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THESIS FOR THE DEGREE OF LICENTIATE OF ENGINEERING

Structural Safety Analysis of Bow-Doors


ULF KARLSSON

Department of Naval Architecture and Ocean Engineering


CHALMERS UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY
Gteborg, Sweden 2004

Structural Safety Analysis of Bow-Doors

ULF KARLSSON
ULF KARLSSON, 2004
ISSN 1101-0614
CHA / NAV / R-04 / 0090
Department of Naval Architecture and Ocean Engineering
Chalmers University of Technology
SE-412 96 Gteborg
Sweden
Telephone +46 (0)31-772 1000

Printed by Chalmers Reproservice


Gteborg, Sweden 2004

Structural Safety Analysis of Bow-Doors


Ulf Karlsson
Department of Naval Architecture and Ocean Engineering
Chalmers University of Technology

Abstract
Bow-doors are one of the most vulnerable parts on a RoRo-vessel. At the same time, they are
necessary for the profitability of todays RoRo-vessels.
The minimum design rules for bow-door systems, stated in the International Association of
Classification Societies (IACS) S8, constitute the basis for the class rules.
In this work, the rules of IACS S8 have been assessed regarding the structural integrity for
bow-doors of the clam door type.
The work is based on previous damages, compared to the design rules, so as to find
weaknesses in the rules. Damages were mapped and weak points in the rules as well as in the
design and construction stages were identified. For the found problem areas part analyses
were performed.
Fractures and cracks dominate as the cause of damage for bow-door systems. In most of these
cases cracks in welds are involved. Fatigue proved to be a major cause for the development of
fractures and cracks.
Assuming the bow-door as a rigid-body and distributing the forces equally on each support, as
prescribed by IACS S8, proved to be an approach that leads to inadequate results. The
deformation of the door causes the loads on the supports to differ significantly and the real
pressure distribution subjects the lower supports to much higher loads then the upper ones.
It is common with gaps between the supports in the doors and the corresponding ones in the
hull. These gaps will considerably affect the load distribution on the supports.
In certain situations, bow propellers may excite bow-door arms into resonance cycling. This
would give rise to a large number of high stress cycles and might even cause fatigue failure.

Keywords:
bow-door; IACS S8; damage; analysis; safety; arm; structure; ship design; fatigue.

Acknowledgments
Many people, companies and organisations have contributed with information and work in
this project, both people in the project group, reference group one [1], and from outside,
reference group two [2]. Great thanks for all of your support, information and advice. As you
all know, without you it would not have been possible to fulfil this project.
Especially, I would like to thank my supervisor Anders Ulfvarson for his knowledgeable
advice, guidance and always positive and good mood.
Erland Johnson and Gunnar Kjell at the Swedish National Testing Institute, SP, for their
measuring and analysis work of the bow-door arm.
Jan-Ove Carlsson and Pontus Dhalstrm at MacGREGOR RoRo-Division and Olle Thomsson
at Lloyds Register, for all the time and effort they put into this project.
I would also like to thank Vinnova and the Swedish Maritime Administration for funding this
project and Swedish Maritime Administration for their participation in the project.
To all at the Department of Naval Architecture and Ocean Engineering, it has really been fun;
even if the workload has sometimes been heavy, the good atmosphere makes one cope.

II

Table of Contents
Abstract .. I
Acknowledgements II
Table of contents ... III
1. Introduction ...

1.1 Background
1.2 Aim of the Project .
1.3 Limitations ...

1
1
1

2. Method ..

3. Pre-Study of Bow-Door Systems ... 4


3.1 Why Bow-Doors
3.2 Bow-Door Systems ..
3.3 Design Procedures
3.4 Design Rules with Comments .
3.5 Incidents and Damages to Bow-Door Systems

4
5
10
12
15

4. Structural Damage Analysis of Bow-Doors .. 16


4.1 Introduction ..
4.2 Method ..
4.3 General Damage Distribution ..
4.4 Damage Distribution on the Main Parts .
4.5 Arms
4.6 Severity of the Damage Cases

16
17
18
20
21
21

5 Identified Problems - Items to Analyse

22

6 Fractures and Cracks

23

6.1 Fatigue or Overloads


6.2 High- or Low-Cycle Fatigue ..

23
25

7. Load Distribution on Bow-Door Supports ..

29

7.1 Introduction ..
7.2 Rules ..
7.3 Required Strength of the Supports according to IACS S8
7.4 Required Strength according to the Finite-Element Calculation .
7.5 Application of a Measured Pressure Event .

29
30
31
33
37

8. Stress and Fatigue Analysis of a Bow-Door Arm ...

41

8.1 Introduction
8.2 Real Arm Verses the Model .
8.3 Load Cases ..
8.4 Bow Propellers
8.5 Fatigue Analysis ...

41
42
44
47
51

9. Conclusions

52

10. Recommendations

54

10.1 Rule-Based Recommendations .


10.2 Design-Based Recommendations .

54
54

11. Further Work ...

55

12. References ...

56
III

1. Introduction
1.1 Background
Accidents with many casualties due to failure of bow-door systems and several additional
incidents, are the cause for concern of the safety of bow-door systems.
The problem in these cases has been visors and bow-doors that, for some reason, have been
open or opened at sea.
This project is limited to bow-door systems of the clam door type, partly because no visors
have been constructed since the loss of M/S Estonia, at least not in Europe, and partly to limit
the size of the project in order to be able to conduct analysis with enough depth.

1.2 Aim of the Project


The main task of this project is to increase the safety of RoRo-ferries.
The main purpose is to investigate if the design rules of today are good enough for the ships
of tomorrow. The purpose is also to propose changes in the rules and design methods if
needed.
The classification societies design rules for bow-door systems are based on the International
Association of Classification Societies, IACS, S8 rules, which also constitutes the minimum
requirements. Hence, the IACS S8 has been the analysed rules in this project.
The aim is also to find methods for analysis of this kind.

1.3 Limitations
The descriptions and information provided in this report are limited to RoRo-passenger ships
with bow openings of the bow-blade type, or clam doors, i.e., two doors that are either
attached to the hull via arms and open horizontally outwards, or two doors that are directly
attached to the hull with hinges and open down and outwards. It does not consider the inner
watertight door, the surveillance system or the crews management of the system.

2. Method
This licentiate thesis is a summery report based on four part-, or project reports. These are:
- Pre-Study of Bow-Door Systems CHA / NAV / R-04 / 0085
- Structural Damage Analysis of Bow-Doors CHA / NAV / R-04 / 0086
- Stress and Fatigue Analysis of a Bow-Door Arm CHA / NAV / R-04 / 0088
- Supports of Bow-Doors according to IACS S8 CHA / NAV / R-04 / 0089
The reports are all registered at the department of Naval Architecture and Ocean Engineering,
Chalmers University of Technology, Gteborg, Sweden.
The results from the analyses are based on verifiable facts. The research material, or the
chosen bow-door system, have a common design and are representative for most of the bowdoor designs of this type. All bow-door systems are, however, designed according to the same
basic rules, comprised within the IACS S8 rules.
The research method used consists of six steps, as described in diagram 2.1.
1. Pre-study of bow-door systems

2. Structural damage
analysis of bow-doors

3. Identifying problems Items to


analyse

4. Part-analysis of identified problems

5. Validation

6. Recommendations
Diagram 2.1. Schematic diagram of the used research method.
2

Step 1
The purpose of Step 1 is to gather information of different types of bow-door designs, the
design method and the design rules they are to comply too. It also describes some incidents
and damages that have previously occurred to bow-door systems. This information constitutes
the base for the continuation of this project.
The information was gathered through interviews with representatives of companies
designing bow-door systems, ships crews and other people knowledgeable in this area [1, 2],
the study of different types of bow-door systems, damage reports [3, 4], and of the IACS S8
rules [5], which the class rules are based on.
Step 1 consists of Chapter 3,Pre-Study of Bow-Door Systems.
Step 2
In this Step, we try to find structural weaknesses in these kinds of systems, based on previous
damages that have occurred. The result will give information of which parts that demand
further investigation.
The goal with the damage analysis has been to investigate what kind of structural damage that
has occurred on bow-door systems and surrounding hull structure, where the damages have
occurred and how common they are.
All relevant ships with bow-doors in a specific classification society are part of the analysis.
Step 2 consists of Chapter 4, Structural Damage Analysis of Bow-Door Systems.
Step 3
From Steps 1 and 2, items demanding further analysis were identified. Five items were found.
Step 4
Of the five items found in need of analysis, four have been analysed.
These are:
- Fractures and Cracks (Chapter 6)
- Load Distribution on Bow-Door Supports (Chapter 7)
- Gaps between the Plates of Supports (Section 7.4.3)
- Stress and Fatigue Analysis of a Bow-Door Arm (Chapter 8)
One item remains to be analysed:
- The rules for the hull structure around the doors
Step 5
In Step 5, the results from the part-analyses were validated with regard to the IACS S8 rules
and to design aspects.
Step 6
Finally, both rule-based and design-based recommendations are made regarding changes of
the active rules and regarding designing issues.

3. Pre-Study of Bow-Door Systems


3.1 Why Bow-Doors

The best bow-door is the one


that does not exist
Christer Schoug, Stena RoRo

One of the most vulnerable areas of RoRo-vessels is the bow-door [2]. However, bow-doors
are essential to the profitability of this type of ship. The main reason is the large cost of
having a ship in port. The limiting factor regarding time-in-harbour is loading and unloading
from a RoRo deck. The best solution today for fast loading and unloading is to let the vehicles
drive through the ship. To make this possible, there needs to be a bow-door and an aft ramp.
Wide lanes through the bow are also important, as this makes it easier and faster to drive
trailers in and out from the ship.
The alternative to bow-doors is having very wide vessels in which vehicles can turn around.
This would work on ships trading on longer routes, where the ship stays in harbour for a
longer time and where loading and unloading is not the limiting time factor. If the vessel is to
go on a shorter route, the time-in-harbour is generally short, and loading/unloading becomes
the limiting factor.
Another reason to mount bow-doors on vessels, even if they are going to trade on a longer
route, is to make the vessels all-round, to be able to traffic more routes.
The second-hand value is also considered, as it is easier to sell a ferry with bow-doors than
without. The cost of mounting bow-doors on a ship afterwards, without the ship being
prepared for it, is about 50% higher than to install them during construction of the ship.
The customers wish of fast unloading is also an issue to consider.

3.2 Bow-Door Systems


Bow-doors can be divided into two types, visor and bow-blades. From here on, bow-blades
will be called bow-doors.
Visors
Visor systems consist of one door, the visor, which is
hinged to the hull by two hinges, positioned on the
weather deck. The visor opens upwards in a rotating
track around these hinges. Since the hinges are normally
positioned aft of the visor, the sea forces are directed in
the opening direction of the visor and the locking
devices can therefore be subjected to heavy loads.
Visors have not been installed on new civil ferries, at
least not in Europe [1], since MV Estonia lost her visor
and sank. Although many ferries still have visors, they
have not been designed for a long time and are therefore
not part in this analysis.
Photo 3.1. Visor
Bow-Doors
There are two types of bow-doors, one where the doors are hinged to the hull by arms and one
where the doors are hinged directly to the hull via hinges. The system with the doors attached
to arms is the most common [1]. The main reason for using bow-doors instead of visors is that
the sea forces are in the closing direction of the bow-doors. Another reason is that visors
cannot be mounted on ships with a high bow, or where the opening does not reach up to
weather deck.
The advantages of having bow-doors with arms are that
the doors open horizontally outwards. Thereby the doors
can be mounted on any ship, regardless of its bow shape.
The disadvantages are that it is an expensive and
complicated system with more parts that have to interact
and can fail. The doors are not as stiff as visors and
become more easily deformed and the arms and hinges
are very sensitive to vibrations in an open position [1].
Photo 3.2. Bow-doors with arms.
The advantage with bow-doors directly attached to the
hull is the more stable attachment in the open position.
The design is also cheaper and simpler, with fewer parts
that can fail.
A disadvantage is that the doors cannot be used on ships
that have a pronounced flare, since the doors then would
go into the water, or ice, when opened [1].

Photo 3.3. Bow-doors directly hinged to the hull.


5

Door
Arm
Hinges
Hinges
y

z
x

The direction of the


reaction forces from the
supports and stoppers.

Symbols
Figure 3.4. Bow-door system with arms.

Cleating/Locking device
Support
Stopper
Guide
Icebreaking cylinder

An outer bow-door system generally consists of the following components:


(Components in italic are shown in figure 3.4 and/or photo 3.5)
1. Two doors
2. Manoeuvring arms with hinges or just hinges
3. Hydraulic manoeuvring cylinders
4. Cleating/locking devices between the doors (2-3 devices)
5. Cleating/locking devices between each door and the hull (2-3 devices per door)
6. Rubber seal
7. Supports (5-7 per door)
8. Stoppers (3-4 devices)
9. Guide (1-2 per door)
10. Icebreaking cylinder (1-2 per door)
11. Locking for open position
Bow-door systems are hydraulically manoeuvred. The manoeuvring is usually fully automatic
and governed by a PLC (Programmable Logical Controller). Sensors, usually magnetic and
contact sensors, survey the system and the bow area is illuminated for surveillance with a
camera. To prevent ice formation, the bow area is heated. On the tank top a drainage pump
and a water level alarm are installed.

Surveillance
camera
2
4

10

Ramp

Heaters

Photo 3.5. Stitch image of a bow-door system with arms (inside view).

Doors
The two doors are to have at least the same strength as the surrounding bow-hull, according to
IACS S8.4 [5], and the rules for the door structure are the same as for the foreship structure.
Manoeuvring arm
Each door is attached to an arm that carries the door during opening and closing and in an
open position. The arms have the shape of a box beam since they must carry heavy loads in
the form of a bending moment and torsion. They are attached to the doors at approximately
where the centre of gravity of the doors is.
The door is attached to the arm with two hinges, of which only one hinge carries vertical
loads, and the arm is attached to the hull, also with two hinges, of which only one hinge
carries vertical loads.
Hydraulic manoeuvring cylinder
The arm, and thereby the door, is manoeuvred by a hydraulic cylinder. Usually the hydraulic
cylinder is attached to the side of the hull and at the rear end of the arm.

Cleating- and locking devices


Cleating devices
The purpose of the cleating devices is, at closing, to cleat the doors to each other and to the
hull (support to support), compressing the rubber seal between the doors and the hull to keep
the bow-doors weather-tight. A hydraulic cylinder manoeuvres each cleating device.
Locking devices
The task of the locking devices is to lock the doors in a cleated position and to prevent the
doors from opening. They are not to transfer any sea loads, this being the task of the supports.
They are usually hydraulically manoeuvred, but manually locking devices exist.
The cleating and locking devices are positioned between the doors (2-3 devices) in order to
cleat and lock the doors to each other and around the edge of the doors (2-3 devices per door)
in order to cleat and lock the doors to the hull.
There are different types of cleating and locking devices.
One type is a combined cleating/locking device. It first cleats the doors with a hydraulically
manoeuvred hook pulling in an eye-plate and then locks them by putting the mechanical
connection over the centre and manually by sticking a rod through the mechanical
connection.
In another design, the cleating and locking device are separate devices. The cleating devices
first cleat the doors with a hydraulic hook pulling in an eye-plate. The locking devices then
push a hydraulic rod through an eye-plate, which stays locked by gravity.

Rubber seal
Along the edge of each door is a rubber seal. In the hull and in one of the doors is a coaming
in which the rubber seal is compressed at closing. The purpose is to keep the bow-doors
weather-tight. There are support edges on each side of the rubber seal to prevent it from
becoming too compressed, and to shelter it from water pressure and ice.
Supports
The doors open outwards and the forces from the sea are therefore in the closing direction.
These forces are transferred from the doors into the hull via supports on the doors and the
corresponding supports in the hull. Each door has 5-7 supports, positioned around the door
frames.
The supports transfer forces in different directions, depending on their position.
The supports mainly consist of thick steel plates welded to the doors and hull at structurally
strong points and strengthened with brackets etc.
Stoppers
Between the doors, there are stoppers with the purpose of transferring loads between the
doors. The stoppers consist of plates welded on structurally strong points on the doors.
Guide
The task of the guides is to guide the doors at opening and closing. There can be one or two
guides mounted in the front and upper part of the bow-hull and/or on the tank top. The guides
consist of guide rails in the hull and guide-wheels on the doors, which follow the rails and
guide the doors during opening and closing.

Icebreaking cylinders
There are one or two icebreaking cylinders for each door, positioned on the tank top and/or on
the front top of the doors. Their purpose is to help push out the doors, especially when they
are frozen stuck.
Locking for open position
In a fully open position, doors are locked by one hydraulically manoeuvred rod, or hook,
each. These are positioned on the side of the hull and lock through an eye-plate on the arm.

Manoeuvring sequence
Below is an example describing a typical manoeuvring sequence during opening and closing.
Opening the doors
1. Locking pins are manually pulled out from the cleating/locking devices;
2. Hydraulic pressure is turned on;
3. The cleating/locking devices between the doors and the hull are unhooked;
4. The cleating/locking devices between the doors are unhooked;
5. The icebreaking cylinders push the doors out;
6. The manoeuvring cylinders push on the arms and open the doors;
7. In a fully open position the doors are locked with the locking for open position;
8. The ramp is lowered;
9. The hydraulic pressure is turned off.
Closing the doors
1. Hydraulic pressure is turned on;
2. The ramp is raised;
3. The locking for open position unlocks;
4. The manoeuvring cylinders pull the arms and close the doors;
5. The cleating/locking devices between the doors cleat the doors towards each other,
compressing the rubber seal, and finally lock the doors in a cleated position;
6. The cleating/locking devices between the doors and the hull cleat the doors against the
hull, compressing the rubber seal, and finally lock the doors in a cleated position;
7. Hydraulic pressure is turned off;
8. Locking pins are manually pushed into the cleating/locking devices.

3.3 Design Procedures


Procedures
The request for bow-door systems comes late in the design process of a ship [1]. Often, the
bow structure has already been determined. This means that the designs most often cannot be
optimal.
Before constructing a bow-door system, the design companies receives data of the bow shape
in the form of a body plan and the ramp main dimensions, i.e., width, length, and the free
height through the bow.
From this data, they decide the shape and the size of the bow-doors and the location in the
bow. They then design the locking arrangement, supports, manoeuvring equipment,
surveillance system etc.
Fittings of the equipment are adjusted after the bulkheads, reinforcements in the hull and the
space available in co-operation with the shipyard.
Information and drawings of the system are sent to the shipyard, including information about
how large forces that are to be transferred from each support, hinge and cleating/locking
device. The shipyard then has the responsibility for seeing to it that these forces are
transferred correctly into the hull through meeting webs, stringers, brackets etc.
The design companies follow the class rules very much as they are written, for which the
IACS S8 rules serve as a base. They do not add any safety margins of their own. This makes
the correctness of these rules important.
Designing
When calculating the loads on each support, the projected areas are divided into segments,
one for each support, with the lines drawn up between the supports. The design external force
for each projected area, calculated according to IACS S8.3.1a, is divided between the area
segments and constitutes the calculated force on the corresponding support. The redundancy
is calculated in a way where one support at a time can be removed, at which the stress on the
other supports must not exceed allowable values according to IACS S8 (class) rules.

Figure 3.6. Projected area divided into segments, longitudinal-direction.


The allowable play between the supports in the hull and in the doors and between locking pins
and eye-plates are not to exceed 3mm according to the IACS S8 rules. This is however,
already at the construction stage, difficult to achieve due to initial deformation caused by the
lower precision on constructions of this size.

10

Some design companies always carry out a finite-element analysis of doors and of the arms
and their hinges; sometimes even of other items, for instance the fore bottom support.
Other design companies do not perform a finite-element analysis, except when they design the
steel structure for the bow-doors.
There are many design solutions to bow-door systems, among other things for how loads
transfer into the hull. This can differ greatly between ships.
In the designs, the ramp in a folded position usually constitutes the watertight bulkhead.
The steel material used is generally AH-36. DH-36 is chosen when thicker steel is to be used,
which is a softer and more ductile material and thus less fragile and gives a better margin for
brittle fracture.
Experience and continuous improvements is the method used for the development of bowdoor systems and elimination of critical points.
Responsibility
The design companies offer one years guarantee for the bow-door system.
The design companies have full responsibility for the bow-door systems they deliver, even if
the classification society in question has approved them.
Sometimes a second party, for instance shipyards in China or Korea, delivers the construction.
This splitting of the design/construction results in a less reliable construction and the question
of responsibility becomes unclear.
Feature bow-door systems
The opinion of the future bow-doors are somewhat divided. Some design companies believe
that the speed of Ro-Pax ships in the future will increase and that the bow shapes thereby will
become sharper. The radius, or the roundness, of the bow will thereby decrease.
They also think that the bow opening will be narrower with only one lane, due to the sharper
bow. Two lanes would make the bow-doors very long.
Others believe that future bow-doors will be wider and longer and made for two lanes through
the bow. They do not think that the speed of ships in the future will be higher than todays
high-speed crafts with a speed of up to 27-28 knots.
They agree about the fact that lightweight materials will not be used in the future, but that the
materials they use today will also be used in the future. They think that the bow-doors
attached directly to the hull will be less common in the future. Faster ships have larger stem
angels, or sharper noses, and these kinds of doors cannot be mounted on sharp noses, as they
would go into the water on opening.

11

3.4 Design Rules with Comments


In this part, the design rules have been analysed and comments have been made based on
discussions with a reference group [1].
3.4.1 General
IACS (International Association of Classification Societies) was founded in 1968 with the
aim of securing as much uniformity as possible between societies.
IACS contributes to maritime safety and regulations through technical support, compliance
verification and research and development.
More than 90 % of the worlds cargo-carrying tonnage is covered by the classification design,
construction and through-life compliance rules and standards set by the ten Member Societies
and two Associates of IACS.
The IACS rules constitute a basis, or provide minimum requirements, for the rules of the
classification societies.
The rules of IACS UR S8, Rev. 3 Nov. 2003, [5] Bow-doors and inner doors concerns the
arrangement, strength and securing of bow-doors.
The IACS UR S8 was approved by IACS members to take effect from 1982 and applies to
new ships.

3.4.2 Comments on the IACS S8 rules


The design companies follow the class rules very much as they are written, for which the
IACS S8 rules serve as a basis, and do not add any safety margins of their own. This makes
the correctness of these rules important.
Regarding the IACS S8 rules, some parts might be a bit vague, as seen below:
S8.3 Design loads
S8.3.1 Bow-doors
A design pressure serves as the basis for the dimensioning of the bow-doors, defined by the
rule S8.3.1 a.
S8.3.1 a. The design external pressure Pe, in kN/m2, to be considered for the scantlings of
primary members, securing and supporting devices of bow-doors is not to be less than the
pressure normally used by the Society nor than:
Pe = 2.75CH(0.22 + 0.15 tan )(0.4V sin + 0.6L0.5)2
Where:
V
contractual ships speed, in knots,
L
ships length, in m, but need not to be taken greater than 200 metres,

coefficient depending on the area where the ship is intended to be operated:


=1
for seagoing ships,
=0.8 for ships operated in coastal waters,
= 0.5 for ships operated in sheltered waters,

12

CH = 0.0125 L
1

for L < 80 m
for L 80 m

flare angle, defined as the angle between a vertical line and the tangent to the side
shell plating, measured in a vertical plane normal to the horizontal tangent to the
shell plating at the point on the bow-door, /2 aft of the steam line on the plane h/2
above the bottom of the door, as shown in Figure 3.7.

entry angle, defined as the angle between a longitudinal line parallel to the centreline
and the tangent to the shell plating in a horizontal plane, measured at the same point
as .

Figure 3.7. Definition of and .


Comment:
- the flare and entry angles, and , used in the formula for the external pressure Pe
are considered only at a specific point, but vary along the bow differently on different
ships.
S8.3.1 b The design external forces, in kN, considered for the scantlings of securing and
supporting devices of bow-doors are not to be less than:
Fx = PeAx
Fy = PeAy
Fz = PeAz
Where: Ax, Ay and Az is the projected area of the door from the respective direction.
For bow-doors, including bulwark, of unusual form or proportions, e.g. ships with a rounded
nose and large stem angles, the areas and angles used for determination of the design values
of external forces may require to be specially considered.
Comment:
- There is no definition of rounded nose and large stem angles.

13

S8.6. Securing and supporting of bow-doors


S8.6.1 General
In rule S8.6.1, it says:
Bow-doors are to be fitted with adequate means of securing and supporting so as to be
commensurate with the strength and stiffness of the surrounding structure.
Comment:
- This rule is impossible to comply with.
S8.6.2 Scantlings
S8.6.2 c:
For side-opening doors the reaction forces applied on the effective securing and supporting
devices assuming the door as a rigid-body are determined for the following combination of
external loads acting simultaneously together with the self weight of the door:
Case 1
Case 2

Fx, Fy and Fz
acting on both doors,
0.7 Fx and 0.7 Fz acting on both doors and 0.7 Fy acting on each door separately,

Where Fx, Fy and Fz are applied at the centroid of projected areas.


Comments:
- The doors are assumed to be a rigid-body, which they are not.
-

The design external forces are applied at the centroid of the projected areas and the
reaction forces can be distributed uniformly on the effective securing and supporting
devices, irrespective of their position. In reality, the lower parts of the doors, and their
supports and securing devices, will be subjected to much larger forces than the upper
parts of the door.

Rule S8.6.2 e says:


The distribution of the reaction forces acting on the securing and supporting devices may
require to be supported by direct calculations taking into account the flexibility of the hull
structure and the actual position and stiffness of the supports.
Comment:
- There is no definition of when direct calculations are required.

3.4.3 Others
There are no special rules for the bow-hull structure depending on the size of the doors.
If the speed of ships increases in the future, the ships would become more slender. This would
require longer bow-doors to be able to have the same lane-width through the bow. The rules
for the hull structure around the doors might then be inadequate.

14

3.5 Incidents and Damages to Bow-Door Systems


From damage reports, incidents [3, 4] and interviews with knowledgeable people [1][2], some
conclusions can be made as follows:
If doors open at sea in heavy weather, there will be little time left to close them before the
waves rip them off. Even if the direction of the waves is from the ships stern, the pitching
and stamping motions will probably cause the doors to fall off in a quite short time. This
means that one of the most important issues is to prevent the doors from opening at sea.
It is apparent that any bow-door can be wrecked in heavy sea if the ships speed is not
adjusted to the conditions. The rules for bow-door designs obviously presume that a ships
speed is adjusted to the conditions.
Common Damages
It is common that cracks develop in the structure, at the attachments for the arm hinges,
cleating and locking devices and supports (mostly lower supports), etc. Many of the cracks
have developed due to poor detail design and construction, stiffened points and bad welding.
Sometimes supports in the hull are pushed in, often a bottom support, by their corresponding
support in the door, causing a hole where water can enter and flood the bow-door area.
Bow-door supports are often not cleated steel to steel, or with a play of maximum 3mm
according to IACS rules, against the corresponding supports in the hull.
Play in the linking system for cleating and locking devices and worn eye-plates for locking
pistons is quite common.
Heavy weather has caused indents to shell plates in doors and in hulls and sometimes even
damaged locking devices and structure.
The rubber seal often breaks due to ice, movements of the doors and water pressure. This
represents no danger and the rubber seal is more less a consumption product.

15

4. Structural Damage Analysis of Bow-Doors


4.1 Introduction
In this damage analysis, we try to find weaknesses in bow-door systems based on previous
damages that have occurred. The result will give information on what parts in the system that
needs to be investigated more closely.
The goal has been to investigate what kind of structural damage that occurs on bow-door
systems and the surrounding hull structure, where the damages occur and how common they
are.
All relevant ships with bow-doors in a specific classification society are part of the analysis.
There were 38 ships. The age varies between 2-36 years, with an average age of 14.7 years.
The ships were built during the years 1967-2001. Together they have 557 years of service. For
these ships, a total of 141 reported damages were found concerning structural damage on
bow-door systems and the surrounding hull structure.
In the analysis, all registered reports are included. No distinction has been made between
severe and less severe damages, since this information has in most cases not been possible to
distinguish in the reports.
It was, in many cases, not possible to conclude if the doors are hinged to arms or directly
hinged to the hull. Both types are therefore represented here without distinction.
The rules for bow-door designs, IACS S8 [5], was established in 1982 and revised in 1995.
The bow-door systems in the analysis are therefore designed according to different rules. This
has not been considered in the analysis.
Older damage reports are missing in the data-base. Many reports do not provide information
about where the damages have occurred, in which detail or what kind of damage it is.
Other sources of error are that some damages have been repaired without being reported to the
classification society. Damages found by surveyors are sometimes not reported if the crew
repairs them while the surveyor is still present and can approve the repair.
For this Damage Analysis, the following limitations have been applied:
- Ships with visors are excluded, i.e., only ships with two doors opening horizontally
outwards, are part of the analysis.
- Ships less than 90 m in length are excluded.
- Ships that operate in too calm or sheltered waters are excluded. Included here
are all short-distance ferries, defined as ferries with equal ends.
- Damages that have occurred due to contact or human errors are excluded.
- Damaged rubber seals are not included in the analysis, since this is normal wear and tear
damage.
- Faults that only require adjustments are not part of the analysis since, these are
included in normal maintenance.

16

4.2 Method
Structural damages on the ships bow-door systems were searched for in the classification
societys database. The search period covered all of their lifetime.
Information on the ships was gathered in a table showing when the ship was built, how old it
was at the different damage occasions, which parts that had been damaged, what kind of
damages there were and where the damages had occurred.
The main structural parts in a bow-door system are:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Door structure
Bow-hull structure
Cleating/Locking devices
Hinges
Arms (if present)
(Supports)

Since it in the damage reports not has been possible to specifically distinguish damage on
supports, these probably appear as damages on doors or hulls; they are not included in the
analysis.
A summarizing of the damages for each of these main parts was made. This shows in what
kind of detail the damages had occurred, the number of damages, the type and location of the
damages and at which ship age they occurred.

17

4.3 General Damage Distribution


4.3.1 Damaged ships
40
15 17
17
12

35
61
30

7
4

Age

25

20
6

15 2 1

15
3

3
1
3 11

10
5

0
1

9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37
Ship

Diagram 4.1. Damages versus ship ages.


Diagram 4.1 shows the 38 ships included in the analysis on the horizontal axis, each
represented by a pillar, and the age of the ships on the vertical axis. Pillars in grey represent
the ships for which no damage reports were found. The pillars in black represent the ships for
which damage reports were found. The number above each black pillar shows the number of
damages found for each respective ship.
As can be seen in the diagram, the number of damages found on the ships increases with the
age of the ships, as expected.

Undamaged
Ships
47%
(8.2 years)

Damaged
Ships
53%
(20.5 years)

Of the total of 38 ships in the analysis, 20, or 53%, had


reports of structural damage on the bow-door system
and/or the surrounding hull structure. The average age of
the 38 ships was 14.7 years. For the 20 ships with damage
reports, the average age was 20.5 years, which can be
compared to 8.2 years for the 18 ships without any
damages reported.

Diagram 4.2. Damaged and undamaged ships.


18

4.3.2 Damaged Main Parts


A total of 141 damages were found and these were distributed on the main parts as follows:
Door
Hull
Cleating/Locking
Hinge
Arm

47 damages
25
39
28
2

In Diagram 4.3 the percentage distribution of the damages is shown together with the average
age of the ships when the damages occurred.
ARM
1%
(15.0 years)
HINGE
20%
(19.6 years)

CLEATING/
LOCKING
28%
(13.9 years)

Diagram 4.3. Percentage distribution of the


damages on the Main Parts.
DOOR
33%
(18.3 years)

HULL
18%
(15.9 years)

The distribution of the 141 damages on the main parts shows that damages on doors are the
most common with 33% of the cases, closely followed by damages on the cleating/locking
devices with 28%. Hinges and hull have fewer damages, 20% and 18%, respectively. Arm
damages were only reported twice.
The average age of the ships, when the damages occurred on the different parts, varies
between 13.9-19.6 years.

19

4.4 Damage Distribution on the Main Parts


Diagrams 4.4 a,b,c,d shows the percentage distribution of the damages in the different details
for the main parts.
Shell plate
8%
(22.0 years)

Seal chanel
11%
(18.3 years)
Stiffener
33%
(22.7 years)
Frame
33%
(23.1 years)

Bracket
42%
(17.0 years)

Stiffner
50%
(8.8 years)

Bracket
11%
Shell plate (6.3 yeras)
11%
(21.0 years)

Diagram 4.4 a. Door


On 13 ships, or on 34% of the total number
of ships, a total of 47 damages were found
in relation to doors.

Pins/
Bearings
36%
(19.4 years)

Attachment/
Bracket
64%
(17.0 years)

Diagram 4.4 c. Cleating/Locking device


In total, 39 damages were found on 12 ships
(32%) related to cleating/locking devices.

Diagram 4.4 b. Hull


For the hull, a total of 25 damages were
found on 6 ships, or on 16% of the ships.

Locking
pin/eye
37%
(17.8 years)

Attachment/
Bracket
63%
(14.9 years)

Diagram 4.4 d. Hinge


For hinges, 28 damages were found on 10
ships, corresponding to 26% of the ships.

General for all main parts is that fractures and cracks dominate as the cause of damage.
Most common are fractures and cracks in stiffeners, brackets, attachments and in the door and
hull frame. Fractures and cracks were the cause in 70% of all damage cases and in most of
these cases, cracks in welds were involved.
Other found damages were; buckled, deformed, torn and worn.
For the door and the hull, most damages (80-90%) occurred in the aft parts. For the hull, there
were three times more damages in the upper parts than in the lower parts. For the doors the
damages between the upper parts and the lower parts were in equal numbers.
Damages in the cleating/locking devices occurred in 5 out of 6 occasions in the lower-placed
devices. Damages for the cleating/locking devices located at the centre were 4 times more
common than damages in the outer devices.
Hinges placed low had 2.6 times more damages then hinges placed high.
20

4.5 Arms
Only two cases of damage in arms were found. These were found on the same ship and on the
same occasion (See Section 4.6).
As mentioned before, it has not been possible to establish how many of the ships that have
their doors hinged to arms. An estimate is that approximately 40-45% of the ships in this
analysis have this arrangement. It would then mean that one out of 16 ships with arms have
suffered damages in an arm.

4.6 Severity of the Damage Cases


Most of the damage occasions in this analysis were of minor severity and represented no
danger for the ship, the passengers or the crew, except in two cases.
In one case, after a voyage in heavy
weather, one of the bow-doors on a
vessel was difficult to close. The
reason was found to be a large crack
in the port-side arm. The crack had
progressed from the fore upper part of
the arm, started in what seemed to be
a bad weld, and progressed in the
upper plate and down on the sides. A
small crack was also found in the
transition between the eye for the
upper pin in the hinge and the top
plate of the arm.
Photo 4.5. Crack in a bow-door arm.
It was found that if the arm had cracked off completely, the bow-door would probably have
been lost at sea, as the arm was a part of the locking arrangement. The redundancy regarding
the locking arrangements for keeping the doors in a closed position was in this case
inadequate.
In the second case, a vessel in extreme heavy weather suffered damage to the collision
bulkhead in the region of the bow-doors lower hinge horizontal bracket. The damage resulted
in flooding of the area between the outer bow clam doors and the inner watertight ramp
through ingress of water via the clam doors top horizontal joint. In view of the water ingress
and associated electrical equipment problems, the voyage was terminated and the vessel
returned to port.

21

5. Identified Problems - Items to Analyse


From the previous chapters the following five items were found requiring further analysis:
1. Fractures and Cracks (Chapter 6)
In Chapter 4, Structural Damage Analysis of Bow-Doors, fractures and cracks were found
to dominate as the cause of damage. As such, it is vital to find the cause of the development of
cracks in order to be able to prevent or reduce them.
2. Load Distribution on Bow-Door Supports (Chapter 7)
From Part 3.5, Incidents and damages, it was found that supports are sometimes pushed in,
especially bottom supports.
According to the rules, the design external forces are to be applied at the centroid of the
projected areas and the doors are assumed to be rigid bodies. The reaction forces can then be
distributed uniformly on the effective securing and supporting devices, irrespective of where
they are positioned.
In reality, the door flexibility will alter the force distribution on the supports and a real
pressure distribution will subject the lower parts of the doors, and their supports, to much
larger forces than the upper parts and their supports.
The design rules for the dimensioning of the supports needs to be analysed regarding the
influence of the hull flexibility and the real pressure distribution.
3. Gaps between the plates of supports (Chapter 7.4.3)
Bow-door supports are often not cleated steel to steel, or with a play of maximum 3mm
according to IACS S8.6.1 a, against the corresponding supports in the hull. This will affect the
load distribution on the supports.
4. Stress and Fatigue Analysis of a Bow-Door Arm (Chapter 8)
In one case, described in Section 4.6, Severity of the Damage Cases, a large crack was
found in a bow-door arm. If the arm had cracked off completely, the bow-door would
probably have been lost at sea, as the arm was a part of the locking arrangement.
To investigate if arms can be a part of the supporting- and locking arrangement, an analysis of
a bow-door arm has been made.
5. The rules for the hull structure around the doors.
There are no special rules for the bow-hull structure depending on the size of the doors.
If the speed of ships increases in the future, the ships will become more slender. This would
require longer bow-doors to be able to have the same lane-width through the bow. The rules
for the hull structure around the doors might then be inadequate. This ought to be analysed.
Of these, items 1, 2, 3, 4 are analysed below.
Items 5 remain to be analysed.

22

6. Fractures and Cracks


6.1 Fatigue or Overloads
In Chapter 4, Structural Damage Analysis of Bow-Doors, fractures and cracks were the
cause, or partly the cause, of 99 damages, or in 70% of all 141 damages.
In order to investigate what normally causes the fractures and cracks to develop, if they are
due to occasional overloads, fatigue, or both, all the fractures and cracks found in the analysis
are represented in Diagram 6.1, showing the damage distribution over the ships age.

Number of Fractures/Cracks

14

12

10

0
1

11

13

15

17

19

21

23

25

27

29

31

Ship Age (Years)

Diagram 6.1. Distribution of Fracture/


Crack damages over the ships age.

In order to compensate for the misrepresentation we


give the older damages a higher weight. The
abstraction is to consider all ships to have reached an
age of 30 years and re-calculate the numbers of
damages from the relations we have in diagram 6.1.
The more representative damage distribution is shown
in Diagram 6.2.

60

Number of Fractures/Cracks

Diagram 6.1, however, gives a distorted picture, since


the average age of the ships in the analysis is 14.7
years, i.e., about half of the ships have not reached an
age of 14.7 years. The number of damages for the
lower ship ages in the diagram are therefore
overrepresented, since more ships have reached this
age, compared to the number of damages for higher
ship ages that fewer ships have reached.
The number of damages in the diagram will in reality
be increasingly higher with the age of the ships.

50

40

30

20

10

0
1

11

13

15

17

19

21

23

25

27

29

31

Ship Age (Years)

Diagram 6.2. Modified distribution of


Fracture/Crack damages over the ships age.
For example, we have 3 damages at a ship age of 25 years (diagram 6.1). In Diagram 4.1, we
find that 8 ships have reached this age while 30 ships have not. To find the relevant
proportional value, we apply the relation between the 3 damages and the 8 ships to all 38
ships:

3
x38 = 14 damages
8
This is the relevant proportional value for the number of damages at age 25, considering all
ships to have reached this age.
As can be seen in Diagram 6.2, the number of damages has increased with the ships age and
are, especially for higher ship ages, much higher then in Diagram 6.1.

23

Summing up all damages for the first 10 years of age, for the age between 11-20 years and
between 21-30 years, the diagram will be as follows:

FRACTURES / CRACKS

Number of Fractures/Cracks

250

220.9
200

150

100

50

45.8

1 - 10

38.8
11 - 20

21 - 30

Ship Age (Years)

Diagram 6.3. Modified distribution of Fracture/Crack


damages over the ships age (10-year periods).

The first 10-year period shows somewhat more damages than the second, 11-20 year period.
One possible explanation could be initial faults in the construction, such as bad welds,
construction errors or even poor design. These kinds of damages will be discovered and
repaired in the ships early years. The number of damages would subsequently decline, as it
does in the next period between 11-20 years.
For the last 10-year period there are several times more damages found than for the earlier
two periods.
A filled line has been drawn through the columns in the diagram, illustrating how the
damages would occur.
If the cause of the fractures and cracks were due to random overloads, the distribution of the
damages would follow a straight increasing line, as the dotted line in the diagram shows, or at
least look something like that. The solid line, however, does not follow this line at all. Instead,
the line goes up in the first period, down in the second and increases thereafter rapidly in the
last period. This suggests fatigue to be a major cause for the development of fractures and
cracks.
It is of course difficult, from this analysis, to say how large a share fatigue has, or how large a
share overloads has, concerning the development of fractures and cracks. Most certainly both
fatigue and overloads are to blame, probably combined in many cases, but we can definitely
conclude that fatigue is a major cause of the development of fractures and cracks in bow-door
systems.

24

6.2 High- or Low-Cycle Fatigue


In this Section, we will try to analyse what the main cause of the development of cracks in the
main parts is, if it is due to high or low-cycle fatigue.
Here fatigue is referred to as crack growth. This does not mean that there will be a fatigue
failure during the ships lifetime, but merely that the stress ranges are large enough to grow
cracks.
Fatigue occurs in spots where the stress ranges are high, so called hot spots. These hot spots
are normally found at sharp edges and corners, often in welds. When fatigue in the following
is mentioned, it is assumed to be in spots like these.
Many small stress ranges over a long time can give rise to high-cycle fatigue, i.e., the crack
growth for each cycle is small and a large number of cycles are needed to cause a fatigue
failure. For our material, several million cycles are needed generally.
Large stress ranges can give rise to low-cycle fatigue, i.e., the crack growth for each cycle is
larger than for small stress ranges and fatigue failure occurs already within 100,000 cycles for
our material.
In bow-door systems, both small and large stress ranges occur giving rise to both high and
low-cycle fatigue.
The following events subject bow-door systems to loads:
Waves
Flare slamming
Opening/closing
Loading/unloading
Thrusters
Waves
The loads that the waves give rise to in a bow-door system, as well as in other ship hull
structures, are mainly due to the bending and twisting of the ship when moving in the waves.
A ship meets approximately 100,000,000 waves during its lifetime. If we calculate with a
ships lifetime of 30 years, the ship will encounter approximately 3,000,000 waves a year.
This will induce a large number of stress cycles. These stress cycles will, however, only give
rise to small stress ranges [1] and can thereby only cause high-cycle fatigue in some areas.
Very large waves can cause large stress ranges but the number of these are small during a
ships lifetime.
Flare slamming
Flare slamming occurs rarely. Occasionally a ship is subjected to flare slamming, but when
this happens, the ships speed and/or heading is changed to avoid it. A RoRo-ferry is in
average subjected to approximately 100 flare slamming occasions a year [2]. Flare slamming
can gives rise to direct overloads, i.e., yielding of the material, and large stress ranges (lowcycle fatigue) [1].

25

Opening/closing
During opening and closing of the doors, large stress ranges occur in hinges and arms, see
Chapter 8, Stress and Fatigue Analysis of a Bow-Door Arm. This causes low-cycle fatigue.
Since doors in general are opened and closed only 1/2 - 2 times a day, the number of these
cycles is low.
Loading/unloading
Loading and unloading will generally not give rise to fatigue in any of the main parts, see
Chapter 8.
Thrusters
When the thrusters are running, they often cause the whole bow of the ship to vibrate,
especially if the ship is moving at the same time at which the flow through the thruster tunnels
will be disturbed. In normal cases, this will only induce small stress ranges (Chapter 8), which
can cause high-cycle fatigue, but it will affect all parts and the number of these cycles is quite
high, between 1.5 15 million cycles a year depending on how often a ship enters a harbour.
The load cases described here will affect the main parts differently.
Table 6.4 shows how these load cases mainly can affect the main parts regarding high and
low-cycle fatigue. There will of course be exceptions, since all bow-door designs are
different.
Small stress ranges might give rise to high-cycle fatigue, marked High in the table.
Large stress ranges might give rise to low-cycle fatigue and are consequently marked Low
in the table.

Load cases

Number of
Cycles/Year

High-, Low-Cycle Fatigue


Door

Hull

Waves

Large

High

High

Cleating/
Locking
High

Hinge

Arm

Flare slamming

Small

Low

Low

Low

Opening/closing

Small

Low

Low

Low

Loading/unloading

Large

Thruster

Large

High

High

High

High

High

Table 6.4.Type of fatigue the load cases mainly can cause in each main part.

26

Below, diagrams for damages due to fractures and cracks have been made for each main part
(except Arm) recalculated and summarised for each 10-year period as before.
Door and Hull
HULL

DOOR

45.6

50

140

120.2
Number of Damages

Number of Damages

120
100
80
60
40
20

45

11.9

12.6

1 - 10

11 - 20

40
35
30
25
20
15
10

11.9

5
0

7.6

21 - 30

Ship Age (Years)

Diagram 6.5. Modified distribution of


Fracture/Crack damages on Doors over
the ships age (10-year periods).

1 - 10

11 - 20

21 - 30

Ship Age (Years)

Diagram 6.6. Modified distribution of


Fracture/Crack damages on Hulls over
the ships age (10-year periods).

As can be seen in table 6.4, doors and hulls can normally only be subjected to low-cycle
fatigue at flare slamming, for which the numbers of cycles per year are low. The load cases
loading/unloading and opening/closing will not affect the door and the hull, but the load
cases waves and thrusters can give rise to a large number of high-fatigue cycles.
In Diagrams 6.5 and 6.6, the first two 10-year periods have about the same number of
damages but during the last period, the number increases rapidly.
During the last period, between 20-30 years, the ships would have been subjected to more
than 100 million high-fatigue cycles, but only a few thousand low-fatigue cycles. If a few
thousand low-fatigue cycles had been the main reason for the development of the cracks,
these stress cycles have more or less to be overloads, as there are so few of them. The cracks
would in this case been distributed more evenly over time.
This indicates that high-cycle fatigue is the main cause for the development of cracks in doors
and hull. Nevertheless, low-cycle fatigue contributes and can be the main reason for the
cracks in the first two periods and for some of the cracks in the third period. The large
increase of cracks in the last period is, however, due to high-cycle fatigue.
As can be seen in Diagrams 6.5 and 6.6, doors have a much higher number of damages in the
last period compared to hull. A probable explanation for this is that hulls are stiffer than doors
and thus not subjected to as large stress ranges as doors are.

27

Cleating/Locking devices
CLEATING/LOCKING
20

18.6
18.6

Number of Damages

18
16
14
12

8.6

10
8

2.5

6
4
2
0

1 - 10

11 - 20

21 - 30

Ship Age (Years)

Cleating/locking devices can be subjected to lowcycle fatigue both from flare slamming, and from
opening/closing. The number of cycles they induce
is, however, low. Waves and thrusters will
induce a large number of high-fatigue cycles.
Loading and unloading will not affect
cleating/locking devices at all.
Of the 18.6 fracture/cracks (recalculated value) in
the first 10 year period (diagram 6.7), 17.6 were
found in four sister ships.

Diagram 6.7. Modified distribution of


Fracture/Crack damages on Cleating/Locking
devices over the ships age (10-year periods).

Three cracks were found in each ship, all at the same location, when the ships were between
7-9 years old. The cause of these cracks was obviously a design error. Removing these cases,
only one fracture/crack would remain in the first period. In the second period, we have 2.5
fractures/cracks and in the last period, 8.6 fractures/cracks. There would now be quite a linear
increase of cracks over time, suggesting that high-cycle fatigue not is a major cause of the
development of cracks in cleating/locking devices. The low number of fractures/cracks found
indicates that random overloads and possible low-cycle fatigue is the cause of the fractures
and cracks.
Hinge
HINGE

46.6

50

Number of Damages

45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10

6.6

7.0

5
0

1 - 10

11 -- 20

21 - 30

Ship Age (Years)

Diagram 6.8. Modified distribution of


Fracture/Crack damages on Hinges
over the ships age (10-year periods).

The load cases opening/closing and thrusters can


affect hinges. The opening/closing event will give
rise to a few but very large stress cycles each time
the doors are opened and closed. This will cause
low-cycle fatigue. The number of these cycles is
low per year and several years are needed for
cracks to develop. In diagram 6.8 we have about
the same number of fractures/cracks in the first
two 10-year periods and a several times higher
number of fractures/cracks in the last period.
This indicates that low-cycle fatigue due to the
opening/closing event is the main cause of the
development of cracks in hinges, although the
load case thruster will contribute.

Arms
Arms will mostly be affected by the load cases: opening/closing and thrusters. Loading/
unloading, waves and slamming will not affect the arms very much, as long as they are
connected to the hull and to the door via a jointed coupling, which most of them are. Thrusters
will, in normal cases, induce high-cycle fatigue but can, as shown in Chapter 8, excite the arm
into resonance cycling, causing large stress ranges and thereby low-cycle fatigue. During each
opening and closing, the arms will be subjected to very large stress cycles, especially in the
attachments. The numbers of these are, however, few and they will generally not be able to
cause a fatigue failure during the ships lifetime.
28

7. Load Distribution on Bow-Door Supports


7.1 Introduction
The Unified Requirement S8 [5], developed by the International Association of Classification
Societies, describes criteria for the strength of bow-doors. In this work these rules are
assessed regarding the design load and the required strength of the supports on side opening
bow-doors. The analysis has been carried out with finite-element calculation of the bow-door
of an existing car-passenger ferry.
The purpose of the analysis is to investigate the effect that the door-flexibility has on the load
distribution between the supports and the effect that real pressure values and pressure
distributions have on the load distribution between the supports.
The analysis has been carried out according to the following steps:
1. A calculation of the required strength of the supports was performed, following the
simple rigid-body approach prescribed by the IACS S8 rules.
2. The required strength was compared to a direct calculation, as proposed by IACS S8,
in the form of a finite-element calculation, where the effect of the door-flexibility is
assessed regarding the distribution of the loads on the supports.
3. In the third step, the finite-element calculation is compared to a calculation based on
real pressure values and distributions recorded onboard.
The hull is assumed as being rigid. The effects caused by deformation of the hull and its
interaction with the door have therefore been disregarded.
All calculations performed have been static linear FE-calculations.
This simplified approach will answer our question; if the rules of IACS S8.6, regarding
dimensioning of the supports, are adequate. For a more thorough analysis, the hull flexibility
should be included, a dynamic load should be used and a transient analysis ought to be made.
The simulation model is prepared in the CAD-program Pro/Engineer and the FE-calculations
are made in Pro/Mechanica. These are commercial software programmes for design and
finite-element simulations. The geometry is taken from the original construction drawings and
the model is made with shell and beam elements.
This work can only show how far the rules are suitable for the one design analysed. However,
if the rules are not appropriate for each individual case, they lose their legitimacy.

29

7.2 Rules
For the first two steps, the rigid-body assumption and the direct calculation, the design
external pressure that is to be applied on the projected areas, are calculated according to IACS
S8.3 (see Section 3.4.2).
The arrangement and strength of supporting devices is to be designed with redundancy so that
in the event of failure of any single supporting device, the remaining devices are capable of
withstanding the reaction forces without exceeding by more than 20 per cent the permissible
stresses (S8.6.2).
The reaction forces applied on the effective supporting devices are to be determined for the
following combination of external loads acting simultaneously together with the self-weight
of the door (S8.6.2c):
Load case 1: Symmetric load case
The first load case is a symmetric load case, i.e., the load acts on both doors simultaneously.
Load case 2: Asymmetric load case
The second load case represents an asymmetric load case in which the doors cannot support
each other. The supports F1-F3 (see Figure 7.1), transferring loads between the doors, cannot
be considered here. In this load case, only 70% of the design load is to be applied.
The reaction forces from these load cases yield the minimum required strength of the
supports.

30

7.3 Required Strength of the Supports according to IACS S8


Step one: A calculation of the required strength of the supports, following the simple rigidbody approach prescribed by the IACS S8 rules.
In IACS rule S8.6, prescribing the calculation of the required strength of the supports, the
door is assumed as being a rigid-body. The design external forces are applied at the centroid
of the projected areas and the reaction forces are distributed uniformly on the effective
supporting devices, irrespective of positioning, i.e., the total reaction force is distributed
equally over all supports.
Only the active supporting devices having an effective stiffness in the relevant direction are to
be included when calculating the reaction forces acting on the devices.
The supports of the bow-door are located as indicated in Figure 7.1. Even though the supports
are not aligned to the main coordinate system, in this simple calculation a support can only be
assumed as being rigid/not rigid along orthogonal coordinate directions. In Table 7.2, the
constraints are shown, i.e., the active supporting devices in the relevant direction, and in
figure 7.1 they are visualized.

x, longitudinal direction
y, transverse direction
z, vertical direction

Figure 7.1. Supports with orthogonal constraints (dots) and degrees of freedom (arrows).
Constrained
Direction
x
y
z

A
X

B
X

D1

X
X

X
X

Support
E
F1
X
X

Total
F2

F3

G
X
X
X

2
6
4

Table 7.2. Constrained degrees of freedom for the supports.


31

The design external pressure to be applied on the projected areas, calculated according to
IACS S8.3, is 166.4 kN/m2.
The design loads to be applied on the projected areas, shown in Table 7.3, are calculated by
multiplying the design external pressure with the projected areas.
Projected area
Design load (kN)

x
y
z
5431 8379 7678

Table 7.3. Design loads for the projected areas.


In Table, 7.4, the loads that the supports are required to take - including redundancy - are
shown.
Support

Direction
x
-y
-z
A
0
1397
0
B
4526
0
0
C
0
1397
0
D
0
1397
2284
D1
0
1397
2284
E
0
1397
2284
F1
0
1397
0
F2
0
1397
0
F3
0
1397
0
G
4526
1397
2284
Table 7.4. Required strength (kN) of the supports,
according to the rigid-body assumption.
In Figures, 7.6 and 7.11, the resulting minimum required strength of the supports is shown as
grey lines.

32

7.4 Required Strength according to the Finite-Element Calculation


Step two: The required strength is compared to a direct calculation, as proposed by IACS S8,
in the form of a finite-element calculation, where the effect of the door-flexibility is assessed
regarding the distribution of the loads on the supports.
In the rule S8.6.2e, a direct calculation, with respect to the flexibility of the hull structure and
the actual position and stiffness of the supports, is proposed in order to determine the required
strength of supports and securing devices.
7.4.1 Loads and constraints
The design pressure, Pe = 166.4 kPa as calculated in section 7.3, was applied uniformly to the
door model.
As the rules demands, a symmetric load case in which the bow-doors can support each other
and an asymmetric load case, with the reduced design pressure 0.7 Pe, in which the bow-door
is considered on its own, have been performed. In both cases, the self-weight of the door is
applied and the redundancy tests were carried out in addition to the intact load cases.

Failure redundancy - successive removal of supports


For the redundancy calculations, every single support are removed successively, i.e., the door
is allowed to move freely at the point of the removed support. This is done for the symmetric
case as well as for the asymmetric case. The other supports must be able to take the load of
the removed support without any of them being stressed by more than 120% of their design
strength.
Supports
The directions, in which the supports in reality transfer loads are different from the
assumptions from section 7.2, where only the supports having effective stiffness along
orthogonal coordinate directions are to be included. The O in Table 7.5 shows the additional
directions in which the supports in reality transfer loads, based on their geometry.
Constrained
Direction
X
Y
Z

A
X
O

B
X
O

D1

X
O

X
X

X
X

Support
E
F1
X
X

Total
F2

F3

G
X
X
X

2
6
7

Table 7.5. Constrained degrees of freedom for the supports in the FE-calculations.
All the supports are modelled as point constraints. Point constraints result in high local
stresses and therefore deformations. Thus, the supports are softer than they would be in
reality. This error causes a more uniform distribution of forces over the supports and is
therefore favourable to the rules.
Vertical movement of support G
Especially the vertical direction of the top support on the centreline (in this work Support G)
is often not constrained in simulations, as the deck above the bow-door has a much lower
stiffness than the tank top. Other supports are then assumed to take the forces in a vertical
direction. However, the superstructure of the ship analysed in this work reaches over the
position of the bow-door, presumably making the area over the Support G a lot stronger than
on other ships. Therefore, constraining Support G in all three directions is appropriate.
33

7.4.2 FE-calculation verses rigid-body assumption


The FE-calculations are carried out applying the design pressure and the load cases stated in
section 7.2. Altogether 19 simulations are necessary, 2 intact and 17 failure redundancy tests.
In each failure redundancy test, one support is assumed to fail. The obtained reaction forces
from these load cases yield the minimum required strength of the supports.

The reaction forces obtained by the FE-calculations are compared to the required strength
according to the rigid-body assumption in Figure 7.6. The load cases describing failure of
Support G is specially marked in dark grey, since the stress for these cases is extreme.
For cases where the door is fully supported, the reaction forces for the symmetric load case
are shown as black lines and for the asymmetric load case with dotted black lines.
6000
5000
4000
3000

F [kN]

2000
1000
0
-1000
-2000
Required strength according to IACS S8
Range of reaction forces without failure in G
Range of reaction forces with failure in G
Symmetric reaction forces at fully supported door
Asymmetric reaction forces at fully supported door

-3000
-4000
-5000

D1

Support (x-direction)

Figure 7.6 a. Ranges of reaction forces [kN] of the FE-calculations in the x-direction, taking
all failure cases into account.
7000
6000
5000
4000
3000

F [kN]

2000
1000
0
-1000
-2000

Required strength according to IACS S8


Range of reaction forces without failure in G
Range of reaction forces with failure in G
Symmetric reaction forces at fully supported door
Asymmetric reaction forces at fully supported door

-3000
-4000
-5000

D1

F1

F2

F3

Support (y-direction)

Figure 7.6 b. Ranges of reaction forces [kN] of the FE-calculations in the y-direction, taking
all failure cases into account.

34

14000
12000
10000

Required strength according to IACS S8


Range of reaction forces without failure in G
Range of reaction forces with failure in G
Symmetric reaction forces at fully supported door
Asymmetric reaction forces at fully supported door

8000

F [kN]

6000
4000
2000
0
-2000
-4000
-6000
A

D1

Support (z-direction)

Figure 7.6 c. Ranges of reaction forces [kN] of the FE-calculations in the z-direction, taking
all failure cases into account.
Positive reaction forces imply pressure on the support while negative values imply tension.
The supports themselves cannot take tension, as they are realized as plate bearings. Therefore,
locking devices become necessary where negative forces occur. An exception to this is the zdirection of the supports A, B and C, situated at the bottom of the door. Due to their
geometry, they can transfer both positive and negative forces in the z-direction to a certain
extent.
It can clearly be seen that the distribution of forces over the supports is a long way from being
uniform. The forces do not only vary in wide ranges, they also have different signs. The cause
for this is the doors deformation. Even with the door fully supported, negative forces can be
found in the x-direction for Support G for the asymmetric load case and in the y-direction for
Support D for the symmetric load case.
In the rigid-body approach, only the active supporting devices having an effective stiffness in
the relevant orthogonal coordinate direction are to be included when calculating the reaction
forces acting on the devices. The supports that are not to be included, but in reality transfer
loads, are in this approach not dimensioned for it.
The loads when omitting failure of Support G
Special notice should be taken to Supports D and D1:
- They are assumed not to take any forces in the x-direction, since their direction of
possible displacement is mainly in the x-direction. However, the calculation reveals
that they take a great share of the forces in the x-direction. If, on the other hand, they
were to be taken into account for the simple calculation, this would lead to a required
strength of 1509kN according to IACS S8. The maximum load on support D is almost
twice that high.
- They are loaded with large negative forces in several of the redundancy cases. This
means that locking devices are necessary to prevent the door from moving outboard.
Even Support E has to stand some tension in the x-, and y-direction; this also calls for locking
devices.
35

It has to be checked, whether or not the strength of the locking devices according to the rules
is high enough to stand this tension.
The result shows that assuming the bow-door as a rigid-body and distributing the forces
equally between the supports, as prescribed by the IACS S8, is an approach that leads to
inadequate results.
Failure of Support G
Even though the door formally fulfils the redundancy criteria, because of its geometry, a
failure of Support G could cause massive overloads on the other supports. With the given
positions of the supports, especially Supports D and D1, but also Support B would have to be
equipped with massive securing devices in order to prevent the door from moving away at
these points.

7.4.3 Gaps between the supports


The bow-door is a very stiff construction. Table 7.7 shows the magnitude of the displacement
at each support after removing its constraints in the redundancy calculations. It shows how
much the door would give in at the point of the support after the support has failed.
Removed Support

A
B
C
D
D1
E
F1 F2 F3
G
Loadcase 1 7.7 1.0 11.8 9.2 12.8 9.7 1.8 3.5 7.0 32.2
Loadcase 2 4.3 3.5 12.4 5.9 11.0 6.3
279.5
Table 7.7. Displacement [mm] at removed supports in redundancy calculations.
The values are very low, compared to the average accuracy of welded structures of this size.
If the gap between the two plates of a support is higher than the value in the table, the support
is not able to take any forces, since the two plates can never make contact. The force then has
to be taken by other supports, of which some then might be stressed up to their redundancy
strength. If more than one support never makes contact, other supports can be overloaded.
According to the rules, the gap between supports is not to exceed 3mm. In reality, this is
difficult to achieve and even larger gaps than the above are common on ships [1].
These gaps are, most certainly, what affect the load distribution on the supports to the greatest
degree.
As all the supports in the FE-model are built with no gaps, and therefore assure a good
distribution of the forces, the maximum forces on the supports on the real door are likely to be
even higher than the simulated ones.
The hulls flexibility has not been modelled. This flexibility could reduce some of the
maximum forces.

36

7.5 Application of a Measured Pressure Event


Step three: The finite-element calculation is compared to a calculation based on real pressure
values and distributions recorded onboard.
Long-term pressure measurements [6] were carried out on the ship while it was operating its
usual route. The maximum pressure event from these measurements, a flare slamming load,
was applied to the bow-door model in order to test the sufficiency of the rules.
7.5.1 Pressure data
The pressure was measured at nine points on the starboard door, as depicted in Figure 7.8.
The sensors were placed at three different heights with three sensors each.

Figure 7.8. Positions of


the pressure transducers
P1-P9 and the areas
over which the pressure
is interpolated (view
from starboard).

The signals used from the pressure transducers were 10 Hz low-pass filtered pressure signals.
These pressure signals are, for our purposes, considered representative as pressure on the
bow-door since they reduce the local high-pressure peaks, which are not relevant to the larger
structural members. This is because the energy is small in pressure peaks of high frequency.
This energy will be absorbed, or damped out, locally in the doors plates and will thus not
affect the supports.
The measured average load is about the same as the design load, somewhat higher in the ydirection and a bit lower in the x-, and z-direction (see Table 7.9).

Measured Load
Design Load Case 1
Measured Load per Design Load

Direction
x
-y
-z
4451 kN 8684 kN 7232 kN
5431 kN 8378 kN 7678 kN
82 %
104 %
94 %

Table 7.9. Total load according to measurement compared with the design load.

37

For the event used in the calculations, the measured pressure signals are as in Table 7.10.
The highest pressure found is at the lower parts of the door, especially in the middle and aft
areas, P1-P3 and P6. The upper parts are not exposed to any pressure at all.
For this bow-door, a design pressure of 166.4 kN is to be applied according to IACS S8. In
areas P1-P3 and P6, this pressure is exceeded, in area P2 by more then 3 times.
P9 =
0
P6 = 227.7
P3 = 263.6

P8 =
0
P5 = 95.9
P2 = 524.9

P7 =
0
P4 = 95.1
P1 = 180.0

Table 7.10. 10 Hz filtered pressure signals [kPa] at the


measuring points during the maximum pressure event.

7.5.2 Resultant forces to a measured pressure event


The measured pressure was applied to the model, thus taking both the doors flexibility and a
real pressure distribution into account. The model was in a fully supported mode.
During the measurements, the pressure was measured on the starboard side only. It is
therefore not known whether or not the maximum pressure event was symmetric or
asymmetric.
Because of this, two FE-calculations are carried out. One, assuming the event to be
symmetric, i.e., Supports F1-F3 are rigid in the y-direction, and the other assuming the event
to be asymmetric, i.e., Supports F1-F3 are free. The pressure was not reduced for the
asymmetric load case.

The reaction forces obtained are in Figure 7.11 compared to the required strength according to
the prescribed rigid-body assumption and the proposed FE-calculation, including failure of
Support G.
6000
5000
4000
3000

F [kN]

2000
1000
0
-1000
-2000

Required strength according to IACS S8


Required strength according to FEM
Symmetric reaction forces at fully supported door
Asymmetric reaction forces at fully supported door
Reaction forces to symmetric pressure event
Reaction forces to asymmetric pressure event

-3000
-4000
-5000

D1

Support (x-direction)

Figure 7.11 a. Reaction forces [kN] from the real pressure event, compared to the required
strength according to IACS S8 and to the FE-calculation in the x-direction.

38

7000
6000
5000
4000
3000

F [kN]

2000
1000
0
-1000

Required strength according to IACS S8


-2000

Required strength according to FEM

-3000

Symmetric reaction forces at fully supported door


Asymmetric reaction forces at fully supported door
Reaction forces to symmetric pressure event

-4000

Reaction forces to asymmetric pressure event


-5000
C

D1

F1

F2

F3

Support (y-direction)

Figure 7.11 b. Reaction forces [kN] from the real pressure event, compared to the required
strength according to IACS S8 and to the FE-calculation in the y-direction.

14000
Required strength according to IACS S8
Required strength according to FEM
Symmetric reaction forces at fully supported door
Asymmetric reaction forces at fully supported door
Reaction forces to symmetric pressure event
Reaction forces to asymmetric pressure event

12000
10000
8000

F [kN]

6000
4000
2000
0
-2000
-4000
-6000

D1

Support (z-direction)

Figure 7.11 c. Reaction forces [kN] from the real pressure event, compared to the required
strength according to IACS S8 and to the FE-calculation in the z-direction.
For the FE-calculations with the door fully supported, the required strength - according to the
FE-calculations - is shown with black solid lines in Figure 7.11 for the symmetric load case
and with dotted black lines for the asymmetric load case. As the measured pressure was
applied to the model while fully supported, the symmetric and asymmetric reaction forces
should not exceed the respective lines.
39

As can be seen, the reaction forces for many of the supports exceed the required strength
according to the FE-calculations. For some of the supports, the loads are even higher than the
required redundancy strength according to the FE-calculations. In some cases, the reaction
force is negative, i.e., the supports will not take any forces at all and, instead, the locking
devices are called for.
The result shows that even a direct simulation, as proposed in IACS S8, with the design
pressure applied uniformly to the door model, cannot ensure the bow-door from becoming
overloaded in real sea conditions. The pressure distribution has also to be taken into account.

40

8. Stress and Fatigue Analysis of a Bow-Door Arm


8.1 Introduction
Measurements on one of the two arms on a ship have been made [7]. Strain measurements
(stress) were made at one point on the arm and acceleration measurements on the arm, the
door and on the hull. The measurements were carried out during loading and unloading of
vehicles, opening and closing of the bow-doors, when the bow-propellers were running (with
the doors closed) and at sea. Since the sea was, more or less, dead calm at the time of
measuring, the sea measurements showed low load levels. However, measurements have been
made earlier on the ship in question [6], among other things, for the acceleration of the bowdoors at sea, even during storms, and this information has been used here instead.
An FE-model was made of the arm and loaded in accordance with the measured stresses.
FE-calculations then gave the stress and the stress ranges in the whole arm for the different
load cases that the arm is subjected to. From this, areas subjected to fatigue were identified
and fatigue calculations were made for these areas.

CAD- and FEM-Program


The CAD-program, PRO-Engineer, and the FEM program, PRO-Mechanica, have been used
to model and analyse the arm.
PRO-Mechanica uses the p-method [8], which means that instead of refining and recreating
finer and finer meshes, convergence is obtained by increasing the order of the polynomials
while the mesh stays the same.
The restriction on element size and shape is not nearly as stringent for p-elements as they are
for h-elements, where concerns of aspect ratios, skewness etc, often arise.

41

8.2 Real Arm Verses the Model

Photo 8.1. Arm and bow-door.


The investigated arm, shown in photo 8.1, is mounted on a ship that is approximately 200
metres long and that traffics waters that occasionally are quite rough. The bow-doors are
opened and closed for the unloading and loading of vehicles every second day.
The arm is in the shape of an L and its main measurements are as shown in Figure 8.2 . In
the short end of the arm the door is hinged in four eye-plates. The long end of the arm is
hinged to the hull, also here in two eye-plates. The arms height increases towards the hullattachments as the bending moment there increases.
4379
(mm)
2100

2500
1510

Door
attachment
Eye-plates that carry
the vertical loads

Hull
attachment

Figure 8.2. CAD-model of the arm.


42

The second upper eye-plate carries the vertical load from the door. Two plates under each side
of the eye-plate support this eye-plate. All the four eye-plates carry the horizontal load.
At the attachment arm/hull, the second lowest eye-plate carries the vertical load. On top, the
eye-plate is supported by two plates on each side. All the four eye-plates carry the horizontal
load here also.
The plating is 8 mm thick everywhere in the arm, except for the end plate at the attachment
arm/hull where the thickness is 10 mm and at both sides of the same attachment, where 15
mm plates are inlaid. The eye-plates have a thickness of 40-50 mm at the arm/hull attachment
and 30 mm at the arm/door attachment.
The material in the arm is A36 and has the following properties:
Yield stress, y = 355 MPa
Ultimate stress, max = 510 MPa
The arms weight is 3.9 tons, including attachment devices, such as hinges etc.
The mass of the door is 26.5 tons.
To stiffen the arm there are transverse
plates and stiffeners inside the arm,
see figure 8.3.
The model is made according to
drawings. It is, however, modified
with measurements taken at a control
measuring, as it showed that the
measurements of the real arms and
the drawings differed in some areas.

Figure 8.3. Inner-structure of the arm.


The arm plates are welded together with double fillet welds, i.e., one weld on each side of the
connected plates. To be able to weld on both sides, the plates overlap each other. The weld
class used is weld class B (WB) for all welds in the arm.
In the model, welds have not been modelled and overlapping of the plates has not been done,
instead the plates connect edge to edge.
The arm model has been made with shell elements in order to bring down to an acceptable
level the number of equations needed to be solved. Shell elements work well for thin plates,
which the arm to most parts consist of.
Since the stress showed to be both large and complicated at the attachment arm/door, a submodel was made of this part with solid elements.
In this solid model, only the attachments for the arm/door and a smaller part of the arm have
been modelled, with the purpose of analysing the stress in the eye-plates and in the supporting
plates.

43

8.3 Load Cases


The dimensioning parameter at fatigue analysis of welded structures is the stress ranges that
the weld joints are subjected to [9]. The purpose of the measuring has, above all, been to find
out which stress ranges the arm is subjected to.
Measuring of the strain (stress) was made at one point on the arm for the different load
cases [7].
With the help of an FE-model of the arm and these measuring results, the stress and stress
ranges in the whole arm, could be established.
Measuring point

The loads that the arm is subjected to, can


be divided into the following load cases:
-

At sea
Loading/unloading
Opening/closing
Bow propeller

(door closed)
(door open)
(in between)
(door closed)

Figure 8.4. Measuring point.


Below, these load cases are described and the stress (von Mises) they give rise to, at the
measuring point, is shown in diagrams.

8.3.1 At sea
Earlier measurements [6] made on the ship showed that the acceleration on the foreship was
as its highest +4.5 m/s2 and -5 m/s2 at slamming in storm. This corresponds to a gravity of
+1.46 g and +0.49 g. The weather in the area can be even rougher than it was during this
measuring period, but the ships speed and course adjusts after the waves, and the foreship is
normally not subjected to higher accelerations than this.

In a closed position, the door rests on the bottom supports, and will not be able to affect the
arms downwards. Since there is no negative gravity, the door will not affect the arms upwards
either.
The frequencies of the accelerations at sea are low and one can assume that if the arm were
loaded with the corresponding g-forces, it would give the stress- increase/decrease in the arm
due to the accelerations. The stress difference between these two calculations should then
correspond to the highest stress range the arm is subjected to at sea.
FE-calculations have been made with the arm-model in a closed position, loaded with 1.46 g
and 0.49 g, respectively. This gave a maximum stress range of 0.41 MPa at the measuring
point.
The stress range is obviously small and, consequently, the ships motion at sea cannot cause
fatigue in the arms.

44

8.3.2 Loading/Unloading
During loading and unloading the hull is subjected to accelerations when vehicles drive
onboard or off the ship. The accelerations translate from the hull via the arms to the doors and
give rise to stress changes in the form of stress cycles with different stress amplitudes, i.e.,
stress ranges.
The stress ranges vary due to, among other things, the vehicles weight and speed. Vehicles
with hard rubber wheels give rise to higher accelerations, and thereby higher stress ranges,
than normal vehicles with air rubber wheels. Loading of a vehicle gives a somewhat higher
acceleration than unloading of the same.

Trucks with and without trailers


Diagram 8.5 shows the stress ranges (von Mises) at the measuring point when trucks with and
without trailers drive onboard the ship. The level of interference, or noise, in the measuring
system is about 0.4-0.5 MPa.
Numbers 1-6 in Diagram 8.5 show the
events when the following vehicles
drive onboard or off the ship:

[s]

1. Truck with trailer


2. Truck
3. Truck
4. Truck with trailer
5. Truck with trailer
6. Truck

(driving onboard)
(driving off)
(driving off)
(driving onboard)
(driving onboard)
(driving off)

Diagram 8.5. Trucks with and without trailers.


The diagram shows that the stress ranges (von Mises) are between 1.2-1.5 MPa when a truck
drives off the ship and 2.2-3.2 MPa when a truck with trailer drives onboard.
These are relatively small stress ranges. They should not be able to give rise to fatigue
anywhere in the arms.

45

8.3.3 Closing and opening

Closing
During the closing event of the door, strain measurements carried out on the arm showed that
the stress at the measuring point decreased by about 34 MPa, from 55.6 MPa (calculated
value) at the fully open position to 21.6 MPa at the fully closed position. This means that 21.6
MPa is locked into the arm, at the measuring point, in the closed position.
The stress in the arm is constant during manoeuvring of the door from the fully open position
until it reaches the hull and the supports (Figure 8.6). Here the door starts to be drawn up on
the bottom supports at which the stress increases. The reason is that only the bottom part of
the door is in contact with the supports in the hull, which results in a twisting moment in the
arm. The arm starts to get unloaded, and the stress starts to decrease, when the hooks begin to
cleat the door into the fully closed position.
The largest stress occurs just before the hooks starts to cleat the door.
Opening
The stress increases in the arm when the hooks open. When the door is pushed out and off
from the bottom supports, the stress first increases rapidly and thereafter starts to decrease
until it hangs freely where some large stress cycles occur (Figure 8.7). During the rest of the
opening event, to the fully open position, the stress is relatively constant.
The door starts to
be pushed out.

The door begins to


be pulled up on the
bottom supports.

The door goes of the bottom


supports and starts to hang freely.

The hooks start to


pull the door in.

Diagram 8.6. Closing event

Diagram 8.7. Opening event

At both the closing and the opening event, the largest half-stress range is 50 MPa. During
the measured events, there were a number of cycles with stress ranges in between 1-15 MPa
and some large cycles with stress ranges of 15-31 MPa.
Some of the stress ranges are quite large, but the number of these is small and during the
ships lifetime, the total number of these stress cycles will be relatively small.

46

8.4 Bow propellers


When the doors are closed and a ferry leaves the quay, and even in the harbour area and in
narrow passes, bow propellers, and sometimes even sideways-acting stern propellers, are used
to turn around and manoeuvre a ferry [2]. Normally, these are electrically driven. The bow
propellers are positioned under and just aft of the bow-doors and give rise to large vibrations,
especially in the foreship.
This ship has three sideways-acting propellers, two at the bow and one at the stern.
The sideways-acting propellers have adjustable propeller blades. They usually run at the
maximum operating speed (80% of maximum speed) and are computer-governed. The force
required from them at different occasions, is adjusted by altering the pitch of the propeller
blades. The rpm of the propeller will not be affected when the pitch of the blades changes. In
normal cases, both bow propellers and the stern propeller run at the same time and there is no
synchronization between them.
The propellers have four blades each and a diameter of 2,400 mm and run at a speed of about
212 rpm.
The vibrations are larger when the bow propellers are running in ice. The ship is then also
going forward or backward to be able to move in the ice.
Sometimes they are used to push away ice. The two bow propellers will then be running in
different directions.

47

Diagram 8.8. Stress at the measuring point while the bow propellers are running.
Diagram 8.8 shows von Mises stress at the measuring point in the arm when the bow
propellers are running and the ship leaves the quay.
As can be seen in Diagram 8.8, there are two occasions when the stress ranges are high,
between 300-370 seconds and 470-540 seconds. Apart from the large stress ranges of 9-18
MPa at the time 330 seconds, the stress ranges vary between 2-7 MPa at the measuring point,
with many cycles around 5 MPa.
Except for these two occasions, the measured stress is low, about 0.3 MPa.

[S]

Diagram 8.9. Acceleration in the hull while the bow propellers are running.
If we compare the stress in Diagram 8.8 to Diagram 8.9, showing the measured acceleration
in the hull during the same period, we find the acceleration in the hull to be only marginally
higher between 300-540 seconds. No acceleration peaks can be found at the same time as
during the two periods of high stresses found in Diagram 8.8. This indicates that the arm
could be subjected to resonance cycling.

48

In the Power Spectral Densities (PSD) diagram [7], for instance Diagram 8.10 showing the
power density as a function of the frequency of the arm for vertical motions, we find power
tops at the frequencies 6.8/7.5, 15.1 and 30.1 Hz. The frequencies at 7.5, 15.1 and 30.1 Hz are
multiples, which is typical for a forced vibration caused by a rotating device with some
unbalance. This unbalance is common for all propellers, which all have it in different degrees.

6.8/7.5 Hz

15.1 Hz

30.1 Hz

Diagram 8.10. Power Spectra Density (PSD) diagram of the arm for vertical motions.
A frequency analysis of different parts of the time history shows that in the parts with high
levels of strain (stress), the 30.1 Hz component is more dominating than in the time histories
with low levels. When the phase relationship between the two bow propellers is critical, the
arm vibrates at 30.1 Hz and at a rather high level, probably caused by resonance in the arm. If
the phase relationship is not critical, the motion is at a lower level but more complex and built
up by forced vibrations consisting of several frequency components [10].
The arms probably have a natural frequency at around 30 Hz. The two four-bladed,
unsynchronized bow propellers generate this frequency when they are running with a critical
phase relationship, causing resonance cycling in the arm.

49

The measured sequence in Diagram 8.8 is recorded when the ship leaves the quay. The ship
first started to back out, speed 5 knots with the bow propellers running, but with the blades
idle, i.e., without pitch. While backing, they started to turn the ship around with the bow
propellers (maximum pitch), during which large vibrations appeared in the ship until the ship
stood still, turning. While standing still and turning, there were no large vibrations. When they
had nearly turned around to the new course (they turned around nearly 180), they started to
go forward, during which large vibrations once more appeared until the bow propeller blades
were idle again. The forward speed was then 5 knots.
One theory is that when using the bow propellers with a large pitch on the blades, i.e., while
taking out effect from the bow propellers and at the same time moving forward or backwards,
the water flow through the bow propeller tunnels will be disturbed. This will cause the flow to
the bow propeller blades to differ, which causes unbalance in the propellers and large
vibrations as an effect. The disturbance frequency could then be: 3.8 x 2 x 4 = 30.1 Hz. (3.8
rotations per second for one propeller, 2 bow propellers, and 4 blades), corresponding to one
of the natural frequencies for the arm.

Disturbance

Figure 8.11. Flow through a bow propeller tunnel while going forward and turning with the
bow propeller.

Summary
The highest measured stress ranges for the different load cases are:

At sea (door closed)


Loading/unloading (door open)
Bow propellers (door closed)
Opening/closing

0.41 MPa,
3.2
7
50

The stress ranges for the load cases at sea and loading/unloading are very small and
probably cause no fatigue. Even for the case bow propellers, the stress ranges are normally
small, except when they excite the arm into resonance cycling, which causes large stress
cycles. At opening and closing, some stress ranges are very large, but the number of these
cycles are few.
Except for the case where the bow propellers excite the arm into resonance cycling, no other
load case is able to cause resonance in the arm.
50

8.5 Fatigue Analysis


For the fatigue analysis the Sheet Steel Handbook, Design and fabrication in high strength
steel [11] is referred to.
In the fatigue analysis, it was found that during loading and unloading and at sea, the
amplitude of the stress cycles is too small to cause fatigue in the arm.
During opening and closing, large stress ranges occur, which give rise to fatigue in several
areas, but the number of these cycles is too few during the ships lifetime to ever even come
close to give a fatigue fracture. In fact, the area subjected to most fatigue due to opening and
closing, the weld between the eye-plate carrying the vertical load from the door and one of its
support plates, has a life expectancy of 246 years with only 1% risk of failure.
Bow Propellers
The bow propellers do not give rise to fatigue under normal conditions. However, during
some situations, they excite the arms into resonance cycling. This gives rise to a large number
of high stress cycles, which the arms, of course, are not designed to withstand.
In two areas, between the eye-plate carrying the vertical load from the door and their support
plates, this results in a large degree of fatigue and risk of fatigue fracture. These areas are
shown in Figure 8.12 a,b.
The recorded sequence of the bow propellers running is during the turning of the ship 180 in
a harbour. This is done once a day. An estimate is then that the ship is subjected to one of the
measured sequence each day.
If this is true, the life expectancy in area 1 is very low, only about 4 years at 1% risk of
failure and 10 years at 50% risk. In area 2, the life expectancy is a bit higher, 14 years at 1%
risk of failure and 49 years at 50% risk.

Figure 8.12 a,b. Arm/door attachments (stress in the y-direction is shown).

51

9. Conclusions
Structural Damage Analysis of Bow-Doors
It is common with damages on bow-door systems, as about half of the ships in the damage
analysis have had reports of structural damages. The doors and the cleating/locking devices
had about 30% each of the found damages and the hinges and the hulls, about 20% each. The
arm had two reported damages.
General for all main parts is that fractures and cracks dominate as the cause of damage. In
most of these cases cracks in welds were involved.
Many of the cracks had developed due to poor detail design and construction, hard spots and
bad welding.
Damages on the doors occurred mostly in the aft parts. Between the upper and the lower parts
of the doors, no differences where found. For the hull, most damages occurred in the aft and
upper parts. Damages to the cleating/locking devices occurred mostly in the lower and centrepositioned devices. Hinges placed low had more damages then hinges placed high.
Most of the damage occasions in this analysis were of minor severity and represented no
danger for the ship, the passenger or the crew. However, on two occasions and for two
vessels, the damages led to severe incidents. Two, out of 38 ships, with an average age of 14.7
years, is a high proportion.
Fractures and Cracks
The distribution of fractures and cracks over the ships age showed for the last 10-year period,
between 20-30 years of age, a dramatic increase in damages. The damages were several times
larger than for the two previous periods, indicating fatigue to be a major cause for the
development of fractures and cracks.
In general, high-cycle fatigue appears to be the main cause of the development of cracks in
doors and hull.
For cleating/locking devices, high-cycle fatigue seems not to be the cause for the development
of cracks. Instead, overloads and possibly low-cycle fatigue, appear to be the reason.
For hinges, low-cycle fatigue due to the opening and closing event seems to be the main cause
for the development of cracks.
Arms seem rarely subjected to fractures and cracks, as there were only two fracture/cracks
found in one arm. In this case, the arm was rigidly attached to the door, which is a rare design
solution. However, arms can be excited to resonance cycling by the thrusters. This would
cause large stress cycles, which can result in a fatigue failure.

52

Load Distributions on Bow-Door Supports


Assuming the bow-door as a rigid-body and distributing the forces equally on each support, as
prescribed by the IACS S8, is an approach that leads to inadequate results.
The deformation of the door will cause the loads on the supports to differ greatly and
sometimes even cause negative forces, i.e., the loads have to be taken by the locking devices.
In the design rules, this has to be considered regarding dimensioning of the locking devices.
Even if a direct simulation is made, as proposed by IACS, with the design pressure applied
uniformly to the door model, it can still not ensure the bow-door from being overloaded in
real sea conditions. The pressure distribution also has to be taken into account, as it subjects
the lower supports to much higher loads then the upper ones.
Gaps Between the Plates of Supports
According to the rules, the gap between a support in the door and the corresponding support
in the hull is not to exceed 3mm. In reality, this is already at the construction level difficult to
achieve. In time, the doors become deformed causing even larger gaps between the supports.
Even larger gaps than 3mm are common on ships. These gaps will affect the load distribution
on the supports. If the gap between supports is too high, and we are talking about millimetres,
the supports are not able to take any forces, since the two plates can never make contact. The
forces then have to be taken by other supports, of which some then can be stressed up to their
limit strength, or their calculated redundancy strength. If more than one support has too large
a gap, some supports might be overloaded.
These gaps are, most certainly, what affect the load distribution on the supports to the greatest
degree.
Stress and Fatigue Analysis of a Bow-Door Arm
Most arms carry loads in the closed position. In most cases, they will unload the locking
devices to some degree. This might affect the way the doors are cleated and locked. A failure
of an arm could then affect the loads on the locking devices, and thereby the locking
arrangement.
In general, there does not seem to be any risk for fatigue in bow-door arms during loading and
unloading and while at sea, provided the door are locked in firmly and do not move at sea.
All arms, especially their attachments, are subjected to fatigue during opening and closing,
which causes large stress amplitudes, but the number of these stress cycles is generally too
small during the ships lifetime to be able to cause a fatigue fracture.
Bow propellers seem not to give rise to fatigue in arms under normal conditions. However, in
some situations the arms can be excited into resonance cycling by the bow propellers. This
will give rise to a large number of high-stress cycles that will cause fatigue in the arm, which
might cause fatigue fractures.
Except for this case, no other load case seems to be able to excite the arm into resonance
cycling.

53

10. Recommendations
10.1 Rule-Based Recommendations
Load Distributions on Bow-Door Supports
A new rule concerning the design load is called for. It has to consider the deformation of the
door and the hull and to satisfy the fact that the pressure on a bow-door is not distributed
uniformly.
To achieve this, one can demand a direct simulation of the doors.
If the rigid-body assumption is to be used even in the future, the design pressure for
dimensioning of the supports has to be raised. It has to be large enough to cope with the
unknown load distribution, due to deformation of the door and the hull. This new design
pressure should, however, not affect the stiffness of the door, as it does today. To raise the
stiffness of the door would result in an even stiffer construction, with an even worse load
distribution.
The design pressure must also be distributed in a way where it takes into account the peaks at
the bottom and aft parts of the doors.
Stress and Fatigue Analysis of a Bow-Door Arm
It should not be allowed to include the arms in the supporting or locking arrangement, unless
a resonance and fatigue analysis has been carried out, insuring the arms structural integrity.

10.2 Design-Based Recommendations


Fractures and Cracks
Many cracks can be prevented from arising if hot spots are avoided at detail designing and the
welds are properly made.
Gaps Between the Plates of Supports
One way of keeping the supports cleat steel to steel is to position the supports at, or close to,
pre-stressed cleating/locking devices and to have the door structure flexible enough to ensure
the supports to make contact after cleating/locking.
It is important not to make the doors too stiff. The doors should be able to deform in a way
where the supports can make contact.
Stress and Fatigue Analysis of a Bow-Door Arm
To avoid a possible fatigue failure of the arms, the designers have to check if the arms can be
excited into resonance cycling by the bow propellers.

54

11. Further Work


Load Distribution on Bow-Door Supports
In a more thorough analysis of the loads of bow-door supports, the hull should be part of the
model, to include its flexibility in the calculations, and the model should be loaded with a
dynamic load.
The natural frequencies of the bow-door structure are fairly low and are likely to be in a
range, where magnification of response is expected. A time domain analysis is proposed in
order to completely understand the effects of this type of load.
The Rules for the Hull Structure around the Doors
There are no special rules for the bow-hull structure depending on the size of the doors.
If the speed of the ships increases in the future, the ships will become more slender. This
would require longer bow-doors to be able to have the same lane-width through the bow. The
rules for the hull structure around the doors might then be inadequate.
Design for Maintenance and Inspection
The bow-doors of today are not designed with respect to maintenance and, especially, not to
inspection. This is a major drawback, especially for older ships, as damages can go
undiscovered. Ways to design for easier inspection and maintenance would therefore increase
the safety.

55

12. References
[1] Reference group 1
Hkan Torstensson, Professor
Hgskolan i Bors
School of Engineering
Erland Johnson, Ph.D.
Manager R&D
Swedish National Testing and Research Institute (SP), Bors
Building Technology and Mechanics
Gunnar Kjell, Ph.D.
Swedish National Testing and Research Institute (SP), Bors
Building Technology and Mechanics
Jan-Ove Carlsson,
General Manager
Conversion Department
MacGREGOR, RoRo Ship Division, Gothenburg
Pontus Dahlstrm, M.Sc. Naval Architect
Structural Analysis Manager
MacGREGOR, RoRo Ship Division, Gothenburg
Mikael Jogvall, M.Sc. Naval Architect
Steel Structural Engineer
TTS Ships Equipment AB, Gothenburg
Per Nordstrm, M.Sc. Naval Architect
Deputy Director of Marine Safety
Swedish Maritime Administration
Maritime Safety Inspectorate, Norrkping
Olle Thomsson, M.Sc. Tekn. Lic, Naval Architect
Lloyds Register, Gothenburg
Anders Ulfvarson, Professor
Department of Naval Architecture and Ocean Engineering
Chalmers University of Technology

56

[2] Reference group 2


Mats Berggren, M.Sc. Naval Architect
Senior Ship Surveyor
The Swedish Maritime Safety Inspectorate in Gothenburg
Jan Rosenblad, M.Sc. Naval Architect
Senior Ship Surveyor
The Swedish Maritime Safety Inspectorate in Gothenburg
Ralf-Erik Lindstrm, Master Mariner
Safety & Security Superintendent
Silja Line
Per-Eric Berglund, Captain
M/S Silja Serenade
Silja Line
Tobias Magnusson, Chief Officer
M/S Silja Symphony
Silja Line
Kaj Jansson
Tech. Manager
Viking Line
Frberg, Chief Engineer
M/S Cinderella
Viking Line
Rainer Enros, Chief Engineer
M/S Gabriella
Viking Line
Christer Schoug, M.Sc. Naval Architect
Newbuilding Manager
Stena RoRo
Per Westling, M.Sc. Naval Architect
Manager Project and Conversion
Stena RoRo
Hkan Gustavsson, Second Officer
Stena Jutlandica
Stena Line
Joacim Linder, M.Sc. Naval Architect
Design Responsible
MacGREGOR, RoRo Ship Division, Gothenburg

57

[3]

Karlsson U. Incidents and Damages of Bow-Doors


Department of Naval Architecture and Ocean Engineering, Chalmers University of
Technology, R-04 / 0084, Gteborg, Sweden, 2003.

[4]

The Joint Accident Investigation Commission of Estonia, Finland and Sweden (1997),
Final report on the capsizing on 28 September 1994 in the Baltic Sea of the RoRo
Passenger Vessel MV ESTONIA, 1997.

[5]

International Association of Classification Societies (IACS), Requirements concerning


Strength of Ships, S8 Bow-doors and inner doors 1982, Revision 3 Nov. 2003.

[6]

VTT Manufacturing Technology, The Bow-Door Wave Pressure Measurements of M/S


Symphony, Research Report VAL321-5037, 1995.

[7]

Kjell G. Johnson E. Karlsson U. Strain and Acceleration Measurements of a BowDoor Arm, Department of Naval Architecture and Ocean Engineering, Chalmers
University of Technology, R-04 / 0087, Gteborg, Sweden, 2003.

[8]

Toolgood R. Pro/MECHANICA Tutorial Structure


Schroff Development Corporation 2001. pp. 2(9-10)

[9]

sa Eriksson, Anna-Maria Lignell. Svetsutvrdering med FEM


Sveriges Verkstadsindustrier 2002. (Swedish)

[10] Andersson B, Axner Y. Ingenjrshandboken / Tekniska grundvetenskaper, 1953.


pp.76-106 (Swedish)
[11] Bergstrm U, Brottare I. Sheet Steel Handbook, Design and fabrication in high
strength steel, SSAB Tunnplt, 1996. pp. 64-90

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