RA 8749

G.R. No. 158290

October 23, 2006

HILARION M. HENARES, JR., VICTOR C. AGUSTIN, ALFREDO L.

HENARES, DANIEL L. HENARES, ENRIQUE BELO HENARES, and
CRISTINA BELO HENARES, petitioners,
vs.
LAND TRANSPORTATION FRANCHISING AND REGULATORY
BOARD and DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS, respondents.
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Petitioners challenge this Court to issue a writ of mandamus commanding
respondents Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board
(LTFRB) and the Department of Transportation and Communications
(DOTC) to require public utility vehicles (PUVs) to use compressed natural
gas (CNG) as alternative fuel.
Citing statistics from the Metro Manila Transportation and Traffic Situation
Study of 1996,1 the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the
National Capital Region,2 a study of the Asian Development Bank,3 the
Manila Observatory4 and the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources5 (DENR) on the high growth and low turnover in vehicle
ownership in the Philippines, including diesel-powered vehicles, two-stroke
engine powered motorcycles and their concomitant emission of air
pollutants, petitioners attempt to present a compelling case for judicial action
against the bane of air pollution and related environmental hazards.
Petitioners allege that the particulate matters (PM) complex mixtures of
dust, dirt, smoke, and liquid droplets, varying in sizes and compositions
emitted into the air from various engine combustions have caused

detrimental effects on health, productivity, infrastructure and the overall

quality of life. Petitioners particularly cite the effects of certain fuel
emissions from engine combustion when these react to other pollutants. For
instance, petitioners aver, with hydrocarbons, oxide of nitrogen (NOx)
creates smog; with sulfur dioxide, it creates acid rain; and with ammonia,
moisture and other compounds, it reacts to form nitric acid and harmful
nitrates. Fuel emissions also cause retardation and leaf bleaching in plants.
According to petitioner, another emission, carbon monoxide (CO), when not
completely burned but emitted into the atmosphere and then inhaled can
disrupt the necessary oxygen in blood. With prolonged exposure, CO affects
the nervous system and can be lethal to people with weak hearts.6
Petitioners add that although much of the new power generated in the
country will use natural gas while a number of oil and coal-fired fuel stations
are being phased-out, still with the projected doubling of power generation
over the next 10 years, and with the continuing high demand for motor
vehicles, the energy and transport sectors are likely to remain the major
sources of harmful emissions. Petitioners refer us to the study of the
Philippine Environment Monitor 20027, stating that in four of the country's
major cities, Metro Manila, Davao, Cebu and Baguio, the exposure to PM10,
a finer PM which can penetrate deep into the lungs causing serious health
problems, is estimated at over US$430 million.8 The study also reports that
the emissions of PMs have caused the following:
Over 2,000 people die prematurely. This loss is valued at about US$140
million.
Over 9,000 people suffer from chronic bronchitis, which is valued at about
US$120 million.
Nearly 51 million cases of respiratory symptom days in Metro Manila
(averaging twice a year in Davao and Cebu, and five to six times in Metro
Manila and Baguio), costs about US$170 million. This is a 70 percent
increase, over a decade, when compared with the findings of a similar study
done in 1992 for Metro Manila, which reported 33 million cases.9
Petitioners likewise cite the University of the Philippines' studies in 1990-91
and 1994 showing that vehicular emissions in Metro Manila have resulted to
the prevalence of chronic obstructive pulmonary diseases (COPD); that
pulmonary tuberculosis is highest among jeepney drivers; and there is a 4.8

to 27.5 percent prevalence of respiratory symptoms among school children

and 15.8 to 40.6 percent among child vendors. The studies also revealed that
the children in Metro Manila showed more compromised pulmonary
function than their rural counterparts. Petitioners infer that these are mostly
due to the emissions of PUVs.
To counter the aforementioned detrimental effects of emissions from PUVs,
petitioners propose the use of CNG. According to petitioners, CNG is a
natural gas comprised mostly of methane which although containing small
amounts of propane and butane,10 is colorless and odorless and considered
the cleanest fossil fuel because it produces much less pollutants than coal
and petroleum; produces up to 90 percent less CO compared to gasoline and
diesel fuel; reduces NOx emissions by 50 percent and cuts hydrocarbon
emissions by half; emits 60 percent less PMs; and releases virtually no sulfur
dioxide. Although, according to petitioners, the only drawback of CNG is
that it produces more methane, one of the gases blamed for global
warming.11
Asserting their right to clean air, petitioners contend that the bases for their
petition for a writ of mandamus to order the LTFRB to require PUVs to use
CNG as an alternative fuel, lie in Section 16,12 Article II of the 1987
Constitution, our ruling in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.,13 and Section 414 of
Republic Act No. 8749 otherwise known as the "Philippine Clean Air Act of
1999."
Meantime, following a subsequent motion, the Court granted petitioners'
motion to implead the Department of Transportation and Communications
(DOTC) as additional respondent.
In his Comment for respondents LTFRB and DOTC, the Solicitor General,
cites Section 3, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and explains that the
writ of mandamus is not the correct remedy since the writ may be issued
only to command a tribunal, corporation, board or person to do an act that is
required to be done, when he or it unlawfully neglects the performance of an
act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust
or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a
right or office to which such other is entitled, there being no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.15 Further citing
existing jurisprudence, the Solicitor General explains that in contrast to a
discretionary act, a ministerial act, which a mandamus is, is one in which an

officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner,

in obedience to a mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the
exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of an act
done.
The Solicitor General also notes that nothing in Rep. Act No. 8749 that
petitioners invoke, prohibits the use of gasoline and diesel by owners of
motor vehicles. Sadly too, according to the Solicitor General, Rep. Act No.
8749 does not even mention the existence of CNG as alternative fuel and
avers that unless this law is amended to provide CNG as alternative fuel for
PUVs, the respondents cannot propose that PUVs use CNG as alternative
fuel.
The Solicitor General also adds that it is the DENR that is tasked to
implement Rep. Act No. 8749 and not the LTFRB nor the DOTC. Moreover,
he says, it is the Department of Energy (DOE), under Section 2616 of Rep.
Act No. 8749, that is required to set the specifications for all types of fuel
and fuel-related products to improve fuel compositions for improved
efficiency and reduced emissions. He adds that under Section 2117 of the
cited Republic Act, the DOTC is limited to implementing the emission
standards for motor vehicles, and the herein respondents cannot alter, change
or modify the emission standards. The Solicitor General opines that the
Court should declare the instant petition for mandamus without merit.
Petitioners, in their Reply, insist that the respondents possess the
administrative and regulatory powers to implement measures in accordance
with the policies and principles mandated by Rep. Act No. 8749, specifically
Section 218 and Section 21.19 Petitioners state that under these laws and
with all the available information provided by the DOE on the benefits of
CNG, respondents cannot ignore the existence of CNG, and their failure to
recognize CNG and compel its use by PUVs as alternative fuel while air
pollution brought about by the emissions of gasoline and diesel endanger the
environment and the people, is tantamount to neglect in the performance of a
duty which the law enjoins.
Lastly, petitioners aver that other than the writ applied for, they have no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Petitioners insist that the writ in fact should be issued pursuant to the very
same Section 3, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court that the Solicitor
General invokes.

In their Memorandum, petitioners phrase the issues before us as follows:

I. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS HAVE THE PERSONALITY
TO BRING THE PRESENT ACTION
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE PRESENT ACTION IS SUPPORTED BY
LAW
III. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT IS THE AGENCY
RESPONSIBLE TO IMPLEMENT THE SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVE
OF REQUIRING PUBLIC UTILITY VEHICLES TO USE COMPRESSED
NATURAL GAS (CNG)
IV. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT CAN BE COMPELLED TO
REQUIRE PUBLIC UTILITY VEHICLES TO USE COMPRESSED
NATURAL GAS THROUGH A WRIT OF MANDAMUS20
Briefly put, the issues are two-fold. First, Do petitioners have legal
personality to bring this petition before us? Second, Should mandamus issue
against respondents to compel PUVs to use CNG as alternative fuel?
According to petitioners, Section 16,21 Article II of the 1987 Constitution is
the policy statement that bestows on the people the right to breathe clean air
in a healthy environment. This policy is enunciated in Oposa.22 The
implementation of this policy is articulated in Rep. Act No. 8749. These,
according to petitioners, are the bases for their standing to file the instant
petition. They aver that when there is an omission by the government to
safeguard a right, in this case their right to clean air, then, the citizens can
resort to and exhaust all remedies to challenge this omission by the
government. This, they say, is embodied in Section 423 of Rep. Act No.
8749.
Petitioners insist that since it is the LTFRB and the DOTC that are the
government agencies clothed with power to regulate and control motor
vehicles, particularly PUVs, and with the same agencies' awareness and
knowledge that the PUVs emit dangerous levels of air pollutants, then, the
responsibility to see that these are curbed falls under respondents' functions
and a writ of mandamus should issue against them.

The Solicitor General, for his part, reiterates his position that the respondent
government agencies, the DOTC and the LTFRB, are not in a position to
compel the PUVs to use CNG as alternative fuel. The Solicitor General
explains that the function of the DOTC is limited to implementing the
emission standards set forth in Rep. Act No. 8749 and the said law only goes
as far as setting the maximum limit for the emission of vehicles, but it does
not recognize CNG as alternative engine fuel. The Solicitor General avers
that the petition should be addressed to Congress for it to come up with a
policy that would compel the use of CNG as alternative fuel.
Patently, this Court is being asked to resolve issues that are not only
procedural. Petitioners challenge this Court to decide if what petitioners
propose could be done through a less circuitous, speedy and unchartered
course in an issue that Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. in his ponencia in
the Oposa case,24 describes as "inter-generational responsibility" and "intergenerational justice."
Now, as to petitioners' standing. There is no dispute that petitioners have
standing to bring their case before this Court. Even respondents do not
question their standing. This petition focuses on one fundamental legal right
of petitioners, their right to clean air. Moreover, as held previously, a party's
standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which may, in the
exercise of the Court's discretion, be set aside in view of the importance of
the issue raised. We brush aside this issue of technicality under the principle
of the transcendental importance to the public, especially so if these cases
demand that they be settled promptly.
Undeniably, the right to clean air not only is an issue of paramount
importance to petitioners for it concerns the air they breathe, but it is also
impressed with public interest. The consequences of the counter-productive
and retrogressive effects of a neglected environment due to emissions of
motor vehicles immeasurably affect the well-being of petitioners. On these
considerations, the legal standing of the petitioners deserves recognition.
Our next concern is whether the writ of mandamus is the proper remedy, and
if the writ could issue against respondents.
Under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, mandamus lies under any of
the following cases: (1) against any tribunal which unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty; (2) in

case any corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the performance

of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or
station; and (3) in case any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully
excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which
such other is legally entitled; and there is no other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
In University of San Agustin, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,25 we said,
It is settled that mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when
refused, of a ministerial duty, this being its main objective. It does not lie to
require anyone to fulfill contractual obligations or to compel a course of
conduct, nor to control or review the exercise of discretion. On the part of
the petitioner, it is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that he
should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the
imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act required. It never issues
in doubtful cases. While it may not be necessary that the duty be absolutely
expressed, it must however, be clear. The writ will not issue to compel an
official to do anything which is not his duty to do or which is his duty not to
do, or give to the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law. The
writ neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a command to
exercise a power already possessed and to perform a duty already imposed.
(Emphasis supplied.)
In this petition the legal right which is sought to be recognized and enforced
hinges on a constitutional and a statutory policy already articulated in
operational terms, e.g. in Rep. Act No. 8749, the Philippine Clean Air Act of
1999. Paragraph (a), Section 21 of the Act specifically provides that when
PUVs are concerned, the responsibility of implementing the policy falls on
respondent DOTC. It provides as follows:
SEC 21. Pollution from Motor Vehicles. - a) The DOTC shall implement the
emission standards for motor vehicles set pursuant to and as provided in this
Act. To further improve the emission standards, the Department [DENR]
shall review, revise and publish the standards every two (2) years, or as the
need arises. It shall consider the maximum limits for all major pollutants to
ensure substantial improvement in air quality for the health, safety and
welfare of the general public.
Paragraph (b) states:

b) The Department [DENR] in collaboration with the DOTC, DTI and

LGUs, shall develop an action plan for the control and management of air
pollution from motor vehicles consistent with the Integrated Air Quality
Framework . . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
There is no dispute that under the Clean Air Act it is the DENR that is tasked
to set the emission standards for fuel use and the task of developing an
action plan. As far as motor vehicles are concerned, it devolves upon the
DOTC and the line agency whose mandate is to oversee that motor vehicles
prepare an action plan and implement the emission standards for motor
vehicles, namely the LTFRB.
In Oposa26 we said, the right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries
with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. We
also said, it is clearly the duty of the responsible government agencies to
advance the said right.
Petitioners invoke the provisions of the Constitution and the Clean Air Act in
their prayer for issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the
respondents to require PUVs to use CNG as an alternative fuel. Although
both are general mandates that do not specifically enjoin the use of any kind
of fuel, particularly the use of CNG, there is an executive order
implementing a program on the use of CNG by public vehicles. Executive
Order No. 290, entitled Implementing the Natural Gas Vehicle Program for
Public Transport (NGVPPT), took effect on February 24, 2004. The program
recognized, among others, natural gas as a clean burning alternative fuel for
vehicle which has the potential to produce substantially lower pollutants;
and the Malampaya Gas-to-Power Project as representing the beginning of
the natural gas industry of the Philippines. Paragraph 1.2, Section 1 of E.O.
No. 290 cites as one of its objectives, the use of CNG as a clean alternative
fuel for transport. Furthermore, one of the components of the program is the
development of CNG refueling stations and all related facilities in strategic
locations in the country to serve the needs of CNG-powered PUVs. Section
3 of E.O. No. 290, consistent with E.O. No. 66, series of 2002, designated
the DOE as the lead agency (a) in developing the natural gas industry of the
country with the DENR, through the EMB and (b) in formulating emission
standards for CNG. Most significantly, par. 4.5, Section 4 tasks the DOTC,
working with the DOE, to develop an implementation plan for "a gradual
shift to CNG fuel utilization in PUVs and promote NGVs [natural gas

vehicles] in Metro Manila and Luzon through the issuance of

directives/orders providing preferential franchises in present day major
routes and exclusive franchises to NGVs in newly opened routes" A
thorough reading of the executive order assures us that implementation for a
cleaner environment is being addressed. To a certain extent, the instant
petition had been mooted by the issuance of E.O. No. 290.
Regrettably, however, the plain, speedy and adequate remedy herein sought
by petitioners, i.e., a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to
require PUVs to use CNG, is unavailing. Mandamus is available only to
compel the doing of an act specifically enjoined by law as a duty. Here, there
is no law that mandates the respondents LTFRB and the DOTC to order
owners of motor vehicles to use CNG. At most the LTFRB has been tasked
by E.O. No. 290 in par. 4.5 (ii), Section 4 "to grant preferential and exclusive
Certificates of Public Convenience (CPC) or franchises to operators of
NGVs based on the results of the DOTC surveys."
Further, mandamus will not generally lie from one branch of government to
a coordinate branch, for the obvious reason that neither is inferior to the
other.27 The need for future changes in both legislation and its
implementation cannot be preempted by orders from this Court, especially
when what is prayed for is procedurally infirm. Besides, comity with and
courtesy to a coequal branch dictate that we give sufficient time and leeway
for the coequal branches to address by themselves the environmental
problems raised in this petition.
In the same manner that we have associated the fundamental right to a
balanced and healthful ecology with the twin concepts of "inter-generational
responsibility" and "inter-generational justice" in Oposa,28 where we upheld
the right of future Filipinos to prevent the destruction of the rainforests, so
do we recognize, in this petition, the right of petitioners and the future
generation to clean air. In Oposa we said that if the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is now explicitly found in the Constitution even if the right
is "assumed to exist from the inception of humankind, it is because of the
well-founded fear of its framers [of the Constitution] that unless the rights to
a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies
by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance
and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and
protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else
would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to

come. . ."29
It is the firm belief of this Court that in this case, it is timely to reaffirm the
premium we have placed on the protection of the environment in the
landmark case of Oposa. Yet, as serious as the statistics are on air pollution,
with the present fuels deemed toxic as they are to the environment, as fatal
as these pollutants are to the health of the citizens, and urgently requiring
resort to drastic measures to reduce air pollutants emitted by motor vehicles,
we must admit in particular that petitioners are unable to pinpoint the law
that imposes an indubitable legal duty on respondents that will justify a grant
of the writ of mandamus compelling the use of CNG for public utility
vehicles. It appears to us that more properly, the legislature should provide
first the specific statutory remedy to the complex environmental problems
bared by herein petitioners before any judicial recourse by mandamus is
taken.
WHEREFORE, the petition for the issuance of a writ of mandamus is
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Morales, Tinga, and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.
Fisheries
G.R. No. 172678

March 23, 2011

SEA LION FISHING CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
When an instrument or tool used in a crime is being claimed by a third-party
not liable to the offense, such third-party must first establish its ownership
over the same.

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the January 10, 2006
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 91270 which
denied the Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus2 questioning the twin
Sentences3 both dated May 16, 2005 and the Order4 dated August 4, 2005 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Puerto Princesa City, Branch 52 in
Criminal Case Nos. 18965 and 19422. Likewise assailed is the May 5, 2006
Resolution5 of the CA denying the Motion for Reconsideration6 thereto.
Factual Antecedents
In response to fishermens report of poaching off Mangsee Island in Balabac,
Palawan, a combined team of Philippine Marines, Coast Guard and barangay
officials conducted search and seizure operations therein. There they found
F/V Sea Lion anchored three nautical miles northwest of Mangsee Island.
Beside it were five boats and a long fishing net already spread over the
water. The team boarded the vessel and apprehended her captain, a Filipino,
and a crew composed of three Filipinos and three Chinese. Also arrested
were 17 Chinese fishermen aboard F/V Sea Lion.
Various charges were thereafter filed as follows: (1) Violation of Section 977
of Republic Act (RA) No. 85508 against all those arrested, docketed as I.S.
No. 2004-032; (2) Violation of Section 909 of the same law against the
captain of F/V Sea Lion, the Chief Engineer, and the President of the
corporation which owned said vessel, docketed as I.S. No. 2004-061; and (3)
Violation of Section 27(a) and (f)10 of RA 914711 and of Section 8712 of
RA 8550 against all those arrested and the President of the corporation
which owned the vessel, respectively docketed as I.S. Nos. 2004-68, 200469, and 2004-70.
Ruling of the Provincial Prosecutor
While the Provincial Prosecutor of Palawan dismissed I.S. Nos. 2004-61,
2004-68 and 2004-69, he nevertheless found probable cause for the
remaining charges13 but only against the 17 Chinese fishermen.14 This was
after it was found out that the crew of F/V Sea Lion did not assent to the
illegal acts of said 17 Chinese fishermen who were rescued by the crew of
the F/V Sea Lion from a distressed Chinese vessel. The prosecutor
concluded that the crew, unarmed, outnumbered and hampered by language
barrier, acted only out of uncontrollable fear of imminent danger to their

lives and property which hindered them from asserting their authority over
these Chinese nationals. Accordingly, corresponding Informations against
the 17 Chinese fishermen were filed in court.
With the crew of F/V Sea Lion now exculpated, petitioner Sea Lion Fishing
Corporation filed before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor an Urgent
Motion for Release of Evidence15 alleging that it owns the vessel. Said
Office thus issued a Resolution16 dated August 25, 2004, viz:
WHEREFORE, F/[V] Sea Lion is hereby recommended to be released to the
movant upon proper showing of evidence of its ownership of the aforesaid
vessel and the posting of a bond double the value of said vessel as appraised
by the MARINA, if through any court accredited company surety, or equal
to the aforesaid value[,] if by cash bond. Said bond shall be on the condition
that [the] vessel owner shall make [the vessel] available for inspection
during the course of the trial.17 (Emphasis supplied.)
This Resolution was later amended through a Supplemental Resolution18
dated September 10, 2004 reading as follows:
This pertains to the Resolution of the undersigned dated 25 August 2004
recommending the release of the vessel F/[V] Sea Lion. In addition to the
conditions therein, the release of the said vessel shall be with the approval of
the Provincial Committee on Illegal Entrants which has jurisdiction over all
apprehended vessels involved in poaching.19
Petitioner, however, failed to act in accordance with said Resolutions.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The case for Violation of Section 97 of RA 8550 was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 18965 while that for Violation of Section 87 of the same law was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 19422. The Chinese nationals entered
separate pleas of "not guilty" for both offenses. Later, however, in Criminal
Case No. 18965, they changed their pleas from "not guilty" to "guilty" for
the lesser offense of Violation of Section 88, sub-paragraph (3)20 of RA
8550. Hence, they were accordingly declared guilty of said lesser offense in
a Sentence21 issued by the RTC of Puerto Princesa City, Branch 52 on May
16, 2005, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, with the plea of guilty of all the accused to the lesser
offense, the Court hereby finds the Seventeen (17) accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principals for the crime of Violation of Section 88, subpar. (3) of R.A. 8550 and sentences them to suffer an imprisonment of FIVE
(5) YEARS TO SIX (6) YEARS, SIX (6) MONTHS AND SEVEN (7)
DAYS. The Fishing Vessel F/V Sea Lion I as well as the fishing
paraphernalia and equipments used by the accused in committing the crime
[are] hereby ordered confiscated in favor of the government.
The x x x confiscated vessel and all the fishing gadgets, paraphernalia and
equipment are hereby ordered to be placed under the [temporary] custody of
the Philippine Coast Guard. The latter is hereby directed to prepare and
submit to this Court the inventory of all confiscated items within 15 days
from receipt of this order. Further, the Commander of the Philippine Coast
Guard should observe the diligence of a good father of the family in the
preservation and maintenance of the entrusted confiscated items until the
final disposition thereof by the Court.
Having appeared that the accused have been detained since January 19,
2004, the period of their detention is hereby credited in their favor.
SO ORDERED.22
A Sentence23 in Criminal Case No. 19422 was also issued on even date, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, with the plea of guilty of all seventeen (17) accused, the
Court hereby finds them guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals of the
crime of Violation of Section 87 of R.A. 8550 (Poaching) and sentences
them to pay a fine of One Hundred Thousand (US$100,000.00) Dollars to be
paid to the Republic of the Philippines. The Fishing Vessel F/V Sea Lion 1
as well as the fishing paraphernalia and equipments used by the accused in
committing the crime [are] hereby ordered confiscated in the favor of the
government.
The x x x confiscated vessel and all the fishing gadgets, paraphernalia and
equipment are hereby ordered to be placed under the [temporary] custody of
the Philippine Coast Guard. The latter is hereby directed to prepare and
submit to this Court the inventory of all confiscated items within 15 days
from receipt of this order. Further, the commander of the Philippine Coast

Guard should observe the diligence of a good father of the family in the
preservation and maintenance of the entrusted confiscated items until the
final disposition thereof by the Court.
The Provincial Jail Warden of Palawan is hereby ordered to release all the
above-named accused unless held for some other lawful cause or causes.
SO ORDERED.
It was only after the issuance of the above Sentences that petitioner again
made its move by filing a Motion for Reconsideration25 on June 24, 2005. It
prayed for the trial court to delete from said Sentences the confiscation of
F/V Sea Lion. The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor filed an Opposition
thereto.26 After receipt of petitioners Reply27 to said Opposition, the trial
court denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
Hence, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus28 with the
CA.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On January 10, 2006, the CA promulgated its assailed Decision denying the
petition.29 The CA ruled that there was no lack of jurisdiction, excess of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court since it
had jurisdiction over the crimes as alleged in the Informations and the
penalty for violating the laws stated therein. Necessarily, it had the authority
to seize the F/V Sea Lion which was mentioned in the said Informations.
The CA further held that while the petitioner attempted to claim as its own
the fishing vessel in its Motion for Reconsideration dated June 24, 2005, its
effort is undeserving of merit due to failure to adduce evidence. Lastly, the
CA declared that the petitioner did not avail of the proper procedural
remedy. After the trial court recognized its personality to intervene in the
Order dated August 4, 2005, petitioners recourse should have been an
appeal and not certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.30
The appellate court also denied petitioners subsequent Motion for
Reconsideration31 in its assailed Resolution dated May 5, 2006.32
Thus, petitioner filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the sole
issue of whether the confiscation of F/V Sea Lion was valid.33

The Parties Arguments

Petitioner contends that F/V Sea Lion should be released to it because it is
the registered owner of said vessel and her captain and crew members were
not among those accused of and convicted in Criminal Case Nos. 18965 and
19422. To buttress its contention, petitioner invokes Article 45 of the
Revised Penal Code which provides:
ART. 45. Confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments of the
crime. - Every penalty imposed for the commission of a felony shall carry
with it the forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime and the instruments or
tools with which it was committed.
Such proceeds and instruments or tools shall be confiscated and forfeited in
favor of the Government, unless they be the property of a third person not
liable for the offense, but those articles which are not subject of lawful
commerce shall be destroyed. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner also claims that it was denied its right to due process of law when
it was not notified of the judicial proceedings relative to the confiscation of
the fishing vessel. It argues that such notification was necessary considering
that the provincial prosecutor was duly informed of its claim of ownership of
the F/V Sea Lion.
On the other hand, respondent People of the Philippines through the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG) argues that since the 17 Chinese nationals
were charged with violations of the provisions of RA 8550, a special law,
Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code does not apply. This is in view of
Article 10 of said Code which specifically declares that acts punishable by
special laws are not subject to the provisions of the Revised Penal Code.
They are only supplementary to such laws unless the latter should
specifically provide the contrary. Hence, the forfeiture and confiscation of
the fishing vessel under RA 8550 are different from the forfeiture and
confiscation under the Revised Penal Code which are additional penalties
imposed in the event of conviction. And, since RA 8550 provides that the
vessel used in connection with or in direct violation of the provisions of RA
8550 shall be subjected to forfeiture in favor of the government without
mention of any distinction as to who owns the vessel, the forfeiture of F/V
Sea Lion was proper.

The OSG also contends that even if Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code is
applicable, still the present petition must fail due to petitioners failure to
present its third-party claim at the earliest opportunity. It likewise argues that
petitioner was not deprived its right to due process considering that it was
given ample opportunity to be heard particularly when its motion for release
of the F/V Sea Lion was granted by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
subject to certain conditions. However, it opted not to comply with the
conditions imposed by the prosecutor and instead waited for the trial courts
final disposition of the case.
Our Ruling
The petition has no merit.
We note, at the outset, that petitioner pursued an incorrect remedy when it
sought recourse before the CA. The filing of a Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA is limited only to the correction
of errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial
court.34 "A special civil action for certiorari is an independent action, raising
the question of jurisdiction where the tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction."35 The CA did not find either lack or error of jurisdiction or
grave abuse of discretion. There was no jurisdictional error because based on
the Informations,36 the offenses were committed within the territorial
jurisdiction of the trial court. The penalties imposable under the law were
also within its jurisdiction. As a necessary consequence, the trial court had
the authority to determine how the subject fishing vessel should be disposed
of. Likewise, no grave abuse of discretion attended the issuance of the trial
courts order to confiscate F/V Sea Lion considering the absence of evidence
showing that said vessel is owned by a third party. Evidently, the remedial
relief pursued by the petitioner was infirm and improper.
We also agree with the CAs observation that the trial court impliedly
recognized petitioners right to intervene when it pronounced that petitioner
failed to exercise its right to claim ownership of the F/V Sea Lion. This
being the case, petitioner should have filed an appeal instead of a petition for
certiorari before the CA. Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, certiorari is
unavailing when an appeal is the plain, speedy, and adequate remedy.37

"The nature of the questions intended to be raised on appeal is of no

consequence. It may well be that those questions will treat exclusively of
whether x x x the judgment or final order was rendered without or in excess
of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion x x x. This is immaterial.
The remedy, to repeat, is appeal, not certiorari as a special civil action."38
The jurisdiction of a court is not affected by its erroneous decision.39 The
orders and rulings of a court on all controversies pertaining to the case
cannot be corrected by certiorari if the court has jurisdiction over the subject
matter and over the person.40 Thus, we agree with the CAs dismissal of the
petition.
Even assuming that the CA may resolve an error of procedure or judgment,
there was none committed in this particular case.
Petitioners claim of ownership of F/V Sea Lion is not supported by any
proof on record. The only document on record that is relevant in this regard
is a request for the release of the F/V Sea Lion based on petitioners alleged
ownership filed with the Provincial Prosecutor. While the latter authorized
the release of said fishing vessel, this was conditioned upon petitioners
submission of a proof of ownership and the filing of a bond, with which
petitioner failed to comply. Even when judicial proceedings commenced,
nothing was heard from the petitioner. No motion for intervention or any
manifestation came from petitioners end during the period of arraignment
up to the rendition of sentence. While petitioner later explained before the
CA that its inaction was brought about by its inability to put up the required
bond due to financial difficulties, same is still not a sufficient justification
for it to deliberately not act at all.
It was only after the trial court ordered the confiscation of F/V Sea Lion in
its assailed twin Sentences that petitioner was heard from again. This time, it
filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated June 24, 200541 to which was
attached a copy of an alleged Certificate of Registration issued by the
Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA).42 However, as correctly observed
by the CA:
Significantly, the lack of any factual basis for the third-party claim of
ownership was not cured at all when the petitioner filed its motion for
reconsideration before the trial court. At that point, evidence should have
been adduced to support the petitioners claim (so that a new trial or
reopening of the trial on the confiscation aspect should have been prayed for,

rather than a mere motion for reconsideration.) There is firstly the factual
issue - to be proved by proper evidence in order to be properly considered by
the court - that the vessel is owned by a third party other than the accused.
Article 45 required too that proof be adduced that the third party is not liable
for the offense. After the admission by the accused through their guilty plea
that the vessel had been used in the commission of a crime, we believe and
so hold that this additional Article 45 requirement cannot be simply inferred
from the mere fact that the alleged owner is not charged in the same case
before the court.43
Accordingly, petitioners recourse to a motion for reconsideration was not
proper. Although it attached a copy of an alleged Certificate of Registration,
the same cannot be considered by the trial court because it has not been
formally offered, pursuant to Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. As
suggested by the CA, petitioner should have instead moved for a new trial or
reopening of the trial on the confiscation aspect, rather than a mere motion
for reconsideration.44
Finally, petitioners contention that it was deprived of its right to due process
in the confiscation of F/V Sea Lion has no factual basis. As correctly pointed
out by the CA:
That the trial court concluded that no denial of due process occurred is
likewise legally correct, perhaps not in the exact way expressed in the
assailed order, but for what the reason articulated in the assailed order
directly implies. As we discussed above, the petitioner did not intervene
before the trial court to claim ownership of the fishing vessel, nor were there
records before the court showing a third-party claim of ownership of the
vessel; the formal introduction of evidence that would have formally brought
the third-party ownership of the vessel to light was prevented by the plea of
guilt of the accused. There was therefore no third-party property right sought
to be protected when the trial court ordered the confiscation of the vessel.
Significantly, the lack of any factual basis for the third-party claim of
ownership was not cured at all when the petitioner filed its motion for
reconsideration before the trial court. At that point, evidence should have
been adduced to support the petitioners claim (so that a new trial or
reopening of the trial on the confiscation aspect should have been prayed for,
rather than a mere motion for reconsideration.) There is firstly the factual
issue - to be proved by proper evidence in order to be properly considered by

the court - that the vessel is owned by a third party other than the accused.
Article 45 required too that proof be adduced that the third party is not liable
for the offense. After the admission by the accused through their guilty plea
that the vessel had been used in the commission of a crime, we believe and
so hold that this additional Article 45 requirement cannot be simply inferred
from the mere fact that the alleged owner is not charged in the same case
before the court.
It was under this legal situation that the trial court issued its assailed order
that correctly concluded that there had been no denial of due process. Given
the absence of any admissible evidence of third-party ownership and the
failure to comply with the additional Article 45 requirement, the courts
order to confiscate the F/V Sea Lion pursuant to Article 87 of R.A. No. 8550
cannot be incorrect to the point of being an act in grave abuse of
discretion.45
In fine, it has been established beyond reasonable doubt that F/V Sea Lion
was used by the 17 Chinese fishermen in the commission of the crimes. On
the other hand, petitioner presented no evidence at all to support its claim of
ownership of F/V Sea Lion. Therefore, the forfeiture of F/V Sea Lion in
favor of the government was proper.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 10,
2006 and the Resolution dated May 5, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 91270 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
MINING
FIRST DIVISION
AMADO TAOPA,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 184098

Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

-versusAZCUNA and

CARPIO,
CORONA,

TINGA, JJ.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
Promulgated:
November 25, 2008
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
On April 2, 1996, the Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office of Virac, Catanduanes seized a truck loaded with illegally-cut lumber
and arrested its driver, Placido Cuison. The lumber was covered with
bundles of abaca fiber to prevent detection. On investigation, Cuison pointed
to petitioner Amado Taopa and a certain Rufino Ogalesco as the owners of
the seized lumber.
Taopa, Ogalesco and Cuison were thereafter charged with violating Section
68 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705,[1] as amended, in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Virac, Catanduanes. The information against them
read:
That on or about the 2nd day of April 1996 at around 9:00 oclock in the
morning at Barangay Capilihan, Municipality of Virac, Province of
Catanduanes, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with intent to possess, conspiring,
confederating and helping one another, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully, criminally possess, transport in a truck bearing Plate No. EAS
839 and have in their control forest products, particularly one hundred
thirteen (113) pieces of lumber of Philippine Mahogany Group and Apitong
species with an aggregate net volume of One Thousand Six Hundred Eighty
Four (1,684) board feet with an approximate value of Ninety-Nine Thousand
One Hundred Twenty (Php99,120.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, without
any authority and/or legal documents as required under existing forest laws
and regulations, prejudicial to the public interest.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]

Taopa, Ogalesco and Cuison pleaded not guilty on arraignment. After trial
on the merits, the RTC found them guilty as charged beyond reasonable
doubt.[3]
Only Taopa and Cuison appealed the RTC decision to the Court of
Appeals (CA). Cuison was acquitted but Taopas conviction was affirmed.[4]
The dispositive portion of the CA decision read:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is REVERSED with
respect to accused-appellant Placido Cuison, who is ACQUITTED of the
crime charged on reasonable doubt, and MODIFIED with respect to
accused-appellants Amado Taopa and Rufino Ogalesco by reducing the
penalty imposed on them to four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11)
days of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor,
as maximum.
SO ORDERED.[5]
In this petition,[6] Taopa seeks his acquittal from the charges against
him. He alleges that the prosecution failed to prove that he was one of the
owners of the seized lumber as he was not in the truck when the lumber was
seized.
We deny the petition.
Both the RTC and the CA gave scant consideration to Taopas alibi
because Cuisons testimony proved Taopas active participation in the
transport of the seized lumber. In particular, the RTC and the CA found that
the truck was loaded with the cargo in front of Taopas house and that Taopa
and Ogalesco were accompanying the truck driven by Cuison up to where
the truck and lumber were seized. These facts proved Taopas (and
Ogalescos) exercise of dominion and control over the lumber loaded in the
truck. The acts of Taopa (and of his co-accused Ogalesco) constituted
possession of timber or other forest products without the required legal
documents. Moreover, the fact that Taopa and Ogalesco ran away at the mere
sight of the police was likewise largely indicative of guilt. We are thus
convinced that Taopa and Ogalesco were owners of the seized lumber.

However, we disagree with both the RTC and CA as to the penalty imposed
on Taopa.
Section 68 of PD 705, as amended,[7] refers to Articles 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) for the penalties to be imposed on violators.
Violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, is punished as qualified
theft.[8] The law treats cutting, gathering, collecting and possessing timber
or other forest products without license as an offense as grave as and
equivalent to the felony of qualified theft.
Articles 309 and 310 read:
Art. 309. Penalties. Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
1.
The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if
the value of the thing stolen is more 12,000 pesos but does not exceed
22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount,
the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this
paragraph, and one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total
of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such
cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed
and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be
termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be. (emphasis
supplied)
2.

xxx

Art. 310. Qualified theft. The crime of theft shall be punished by the
penalties next higher by two degrees than those respectively specified in the
next preceding articles xxx (emphasis supplied).

The actual market value of the 113 pieces of seized lumber was
P67,630.[9] Following Article 310 in relation to Article 309, the imposable
penalty should be reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods or
a period ranging from 14 years, eight months and one day to 20 years plus
an additional period of four years for the excess of P47,630.

The minimum term of the indeterminate sentence[10] imposable on Taopa

shall be the penalty next lower to that prescribed in the RPC. In this case, the
minimum term shall be anywhere between 10 years and one day to 14 years
and eight months or prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion
temporal in its minimum period.
The maximum term shall be the sum of the additional four years and the
medium period[11] of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum
periods or 16 years, five months and 11 days to 18 years, two months and 21
days of reclusion temporal. The maximum term therefore may be anywhere
between 16 years, five months and 11 days of reclusion temporal to 22 years,
two months and 21 days of reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The January 31, 2008
decision and July 28, 2008 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR No. 30380 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner Amado
Taopa is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for violation of
Section 68 of PD No. 705, as amended, and sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from 10 years and one day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to 20 years of reclusion temporal as maximum, with the
accessory penalties provided for by law.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 175289
CRISOSTOMO VILLARIN andANIANO LATAYADA,
Petitioners,
- versus BERSAMIN,
August 31, 2011
x-------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Mere possession of timber without the legal documents required
under forest laws and regulations makes one automatically liable of violation
of Section 68, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705,[1] as amended. Lack of
criminal intent is not a valid defense.
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the June 28, 2005
Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 26720 which
affirmed in all respects the Judgment[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 38, Cagayan De Oro City, finding petitioners guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Section 68, P.D. No. 705, as amended.
Likewise assailed in this petition is the September 22, 2006
Resolution[4] denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.[5]
Factual Antecedents
In a Criminal Complaint[6] filed before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Branch 4, Cagayan de Oro City by Marcelino B. Pioquinto (Pioquinto),
Chief of the Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Unit under the TL
Strike Force Team of Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), petitioner Aniano Latayada (Latayada) and three others namely,
Barangay Captain Camilo Sudaria (Sudaria) of Tagpangi, Cagayan de Oro
City, Marlon Baillo (Baillo) and Cipriano Boyatac (Boyatac), were charged
with violation of Section 68, P.D. No. 705 as amended by Executive Order
No. 277.[7]
Subsequently, however, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro
City issued a Resolution[8] dated March 13, 1996 recommending the filing
of an Information for the aforesaid charge not only against Latayada, Baillo
and Boyatac but also against petitioner Crisostomo Villarin (Villarin), then
Barangay Captain of Pagalungan, Cagayan de Oro City. The dismissal of
the complaint against Sudaria was likewise recommended. Said Resolution
was then approved by the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao through a
Resolution[9] dated May 9, 1996 ordering the filing of the Information in the
RTC of Cagayan de Oro City.

Thus, on October 29, 1996, an Information[10] was filed against petitioners

Villarin and Latayada and their co-accused Baillo and Boyatac, for violation
of Section 68, P.D. No. 705 as follows:
That on or about January 13, 1996, in Pagalungan, Cagayan de Oro City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, pursuant to
RA 7975, the accused, Crisostomo Villarin, a public officer being the
Barangay Captain of Pagalungan, this City, with salary grade below 27,
taking advantage of his official position and committing the offense in
relation to his office, and the other above-named accused, all private
individuals, namely: Marlon Baillo, Cipriano Boyatac, and Aniano Latayada,
confederating and mutually helping one another did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously gather and possess sixty-three (63) pieces flitches
of varying sizes belonging to the Apitong specie with a total volume of Four
Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Six (4,326) board feet valued at
P108,150.00, without any authority and supporting documents as required
under existing forest laws and regulation to the damage and prejudice of the
government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[11]
On January 14, 1997, Villarin, Boyatac and Baillo, filed a Motion for
Reinvestigation.[12] They alleged that the Joint Affidavit[13]of the
personnel of the DENR which became one of the bases in filing the
Information never mentioned Villarin as one of the perpetrators of the crime
while the accusations against Baillo and Boyatac were not based on the
personal knowledge of the affiants. They also asserted that their indictment
was based on polluted sources, consisting of the sworn statements of
witnesses like Latayada and Sudaria, who both appeared to have participated
in the commission of the crime charged.
Instead of resolving the Motion for Reinvestigation, the RTC, in its
Order[14] dated January 27, 1997, directed Villarin, Boyatac, and Baillo to
file their Motion for Reinvestigation with the Office of the OmbudsmanMindanao, it being the entity which filed the Information in Court. On
March 31, 1997, only Villarin filed a Petition for Reinvestigation[15] but
same was, however, denied by the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao in
an Order[16] dated May 15, 1997 because the grounds relied upon were not
based on newly discovered evidence or errors of fact, law or irregularities
that are prejudicial to the interest of the movants, pursuant to Administrative

Order No. 07 or the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman in

Criminal Cases. The Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao likewise opined
that Villarin was directly implicated by Latayada, his co-accused.
The RTC thus proceeded with the arraignment of the accused who
entered separate pleas of not guilty.[17] Thereafter, trial ensued.
The Version of the Prosecution
On December 31, 1995, at around five oclock in the afternoon,
prosecution witness Roland Granada (Granada) noticed that a public utility
jeep loaded with timber stopped near his house. The driver, petitioner
Latayada, was accompanied by four to five other persons, one of whom was
Boyatac while the rest could not be identified by Granada.[18] They
alighted from the jeep and unloaded the timber 10 to 15 meters away from
the Batinay bridge at Barangay Pagalungan, Cagayan De Oro City. Another
prosecution witness, Pastor Pansacala (Pansacala), also noticed the jeep with
plate number MBB 226 and owned by Sudaria, loaded with timber.[19]
Being then the president of a community-based organization which serves as
a watchdog of illegal cutting of trees,[20] Pansacala even ordered a certain
Mario Bael to count the timber.[21]
At six oclock in the evening of the same day, Barangay Captain
Angeles Alarcon (Alarcon)[22] noticed that the pile of timber was already
placed near the bridge. Since she had no knowledge of any scheduled repair
of the Batinay bridge she was surprised to discover that the timber would be
used for the repair. After inquiring from the people living near the bridge,
she learned that Latayada and Boyatac delivered the timber.[23]
Another prosecution witness, Ariel Palanga (Palanga), testified that at seven
oclock in the morning of January 1, 1996, Boyatac bought a stick of
cigarette from his store and requested him to cover the pile of timber near
the bridge for a fee. Palanga acceded and covered the pile with coconut
leaves.[24]
On January 13, 1996, at around ten oclock in the morning,
prosecution witness Juan Casenas (Casenas), a radio and TV personality of
RMN-TV8, took footages of the timber[25] hidden and covered by coconut
leaves. Casenas also took footages of more logs inside a bodega at the other
side of the bridge. In the following evening, the footages were shown in a

news program on television.

On the same day, members of the DENR Region 10 Strike Force
Team measured the timber which consisted of 63 pieces of Apitong flitches
and determined that it totaled 4,326 board feet[26] and subsequently
entrusted the same to Alarcon for safekeeping.
Upon further investigation, it was learned that the timber was
requisitioned by Villarin, who was then Barangay Captain of Pagulangan,
Cagayan de Oro City. Villarin gave Sudaria the specifications for the
requisitioned timber. Thereafter, Boyatac informed Villarin that the timber
was already delivered on December 31, 1995.[27]
On January 18, 1996, Felix Vera Cruz (Vera Cruz), a security guard
at the DENR Region 10 Office, received and signed for the confiscated
timber since the property custodian at that time was not around.
The filing of the aforestated Information followed.
The Version of the Defense
In response to the clamor of the residents of Barangays Tampangan,
Pigsag-an, Tuburan and Taglinao, all in Cagayan De Oro City, Villarin,
decided to repair the impassable Batinay bridge. The project was allegedly
with the concurrence of the Barangay Council.
Pressured to immediately commence the needed repairs, Villarin
commissioned Boyatac to inquire from Sudaria about the availability of
timber without first informing the City Engineer. Sudaria asked for the
specifications which Villarin gave. Villarin then asked Baillo and Boyatac to
attend to the same. When the timber was already available, it was
transported from Tagpangi to Batinay. However, the timber flitches were
seized by the DENR Strike Force Team and taken to its office where they
were received by Vera Cruz, the security guard on duty.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In its Memorandum filed before the trial court, the defense notified
the court of Boyatacs demise.[28] However, the trial court did not act on

such notice. Instead, it proceeded to rule on the culpability of Boyatac.

Thus, in its Judgment, the trial court found herein petitioners and the
deceased Boyatac guilty as charged. On the other hand, it found the
evidence against Baillo insufficient. The dispositive portion of the Judgment
reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing findings, judgment is hereby
rendered finding the accused Crisostomo Villarin, Cipriano Boyatac and
Aniano Latayada guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 68 of
Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended, and hereby sentences each of them
to suffer an indeterminate sentence of twelve (12) years of prision mayor as
minimum to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Accused Marlon Baillo is hereby acquitted for lack of evidence.
SO ORDERED.[29]
In reaching said conclusions, the RTC noted that:
Without an iota of doubt, accused Crisostomo Villarin, being then
a Barangay Captain of Pagalungan, Cagayan de Oro City, was the one who
procured the subject flitches, while accused Aniano Latayada and Cipriano
Boyatac mutually helped him and each other by transporting the flitches
from Sitio Batinay to the Pagalungan Bridge. The accused would like to
impress upon the Court that the subject fltiches were intended for the repair
of the Pagalungan Bridge and were acquired by virtue of Barangay
Resolution No. 110 of Barangay Pagalungan. The Court is not impressed by
this lame excuse. There is no dispute that the flitches were intended for the
repair of the bridge. The Court finds it a laudable motive. The fact remains
though that the said forest products were obtained without the necessary
authority and legal documents required under existing forest laws and
regulations.[30]
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration[31] which was
denied by the
RTC in its Order[32] dated August 20, 2002.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Petitioners filed an appeal which was denied by the CA in its
Decision dated June 28, 2005. The dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the judgment of the
court a quo finding [d]efendant-[a]ppellants Crisostomo Villarin, Cipriano
Boyatac and Aniano Latayada GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for
violating Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree 705 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
No pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.[33]
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration[34] which the appellate court
denied for lack of merit in its Resolution[35] promulgated on September 22,
2006.
Issues
Undeterred, petitioners filed the instant petition raising the following
issues:
1.
WHETHER X X X THE COURT OF APPEALS[,] ON [THE]
MATTER OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION[,] DECIDED NOT IN
ACCORD WITH JURISPRUDENCE OF THE SUPREME COURT;
2.
WHETHER X X X THE COURT OF APPEALS DEPARTED
FROM WHAT THE SUPREME COURT HAS ALWAYS BEEN SAYING,
THAT, TO CONVICT AN ACCUSED ALL ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME
MUST BE PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT and;
3.
WHETHER X X X THE COURT OF APPEALS[,] IN
AFFIRMING THE PENALTY IMPOSED BY THE COURT A QUO[,]
DEPARTED FROM JURISPRUDENCE THAT EVEN IN CRIMES
[INVOLVING] VIOLATION OF SPECIAL LAWS[,] SPECIAL
CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO CIRCUMSTANCES THAT
[CAN BE CONSIDERED AS MITIGATING HAD THE VIOLATION
BEEN PENALIZED UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE, IN ORDER
TO REDUCE PENALTY].[36]

Petitioners argue that the refusal of the Ombudsman to conduct a

reinvestigation is tantamount to a denial of the right to due process. As
Villarin was indicted in the Information despite his not being included in the
criminal complaint filed by Pioquinto of the TL Strike Force Team of the
DENR, they claim that he was not afforded a preliminary investigation.
They also bewail the fact that persons who appear to be equally guilty, such
as Sudaria, have not been included in the Information. Hence, they argue
that the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying their
petition for reinvestigation because it deprived Villarin of his right to
preliminary investigation and in refusing and to equally prosecute the guilty.
They contend that the Ombudsman should not have relied on the
prosecutors Certification[37] contained in the Information to the effect that
a preliminary investigation was conducted in the case.
Moreover, petitioners contend that the evidence was insufficient to prove
their guilt beyond reasonable doubt since they had no intention to possess
the timber and dispose of it for personal gain. They likewise claim that there
was failure on the part of the prosecution to present the timber, which were
the object of the offense.
Our Ruling
The petition is unmeritorious.
Villarin was properly afforded his right to due process.
Records show that the investigating prosecutor received a criminal
complaint charging Sudaria, Latayada, Baillo and Boyatac with violation of
Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended.[38] The said complaint did not
state the known addresses of the accused. Neither was the notarized jointaffidavit of the complainants attached thereto. The subpoena issued to the
accused and the copy of their counter-affidavits were also not part of the
record. Moreover, the complaint did not include Villarin as a respondent.
However, said infirmities do not constitute denial of due process particularly
on the part of Villarin.
It is evidently clear from the Resolution dated March 13, 1996 of the Office
of the City Prosecutor that Villarin and all the accused participated in the

scheduled preliminary investigation that was conducted prior to the filing of

the criminal case.[39] They knew about the filing of the complaint and even
denied any involvement in the illegal cutting of timber. They were also
given the opportunity to submit countervailing evidence to convince the
investigating prosecutor of their innocence.
Foregoing findings considered, there is no factual basis to the assertion that
Villarin was not afforded a preliminary investigation. Accordingly, we find
no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Office of the OmbudsmanMindanao in denying Villarins motion for reconsideration. It validly relied
on the certification contained in the Information that a preliminary
investigation was properly conducted in this case. The certification was
made under oath by no less than the public prosecutor, a public officer who
is presumed to have regularly performed his official duty.[40] Besides, it
aptly noted that Villarin was implicated by x x x Latayada in his affidavit
dated January 22, 1996 before Marcelino B. Pioquinto, Chief, Forest
Protection and Law Enforcement Unit. The denial of Villarin cannot prevail
over the declaration of witnesses.[41]
Moreover, the absence of a proper preliminary investigation must be
timely raised and must not have been waived. This is to allow the trial court
to hold the case in abeyance and conduct its own investigation or require the
prosecutor to hold a reinvestigation, which, necessarily involves a reexamination and re-evaluation of the evidence already submitted by the
complainant and the accused, as well as the initial finding of probable cause
which led to the filing of the Informations after the requisite preliminary
investigation.[42]
Here, it is conceded that Villarin raised the issue of lack of a
preliminary investigation in his Motion for Reinvestigation. However, when
the Ombudsman denied the motion, he never raised this issue again. He
accepted the Ombudsman's verdict, entered a plea of not guilty during his
arraignment and actively participated in the trial on the merits by attending
the scheduled hearings, conducting cross-examinations and testifying on his
own behalf. It was only after the trial court rendered judgment against him
that he once again assailed the conduct of the preliminary investigation in
the Motion for Reconsideration.[43] Whatever argument Villarin may have
regarding the alleged absence of a preliminary investigation has therefore
been mooted. By entering his plea, and actively participating in the trial, he
is deemed to have waived his right to preliminary investigation.

Petitioners also contend that Sudaria should also have been included
as a principal in the commission of the offense. However, whether Sudaria
should or should not be included as co-accused can no longer be raised on
appeal. Any right that the petitioners may have in questioning the noninclusion of Sudaria in the Information should have been raised in a motion
for reconsideration of the March 13, 1996 Resolution of the Office of the
City Prosecutor which recommended the dismissal of the complaint against
Sudaria.[44] Having failed to avail of the proper
procedural remedy, they are now estopped from assailing his non-inclusion.
Two Offenses Penalized Under Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705.
Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, provides:
Section 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber or Other Forest
Products Without License. Any person who shall cut, gather, collect,
remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from
alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any
authority, or possess timber or other forest products without legal documents
as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with
the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal
Code: Provided, that in the case of partnerships, associations, or
corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or
possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in
addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part
of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.
There are two distinct and separate offenses punished under Section
68 of P.D. No. 705, to wit:
(1)
Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest
products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public
land, or from private land without any authorization; and
(2)
Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal
documents required under existing forest laws and regulations.[45]

The Information charged petitioners with the second offense which is

consummated by the mere possession of forest products without the proper
documents.
We reviewed the records and hold that the prosecution had discharged the
burden of proving all the elements of the offense charged. The evidence of
the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that petitioners were in
custody of timber without the necessary legal documents. Incidentally, we
note that several transcripts of stenographic notes (TSNs) were not
submitted by the trial court. No explanation was provided for these missing
TSNs. Notwithstanding the incomplete TSNs, we still find that the
prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt petitioners
culpability.
The prosecution adduced several documents to prove that timber was
confiscated from petitioners. It presented a Tally Sheet[46] to prove that the
DENR Strike Force Team examined the seized timber on January 13, 1996.
The number, volume and appraised value of said timber were also noted in
the Tally Sheet. Seizure receipts were also presented to prove that the
confiscated timber were placed in the custody of Alarcon[47] and eventually
taken to the DENR Office.[48] There was a photograph of the timber taken
by the television crew led by Casenas.[49]
The prosecution likewise presented in evidence the testimonies of
eyewitnesses Granada and Pansacala who testified that Latayada and
Boyatac were the ones who delivered the timber.[50]
More significantly, Villarin admitted that he was the one who commissioned
the procurement of the timber[51] for the repair of the Batinay bridge. He
even deputized Boyatac to negotiate with Sudaria and gave Latayada
P2,000.00 to transport the logs. Boyatac later informed him of the delivery
of timber. However, he could not present any document to show that his
possession thereof was legal and pursuant to existing forest laws and
regulations.
Relevant portions of the testimony of Villarin are as follows:
Q
As Barangay Captain of Pagalungan, of course, you heard reports
prior to the incident on December 31, 1995 that Barangay Captain Camilo
Sudaria was also engaged in supplying forest products like forest lumber?
A
Yes, because I always go to Cagayan de Oro and I can always ride

on his jeepney.
Q
And you were sure that information of yours was received by you
and not only by one but several persons from Barangay Tagpangi even up to
Barangay Pagalungan?
A
Thats true because he even has a record with the police.
Q
A

And you learned [this] prior to January 1995?

Yes, Sir.

Q
And your information was even to the effect that Sudaria was
supplying illegally cut lumber regularly?
A
What I have noticed because I always ride on his jeep wherein
lumber was being loaded, the lumber will be taken when it arrived in
Lumbia, kilometer 5.
Q
Even if there were already raids being conducted to the person of
Camilo Sudaria, still he continued to load illegally cut lumber?
A
He slowed down after several arrest because maybe he was
ashamed because he was the Barangay Captain of Tagpangi.
Q
And his arrest and the slackening of his activities of illegally cut
lumber occurred prior to June 1995?
A
Yes, sir.
Q
[In spite] of your knowledge that he is engaged [in] illegally
cut[ting] forest products, you as Barangay Captain of Pagalungan transacted
with him for the purpose of acquiring lumber [for] the bridge at Pagalungan?
A
As we rode together in his jeep, he informed me that he has some
lumber to be used to build his house and he told me he will sell it for the
repair of the bridge in Pagalungan.
Q
And because of that, in addition, you sent him the specifications of
materials for the repair of the bridge in Pagalungan?
A
I let Boyatac go to him and [inquire] from him if he has those
specifications.
Q
And he communicated to you that he has available lumber of those
specification?
A
Yes, because he sent to Boyatac some requirements of the

specifications and he let me sign it.

Q
A

And after that, you closed the [deal] with Sudaria?

Yes, because I sent somebody to him and we did not talk anymore.

Q
And thereafter on December 31, 1995, according to your testimony
before, Aniano Latayada delivered the lumber flitches you ordered on board
the passenger jeep of Camilo Sudaria?
A
When the specifications were given, we were informed that the
lumber were already there. So, it was delivered.
Q
A

Who informed you that the lumber were already delivered?

Boyatac.

Q
And he is referring to those lumber placed alongside the Batinay
Bridge.
A
Yes, Sir.
Q
And even without personally inspecting it, you immediately paid
Latayada the compensation for the delivery of those lumber?
A
There was already an advance payment for his delivery.
Q
A

To whom did you give the advance?

To Latayada.

Q
A

You have not given the amount to Camilo Sudaria?

No, Sir.

Q
In fact, the money that you paid to Latayada was specifically for
the transportation of the lumber from Tagpangi to Batinay bridge?
A
Yes, Sir.
PROS. GALARRITA:
Q
And at that time, you paid Latayada P2,000 as payment of the
lumber?
A
Yes, Sir.
COURT:
Q
Did you pay Latayada?
A
Yes, Sir.

Q
A

How much?
P2,000.

Q
A

And you gave this to the conductor?

Yes, Sir.

Q
A

You told the conductor to pay the money to Latayada?

Yes, sir.

Q
What did the conductor say?
A
The conductor said that the money was for the payment for the
transporting of lumber from Tagpangi.[52] (Underscoring ours.)
Violation of Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended, is
malum prohibitum.
As a special law, the nature of the offense is malum prohibitum and as such,
criminal intent is not an essential element. However, the prosecution must
prove that petitioners had the intent to possess (animus possidendi) the
timber.[53] Possession, under the law, includes not only actual possession,
but also constructive possession. Actual possession exists when the [object
of the crime] is in the immediate physical control of the accused. On the
other hand, constructive possession exists when the [object of the crime] is
under the dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right to
exercise dominion and control over the place where it is found.[54]
There is no dispute that petitioners were in constructive possession of the
timber without the requisite legal documents. Villarin and Latayada were
personally involved in its procurement, delivery and storage without any
license or permit issued by any competent authority. Given these and
considering that the offense is malum prohibitum, petitioners contention
that the possession of the illegally cut timber was not for personal gain but
for the repair of said bridge is, therefore, inconsequential.
Corpus Delicti is the Fact of the Commission of the Crime

Petitioners argue that their convictions were improper because the corpus
delicti had not been established. They assert that the failure to present the
confiscated timber in court was fatal to the cause of the prosecution.
We disagree. [C]orpus delicti refers to the fact of the commission of the
crime charged or to the body or substance of the crime. In its legal sense, it
does not refer to the ransom money in the crime of kidnapping for ransom or
to the body of the person murdered[55] or, in this case, to the seized timber.
Since the corpus delicti is the fact of the commission of the crime, this
Court has ruled that even a single witness uncorroborated testimony, if
credible, may suffice to prove it and warrant a conviction therefor. Corpus
delicti may even be established by circumstantial evidence.[56]
Here, the trial court and the CA held that the corpus delicti was established
by the documentary and testimonial evidence on record. The Tally Sheet,
Seizure Receipts issued by the DENR and photograph proved the existence
of the timber and its confiscation. The testimonies of the petitioners
themselves stating in no uncertain terms the manner in which they
consummated the offense they were charged with were likewise crucial to
their conviction.
We find no reason to deviate from these findings since it has been
established that factual findings of a trial court are binding on us, absent any
showing that it overlooked or misinterpreted facts or circumstances of
weight and substance.[57] The legal precept applies to this case in which the
trial courts findings were affirmed by the appellate court.[58]
The Proper Penalty
Violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, is penalized as
qualified theft under Article 310 in relation to Article 309 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC). The pertinent portions of these provisions read:
Art. 310. Qualified Theft The crime of theft shall be punished by the
penalties next higher by two degrees than those respectively specified in the
next preceding articles, if committed by a domestic servant, or with grave
abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or
large cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the premises of the plantation
or fish taken from a fishpond or fishery, or if property is taken on the
occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any calamity,

vehicular accident or civil disturbance.

Art. 309. Penalties. Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the
value of the thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed
22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount,
the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this
paragraph, and one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total
of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such
cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed
and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be
termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be. x x x
The Information filed against the petitioners alleged that the 63 pieces of
timber without the requisite legal documents measuring 4,326 board feet
were valued at P108,150.00. To prove this allegation, the prosecution
presented Pioquinto to testify, among others, on this amount. Tally Sheets
and Seizure Receipts were also presented to corroborate said amount. With
the value of the timber exceeding P22,000.00, the basic penalty is prision
mayor in its minimum and medium periods to be imposed in its maximum,
the range of which is eight (8) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to ten
(10) years. Since none of the qualifying circumstances in Article 310 of the
RPC was alleged in the Information, the penalty cannot be increased two
degrees higher.
In determining the additional years of imprisonment, P22,000.00 is to be
deducted from P108,150.00, which results to P86,150.00. This remainder
must be divided by P10,000.00, disregarding any amount less than
P10,000.00. Consequently, eight (8) years must be added to the basic
penalty. Thus the maximum imposable penalty ranges from sixteen (16)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to eighteen (18) years of reclusion
temporal.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum imposable penalty
should be taken anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower in
degree, without considering the modifying circumstances. The penalty one
degree lower from prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods is
prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, the range of

which is from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to six (6) years.
Thus, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, erroneously fixed the minimum
period of the penalty at twelve (12) years of prision mayor.
Finally, the case against Boyatac must be dismissed considering his demise
even before the RTC rendered its Judgment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated June
28, 2005 and the Resolution dated September 22, 2006 in CA-G.R. CR No.
26720 are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that petitioners
Crisostomo Villarin and Aniano Latayada are each sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of two (2) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years, eight (8) months, and one
(1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The complaint against Cipriano
Boyatac is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Petitioner,

G.R. No. 154557

Present:

- versus -

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.

The HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS, 12th DIVISION, RICO
LIPAO, and RICKSON LIPAO,

Promulgated:

Respondents.
February 13, 2008
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Where a court acquired jurisdiction over an action, its jurisdiction continues
to the final conclusion of the case. Such jurisdiction is not affected by new
legislation placing jurisdiction over such dispute in another court or tribunal
unless the statute provides for retroactivity.[1]
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, seeking to nullify the
June 13, 2002 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
17275 which set aside the July 25, 1994 Judgment[3] of the Surigao City
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 32 and dismissed Criminal Case No.
551 entitled People of the Philippines v. Rico Lipao and Rickson Lipao for
violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 705,[4] as amended
by Executive Order No. (EO) 277.[5]
On February 24, 1992, private respondents Rico and Rickson Lipao were
indicted for and pleaded not guilty to violation of Sec. 68 of PD 705, as
amended by EO 277. The Information in Criminal Case No. 551 reads:
That on or about the 21st day of October 1991 in Cagdianao, Surigao del
Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused Rico Lipao and Rickson Lipao without legal documents as required
under existing forest laws and regulations, conspiring, confederating and
helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
possess without license eight (8) pieces of round timbers and 160 bundles of
firewood with a market value of P3,100.00, said forest products not covered
with legal transport document, and willfully and unlawfully load these forest
products in the pumpboat Rickjoy owned by Rico Lipao, nor the accused
Rico Lipao and Rickson Lipao holders of a license issued by the DENR, to
the prejudice of the government in the sum of P3,100.00.
Contrary to law. The offense is punished with the penalties imposed under
Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, as provided under Section
68 of PD No. 705.[6]

The offense charged is punishable under Art. 309 of the Revised Penal Code
which provides:
Art. 309. Penalties.Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
xxxx
2.
The penalty of prisin correccional in its medium and maximum
period, if the value of the thing stolen is more than 6,000 pesos but does not
exceed 12,000 pesos.

Prisin correccional in its medium period is imprisonment from 2 years, 4

months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months while prisin correccional in its
maximum period is imprisonment from 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 6
years.
Parenthetically, during the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 551 and before
the RTC rendered its Judgment, Republic Act No. (RA) 7691[7] took effect
on April 15, 1994 or 15 days after its publication on March 30, 1994. RA
7691 expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial
Courts (MeTCs), Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs), and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts (MCTCs) in criminal cases to cover all offenses punishable with
imprisonment not exceeding six years irrespective of the amount of fine and
regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including civil
penalties arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of
kind, nature, value or amount thereof. Before the amendments of RA 7691,
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 entitled The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980
provided that the MeTC, MTC, and MCTC shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding
four years and two months, or a fine of not more than PhP 4,000, or both
such fine and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or
other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or
predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount thereof.
On July 25, 1994, the RTC rendered its Judgment, finding private

respondents guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged. The

dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused Rico Lipao
and Rickson Lipao both guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the Violation of
Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended by Executive Order
No. 277, Series of 1987, in relation to Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised
Penal Code, and hereby sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty
of from four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to nine (9) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as maximum; and each to pay one-half of the costs.
The posts and firewood in question, or the proceeds thereof if sold at public
auction are hereby forfeited in favor of the Government.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Private respondents seasonably interposed their appeal before the CA,
docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 17275. They argued that private respondent
Rickson was subjected to an illegal search and seizure of the round posts and
firewood which cannot be used as evidence against him. They insisted that
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) personnel
together with some Philippine National Police personnel who stopped
private respondent Rickson did not have a search warrant. They also opined
that the plain sight or open review doctrine is inapplicable as the posts
and firewood are not incriminatory, more so as firewood is available and
sold in public markets without the requirement of any permit from the
DENR.
Moreover, private respondents argued that the prosecution failed to prove
their lack of license to possess timber. They contended that since private
respondent Rico is merely the owner of the pumpboat and was not present
when the posts and firewood were seized, he could never be held liable for
illegal possession of timber as he was never in possession of the round posts.
Relying on People v. Macagaling,[9] private respondents asserted that
constructive possession of forest products is no longer the rule in
successfully prosecuting offenses for violation of the Forestry Code.
On June 13, 2002, the CA rendered the assailed Decision, granting the
appeal of private respondents and dismissing the case before it on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction of the RTC. The decretal portion reads:

WHEREFORE, upon the premises, the Decision appealed from is SET

ASIDE. The instant criminal case is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.[10]
In sustaining the appeal of private respondents, the CA did not rule on the
assigned errors or on the merits of the case. It anchored its dismissal of the
criminal case on the lack of jurisdiction of the RTC to hear and decide it.
Thus, People of the Philippines filed the instant petition, raising the sole
assignment of error that:
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ARBITRARILY AND
WHIMSICALLY DISMISSED THE CRIMINAL CASE AGAINST
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ON THE GROUND THAT THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE IN VIEW
OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7691 WHICH BECAME EFFECTIVE ON
APRIL 15, 1994.[11]
Petitioner People posits that the passage of RA 7691 did not ipso facto take
jurisdiction away from the RTC to hear and decide the instant criminal case
instituted prior to the passage of said law expanding the jurisdiction of the
MTCs.
On the other hand, in their Comment and Memorandum, private respondents
do not meet head on the sole issue raised by petitioner on jurisdiction but
instead argue that the instant petition should have been outrightly
dismissed on the grounds of noncompliance with the
requirements for a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 and the
requisites for a valid verification. Private respondents asseverate that the
instant petition cannot be entertained as no motion for reconsideration has
been filed before the CA, which is a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
available to petitioner and an indispensable and jurisdictional requirement
for the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, relying on Labudahon v. NLRC.
[12] Moreover, they contend that an action for certiorari under Rule 65 is
the wrong remedy as the dismissal by the CA on lack of jurisdiction did not
constitute double jeopardy and, thus, an appeal through a Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 is the proper remedy. They maintain

that the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), while undoubtedly the
counsel for the State and its agencies, cannot arrogate unto itself the
authority to execute in its name the certificate of non-forum shopping for a
client office, which in the instant case is the DENR.
The arguments of private respondents are unmeritorious.
On the issue of the propriety of the resort to a special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 instead of a petition under Rule 45, we find that
Rule 65 is the proper remedy. The CA ruled that the RTC was ousted of its
jurisdiction as a result of the enactment of RA 7691. While the defense of
lack of jurisdiction was never raised by private respondents before the RTC
and the CA, the CA nevertheless proceeded to acquit private respondents
based on the new law. It is quite glaring from Sec. 7 of RA 7691 that said
law has limited retroactivity only to civil cases. As such, the CA indeed
committed grave abuse of discretion as it acted in an arbitrary and patently
erroneous exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Hence, the
use of Rule 65 is proper.
On other procedural issues, we also find for petitioner. First, we reiterate
our holding in Santiago and City Warden of the Manila City Jail that the
signature by the Solicitor General on the verification and certification of
non-forum shopping in a petition before the CA or with this
Court is substantial compliance of the requirement under Sec. 4,[13] Rule 7
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, considering that the OSG is the legal
representative of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and its
agencies and instrumentalities, more so in a criminal case where the People
or the State is the real party-in-interest and is the aggrieved party.
Second, while it is true that petitioner did not file a motion for
reconsideration of the assailed CA Decision which normally is a ground for
dismissal for being premature[14] and to accord respondent CA opportunity
to correct itself,[15] yet the rule admits of exceptions, such as where, under
the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless,[16] and
where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any
further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government.[17]
In the instant case, these exceptions are present; thus, the propriety of the
instant petition. The assailed CA Decision rendered on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction clearly bespeaks that any motion for reconsideration is useless.

For one, the issue of lack of jurisdiction was never raised by private
respondents in their Brief for the Accused-Appellants,[18] but was
considered motu proprio by the CA. For another, the issues and errors raised
by private respondents were not considered and much less touched upon by
the CA in its assailed Decision.
But of more importance, as this Court held in Vivo v. Cloribel,[19] a motion
for reconsideration is not necessary before a petition for certiorari can be
filed when the respondent court took almost eight years to the day to resolve
private respondents appeal. It is not only the accused who has a right to a
speedy disposition of his case, but the prosecution or the State representing
the People also has and must be accorded the same right. Thus, any further
delay would prejudice the interest of the Government to prosecute and bring
closure to a criminal case filed way back in early 1992.
On the main issue of whether the RTC retained jurisdiction over the criminal
case, we agree with petitioner. The passage of RA 7691 did not ipso facto
relieve the RTC of the jurisdiction to hear and decide the criminal case
against private respondents.
This issue has been laid to rest in People v. Velasco, where this Court
emphatically held:
As to the issue of whether or not R.A. 7691 operated to divest the Regional
Trial Court of jurisdiction over appellants case, we rule in the negative. It
has been consistently held as a general rule that the jurisdiction of a court to
try a criminal action is to be determined by the law in force at the time of the
institution of the action. Where a court has already obtained and is
exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, its jurisdiction to proceed to the
final determination of the cause is not affected by new legislation placing
jurisdiction over such proceedings in another tribunal. The exception to the
rule is where the statute expressly provides, or is construed to the effect that
it is intended to operate as to actions pending before its enactment. Where a
statute changing the jurisdiction of a court has no retroactive effect, it cannot
be applied to a case that was pending prior to the enactment of a statute.
A perusal of R.A. 7691 will show that its retroactive provisions apply only to
civil cases that have not yet reached the pre-trial stage. Neither from an
express proviso nor by implication can it be understood as having retroactive
application to criminal cases pending or decided by the Regional Trial

Courts prior to its effectivity. Thus, the general rule enunciated above is the
controlling doctrine in the case at bar. At the time the case against the
appellant was commenced by the filing of the information on July 3, 1991,
the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction over the offense charged, inasmuch
as Section 39 of R.A. 6425 (the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 prior to the
amendments introduced by R.A. 7659 and R.A. 7691), provided that:
Sec. 39. Jurisdiction. - The Court of First Instance, Circuit Criminal Court,
and Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court shall have concurrent original
jurisdiction over all cases involving offenses punishable under this Act:
Provided, That in cities or provinces where there are Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Courts, the said courts shall take exclusive cognizance of cases
where the offenders are under sixteen years of age.
xxxx
It must be stressed that the abovementioned provision vested concurrent
jurisdiction upon the said courts regardless of the imposable penalty. In fine,
the jurisdiction of the trial court (RTC) over the case of the appellant was
conferred by the aforecited law then in force (R.A. 6425 before amendment)
when the information was filed.
Jurisdiction attached upon the
commencement of the action and could not be ousted by the passage of R.A.
7691 reapportioning the jurisdiction of inferior courts, the application of
which to criminal cases is, to stress, prospective in nature.[20] (Emphasis
supplied.)
This Court categorically reiterated the above ruling in the 2003 case of Yu
Oh v. Court of Appeals,[21] in the 2004 case of Alonto v. People,[22] and in
the 2005 case of Lee v. Court of Appeals.[23]
Thus, where private respondents had been charged with illegal logging
punishable under Articles 309[24] and 310[25] of the Revised Penal Code
with imprisonment ranging from four (4) years, two (2) months, and one (1)
day of prision correccional, as minimum, to nine (9) years, four (4) months,
and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, the RTC clearly had
jurisdiction at the inception of the criminal case. Since jurisdiction over the
criminal case attached upon the filing of the information, then the RTC is
empowered and mandated to try and decide said case notwithstanding a
subsequent change in the jurisdiction over criminal cases of the same nature

under a new statute. The rule is settled that jurisdiction continues until the
court has done all that it can do to exercise that jurisdiction unless the law
provides otherwise.[26]
While jurisdiction can be challenged at any stage of the proceedings, private
respondents did not bother to raise the issue of jurisdiction in their appeal
before the CA. In addition, private respondents did not lift a finger to
reinforce the CA decision relying on lack of jurisdiction as ground for the
dismissal of Criminal Case No. 551 in their submissions before this Court.
Indeed, it appears that even respondents are not convinced of the correctness
of the CA ruling on the issue of jurisdiction.
Lastly, the CA committed reversible error in making use of the values
adduced during the hearing to determine jurisdiction. It is basic that the
jurisdiction of a court is determined both by the law in force at the time of
the commencement of the action and by the allegations in the Complaint or
Information.
Thus, the RTC clearly had jurisdiction when it heard and decided Criminal
Case No. 551. The CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when it ruled that the RTC was divested of
jurisdiction by reason of the enactment of RA 7691.
However, considering that this Court is not a trier of facts, we remand the
case to the CA to resolve the appeal in CA-G.R. CR No. 17275 on the
merits.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed June 13, 2002 CA
Decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 17275 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The CA is directed to resolve the appeal of private respondents on
the merits and with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.

RODOLFO TIGOY, Petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing
the decision and resolution, dated March 6, 2000 and August 23, 2000,
respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20864 entitled
"People of the Philippines v. Nestor Ong and Rodolfo Tigoy," acquitting
Nestor Ong for insufficiency of evidence, while convicting Rodolfo Tigoy
for violating Section 68 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705 or the Revised
Forestry Code of the Philippines, as amended by Executive Order (E.O.) No.
277, Series of 1987, in relation to Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal
Code.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On August 3, 1993, Nestor Ong, who had been engaged in the trucking
business in Iligan City since 1986, was allegedly introduced by his friend
Gamad Muntod to Lolong Bertodazo who signified his intent to rent the
trucks of Ong to transport construction materials from Larapan, Lanao del
Norte to Dipolog City. A Contract to Transport was supposedly entered into
between Ong and Bertodazo, the salient portions of which state:
1. That the party of the First Part is an owner of Cargo Trucks with place of
business at Iligan City;
2. That the party of the Second Part is a businessman dealing in buy and sell
of General Merchandise, dry goods and construction materials;
3. That the party of the Second Part will engage the services of the two (2)
cargo trucks of the party of the First Part;
4. That the services agreed upon should be rendered by the party of the First
Part on August 3, 1993 from Larapan, Linamon, Lanao del Norte to Dipolog
City for an agreed amount of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) Pesos per
truck or a total of TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000.00) Pesos, Philippine

Currency for the carriage of cement and other merchandise owned by the
party of the Second Part;
5. That any legal controversy involving the cargo or of and when the cargo
trucks are not actually used for the purpose herein stipulated, it is agreed that
the same is the sole responsibility of the party of the Second Part without
any liability of the party of the First Part.1
In the evening of October 3, 1993, Ong allegedly ordered Nestor Sumagang
and petitioner Rodolfo Tigoy who had been employed by him as truck
drivers for two (2) years and ten (10) years, respectively, to bring the two
trucks to Lolong Bertodazo in Larapan, Lanao del Norte which is about
fifteen (15) minutes away from Iligan City. He instructed the two drivers to
leave the trucks in Larapan for the loading of the construction materials by
Lolong Bertodazo, and to go back at dawn for the trip to Dipolog City. Thus,
after meeting with Bertodazo, Sumagang and petitioner Tigoy allegedly
went home to return to Larapan at four oclock in the morning the next day.
When they arrived, the trucks had been laden with bags of cement and were
half-covered with canvas.2 Before departing, they allegedly checked the
motor oil, water, engine and tires of the trucks to determine if the same were
in good condition.
That same morning of October 4, 1993, Senior Inspector Rico Lacay Tome
(then Deputy Chief of Police of Ozamis City), while escorting Provincial
Director Dionisio Coloma at the ICC Arts Center in Ozamis City, along with
the members of the Special Operation Group, received a dispatch from the
466th PNP Company situated at Barangay Bongbong, Ozamis City,
informing him that two trucks, a blue and green loaded with cement, that
were going towards Ozamis City did not stop at the checkpoint. Upon
receiving the report, Tome, along with PO2 Peter Paul Nuqui and PO3
Bienvenido Real, boarded their patrol vehicle, a mini cruiser jeep, to
intercept the two trucks at Lilian Terminal, Ozamis City.3
At the Lilian Terminal, PO2 Nuqui, who was the only one in uniform among
the police officers, flagged down the two trucks but the same just sped away
and proceeded towards the direction of Oroquieta City. Aboard their patrol
vehicle, they chased the trucks and overtook the same at Barangay Manabay.
They blocked the road with their vehicle causing the two trucks to stop.
According to Senior Inspector Tome, he asked the driver who had alighted

from the green truck why he did not stop at the checkpoint but the latter did
not answer. When he inquired what was loaded in the truck, the driver
replied that there is "S.O.P," which means grease money in street parlance.4
This raised the suspicion of Tome that the trucks were loaded with "hot
items."
Meanwhile, the blue truck which had been speeding behind the green truck
and was being driven by Sumagang was intercepted by PO3 Real. Upon
inspection, the police officers discovered piles of sawn lumber beneath the
cement bags in both trucks. Tome inquired if the drivers had a permit for the
lumber but the latter could not produce any.
The drivers were brought and turned over to the investigator at the City Hall
in Ozamis City. The truckmen, namely, Felix Arante and Doro Lopez, and
another passenger whom Tigoy identified as Lolong Bertodazo, who were
riding with them in the trucks, were not investigated. According to Nuqui,
they did not notice that the group had left. It was later learned that they were
instructed by Sumagang to inform Nestor Ong of the incident.
Afterwards, the group of Tome proceeded back to the ICC Arts Center and
informed the Provincial Director of the apprehension. Meanwhile, the
drivers, Tigoy and Sumagang, were detained at the Ozamis City Police
Station while Arante and Lopez were released.5
Meanwhile, Ermelo delos Santos, Chief of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources Community and Environment and Natural
Resources Office (DENR-CENRO),6 after receiving a call from the Ozamis
City Police Station that two trucks were apprehended transporting sawn
lumber without a permit and were brought to the City Hall, sent Rolando
Dingal, Forester of the DENR, together with Teodoro Echavez, Juanito
Taruc and Lucio Penaroya, to investigate.
Petitioner Tigoy and Sumagang presented to Dingal the registration papers
of the two trucks and appearing therein was the name of Nestor Ong as the
owner. After ascertaining that the sawn lumber loaded on the two trucks did
not have supporting documents, Dingal and his companions scaled the
subject lumber and prepared a tally sheet. Loaded in the blue Nissan tenwheeler truck were 229 pieces of lumber with a total volume of 6,232.46
board feet; and, in the green Isuzu eight-wheeler truck, 333 pieces of lumber
with a total volume of 5,095.5 board feet.7 Consequently, the lumber and the

vehicles were seized upon the order of the DENR Regional Executive
Director.8
On October 6, 1993, an Information was filed against Nestor Ong,
Sumagang, Lolong Bertodazo and petitioner Tigoy for possession of forest
products without legal permit, thus:
That on or about the 4th day of August, 1993 at Barangay Catadman,
Ozamiz City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping each other, for a common design, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and illegally possess and transport without
the necessary legal documents nor permit from the lawful authorities, sawn
dipterocarp lumbers (Philippine Mahogany), in the following manner, to wit:
accused Nestor Ong, being the owner of 2 ten wheeler trucks with Plate Nos.
GDA-279 and PNH-364 facilitated and allowed the use and transport of
above-stated sawn [lumber] from Larapan, Lanao del Norte, but intercepted
by the PNP authorities in Ozamiz City; while the accused Lolong Bertodazo
facilitated the loading and transport of said sawn lumbers, while accused
Nestor Sumagang y Lacson drove the Nissan 10 wheeler cargo truck bearing
Plate No. GDA-279 which was loaded with 333 pieces of said sawn
dipterocarp lumbers (Philippine Mahogany) of assorted sizes equivalent [to]
5,095.5 board feet which was concealed under piled bags of cement, which
lumbers [were] valued at P134, 242.36; while accused Rodolfo Tigoy drove
the 8 wheeler Isuzu truck bearing Plate No. ONH-364, which was loaded
and transported with 229 pieces of sawn dipterocarp lumbers (Philippine
Mahogany) of assorted sizes equivalent to 6,232.46 board feet which was
concealed under piled bags of cement which lumbers [were] valued at
P92,316.77 or total value of P226,559.13, without, however, causing damage
to the government, inasmuch as the aforestated lumbers were recovered.
CONTRARY to Section 68 of Presidential Decree 705, as amended by
Executive Order No. 277, Series of 1987, in relation to Article 309 and 310
of the Revised Penal Code.9
Ong and petitioner Tigoy entered pleas of not guilty during the arraignment.
Sumagang died after the case was filed while the other co-accused, Lolong
Bertodazo, was not arrested and has remained at large.
On October 11, 1996, the Regional Trial Court rendered its Decision, the

dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, finding accused Nestor Ong and Rodolfo Tigoy [GUILTY]
beyond reasonable doubt of possession of dipterocarp lumber [VALUED] at
more than P22,000.00 without the legal documents as required by existing
laws and regulations, penalized as qualified theft, this Court sentences them
to an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor to eighteen (18) years and three (3) months of reclusion temporal.
The lumber and the conveyances used are forfeited in favor of the
government. With costs.
The DENR is ordered to sell/dispose of the lumber and conveyances in
accordance with the existing laws, WITHOUT DELAY. Let the Court of
Appeals, Fourteenth Division, before which accused Ongs appeal of this
Courts denial of his action for replevin relative to his trucks is pending, be
furnished with a copy of this judgment.
With costs.
SO ORDERED.10
Declaring that "constructive possession" of unlicensed lumber is not within
the contemplation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, and for failure by the
prosecution to prove the complicity of Ong, the Court of Appeals rendered
its decision on March 6, 2000 modifying the ruling of the lower court, thus:
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby MODIFIED in that
accused-appellant Nestor Ong is acquitted for insufficiency of evidence and
his two (2) trucks are ordered returned to him. The conviction of Rodolfo
Tigoy is upheld and the decision dated October 11, 1996 is AFFIRMED in
all respects.
SO ORDERED.11
On March 24, 2000, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion for
Reconsideration praying for his acquittal but the same was denied on August
23, 2000.
Hence, this petition, with the following assignment of errors:

I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING "COLLUSION"
BETWEEN LOLONG BERTODAZO AND PETITIONER TIGOY;
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN COMPLETELY DISREGARDING
THE AFFIDAVIT OF LOLONG BERTODAZO AGAINST HIS PENAL
INTEREST;
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING PETITIONER TIGOY
TO HAVE KNOWLEDGE OF THE LUMBER HE WAS
TRANSPORTING; AND,
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER
TIGOY HAD ACTUAL AND PHYSICAL POSSESSION OF THE
UNDOCUMENTED LUMBER.12
Stated otherwise, the core issue presented is whether or not petitioner Tigoy
is guilty of conspiracy in possessing or transporting lumber without the
necessary permit in violation of the Revised Forestry Code of the
Philippines.
Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277, otherwise known
as the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines, provides:
Section 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber or Other Forest
Products Without License. Any person who shall cut, gather, collect,
remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from
alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any
authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal
documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be
punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code. . . .

There are two ways of violating Section 68 of the above Code: 1) by cutting,
gathering and/or collecting timber or other forest products without a license;
and, 2) by possessing timber or other forest products without the required
legal documents.
Petitioner was charged with and convicted of transporting lumber without a
permit which is punishable under Section 68 of the Code. He, Sumagang and
the rest of their companions were apprehended by the police officers in
flagrante delicto as they were transporting the subject lumber from Larapan
to Dipolog City.
Petitioner maintains that he could not have conspired with Lolong Bertodazo
as he did not know about the unlicensed lumber in the trucks. He believed
that what he was transporting were bags of cement in view of the contract
between Ong and Bertodazo. Also, he was not around when Bertodazo
loaded the trucks with the lumber hidden under the bags of cement.
This contention by petitioner, however, was not believed by the lower court.
In declaring that petitioner connived with Bertodazo in transporting the
subject lumber, the court a quo noted:
x x x The evidence of the prosecution established that the two drivers of
accused Ong refused to stop at a checkpoint, a fact admitted by both in their
affidavit, Exhs. "E" and "E-2". Likewise, the two drivers refused to stop on
the national highway near a bus terminal when required by a uniformed
policeman. When finally accosted, one of the drivers, whom witness Tome
identified as the driver of the green truck, Sumagang, but who actually was
Tigoy (as he was the driver of the green truck and who came to the road
block first, being the lead driver) offered "S.O.P." which to witness Tome
meant that the trucks were carrying "hot items."
Why would the drivers refuse to stop when required? Did they fear
inspection of their cargo? Why would "S.O.P." (which in street parlance is
grease money) be offered to facilitate the passage of the trucks? The only
logical answer to all these questions is that the drivers knew that they were
carrying contraband lumber. This Court believes that the drivers had
knowledge of the fact that they were transporting and were in possession of
undocumented lumber in violation of law.13
In offenses considered as mala prohibita or when the doing of an act is

prohibited by a special law such as in the present case, the commission of

the prohibited act is the crime itself. It is sufficient that the offender has the
intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law, and that it is done
knowingly and consciously.14
Direct proof of previous agreement to commit an offense is not necessary to
prove conspiracy.15 Conspiracy may be proven by circumstantial
evidence.16 It may be deduced from the mode, method and manner by
which the offense is perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused
when such acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and
community of interest.17 It is not even required that the participants have an
agreement for an appreciable period to commence it.18
Petitioners actions adequately show that he intentionally participated in the
commission of the offense for which he had been charged and found guilty
by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
Finding that petitioners conviction was reached without arbitrariness and
with sufficient basis, this Court upholds the same. The Court accords high
respect to the findings of facts of the trial court, its calibration of the
collective testimonies of the witnesses, its assessment of the probative
weight of the evidence of the parties as well as its conclusions19 especially
when these are in agreement with those of the Court of Appeals, which is the
case here. As a matter of fact, factual findings of the trial court, when
adopted and confirmed by the Court of Appeals, are generally final and
conclusive.20
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Decision and Resolution,
dated March 6, 2000 and August 23, 2000, respectively, of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20864 are hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
SYLLABI/SYNOPSIS
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 121587. March 9, 1999]

SOLEDAD DY, doing business under the name and style RONWOOD
LUMBER, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ODEL BERNARDO
LAUSA, respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA
G.R. SP 33099 setting aside two orders of the Regional Trial Court of
Butuan City (Branch 5) and the appellate courts resolution denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The facts are as follows.
On May 31, 1993, the Mayor of Butuan City issued Executive Order No. 9301 creating Task Force Kalikasan to combat illegal logging, log smuggling
or possession of and/or transport of illegally cut or produced logs, lumber,
flitches and other forest products in that city.[2] The team was composed of
personnel of the Philippine Army, Philippine National Police (PNP), the
Department of Natural Resources (DENR), and the Office of the City Mayor
of Butuan. Respondent Odel Bernardo Lausa, who was the acting chief of
civilian security in the mayors office, was a member of the team.
On July 1, 1993, the members of the task force received confidential
information that two truckloads of illegally cut lumber would be brought to
Butuan City from the Ampayon-Taguibe-Tiniwisan area. Accordingly, the
team set up a check-point along kilometer 4 in Baan, Butuan City.[3] What
happened thereafter is summarized in the following portion of the decision
of the Court of Appeals:[4]
At around 10:00 p.m., two trucks with Plate Nos. KAK-542 and KBL-214
and loaded with lumber approached the checkpoint. They were flagged
down by the operatives but instead of stopping, they accelerated their speed
hence, the task force gave chase. They finally caught up with the two
vehicles at the compound of Young Metalcraft and Peterwood Agro-Forest
Industries at Baan, Butuan City, about two kilometers from the checkpoint.
When requested by the operatives, Pulcita Lucero, caretaker/in charge of the
compound could not produce any document as proof of the legality of the
origin/possession of the forest products.

Forester Resurreccion Maxilom of the DENR issued a temporary seizure

order and a seizure receipt for the two vehicles and their cargo consisting of
several pieces of lumber of different sizes and dimensions, but Lucero, the
caretaker of the compound where they were seized, refused to accept them.
The seized lumber and vehicles were then taken to the City motorpool and
placed in the custody of respondent Lausa.
The next day, July 2, 1993, Maxilom submitted a memorandum-report to the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) of
Butuan City on the seizure of the lumber and the two vehicles.[5] On July 6,
the CENRO issued a notice of confiscation which was duly posted for three
days.
For lack of claimants, DENR Regional Technical Director Raoul Geollegue
recommended to the Secretary on July 29, 1993 the forfeiture of the lumber
and the two vehicles. [6] Accordingly, on July 30, 1993, DENR Regional
Director De la Rosa ordered the CENRO of Butuan City to issue the
requisite forfeiture orders,[7] which CENRO Angelita Orcasitas issued on
August 15, 1993.[8]
On October 20, 1993, more than two months after the lumber had been
forfeited, petitioner, claiming to be the owner of the lumber, filed a suit for
replevin in the Regional Trial Court of Butuan City (Branch 5) for its
recovery. The next day, October 21, 1993, the trial court issued a
preliminary writ of replevin.
On October 29, 1993, respondent Lausa filed a motion for the approval of a
counterbond. Before the court could act on his motion, he moved to dismiss
and/or quash the writ of replevin on the ground that the lumber in question,
having been seized and forfeited by the DENR pursuant to P.D. No. 705, as
amended (Revised Forestry Code), was under its custody and, therefore,
resort should first be made to the DENR.
On November 29, 1993, the trial court denied respondent Lausas
application for the approval of the counterbond as well as his motion to
dismiss and/or quash the suit for replevin. For this reason, respondent filed a
petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals in which he sought the
approval of his counterbond and the nullification of the two orders, dated
October 21, 1993 and November 29, 1993, granting petitioners prayer for a
preliminary writ of replevin and denying his Motion to Dismiss Case and/or

Quash Writ of Replevin.

On January 19, 1995, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED, and
a. The Orders dated 21 October 1993 and 29 November 1993 are SET
ASIDE.
b. Respondent judge is directed to approve a duly qualified counterbond to
be filed by petitioner, even with a period of at least one year.
No pronouncements as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[9]
Petitioners subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied in a
resolution, dated July 26, 1995. Hence, this petition. Petitioner alleges that:
FIRST ERROR
WITH DUE RESPECT RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
RULING THAT THE VERIFICATION MADE BY LORENCIO DY AND
NOT BY PETITIONER SOLEDAD Y. DY WAS INSUFFICIENT TO
JUSTIFY THE ISSUANCE OF THE REPLEVIN WRIT.[10]
SECOND ERROR
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT A
COUNTERBOND IN REPLEVIN WHICH IS EFFECTIVE FOR ONLY
ONE YEAR IS VALID TO CAUSE THE RETURN OF THE PROPERTY
TO DEFENDANT.[11]
THIRD ERROR
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GIVING DUE
COURSE TO PRIVATE RESPONDENTS PETITION FOR CERTIORARI.
[12]

The appeal is without merit. The threshold question is whether the Regional
Trial Court could in fact take cognizance of the replevin suit, considering
that the object was the recovery of lumber seized and forfeited by law
enforcement agents of the DENR pursuant to P.D. No. 705 (Revised Forestry
Code), as amended by Executive Order No. 277.
The rule is that a party must exhaust all administrative remedies before he
can resort to the courts. In a long line of cases, we have consistently held
that before a party may be allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is
a pre-condition that he should have availed himself of all the means afforded
by the administrative processes. Hence, if a remedy within the
administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative
officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within
his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before a courts
judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of a courts
intervention is fatal to ones cause of action. Accordingly, absent any
finding of waiver or estoppel, the case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of
cause of action.[13]
Section 8 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, provides:
SEC. 8. Review. All actions and decisions of the Director are subject to
review, motu propio or upon appeal of any person aggrieved thereby, by the
Department Head whose decision shall be final and executory after the lapse
of thirty (30) days from receipt by the aggrieved party of said decision,
unless appealed to the President in accordance with Executive Order No. 19,
series of 1966. The Decision of the Department Head may not be reviewed
by the courts except through a special civil action for certiorari or
prohibition.
In Paat v. Court of Appeals,[14] where, as in the case at bar, the trial court
issued a writ of replevin against the DENR, thus allowing the claimant to
obtain possession of the conveyance used in transporting undocumented
forest products, this Court stated:
Dismissal of the replevin suit for lack of cause of action in view of the
private respondents failure to exhaust administrative remedies should have
been the proper cause of action by the lower court instead of assuming
jurisdiction over the case and consequently issuing the writ ordering the
return of the truck. Exhaustion of the remedies in the administrative forum,

being a condition precedent prior to ones recourse to the courts and more
importantly, being an element of private respondents right of action, is too
significant to be waylaid by the lower court.[15]
As petitioner clearly failed to exhaust available administrative remedies, the
Court of Appeals correctly set aside the assailed orders of the trial court
granting petitioners application for a replevin writ and denying private
respondents motion to dismiss. Having been forfeited pursuant to P.D. No.
705, as amended, the lumber properly came under the custody of the DENR
and all actions seeking to recover possession thereof should be directed to
that agency.
The appellate courts directive to the trial court judge to allow the
respondent agent of the DENR to file a counterbond in order to recover
custody of the lumber should be disregarded as being contrary to its order to
dismiss the replevin suit of petitioner. For, indeed, what it should have done
was to dismiss the case without prejudice to petitioner filing her claim
before the Department of Natural Resources (DENR).
In view of the conclusion reached in this case, it is unnecessary to discuss
the errors assigned by petitioner. These pertain to the questions whether
petitioners complaint below was properly verified and whether private
respondents counterbond should be approved. Both are based on the
premise that the trial court can take cognizance over the case. As shown
above, however, such is not the case.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated January 19,
1995, and its Resolution, dated July 26, 1995, in CA-G.R. SP 33099 are
AFFIRMED with the modification that the complaint for recovery of
personal property is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 115634

April 27, 2000

FELIPE CALUB and RICARDO VALENCIA, DEPARTMENT of

ENVIRONMENT
and
NATURAL
RESOURCES
(DENR),
CATBALOGAN, SAMAR, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, MANUELA T. BABALCON, and CONSTANCIO
ABUGANDA, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review is the decision1 dated May 27, 1994, of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 29191, denying the petition filed by herein petitioners for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, in order to annul the Order dated May
27, 1992, by the Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan, Samar. Said Order had
denied petitioners' (a) Motion to Dismiss the replevin case filed by herein
private respondents, as well as (b) petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of
the Order of said trial court dated April 24, 1992, granting an application for
a Writ of replevin.2
The pertinent facts of the case, borne by the records, are as follows:
On January 28, 1992, the Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Team of
the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the
DENR apprehended two (2) motor vehicles, described as follows:
1. Motor Vehicle with Plate No. HAK-733 loaded with one thousand and
twenty six (1,026) board feet of illegally sourced lumber valued at
P8,544.75, being driven by one Pio Gabon and owned by [a certain] Jose
Vargas.
2. Motor Vehicle with Plate No. FCN-143 loaded with one thousand two
hundred twenty four and ninety seven (1,224.97) board feet of illegallysourced lumber valued at P9,187.27, being driven by one Constancio
Abuganda and owned by [a certain] Manuela Babalcon. . . .3
Constancio Abuganda and Pio Gabon, the drivers of the vehicles, failed to
present proper documents and/or licenses. Thus, the apprehending team
seized and impounded the vehicles and its load of lumber at the DENRPENR (Department of Environment and Natural Resources-Provincial
Environment and Natural Resources) Office in Catbalogan.4 Seizure receipts
were issued but the drivers refused to accept the receipts.5 Felipe Calub,

Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer, then filed before the
Provincial Prosecutor's Office in Samar, a criminal complaint against
Abuganda, in Criminal Case No. 3795, for violation of Section 68 [78],
Presidential Decree 705 as amended by Executive Order 277, otherwise
known as the Revised Forestry Code.6
On January 31, 1992, the impounded vehicles were forcibly taken by Gabon
and Abuganda from the custody of the DENR, prompting DENR Officer
Calub this time to file a criminal complaint for grave coercion against Gabon
and Abuganda. The complaint was, however, dismissed by the Public
Prosecutor.7
On February 11, 1992, one of the two vehicles, with plate number FCN 143,
was again apprehended by a composite team of DENR-CENR in Catbalogan
and Philippine Army elements of the 802nd Infantry Brigade at Barangay
Buray, Paranas, Samar. It was again loaded with forest products with an
equivalent volume of 1,005.47 board feet, valued at P10,054.70. Calub duly
filed a criminal complaint against Constancio Abuganda, a certain Abegonia,
and several John Does, in Criminal Case No. 3625, for violation of Section
68 [78], Presidential Decree 705 as amended by Executive Order 277,
otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code.8
In Criminal Cases Nos. 3795 and 3625, however, Abegonia and Abuganda
were acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt. But note the trial court
ordered that a copy of the decision be furnished the Secretary of Justice, in
order that the necessary criminal action may be filed against Noe Pagarao
and all other persons responsible for violation of the Revised Forestry Code.
For it appeared that it was Pagarao who chartered the subject vehicle and
ordered that cut timber be loaded on it.9
Subsequently, herein private respondents Manuela Babalcon, the vehicle
owner, and Constancio Abuganda, the driver, filed a complaint for the
recovery of possession of the two (2) impounded vehicles with an
application for replevin against herein petitioners before the RTC of
Catbalogan. The trial court granted the application for replevin and issued
the corresponding writ in an Order dated April 24, 1992. 10 Petitioners filed
a motion to dismiss which was denied by the trial court. 11
Thus, on June 15, 1992, petitioners filed with the Supreme Court the present
Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with application for

Preliminary Injunction and/or a Temporary Restraining Order. The Court

issued a TRO, enjoining respondent RTC judge from conducting further
proceedings in the civil case for replevin; and enjoining private respondents
from taking or attempting to take the motor vehicles and forest products
seized from the custody of the petitioners. The Court further instructed the
petitioners to see to it that the motor vehicles and other forest products
seized are kept in a secured place and protected from deterioration, said
property being in custodia legis and subject to the direct order of the
Supreme Court. 12 In a Resolution issued on September 28, 1992, the Court
referred said petition to respondent appellate court for appropriate
disposition. 13
On May 27, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied said petition for lack of
merit. It ruled that the mere seizure of a motor vehicle pursuant to the
authority granted by Section 68 [78] of P.D. No. 705 as amended by E.O.
No. 277 does not automatically place said conveyance in custodia legis.
According to the appellate court, such authority of the Department Head of
the DENR or his duly authorized representative to order the confiscation and
disposition of illegally obtained forest products and the conveyance used for
that purpose is not absolute and unqualified. It is subject to pertinent laws,
regulations, or policies on that matter, added the appellate court. The DENR
Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990, is one such regulation, the
appellate court said. For it prescribes the guidelines in the confiscation,
forfeiture and disposition of conveyances used in the commission of offenses
penalized under Section 68 [78] of P.D. No. 705 as amended by E.O. No.
277. 14
Additionally, respondent Court of Appeals noted that the petitioners failed to
observe the procedure outlined in DENR Administrative Order No. 59,
series of 1990. They were unable to submit a report of the seizure to the
DENR Secretary, to give a written notice to the owner of the vehicle, and to
render a report of their findings and recommendations to the Secretary.
Moreover, petitioners' failure to comply with the procedure laid down by
DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990, was confirmed by the
admission of petitioners' counsel that no confiscation order has been issued
prior to the seizure of the vehicle and the filing of the replevin suit.
Therefore, in failing to follow such procedure, according to the appellate
court, the subject vehicles could not be considered in custodia legis. 15
Respondent Court of Appeals also found no merit in petitioners' claim that

private respondents' complaint for replevin is a suit against the State.

Accordingly, petitioners could not shield themselves under the principle of
state immunity as the property sought to be recovered in the instant suit had
not yet been lawfully adjudged forfeited in favor of the government.
Moreover, according to respondent appellate court, there could be no
pecuniary liability nor loss of property that could ensue against the
government. It reasoned that a suit against a public officer who acted
illegally or beyond the scope of his authority could not be considered a suit
against the State; and that a public officer might be sued for illegally seizing
or withholding the possession of the property of another. 16
Respondent court brushed aside other grounds raised by petitioners based on
the claim that the subject vehicles were validly seized and held in custody
because they were contradicted by its own findings. 17 Their petition was
found without merit. 18
Now, before us, the petitioners assign the following errors: 19
(1) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT MERE
SEIZURE OF A CONVEYANCE PURSUANT TO SECTION 68-A [78-A]
OF P.D. NO. 705 AS AMENDED BY EXECUTIVE ORDER 277 DOES
NOT PLACE SAID CONVEYANCE IN CUSTODIA LEGIS;
(2) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE
OPERATIVE ACT GIVING RISE FOR THE SUBJECT CONVEYANCE
TO BE IN CUSTODIA LEGIS IS ITS LAWFUL SEIZURE BY THE DENR
PURSUANT TO SECTION 68-A [78-A] OF P.D. NO. 705, AS AMENDED
BY E.O. NO. 277; AND
(3) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
COMPLAINT FOR REPLEVIN AGAINST THE PETITIONERS IS NOT A
SUIT AGAINST THE STATE.
In brief, the pertinent issues for our consideration are:
(1) Whether or not the DENR-seized motor vehicle, with plate number FCN
143, is in custodia legis.
(2) Whether or not the complaint for the recovery of possession of
impounded vehicles, with an application for replevin, is a suit against the

State.
We will now resolve both issues.
The Revised Forestry Code authorizes the DENR to seize all conveyances
used in the commission of an offense in violation of Section 78. Section 78
states:
Sec. 78. Cutting, Gathering, and/or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest
Products without License. Any person who shall cut, gather, collect,
remove timber or other forest products from any forestland, or timber from
alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any
authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal
documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be
punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code. . .
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of
the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or
possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools
illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found.
This provision makes mere possession of timber or other forest products
without the accompanying legal documents unlawful and punishable with
the penalties imposed for the crime of theft, as prescribed in Articles 309310 of the Revised Penal Code. In the present case, the subject vehicles were
loaded with forest products at the time of the seizure. But admittedly no
permit evidencing authority to possess and transport said load of forest
products was duly presented. These products, in turn, were deemed illegally
sourced. Thus there was a prima facie violation of Section 68 [78] of the
Revised Forestry Code, although as found by the trial court, the persons
responsible for said violation were not the ones charged by the public
prosecutor.
The corresponding authority of the DENR to seize all conveyances used in
the commission of an offense in violation of Section 78 of the Revised
Forestry Code is pursuant to Sections 78-A and 89 of the same Code. They
read as follows:
Sec. 78-A. Administrative Authority of the Department Head or His Duly

Authorized Representative to Order Confiscation. In all cases of violation

of this Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations, the Department Head
or his duly authorized representative, may order the confiscation of any
forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned,
and all conveyances used either by land, water or air in the commission of
the offense and to dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws,
regulations or policies on the matter.
Sec. 89. Arrest; Institution of criminal actions. A forest officer or
employee of the Bureau [Department] or any personnel of the Philippine
Constabulary/Philippine National Police shall arrest even without warrant
any person who has committed or is committing in his presence any of the
offenses defined in this Chapter. He shall also seize and confiscate, in favor
of the Government, the tools and equipment used in committing the
offense. . . [Emphasis supplied.]
Note that DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990, implements
Sections 78-A and 89 of the Forestry Code, as follows:
Sec. 2. Conveyances Subject to Confiscation and Forfeiture. All
conveyances used in the transport of any forest product obtained or gathered
illegally whether or not covered with transport documents, found spurious or
irregular in accordance with Sec. 68-A [78-A] of P.D. No. 705, shall be
confiscated in favor of the government or disposed of in accordance with
pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter.
Sec. 4. Who are Authorized to Seize Conveyance. The Secretary or his
duly authorized representative such as the forest officers and/or natural
resources officers, or deputized officers of the DENR are authorized to seize
said conveyances subject to policies and guidelines pertinent thereto.
Deputized military personnel and officials of other agencies apprehending
illegal logs and other forest products and their conveyances shall notify the
nearest DENR field offices, and turn oversaid forest products and
conveyances for proper action and disposition. In case where the
apprehension is made by DENR field officer, the conveyance shall be
deposited with the nearest CENRO/PENRO/RED Office as the case may be,
for safekeeping wherever it is most convenient and secured. [Emphasis
supplied.]
Upon apprehension of the illegally-cut timber while being transported

without pertinent documents that could evidence title to or right to

possession of said timber, a warrantless seizure of the involved vehicles and
their load was allowed under Section 78 and 89 of the Revised Forestry
Code.
Note further that petitioners' failure to observe the procedure outlined in
DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990 was justifiably
explained. Petitioners did not submit a report of the seizure to the Secretary
nor give a written notice to the owner of the vehicle because on the 3rd day
following the seizure, Gabon and Abuganda, drivers of the seized vehicles,
forcibly took the impounded vehicles from the custody of the DENR. Then
again, when one of the motor vehicles was apprehended and impounded for
the second time, the petitioners, again were not able to report the seizure to
the DENR Secretary nor give a written notice to the owner of the vehicle
because private respondents immediately went to court and applied for a writ
of replevin. The seizure of the vehicles and their load was done upon their
apprehension for a violation of the Revised Forestry Code. It would be
absurd to require a confiscation order or notice and hearing before said
seizure could be effected under the circumstances.
Since there was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the seizure was
in accordance with law, in our view the subject vehicles were validly
deemed in custodia legis. It could not be subject to an action for replevin.
For it is property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process and considered in
the custody of the law, and not otherwise. 20
In Mamanteo, et. al. v. Deputy Sheriff Magumun, A.M. No. P-98-1264,
promulgated on July 28, 1999, the case involves property to be seized by a
Deputy Sheriff in a replevin suit. But said property were already impounded
by the DENR due to violation of forestry laws and, in fact, already forfeited
in favor of the government by order of the DENR. We said that such
property was deemed in custodia legis. The sheriff could not insist on
seizing the property already subject of a prior warrant of seizure. The
appropriate action should be for the sheriff to inform the trial court of the
situation by way of partial Sheriff's Return, and wait for the judge's
instructions on the proper procedure to be observed.
Note that property that is validly deposited in custodia legis cannot be the
subject of a replevin suit. In Mamanteo v. Deputy Sheriff Magumun, we
elucidated further:

. . . the writ of replevin has been repeatedly used by unscrupulous plaintiffs

to retrieve their chattel earlier taken for violation of the Tariff and Customs
Code, tax assessment, attachment or execution. Officers of the court, from
the presiding judge to the sheriff, are implored to be vigilant in their
execution of the law otherwise, as in this case, valid seizure and forfeiture
proceedings could easily be undermined by the simple devise of a writ of
replevin. . . 21
On the second issue, is the complaint for the recovery of possession of the
two impounded vehicles, with an application for replevin, a suit against the
State?
Well established is the doctrine that the State may not be sued without its
consent. 22 And a suit against a public officer for his official acts is, in
effect, a suit against the State if its purpose is to hold the State ultimately
liable. 23 However, the protection afforded to public officers by this doctrine
generally applies only to activities within the scope of their authority in good
faith and without willfulness, malice or corruption. 24 In the present case,
the acts for which the petitioners are being called to account were performed
by them in the discharge of their official duties. The acts in question are
clearly official in nature. 25 In implementing and enforcing Sections 78-A
and 89 of the Forestry Code through the seizure carried out, petitioners were
performing their duties and functions as officers of the DENR, and did so
within the limits of their authority. There was no malice nor bad faith on
their part. Hence, a suit against the petitioners who represent the DENR is a
suit against the State. It cannot prosper without the State's consent.
Given the circumstances in this case, we need not pursue the Office of the
Solicitor General's line for the defense of petitioners concerning exhaustion
of administrative remedies. We ought only to recall that exhaustion must be
raised at the earliest time possible, even before filing the answer to the
complaint or pleading asserting a claim, by a motion to dismiss. 26 If not
invoked at the proper time, this ground for dismissal could be deemed
waived and the court could take cognizance of the case and try it. 27
ACCORDINGLY, the Petition is GRANTED, and the assailed Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 29191 is SET ASIDE.1wphi1
Consequently, the Order issued by the Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan,
dated May 27, 1992, and the Writ of replevin issued in the Order dated April

24, 1992, are ANNULLED. The Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court of
Catbalogan, Branch 29, is directed to take possession of the subject motor
vehicle, with plate number FCN 143, for delivery to the custody of and
appropriate disposition by petitioners. Let a copy of this decision be
provided the Honorable Secretary of Justice for his appropriate action,
against any and all persons responsible for the abovecited violation of the
Revised Forestry Code.
Costs against private respondents.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
WATER CODE

G.R. No. 194336

March 11, 2013

PILAR DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
RAMON DUMADAG, EMMA BACABAC, RONALDO NAVARRO,
JIMMY PAGDALIAN, PAY DELOS SANTOS, ARMANDO TRILLOS,
FELICISIMO TRILLOS, ARCANGEL FLORES, EDDIE MARTIN,
PRESILLA LAYOG, CONRADO CAGUYONG, GINA GONZALES,
ARLENE PEDROSA, JOCELYN ABELINO, ROQUE VILLARAZA,
ROLANDO VILLARAZA, CAMILO GENOVE, NILDA ROAYANA,
SUSAN ROAYANA, JUANCHO PANGANIBAN, BONG DE GUZMAN,
ARNOLD ENVERSO, DONNA DELA RAZA, EMELYN HAGNAYA,
FREDDIE DE LEON, RONILLO DE LEON, MARIO MARTINEZ, and
PRECY LOPEZ, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Challenged in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure are the March 5, 2010 Decision1 and October 29,

2010 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 90254,

which affirmed the May 30, 2007 Decision3 of the Las Pias Regional Trial
Court, Branch 197 (trial court) dismissing the complaint filed by petitioner.
On July 1, 2002, petitioner filed a Complaint4 for accion publiciana with
damages against respondents for allegedly building their shanties, without its
knowledge and consent, in its 5,613-square-meter property located at Daisy
Road, Phase V, Pilar Village Subdivision, Almanza, Las
Pias City. It claims that said parcel of land, which is duly registered in its
name under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 481436 of the Register of Deeds
for the Province of Rizal, was designated as an open space of Pilar Village
Subdivision intended for village recreational facilities and amenities for
subdivision residents.5 In their Answer with Counterclaim,6 respondents
denied the material allegations of the Complaint and briefly asserted that it is
the local government, not petitioner, which has jurisdiction and authority
over them.
Trial ensued. Both parties presented their respective witnesses and the trial
court additionally conducted an ocular inspection of the subject property.
On May 30, 2007, the trial court dismissed petitioners complaint, finding
that the land being occupied by respondents are situated on the sloping area
going down and leading towards the Mahabang Ilog Creek, and within the
three-meter legal easement; thus, considered as public property and part of
public dominion under Article 5027 of the New Civil Code (Code), which
could not be owned by petitioner. The court held:
x x x The land title of [petitioner] only proves that it is the owner in fee
simple of the respective real properties described therein, free from all liens
and encumbrances, except such as may be expressly noted thereon or
otherwise reserved by law x x x. And in the present case, what is expressly
reserved is what is written in TCT No. T-481436, to wit "that the 3.00 meter
strip of the lot described herein along the Mahabang Ilog Creek is reserved
for public easement purposes. (From OCT 1873/A-50) and to the limitations
imposed by Republic Act No. 440. x x x"8
The trial court opined that respondents have a better right to possess the
occupied lot, since they are in an area reserved for public easement purposes
and that only the local government of Las Pias City could institute an

action for recovery of possession or ownership.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the
trial court in its Order dated August 21, 2007.9 Consequently, petitioner
elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals which, on March 5, 2010,
sustained the dismissal of the case.
Referring to Section 210 of Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 99-21 of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), the appellate
court ruled that the 3-meter area being disputed is located along the creek
which, in turn, is a form of a stream; therefore, belonging to the public
dominion. It said that petitioner could not close its eyes or ignore the fact,
which is glaring in its own title, that the 3-meter strip was indeed reserved
for public easement. By relying on the TCT, it is then estopped from
claiming ownership and enforcing its supposed right. Unlike the trial court,
however, the CA noted that the proper party entitled to seek recovery of
possession of the contested portion is not the City of Las Pias, but the
Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), pursuant to Section 10111 of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141
(otherwise known as The Public Land Act).
The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied by the CA per
Resolution dated October 29, 2010, hence, this petition.
Anchoring its pleadings on Article 63012 of the Code, petitioner argues that
although the portion of the subject property occupied by respondents is
within the 3-meter strip reserved for public easement, it still retains
ownership thereof since the strip does not form part of the public dominion.
As the owner of the subject parcel of land, it is entitled to its lawful
possession, hence, the proper party to file an action for recovery of
possession against respondents conformably with Articles 42813 and 53914
of Code.
We deny.
An easement or servitude is a real right on another's property, corporeal and
immovable, whereby the owner of the latter must refrain from doing or
allowing somebody else to do or something to be done on his or her
property, for the benefit of another person or tenement; it is jus in re aliena,
inseparable from the estate to which it actively or passively belongs,

indivisible, perpetual, and a continuing property right, unless extinguished

by causes provided by law.15 The Code defines easement as an
encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of another
immovable belonging to a different owner or for the benefit of a community,
or of one or more persons to whom the encumbered estate does not
belong.16 There are two kinds of easement according to source: by law or by
will of the owners the former are called legal and the latter voluntary
easement.17 A legal easement or compulsory easement, or an easement by
necessity constituted by law has for its object either public use or the interest
of private persons.18
While Article 630 of the Code provides for the general rule that "the owner
of the servient estate retains the ownership of the portion on which the
easement is established, and may use the same in such a manner as not to
affect the exercise of the easement," Article 635 thereof is specific in saying
that "all matters concerning easements established for public or communal
use shall be governed by the special laws and regulations relating thereto,
and, in the absence thereof, by the provisions of this Title Title VII on
Easements or Servitudes."
In the case at bar, the applicability of DENR A.O. No. 99-21 dated June 11,
1999, which superseded DENR A.O. No. 97-0519 dated March 6, 1997 and
prescribed the revised guidelines in the implementation of the pertinent
provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1273 and Presidential Decree (P.D.)
Nos. 705 and 1067, cannot be doubted. Inter alia, it was issued to further the
governments program of biodiversity preservation. Aside from Section 2.1
above-quoted, Section 2.3 of which further mandates:
2.3 Survey of Titled Lands:
2.3.1 Administratively Titled Lands:
The provisions of item 2.1.a and 2.1.b shall be observed as the above.
However, when these lands are to be subdivided, consolidated or
consolidated-subdivided, the strip of three (3) meters which falls within
urban areas shall be demarcated and marked on the plan for easement and
bank protection.
The purpose of these strips of land shall be noted in the technical description
and annotated in the title.

xxxx
2.3.3 Complex Subdivision or Consolidation Subdivision Surveys for
Housing/Residential, Commercial or Industrial Purposes:
When titled lands are subdivided or consolidated-subdivided into lots for
residential, commercial or industrial purposes the segregation of the three (3)
meter wide strip along the banks of rivers or streams shall be observed and
be made part of the open space requirement pursuant to P.D. 1216.
The strip shall be preserved and shall not be subject to subsequent
subdivision. (Underscoring supplied)
Certainly, in the case of residential subdivisions, the allocation of the 3meter strip along the banks of a stream, like the Mahabang Ilog Creek in this
case, is required and shall be considered as forming part of the open space
requirement pursuant to P.D. 1216 dated October 14, 1977.20 Said law is
explicit: open spaces are "for public use and are, therefore, beyond the
commerce of men" and that "[the] areas reserved for parks, playgrounds and
recreational use shall be non-alienable public lands, and non-buildable."
Running in same vein is P.D. 1067 or The Water Code of the Philippines21
which provides:
Art. 51. The banks of rivers and streams and the shores of the seas and lakes
throughout their entire length and within a zone of three (3) meters in urban
areas, twenty (20) meters in agricultural areas and forty (40) meters in forest
areas, along their margins, are subject to the easement of public use in the
interest of recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing and salvage. No person
shall be allowed to stay in this zone longer than what is necessary for
recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing or salvage or to build structures of
any kind. (Underscoring supplied)
Thus, the above prove that petitioners right of ownership and possession has
been limited by law with respect to the 3-meter strip/zone along the banks of
Mahabang Ilog Creek. Despite this, the Court cannot agree with the trial
courts opinion, as to which the CA did not pass upon, that respondents have
a better right to possess the subject portion of the land because they are
occupying an area reserved for public easement purposes. Similar to

petitioner, respondents have no right or title over it precisely because it is

public land. Likewise, we repeatedly held that squatters have no possessory
rights over the land intruded upon.22 The length of time that they may have
physically occupied the land is immaterial; they are deemed to have entered
the same in bad faith, such that the nature of their possession is presumed to
have retained the same character throughout their occupancy.23
As to the issue of who is the proper party entitled to institute a case with
respect to the 3-meter strip/zone, We find and so hold that both the Republic
of the Philippines, through the OSG and the local government of Las Pias
City, may file an action depending on the purpose sought to be achieved.
The former shall be responsible in case of action for reversion under C.A.
141, while the latter may also bring an action to enforce the relevant
provisions of Republic Act No. 7279 (otherwise known as the Urban
Development and Housing Act of 1992).24 Under R.A. 7279, which was
enacted to uplift the living conditions in the poorer sections of the
communities in urban areas and was envisioned to be the antidote to the
pernicious problem of squatting in the metropolis,25 all local government
units (LGUs) are mandated to evict and demolish persons or entities
occupying danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps,
riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public places such as
sidewalks, roads, parks, and playgrounds.26 Moreover, under pain of
administrative and criminal liability in case of non-compliance,27 it obliges
LGUs to strictly observe the following:
Section 29. Resettlement. - Within two (2) years from the effectivity of this
Act, the local government units, in coordination with the National Housing
Authority, shall implement the relocation and resettlement of persons living
in danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks,
shorelines, waterways, and in other public places such as sidewalks, roads,
parks and playgrounds. The local government unit, in coordination with the
National Housing Authority, shall provide relocation or resettlement sites
with basic services and facilities and access to employment and livelihood
opportunities sufficient to meet the basic needs of the affected
families.1wphi1
Section 30. Prohibition Against New Illegal Structures. - It shall be unlawful
for any person to construct any structure in areas mentioned in the preceding
section. After the effectivity of this Act, the barangay, municipal or city
government units shall prevent the construction of any kind or illegal

dwelling units or structures within their respective localities. The head of

any local government unit concerned who allows, abets or otherwise
tolerates the construction of any structure in violation of this section shall be
liable to administrative sanctions under existing laws and to penal sanctions
provided for in this Act.
Yet all is not lost for petitioner. It may properly file an action for mandamus
to compel the local government of Las Pias City to enforce with reasonable
dispatch the eviction, demolition, and relocation of respondents and any
other persons similarly situated in order to give flesh to one of the avowed
policies of R.A. 7279, which is to reduce urban dysfunctions, particularly
those that adversely affect public health, safety, and ecology.28
Indeed, as one of the basic human needs, housing is a matter of state concern
as it directly and significantly affects the general welfare.29
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The March 5, 2010 Decision and
October 29, 2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
90254, which affirmed the May 30, 2007 Decision of the Las Pias RTC,
Branch 197, dismissing petitioner's complaint, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Today is Monday, October 27, 2014

search
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 152644

February 10, 2006

JOHN ERIC LONEY, STEVEN PAUL REID

HERNANDEZ, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

and

PEDRO

B.

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review1 of the Decision2 dated 5 November 2001 and
the Resolution dated 14 March 2002 of the Court of Appeals. The 5
November 2001 Decision affirmed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court,
Boac, Marinduque, Branch 94, in a suit to quash Informations filed against
petitioners John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid, and Pedro B. Hernandez
("petitioners"). The 14 March 2002 Resolution denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
The Facts
Petitioners John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid, and Pedro B. Hernandez are
the President and Chief Executive Officer, Senior Manager, and Resident
Manager for Mining Operations, respectively, of Marcopper Mining
Corporation ("Marcopper"), a corporation engaged in mining in the province
of Marinduque.
Marcopper had been storing tailings3 from its operations in a pit in Mt.
Tapian, Marinduque. At the base of the pit ran a drainage tunnel leading to
the Boac and Makalupnit rivers. It appears that Marcopper had placed a
concrete plug at the tunnels end. On 24 March 1994, tailings gushed out of
or near the tunnels end. In a few days, the Mt. Tapian pit had discharged
millions of tons of tailings into the Boac and Makalupnit rivers.
In August 1996, the Department of Justice separately charged petitioners in
the Municipal Trial Court of Boac, Marinduque ("MTC") with violation of
Article 91(B),4 sub-paragraphs 5 and 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1067 or
the Water Code of the Philippines ("PD 1067"),5 Section 86 of Presidential
Decree No. 984 or the National Pollution Control Decree of 1976 ("PD
984"),7 Section 1088 of Republic Act No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act

of 1995 ("RA 7942"),9 and Article 36510 of the Revised Penal Code
("RPC") for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property.11
Petitioners moved to quash the Informations on the following grounds: (1)
the Informations were "duplicitous" as the Department of Justice charged
more than one offense for a single act; (2) petitioners John Eric Loney and
Steven Paul Reid were not yet officers of Marcopper when the incident
subject of the Informations took place; and (3) the Informations contain
allegations which constitute legal excuse or justification.
The Ruling of the MTC
In its Joint Order of 16 January 1997 ("Joint Order"), the MTC12 initially
deferred ruling on petitioners motion for lack of "indubitable ground for the
quashing of the [I]nformations x x x." The MTC scheduled petitioners
arraignment in February 1997. However, on petitioners motion, the MTC
issued a Consolidated Order on 28 April 1997 ("Consolidated Order"),
granting partial reconsideration to its Joint Order and quashing the
Informations for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984. The MTC maintained the
Informations for violation of RA 7942 and Article 365 of the RPC. The MTC
held:
[T]he 12 Informations have common allegations of pollutants pointing to
"mine tailings" which were precipitately discharged into the Makulapnit and
Boac Rivers due to breach caused on the Tapian drainage/tunnel due to
negligence or failure to institute adequate measures to prevent pollution and
siltation of the Makulapnit and Boac River systems, the very term and
condition required to be undertaken under the Environmental Compliance
Certificate issued on April 1, 1990.
The allegations in the informations point to same set [sic] of evidence
required to prove the single fact of pollution constituting violation of the
Water Code and the Pollution Law which are the same set of evidence
necessary to prove the same single fact of pollution, in proving the elements
constituting violation of the conditions of ECC, issued pursuant to the
Philippine Mining Act. In both instances, the terms and conditions of the
Environmental Compliance Certificate were allegedly violated. In other
words, the same set of evidence is required in proving violations of the three
(3) special laws.

After carefully analyzing and weighing the contending arguments of the

parties and after taking into consideration the applicable laws and
jurisprudence, the Court is convinced that as far as the three (3) aforesaid
laws are concerned, only the Information for [v]iolation of Philippine
Mining Act should be maintained. In other words, the Informations for
[v]iolation of Anti-Pollution Law (PD 984) and the Water Code (PD 1067)
should be dismissed/quashed because the elements constituting the aforesaid
violations are absorbed by the same elements which constitute violation of
the Philippine Mining Act (RA 7942).
Therefore, x x x Criminal Case[] Nos. 96-44, 96-45 and 96-46 for [v]iolation
of the Water Code; and Criminal Case[] Nos. 96-47, 96-48 and 96-49 for
[v]iolation of the Anti-Pollution Law x x x are hereby DISMISSED or
QUASHED and Criminal Case[] Nos. 96-50, 96-51 and 96-52 for [v]iolation
of the Philippine Mining Act are hereby retained to be tried on the merits.
The Information for [v]iolation of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
should also be maintained and heard in a full blown trial because the
common accusation therein is reckless imprudence resulting to [sic] damage
to property. It is the damage to property which the law punishes not the
negligent act of polluting the water system. The prosecution for the
[v]iolation of Philippine Mining Act is not a bar to the prosecution for
reckless imprudence resulting to [sic] damage to property.13
The MTC re-scheduled petitioners arraignment on the remaining charges on
28 and 29 May 1997. In the hearing of 28 May 1997, petitioners manifested
that they were willing to be arraigned on the charge for violation of Article
365 of the RPC but not on the charge for violation of RA 7942 as they
intended to appeal the Consolidated Order in so far as it maintained the
Informations for that offense. After making of record petitioners
manifestation, the MTC proceeded with the arraignment and ordered the
entry of "not guilty" pleas on the charges for violation of RA 7942 and
Article 365 of the RPC.
Petitioners subsequently filed a petition for certiorari with the Regional Trial
Court, Boac, Marinduque, assailing that portion of the Consolidated Order
maintaining the Informations for violation of RA 7942. Petitioners petition
was raffled to Branch 94. For its part, public respondent filed an ordinary
appeal with the same court assailing that portion of the Consolidated Order
quashing the Informations for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984. Public

respondents appeal was raffled to Branch 38. On public respondents

motion, Branch 38 ordered public respondents appeal consolidated with
petitioners petition in Branch 94.
The Ruling of Branch 94
In its Resolution14 of 20 March 1998, Branch 94 granted public
respondents appeal but denied petitioners petition. Branch 94 set aside the
Consolidated Order in so far as it quashed the Informations for violation of
PD 1067 and PD 984 and ordered those charges reinstated. Branch 94
affirmed the Consolidated Order in all other respects. Branch 94 held:
After a careful perusal of the laws concerned, this court is of the opinion that
there can be no absorption by one offense of the three other offenses, as [the]
acts penalized by these laws are separate and distinct from each other. The
elements of proving each violation are not the same with each other.
Concededly, the single act of dumping mine tailings which resulted in the
pollution of the Makulapnit and Boac rivers was the basis for the
information[s] filed against the accused each charging a distinct offense. But
it is also a well-established rule in this jurisdiction that
"A single act may offend against two or more entirely distinct and unrelated
provisions of law, and if one provision requires proof of an additional fact or
element which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of
the information under one does not bar prosecution under the other. x x x."
xxxx
[T]he different laws involve cannot absorb one another as the elements of
each crime are different from one another. Each of these laws require [sic]
proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not although they
stemmed from a single act.15
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals alleging
that Branch 94 acted with grave abuse of discretion because (1) the
Informations for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, RA 7942 and the Article 365
of the RPC "proceed from and are based on a single act or incident of
polluting the Boac and Makalupnit rivers thru dumping of mine tailings" and
(2) the duplicitous nature of the Informations contravenes the ruling in
People v. Relova.16 Petitioners further contended that since the acts

complained of in the charges for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA

7942 are "the very same acts complained of" in the charge for violation of
Article 365 of the RPC, the latter absorbs the former. Hence, petitioners
should only be prosecuted for violation of Article 365 of the RPC.17
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its Decision of 5 November 2001, the Court of Appeals affirmed Branch
94s ruling. The appellate court held:
The records of the case disclose that petitioners filed a motion to quash the
aforementioned Informations for being duplicitous in nature. Section 3 of
Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court specifically provides the grounds
upon which an information may be quashed. x x x
xxxx
[D]uplicity of Informations is not among those included in x x x [Section 3,
Rule 117].
xxxx
We now go to petitioners claim that the resolution of the public respondent
contravened the doctrine laid down in People vs. Relova for being violative
of their right against multiple prosecutions.
In the said case, the Supreme Court found the Peoples argument with
respect to the variances in the mens rea of the two offenses being charged to
be correct. The Court, however, decided the case in the context of the second
sentence of Article IV (22) of the 1973 Constitution (now under Section 21
of Article III of the 1987 Constitution), rather than the first sentence of the
same section. x x x
xxxx
[T]he doctrine laid down in the Relova case does not squarely apply to the
case at Bench since the Informations filed against the petitioners are for
violation of four separate and distinct laws which are national in character.
xxxx

This Court firmly agrees in the public respondents understanding that the
laws by which the petitioners have been [charged] could not possibly absorb
one another as the elements of each crime are different. Each of these laws
require [sic] proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not,
although they stemmed from a single act. x x x
xxxx
[T]his Court finds that there is not even the slightest indicia of evidence that
would give rise to any suspicion that public respondent acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in reversing
the Municipal Trial Courts quashal of the Informations against the
petitioners for violation of P.D. 1067 and P.D. 984. This Court equally finds
no error in the trial courts denial of the petitioners motion to quash R.A.
7942 and Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.18
Petitioners sought reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied their
motion in its Resolution of 14 March 2002.
Petitioners raise the following alleged errors of the Court of Appeals:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A R[E]VERSIBLE ERROR
IN MAINTAINING THE CHARGES FOR VIOLATION OF THE
PHILIPPINE MINING ACT (R.A. 7942) AND REINSTATING THE
CHARGES FOR VIOLATION OF THE WATER CODE (P.D. 1067) AND
POLLUTION CONTROL LAW (P.D. 984), CONSIDERING THAT:
A. THE INFORMATIONS FOR VIOLATION OF THE WATER CODE
(P.D. 1067), THE POLLUTION CONTROL LAW (P.D. 984), THE
PHILIPPINE MINING ACT (R.A. 7942) AND ARTICLE 365 OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE PROCEED FROM AND ARE BASED ON A
SINGLE ACT OR INCIDENT OF POLLUTING THE BOAC AND
MAKULAPNIT RIVERS THRU DUMPING OF MINE TAILINGS.
B. THE PROSECUTION OF PETITIONERS FOR DUPLICITOUS AND
MULTIPLE CHARGES CONTRAVENES THE DOCTRINE LAID DOWN
IN PEOPLE VS. RELOVA, 148 SCRA 292 [1986 THAT "AN ACCUSED
SHOULD NOT BE HARASSED BY MULTIPLE PROSECUTIONS FOR
OFFENSES WHICH THOUGH DIFFERENT FROM ONE ANOTHER

ARE NONETHELESS EACH CONSTITUTED BY A COMMON SET OR

OVERLAPPING SETS OF TECHNICAL ELEMENTS."
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN RULING THAT THE ELEMENT OF LACK OF NECESSARY OR
ADEQUATE PRECAUTION, NEGLIGENCE, RECKLESSNESS AND
IMPRUDENCE UNDER ARTICLE 356 [sic] OF THE REVISED PENAL
CODE DOES NOT FALL WITHIN THE AMBIT OF ANY OF THE
ELEMENTS OF THE PERTINENT PROVISIONS OF THE WATER
CODE, POLLUTION CONTROL LAW AND PHILIPPINE MINING ACT
CHARGED AGAINST PETITIONERS[.]19
The Issues
The petition raises these issues:
(1) Whether all the charges filed against petitioners except one should be
quashed for duplicity of charges and only the charge for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property should stand; and
(2) Whether Branch 94s ruling, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
contravenes People v. Relova.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
No Duplicity of Charges in the Present Case
Duplicity of charges simply means a single complaint or information charges
more than one offense, as Section 13 of Rule 11020 of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure clearly states:
Duplicity of offense. A complaint or information must charge but one
offense, except only in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single
punishment for various offenses.
In short, there is duplicity (or multiplicity) of charges when a single
Information charges more than one offense.21

Under Section 3(e), Rule 11722 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure,
duplicity of offenses in a single information is a ground to quash the
Information. The Rules prohibit the filing of such Information to avoid
confusing the accused in preparing his defense.23 Here, however, the
prosecution charged each petitioner with four offenses, with each
Information charging only one offense. Thus, petitioners erroneously invoke
duplicity of charges as a ground to quash the Informations. On this score
alone, the petition deserves outright denial.
The Filing of Several Charges is Proper
Petitioners contend that they should be charged with one offense only
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property because (1) all the
charges filed against them "proceed from and are based on a single act or
incident of polluting the Boac and Makalupnit rivers thru dumping of mine
tailings" and (2) the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC "absorbs"
the other charges since the element of "lack of necessary or adequate
protection, negligence, recklessness and imprudence" is common among
them.
The contention has no merit.
As early as the start of the last century, this Court had ruled that a single act
or incident might offend against two or more entirely distinct and unrelated
provisions of law thus justifying the prosecution of the accused for more
than one offense.24 The only limit to this rule is the Constitutional
prohibition that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for
"the same offense."25 In People v. Doriquez,26 we held that two (or more)
offenses arising from the same act are not "the same"
x x x if one provision [of law] requires proof of an additional fact or element
which the other does not, x x x. Phrased elsewise, where two different laws
(or articles of the same code) define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of
them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both offenses
arise from the same facts, if each crime involves some important act which
is not an essential element of the other.27 (Emphasis supplied)
Here, double jeopardy is not at issue because not all of its elements are
present.28 However, for the limited purpose of controverting petitioners
claim that they should be charged with one offense only, we quote with

approval Branch 94s comparative analysis of PD 1067, PD 984, RA 7942,

and Article 365 of the RPC showing that in each of these laws on which
petitioners were charged, there is one essential element not required of the
others, thus:
In P.D. 1067 (Philippines Water Code), the additional element to be
established is the dumping of mine tailings into the Makulapnit River and
the entire Boac River System without prior permit from the authorities
concerned. The gravamen of the offense here is the absence of the proper
permit to dump said mine tailings. This element is not indispensable in the
prosecution for violation of PD 984 (Anti-Pollution Law), [RA] 7942
(Philippine Mining Act) and Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code. One can be
validly prosecuted for violating the Water Code even in the absence of actual
pollution, or even [if] it has complied with the terms of its Environmental
Compliance Certificate, or further, even [if] it did take the necessary
precautions to prevent damage to property.
In P.D. 984 (Anti-Pollution Law), the additional fact that must be proved is
the existence of actual pollution. The gravamen is the pollution itself. In the
absence of any pollution, the accused must be exonerated under this law
although there was unauthorized dumping of mine tailings or lack of
precaution on its part to prevent damage to property.
In R.A. 7942 (Philippine Mining Act), the additional fact that must be
established is the willful violation and gross neglect on the part of the
accused to abide by the terms and conditions of the Environmental
Compliance Certificate, particularly that the Marcopper should ensure the
containment of run-off and silt materials from reaching the Mogpog and
Boac Rivers. If there was no violation or neglect, and that the accused
satisfactorily proved [sic] that Marcopper had done everything to ensure
containment of the run-off and silt materials, they will not be liable. It does
not follow, however, that they cannot be prosecuted under the Water Code,
Anti-Pollution Law and the Revised Penal Code because violation of the
Environmental Compliance Certificate is not an essential element of these
laws.
On the other hand, the additional element that must be established in Art.
365 of the Revised Penal Code is the lack of necessary or adequate
precaution, negligence, recklessness and imprudence on the part of the
accused to prevent damage to property. This element is not required under

the previous laws. Unquestionably, it is different from dumping of mine

tailings without permit, or causing pollution to the Boac river system, much
more from violation or neglect to abide by the terms of the Environmental
Compliance Certificate. Moreover, the offenses punished by special law are
mal[a] prohibita in contrast with those punished by the Revised Penal Code
which are mala in se.29
Consequently, the filing of the multiple charges against petitioners, although
based on the same incident, is consistent with settled doctrine.
On petitioners claim that the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC
"absorbs" the charges for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942,
suffice it to say that a mala in se felony (such as Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Damage to Property) cannot absorb mala prohibita crimes (such
as those violating PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942). What makes the former
a felony is criminal intent (dolo) or negligence (culpa); what makes the latter
crimes are the special laws enacting them.
People v. Relova not in Point
Petitioners reiterate their contention in the Court of Appeals that their
prosecution contravenes this Courts ruling in People v. Relova. In particular,
petitioners cite the Courts statement in Relova that the law seeks to prevent
harassment of the accused by "multiple prosecutions for offenses which
though different from one another are nonetheless each constituted by a
common set or overlapping sets of technical elements."
This contention is also without merit.1avvphil.net
The issue in Relova is whether the act of the Batangas Acting City Fiscal in
charging one Manuel Opulencia ("Opulencia") with theft of electric power
under the RPC, after the latter had been acquitted of violating a City
Ordinance penalizing the unauthorized installation of electrical wiring,
violated Opulencias right against double jeopardy. We held that it did, not
because the offenses punished by those two laws were the same but because
the act giving rise to the charges was punished by an ordinance and a
national statute, thus falling within the proscription against multiple
prosecutions for the same act under the second sentence in Section 22,
Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, now Section 21, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. We held:

The petitioner concludes that:

"The unauthorized installation punished by the ordinance [of Batangas City]
is not the same as theft of electricity [under the Revised Penal Code]; that
the second offense is not an attempt to commit the first or a frustration
thereof and that the second offense is not necessarily included in the offense
charged in the first information."
The above argument[ ] made by the petitioner [is] of course correct. This is
clear both from the express terms of the constitutional provision involved
which reads as follows:
"No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or
acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the
same act." x x x
and from our case law on this point. The basic difficulty with the petitioners
position is that it must be examined, not under the terms of the first sentence
of Article IV (22) of the 1973 Constitution, but rather under the second
sentence of the same section. The first sentence of Article IV (22) sets forth
the general rule: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is not
available where the second prosecution is for an offense that is different
from the offense charged in the first or prior prosecution, although both the
first and second offenses may be based upon the same act or set of acts. The
second sentence of Article IV (22) embodies an exception to the general
proposition: the constitutional protection, against double jeopardy is
available although the prior offense charged under an ordinance be different
from the offense charged subsequently under a national statute such as the
Revised Penal Code, provided that both offenses spring from the same act or
set of acts. x x x30 (Italicization in the original; boldfacing supplied)
Thus, Relova is no authority for petitioners claim against multiple
prosecutions based on a single act not only because the question of double
jeopardy is not at issue here, but also because, as the Court of Appeals held,
petitioners are being prosecuted for an act or incident punished by four
national statutes and not by an ordinance and a national statute. In short,
petitioners, if ever, fall under the first sentence of Section 21, Article III
which prohibits multiple prosecution for the same offense, and not, as in

Relova, for offenses arising from the same incident.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 5
November 2001 and the Resolution dated 14 March 2002 of the Court of
Appeals.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 186450

April 14, 2010

NATIONAL WATER RESOURCES BOARD (NWRB), Petitioner,

vs.
A. L. ANG NETWORK, INC., Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
In issue is whether Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction over appeals from
decisions, resolutions or orders of the National Water Resources Board
(petitioner).
A.L. Ang Network (respondent) filed on January 23, 2003 an application for
a Certificate of Public Convenience (CPC) with petitioner to operate and
maintain a water service system in Alijis, Bacolod City.
Bacolod City Water District (BACIWA) opposed respondents application on
the ground that it is the only government agency authorized to operate a
water service system within the city.1
By Decision of August 20, 2003, petitioner granted respondents CPC
application. BACIWA moved to have the decision reconsidered, contending
that its right to due process was violated when it was not allowed to present
evidence in support of its opposition.2
Petitioner reconsidered its Decision and allowed BACIWA to present
evidence,3 drawing respondent to file a petition for certiorari with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City against petitioner and

BACIWA. Petitioner moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that the proper
recourse of respondent was to the Court of Appeals, citing Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court.
The RTC, by Order of April 15, 2005,4 dismissed respondents petition for
lack of jurisdiction, holding that it is the Court of Appeals which has
"exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions,
resolutions, order[s] or awards of . . . quasi-judicial agencies,
instrumentalities, boards or commission[s] . . . except those within the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court . . . ." Thus the RTC explained:
Art. 89 of P.D. 1067 having been long repealed by BP 129, as amended,
which has effectively and explicitly removed the Regional Trial Courts
appellate jurisdiction over the decisions, resolutions, order[s] or awards of
quasi-judicial agencies such as [petitioner] NWRB, and vested with the
Court of Appeals, very clearly now, this Court has no jurisdiction over this
instant petition.
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied, respondent filed a
petition for certiorari at the Court of Appeals, which, by Decision of January
25, 2008,5 annulled and set aside the RTC April 15, 2005, holding that it is
the RTC which has jurisdiction over appeals from petitioners decisions.
Thus the appellate court discoursed.
In the analogous case of BF Northwest Homeowners Association, Inc. vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court[,] the Supreme Court . . . categorically
pronounced the RTCs jurisdiction over appeals from the decisions of the
NWRB consistent with Article 89 of P.D. No. 1067 and ratiocinated in this
wise:
x x x x.
The logical conclusion, therefore, is that jurisdiction over actions for
annulment of NWRC decisions lies with the Regional Trial Courts,
particularly, when we take note of the fact that the appellate jurisdiction of
the Regional Trial Court over NWRC decisions covers such broad and all
embracing grounds as grave abuse of discretion, questions of law, and
questions of fact and law (Art. 89, P.D. No. 1067). This conclusion is also in
keeping with the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, which vests
Regional Trial Courts with original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari,

prohibition, mandamus, etc. (Sec. 21 [1], B.P. Blg. 129) relating to acts or
omissions of an inferior court (Sec. 4, Rule 65, Rules of Court).
x x x x.
Similarly, in Tanjay Water District vs. Pedro Gabaton, the Supreme Court
conformably ruled, viz:
"Inasmuch as Civil Case No. 8144 involves the appropriation, utilization and
control of water, We hold that the jurisdiction to hear and decide the dispute
in the first instance, pertains to the Water Resources Council as provided in
PD No. 1067 which is the special law on the subject. The Court of First
Instance (now Regional Trial Court) has only appellate jurisdiction over the
case."
Based on the foregoing jurisprudence, there is no doubt that [petitioner]
NWRB is mistaken in its assertion. As no repeal is expressly made, Article
89 of P.D. No. 1067 is certainly meant to be an exception to the jurisdiction
of the Court of Appeals over appeals or petitions for certiorari of the
decisions of quasi-judicial bodies. This finds harmony with Paragraph 2,
Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court wherein it is stated that, "If it
involves the acts of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by
law or these rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the
Court of Appeals." Evidently, not all petitions for certiorari under Rule 65
involving the decisions of quasi-judicial agencies must be filed with the
Court of Appeals. The rule admits of some exceptions as plainly provided by
the phrase "unless otherwise provided by law or these rules" and Article 89
of P.D. No. 1067 is verily an example of these exceptions. (italics and
emphasis partly in the original; underscoring supplied)
Petitioners motion for reconsideration having been denied by the appellate
court by Resolution of February 9, 2009,6 petitioner filed the present
petition for review, contending that:
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAS NO CERTIORARI
JURISDICTION OVER THE [PETITIONER] SINCE SECTION 89, PD
NO. 1067, REGARDING APPEALS, HAS BEEN SUPERSEDED AND
REPEALED BY [BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG] 129 AND THE RULES
OF COURT. FURTHERMORE, PD 1067 ITSELF DOES NOT
CONTEMPLATE THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT SHOULD

HAVE CERTIORARI JURISDICTION OVER THE [PETITIONER].7

(underscoring supplied)
Petitioner maintains that the RTC does not have jurisdiction over a petition
for certiorari and prohibition to annul or modify its acts or omissions as a
quasi-judicial agency. Citing Section 4 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
petitioner contends that there is no law or rule which requires the filing of a
petition for certiorari over its acts or omissions in any other court or tribunal
other than the Court of Appeals.8
Petitioner goes on to fault the appellate court in holding that Batas Pambansa
Bilang 129 (BP 129) or the Judiciary Reorganization Act did not expressly
repeal Article 89 of Presidential Decree No. 1067 (PD 1067) otherwise
known as the Water Code of the Philippines.9
Respondent, on the other hand, maintains the correctness of the assailed
decision of the appellate court.
The petition is impressed with merit.
Section 9 (1) of BP 129 granted the Court of Appeals (then known as the
Intermediate Appellate Court) original jurisdiction to issue writs of
mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus and quo warranto, and
auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction.10
Since the appellate court has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over quasijudicial agencies under Rule 4311 of the Rules of Court, petitions for writs
of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus against the acts and omissions of
quasi-judicial agencies, like petitioner, should be filed with it. This is what
Rule 65 of the Rules imposes for procedural uniformity. The only exception
to this instruction is when the law or the Rules itself directs otherwise, as
cited in Section 4, Rule 65.12 The appellate courts construction that Article
89 of PD 1067, which reads:
ART. 89. The decisions of the [NWRB] on water rights controversies may be
appealed to the [RTC] of the province where the subject matter of the
controversy is situated within fifteen (15) days from the date the party
appealing receives a copy of the decision, on any of the following grounds:
(1) grave abuse of discretion; (2) question of law; and (3) questions of fact

and law (emphasis and underscoring supplied), is such an exception, is

erroneous.
Article 89 of PD 1067 had long been rendered inoperative by the passage of
BP 129. Aside from delineating the jurisdictions of the Court of Appeals and
the RTCs, Section 47 of BP 129 repealed or modified:
x x x. [t]he provisions of Republic Act No. 296, otherwise known as the
Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, of Republic Act No. 5179, as amended,
of the Rules of Court, and of all other statutes, letters of instructions and
general orders or parts thereof, inconsistent with the provisions of this Act x
x x. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The general repealing clause under Section 47 "predicates the intended
repeal under the condition that a substantial conflict must be found in
existing and prior acts."13
In enacting BP 129, the Batasang Pambansa was presumed to have
knowledge of the provision of Article 89 of P.D. No. 1067 and to have
intended to change it.14 The legislative intent to repeal Article 89 is clear
and manifest given the scope and purpose of BP 129, one of which is to
provide a homogeneous procedure for the review of adjudications of quasijudicial entities to the Court of Appeals.
More importantly, what Article 89 of PD 1067 conferred to the RTC was the
power of review on appeal the decisions of petitioner. It appears that the
appellate court gave significant consideration to the ground of "grave abuse
of discretion" to thus hold that the RTC has certiorari jurisdiction over
petitioners decisions. A reading of said Article 89 shows, however, that it
only made "grave abuse of discretion" as another ground to invoke in an
ordinary appeal to the RTC. Indeed, the provision was unique to the Water
Code at the time of its application in 1976.
The issuance of BP 129, specifically Section 9 (Jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals, then known as Intermediate Appellate Court), and the subsequent
formulation of the Rules, clarified and delineated the appellate and certiorari
jurisdictions of the Court of Appeals over adjudications of quasi-judicial
bodies. Grave abuse of discretion may be invoked before the appellate court
as a ground for an error of jurisdiction.

It bears noting that, in the present case, respondent assailed petitioners order
via certiorari before the RTC, invoking grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction as ground-basis thereof. In other words, it
invoked such ground not for an error of judgment.
While Section 9 (3) of BP 12915 and Section 1 of Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court16 does not list petitioner as "among" the quasi-judicial agencies
whose final judgments, orders, resolutions or awards are appealable to the
appellate court, it is non sequitur to hold that the Court of Appeals has no
appellate jurisdiction over petitioners judgments, orders, resolutions or
awards. It is settled that the list of quasi-judicial agencies specifically
mentioned in Rule 43 is not meant to be exclusive.17 The employment of the
word "among" clearly instructs so.1avvphi1
BF Northwest Homeowners Association v. Intermediate Appellate Court,18
a 1987 case cited by the appellate court to support its ruling that RTCs have
jurisdiction over judgments, orders, resolutions or awards of petitioner, is no
longer controlling in light of the definitive instruction of Rule 43 of the
Revised Rules of Court.
Tanjay Water District v. Gabaton19 is not in point either as the issue raised
therein was which between the RTC and the then National Water Resources
Council had jurisdiction over disputes in the appropriation, utilization and
control of water.
In fine, certiorari and appellate jurisdiction over adjudications of petitioner
properly belongs to the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the challenged Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The April 15, 2005 Order of the
Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City dismissing petitioners petition for lack
of jurisdiction is UPHELD.
No costs.

G.R. No. 199199

August 27, 2013

MARICRIS D. DOLOT, CHAIRMAN OF THE BAGONG ALYANSANG

MAKABAYAN-SORSOGON, PETITIONER
vs.
HON. RAMON PAJE, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES,
REYNULFO A. JUAN, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, MINES AND
GEOSCIENCES BUREAU, DENR, HON. RAUL R. LEE, GOVERNOR,
PROVINCE OF SORSOGON, ANTONIO C. OCAMPO, JR., VICTORIA
A. AJERO, ALFREDO M. AGUILAR, AND JUAN M. AGUILAR,
ANTONES ENTERPRISES, GLOBAL SUMMIT MINES DEV'T CORP.,
AND TR ORE, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assailing the Order2 dated September 16, 2011 and Resolution3 dated
October 18, 2011 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sorsogon,
Branch 53. The assailed issuances dismissed Civil Case No. 2011-8338 for
Continuing Mandamus, Damages and Attorneys Fees with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Temporary Environment Protection Order.
Antecedent Facts
On September 15, 2011, petitioner Maricris D. Dolot (Dolot), together with
the parish priest of the Holy Infant Jesus Parish and the officers of Alyansa
Laban sa Mina sa Matnog (petitioners), filed a petition for continuing
mandamus, damages and attorneys fees with the RTC of Sorsogon,
docketed as Civil Case No. 2011-8338.4 The petition contained the
following pertinent allegations: (1) sometime in 2009, they protested the iron
ore mining operations being conducted by Antones Enterprises, Global
Summit Mines Development Corporation and TR Ore in Barangays
Balocawe and Bon-ot Daco, located in the Municipality of Matnog, to no
avail; (2) Matnog is located in the southern tip of Luzon and there is a need
to protect, preserve and maintain the geological foundation of the
municipality; (3) Matnog is susceptible to flooding and landslides, and
confronted with the environmental dangers of flood hazard, liquefaction,
ground settlement, ground subsidence and landslide hazard; (4) after
investigation, they learned that the mining operators did not have the

required permit to operate; (5) Sorsogon Governor Raul Lee and his
predecessor Sally Lee issued to the operators a small-scale mining permit,
which they did not have authority to issue; (6) the representatives of the
Presidential Management Staff and the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR), despite knowledge, did not do anything to
protect the interest of the people of Matnog;5 and (7) the respondents
violated Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7076 or the Peoples Small-Scale Mining
Act of 1991, R.A. No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, and the
Local Government Code.6 Thus, they prayed for the following reliefs: (1)
the issuance of a writ commanding the respondents to immediately stop the
mining operations in the Municipality of Matnog; (2) the issuance of a
temporary environment protection order or TEPO; (3) the creation of an
inter-agency group to undertake the rehabilitation of the mining site; (4)
award of damages; and (5) return of the iron ore, among others.7
The case was referred by the Executive Judge to the RTC of Sorsogon,
Branch 53 being the designated environmental court.8 In the Order9 dated
September 16, 2011, the case was summarily dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in the
Resolution10 dated October 18, 2011. Aside from sustaining the dismissal of
the case for lack of jurisdiction, the RTC11 further ruled that: (1) there was
no final court decree, order or decision yet that the public officials allegedly
failed to act on, which is a condition for the issuance of the writ of
continuing mandamus; (2) the case was prematurely filed as the petitioners
therein failed to exhaust their administrative remedies; and (3) they also
failed to attach judicial affidavits and furnish a copy of the complaint to the
government or appropriate agency, as required by the rules.12
Petitioner Dolot went straight to this Court on pure questions of law.
Issues
The main issue in this case is whether the RTC-Branch 53 has jurisdiction to
resolve Civil Case No. 2011-8338. The other issue is whether the petition is
dismissible on the grounds that: (1) there is no final court decree, order or
decision that the public officials allegedly failed to act on; (2) the case was
prematurely filed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies; and (3) the
petitioners failed to attach judicial affidavits and furnish a copy of the

complaint to the government or appropriate agency.

Ruling of the Court
Jurisdiction and Venue
In dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction, the RTC, in its Order dated
September 16, 2011, apparently relied on SC Administrative Order (A.O.)
No. 7 defining the territorial areas of the Regional Trial Courts in Regions 1
to 12, and Administrative Circular (Admin. Circular) No. 23-2008,13
designating the environmental courts "to try and decide violations of
environmental laws x x x committed within their respective territorial
jurisdictions."14 Thus, it ruled that its territorial jurisdiction was limited
within the boundaries of Sorsogon City and the neighboring municipalities
of Donsol, Pilar, Castilla, Casiguran and Juban and that it was "bereft of
jurisdiction to entertain, hear and decide [the] case, as such authority rests
before another co-equal court."15
Such reasoning is plainly erroneous. The RTC cannot solely rely on SC A.O.
No. 7 and Admin. Circular No. 23-2008 and confine itself within its four
corners in determining whether it had jurisdiction over the action filed by the
petitioners.
None is more well-settled than the rule that jurisdiction, which is the power
and authority of the court to hear, try and decide a case, is conferred by
law.16 It may either be over the nature of the action, over the subject matter,
over the person of the defendants or over the issues framed in the
pleadings.17 By virtue of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129 or the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, jurisdiction over special civil actions for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is vested in the RTC. Particularly,
Section 21(1) thereof provides that the RTCs shall exercise original
jurisdiction
in the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
habeas corpus and injunction which may be enforced in any part of their
respective regions. (Emphasis ours)
A.O. No. 7 and Admin. Circular No. 23-2008 was issued pursuant to Section
18 of B.P. Blg. 129, which gave the Court authority to define the territory
over which a branch of the RTC shall exercise its authority. These

administrative orders and circulars issued by the Court merely provide for
the venue where an action may be filed. The Court does not have the power
to confer jurisdiction on any court or tribunal as the allocation of jurisdiction
is lodged solely in Congress.18 It also cannot be delegated to another office
or agency of the Government.19 Section 18 of B.P. Blg. 129, in fact,
explicitly states that the territory thus defined shall be deemed to be the
territorial area of the branch concerned for purposes of determining the
venue of all suits, proceedings or actions. It was also clarified in Office of
the Court Administrator v. Judge Matas20 that
Administrative Order No. 3 [defining the territorial jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Courts in the National Capital Judicial Region] and, in like
manner, Circular Nos. 13 and 19, did not per se confer jurisdiction on the
covered regional trial courts or its branches, such that non-observance
thereof would nullify their judicial acts. The administrative order merely
defines the limits of the administrative area within which a branch of the
court may exercise its authority pursuant to the jurisdiction conferred by
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.21
The RTC need not be reminded that venue relates only to the place of trial or
the geographical location in which an action or proceeding should be
brought and does not equate to the jurisdiction of the court. It is intended to
accord convenience to the parties, as it relates to the place of trial, and does
not restrict their access to the courts.22 Consequently, the RTCs motu
proprio dismissal of Civil Case No. 2011-8338 on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction is patently incorrect.
At most, the error committed by the petitioners in filing the case with the
RTC of Sorsogon was that of improper venue. A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC or the
Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (Rules) specifically states that a
special civil action for continuing mandamus shall be filed with the "[RTC]
exercising jurisdiction over the territory where the actionable neglect or
omission occurred x x x."23 In this case, it appears that the alleged
actionable neglect or omission occurred in the Municipality of Matnog and
as such, the petition should have been filed in the RTC of Irosin.24 But even
then, it does not warrant the outright dismissal of the petition by the RTC as
venue may be waived.25 Moreover, the action filed by the petitioners is not
criminal in nature where venue is an essential element of jurisdiction.26 In
Gomez-Castillo v. Commission on Elections,27 the Court even expressed
that what the RTC should have done under the circumstances was to transfer

the case (an election protest) to the proper branch. Similarly, it would serve
the higher interest of justice28 if the Court orders the transfer of Civil Case
No. 2011 8338 to the RTC of Irosin for proper and speedy resolution, with
the RTC applying the Rules in its disposition of the case.
At this juncture, the Court affirms the continuing applicability of Admin.
Circular No. 23-2008 constituting the different "green courts" in the country
and setting the administrative guidelines in the raffle and disposition of
environmental cases. While the designation and guidelines were made in
2008, the same should operate in conjunction with the Rules.
A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC: Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases
In its Resolution dated October 18, 2011, which resolved the petitioners
motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal, the RTC further ruled
that the petition was dismissible on the following grounds: (1) there is no
final court decree, order or decision yet that the public officials allegedly
failed to act on; (2) the case was prematurely filed for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies; and (3) there was failure to attach judicial affidavits
and furnish a copy of the complaint to the government or appropriate
agency.29 The respondents, and even the Office of the Solicitor General, in
behalf of the public respondents, all concur with the view of the RTC.
The concept of continuing mandamus was first introduced in Metropolitan
Manila Development Authority v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay.30
Now cast in stone under Rule 8 of the Rules, the writ of continuing
mandamus enjoys a distinct procedure than that of ordinary civil actions for
the enforcement/violation of environmental laws, which are covered by Part
II (Civil Procedure). Similar to the procedure under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court for special civil actions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus,
Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules requires that the petition filed should be
sufficient in form and substance before a court may take further action;
otherwise, the court may dismiss the petition outright. Courts must be
cautioned, however, that the determination to give due course to the petition
or dismiss it outright is an exercise of discretion that must be applied in a
reasonable manner in consonance with the spirit of the law and always with
the view in mind of seeing to it that justice is served.31
Sufficiency in form and substance refers to the contents of the petition filed
under Rule 8, Section 1:

When any agency or instrumentality of the government or officer thereof

unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station in connection with
the enforcement or violation of an environmental law rule or regulation or a
right therein, or unlawfully excludes another from the use or enjoyment of
such right and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty, attaching
thereto supporting evidence, specifying that the petition concerns an
environmental law, rule or regulation, and praying that judgment be rendered
commanding the respondent to do an act or series of acts until the judgment
is fully satisfied, and to pay damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of
the malicious neglect to perform the duties of the respondent, under the law,
rules or regulations. The petition shall also contain a sworn certification of
non-forum shopping.1wphi1
On matters of form, the petition must be verified and must contain
supporting evidence as well as a sworn certification of non-forum shopping.
It is also necessary that the petitioner must be one who is aggrieved by an act
or omission of the government agency, instrumentality or its officer
concerned. Sufficiency of substance, on the other hand, necessitates that the
petition must contain substantive allegations specifically constituting an
actionable neglect or omission and must establish, at the very least, a prima
facie basis for the issuance of the writ, viz: (1) an agency or instrumentality
of government or its officer unlawfully neglects the performance of an act or
unlawfully excludes another from the use or enjoyment of a right; (2) the act
to be performed by the government agency, instrumentality or its officer is
specifically enjoined by law as a duty; (3) such duty results from an office,
trust or station in connection with the enforcement or violation of an
environmental law, rule or regulation or a right therein; and (4) there is no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law.32
The writ of continuing mandamus is a special civil action that may be
availed of "to compel the performance of an act specifically enjoined by
law."33 The petition should mainly involve an environmental and other
related law, rule or regulation or a right therein. The RTCs mistaken notion
on the need for a final judgment, decree or order is apparently based on the
definition of the writ of continuing mandamus under Section 4, Rule 1 of the
Rules, to wit:

(c) Continuing mandamus is a writ issued by a court in an environmental

case directing any agency or instrumentality of the government or officer
thereof to perform an act or series of acts decreed by final judgment which
shall remain effective until judgment is fully satisfied. (Emphasis ours)
The final court decree, order or decision erroneously alluded to by the RTC
actually pertains to the judgment or decree that a court would eventually
render in an environmental case for continuing mandamus and which
judgment or decree shall subsequently become final.
Under the Rules, after the court has rendered a judgment in conformity with
Rule 8, Section 7 and such judgment has become final, the issuing court still
retains jurisdiction over the case to ensure that the government agency
concerned is performing its tasks as mandated by law and to monitor the
effective performance of said tasks. It is only upon full satisfaction of the
final judgment, order or decision that a final return of the writ shall be made
to the court and if the court finds that the judgment has been fully
implemented, the satisfaction of judgment shall be entered in the court
docket.34 A writ of continuing mandamus is, in essence, a command of
continuing compliance with a final judgment as it "permits the court to retain
jurisdiction after judgment in order to ensure the successful implementation
of the reliefs mandated under the courts decision."35
The Court, likewise, cannot sustain the argument that the petitioners should
have first filed a case with the Panel of Arbitrators (Panel), which has
jurisdiction over mining disputes under R.A. No. 7942.
Indeed, as pointed out by the respondents, the Panel has jurisdiction over
mining disputes.36 But the petition filed below does not involve a mining
dispute. What was being protested are the alleged negative environmental
impact of the small-scale mining operation being conducted by Antones
Enterprises, Global Summit Mines Development Corporation and TR Ore in
the Municipality of Matnog; the authority of the Governor of Sorsogon to
issue mining permits in favor of these entities; and the perceived
indifference of the DENR and local government officials over the issue.
Resolution of these matters does not entail the technical knowledge and
expertise of the members of the Panel but requires an exercise of judicial
function. Thus, in Olympic Mines and Development Corp. v. Platinum
Group Metals Corporation,37 the Court stated

Arbitration before the Panel of Arbitrators is proper only when there is a

disagreement between the parties as to some provisions of the contract
between them, which needs the interpretation and the application of that
particular knowledge and expertise possessed by members of that Panel. It is
not proper when one of the parties repudiates the existence or validity of
such contract or agreement on the ground of fraud or oppression as in this
case. The validity of the contract cannot be subject of arbitration
proceedings. Allegations of fraud and duress in the execution of a contract
are matters within the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts of law. These
questions are legal in nature and require the application and interpretation of
laws and jurisprudence which is necessarily a judicial function.38 (Emphasis
supplied in the former and ours in the latter)
Consequently, resort to the Panel would be completely useless and
unnecessary.
The Court also finds that the RTC erred in ruling that the petition is infirm
for failure to attach judicial affidavits. As previously stated, Rule 8 requires
that the petition should be verified, contain supporting evidence and must be
accompanied by a sworn certification of non-forum shopping. There is
nothing in Rule 8 that compels the inclusion of judicial affidavits, albeit not
prohibited. It is only if the evidence of the petitioner would consist of
testimony of witnesses that it would be the time that judicial affidavits
(affidavits of witnesses in the question and answer form) must be attached to
the petition/complaint.39
Finally, failure to furnish a copy of the petition to the respondents is not a
fatal defect such that the case should be dismissed. The RTC could have just
required the petitioners to furnish a copy of the petition to the respondents. It
should be remembered that "courts are not enslaved by technicalities, and
they have the prerogative to relax compliance with procedural rules of even
the most mandatory character, mindful of the duty to reconcile both the need
to speedily put an end to litigation and the parties right to an opportunity to
be heard."40
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Order dated September 16,
2011 and Resolution dated October 18, 2011 issued by the Regional Trial
Court of Sorsogon, Branch 53, dismissing Civil Case No. 2011-8338 are
NULLIFIED AND SET ASIDE. The Executive Judge of the Regional Trial

Court of Sorsogon is DIRECTED to transfer the case to the Regional Trial

Court of Irosin, Branch 55, for further proceedings with dispatch. Petitioner
Maricris D. Dolot is also ORDERED to furnish the respondents with a copy
of the petition and its annexes within ten (10) days from receipt of this
Decision and to submit its Compliance with the RTC of Irosin.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 180771 : April 24, 2012]

RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF THE PROTECTED SEASCAPE
TAON STRAIT, E.G., TOOTHED WHALES, DOLPHINS, PORPOISES,
AND OTHER CETACEAN SPECIES, JOINED IN AND REPRESENTED
HEREIN BY HUMAN BEINGS GLORIA ESTENZO RAMOS, ET AL. VS.
SECRETARY ANGELO REYES, ET AL. G.R. NO. 181527 - CENTRAL
VISAYAS FISHERFOLK DEVELOPMENT CENTER (FIDEC), ET AL.
VS. SECRETARY ANGELO REYES, ET AL.
Sirs/Mesdames:
Please take notice that the Court en banc issued a Resolution dated APRIL
24, 2012, which reads as follows:
G.R. No. 180771- RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF THE
PROTECTED SEASCAPE TAON STRAIT, e.g., TOOTHED WHALES,
DOLPHINS, PORPOISES, AND OTHER CETACEAN SPECIES, Joined in
and Represented herein by Human Beings Gloria Estenzo Ramos, ET AL.
vs. SECRETARY ANGELO REYES, ET AL.
G.R. No. 181527 - CENTRAL VISAYAS FISHERFOLK DEVELOPMENT
CENTER (FIDEC), ET AL. vs. SECRETARY ANGELO REYES, ET AL.
RESOLUTION
This Court resolves to GRANT the Motion to Admit Re: Motion for
Clarification (By Special Appearance) dated March 19, 2012, filed by
counsel for JAPEX Philippines, Ltd.cralaw

With regard to its Motion for Clarification (By Special Appearance) dated
March 19, 2012, this Court considers JAPEX Philippines, Ltd. as a real
party-in-interest in these cases. Under Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of
Court, a real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the
suit. Contrary to JAPEX Philippines, Ltd.'s allegation that it is a completely
distinct corporation, which should not be confused with JAPEX Company,
Ltd., JAPEX Philippines, Ltd. is a mere branch office, established by JAPEX
Company, Ltd. for the purpose of carrying out the latter's business
transactions here in the Philippines. Thus, JAPEX Philippines, Ltd., has no
separate personality from its mother foreign corporation, the party
impleaded in this case.
Moreover, Section 128 of the Corporation Code provides for the
responsibilities and duties of a resident agent of a foreign corporation:
SECTION 128. Resident agent; service of process. The Securities and
Exchange Commission shall require as a condition precedent to the issuance
of the license to transact business in the Philippines by any foreign
corporation that such corporation file with the Securities and Exchange
Commission a written power of attorney designating some person who must
be a resident of the Philippines, on whom any summons and other legal
processes may be served in all actions or other legal proceedings against
such corporation, and consenting that service upon such resident agent shall
be admitted and held as valid as if served upon the duly authorized officers
of the foreign corporation at its home office. Any such foreign corporation
shall likewise execute and file with the Securities and Exchange
Commission an agreement or stipulation, executed by the proper authorities
of said corporation, in form and substance as follows:
"The (name of foreign corporation) does hereby stipulate and agree, in
consideration of its being granted by the Securities and Exchange
Commission a license to transact business in the Philippines, that if at any
time said corporation shall cease to transact business in the Philippines, or
shall be without any resident agent in the Philippines on whom any
summons or other legal processes may be served, then in any action or
proceeding arising out of any business or transaction which occurred in the
Philippines, service of any summons or other legal process may be made
upon the Securities and Exchange Commission and that such service shall

have the same force and effect as if made upon the duly-authorized officers
of the corporation at its home office."
Whenever such service of summons or other process shall be made upon the
Securities and Exchange Commission, the Commission shall, within ten (10)
days thereafter, transmit by mail a copy of such summons or other legal
process to the corporation at its home or principal office. The sending of
such copy by the Commission shall be a necessary part of and shall complete
such service. All expenses incurred by the Commission for such service shall
be paid in advance by the party at whose instance the service is made.
In case of a change of address of the resident agent, it shall be his or its duty
to immediately notify in writing the Securities and Exchange Commission of
the new address.
It is clear from the foregoing provision that the function of a resident agent
is to receive summons or legal processes that may be served in all actions or
other legal proceedings against the foreign corporation. These cases have
been prosecuted in the name of JAPEX Company, Ltd., and JAPEX
Philippines Ltd., as its branch office and resident agent, had been receiving
the various resolutions from this Court, as evidenced by Registry Return
Cards signed by its representatives.
However, in the interest of justice this Court, nonetheless, resolves to grant
JAPEX Philippines Ltd.'s Motion for Extension of Time (By Special
Appearance), dated March 21, 2012, to file its Memorandum. As prayed for
by JAPEX Philippines Ltd., it is given thirty (30) days from March 21, 2012
or until April 21, 2012, within which to file its Memorandum." cralaw
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) ENRIQUETA E. VIDAL
Clerk of Court