that Jocelyn had lesbian relations and indeed, such immoral conduct would warrant her unfit.
The SC also states that sexual preference or moral laxity alone does not prove parental neglect or incompetence. Not even
the fact that a mother is a prostitute or has been unfaithful to her husband would render her unfit to have custody of her minor
child.
The SC cited cases to support its ruling:
a. Unson III v. Navarro: The mother was openly living with her brother-in-law, the childs uncle. Such unwholesome, immoral
conduct warranted the awarding of custody of the 9yr. child not in her favor.
b. Espiritu v. CA: Illicit relationships of the mother caused the child emotional disturbances, personality conflicts, etc.
It is insufficient for Crisanto just to say that Jocelyn is a lesbian. He must also demonstrate that she carried on her alleged
lesbian relationship w/ a person of the same sex in the presence of their son or under circumstances not conducive to the
childs proper moral development. There were no evidence of this.
Also, the RTC judge found that it was insufficient because she personally had the chance to observe and talk to the sps. and
the child in her chambers, thus, concluded that she was not unfit.
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GRANDE v ANTONIO
G.R. No. 206248. February 18, 2014
TOPIC: Who exercises parental authority
PONENTE: VELASCO, JR., J.
AUTHOR: PARIAN (edited by Pam)


Grande and Antonio lived together as husband and wife, although Antonio was at that time married to someone else.
They had two sons.
Antonio did not expressly recognize the sons as his own in the Records of Birth in the Civil Registry.
Grande and Antonio eventually separated, and Grande left for the US.
This prompted Antonio to file a Petition for Judicial Approval of Recognition with Prayer to take Parental Authority,
Parental Physical Custody, Correction/Change of Surname of Minors and for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary
Injunction before the RTC.
He appended a notarized Deed of Voluntary Recognitions of Paternity of the children.
RTC awarded him the parental authority and custody, and granted his prayer of change of surname of the children.
Grande appealed with the CA attributing grave error on the part of RTC for not granting sole custody as provided in
FC Art 176 (illegitimate children shall be under the parental authority of the mother).
CA modified RTCs ruling, granting Grande sole custody but sustained the change of surname.
She then filed for certiorari on CAs decision sustaining the change of surname.
ISSUE(S): WON the father can compel his illegitimate children to use his surname
HELD: NO. CA and RTC decision SET ASIDE. Change of surname case REMANDED back to RTC due to the letters submitted by the
children during the certiorari, opposing the change of their surname.
RATIO:
Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname of their father or not.
Art 176: Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be
entitled to support in conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if their
filiation has been expressly recognized by their father xxx.
The use of the word may in the provision readily shows that an acknowledged illegitimate child is under no compulsion to
use the surname of his illegitimate father.
The word may is permissive and operates to confer discretion upon the illegitimate children.
It is not the father (Antonio) or the mother (Grande) who is granted by law the right to dictate the surname of their illegitimate
children.
Parental authority over minor children is lodged by Art. 176 on the mother; hence, respondents prayer has no legal mooring.
Since parental authority is given to the mother, then custody over the minor children also goes to the mother, unless she is
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shown to be unfit.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Illegitimate children, recognized by their father, MAY use their fathers surname. Otherwise, they shall use their mothers.
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Vancil vs Belmes
G.R. No. 132223. June 19, 2001
TOPIC: Substitute parental authority
PONENTE: SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
AUTHOR: PARIAN

Vancil filed for guardianship over the persons and properties of her grandchildren, Valerie and Vincent. She was
appointed by the RTC as their legal guardian.
Belmes, the natural mother, filed an opposition and a motion to remove and/or disqualify Vancil as guardian.
RTC dismissed the motion and, instead, ordered Vancil to perform her duties as guardian.
On appeal, CA reversed the decision.
Vancil filed for certiorari; asserting that she has all the qualifications, that there is no ground to disqualify her, and that
Belmes is unsuitable to be their guardian for allowing her live-in partner to rape Valerie seven times.
However, the case was dismissed with respect to Valerie since she already turned 18 while the petition was pending in
SC.
ISSUE(S): WON Vancil should be granted guardianship over the minor, Vincent.
HELD: NO. CA decision affirmed.
RATIO:
SC decision was supported by FC 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of
their common children. In case of disagreement, the fathers decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the
contrary, x x x.
Belmes being the natural mother of minor Vincent, she has the corresponding natural and legal right to his custody.
Vancil failed to provide evidence that Belmes is unfit to be the guardian. FC 214, wherein in case of death, absence or
unsuitability of the parents, substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving grandparent, x x x, cannot be
applied.
Moreover, Vancil is an American citizen and resides in Colorado. She will not be able to perform the responsibilities and
obligations required of a guardian.
In fact, in her petition, she admitted the difficulty of discharging the duties of a guardian by an expatriate, like her.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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Aquinas School v Inton
GR 184202, January 26, 2011
TAKE NOTE: Sister meaning nun, not sibling of Jose Luis
TOPIC: Special Parental Authority, FC218-219,
FC233 cf. FC 221 in rel. to NCC 2180
PONENTE: Abad, J.
FACTS:
On 1998, respondent Jose Luis Inton was a grade 3 student at petitioner Aquinas School.
Respondent Sister Margarita Yamyamin was a religion teacher at such school and taught Jose Luis grade 3 religion class.
Because of Jose Luis disobedience during class, she approached him and kicked him on the legs several times. She also
pulled and shoved his head on the classmates seat.
This prompted the parents Jose and Victoria Inton to file this action for damages w/ the RTC of Pasig on their behalf because
they suffered and on Jose Luis behalf. They also filed criminal action under RA7610 w/ Sis Margarita pleaded guilty and was
sentenced.
But the RTC dismissed their personal claim for damages and instead awarded it to Jose Luis against the school and Sis
Margarita ordering them to pay 60k solidarily.
The parents appeal to the CA to increase the damages on Jose Luis behalf and also theirs but both were denied.
ISSUE:
WON the school is also liable for the action of Sis Margarita. NO. CA decision set aside. School not liable.
HELD:
The SC stated that the school cannot be guilty of outright neglect in admitting such teacher-sisters because:
a. The school had an agreement w/ the sister congregation that it would send out to schools qualified sisters to teach
religion;
b. They were assumed to behave properly upon the students;
c. They were given administrative manuals, hence, aware of the rules; and
d. The school immediately dismissed her from employment after it knew about the incident.
Under FC218-219, teachers, schools, etc. have SPA and are liable for the actions of the minors but the school was not
negligent after the actions it has taken upon the incident w/c led to the absolving of liability.
W/ regard to Sis Margarita, she is liable for the damages. Even if she has SPA, she cannot execute corporal punishment
because only parents can do it.
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Lee v. CA
[G.R. No. 177861. July 13, 2010]
TOPIC: Filial privilege
PONENTE: Abad, J.

NOTES:
ad testificandum - a writ commanding a person to appear in court to testify
as a witness
duces tecum - a writ commanding a person to produce in court certain
designated documents or evidence
FACTS:
Spouses Lee Tek Sheng (Lee) and Keh Shiok Cheng (Keh) are immigrants from China. They had 11 children (Lee-Keh children Respondent).
In 1948, Lee brought Tiu Chuan (Tiu) from, supposedly to serve as housemaid. The Lee-Keh children believed she left the
household and resided in another property owned by Lee. She had a relationship with Lee.
When Keh died, the children of Lee and Tiu also claimed that they were children of Lee and Keh.
The Lee-Keh children then had NBI investigate the matter. It was proven that Keh cannot be the mother of the children
through the hospital records (The supposed 12th child was said to be born from a 17 years old mother when Keh was already
38 years old).
The Lee-Keh children filed before RTC the deletion of the name of Keh as mother of Emma Lee (Petitioner) and replace it with
the name of Tiu.
The Lee-Keh also filed a request for subpoena ad testificandum to compel Tiu to testify. It was granted. But Tiu filed a motion to
quash claiming that it was oppressive and violated Sec. 25, Rule 130 of the ROC, the rule on parental privilege which was also
granted.
The CA granted the appeal of the Lee-Keh children. It held that only a subpoena duces tecum, not a subpoena ad
testificandum, may be quashed for being oppressive or unreasonable under Sec. 4, Rule 21 of the ROC. The CA also held that
Tius advanced age alone does not render her incapable of testifying. The party seeking to quash the subpoena for that
reason must prove that she would be unable to withstand the rigors of trial, something that Emma failed to do.
Motion for reconsideration also denied.
ISSUE(S): May Tiu be compelled to testify in the correction of entry case for the correction of the certificate of birth of Emma to show
that she is not Kehs daughter?
HELD: Yes, she may be compelled to testify against Emma. Petition denied. CA decision affirmed.
RATIO:
The Lee-Keh children have the right to file the action for correction of entries in the certificates of birth of Lees other children.
The Court recognized that the ultimate object of the suit was to establish the fact that Lees other children were not children
of Keh.
Keh had died already so she cannot give a testimony, which is why the Lee-Keh children had a legitimate reason on why they
seek the testimony of Tiu.
Tiu, who invokes the filial privilege, claims that she is the stepmother of Emma. The privilege cannot apply to them because the
rule applies only to direct ascendants and descendants, a family tie connected by a common ancestry. A stepdaughter
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has no common ancestry by her stepmother as provided by Art. 965.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Art. 965 The direct line is either descending or ascending. The former unites the head of the family with those who descend from
him. The latter binds a person with those from whom he descends.
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Cuadra vs Monfort
No. L-24101. September 30, 1970
TOPIC: Effects of parental authority over the childs
person
PONENTE: MAKALINTAL, J..
AUTHOR: PARIAN

Teresa Monfort pulled a prank on Maria Cuadra. While they were gardening in school, Teresa found a headband. She
jokingly said aloud that she found an earthworm and, to frighten Cuadra, tossed the headband at her.
At that precise moment Cuadra turned around to face her friend, and the headband hit her right eye.
After a couple of days her eye became swollen. She was treated and several operations were performed to her eye.
Unfortunately, Cuadra completely lost the sight of her right eye.
Her parents, in her behalf, then filed an action for damages based on quasi-delict against Monforts father.
CFI ordered the Monforts to pay for the hospital fees as actual damages plus P20,000 as moral damages.
Monforts appealed but CA affirmed CFI.
ISSUE(S): WON the parents of Monfort are liable for the acts of Maria Teresa which caused damage to another.
HELD: NO. CA decision reversed.
RATIO:
NCC 2176: Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no preexisting contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasidelict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
NCC. 2180: The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also for those
of persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live
in their company.
The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence
of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
There is nothing from which it may be inferred that the defendant could have prevented the damage by the observance of
due care, or that he was in any way remiss in the exercise of his parental authority in failing to foresee such damage, or the
act which caused it.
On the contrary, his child was at school, where it was his duty to send her and where she was, as he had the right to expect
her to be, under the care and supervision of the teacher.
And as far as the act which caused the injury was concerned, it was an innocent prank not unusual among children at play
and which no parent, however careful, would have any special reason to anticipate, much less guard against. Nor did it
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reveal any mischievous propensity, or indeed any trait in the childs character which would reflect unfavorably on her
upbringing and for which the blame would be attributed to her parents.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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Neri vs. Heirs of Hadji Yusop Uy
G.R. No. 194366. October 10, 2012.
TOPIC: Effects of PA over the childs property
FACTS:
Anunciacion Neri had 2 marriages and several children respectively:
a. 1st marriage w/ Gonzalo Illut Eutropia and Victoria; and
b. 2nd marriage w/ Enrique Neri Napoleon, Alicia, Visminda, Douglas, Rosa (Herein petitioners).
During the 2nd marriage, sps. acquired homesteads totaling to 296k sqm. in Davao Del Norte.
Unfortunately, on Sept. 21, 1977, Anunciacion died intestate. This caused Enrique to be the natural guardian of 2 minors
Douglas and Rosa.
Petitioners and Enrique extra-judicially settled and made an absolute deed of sale in favor of Hadji and Julpha Uy for 80k.
On June 11, 1996, petitioners and Enrique filed this petition w/ the RTC assailing the validity of the sale for being sold w/in the
prohibited period. But later amended their petition including the 1st marriage kids for being excluded and deprived of their
legitimes.
Heirs of Sps. Uy stated as defense it is already beyond the 5-yr. prohibitory period and also denied knowledge of Eutropia and
Victorias exclusion.
RTC ruled in favor of petitioners:
a. Annulling the extrajudicial settlement and the deed of sale for being w/in the 5-yr period;
b. Sale void because the 1st marriage kids were not included;
c. Enrique had no judicial authority to sell the shares of the minors.
CA reversed the decision:
a. Sps. Uy were already in possession of the properties for 17 yrs.;
b. Eutropia and Victoria belatedly filed their action in 1997 or more than 2 yrs. from knowledge of their exclusion as heirs in
1994 when their stepfather died;
c. Extrajudicial settlement and sale valid w/ respect to Enrique and the petitioners shares;
d. Also considered valid between the minors Douglas and Rosa because they ratified it when they reached the age of
majority.
ISSUE:
WON the extrajudicial settlement and absolute deed of sale is valid. NO. Only the deed of sale is valid.
HELD:
The SCs ratio:
a. The extrajudicial settlement is null and void because it was admitted that Eutropia and Victoria, legit 1st marriage kids,
were excluded. And the minors Douglas and Rosa were not properly presented;
b. Rule 74, Sec. 1 of the ROC. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs.x x x No extrajudicial settlement shall
be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof;
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c. Segura v. Segura: The rule covers only valid partitions. The partition in this case was void because it excluded 6 of 9 heirs
who were entitled to equal shares in the partitioned property pursuant to such rule. As the partition was a total nullity and
did not affect the excluded heirs, RTC erred in holding that their right to challenge the partition had prescribed after two
years from its execution.
d. The sale is valid but not w/ regard to Douglas and Rosas shares because theyre minors. Under NCC320 and 326, Enrique,
as the guardian, he can administer it but cannot dispose or encumber their shares unless the minors ratified it upon legal
age.
It was only later on found out that Rosa ratified the sale by a manifestation and a joint-affidavit w/ an older sibling. But w/
regard to Dogulas, no evidence he ratified.
Hence, the SC ruled that the extrajudicial settlement is null and void, and the deed of sale, valid but excluding the 1st
marriage kids and Douglas shares.
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Chua v. Cabangbang
[27 SCRA 791. March 28, 1969]
NOTES:
TOPIC: Suspension on parental authority
PONENTE: Castro, J.
FACTS:
Pacita Chua worked in nightclubs as a hostess.
She had two children with Sy Sia Lay: Robert and Betty Chua Sy. Pacita and Sia separated.
She then lingered in nightclubs again and became the mistress of Victor Tan Villareal. They had a child but they separated.
Pacita then gave away the child to a comadre in Cebu.
Spouses Cabangbang acquired custody of Betty. They had her christened as Grace Cabangbang.
Pacita alleges that when she was still living with Victor, he took the child Betty from her and gave the child to spouses
Cabangbang. She came to know this as Victor brought the child when she was 4 years old to Pacita but then returned to
spouses Cabangbang after.
Spouses Cabangbang allege that they saw the child wrapped in a blanket and was left in front of the gate of their house.
Pacita filed a petition for habeas corpus before the CFI, praying that the court grant her custody of and recognize her
parental authority over the child. A writ was issued commanding the sheriff to bring the child to Court, but they failed to do so.
Pacitas petition was denied. The custody is still with spouses Cabangbang. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE(S): Should the custody be awarded to Pacita?
RATIO:
The court is bound that when a helpless child is at stake it is the duty of courts to respect, enforce, and give meaning and
substance to a childs natural and legal right to live and grow in the proper physical, moral and intellectual environment.
The absence of any kinship between the child and the respondents alone cannot be a ground to give the child back.
It is shown that it is unsure if the father, Victor, will provide support for the child.
Pacita also has no stable income and that her overt acts in the past resulted in her simply giving away her first child.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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De Guzman vs Perez
G.R. No. 156013. July 25, 2006
TOPIC: Suspension of parental authority
PONENTE: Corona, J.
AUTHOR: PARIAN

De Guzman came from a wealthy family. Aberde (private respondent) did not.
While both of them were in law school, he got Aberde pregnant with Robby. However, he did not marry her and
married someone else afterwards.
He only provided thrice for Robby. Twice for his schooling and one instance for hospital bills.
Aberde had to work to Taiwan to provide for Robby. When her savings ran out, she demanded support from De
Guzman. De Guzman ignored the letter.
Aberde then filed a criminal complaint for abandonment and neglect of child under Art 59(2) and (4) of PD 603 (Child
and Youth Welfare Code). She also submitted a notarized general information sheet (GIS) showing De Guzman owned
P750,000 worth of paid shares of their familys corporation.
City Prosecutor issued his resolution dismissing the complaint for abandonment but finding probable cause to charge
petitioner with neglect of child punishable under Article 59(4) of PD 603 in relation to Section 10(a) of RA 7610 (Child
Abuse Law). Subsequently, such criminal case was filed.
But before De Guzman could be arraigned, he filed a petition for review with Justice Sec. Perez.
Justice Sec. Perez affirmed the city prosecutors resolution; finding De Guzmans luxurious lifestyle as circumstantial
evidence of his ample financial capacity.
De Guzman the filed for certiorari, contending:
(1) his financial incapacity - one can only be charged with neglect if he has the means but refuses to give it;
(2) Robby is not a neglected child. He has been given, albeit by Aberde who is the financially capable parent, the requisite
education he is entitled to.
ISSUE(S): Should De Guzman be charged for neglect of child under Art. 59(4) of PD 603 in relation to Sec 10(a) of RA 7610?
HELD: NO (not entirely). Petition dismissed. De Guzman set for arraignment only for neglect under Art. 59 (4) of PD 603
RATIO:
De Guzmans assertion that the GIS is not evidence of his financial capability (since the shares are allegedly owned by his
father) is of no moment. The claim is factual and evidentiary.
Art. 59. Crimes.Criminal liability shall attach to any parent who:
(4) Neglects the child by not giving him the education which the familys station in life and financial conditions permit.
The argument that criminal liability for neglect of child under Article 59(4) of PD 603 attaches only if both parents are guilty of
neglecting the childs education is untenable. The law is clear. The crime may be committed by any parent. The law intends
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to punish the neglect of any parent.
However, while petitioner can be indicted for violation of PD 603 Art. 59(4), the charge against him cannot be made in
relation to RA 7610 Sec. 10(a).
The law expressly penalizes any person who commits other acts of neglect, child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be
responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the childs development including those covered by Article 59 of PD 603 but
not covered by the Revised Penal Code.
The neglect of child under Art. 59(4) of PD 603 is also a crime (known as indifference of parents) penalized under
paragraph 2 of RPC 227.
Hence, it is excluded from the coverage of RA 7610.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
RA 7610 Sec. 10(a):
SEC. 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions Prejudicial to the Childs Development:
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be responsible for other conditions
prejudicial to the childs development including those covered by Article 59 of PD No. 603, as amended, but not covered
by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.
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Llaneta v. Agrava
No. L-32054. May 15, 1974
TOPIC: NCC 364-380, RA 6085 regulating the
use of aliases, RA 9255, FC176
PONENTE: Castro, J.
FACTS:
What caused this petition is because during mid-20s of petitioner Teresita Llaneta, when she applied for a copy of her birth
certificate in Sorsogon, she found out that the registered surname was Llaneta.
Teresita filed this petition for change of name to Teresita Llaneta Ferrer.
Her mother, Atanacia Llaneta, was once married to a Serafin Ferrer and had a son named Victoriano Ferrer. But Serafin died
and Atanacia had a subsequent affair w/c Teresita was the result, hence, shes illegitimate. They lived w/ Serafins mother in
Manila.
She now claims that:
a. She was raised in the household of the Ferrers;
b. Used the surname of Ferrer in all her dealings and throughout her schooling;
c. Using Llaneta would cause untold difficulties and confusion;
d. Her friends and associates know her only as Teresita Ferrer; and
e. Even the late Serafin Ferrer's nearest of kin (Victoriano, who apparently have kept Teresita's illegitimacy a secret from her)
have tolerated and still approve of her use of the surname Ferrer.
RTC dismissed the petition, hence, this direct appeal to the SC.
ISSUE:
WON the RTC erred in not allowing Teresita to use Ferrer. YES. Decision reversed.
HELD:
The SC duly noted of the RTCs reliance on the doctrine on how an illegitimate child is not allowed to use such surname.
But the SC says that the doctrine remains valid only to the extent that the proposed change of name would in great
probability cause prejudice or future mischief to the family whose surname it is that is involved or to the community in general.
The SC mainly considered her (c) claim because it would entail endless and vexatious explanations of the circumstances of
her new surname. It also means a lifelong fending with the necessary affidavits.
Also, the mother of Serafin and Serafins brothers (In-laws) even supported Teresitas petition, hence, no opposition. The State
as well did not oppose.
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Dapar v. Biascan
[G.R. No. 141880. September 27, 2004]
NOTES:
TOPIC: Surnames
PONENTE: Callejo, Sr., J.
FACTS:
Mario Biascan is married to Gloria Biascan. They have 4 children.
Mario, while working in UAE, met Zenaida Daspar. They became lovers which led to Mario not being able to support his family.
They went back to the Philippines. They opened a joint bank account. Mario went back to UAE while Zenaida stayed. He
remitted his earnings to the said bank account.
Mario and Zenaida bought a house and lot and the TCR is under the name, Spouses Mario Biascan and Zenaida Biascan.
Gloria filed a complaint against Zenaida for annulment of title, reconveyance, and damages in the RTC Caloocan City. She
alleged that Zenaida fraudulently misrepresented herself as she is not the wife of Mario.
According to Zenaida, she was fraudulently and maliciously forced by Mario and his family to vacate the house and lot in
question. She filed an action for partition. RTC declared her as a co-owner of the lot using Art. 148 of FC.
Mario filed for petition for certiorari before CA. It reversed the decision. It held that the title of the land in question is null and
void. It ordered Zenaida to reconvey the land.
ISSUE(S): Is Gloria entitled to damages because Zenaida used the surname Biascan?
HELD: No. Petition is granted.
RATIO:
Zenaida is not guilty of usurpation or Art. 377 of the Civil Code because Mario consented.
The mere use of the surname cannot be enjoined. It shall be coupled with the representation that one is the lawful wife, or the
usurpation of ones status, which gives rise to an action for damages. In this case, Zenaida did not pretend to be Gloria.
The usurpation of name under Article 377 of the Civil Code implies some injury to the interests of the owner of the name. It
consists in the possibility of confusion of identity between the owner and the usurper, and exists when a person designates
himself by another name.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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Limson vs Gonzalez
G.R. No. 162205. March 31, 2014
TOPIC: Surnames; Aliases RA 6085
AUTHOR: PARIAN

Limson filed a criminal charge for falsification against Gonzalez.
He alleges that Eugenio Juan Gonzalez pretends to be an architect; and is not the same Eugenio Gonzalez who is
registered in PRC.
Gonzales filed a counter-affidavit, claiming that he has identified himself as much as possible as Arch. Eugenio Juan
Gonzalez, because the surname GONZALEZ was and is still, a very common surname throughout the Philippines and he
wanted to distinguish himself with his second given name, JUAN, after his first given name, EUGENIO.
The prosecutor dismissed the charge, finding that, indeed, Juan is the architect registered in PRC. Limson elevated it to
DOJ. Justice secretary affirmed the prosecutors resolution.
Limson filed a new letter of complaint alleging the same but adding the accusation that because Gonzalez used
various combinations of his name, in different signature, on different occasions, Gonzalez had also violated RA 6085
(the Anti-Alias Law).
DOJ referred it back to the prosecutor. Same result. To DOJ. Same result. To CA. Denied.
ISSUE(S): WON Gonzalez violated the Anti-Alias Law for using different variations of his name.
HELD: NO. Certiorari denied.
RATIO:
Limsons evidence: Gonzales graduation photo in 1941 does not match his drivers license photo taken in 1996.
It is really absurd to expect Gonzalez to look the same after 55 long years.
On illegal aliases: SC observed that Gonzalez aliases were Eugenio Gonzalez, Eugenio Gonzales, Eugenio Juan
Gonzalez, Eugenio Juan Gonzalez y Regalado, Eugenio C.R. Gonzalez, Eugenio J. Gonzalez, and Eugenio Juan Robles
Gonzalez.
But these names contained his true names, at times joined with an erroneous middle or second name, or a misspelled family
name in one instance.
Records show that the erroneous second names, or the misspelling of the family name resulted from error or inadvertence left
unchecked and unrectified over time.
What is significant, however, is that such names were not fictitious names within the purview of the Anti-Alias Law; and that
such names were not different from each other.
Considering that he was not also shown to have used the names for unscrupulous purposes, or to deceive or confuse the
public, the dismissal of the charge against him was justified in fact and in law.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
R.A. No. 6085:
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Section 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema, television, radio or other entertainment purposes and in athletic events
where the use of pseudonym is a normally accepted practice, no person shall use any name different from the one with which he
was registered at birth in the office of the local civil registry or with which he was baptized for the first time, or in case of an alien, with
which he was registered in the bureau of immigration upon entry; or such substitute name as may have been authorized by a
competent court: Provided, That persons whose births have not been registered in any local civil registry and who have not been
baptized, have one year from the approval of this act within which to register their names in the civil registry of their residence. The
name shall comprise the patronymic name and one or two surnames.
Sec. 2. Any person desiring to use an alias shall apply for authority therefor in proceedings like those legally provided to obtain judicial
authority for a change of name and no person shall be allowed to secure such judicial authority for more than one alias. The petition
for an alias shall set forth the persons baptismal and family name and the name recorded in the civil registry, if different, his
immigrants name, if an alien, and his pseudonym, if he has such names other than his original or real name, specifying the reason or
reasons for the desired alias. The judicial authority for the use of alias, the Christian name and the alien immigrants name shall be
recorded in the proper local civil registry, and no person shall use any name or names other than his original or real name unless the
same is or are duly recorded in the proper local civil registry.
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Reyes v. Alejandro
No. L-32026. January 16, 1986.
TAKE NOTE: This is before the FC. Hence, for purposes of remarrying, the declaration
TOPIC: RULES GOVERNING PERSONS WHO ARE of absence is already provided by the provisions if absent for 7 years. No need for
ABSENT NCC381-396, FC96, 101, 124, FC 41
judicial declaration.
PONENTE: Patajo, J.
FACTS:
On Oct. 25, 1969, petitioner Erlinda Reyes filed this petition for the declaration of absence of her husband, Roberto Reyes.
She alleges in her petition that:
a. They were married on March 20, 1960;
b. He left the conjugal home since April 1962 because they quarreled;
c. Have not received any info. about his whereabouts;
d. They did not acquire any property during marriage nor any debts;
e. Wants to file this because of R107 of the ROC and NCC384.
Presiding judge respondent Alejandro dismissed her petition because:
a. Under such rule, the purpose of this are:
1. The interest of the person himself who has disappeared;
2. The rights of 3rd parties against the absentee, especially those who have rights which would depend upon the death
of the absentee; and
3. The general interest of society which may require that property does not remain abandoned without someone
representing it and without an owner.
b. In harmony w/ NCC384, the court may declare a person absent if:
1. After 2 years, no news about the whereabouts of the absentee or since the receipt of the last news; and
2. After 5 years, in case the absentee has left a person in charge of the administration of his property;
3. After such declaration, the court must provide an administrator of the property of the absentee;
c. But unfortunately, it was stated in the Erlindas petition that Roberto did not have any property, debts, interests, etc.,
hence, theres no point in judicially declaring him absent.
ISSUE:
WON the RTC erred in not declaring Roberto an absentee. NO. Decision affirmed.
HELD:
The SC cites Jones v. Hortiguela:
a. For the purposes of remarriage, no need to have the spouse judicially declared absent since the declaration is already
provided in the provision if the spouse is absent for 7 years;
b. The purpose of declaration of absence is to enable to take necessary precautions for the administration of the estate of
the absentee.
The need to have a person judicially declared an absentee is when:
a. He has properties which have to be taken cared of or administered by a representative appointed by the Court
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(NCC384);
b. The spouse of the absentee is asking for separation of property (NCC191):
c. His wife is asking the Court that the administration of all classes of property in the marriage be transferred to her (NCC196).
Since theres no property, debts, etc., no need for declaration of absence.
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Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Lucero
[124 SCRA 425. August 31, 1983]
NOTES:
TOPIC: Rules governing persons who are absent
PONENTE: Escolin, J.
FACTS:
Julio Lucero is the Captain of M/V Eastern Minicon under Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. His salary (voyage to voyage basis, will
only terminate monthly if he is back in the port) is to be given to his wife in Manila, Josephine.
While the ship was on its way to Manila, they sent three messages to the petitioner companys Manila office. The messages
were meant to tell the company that the ship was in dire straits as it had encountered boisterous weather.
The last few parts of the messages eventually called on the company for help, but it was too late as the ship was lost at sea,
never to be found again.
The company took the necessary steps and mobilized its insurer, Lloyds of London, to confirm the ships loss. The insurance
company gave its report that the ship was confirmed to be lost and the company proceeded to provide death benefits to
the families left behind by the ship members.
Josephine filed a complaint with the National Seamen Board to claim the monthly allotment she thought she supposed to get.
The company countered by saying that she is not entitled to anything anymore because she declined to accept the death
benefits as the ship was confirmed to be lost.
The Board ruled in favor of Josephine. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the Boards decision, saying that the presumption
applies here and that since the four year period has not yet expired, Josephine is still entitled to the monthly allotment from
her husbands salary. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE(S): Is Josephine entitled to get monthly allotments for his salary?
HELD: No. But the Court held that she is still entitled to death benefits.
RATIO:
There is enough evidence to show the circumstances attending the loss and disappearance of the M/V Eastern Minicon and
its crew. The foregoing facts lead to the fact that the vessel had sunk and that the persons aboard had perished with it.
The presumption of death, therefore, should yield to the preponderance of evidence showing that the moment of death was
clearly established. The ruling on Joaquin v Navarro is applicable here: where there are facts, known or knowable, from
which a rational conclusion can be made, the presumption does not step in, and the rule on preponderance of evidence
controls.
Article 391 cannot be permitted to override the facts established in this case and Josephine must accept the fact that her
husband really is dead.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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Rebulic vs Narceda
G.R. No. 182760. April 10, 2013
TOPIC: Rules governing persons who are absent
PONENTE: Sereno, C.J.
AUTHOR: PARIAN

1994: Narceda alleged that his wife, Marina B. Narceda, went to Singapore and never came back; which prompted
him to look for her but to no avail. (Did he try the Marina BBay? Badum tss!)
2002: Narceda filed with the RTC a Petition for a judicial declaration of the presumptive death and/or absence of
Marina because of her absence and his desire to remarry.
RTC granted the petition.
OSG filed an ordinary appeal to CA; arguing that Narceda failed to conduct a search for his missing wife with the
diligence required by law and enough to give rise to a well-founded belief that she was dead.
CA dismissed the petition outright on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
CA ruled that the hearing of a petition for the declaration of presumptive death is a summary proceeding under the
Family Code and is thus governed by Title XI.
In which FC 247 provides that the judgment of the trial court in summary court proceedings shall be immediately final
and executory.
ISSUE(S): WON a judgment on a summary court proceeding under FC may be appealed.
HELD: YES. But it should be a petition for certiorari with CA, not an ordinary appeal.
RATIO:
In FC 41: xxx. For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present
must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee,
without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
The procedural rules to be followed are:
Art. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules provided for in this Title shall apply as regards separation in fact
between husband and wife, abandonment by one of the other, and incidents involving parental authority. xxx
Art. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory. xxx
Art. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall likewise govern summary proceedings filed under Articles 41, 51, 69, 73,
96, 124 and 217, insofar as they are applicable.
As explained in Republic v. Tango, the remedy of a losing party in a summary proceeding is not an ordinary appeal, but a
petition for certiorari filed with CA.
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Valino v. Adriano
G.R. No. 182894. April 22, 2014.
TOPIC: FUNERALS, NCC305-310, FC194-195
FACTS:
Atty. Adriano Adriano married respondent Rosario Adriano and had 6 children (1 adopted).
However, they eventually separated and years later, Atty. Adriano started dating his client, petitioner Floro Valino. They
decided to live together as husband and wife but he still gives support to his children w/ Rosario.
Unfortunately, Atty. Adriano died of acute emphysema and at that time, Rosario was in the US w/ the children for Christmas. It
was Floro who shouldered the funeral expenses.
When Rosario learned about this, she called Floro and requested to delay the interment but it was not heeded. The burial
happened w/o Rosario and the children. The remains were transferred to the Valino family at Manila Memorial Park (MMP).
This prompted Rosario to file a petition to claim damages and the remains be transferred at Holy Cross Memorial.
Floro stated as defense:
a. The sps. separated 20 yrs. ago before she met Atty. Adriano;
b. She was introduced as his wife to everybody;
c. Floro admitted Atty. Adriano still continued supporting Rosario and the kids;
d. Unlike Rosario, she took good care of Atty. Adriano while Rosario was away;
e. It was Atty. Adrianos wishes to be buried at Manila Memorial Park.
The RTC dismissed their complaints for lack of evidence. But ruled that since Floro lived w/ the deceased for a very long time,
she knew his wishes to be buried in MMP, assumed responsibilities as the wife while Rosario, the lawful wife, left for the US.
The CA reversed the decision and directed Floro to give the remains to Rosario because she was the lawful wife and was
entitled to the custody of the remains under NCC305 in relation to FC199, notwithstanding the 30 year separation.
ISSUE:
WON the Floro Valino is entitled to the remains of Atty. Valino. NO.
HELD:
The SC states that it is clear that the law gives the right and duty to make funeral arrangements to Rosario, she being the
surviving lawful wife of Atty. Adriano:
a. The fact that she was living separately from her husband and was in the US when he died is insignificant;
b. Hence, when there were adverse claims about the burial site, Rosario had the right because the law favors the legitimate
family. No presumption was made in favor of Floro solely because of her long-time relationship w/ the deceased;
c. This is a family right. There can be no doubt that persons having this right may recover the corpse from third persons.
The right and duty to make funeral arrangements, like any other right, will not be considered as having been waived or
renounced, except upon clear and satisfactory proof of conduct indicative of a free and voluntary intent to that end:
a. Rosario cannot be said that she waived or renounced, expressly or impliedly, her right and duty to make funeral
arrangements;
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b. The SC did not consider the separation between the lawful sps. as an act of waiver because Rosario wasted no time to
ask Floro to delay the burial for a few days but it was not heeded.
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Barretto v. Local Civil Registrar of Manila
[74 SCRA 257. December 10, 1976]
NOTES:
TOPIC: Entries in the civil register
PONENTE: Aquino, J.
FACTS:
According to the record of births in Civil Register of Manila, a female child named Rosario Barretto was born on June 29, 1944.
The parents are to the spouses Faustino Barreto and King Lian.
On the other hand, a record of baptisms of the Parroquia de Chinos in Manila that Domingo Sy Barretto was born on June 29,
1944 to the spouses Faustino Sy Barretto and Diana King Luan Ty.
In 1967, Domingo requested for a copy of his birth record which he needed in connection with his application for a marriage
license. He discovered that his name in the record of birth is Rosario, a female.
He filed in the CFI of Manila a petition for the correction of the alleged erroneous entries in his birth record regarding his name
and sex. The petition was dismissed.
He filed an amended petition now limiting his petition to the change of his sex.
The Solicitor General filed motions to dismiss. It contended that the alleged error in the entry as to the sex of the petitioner is
not clerical and that its correction involves a substantial change which may affect his identity.
Domingo Barretto testified that he is the same person known as Rosario Barretto in the birth certificate. He has been using the
name Domingo in his school records. His mother also testified.
CFI granted the amended petition.
The Solicitor General files this appeal.
ISSUE(S): Is the error as to the sex of Rosario Barretto a clerical error that may be changed by means of a petition for correction?
HELD: No. The alleged error is not clerical in nature. CFI decision reversed.
RATIO:
If the name in the record of birth were Domingo Barretto and his sex was indicated therein as female, it might be argued that
the error would be clerical.
It is settled that the summary procedure for correction of entries in the civil registry under article 412 of the Civil Code and Rule
108 of the Rules of Court is confined to innocuous or clerical errors, such as misspellings and the like, errors that are visible to
the eyes or obvious to the understanding or corrections that are not controversial and are supported by indubitable
evidence.
A clerical error is one made by a clerk in transcribing or otherwise, and, of course, must be apparent on the face of the
record, and capable of being corrected by reference to the record only.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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Republic vs Valencia
No. L-32181. March 5, 1986
TOPIC: Entries in the civil register
PONENTE: Gutierrez, Jr., J.
AUTHOR: PARIAN
Summary proceedings - are shorter and simpler than the ordinary steps in a
suit. Summary proceedings are ordinarily available for cases that require
prompt action and generally involve a small number of clear cut issues.

Leonor Valencia, for and in behalf of her minor children, Bernardo Go and Jessica Go, filed with the CFI of Cebu a
petition for the cancellation and/or correction of entries of birth of Bernardo Go and Jessica Go in the Civil Registry.
She wants to change their nationality from Chinese to Filipino, and status from Legitimate to Illegitimate.
OSG filed an opposition, alleging that correction of entry pursuant to NCC 412 in relation to ROC Rule 108
contemplates a summary proceeding and correction of mere clerical harmless errors and not changes involving
nationality or civil status.
OSG argues that it is not the appropriate action.
CFI granted her petition.
OSG filed for certiorari directly to SC
ISSUE(S): WON the petition for correction of entry pursuant to NCC 412 in relation to ROC Rule 108 is the proper action in the instant
case.
HELD: YES. Petition dismissed.
RATIO:
Provided the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where
opposing counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite partys case, and where the evidence has been
thoroughly weighed and considered, the suit or proceeding is appropriate.
The petition filed by the respondent in the lower court by way of a special proceeding for cancellation and/or correction of
entries in the civil register with the requisite notice and publication and the recorded proceedings that actually took place
thereafter could very well be regarded as that proper suit or appropriate action.
To follow OSGs argument that Rule 108 is not an appropriate proceeding without in any way stating what is the correct
proceeding or if such a proceeding exists at all, would result in manifest injustice.
Besides, the minors have older siblings from the same mother and father who are not only registered as Filipino citizens but also
who have pursued careers which require Philippine citizenship as a mandatory pre-requisite.
It would be a denial of substantive justice if the two minors are denied the rights of citizens on the simple argument that the
correct procedure not specified has not been followed.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Rule 108:
SEC. 3. Parties.When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have
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or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and publication.Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hear-ing of
the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order
to be published once in a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition.The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or
correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his
opposition thereto.
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IWASAWA v GANGAN
[G.R. No. 204169. September 11, 2013]
TOPIC: Bigamous marriages, ENTRIES IN THE CIVIL
REGISTER,NCC 407-413, ROC, R108, RA9048, as
amended by RA10172
AUTHOR: PARIAN (Edited by: Ocampo, Miguel)


1994: Respondent Felisa Gangan married Raymond Arambulo
2002: Gangan introduced herself to petitioner Yasuo Iwasawa as single. Later that year, they got married and moved
to Japan.
2009: Gangan got news that Arambulo died and she got depressed. Iwasawa inquired about her depression and
found out that she had a prior existing marriage.
Iwasawa filed a declaration of nullity of his marriage with Gangan for being bigamous.
He presented to the RTC: (1) certificate of marriage between Arambulo and Gangan; (2) certificate of marriage
between Iwasawa and Gangan; (3) death certificate of Arambulo.
RTC dismissed the case for the evidence he presented is unreliable. He was a stranger to the documents.
Iwasawa filed for certiorari.
ISSUE(S): WON the documents presented should be admitted as evidence of marriage
HELD: Yes. RTC decision set aside. Marriage of Iwasawa and Gangan declared null and void.
RATIO:
The documents submitted are public documents. In effect, as per NCC 410: The books making up the civil register and all
documents relating thereto shall be considered public documents and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein
contained.
As public documents, they are admissible in evidence even without further proof of their due execution and genuineness.
Therefore, the public documents are prima facie proof that Gangan had a prior existing marriage when she married Iwasawa.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
Marriage certificates, being a public document, are prima facie evidence that such marriage is a fact.
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Republic v. Olaybar
[G.R. No. 189538. February 10, 2014]
NOTES:
TOPIC: Entries in the Civil Register
PONENTE: Peralta, J.
FACTS:
Merlinda Olaybar requested from the NSO a Certificate of No Marriage (CENOMAR) as one of the
requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend. Upon receipt, she discovered that she was already
married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean National.
She denied having contracted said marriage and claimed that she did not know the alleged husband;
she did not appear before the solemnizing officer; and, that the signature appearing in the marriage
certificate is not hers.
She filed a Petition for Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage Contract.
She presented herself as a witness. She alleged that her signature was forged (expert said it was)
RTC granted the petition founding that her signature was forged.
Petitioner filed for motion for reconsideration on the grounds that: (1) there was no clerical spelling,
typographical and other innocuous errors in the marriage contract for it to fall within the provisions of
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court; and (2) granting the cancellation of all the entries in the wife portion of
the alleged marriage contract is declaring the marriage void ab initio. RTC denied the petition.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE(S): Did RTC err in granting the petition of cancellation of entries in the marriage contract?
RATIO:
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry. The proceedings may either be summary or adversary. If the correction is clerical, then the
procedure to be adopted is summary.
Republic v. Valencia - the Court has repeatedly ruled that "even substantial errors in a civil registry may
be corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108, with the true facts established and the parties
aggrieved by the error availing themselves of the appropriate adversarial proceeding."
Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of marriage. In this case, SC said they cannot
nullify the proceedings before the trial court where the respondent gave evidence that she is indeed not
married. The trial court, in allowing the change of entry in the marriage contract, did not in any way
declare the marriage void as there was no marriage to speak of.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
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