DUNGO AND SIBAL VS.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 209464, July 01, 2015
Facts: The fraternal contract should not be signed in blood, celebrated with
pain, marred by injuries, and perpetrated through suffering. That is the
essence of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8049 or the Anti-Hazing Law of 1995.
In the early morning of January 14, 2006, an Initiation rite was
conducted by the officers and members of the Alpha Phi Omega fraternity,
which caused the death of one Marlon Villanueva, who was a B.S.
Agricultural Economics student at the UP Los Baos. During the
proceedings it was found that, Villanueva was brought to Dr. Jose P. Rizal
District Hospital at around 3:20 oclock in the morning of January 14, 2006,
by two men who signed in the log book as Brandon Gonzales and Jerico
Paril, who later turned out to be the petitioners Dandy L. Dungo and
Gregorio a. Sibal. The two were both officers of the fraternity.
The prosecution presented 20 witnesses. One of the witnesses was
the attending physician at the emergency room of Dr. Jose P. Rizal
Hospital, who affirmed that the cause of death was the initiation rites
inflicted upon the victim. This was further substantiated by the autopsy
report on the body of the victim.
The petitioners claim that, they were only the ones who brought
Villanueva to the hospital. Sibal being in charge of the fraternitys events
claimed that he had to postpone the initiation rites because Villanueva was
at a very poor condition. After cancelling the initiation, all the other
neophytes and members went back to UPLB, except Sibal and another
member who was watching over Villanueva. He then called Dungo, who
was not with them during the initiation rites, asking him to help them bring
Villanueva to the hospital, which was substantiated by the testimony of
Dungos girlfriend and another member of the fraternity.
The petitioners were then convicted of violating Sec. 4 of the Antihazing Law. Which was affirmed in ToTo by the Court of appeals. Hence
this petition.
Issue: Whether the Information properly charged the offense proved in the
trial.

Held: The court ruled that the contention of the petitioners, that the
information did not charged the offense proved in the trial, is without merit.
On the manner of how the Information should be worded, Section 9,
Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, is enlightening:
Section 9. Cause of the accusation. The acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying and
aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise
language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in
terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what
offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.
It is evident that the Information need not use the exact language of the
statute in alleging the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense. The test is whether it enables a person of common understanding
to know the charge against him, and the court to render judgment properly.
[92]

Secrecy and silence are common characterizations of the dynamics of

hazing.[93] To require the prosecutor to indicate every step of the planned
initiation rite in the information at the inception of the criminal case, when
details of the clandestine hazing are almost nil, would be an arduous task,
if not downright impossible. The law does not require the impossible (lex
non cognit ad impossibilia).
The proper approach would be to require the prosecution to state every
element of the crime of hazing, the offenders, and the accompanying
circumstances in the planned initiation activity, which has been satisfied in
the present case. Accordingly, the amended information sufficiently
informed the petitioners that they were being criminally charged for their
roles in the planned initiation rite.

ALVIN MERCADO, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 167510, July 08, 2015
Facts:
On October 1, 2001, the petitioner and his co-accused were charged
in the RTC with the violation of Section 3602, in relation to Section 2503 of
the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines ( TCCP). The information
alleges that the petitioner, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously made an entry of some imported goods from Thailand, by
means of false and fraudulent invoice and declaration as regards the true
kind, nature, and quality of the goods such that the goods indicated or
declared therein were 162 cartons of personal effects of no commercial
value, when in truth and in fact, they were of some commercial value.
Only the petitioner was arraigned because his co-accused, Sea,
remained at larged. Petitioner pleaded not-guilty to the information. Hence,
the case was tried and decided only as to the petitioner.
It was established by the prosecution, that a shipment from Bangkok,
Thailand arrived at the Manila International Container Port (MIICP) on July
29, 2000 on board the vessel Sumire, that the shipment, which was
declared under a Bill of Lading to consist of one 1x20 container of assorted
mens and ladies wearing apparel, textile and accessories in 162
packages. That the shipment was consigned to Al-Mer Cargo Management,
an entity owned and managed by the petitioner. That an examination was
conducted on the packages and that Al-mer Cargo filed and Informal Import
Declaratin and Entry (IIDE) and permit to deliver to broker. After such the
cargo was confiscated. And the information was filed against petitioner.
In his defense, the petitioner asserted that he had only
accommodated the shipment upon the request of Sea and Apolonio Viray,
President of Worth Brokerage Corporation; that Sea had represented to
him that the shipment contained only personal and household effects; that
he did not have any participation in following up the clearance for the
shipment; that as a licensed customs broker, his signature did not appear in
the informal entry; that he executed a deed of assignment over the
shipment in favor of Benita Ochoa; and that the broker prepared the import
entry declaration.

The RTC convicted the petitioner guilty as charged. On appeal the CA

affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence this petition.
Issue: Whether petitioner may be held guilty for violation of section 3601 of
the Tariff and Customs Code notwithstanding the fact that he was charged
for violation of sec. 3602 of the tariff and customs code.
Held: The Court disagrees.
The only basis to hold the petitioner criminally liable under the
declaration made by Saganay would be if the two of them had
acted pursuant to a conspiracy. But even if they had acted pursuant to a
conspiracy, there must be an allegation to that effect in the information. We
note, however, that the information did not charge Saganay as the coconspirator of the petitioner, thereby removing any basis for any inference
in that regard. Neither did the information aver that Saganay was at all an
accomplice of the petitioner. Under Article 18 of the Revised Penal
Code, an accomplice is one who, without being a principal either by direct
participation, or by inducement, or by indispensable cooperation,
cooperates in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous
acts. It would violate the constitutional right of the petitioner to be informed
of the charge brought against him if he were held criminally responsible for
Saganay's act or omission on the basis that Saganay had been his agent in
the transaction. In other words, the importer or consignee should not be
held criminally liable for any underdeclaration or misdeclaration made by
the broker unless either a conspiracy between them had been alleged and
proved, or the Prosecution sufficiently established that the importer had
knowledge of and actively participated in the underdeclaration or
misdeclaration. Indeed, to allow the act or omission of Saganay to bind the
petitioner would be unacceptable under the principle of res inter alios
acta embodied in Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

ALVIN COMERCIANTE Y GONZALES VS. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 205926, July 22, 2015

Facts:
On July 31, 2003, an Information was filed before the RTC charging
Comerciante ofviolation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165.
According to the prosecution, at around 10 o'clock in the evening of July
30, 2003, Agent Eduardo Radan (Agent Radan) of the NARCOTICS group
and PO3 Bienvy Calag II (PO3 Calag) were aboard a motorcycle, patrolling
the area while on their way to visit a friend at Private Road, Barangay Hulo,
Mandaluyong City. Cruising at a speed of 30 kilometers per hour along
Private Road, they spotted, at a distance of about 10 meters, two men later identified as Comerciante and a certain Erick Dasilla (Dasilla) standing and showing "improper and unpleasant movements," with one of
them handing plastic sachets to the other. Thinking that the sachets may
contain shabu, they immediately stopped and approached Comerciante
and Dasilla. At a distance of around five meters, PO3 Calag introduced
himself as a police officer, arrested Comerciante and Dasilla, and
confiscated two plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance from
them. A laboratory examination later confirmed that said sachets contained
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
After the prosecution rested its case, Dasilla filed a demurrer to evidence,
which was granted by the RTC, thus his acquittal. However, due to
Comerciante's failure to file his own demurrer to evidence, the RTC
considered his right to do so waived and ordered him to present his
evidence.
In his defense, Comerciante averred that PO3 Calag was looking for a
certain "Barok", who was a notorious drug pusher in the area, when
suddenly, he and Dasilla, who were just standing in front of a jeepney along
Private Road, were arrested and taken to a police station. There, the police
officers claimed to have confiscated illegal drugs from them and were
asked money in exchange for their release. When they failed to accede to
the demand, they were brought to another police station to undergo inquest
proceedings, and thereafter, were charged with illegal possession of
dangerous drugs.

Issue:
Whether PO3 Calag effected a valid warrantless arrest on
Comerciante under the provisions of Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules of Court.
Held:

No.

The Court finds it highly implausible that PO3 Calag, even assuming
that he has perfect vision, would be able to identify with reasonable
accuracy especially from a distance of around 10 meters, and while aboard
a motorcycle cruising at a speed of 30 kilometers per hour miniscule
amounts of white crystalline substance inside two very small plastic
sachets held by Comerciante. The Court also notes that no other overt act
could be properly attributed to Comerciante as to rouse suspicion in the
mind of PO3 Calag that the former had just committed, was committing, or
was about to commit a crime. Verily, the acts of standing around with a
companion and handing over something to the latter cannot in any way be
considered criminal acts. In fact, even if Comerciante and his companion
were showing "improper and unpleasant movements" as put by PO3 Calag,
the same would not have been sufficient in order to effect a lawful
warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure.[31] That his reasonable suspicion bolstered by (a) the
fact that he had seen his fellow officers arrest persons in possession
of shabu; and (b) his trainings and seminars on illegal drugs when he was
still assigned in the province are insufficient to create a conclusion that
what he purportedly saw in Comerciante was indeed shabu.[
For a warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a) to operate, two (2)
elements must concur, namely: (a) the person to be arrested must execute
an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such overt act is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officer.[27] On the other hand,
Section 5 (b) requires for its application that at the time of the arrest, an
offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting officer had
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had committed it. [28]
In both instances, the officer's personal knowledge of the fact of the
commission of an offense is absolutely required. Under Section 5 (a), the
officer himself witnesses the crime; while in Section 5 (b), he knows for a
fact that a crime has just been committed.

JM DOMINGUEZ AGRONOMIC COMPANY, INC. VS. LICLICAN

G.R. No. 208587, July 29, 2015
FACTS: JM Dominguez Agronomic Company, Inc. (JDM) held its annual
stockholders meeting held on December 29, 2007 at the Baguio City
Country Club, during which the election for its new set of directors was
conducted. Which was presided by then company president, Cecilia
Liclican. During such meeting, a conflict ensued when petitioners were not
allowed to vote on the ground that they were not registered stock holders.
Tensions rose and respondents walked out of the meeting. But since the
remaining stockholders constituted a quorum they continued with the
election. While on the other hand the respondents, issued a Board
resolution certifying themselves as directors and officers. Because of the
conflicting results of the election and the Board resolution the petitioners,
filed a complaint against the respondents before the RTC of Baguio City for
nullification of meetings, election and acts of directors and officers,
injunction and other reliefs, raffled to Branch 59 of the court. The case
failed mediation, hence it was referred for appropriate Judicial Dispute
Resolution (JDR) to branch 7 of the RTC. Meanwhile, petitioner
stockholders immediately took hold of corporate properties, represented
themselves to JMDs tenants as the true and lawful directors of the
company, and collected and deposited rents due the company to its bank
account.
The petitioners then filed an Affidavit-Complaint dated December 15, 2008
charging respondents Liclican and Isip of qualified theft. After due
proceedings the prosecutor recommended the filing of informations. When
filed, the informations were eventually raffled to Branch 7 of the RTC, the
same court overseeing the JDR, presided over by Judge Tiongson-Tabora,
who after finding probable cause, issued arrest warrants against
petitioners.
Respondents in response lodged a petition for certiorari with the CA to
annul and set aside the two (2) March 10, 2009 Orders by the RTC Branch

7, anchored, among others, on the alleged existence of a prejudicial

question. According to respondents, petitioner stockholders, by filing the
complaint-affidavit, are already assuming that they are the legitimate
directors of JMD, which is the very issue in the intra-corporate dispute
pending in the RTC, Branch 59.
The CA granted the petition and ruled that Judge Tiongson-Tabora should
have refrained from determining probable cause since she is well aware of
the pendency of the issue on the validity of JMDs elections in Civil Case
No. 6623-R. As the judge overseeing the JDR of the said intra-corporate
dispute, she knew that there was still doubt as to who the rightfully elected
directors of JMD are and, corollarily, who would have the authority to
initiate the criminal proceedings for qualified theft.
Issue: Whether there exists a prejudicial question that could affect the
criminal proceedings for qualified theft against respondents.
Held: Yes.
A prejudicial question generally exists in a situation where a civil action
and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the former an
issue that must be pre-emptively resolved before the latter may proceed,
because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be
determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the
criminal case. The rationale behind the principle is to avoid two conflicting
decisions and its existence rests on the concurrence of two essential
elements: (i) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to
the issue raised in the criminal action; and (ii) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
In the case at bar, the CA correctly ruled that Judge Tiongson-Tabora
acted with grave abuse of discretion when she ordered the arrests of
respondents Isip and Liclican despite the existence of a prejudicial
question.
The resolution of the prejudicial question did not, in context, cure the grave
abuse of discretion already committed. The fact remains that when the
RTC, Branch 7 issued its challenged Orders on March 10, 2009, the
Judgment in favor of petitioners was not yet rendered. Consequently, there

was still, at that time, a real dispute as to who the rightful set of officers
were. Plainly, Judge Tiongson-Tabora should not have issued the
challenged Orders and should have, instead, suspended the proceedings
until Civil Case No. 6623-R was resolved with finality.