EN BANC

ROBERTO SORIANO, A.C. No. 6792

Complainant,
- versus Atty. MANUEL DIZON, Promulgated:
Respondent. January 25, 2006
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before us is a Complaint-Affidavit[1] for the disbarment of Atty. Manuel Dizon, filed
by Roberto Soriano with the Commission on Bar Discipine (CBD) of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Complainant alleges that the conviction of respondent
for a crime involving moral turpitude, together with the circumstances
surrounding the conviction, violates Canon 1 of Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility;[2] and constitutes sufficient ground for his disbarment
under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.[3]
Because of the failure of Atty. Dizon to submit his Answer to the Complaint, the
CBD issued a Notice dated May 20, 2004, informing him that he was in default,
and that an ex-parte hearing had been scheduled for June 11, 2004.[4]
After that hearing, complainant manifested that he was submitting the case on
the basis of the Complaint and its attachments.[5] Accordingly, the CBD directed
him to file his Position Paper, which he did on July 27, 2004.[6] Afterwards, the
case was deemed submitted for resolution.
On December 6, 2004, Commissioner Teresita J. Herbosa rendered her Report and
Recommendation, which was later adopted and approved by the IBP Board of
Governors in its Resolution No. XVI-2005-84 dated March 12, 2005.
In his Complaint-Affidavit, Soriano alleged that respondent had violated Canon 1,
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and that the conviction of the
latter for frustrated homicide,[7] which involved moral turpitude, should result in
his disbarment.
The facts leading to respondents conviction were summarized by Branch 60 of the
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City in this wise:
x x x. The accused was driving his brown Toyota Corolla and was on his way home
after gassing up in preparation for his trip to Concepcion, Tarlac with his wife.
Along Abanao Street, a taxi driver overtook the car driven by the accused not
knowing that the driver of the car he had overtaken is not just someone, but a
lawyer and a prominent member of the Baguio community who was under the
influence of liquor. Incensed, the accused tailed the taxi driver until the latter
stopped to make a turn at [the] Chugum and Carino Streets. The accused also
stopped his car, berated the taxi driver and held him by his shirt. To stop the
aggression, the taxi driver forced open his door causing the accused to fall to the
ground. The taxi driver knew that the accused had been drinking because he
smelled of liquor. Taking pity on the accused who looked elderly, the taxi driver
got out of his car to help him get up. But the accused, by now enraged, stood up
immediately and was about to deal the taxi driver a fist blow when the latter

boxed him on the chest instead. The accused fell down a second time, got up
again and was about to box the taxi driver but the latter caught his fist and turned
his arm around. The taxi driver held on to the accused until he could be pacified
and then released him. The accused went back to his car and got his revolver
making sure that the handle was wrapped in a handkerchief. The taxi driver was
on his way back to his vehicle when he noticed the eyeglasses of the accused on
the ground. He picked them up intending to return them to the accused. But as he
was handing the same to the accused, he was met by the barrel of the gun held
by the accused who fired and shot him hitting him on the neck. He fell on the
thigh of the accused so the latter pushed him out and sped off. The incident was
witnessed by Antonio Billanes whose testimony corroborated that of the taxi
driver, the complainant in this case, Roberto Soriano.[8]
It was the prosecution witness, Antonio Billanes, who came to the aid of Soriano
and brought the latter to the hospital. Because the bullet had lacerated the
carotid artery on the left side of his neck,[9] complainant would have surely died
of hemorrhage if he had not received timely medical assistance, according to the
attending surgeon, Dr. Francisco Hernandez, Jr. Soriano sustained a spinal cord
injury, which caused paralysis on the left part of his body and disabled him for his
job as a taxi driver.
The trial court promulgated its Decision dated November 29, 2001. On January 18,
2002, respondent filed an application for probation, which was granted by the
court on several conditions. These included satisfaction of the civil liabilities
imposed by [the] court in favor of the offended party, Roberto Soriano.[10]
According to the unrefuted statements of complainant, Atty. Dizon, who has yet to
comply with this particular undertaking, even appealed the civil liability to the
Court of Appeals.[11]
In her Report and Recommendation, Commissioner Herbosa recommended that
respondent be disbarred from the practice of law for having been convicted of a
crime involving moral turpitude.
The commissioner found that respondent had not only been convicted of such
crime, but that the latter also exhibited an obvious lack of good moral character,
based on the following facts:
1. He was under the influence of liquor while driving his car;
2. He reacted violently and attempted to assault Complainant only because the
latter, driving a taxi, had overtaken him;
3. Complainant having been able to ward off his attempted assault, Respondent
went back to his car, got a gun, wrapped the same with a handkerchief and shot
Complainant[,] who was unarmed;
4. When Complainant fell on him, Respondent simply pushed him out and fled;
5. Despite positive identification and overwhelming evidence, Respondent denied
that he had shot Complainant;
6. Apart from [his] denial, Respondent also lied when he claimed that he was the
one mauled by Complainant and two unidentified persons; and,
7. Although he has been placed on probation, Respondent has[,] to date[,] not yet
satisfied his civil liabilities to Complainant.[12]
On July 8, 2005, the Supreme Court received for its final action the IBP Resolution
adopting the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
We agree with the findings and recommendations of Commissioner Herbosa, as
approved and adopted by the IBP Board of Governors.

Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, conviction for a crime
involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment or suspension. By such
conviction, a lawyer is deemed to have become unfit to uphold the administration
of justice and to be no longer possessed of good moral character.[13] In the
instant case, respondent has been found guilty; and he stands convicted, by final
judgment, of frustrated homicide. Since his conviction has already been
established and is no longer open to question, the only issues that remain to be
determined are as follows: 1) whether his crime of frustrated homicide involves
moral turpitude, and 2) whether his guilt warrants disbarment.
Moral turpitude has been defined as everything which is done contrary to justice,
modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private
and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general,
contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.[14]
The question of whether the crime of homicide involves moral turpitude has been
discussed in International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) v. NLRC,[15] a labor case
concerning an employee who was dismissed on the basis of his conviction for
homicide. Considering the particular circumstances surrounding the commission
of the crime, this Court rejected the employers contention and held that homicide
in that case did not involve moral turpitude. (If it did, the crime would have been
violative of the IRRIs Employment Policy Regulations and indeed a ground for
dismissal.) The Court explained that, having disregarded the attendant
circumstances, the employer made a pronouncement that was precipitate.
Furthermore, it was not for the latter to determine conclusively whether a crime
involved moral turpitude. That discretion belonged to the courts, as explained
thus:
x x x. Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree
of the crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not shown
by every known and intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular
conviction involves moral turpitude may be a question of fact and frequently
depends on all the surrounding circumstances. x x x.[16] (Emphasis supplied)

In the IRRI case, in which the crime of homicide did not involve moral turpitude,
the Court appreciated the presence of incomplete self-defense and total absence
of aggravating circumstances. For a better understanding of that Decision, the
circumstances of the crime are quoted as follows:
x x x. The facts on record show that Micosa [the IRRI employee] was then
urinating and had his back turned when the victim drove his fist unto Micosa's
face; that the victim then forcibly rubbed Micosa's face into the filthy urinal; that
Micosa pleaded to the victim to stop the attack but was ignored and that it was
while Micosa was in that position that he drew a fan knife from the left pocket of
his shirt and desperately swung it at the victim who released his hold on Micosa
only after the latter had stabbed him several times. These facts show that
Micosa's intention was not to slay the victim but only to defend his person. The
appreciation in his favor of the mitigating circumstances of self-defense and
voluntary surrender, plus the total absence of any aggravating circumstance
demonstrate that Micosa's character and intentions were not inherently vile,
immoral or unjust.[17]

The present case is totally different. As the IBP correctly found, the circumstances
clearly evince the moral turpitude of respondent and his unworthiness to practice
law.

Atty. Dizon was definitely the aggressor, as he pursued and shot complainant
when the latter least expected it. The act of aggression shown by respondent will
not be mitigated by the fact that he was hit once and his arm twisted by
complainant. Under the circumstances, those were reasonable actions clearly
intended to fend off the lawyers assault.
We also consider the trial courts finding of treachery as a further indication of the
skewed morals of respondent. He shot the victim when the latter was not in a
position to defend himself. In fact, under the impression that the assault was
already over, the unarmed complainant was merely returning the eyeglasses of
Atty. Dizon when the latter unexpectedly shot him. To make matters worse,
respondent wrapped the handle of his gun with a handkerchief so as not to leave
fingerprints. In so doing, he betrayed his sly intention to escape punishment for
his crime.
The totality of the facts unmistakably bears the earmarks of moral turpitude. By
his conduct, respondent revealed his extreme arrogance and feeling of selfimportance. As it were, he acted like a god on the road, who deserved to be
venerated and never to be slighted. Clearly, his inordinate reaction to a simple
traffic incident reflected poorly on his fitness to be a member of the legal
profession. His overreaction also evinced vindictiveness, which was definitely an
undesirable trait in any individual, more so in a lawyer. In the tenacity with which
he pursued complainant, we see not the persistence of a person who has been
grievously wronged, but the obstinacy of one trying to assert a false sense of
superiority and to exact revenge.
It is also glaringly clear that respondent seriously transgressed Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility through his illegal possession of an unlicensed
firearm[18] and his unjust refusal to satisfy his civil liabilities.[19]
He has thus brazenly violated the law and disobeyed the lawful orders of the
courts. We remind him that, both in his attorneys oath[20] and in the Code of
Professional Responsibility, he bound himself to obey the laws of the land.
All told, Atty. Dizon has shown through this incident that he is wanting in even a
basic sense of justice. He obtained the benevolence of the trial court when it
suspended his sentence and granted him probation. And yet, it has been four
years[21] since he was ordered to settle his civil liabilities to complainant. To date,
respondent remains adamant in refusing to fulfill that obligation. By his extreme
impetuosity and intolerance, as shown by his violent reaction to a simple traffic
altercation, he has taken away the earning capacity, good health, and youthful
vigor of his victim. Still, Atty. Dizon begrudges complainant the measly amount
that could never even fully restore what the latter has lost.
Conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude may relate, not to the exercise of
the profession of lawyers, but certainly to their good moral character.[22] Where
their misconduct outside of their professional dealings is so gross as to show them
morally unfit for their office and unworthy of the privileges conferred upon them
by their license and the law, the court may be justified in suspending or removing
them from that office.[23]
We also adopt the IBPs finding that respondent displayed an utter lack of good
moral character, which is an essential qualification for the privilege to enter into
the practice of law. Good moral character includes at least common honesty.[24]
In the case at bar, respondent consistently displayed dishonest and duplicitous
behavior. As found by the trial court, he had sought, with the aid of Vice-Mayor
Daniel Farias, an out-of-court settlement with complainants family.[25] But when
this effort failed, respondent concocted a complete lie by making it appear that it

was complainants family that had sought a conference with him to obtain his
referral to a neurosurgeon.[26]
The lies of Atty Dizon did not end there. He went on to fabricate an entirely
implausible story of having been mauled by complainant and two other persons.
[27] The trial court had this to say:
The physical evidence as testified to by no less than three (3) doctors who
examined [Atty. Dizon] does not support his allegation that three people including
the complainant helped each other in kicking and boxing him. The injuries he
sustained were so minor that it is improbable[,] if not downright unbelievable[,]
that three people who he said were bent on beating him to death could do so little
damage. On the contrary, his injuries sustain the complainants version of the
incident particularly when he said that he boxed the accused on the chest. x x x.
[28]

Lawyers must be ministers of truth. No moral qualification for bar membership is

more important than truthfulness.[29] The rigorous ethics of the profession places
a premium on honesty and condemns duplicitous behavior.[30] Hence, lawyers
must not mislead the court or allow it to be misled by any artifice. In all their
dealings, they are expected to act in good faith.
The actions of respondent erode rather than enhance public perception of the
legal profession. They constitute moral turpitude for which he should be disbarred.
Law is a noble profession, and the privilege to practice it is bestowed only upon
individuals who are competent intellectually,
academically and, equally important, morally. Because they are vanguards of the
law and the legal system, lawyers must at all times conduct themselves,
especially in their dealings with their clients and the public at large, with honesty
and integrity in a manner beyond reproach.[31]
The foregoing abhorrent acts of respondent are not merely dishonorable; they
reveal a basic moral flaw. Considering the depravity of the offense he committed,
we find the penalty recommended by the IBP proper and commensurate.
The purpose of a proceeding for disbarment is to protect the administration of
justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function be competent,
honorable and reliable -- lawyers in whom courts and clients may repose
confidence.[32] Thus, whenever a clear case of degenerate and vile behavior
disturbs that vital yet fragile confidence, we shall not hesitate to rid our profession
of odious members.
We remain aware that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution,
and that disbarment should never be decreed when any lesser penalty would
accomplish the end desired. In the instant case, however, the Court cannot
extend that munificence to respondent. His actions so despicably and wantonly
disregarded his duties to society and his profession. We are convinced that meting
out a lesser penalty would be irreconcilable with our lofty aspiration for the legal
profession -- that every lawyer be a shining exemplar of truth and justice.
We stress that membership in the legal profession is a privilege demanding a high
degree of good moral character, not only as a condition precedent to admission,
but also as a continuing requirement for the practice of law. Sadly, herein
respondent has fallen short of the exacting standards expected of him as a
vanguard of the legal profession.
In sum, when lawyers are convicted of frustrated homicide, the attending
circumstances not the mere fact of their conviction would demonstrate their

fitness to remain in the legal profession. In the present case, the appalling
vindictiveness, treachery, and brazen dishonesty of respondent clearly show his
unworthiness to continue as a member of the bar.
WHEREFORE, RESPONDENT MANUEL DIZON is hereby DISBARRED, and his name
is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be
entered in his record as a member of the Bar; and let notice of the same be
served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 137378. October 12, 2000]
PHILIPPINE ALUMINUM WHEELS, INC., petitioner, vs. FASGI ENTERPRISES, INC.,
respondent.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
On 01 June 1978, FASGI Enterprises Incorporated ("FASGI"), a corporation
organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of California,
United States of America, entered into a distributorship arrangement with
Philippine Aluminum Wheels, Incorporated ("PAWI"), a Philippine corporation, and
Fratelli Pedrini Sarezzo S.P.A. ("FPS"), an Italian corporation. The agreement
provided for the purchase, importation and distributorship in the United States of
aluminum wheels manufactured by PAWI. Pursuant to the contract, PAWI shipped
to FASGI a total of eight thousand five hundred ninety four (8,594) wheels, with an
FOB value of US$216,444.30 at the time of shipment, the first batch arriving in
two containers and the second in three containers. Thereabouts, FASGI paid PAWI
the FOB value of the wheels. Unfortunately, FASGI later found the shipment to be
defective and in non-compliance with stated requirements, viz;

"A. contrary to the terms of the Distributorship Agreement and in violation of U.S.
law, the country of origin (the Philippines) was not stamped on the wheels;
"B. the wheels did not have weight load limits stamped on them as required to
avoid mounting on excessively heavy vehicles, resulting in risk of damage or
bodily injury to consumers arising from possible shattering of the wheels;
"C. many of the wheels did not have an indication as to which models of
automobile they would fit;
"D. many of the wheels did not fit the model automobiles for which they were
purportedly designed;
"E. some of the wheels did not fit any model automobile in use in the United
States;
"F. most of the boxes in which the wheels were packed indicated that the wheels
were approved by the Specialty Equipment Manufacturer's Association (hereafter,
`SEMA'); in fact no SEMA approval has been obtained and this indication was
therefore false and could result in fraud upon retail customers purchasing the
wheels."[1]
On 21 September 1979, FASGI instituted an action against PAWI and FPS for
breach of contract and recovery of damages in the amount of US$2,316,591.00
before the United States District Court for the Central District of California. In
January 1980, during the pendency of the case, the parties entered into a
settlement, entitled "Transaction" with the corresponding Italian translation
"Convenzione Transsativa," where it was stipulated that FPS and PAWI would
accept the return of not less than 8,100 wheels after restoring to FASGI the
purchase price of US$268,750.00 via four (4) irrevocable letters of credit ("LC").
The rescission of the contract of distributorship was to be effected within the
period starting January up until April 1980.[2]
In a telex message, dated 02 March 1980, PAWI president Romeo Rojas expressed
the company's inability to comply with the foregoing agreement and proposed a
revised schedule of payment. The message, in part, read:
"We are most anxious in fulfilling all our obligations under compromise agreement
executed by our Mr. Giancarlo Dallera and your Van Curen. We have tried our best
to comply with our commitments, however, because of the situation as mentioned
in the foregoing and currency regulations and restrictions imposed by our
government on the outflow, of foreign currency from our country, we are
constrained to request for a revised schedule of shipment and opening of L/Cs.
"After consulting with our bank and government monetary agencies and on the
assumption that we submit the required pro-forma invoices we can open the
letters of credit in your favor under the following schedule:
"A) First L/C - it will be issued in April 1980 payable 90 days thereafter
"B) Second L/C - it will be issued in June 1980 payable 90 days thereafter
"C) Third L/C - it will be issued in August 1980 payable 90 days thereafter
"D) Fourth L/C - it will be issued in November 1980 payable 90 days thereafter
"We understand your situation regarding the lease of your warehouse. For this
reason, we are willing to defray the extra storage charges resulting from this new
schedule. If you cannot renew the lease [of] your present warehouse, perhaps you

can arrange to transfer to another warehouse and storage charges transfer

thereon will be for our account. We hope you understand our position. The delay
and the revised schedules were caused by circumstances totally beyond our
control."[3]
On 21 April 1980, again through a telex message, PAWI informed FASGI that it was
impossible to open a letter of credit on or before April 1980 but assured that it
would do its best to comply with the suggested schedule of payments.[4] In its
telex reply of 29 April 1980, FASGI insisted that PAWI should meet the terms of the
proposed schedule of payments, specifically its undertaking to open the first LC
within April of 1980, and that "If the letter of credit is not opened by April 30,
1980, then x x x [it would] immediately take all necessary legal action to protect
[its] position."[5]
Despite its assurances, and FASGI's insistence, PAWI failed to open the first LC in
April 1980 allegedly due to Central Bank "inquiries and restrictions," prompting
FASGI to pursue its complaint for damages against PAWI before the California
district court. Pre-trial conference was held on 24 November 1980. In the interim,
the parties, realizing the protracted process of litigation, resolved to enter into
another arrangement, this time entitled "Supplemental Settlement Agreement,"
on 26 November 1980. In substance, the covenant provided that FASGI would
deliver to PAWI a container of wheels for every LC opened and paid by PAWI:
"3. Agreement
"3.1 Sellers agree to pay FASGI Two Hundred Sixty-Eight Thousand, Seven
Hundred Fifty and 00/100 Dollars ($268,750.00), plus interest and storage costs as
described below. Sellers shall pay such amount by delivering to FASGI the
following four (4) irrevocable letters of credit, confirmed by Crocker Bank, Main
Branch, Fresno, California, as set forth below:
"(i) on or before June 30, 1980, a documentary letter of credit in the amount of (a)
Sixty-Five Thousand, Three Hundred Sixty-nine and 00/100 Dollars ($65,369.00),
(b) plus interest on that amount at the annual rate of 16.25% from January 1,
1980 until July 31, 1980, (c) plus Two Thousand Nine Hundred Forty Dollars and
00/100 ($2,940.00) and (d) with interest on that sum at the annual rate of 16.25%
from May 1, 1980 to July 31, 1980, payable on or after August 31, 1980;
"(ii) on or before September 1, 1980, a documentary letter of credit in the amount
of (a) Sixty-Seven Thousand, Seven Hundred Ninety-Three Dollars and Sixty-Seven
Cents ($67,793.67) plus (b) Two Thousand, Nine Hundred Forty and 00/100 Dollars
($2,940.00), plus (c) interest at an annual rate equal to the prime rate of Crocker
Bank, San Francisco, in effect from time to time, plus two percent on the amount
in (a) from January 1, 1980 until December 21, 1980, and on the amount set forth
in (b) from May 1, 1980 until December 21, 1980, payable ninety days after the
date of the bill of lading under the letter of credit;
"(iii) on or before November 1, 1980, a documentary letter of credit in the amount
of (a) Sixty-Seven Thousand, Seven Hundred Ninety-Three Dollars and Sixty-Seven
Cents ($67,793.67) plus (b) Two Thousand, Nine Hundred Forty and 00/100 Dollars
($2,490.00), plus (c) interest at an annual rate equal to the prime rate of Crocker
Bank, San Francisco, in effect from time to time, plus two percent on the amount
in (a) from January 1, 1980 until February 21, 1981, and on the amount set forth
in (b) from May 1, 1980 until February 21, 1981, payable ninety days after the
date of the bill of lading under the latter of credit;
"(iv) on or before January 1, 1981, a documentary letter of credit in the amount of
(a) Sixty-Seven Thousand, Seven Hundred Ninety-Three Dollars and Sixty-Seven
Cents ($67,793.67) plus (b) Five Thousand, Eight Hundred Eighty and 00/100

Dollars ($5,880.00), plus (c) interest at an annual rate equal to the prime rate of
Crocker Bank, San Francisco, in effect from time to time, plus two percent on the
amount in (a) from January 1, 1980 until April 21, 1981, and on the amount set
forth in (b) from May 1, 1980 until April 21, 1981, payable ninety days after the
date of the bill of lading under the latter of credit."[6]
Anent the wheels still in the custody of FASGI, the supplemental settlement
agreement provided that "3.4 (a) Upon execution of this Supplemental Settlement Agreement, the
obligations of FASGI to store or maintain the Containers and Wheels shall be
limited to (i) storing the Wheels and Containers in their present warehouse
location and (ii) maintaining in effect FASGI's current insurance in favor of FASGI,
insuring against usual commercial risks for such storage in the principal amount
of the Letters of Credit described in Paragraph 3.1. FASGI shall bear no liability,
responsibility or risk for uninsurable risks or casualties to the Containers or
Wheels.
"x x x x x x x x x
"(e) From and after February 28, 1981, unless delivery of the Letters of Credit are
delayed past such date pursuant to the penultimate Paragraph 3.1, in which case
from and after such later date, FASGI shall have no obligation to maintain, store or
deliver any of the Containers or Wheels."[7]
The deal allowed FASGI to enter before the California court the foregoing
stipulations in the event of the failure of PAWI to make good the scheduled
payments; thus "3.5 Concurrently with execution and delivery hereof, the parties have executed
and delivered a Mutual Release (the `Mutual Release'), and a Stipulation for
Judgment (the `Stipulation for Judgment') with respect to the Action. In the event
of breach of this Supplemental Settlement Agreement by Sellers, FASGI shall have
the right to apply immediately to the Court for entry of Judgment pursuant to the
Stipulation for Judgment in the full amount thereof, less credit for any payments
made by Sellers pursuant to this Supplemental Settlement Agreement. FASGI shall
have the right thereafter to enforce the Judgment against PAWI and FPS in the
United States and in any other country where assets of FPS or PAWI may be
located, and FPS and PAWI hereby waive all defenses in any such country to
execution or enforcement of the Judgment by FASGI. Specifically, FPS and PAWI
each consent to the jurisdiction of the Italian and Philippine courts in any action
brought by FASGI to seek a judgment in those countries based upon a judgment
against FPS or PAWI in the Action."[8]
In accordance with the aforementioned paragraph 3.5 of the agreement, the
parties made the following stipulation before the California court:
"The undersigned parties hereto, having entered into a Supplemental Settlement
Agreement in this action,
"IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED by and between plaintiff FASGI Enterprises, Inc.
(`FASGI') and defendants Philippine Aluminum Wheels, Inc., (`PAWI'), and each of
them, that judgment may be entered in favor of plaintiff FASGI and against PAWI,
in the amount of Two Hundred Eighty Three Thousand Four Hundred Eighty And
01/100ths Dollars ($283,480.01).
"Plaintiff FASGI shall also be entitled to its costs of suit, and to reasonable
attorneys' fees as determined by the Court added to the above judgment
amount."[9]

The foregoing supplemental settlement agreement, as well as the motion for the
entry of judgment, was executed by FASGI president Elena Buholzer and PAWI
counsel Mr. Thomas Ready.
PAWI, again, proved to be remiss in its obligation under the supplemental
settlement agreement. While it opened the first LC on 19 June 1980, it, however,
only paid on it nine (9) months after, or on 20 March 1981, when the letters of
credit by then were supposed to have all been already posted. This lapse,
notwithstanding, FASGI promptly shipped to PAWI the first container of wheels.
Again, despite the delay incurred by PAWI on the second LC, FASGI readily
delivered the second container. Later, PAWI totally defaulted in opening and
paying the third and the fourth LCs, scheduled to be opened on or before,
respectively, 01 September 1980 and 01 November 1980, and each to be paid
ninety (90) days after the date of the bill of lading under the LC. As so expressed
in their affidavits, FASGI counsel Frank Ker and FASGI president Elena Buholzer
were more inclined to believe that PAWI's failure to pay was due not to any
restriction by the Central Bank or any other cause than its inability to pay. These
doubts were based on the telex message of PAWI president Romeo Rojas who
attached a copy of a communication from the Central Bank notifying PAWI of the
bank's approval of PAWI's request to open LCs to cover payment for the reimportation of the wheels. The communication having been sent to FASGI before
the supplemental settlement agreement was executed, FASGI speculated that at
the time PAWI subsequently entered into the supplemental settlement agreement,
its request to open LCs had already been approved by the Central Bank. Irked by
PAWI's persistent default, FASGI filed with the US District Court of the Central
District of California the following stipulation for judgment against PAWI.
"PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on May 17, 1982 at 10:00 A.M. in the Courtroom of the
Honorable Laughlin E. Waters of the above Court, plaintiff FASGI ENTERPRISES,
INC. (hereinafter `FASGI') will move the Court for entry of Judgment against
defendant PHILIPPINE ALUMINUM WHEELS, INC. (hereinafter `PAWI'), pursuant to
the Stipulation for Judgment filed concurrently herewith, executed on behalf of
FASGI and PAWI by their respective attorneys, acting as their authorized agents.
"Judgment will be sought in the total amount of P252,850.60, including principal
and interest accrued through May 17, 1982, plus the sum of $17,500.00 as
reasonable attorneys' fees for plaintiff in prosecuting this action.
"The Motion will be made under Rule 54 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
pursuant to and based upon the Stipulation for Judgment, the Supplemental
Settlement Agreement filed herein on or about November 21, 1980, the
Memorandum of Points and Authorities and Affidavits of Elena Buholzer, Franck G.
Ker and Stan Cornwell all filed herewith, and upon all the records, files and
pleadings in this action.
"The Motion is made on the grounds that defendant PAWI has breached its
obligations as set forth in the Supplemental Settlement Agreement, and that the
Supplemental Settlement Agreement expressly permits FASGI to enter the
Stipulation for Judgment in the event that PAWI has not performed under the
Supplemental Settlement Agreement."[10]
On 24 August 1982, FASGI filed a notice of entry of judgment. A certificate of
finality of judgment was issued, on 07 September 1982, by the US District Judge
of the District Court for the Central District of California. PAWI, by this time, was
approximately twenty (20) months in arrears in its obligation under the
supplemental settlement agreement.

Unable to obtain satisfaction of the final judgment within the United States, FASGI
filed a complaint for "enforcement of foreign judgment" in February 1983, before
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, of Makati, Philippines. The Makati court,
however, in an order of 11 September 1990, dismissed the case, thereby denying
the enforcement of the foreign judgment within Philippine jurisdiction, on the
ground that the decree was tainted with collusion, fraud, and clear mistake of law
and fact.[11] The lower court ruled that the foreign judgment ignored the
reciprocal obligations of the parties. While the assailed foreign judgment ordered
the return by PAWI of the purchase amount, no similar order was made requiring
FASGI to return to PAWI the third and fourth containers of wheels.[12] This
situation, the trial court maintained, amounted to an unjust enrichment on the
part of FASGI. Furthermore, the trial court said, the supplemental settlement
agreement and the subsequent motion for entry of judgment upon which the
California court had based its judgment were a nullity for having been entered
into by Mr. Thomas Ready, counsel for PAWI, without the latter's authorization.
FASGI appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals. In a
decision,[13] dated 30 July 1997, the appellate court reversed the decision of the
trial court and ordered the full enforcement of the California judgment.
Hence this appeal.
Generally, in the absence of a special compact, no sovereign is bound to give
effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another
country;[14] however, the rules of comity, utility and convenience of nations have
established a usage among civilized states by which final judgments of foreign
courts of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered
efficacious under certain conditions that may vary in different countries.[15]
In this jurisdiction, a valid judgment rendered by a foreign tribunal may be
recognized insofar as the immediate parties and the underlying cause of action
are concerned so long as it is convincingly shown that there has been an
opportunity for a full and fair hearing before a court of competent jurisdiction; that
trial upon regular proceedings has been conducted, following due citation or
voluntary appearance of the defendant and under a system of jurisprudence likely
to secure an impartial administration of justice; and that there is nothing to
indicate either a prejudice in court and in the system of laws under which it is
sitting or fraud in procuring the judgment.[16] A foreign judgment is presumed to
be valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until a contrary showing,
on the basis of a presumption of regularity of proceedings and the giving of due
notice in the foreign forum. Rule 39, section 48 of the Rules of Court of the
Philippines provides:
Sec. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders - The effect of a judgment or
final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the
judgment or final order is as follows:
xxxx
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final
order is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors-in-interest by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact.
In Soorajmull Nagarmull vs. Binalbagan-Isabela Sugar Co. Inc.,[17] one of the
early Philippine cases on the enforcement of foreign judgments, this Court has

ruled that a judgment for a sum of money rendered in a foreign court is

presumptive evidence of a right between the parties and their successors-ininterest by subsequent title, but when suit for its enforcement is brought in a
Philippine court, such judgment may be repelled by evidence of want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud or clear mistake of law or
fact. In Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc., vs. Court of Appeals,[18] the Court has said
that a party attacking a foreign judgment is tasked with the burden of overcoming
its presumptive validity.
PAWI claims that its counsel, Mr. Ready, has acted without its authority. Verily, in
this jurisdiction, it is clear that an attorney cannot, without a client's authorization,
settle the action or subject matter of the litigation even when he honestly believes
that such a settlement will best serve his client's interest.[19]
In the instant case, the supplemental settlement agreement was signed by the
parties, including Mr. Thomas Ready, on 06 October 1980. The agreement was
lodged in the California case on 26 November 1980 or two (2) days after the pretrial conference held on 24 November 1980. If Mr. Ready was indeed not
authorized by PAWI to enter into the supplemental settlement agreement, PAWI
could have forthwith signified to FASGI a disclaimer of the settlement. Instead,
more than a year after the execution of the supplemental settlement agreement,
particularly on 09 October 1981, PAWI President Romeo S. Rojas sent a
communication to Elena Buholzer of FASGI that failed to mention Mr. Ready's
supposed lack of authority. On the contrary, the letter confirmed the terms of the
agreement when Mr. Rojas sought forbearance for the impending delay in the
opening of the first letter of credit under the schedule stipulated in the
agreement.
It is an accepted rule that when a client, upon becoming aware of the compromise
and the judgment thereon, fails to promptly repudiate the action of his attorney,
he will not afterwards be heard to complain about it.[20]
Nor could PAWI claim any prejudice by the settlement. PAWI was spared from
possibly paying FASGI substantial amounts of damages and incurring heavy
litigation expenses normally generated in a full-blown trial. PAWI, under the
agreement was afforded time to reimburse FASGI the price it had paid for the
defective wheels. PAWI, should not, after its opportunity to enjoy the benefits of
the agreement, be allowed to later disown the arrangement when the terms
thereof ultimately would prove to operate against its hopeful expectations.
PAWI assailed not only Mr. Ready's authority to sign on its behalf the
Supplemental Settlement Agreement but denounced likewise his authority to
enter into a stipulation for judgment before the California court on 06 August 1982
on the ground that it had by then already terminated the former's services. For his
part, Mr. Ready admitted that while he did receive a request from Manuel Singson
of PAWI to withdraw from the motion of judgment, the request unfortunately came
too late. In an explanatory telex, Mr. Ready told Mr. Singson that under American
Judicial Procedures when a motion for judgment had already been filed a counsel
would not be permitted to withdraw unilaterally without a court order. From the
time the stipulation for judgment was entered into on 26 April 1982 until the
certificate of finality of judgment was issued by the California court on 07
September 1982, no notification was issued by PAWI to FASGI regarding its
termination of Mr. Ready's services. If PAWI were indeed hoodwinked by Mr. Ready
who purportedly acted in collusion with FASGI, it should have aptly raised the
issue before the forum which issued the judgment in line with the principle of
international comity that a court of another jurisdiction should refrain, as a matter
of propriety and fairness, from so assuming the power of passing judgment on the
correctness of the application of law and the evaluation of the facts of the
judgment issued by another tribunal.[21]

Fraud, to hinder the enforcement within this jurisdiction of a foreign judgment,

must be extrinsic, i.e., fraud based on facts not controverted or resolved in the
case where judgment is rendered,[22] or that which would go to the jurisdiction of
the court or would deprive the party against whom judgment is rendered a chance
to defend the action to which he has a meritorious case or defense. In fine,
intrinsic fraud, that is, fraud which goes to the very existence of the cause of
action - such as fraud in obtaining the consent to a contract - is deemed already
adjudged, and it, therefore, cannot militate against the recognition or
enforcement of the foreign judgment.[23]
Even while the US judgment was against both FPS and PAWI, FASGI had every
right to seek enforcement of the judgment solely against PAWI or, for that matter,
only against FPS. FASGI, in its complaint, explained:
"17. There exists, and at all times relevant herein there existed, a unity of interest
and ownership between defendant PAWI and defendant FPS, in that they are
owned and controlled by the same shareholders and managers, such that any
individuality and separateness between these defendants has ceased, if it ever
existed, and defendant FPS is the alter ego of defendant PAWI. The two entities
are used interchangeably by their shareholders and managers, and plaintiff has
found it impossible to ascertain with which entity it is dealing at any one time.
Adherence to the fiction of separate existence of these defendant corporations
would permit an abuse of the corporate privilege and would promote injustice
against this plaintiff because assets can easily be shifted between the two
companies thereby frustrating plaintiff's attempts to collect on any judgment
rendered by this Court."[24]
Paragraph 14 of the Supplemental Settlement Agreement fixed the liability of
PAWI and FPS to be "joint and several" or solidary. The enforcement of the
judgment against PAWI alone would not, of course, preclude it from pursuing and
recovering whatever contributory liability FPS might have pursuant to their own
agreement.
PAWI would argue that it was incumbent upon FASGI to first return the second and
the third containers of defective wheels before it could be required to return to
FASGI the purchase price therefor,[25] relying on their original agreement (the
"Transaction").[26] Unfortunately, PAWI defaulted on its covenants thereunder
that thereby occasioned the subsequent execution of the supplemental
settlement agreement. This time the parties agreed, under paragraph 3.4(e)[27]
thereof, that any further default by PAWI would release FASGI from any obligation
to maintain, store or deliver the rejected wheels. The supplemental settlement
agreement evidently superseded, at the very least on this point, the previous
arrangements made by the parties.
PAWI cannot, by this petition for review, seek refuge over a business dealing and
decision gone awry. Neither do the courts function to relieve a party from the
effects of an unwise or unfavorable contract freely entered into. As has so aptly
been explained by the appellate court, the over-all picture might, indeed, appear
to be onerous to PAWI but it should bear emphasis that the settlement which has
become the basis for the foreign judgment has not been the start of a business
venture but the end of a failed one, and each party, naturally, has had to
negotiate from either position of strength or weakness depending on its own
perception of who might have to bear the blame for the failure and the
consequence of loss.[28]
Altogether, the Court finds no reversible error on the part of the appellate court in
its appealed judgment.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. P-03-1690
April 4, 2003
(formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 00-956-P)
JUDGE ESTRELLITA M. PAAS, petitioner,
vs.
EDGAR E. ALMARVEZ, respondent.
x-----------------------------x
A.M. No. MTJ-01-1363

April 4, 2003

EDGAR E. ALMARVEZ, petitioner,

vs.
JUDGE ESTRELLITA M. PAAS, respondent.
x-----------------------------x
A.M. No. 01-12-02-SC

April 4, 2003

IN RE: USE BY ATTY. RENERIO G. PAAS AS AN OFFICE IN HIS PRIVATE PRACTICE OF

HIS PROFESSION THE OFFICE OF HIS WIFE, PASAY CITY METC JUDGE ESTRELLITA
M. PAAS.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Pasay City Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 44 Presiding Judge Estrellita M.
Paas administratively charged Court Aide/Utility Worker Edgar E. Almarvez with
"discourtesy, disrespect, insubordination, neglect in performing his duties,
disloyalty, solicitation of monetary consideration and gross violation of the Civil
Service Law." The case was docketed as A.M. OCA IPI No. 00-956-P.
In her complaint, Judge Paas alleged that Almarvez is discourteous to his coemployees, lawyers and party litigants; has failed to maintain the cleanliness in
and around the court premises despite order to do so, thus amounting to
insubordination; was, and on several instances, habitually absent from work or
made it appear that he reported for work by signing the logbook in the morning,
only to stay out of the office the whole day; asked from detention prisoners
P100.00 to P200.00 before he released to them their Release Orders; asked for
amounts in excess of what was necessary for the purchase of stamps and
pocketed the difference; once failed to mail printed matter on July 11, 2000 and
kept for his own use the amount given to him for the purpose; and divulged
confidential information to litigants in advance of its authorized release date for a
monetary consideration, thus giving undue advantage or favor to the paying
party, in violation of Rep. Act No. 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act).1
Pasay City MeTC Branch 44 Clerk of Court Pedro C. Doctolero, Jr., by his Affidavit,2
and members of the court staff,3 by a Joint Affidavit, attested that Almarvez failed
to maintain the cleanliness in and around the court premises, and had shown
discourtesy in dealing with Judge Paas and his co-employees. Doctolero's affidavit
also corroborated Judge Paas' allegation that Almarvez would merely sign the
logbook in the morning and thereafter stay out of the office.
Pasay City Postmaster Emma Z. Espiritu, by Certification dated August 2, 2000,4
attested that the alleged printed matter intended to be mailed on July 11, 2000
was not included in the list of registered mails posted in the Pasay City Post Office
on said date.
Jail Escort Russel S. Hernandez and Jail Officer II Rosendo Macabasag, both
assigned to the Pasay City Jail, by their respective affidavits,5 attested that on
several occasions, they saw Almarvez receive from detention prisoners P100.00 to
P200.00 in consideration of the release of their Release Orders.
Almarvez, by Answer of September 25, 2000,6 denied Judge Paas' charges, and
alleged that the real reason why Judge Paas filed the case against him was
because she suspected him of helping her husband, Atty. Renerio G. Paas, conceal
his marital indiscretions; since she failed to elicit any information from him, she
resorted to calling him names and other forms of harassment; on September 6,
2000, she hurled at him the following invectives before the other employees of
the court: "Walang kuwenta, ahas ka, driver lang kita, pinaasenso kita, walang
utang na loob, pinagtatakpan mo pa ang asawa ko, ulupong;" and she insisted
that he sign a prepared resignation letter, a copy of which he was not able to
keep.
Almarvez added that he had been subjected by Judge Paas to the following
incidents of oppression and abuse of authority: On July 28, 2000, he was called by
the Judge to her chambers where she berated him as follows: "Sinungaling ka, ang
dami mong alam, hindi ka nagsasabi ng totoo sa akin, gago, tanga, pirmahan mo

itong resignation letter, kung hindi kakasuhan kita ng estafa at falsification;" the
next day, the Judge, on seeing him, told him "Bakit ka nandiyan, mag-leave ka sa
Lunes;" and on July 31, 2000, the Judge called him again to her chambers and told
him "Ang kapal ng mukha mo, pumasok ka pa dito, gago, kaya kita ipinasok dito
dahil driver kita."
Continuing, Almarvez claimed that on July 31, 2000, he reported the foregoing
incidents to Pasay City MeTC Executive Judge Maria Cancino Erum who advised
him to report the same to the Office of the Clerk of Court; and on August 1, 2000,
he executed a sworn statement-complaint7 against Judge Paas and went to the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) to file it, but he was advised to try to talk
the matter over with her who then told him that they should forget all about it.
On the merits of the charges, Almarvez denied ever requesting for money in
exchange for the release of court orders and alleged that both Hernandez and
Macabasag executed their respective affidavits because Judge Paas was a
principal sponsor at their respective weddings; Hernandez was in fact indebted to
the Judge for helping him cover-up the escape of a detainee under his charge; the
court's mail matters were always sealed whenever he received them for mailing
and he never tampered with their contents; the alleged unmailed printed matter
was actually posted on June 28, 2000, not on July 11, 2000, via ordinary instead of
registered mail, because the money given to him for the purpose was insufficient;
and on the days when he was out of the office, he was actually performing
personal errands for the judge and her husband, Atty. Paas, who treated him as
their personal driver and messenger.
As further proof of Judge Paas' oppressive behavior towards him, Almarvez
claimed that she ordered him to undergo a drug test per Memorandum dated
September 7, 2000,8 even if he had no history of drug abuse on a periodic or
continuous basis as shown by the test results of his examination.9
The Court treated respondent's Answer as a counter-complaint against Judge Paas
and docketed it as A.M. No. MTJ-01-1363.
The two administrative cases were consolidated and referred for evaluation to the
OCA, which assigned them to Executive Judge Vicente L. Yap of Pasay City RTC,
Branch 114 for investigation.
In a separate case for inhibition of Judge Paas in a criminal case, it was revealed
that Judge Paas' husband, private practitioner Atty. Paas, was using his wife's
office as his office address in his law practice, in support of which were submitted
copies of a Notice of Appeal signed by Atty. Paas, notices from Pasay City RTC
Branch 109 and from the Supreme Court with respect to the case of People vs.
Louie Manabat, et al. (GR Nos. 140536-37) which indicated Atty. Paas' address to
be Room 203, Hall of Justice, Pasay City,10 the office assigned to Pasay City MeTC,
Branch 44.
Pursuant to Sec. 1 of Rule 139-B11 of the Rules of Court which allows the Supreme
Court to motu proprio initiate proceedings for the discipline of attorneys, this
Court resolved to docket the matter as A.M. No. 01-12-02-SC and to consolidate it
with A.M. OCA IPI No. 00-956-P and AM No. MTJ-01-1363.
In compliance with the December 4, 2001 Resolution12 of the Court en banc,
Judge and Atty. Paas submitted their January 16, 2002 Joint Affidavit13 wherein
they vehemently denied the charge that the latter was using Room 203 of the
Pasay City Hall of Justice as his office address, they claiming that Atty. Paas
actually holds office at 410 Natividad Building, Escolta, Manila with his partner
Atty. Herenio Martinez; Atty. Paas would visit his wife at her office only when he
has a hearing before the Pasay City courts or Prosecutor's Office, or when he

lunches with or fetches her, or when he is a guest during special occasions such
as Christmas party and her birthday which are celebrated therein; and Judge Paas
would never consent nor tolerate the use of the court for any personal activities.
Attached to the Joint Affidavit were the separate sworn statements of Atty. Paas'
law partner Atty. Herenio E. Martinez14 and secretary Nilda L. Gatdula15 attesting
that he is holding office at the above-said address in Escolta, and the Joint
Affidavit of the Pasay City MeTC Branch 44 court personnel16 attesting that Atty.
Paas' visits to the court are neither routine nor daily occurrences, and he never
used the court in the practice of his profession.
On January 24, 2002, Judge Paas executed a Supplemental Affidavit17 wherein
she admitted that Atty. Paas did use her office as his return address for notices
and orders in Crim. Case Nos. 98-1197 to 98-1198, "People vs. Louie Manabat y
Valencia and Raymond dela Cruz y Salita," (now docketed in this Court as G.R.
Nos. 140536-37), lodged at the Pasay City RTC, Branch 109, but only to ensure
and facilitate delivery of those notices, but after the cases were terminated, all
notices were sent to his office address in Escolta.
By Resolution of February 12, 2002,18 the Court referred the matter to the OCA
for evaluation, report and recommendation.
After the completion of his investigation of A.M. OCA IPI No. 00-956-P and A.M. No.
MTJ-01-1363, Judge Yap submitted his Report/Recommendation dated February 28,
2002.19
On March 11, 2002, the OCA submitted its Report on A.M. No. 01-12-02-SC dated
March 1, 2002.20
I.

OCA Findings and Recommendations

A.

On the charges against Almarvez:

The OCA, for lack of evidence, recommended the dismissal of the charges against
Almarvez of exacting money from detainees, violating confidentiality of official
communication, absence without official leave, discourtesy and insubordination.
Given Almarvez' unsatisfactory performance ratings for three rating periods
covering January to June 2000,21 July to December 2000,22 and January to April
2001,23 however, the OCA recommended that he be duly penalized for
inefficiency in the performance of his official duties with One (1) Month
suspension without pay, instead of dismissal as warranted under Memorandum
Circular No. 12, s. 1994, his supervisor having failed to observe the procedure
thereunder for dropping of employees from the rolls, which procedure is quoted at
the later portion of this decision.
B.

On the charges against Judge Paas:

With respect to the complaint of Almarvez against Judge Paas, the OCA, for lack of
supporting evidence, recommended the dismissal of the charges of maltreatment,
harassment and verbal abuse. It found, however, that Judge Paas "had used her
administrative power of supervision and control over court personnel for her
personal pride, prejudice and pettiness"24 when she issued her September 7,
2000 Memorandum ordering Alvarez to undergo a drug test after she had already
filed an administrative case against him. It thus concluded that, in all probability,
the purpose of Judge Paas in ordering Almarvez to undergo a drug test was to fish
for evidence to support the administrative case she had already filed against him.
Accordingly, the OCA recommended that Judge Paas be found guilty of simple
misconduct in office, and be penalized with reprimand with a warning that a
repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

II.

This Court's Findings:

A.

On the charges against Almarvez:

Indeed, this Court finds that there is no sufficient evidence to support the charge
of violation of confidentiality of official communication against Almarvez. The
charge against Almarvez in Judge Paas' complaint-affidavit which reads:
That said ALMARVEZ being in charge of the mails had divulged informations which
is confidential in nature to party litigants in advance of its authorized release date
before the release of Court Order and Decision for consideration of a sum of
money thus giving undue advantage or favor to the paying party detrimental to
the due administration of justice.25
in fact lacks particularity. It is devoid of material details to enable Almarvez to
intelligently meet the same.
As for the charges of neglect of duty, discourtesy and insubordination which were
echoed in the affidavits of court personnel, they are also too general to support a
conviction and are contrary to what is reflected in his performance rating that he
cooperated willingly, even wholeheartedly, with his fellow employees.
On the charge of violation of Rep. Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act): Absent any evidence to support the charge, the affiants jail officers who
claimed to have witnessed Almarvez receive money from detention prisoners in
exchange for the release of their Release Orders not having been presented,
hence, their claim remains hearsay, Almarvez' categorical denial and counterallegation that these affiants executed their affidavits only out of fear of or favor
to Judge Paas gain light.
As for the charge that Almarvez would merely sign the logbook and would
thereafter leave the office, again Judge Paas failed to present the affiant-Clerk of
Court Atty. Pedro C. Doctolero, Jr. While she submitted in evidence a copy of her
October 6, 2000 memorandum26 requiring Almarvez to explain why he was not in
the office on September 8, 11, and 13, and October 5, 2000, despite his affixing of
his signature in the logbook on those dates indicating that he reported for work,
Almarvez satisfactorily explained that on September 8, 11, and 13, 2000, he
submitted himself to drug testing as required by her in her September 7, 200027
memorandum, which explanation is supported by the September 14, 2000 letter
of Dr. Rosendo P. Saulog, Medical Specialist II of the Dangerous Drug Board.28 As
to his whereabouts on October 5, 2000, Almarvez' explanation that he was
actually present in the morning but left in the afternoon for the Supreme Court29
was not controverted.
On the charge of inefficiency, this Court concurs with the following findings of the
OCA that he should be faulted therefor:
The performance ratings of respondent Almarvez for three (3) rating periods
covering January to June 2000, July to December 2000 and January to April 2001
evidently shows that he failed to perform his official duties. The fact that
respondent Almarvez never disputed the performance ratings given him is
tantamount to an implied acceptance thereof pursuant to Sec. 5 Rule IX Book V of
Executive Order No. 292, quoted as follows:
"Sec. 5. An employee who expresses dissatisfaction with the rating given him may
appeal through the established Grievance Procedure of the Department or Agency
within fifteen (15) days after receipt of his copy of his performance rating. Failure

to file an appeal within the prescribed period shall be deemed a waiver of such
right."
The performance ratings of respondent for the said periods are valid grounds to
drop him from the Rolls. However, considering that his superior/supervisor failed
to comply with the requirements set forth in Memorandum Circular No. 12, Series
of 1994 of the Civil Service Commission, which is hereunder quoted, and that he
was able to make up and cure his inefficiency after he was given the opportunity
to improve his performance in his detail to Branch 11, MeTC, Manila, as shown by
his performance rating for the period April to June 2001 with a "very satisfactory"
rating, dropping him from the roll will no longer be appropriate30 (Emphasis and
italics supplied.)
Par. 2.2 of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 12, s. 1994 referred to in the abovequoted findings of the OCA reads:
2.2 Unsatisfactory or Poor Performance.
(a) An official or employee who is given two (2) consecutive unsatisfactory
ratings may be dropped from the rolls after due notice. Notice shall mean that the
officer or employee concerned is informed in writing of his unsatisfactory
performance for a semester and is sufficiently warned that a succeeding
unsatisfactory performance shall warrant his separation from the service. Such
notice shall be given not later than 30 days from the end of the semester and
shall contain sufficient information which shall enable the employee to prepare an
explanation. (Emphasis and italics supplied.)
The suspension of Almarvez for One (1) Month without pay, as recommended by
the OCA, is thus in order.
B.

On the charges against Judge Paas:

Regarding the charges of abuse of authority and oppression against Judge Paas,
Almarvez failed to substantiate the same.
Judge Paas' order for Almarvez to undergo a drug test is not an unlawful order. Per
Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 34, s. 1997, public employees
are required to undergo a drug test prior to employment to determine if they are
drug-free. To be drug-free is not merely a pre-employment prerequisite but is a
continuing requirement to ensure the highest degree of productivity of the civil
service. However, considering that the order was issued after Judge Paas filed the
administrative case against Almarvez, it elicits the suspicion that it was only a
fishing expedition against him. This is conduct unbecoming of a member of the
judiciary, for which Judge Paas should be duly reprimanded.
C.

On the charges against Judge Paas and Atty. Paas:

By Judge Paas' own admission in her January 24, 2002 Supplemental Affidavit,31
she was aware that her husband Atty. Paas was using her office to receive court
notices and orders in a case lodged in a Pasay court. As the OCA puts it, "[w]hile
the same appears to be innocuous, it could be interpreted as a subtle way of
sending a message that Atty. Paas is the husband of a judge in the same building
and should be given special treatment by other judges or court personnel."32
The following are instructive in the disposition of these charges against the judge
and her spouse, Atty. Paas:
SC Administrative Circular No. 01-99, "Enhancing the Dignity of Courts as Temples
of Justice and Promoting Respect for their Officials and Employers" reads:

As courts are temples of justice, their dignity and sanctity must, at all times be
preserved and enhanced. In inspiring public respect for the justice system, court
officials and employees must:
1. In general: (a) avoid committing any act which would constitute grounds for
disciplinary action under, as the case may be, the Canons of Judicial Ethics, Code
of Judicial Conduct; and Section 46, Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292); and (b) faithfully comply
with the norms of conduct and perform the duties prescribed in the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (R.A. No. 6713);
2.
xxx

Zealously guard the public trust character of their offices;

xxx

xxx

6. Never use their offices as a residence or for any other purpose than for court
or judicial functions. (Emphasis and italics supplied.)
Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that "A judge should avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities." Specifically, Rule
2.03 thereof provides that:
Rule 2.03. A judge shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to
influence judicial conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be
used or lent to advance the private interests of others, nor convey or permit
others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the
judge. (Emphasis supplied.)
SC Circular No. 3-92,33 dated August 31, 1992, of this Court reads:
SUBJECT:
PROHIBITION AGAINST USE OF HALLS OF JUSTICE FOR RESIDENTIAL
OR COMMERCIAL PURPOSES
All judges and court personnel are hereby reminded that the Halls of Justice may
be used only for purposes directly related to the functioning and operation of the
courts of justice, and may not be devoted to any other use, least of all as
residential quarters of the judges or court personnel, or for carrying on therein
any trade or profession.
Attention is drawn to A.M. No. RTJ-89-327 (Nellie Kelly Austria vs. Judge Singuat
Guerra), a case involving unauthorized and improper use of the court's premises
for dwelling purposes by respondent and his family, in which the Court, by
Resolution dated October 17, 1991, found respondent Judge guilty of irresponsible
and improper conduct prejudicial to the efficient administration of justice and best
interest of the service, and imposed on him the penalty of SEVERE CENSURE, the
Court declaring that such use of the court's premises inevitably degrades the
honor and dignity of the court in addition to exposing judicial records to danger of
loss or damage. (emphasis supplied.)
By allowing her husband to use the address of her court in pleadings before other
courts, Judge Paas indeed "allowed [him] to ride on her prestige for purposes of
advancing his private interest, in violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct"34 and
of the above-stated Supreme Court circulars, which violation is classified as a less
serious charge under the Rules of Court35 and is punishable under the same
Rule.36
A judge's official conduct should indeed be free from the appearance of
impropriety; and his behavior not only in the performance of judicial duties, but

also in his everyday life should be beyond reproach. This is premised on the
truism that a Judge's official life cannot simply be detached or separated from his
personal existence and that upon a Judge's attributes depend the public
perception of the Judiciary.37
On his part, Atty. Paas was guilty of using a fraudulent, misleading, and deceptive
address that had no purpose other than to try to impress either the court in which
his cases are lodged, or his client, that he has close ties to a member of the
juiciary, in violation of the following rules of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:
CANON 3 A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES SHALL USE ONLY
TRUE, HONEST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE INFORMATION OR STATEMENT OF
FACTS.
Rule 3.01. A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent,
misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim
regarding his qualifications or legal services.
CANON 10 A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE
COURT.
Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any
in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
CANON 13 A LAWYER SHALL RELY UPON THE MERITS OF HIS CAUSE AND
REFRAIN FROM ANY IMPROPRIETY WHICH TENDS TO INFLUENCE, OR GIVES THE
APPEARANCE OF INFLUENCING THE COURT.
CANON 15 A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL
HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.
Rule 15.06. A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any
public official, tribunal or legislative body.
The need for relying on the merits of a lawyer's case, instead of banking on his
relationship with a member of the bench which tends to influence or gives the
appearance of influencing the court, cannot be overemphasized. It is
unprofessional and dishonorable, to say the least, to misuse a public office to
enhance a lawyer's prestige. Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded
by such reprehensible and improper conduct.
This Court does not subscribe to the proffered excuse that expediency and a
desire to ensure receipt of court orders and notices prompted Atty. Paas and Judge
Paas to allow him to have his court notices sent to office of Judge Paas, especially
given the fact that for his other cases, Atty. Paas used his office address but there
is no showing that he failed to receive the notices sent to that address. While a
lawyer should make the necessary arrangements to ensure that he is properly
informed of any court action, these should not violate his lawyer's oath or the
Code of Professional Responsibility, nor provide an opportunity for a member of
the judiciary to breach his or her responsibilities under Supreme Court circulars
and the Code of Judicial Conduct.
WHEREFORE, this Court finds:
(1) In A.M. OCA IPI No. 00-956-P, respondent Edgar E. Almarvez GUILTY of
inefficiency and is hereby SUSPENDED for One (1) Month without pay;

(2) In A.M. No. MTJ-01-1363, respondent, Judge Estrellita M. Paas GUILTY of

conduct unbecoming of a member of the judiciary and is hereby REPRIMANDED,
with warning that repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more
severely;
(3) In A.M. No. 01-12-02-SC,
(a) Judge Paas GUILTY of violating SC Administrative Circular No. 01-99, SC
Circular No. 3-92 and Canon 2, Rule 2.03 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and is
hereby ordered to pay a FINE of TWELVE THOUSAND PESOS (P12,000.00), with
warning that repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more
severely; and
(b) Atty. Renerio Paas GUILTY of SIMPLE MISCONDUCT and is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for a period of THREE (3) MONTHS, with warning that
repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
This Decision shall take effect immediately.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, and appended to respondents' personal record.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
Adm. Case No. 2131 May 10, 1985
ADRIANO E. DACANAY, complainant
vs.
BAKER & MCKENZIE and JUAN G. COLLAS JR., LUIS MA. GUERRERO, VICENTE A.
TORRES, RAFAEL E. EVANGELISTA, JR., ROMEO L. SALONGA, JOSE R. SANDEJAS,
LUCAS M. NUNAG, J. CLARO TESORO, NATIVIDAD B. KWAN and JOSE A.
CURAMMENG, JR., respondents.
Adriano E. Dacanay for and his own behalf.
Madrid, Cacho, Angeles, Dominguez & Pecson Law Office for respondents.

AQUINO, J.:
Lawyer Adriano E. Dacanay, admitted to the bar in 1954, in his 1980 verified
complaint, sought to enjoin Juan G. Collas, Jr. and nine other lawyers from
practising law under the name of Baker & McKenzie, a law firm organized in
Illinois.
In a letter dated November 16, 1979 respondent Vicente A. Torres, using the
letterhead of Baker & McKenzie, which contains the names of the ten lawyers,
asked Rosie Clurman for the release of 87 shares of Cathay Products International,
Inc. to H.E. Gabriel, a client.

Attorney Dacanay, in his reply dated December 7, 1979, denied any liability of
Clurman to Gabriel. He requested that he be informed whether the lawyer of
Gabriel is Baker & McKenzie "and if not, what is your purpose in using the
letterhead of another law office." Not having received any reply, he filed the
instant complaint.
We hold that Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the
Philippines (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Rules of Court). As admitted by the respondents in
their memorandum, Baker & McKenzie is a professional partnership organized in
1949 in Chicago, Illinois with members and associates in 30 cities around the
world. Respondents, aside from being members of the Philippine bar, practising
under the firm name of Guerrero & Torres, are members or associates of Baker &
Mckenzie.
As pointed out by the Solicitor General, respondents' use of the firm name Baker
& McKenzie constitutes a representation that being associated with the firm they
could "render legal services of the highest quality to multinational business
enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade and investment" (p. 3,
respondents' memo). This is unethical because Baker & McKenzie is not
authorized to practise law here. (See Ruben E. Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1983 Ed., p.
115.)
WHEREFORE, the respondents are enjoined from practising law under the firm
name Baker & McKenzie.
SO ORDERED.