Samson, Jr. vs.

Tarroza
G.R. No. L-20354
July 28, 1969
FACTS: This is an appeal from a decision of the Director of Patents denying
the petition for the cancellation of Utility Model Letters Patent No. 62 in favor
of respondent Felipe Tarroza for his Side Tilting-Dumping Wheelbarrow.
From the description of the side tilting-dumping wheelbarrow, respondents
product possesses what the statute refers to as "practical utility." The
requirement explicitly set forth in the statute has thus been met, therefore,
respondent Tarroza is entitled to its benefits. The grant to him of a patent for
a utility model is in accordance with law. There was no reason, therefore, for
its cancellation.
Petitioner Gerardo Samson, Jr was also a prior grantee of Utility Model Patent
No. 27 for a Dumping and Detachable Wheelbarrow, which he claims to have
been infringed by the respondent, they being neighbors.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents Utility Model Patent deserves
cancellation.
HELD: No. There is an express recognition under the Patent Law that any
new model of implements or tools or of any industrial product even if not
possessed of the quality of invention but which is of practical utility is
entitled to a patent for a utility model: From the description of the side of
tilting-dumping wheelbarrow, the product of ingenuity and industry, it is
quite apparent that it has a place in the market and possesses what the
statute refers to as practical utility.
Moreover, in appeals from a decision of the Director of Patents, only
questions of law may be reviewed, findings of facts being conclusive unless
unsupported by substantial evidence. As was emphasized in Bagano v.
Director of Patents: "It is almost trite to state here that in cases of the nature
as the one at bar, only questions of law are to be raised in order that this
Court could exercise its appellate jurisdiction and review the decision." The
above well-settled doctrines suffice to demonstrate that this petition for
review, as noted at the outset, is without merit. Decision is affirmed with
costs against the petitioner.

U.S. vs. Kyburz

G.R. No. L-9458
November 24, 1914
FACTS: Kyburz, the defendant and appellant in this case, was convicted in
the court below of a violation of section 6 of Act No. 666 of the Philippine
Commission, which defines and penalizes the fraudulent use of trade-marks
and trade names, and was sentenced to pay a fine P200. He alleged to have
unlawfully, willfully, and feloniously used the word Meridian on cards placed
in connection with his watches for the purpose of selling the same as
genuine Meridian watches at his place of business and with the intention of
making the purchasers believe that the said watches offered for sale were
genuine Meridian watches, when in truth and in fact they were watches of
some other make, to the damage and prejudice of the aforesaid Greilsammer
Hermanos.
The first contention was that the trial court erred in holding Kyburz criminally
responsible for the acts of his employees in the Manila Jewelry Store in
offering for sale and in selling watches under the trade name of Meridian
watches. It is further contended that the evidence does not disclose a
violation of the penal provisions of section 6 of the Act because it does not
appear that the public was in fact deceived as to the quality of the watches
purchased from the defendant, the watches sold by the defendant and the
complaining company having been made by the same manufacturer, and
being in fact of exactly the same standard and quality. It is to be observed,
however, that the statute penalizes the use of trade-marks and trade names
with intent to defraud either the public or the owner of such trade-mark or
trade name.
ISSUE: WON defendant should be liable for selling watches under the trade
of Meridian watches.
HELD: Yes. Greilsammer Hermanos have acquired the exclusive ownership of
the trade name Meridian as applied to this class of watches, and that they
are clearly entitled to protection from the use of this trade name by others,
not only under the express provisions of section 6 of the Act, but also upon
the general grounds which afford protection against unfair competition.
With the infinity of distinguishing names, marks and signs which are subject
to the use and appropriation of makers and dealers in watches, the use of
the trade name Meridian by any other firm than Greilsammer Hermanos can
have but one reasonable explanation, and that is the intent to take

advantage of the favorable opinion formed by the public of the quality and
standard of the watches sold by that firm under the trade name adopted by
it for advertising purposes, and as a guaranty to the public that such
watches have passed through its hands and are up to the standard set by it
for watches advertised and sold as Meridian watches.
There is no error in the proceedings prejudicial to the rights of the accused.
The judgment entered in the court below should therefore be affirmed, with
the costs of this instance against the appellant.

Compaia General de Tabacos de Filipinas vs. Alhambra Cigar &

Cigarette Manufacturing Co.
G.R. No. L-10251
February 10, 1916
FACTS: Plaintiffs trade name, as evidenced by the certificate issued under
the Spanish regime, consists solely of the words La Flor de la Isabela.
Plaintiff does not claim that the word Isabela has been registered by it as a
trade name or that it has a title from any source conferring on it the
exclusive right to use that word. Defendant began the manufacture of
cigarettes, offering them to the public in packages on the front side of each
of which appeared the words Alhambra Isabelas. Action is brought to enjoin
the defendant from using the word Isabelas.
The exclusive right to use this name, plaintiff claim arises from two causes:
First, the contraction of the phrase La Flor de la Isabela into the word
Isabela by popular expression and use; and second, the use for more than
twenty years of the word Isabela. Judgment was for plaintiff and defendant
appealed.
ISSUE: Whether defendants use of the word Alhambra Isabela is an
infringement to the use of trade name.
HELD: No. The opinion of the plaintiff must fail. It shows that in not a single
instance in the history of the plaintiff corporation, so far as is disclosed by
the record, has a package of its cigarettes gone into the market, either at
wholesale or retail with the word Isabela alone on the package as a
separate or distinct word or name.
The Royal Decree of 1888 prohibits the registration of a trade name when
the trade name represents the geographical place of production or origin of
the products or goods to which the trade name refers, or when it is merely
the name, quality or description of the merchandise with respect to which

the trade name is to be used. In such cases, therefore, no trade name can
exist.
The two claims of the plaintiff are identical; for there could have been no
contraction brought about by popular expression except after long lapse of
time. The contraction of the phrase in to the word would create no rights,
there being no registration, unless it resulted from long use.
Even admitting that the word Isabela may have been appropriable by
plaintiff as a trade name at the time it began to use it, the evidence showing
that it had been exclusively appropriated by the plaintiff would have to be
very strong to establish the fact of appropriation and the right to exclusive
use. The law as it stands and has stood since the Royal Decree of 1888
prohibits the use of a geographical name as a trade name. The judgment
appealed from is reversed.